At issue was the “royalty-free” use of intangible assets under an agreement whereby PepsiCo’s Singapore affiliate sold concentrate to Schweppes Australia, which then bottled and sold PepsiCo soft drinks for the Australian market. As no royalties were paid under the agreement, no withholding tax was paid in Australia. The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) determined that the payments for “concentrate” from Schweppes to PepsiCo had been misclassified and were in part royalty for the use of PepsiCo’s intangibles (trademarks, branding etc.), and an assessment was issued for FY2018 and FY2019 where withholding tax was determined on that basis. The assessment was issued under the Australian diverted profits tax provisions. The assessment was appealed to the Federal Court, which in November 2023 found in favour of the tax authorities. PepsiCo then appealed to the Full Federal Court. Judgment In a split decision, the Full Federal Court overturned the decision of the Federal Court and found in favour of PepsiCo. Excerpts “In summary, we conclude that the payments made by the Bottler to the Seller were for concentrate alone and did not include any component which was a royalty for the use of PepsiCo/SVC’s intellectual property. The payments were in no part made in ‘consideration for’ the use of that intellectual property and they did not therefore include a ‘royalty’ within the definition of that term in s 6(1) of the ITAA 1936. Further, the payments were received by the Seller on its own account and they cannot be said to have been paid to PepsiCo/SVC. The Commissioner’s attempts to bring PepsiCo/SVC to tax under s 128B(2B) therefore fails for two interrelated reasons: there was no ‘royalty’ as required by s 128B(2B)(b) and the payments made to the Seller by the Bottler cannot constitute ‘income derived’ by PepsiCo/SVC within the meaning of s 128(2B)(a).” “PepsiCo/SVC’s appeals in the royalty withholding tax proceedings should be allowed, the orders made by the trial judge set aside and in lieu thereof there should be orders setting aside the notices of assessment for royalty withholding tax. The Commissioner’s appeals in the Part IVA proceedings should be dismissed. PepsiCo/SVC should have their costs in both sets of appeals as taxed, assessed or otherwise agreed. The parties should bring in a minute of order giving effect to these conclusions within 14 days.” Click here for translation ...

ABD Limited is a South African telecommunications company with subsidiaries worldwide. These subsidiaries are operating companies, with local shareholders, but having ABD as a significant shareholder. ABD licences its intellectual property to these operating companies (referred to as Opcos) in return for which they pay ABD a royalty. The present case involves the royalty payments made by fourteen of the Opcos to ABD during the periods 2009 to 2012. ABD charged all of them the same royalty rate of 1% for the right to use its intellectual property. In 2011 ABD retained the services of a consultancy to advise it on what royalty it should charge its various Opcos.The consultancy procured research on the subject and then, informed by that, came up with the recommendation that a royalty of 1% could be justified. The tax authorities (SARS) found that a 1% royalty rate was not at arms-length and issued an assessment where the royalty rate had instead been determined to be 3%. Judgment of the Court The Court ruled in favour of ABD Limited and set aside the assessment. Excerpt “I conclude that the Cyprus CUP serves as a comparable internal CUP. The royalty in that agreement was 1%. On that basis the royalty of 1% charged by ABD to the other Opcos constitutes a reasonable arm’s length royalty. That being the case there was no factual justification for the Commissioner to have adjusted the royalty in terms of the then section 31 of the Income Tax Act. The appeal succeeds. It is not necessary for this reason to consider the several other administrative law grounds and accounting issues raised by ABD in its appeal. I appreciate that the outcome of this case will be of great disappointment to SARS which put into it extensive resources to create a precedent in this seldom litigated field of tax law. But this not only meant it running contrary to the opinions and approach of its initial expert (which meant effectively dispensing with his views without explanation and engaging a new expert) but fighting a case where there appeared to be no rationale for the taxpayer to have any motive to shortchange the South African fiscus as I mentioned earlier in this decision.” Click here for translation ...

SA Compagnie Gervais Danone was the subject of an tax audit at the end of which the tax authorities questioned, among other things, the deduction of a compensation payment of 88 million Turkish lira (39,148,346 euros) granted to the Turkish company Danone Tikvesli, in which the french company holds a minority stake. The tax authorities considered that the payment constituted an indirect transfer of profits abroad within the meaning of Article 57 of the General Tax Code and should be considered as distributed income within the meaning of Article 109(1) of the Code, subject to the withholding tax provided for in Article 119a of the Code, at the conventional rate of 15%. SA Compagnie Gervais Danone brought the tax assessment to the Administrative Court and in a decision issued 9 July 2019 the Court discharged SA Compagnie Gervais Danone from the taxes in dispute. This decision was appealed by the tax authorities and in June 2021 the Administrative Court of Appeal set aside the decision of the administrative court and decided in favor of the tax authorities. An appeal was then filed by SA Compagnie Gervais Danone with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Conseil d’État The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal and decided in favor of SA Compagnie Gervais Danone. Excerpts from the Judgement “3. It is apparent from the documents in the files submitted to the trial judges that Compagnie Gervais Danone entered into an agreement with Danone Tikvesli, a company incorporated under Turkish law, granting the latter the right to use Groupe Danone’s dairy product trademarks, patents and know-how, of which it is the owner, in order to manufacture and sell dairy products on the Turkish market. In order to deal with the net loss of nearly 40 million euros recorded by Danone Tikvesli at the end of the 2010 financial year, which, according to the undisputed claims of the companies before the trial judges, should have led, under Turkish law, to the cessation of its business, Danone Tikvesli was granted the right to use Groupe Danone’s dairy product brands, patents and know-how, Compagnie Gervais Danone paid it a subsidy of EUR 39,148,346 in 2011, which the tax authorities allowed to be deducted only in proportion to its 22.58% stake in Danone Tikvesli. In order to justify the existence of a commercial interest such as to allow the deduction of the aid thus granted to its subsidiary, Compagnie Gervais Danone argued before the lower courts, on the one hand, the strategic importance of maintaining its presence on the Turkish dairy products market and, on the other hand, the prospect of growth in the products that it was to receive from its Turkish subsidiary by way of royalties for the exploitation of the trademarks and intangible rights that it holds. 4. On the one hand, it is clear from the statements in the judgments under appeal that, in ruling out the existence of a commercial interest on the part of Compagnie Gervais Danone in paying aid to its subsidiary, the Court relied on the fact that Danone Hayat Icecek, majority shareholder in Danone Tikvesli, also had a financial interest in preserving the reputation of the brand, which prevented Compagnie Gervais Danone from bearing the entire cost of refinancing Danone Tikvesli. In inferring that Compagnie Gervais Danone had no commercial interest from the mere existence of a financial interest on the part of Danone Tikvesli’s main shareholder in refinancing the company, the Court erred in law. 5. Secondly, it is clear from the statements in the contested judgments that, in denying that Compagnie Gervais Danone had its own commercial interest in paying aid to its subsidiary, the Court also relied on the fact that the evidence produced by that company did not make it possible to take as established the alleged prospects for growth of its products, which were contradicted by the fact that no royalties had been paid to it before 2017 by the Turkish company as remuneration for the right to exploit the trade marks and intangible rights which it held. In so ruling, the Court erred in law, whereas the fact that aid is motivated by the development of an activity which, at the date it is granted, has not resulted in any turnover or, as in the present case, in the payment of any royalties as remuneration for the grant of the right to exploit intangible assets, is nevertheless capable of conferring on such aid a commercial character where the prospects for the development of that activity do not appear, at that same date, to be purely hypothetical.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A sales, marketing and management service agreement entered into in 1993 between Asian Hotels Limited and Hyatt International-Southwest Asia Limited had been replaced by various separate agreements – a Strategic Oversight Services Agreements, a Technical Services Agreement, a Hotel Operation Agreement with Hyatt India, and trademark license agreements pursuant to which Asian Hotels Limited was permitted to use Hyatt’s trademark in connection with the hotel’s operation. In 2012, the tax authorities issued assessment orders for FY 2009-2010 to FY 2017-2018, qualifying a portion of the service payments received by Hyatt as royalty and finding that Hyatt had a PE in India. Hyatt appealed the assessment orders to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, which later upheld the order of the tax authorities. Aggrieved with the decision, Hyatt filed appeals before the High Court. Judgement of the High Court The High Court set aside in part and upheld in part the decision of the Tribunal. The court set aside the decision of the Tribunal in regards of qualifying the service payments as royalty. The court found that the strategic and incentive fee received by Hyatt International was not a consideration for the use of or the right to use any process or for information of commercial or scientific experience. Instead, these fees were in consideration of the services as set out in SOSA. The fact that the extensive services rendered by Hyatt in terms of the agreement also included access to written knowledge, processes, and commercial information in furtherance of the services could not lead to the conclusion that the fee was royalty as defined under Article 12 of the DTAA. The court upheld the findings of the Tribunal that Hyatt had a permanent establishment in India. According to the court “It is apparent from the plain reading of the SOSA that the Assessee exercised control in respect of all activities at the Hotel, inter alia, by framing the policies to be followed by the Hotel in respect of each and every activity, and by further exercising apposite control to ensure that the said policies are duly implemented. The assessee’s affiliate (Hyatt India) was placed in control of the hotel’s day-to-day operations in terms of the HOSA. This further ensured that the policies and the diktats by the Assessee in regard to the operations of the Hotel were duly implemented without recourse to the Owner. As noted above, the assessee had the discretion to send its employees at its will without concurrence of either Hyatt India or the Owner. This clearly indicates that the Assessee exercised control over the premises of the Hotel for the purposes of its business. Thus, the condition that a fixed place (Hotel Premises) was at the disposal of the Assessee for carrying on its business, was duly satisfied. There is also little doubt that the Assessee had carried out its business activities through the Hotel premises. Admittedly, the Assessee also performed an oversight function in respect of the Hotel. This function was also carried out, at least partially if not entirely, at the Hotel premises.” The Court also confirmed the direction of the Tribunal asking Hyatt to submit the working regarding apportionment of revenue, losses etc. on a financial year basis so that profit attributable to the PE can be determined judicially. According to the High Court profits attributable to a PE are required to be determined considering the permanent establishment as an independent taxable entity, and prima facie taxpayers would be liable to pay tax in India due to profits earned by the permanent establishment notwithstanding the losses suffered in the other jurisdictions. This matter was to be decided later by a larger bench of the Court ...

A Dutch company “Tobacco B.V.” belonging to an internationally operating tobacco group was subjected to (additional assessment) corporate income tax assessments according to taxable amounts of €2,850,670,712 (2013), €2,849,204,122 (2014), €2,933,077,258 (2015) and €3,067,630,743 (2016), and to penalty fines for the year 2014 of €1,614,709, for the year 2015 of €363,205 and for the year 2016 of €125,175,082. In each case, the dispute focuses on whether the fees charged by various group companies for supplies and services can be regarded as business-related. Also in dispute is whether transfer profit should have been recognised in connection with a cessation of business activities. One of the group companies provided factoring services to “Tobacco B.V.”. The factoring fee charged annually for this includes a risk fee to cover the default risk and an annual fee for other services. The court concluded that the risk was actually significantly lower than the risk assumed in determining the risk fee, that the other services were routine in nature and that the factoring fee as a whole should be qualified as impractical. “Tobacco B.V.” has not rebutted the presumption that the disadvantage caused to it by paying the factoring fees was due to the affiliation between it and the service provider. In 2016, a reorganisation took place within the tobacco group in which several agreements concluded between group companies were terminated. The court concluded that there had been a coherent set of legal acts, whereby a Dutch group company transferred its business activities in the field of exporting tobacco products, including the functions carried out therein, the risks assumed therein and the entire profit potential associated therewith, to a group company in the UK. For the adjustment related to the transfer profit, the court relies on the projected cash flows from the business and information known at the time the decision to transfer was taken. The conclusions regarding factoring and the termination of business activities in the Netherlands lead to a deficiency in the tax return for each of the years 2014 to 2016. For these years, “Tobacco B.V.” filed returns to negative taxable amounts. For the years 2014 and 2016, a substantial amount of tax due arises after correction, even if the corrections established by application of reversal and aggravation are disregarded. For the year 2015, the tax due remains zero even after correction. Had the return been followed, this would have resulted in “Tobacco B.V.” being able to achieve, through loss relief, that substantially less tax would be due than the actual tax due. At the time the returns were filed, “Tobacco B.V.” knew that this would result in a substantial amount of tax due not being levied in each of these years and the court did not find a pleading position in this regard. The burden of proof is therefore reversed and aggravated. For the year 2013, this follows from the court’s decision of 17 October 2022, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2022:8937. To finance their activities, the group companies issued listed bonds under the tobacco group’s so-called EMTN Programme, which were guaranteed by the UK parent company. A subsidiary of “Tobacco B.V.” joined in a tax group paid an annual guarantee fee to the UK parent company for this purpose. The court ruled that: – the guarantee fees are not expenses originating from the subsidiary’s acceptance of liability for debts of an affiliated company; – the EMTN Programme is not a credit arrangement within the meaning of the Umbrella Credit Judgment(ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BW6520); – “Tobacco B.V.” has made it clear that a not-for-profit fee can be determined at which an independent third party would have been willing to accept the same liability on otherwise the same terms and conditions; – “Tobacco B.V.” failed to show that in the years in which the guarantee fees were provided, credit assessments did not have to take implied guarantee into account; – “Tobacco B.V.” failed to show that its subsidiary was not of such strategic importance to the group that its derivative rating did not match the group rating, so that the guarantee fees paid are not at arm’s length due to the effect of implied guarantee in their entirety; – “Tobacco B.V.” did not put forward any contentions that could rebut the objectified presumption of awareness that follows from the size of the adjustments (the entire guarantee fee), that the disadvantage suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the payment of the guarantee fees is due to its affiliation with its parent company. A group company charges the claimant, inter alia, a fee corresponding to a percentage of “Tobacco B.V.”‘s profits (profit split) for activities on behalf of the tobacco group that result in cost savings for “Tobacco B.V.”. The court ruled that “Tobacco B.V.” failed to prove that the group company made a unique contribution to the tobacco group that could justify the agreed profit split. The group company also charges “Tobacco B.V.” a fee equivalent to a 12% mark-up on costs for services relating to the manufacture of cigarettes. The court ruled that, in the context of the reversal and aggravation of the burden of proof, it was not sufficient for “Tobacco B.V.” to refer to the functional analysis, as it was based on the incorrect premise that the group company could be compared to a manufacturer. Finally, since April 2012, “Tobacco B.V.” has been paying the group company a 10% fee on the costs excluding raw materials for the production of cigarettes as toll manufacturer, where previously the basis of this fee also included the costs of raw materials. The court noted that the flow of goods remained the same and that “Tobacco B.V.” remained operationally responsible for the production process. The court ruled that it was up to “Tobacco B.V.” to establish and prove facts from which it follows that it was businesslike to change the basis of remuneration, which it did not do sufficiently. Regarding an adjustment made by the tax authorities in relation to reorganisation costs, the court finds that the adjustment was made in error ...

In 2017 the European Commission concluded that Luxembourg had granted undue tax benefits to Amazon of around €250 million. According to the Commission, a tax ruling issued by Luxembourg in 2003 – and prolonged in 2011 – lowered the tax paid by Amazon in Luxembourg without any valid justification. The tax ruling enabled Amazon to shift the vast majority of its profits from an Amazon group company that is subject to tax in Luxembourg (Amazon EU) to a company which is not subject to tax (Amazon Europe Holding Technologies). In particular, the tax ruling endorsed the payment of a royalty from Amazon EU to Amazon Europe Holding Technologies, which significantly reduced Amazon EU’s taxable profits. This decision was brought before the European Courts by Luxembourg and Amazon, and in May 2021 the General Court found that Luxembourg’s tax treatment of Amazon was not illegal under EU State aid rules. An appeal was then filed by the European Commission with the European Court of Justice. Judgement of the Court The European Court of Justice upheld the decision of the General Court and annulled the decision of the European Commission. However, it did so for different reasons. According to the Court of Justice, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines were not part of the legal framework against which a selective advantage should be assessed, since Luxembourg had not implemented these guidelines. Thus, although the General Court relied on an incorrect legal framework, it had reached the correct result. Click here for other translation ...

At issue was the “royalty-free” use of intangible assets under an agreement whereby PepsiCo’s Singapore affiliate sold concentrate to Schweppes Australia, which then bottled and sold PepsiCo soft drinks for the Australian market. As no royalties were paid under the agreement, no withholding tax was paid in Australia. The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) determined that the payments for “concentrate” from Schweppes to PepsiCo had been misclassified and were in part royalty for the use of PepsiCo’s intangibles (trademarks, branding etc.), and an assessment was issued for FY2018 and FY2019 where withholding tax was determined on that basis. The assessment was issued under the Australian diverted profits tax provisions. The assessment was appealed to the Federal Court in February 2022. Judgment of the Court The Federal Court ruled in favor of the tax authorities. Following the decision of the Court, the ATO issued an announcement concerning the case. According to the announcement it welcomes the decision. “This decision confirms PepsiCo, Inc. (Pepsi) is liable for royalty withholding tax and, in the alternative, diverted profits tax would apply. This is the first time a Court has considered the diverted profits tax – a new tool to ensure multinationals pay the right amount of tax. Deputy Commissioner Rebecca Saint said this is a landmark decision as it confirms that the diverted profits tax can be an effective tool in the ATO’s arsenal to tackle multinational tax avoidance. However, the decision may be subject to appeal and therefore, may be subject to further consideration by the Courts in the event of an appeal. The Tax Avoidance Taskforce has for a number of years been targeting arrangements where royalty withholding tax has not been paid because payments have been mischaracterised, particularly payments for the use of intangible assets, such as trademarks. The ATO has issued Taxpayer Alert 2018/2 which outlines and puts multinationals on notice about our concerns. “The Pepsi matter is a lead case for our strategy to target arrangements where royalty withholding tax should have been paid. Whilst there may still be more to play out in this matter, it sends strong signals to other businesses that have similar arrangements to review and consider their tax outcomes.” ...

In TC opinion of 18 November 2020 the US Tax Court agreed with the US tax authorities (IRS) that Coca-Cola’s US-based income should be increased by $9 billion in a dispute over royalties from its foreign-based licensees. The principal holding was that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in reallocating income to Coca-Cola using a “comparable profits method” (TNMM) that treated independent Coca-Cola bottlers as comparable parties. However, one question remained. Coca-Colas’s Brazilian subsidiary paid no actual royalties to Coca-Cola during 2007–2009. Rather, it compensated Coca-Cola for use of its intangibles by paying dividends of $886,823,232. The court held that the Brazilian subsidiary’s arm’s-length royalty obligation for 2007–2009 was actually about $1.768 billion, as determined by the IRS. But the court held that the dividends remitted in place of royalties should be deducted from that sum. This offset reduces the net transfer pricing adjustment to petitioner from the Brazilian supply point to about $882 million. Thus, the issue to be decided is whether this $882 million net transfer-pricing adjustment is barred by Brazilian law. During 2007–2009 Brazil capped the amounts of trademark royalties and technology transfer payments (collectively, royalties) that Brazilian companies could pay to foreign parent companies. Coca Cola contended that Brazilian law blocked the $882 million net transfer-pricing adjustment. IRS contended that the Brazilian legal restriction should be given no effect in determining the arm’s-length transfer price, relying on what is commonly called the “blocked income” regulation (Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(h)(2)). According to tax authorities the “blocked income” regulation generally provides that foreign legal restrictions will be taken into account for transfer-pricing purposes only if four conditions are met, including the requirement that the restrictions must be “applicable to all similarly situated persons (both controlled and uncontrolled).” Judgement of the tax court The Tax Court sustained the transfer pricing adjustment in full. Excerpts “Allocation of Value Between Grandfathered Intangibles and Those Not Grandfathered Petitioner has shown that eight of TCCC’s trademarks were li-censed to the supply point before November 17, 1985. Those are the only intangibles in commercial use during 2007–2009 that were covered by the grandfather clause. We find that petitioner has failed to carry its burden of proving what portion of the Commissioner’s adjustment is at-tributable to income derived from this (relatively small) subset of the licensed intangibles. And the record does not contain data from which we could make a reliable estimate of that percentage.” “Because the supply point sold concentrate to preordained buyers, it had no occasion to use TCCC’s trademarks for economically significant marketing purposes. By contrast, the bottlers and service companies were much heavier users of TCCC’s trademarks. The bottlers placed those trademarks on every bottle and can they manufactured and on every delivery truck in their fleet. See id. at 264. And the service com-panies, which arranged consumer marketing, continuously exploited the trademarks in television, print, and social media advertising. See id. at 240, 263–64.” “We conclude that all non-trademark IP exploited by the Brazilian supply point was outside the scope of the grandfather clause. The blocked income regulation thus applies to that portion of the transfer-pricing adjustment attributable to exploitation of those intangible as-sets. We further find that this non-trademark IP represented the bulk of the value that the Brazilian supply point derived from use of TCCC’s intangibles generally. Petitioner has supplied no evidence that would enable us to determine, or even to guess, what percentage of the overall value was attributable to the residual intangible assets, i.e., the trademarks.” “In sum, petitioner has failed to satisfy its burden of proof in two major respects. It has offered no evidence that would enable us to determine what portion of the transfer-pricing adjustment is attributable to exploitation of the non-trademark IP, which we have found be the most valuable segment of the intangibles from the Brazilian supply point’s economic perspective. And petitioner has offered insufficient evidence to enable us to determine what portion of the transfer-pricing adjustment is attributable to exploitation of the 8 original core-product trademarks, as opposed to the 60 other core-product trademarks and the entire universe of non-core-product trademarks. Because petitioner has failed to establish what portion of the aggregate transfer-pricing adjustment might be attributable to exploitation of the eight grandfathered trademarks, we have no alternative but to sustain that adjustment in full.” ...

K.P. is active in retail sale of computers, peripheral equipment and software. In December 2013 it had transfered valuable trademarks to its subsidiary and in the years following the transfer incurred costs in form of licence fees for using the trademarks. According to the tax authorities the arrangement was commercially irrationel and had therfore been recharacterised. Not satisfied with the assessment an appeal was filed. Judgement of the Provincial Administrative Court. The Court decided in favor of K.P.  According to the Court recharacterization of controlled transactions was not possible under the Polish arm’s length provisions in force until the end of 2018. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

SAS Arrow Génériques is in the business of distributing generic medicinal products mainly to the pharmacy market, but also to the hospital market in France. It is 82.22% owned by its Danish parent company, Arrow Groupe ApS, which is itself a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Maltese company Arrow International Limited. In 2010 and 2011, SAS Arrow Génériques paid royalties to its Danish parent, Arrow Group ApS, and to a related party in the UK, Breath Ltd. According to the French tax authorities, the royalties constituted a benefit in kind granted to Arrow Group ApS and Breath Ltd, since SAS Arrow Génériques had not demonstrated the reality and nature of the services rendered and had therefore failed to justify the existence and value of the consideration that it would have received from the payment of these royalties, which constitutes an indirect transfer of profits to related companies. On appeal, the Administrative Court decided in favour of SAS Arrow Génériques. The tax authorities appealed the decision to the Court of Administrative Appeal. Judgement of the Court The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities and upheld the decision of the first instance court in favour of SAS Arrow Génériques. Excerpt 5. It is common ground that SAS Arrow Génériques is not dealing at arm’s length with Arrow group ApS, a Danish company that held 82.22% of its shares during the period under review, and the UK company Breath Ltd, which is also 100% owned by Arrow group ApS. The proposed rectifications of 26 December 2013 and 19 December 2014 addressed to SAS Arrow Génériques for the years 2010 and 2011 show that during the period under review it paid royalties of 5% of net sales to Arrow group ApS for the sub-licensing of intellectual property rights relating to the technical files used to file marketing authorisations in France, which were themselves licensed to Arrow group ApS by its parent company, Arrow International Limited, a company incorporated under Maltese law. SAS Arrow Génériques also paid royalties, on similar terms, to the UK company Breath Ltd. In order to challenge the full amount of the royalties paid by SAS Arrow Génériques to Arrow Group ApS and Breath Ltd, the tax authorities took the view that the royalties in question constituted a benefit in kind granted to Arrow Group ApS and Breath Ltd, since the audited company had not demonstrated the reality and nature of the services rendered and had therefore failed to justify the existence and value of the consideration that it would have received from the payment of these royalties, which constitutes an indirect transfer of profits to related companies. However, it is clear from the investigation, as the Court held, that the royalties in question were in return for Arrow Group ApS and Breath Ltd making available to the applicant the technical files necessary for the submission of marketing authorisation applications for its business. Contrary to what the Minister maintains on appeal, the investigation did not show that SAS Arrow Génériques had the material and human resources necessary to produce these technical files itself, which required the assistance of various professionals and the performance of clinical tests, or that it used subcontractors to do so. The fact noted by the authorities that certain molecules for which the technical files essential to the company’s business had been compiled were not held in any capacity whatsoever by Arrow International Limited, Arrow group ApS or Breath Ltd, and in particular that certain molecules were not included in their list of intangible assets, is not sufficient in itself to call into question the existence of these technical files and the services rendered by Arrow group ApS or Breath Ltd, given that this entry may fall into another category of expenditure or may be the result of an error in the entry in the accounts of these molecules and the related technical files. In addition, SAS Arrow Génériques argues, without being contradicted, that the rights attached to certain files were not acquired but leased or subleased from third parties by Arrow International Limited before being licensed and then sub-licensed. Finally, if the Minister maintains that the added value created by SAS Arrow Génériques is based on the development of its commercial network and that the royalties paid deprive it of the return on investment to which it would be entitled as a result of the activity it undertakes, such an argument does not call into question the existence of services rendered by Arrow Group ApS or Breath Ltd in return for the royalties at issue but, where applicable, only the excessive nature of the royalties paid, which therefore do not constitute an advantage in kind granted by a company established in France to a company established outside France. In addition, the Minister did not produce any evidence in his defence comparing the prices charged by the said affiliated companies with those charged by similar companies operating normally in order to establish whether the amount of the royalties paid was excessive. It follows that the Minister for the Economy, Finance and Recovery is not entitled to argue that, in the judgment under appeal, the Administrative Court of Lyon wrongly held that the payment of the royalties at issue by SAS Arrow Génériques could not be regarded as an advantage in kind granted by a company established in France to a company established outside France and that the full amount of the royalties could not therefore be reintegrated into its taxable profits on the basis of the provisions of Article 57 of the General Tax Code. 6. It follows from the foregoing that the Minister for the Economy, Finance and Recovery is not entitled to maintain that it was wrongly that, by Articles 1 to 7 of the contested judgment the Lyon Administrative Court reduced the taxable income of SAS Arrow Génériques for corporation tax purposes by an amount of 4,865,767 euros in respect of the 2010 financial year and consequently discharged SAS Arrow Génériques in ...

Due to the economic situation of automotive suppliers in Germany in 2006, “Cutting Tech GMBH” established a subsidiary (CB) in Bosnien-Herzegovina which going forward functioned as a contract manufacturer. CB did not develop the products itself, but manufactured them according to specifications provided by “Cutting Tech GMBH”. The majority of “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s sales articles were subject to multi-stage production, which could include various combinations of production processes. In particular, “Cutting Tech GMBH” was no longer competitive in the labour-intensive manufacturing processes (cut-off grinding, turning, milling) due to the high wage level in Germany. Good contribution margins from the high-tech processes (adiabatic cutting, double face grinding) increasingly had to subsidise the losses of the labour-intensive processes. Individual production stages, however, could not be outsourced to external producers for reasons of certification and secrecy. In addition, if the production had been outsourced, there would have been a great danger that a third company would have siphoned off “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s know-how and then taken over the business with “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s customer. This could have led to large losses in turnover for “Cutting Tech GMBH”. Furthermore, some of the labour-intensive work also had to cover one or more finishing stages of the high-tech processes, so that this business was also at risk if it was outsourced. For these reasons, the decision was made to outsource the labour-intensive production processes to Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to become profitable again and to remain competitive in the future. There, there were German-speaking staff with the necessary expertise, low customs duties and a low exchange rate risk. CB functioned as a contract manufacturer with the processes of production, quality assurance and a small administrative unit. Cost advantages existed not only in personnel costs, but also in electricity costs. CB prevented the plaintiff’s good earnings from the high-tech processes in Germany from having to continue to be used to subsidise the low-tech processes. “Cutting Tech GMBH” supplied CB with the material needed for production. The deliveries were processed as sales of materials. “Cutting Tech GMBH” received as purchase prices its cost prices without offsetting profit mark-ups or handling fees/commissions. The material was purchased and supplied to CB by “Cutting Tech GMBH”, which was able to obtain more favourable purchase prices than CB due to the quantities it purchased. The work commissioned by “Cutting Tech GMBH” was carried out by CB with the purchased material and its personnel. CB then sold the products to “Cutting Tech GMBH”. In part, they were delivered directly by CB to the end customers, in part the products were further processed by “Cutting Tech GMBH” or by third-party companies. “Cutting Tech GMBH” determined the transfer prices for the products it purchased using a “contribution margin calculation”. Until 2012, “Cutting Tech GMBH” purchased all products manufactured by CB in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 2013 onwards, CB generated its own sales with the external company P. This was a former customer of “Cutting Tech GMBH”. Since “Cutting Tech GMBH” could not offer competitive prices to the customer P in the case of production in Germany, CB took over the latter’s orders and supplied P with the products it manufactured in accordance with the contracts concluded. CB did not have its own distribution in the years in dispute. The tax audit of FY 2011 – 2013 The auditor assumed that the transfer of functions and risks to CB in 2007/2008 basically fulfilled the facts of a transfer of functions. However, since only a routine function had been transferred, “Cutting Tech GMBH” had rightly carried out the transfer of functions without paying any special remuneration. Due to CB’s limited exposure to risks, the auditor considered that the cost-plus method should be used for transfer pricing. In adjusting the transfer prices, the auditor assumed a mark-up rate of 12%. The material invoiced by “Cutting Tech GMBH” and the scrap proceeds was not included in the cost basis used in the assessment. For 2013, the auditor took into account that the customer P had agreed contracts exclusively with CB and reduced the costs by the costs of the products sold to P. Furthermore, the auditor took the legal view that the entire audit period should be considered uniformly. Therefore, it was appropriate to deduct an amount of €64,897 in 2011, which had been calculated in favour of “Cutting Tech GMBH” in 2010 and not taken into account in the tax assessment notices, in order to correct the error. The auditor did not consider it justified to determine the transfer prices for “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s purchases of goods by means of a so-called contribution margin calculation. Based on the functional and risk analysis, the auditor concluded that CB was a contract manufacturer. On the grounds that this profit of CB was remuneration for a routine function, the auditor refrained from recognising a vGA because of the transfer of client P from the applicant to CB. However, he stated that according to arm’s length royalty rates, values between 1% and 3% could be recognised as royalty “according to general practical experience.” “Cutting Tech GMBH” filed an appeal against the assessment in 2015 and in November 2019 the Tax Court parcially allowed the appeal of “Cutting Tech GMBH” and adjusted the assessment issued by the tax authorities. An appeal and cross appeal against the decision of the Tax Court was then filed with the Federal Tax Court (BFH). Judgement of the BFH The Federal Tax Court overturned the decision of the Tax Court and referred the case back to the Tax Court for another hearing and decision. “The appeals of the plaintiff and the FA are well-founded. They lead to the previous decision being set aside and the matter being referred back to the Fiscal Court for a different hearing and decision (§ 126 Para. 3 Sentence 1 No. 2 FGO). The arm’s length comparison carried out by the lower court to determine the transfer prices for the acquisition of processed products from C by the Plaintiff is not free of legal ...

Following an audit of Otis Servizi s.r.l. for FY 2007, 2008 and 2009 an assessment of additional taxable income was issued by the Italian tax authorities. The first part of the assessment related to interest received by OTIS in relation to the contract called “Cash management service for Group Treasury” (hereinafter “Cash Pooling Contract”) signed on 20 March 2001 between OTIS and the company United Technologies Intercompany Lending Ireland Limited (hereinafter “UTILI”) based in Ireland (hereinafter “Cash Pooling Relief”). In particular, the tax authorities reclassified the Cash Pooling Agreement as a financing contract and recalculated the rate of the interest income received by OTIS to be between 5.1 and 6.5 per cent (instead of the rate applied by the Company, which ranged between 3.5 and 4.8 per cent); The second part of the assessment related to of the royalty paid by OTIS to the American company Otis Elevator Company in relation to the “Licence Agreement relating to trademarks and company names” and the “Agreement for technical assistance and licence to use technical data, know-how and patents” signed on 1 January 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the “Royalty Relief”). In particular, the tax authorities had deemed the royalty agreed upon in the aforesaid contracts equal to 3.5% of the turnover as not congruous, recalculating it at 2% and disallowing its deductibility to the extent of the difference between the aforesaid rates. Not satisfied with the assessment an appeal was filed by OTIS. The Regional Tax Commission upheld the assessments and an appeal was then filed with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Court decided in favour of OTIS, set aside the assessment and refered the case back to the Regional Tax Commission in a different composition. Excerpt related to interest received by OTIS under the cash pooling contract “In the present case, the Agenzia delle Entrate redetermined the rate of the interest income received by the OTIS in relation to the contract between the same and UTILI (cash pooling contract) concerning the establishment of a current account relationship for the unitary management of the group treasury. UTILI, as pooler or group treasurer, had entered into a bank account agreement with a credit institution in its own name, but on behalf of the group companies. At the same time, OTIS had mandated that bank to carry out the various tasks in order to fully implement the cash pooling agreement. Under this contract, all participating companies undertook to transfer their bank account balances (assets or liabilities) daily to the pooling company, crediting or debiting these balances to the pool account. As a result of this transfer, the individual current account balances of each participating company are zeroed out (‘zero balance cash pooling’). Notwithstanding the fact that the tax authorities do not dispute that this is a case relating to “zero balance cash pooling” (a circumstance that is, moreover, confirmed by the documents attached to the appeal), it should be noted that the same practice documentation of the Revenue Agency leads to the exclusion that, in the hypothesis in question, the cause of the transaction can be assimilated to a loan. In particular, in Circular 21/E of 3 June 2015, it is stated (p. 32) that “with reference to the sums moved within the group on the basis of cash pooling contracts in the form of the so-called zero balance system, it is considered that a financing transaction cannot be configured, pursuant to Article 10 of the ACE Decree. This is because the characteristics of the contract – which provides for the daily zeroing of the asset and liability balances of the group companies and their automatic transfer to the centralised account of the parent company, with no obligation to repay the sums thus transferred and with accrual of interest income or expense exclusively on that account – do not allow the actual possibility of disposing of the sums in question in order to carry out potentially elusive transactions’. These conclusions are confirmed in the answer to Interpretation No. 396 of 29 July 2022 (p. 5) where it is specified that ‘cash pooling contracts in the form of the so-called zero balance stipulated between group companies are characterised by reciprocal credits and debits of sums of money that originate from the daily transfer of the bank balance of the subsidiary/subsidiary to the parent company. As a result of this contract, the balance of the bank account held by the subsidiary/subsidiary will always be zero, since it is always transferred to the parent company. The absence of the obligation to repay the remittances receivable, the reciprocity of those remittances and the fact that the balance of the current account is uncollectible and unavailable until the account is closed combine to qualify the negotiated agreement as having characteristics that are not attributable to a loan of money in the relationship between the companies of the group’. That being so, the reasoning of the judgment under appeal falls below the constitutional minimum in so far as the CTR qualified the cash pooling relationship as a loan on the basis of the mere assertion that “the obligation to repay each other by the closing date of the account is not found in the case”. In so doing, the Regional Commission identified a generic financing contract function in the cash pooling without distinguishing between “notional cash pooling” and “zero balance cash pooling”, instead excluding, on the basis of the same documentation of practice of the Tax Administration, that in the second case (“zero balance”), a loan contract can be configured. The reasoning of the contested decision does not therefore make the basis of the decision discernible, because it contains arguments objectively incapable of making known the reasoning followed by the judge in forming his own conviction, since it cannot be left to the interpreter to supplement it with the most varied, hypothetical conjectures” (Sez. U. no. 22232 of 2016), the trial judge having failed to indicate in a congruous manner the elements from which he drew ...

K. S.A. had made an in-kind contribution to a subsidiary (a partnership) in the form of previously created or acquired and depreciated trademark protection rights for individual beer brands. The partnership in return granted K. S.A. a licence to use these trademarks (K. S.A. was the only user of the trademarks). The partnership made depreciations on these intangible assets, which – due to the lack of legal personality of the partnership – were recognised as tax deductible costs directly by K. S.A. According to the tax authorities the role of the partnership was limited to the administration of trademark rights, it was not capable of exercising any rights and obligations arising from the licence agreements. Therefore the prerequisites listed in Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. were met, allowing K. S.A.’s income to be determined without regard to the conditions arising from those agreements. The assessment issued by the tax authorities was later set aside by the Provincial Administrative Court. An appeal and cross appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decisions of the Provincial Administrative Court and dismissed both appeals as neither of them had justified grounds. The Provincial Administrative Court had correctly deduced that Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. authorises only adjustment of the amount of licence fees, but not the nature of the controlled transactions by recognising that instead of a licence agreement for the use of the rights to trademarks, an agreement was concluded for the provision of services for the administration of these trademarks. Excerpts “The tax authorities, in finding that the applicant had not in fact made an in-kind contribution of trademark rights to the limited partnership, but had merely entrusted that partnership with the duty to administer the marks, referred to Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. (as expressed in the 2011 consolidated text. ), by virtue of which the tax authorities could determine the taxpayer’s income and the tax due without taking into account the conditions established or imposed as a result of the links between the contracting entities, with the income to be determined by way of an estimate, using the methods described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 11 u.p.d.o.p. However, these are not provisions creating abuse of rights or anti-avoidance clauses, as they only allow for a different determination of transaction (transfer) prices. The notion of ‘transaction price’ is legally defined in Article 3(10) of the I.P.C., which, in the wording relevant to the tax period examined in the case, stipulated that it is the price of the subject of a transaction concluded between related parties. Thus, the essence of the legal institution regulated in Article 11 of the u.p.d.o.p. is not the omission of the legal effects of legal transactions performed by the taxpayer or a different legal definition of those transactions, but the determination of their economic effect expressed in the transaction price, with the omission of the impact of institutional links between counterparties”  “For the same reasons, the parallel plea alleging infringement of Articles 191, 120 and 121(1) of the P.C.P. by annulling the tax authority’s legal rulings on the grounds of a breach of the aforementioned rules of evidence in conjunction with Articles 11(1) and 11(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. and holding that the tax authority did not correct the amount of royalties and the marketability of the transaction, but reclassified the legal relationship on the basis of which the entity incurred the expenditure, is also inappropriate. In fact, the assessment of the Provincial Administrative Court that such a construction of the tax authority’s decision corresponds to the hypothesis of the 2019 standard of Article 11c(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. is correct, but there was no adequate legal basis for applying it to 2012/2013 and based on Article 11(1) and (4) of the u.p.d.o.p. in its then wording. Failure to take into account a transaction undertaken by related parties deemed economically irrational by the tax authority violated, in these circumstances, the provisions constituting the cassation grounds of the plea, as the Provincial Administrative Court reasonably found.” “Contrary to the assumption highlighted in the grounds of the applicant’s cassation appeal, in the individual interpretations issued at its request, the applicant did not obtain confirmation of the legality of the entire optimisation construction, but only of the individual legal and factual actions constituting this construction, presented in isolation from the entire – at that time – planned future event. Such a fragmentation of the description of the future event does not comply with the obligation under Article 14b § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure to provide an exhaustive account of the actual state of affairs or future event, and therefore – as a consequence – the applicant cannot rely on the legal protection provided under Article 14k § 1 or Article 14m § 1, § 2 (1) and § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

SA SACLA, which trades in protective clothing, footwear and small equipment, was the subject of a tax audit covering the financial years 2007, 2008 and 2009. In 2008, Sacla had sold a portfolio of trademarks to a related party, Involvex SA, a company incorporated under Luxembourg law, for the sum of 90,000 euros. In a proposed assessment issued in 2011, the tax authorities increased Sacla’s taxable income on the basis of Article 57 of the General Tax Code, taking the view that Sacla had made an indirect transfer of profits in the form of a reduction in the selling price by selling a set of brands/trademarks held by it for EUR 90,000 to a Luxembourg company, Involvex, which benefited from a preferential tax regime. The tax authorities had estimated the value of the trademarks at €20,919,790, a value that was reduced to €11,288,000 following interdepartmental discussions. In a February 2020, the Lyon Administrative Court of Appeal, after rejecting the objection of irregularity of the judgment, decided that an expert would carry out a valuation to determine whether the sale price of the trademarks corresponded to their value. The valuation was to take into account an agreed exemption from the payment of royalties for a period of five years granted by Involvex to SA SACLA. The expert’s report was filed on 8 April 2021 and, upon receipt of the report, SA SACLA asked the court to modify the judgment by considering that the value of the transferred trademarks should be set at between EUR 1.3 million and EUR 2.1 million and that the penalties for wilful infringement should be waived. By judgement of 19 August 2021, the court rejected SACLA’s request and set the value of the trademarks – in accordance with the expert’s report – at 5,897,610 euros. “The value of the trademarks transferred by SACLA, initially declared by that company in the amount of EUR 90,000 excluding tax, was corrected by the tax authorities to EUR 11,288,000 excluding tax, and was then reduced by the judgment under appeal to EUR 8,733,348 excluding tax. It follows from the investigation, in particular from the expert’s report filed on 8 April 2021, that this value, taking into account the exemption from payment of royalties granted by the purchaser of the trademarks in the amount of 2,400,000 euros excluding tax and after taking into account corporate income tax, must be established at the sum of 5,897,610 euros excluding tax. The result is a difference between the agreed price and the value of the trade marks transferred in the amount of EUR 5 807 610 excluding tax, which constitutes an advantage for the purchaser. The applicant, who merely contests the amount of that advantage, does not invoke any interest or consideration of such a nature as to justify such an advantage. In these circumstances, the administration provides the proof that it is responsible for the existence of a reduction in the price of the sale of assets and the existence of an indirect transfer of profits abroad.” SACLA then appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, which by decision no. 457695 of 27 October 2022 set aside articles 3 and 6 of the judgement from the Administrative Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further considerations. “2. In a judgment before the law of 13 February 2020, the Lyon Administrative Court of Appeal decided that, before ruling on the Sacla company’s request, an expert appraisal would be carried out in order to determine whether the sale price of the trademarks sold by that company corresponded to their value, taking into consideration, in particular, the waiver of payment of royalties for a period of five years granted by the purchasing company, Involvex, to the Sacla company. In order to fulfil the mission entrusted to them by the court, the expert and his assistant first considered four methods, then abandoned the method of comparables and the method of capitalisation of royalties, and finally retained only two methods, the method of historical costs and the method of discounting future flows, from which they derived a weighted average. It follows from the statements in the judgment under appeal that the court, after considering that the historical cost method did not allow the effect of corporation tax to be taken into account with any certainty and led to a valuation almost eight times lower than the discounted cash flow method, rejected the former method and adopted only the latter and considered that there was no need to carry out a weighting, since, in its view, the discounted cash flow method proved to be the most accurate. 3. It follows from the statements in the judgment under appeal that the court, after fixing the value of the trade marks transferred by Sacla at EUR 8 733 348 exclusive of tax, an amount also retained by the administrative court, intended to apply the discount recommended by the expert report of 7 April 2021 in order to take account of the exemption from payment of royalties granted for five years by the purchaser of the trade marks. In fixing the amount of that discount at EUR 2 400 000 exclusive of tax, whereas the expert report which it intended to apply estimated it, admittedly, at that amount in absolute terms, but by applying a rate of 37% to a value of the trade marks transferred estimated at EUR 6 500 000, the Court distorted that expert report and gave insufficient reasons for its judgment.” Judgement of the Administrative Court of Appeal The Court ruled as follows “…by selling on 19 October 2008 a set of trademarks held by it at a reduced price to Involvex, a company incorporated under Luxembourg law, had carried out an indirect transfer of profits. In a judgment of 10 October 2017, the Lyon Administrative Court, after finding that there was no need to rule on the claims for suspension of payment submitted at first instance, granted partial discharge of the additional corporation tax and social security contributions to ...

The tax authorities had issued a notice of assessment which disallowed tax deductions for royalties paid by R…Cash & C…, S.A. to its Polish parent company, O…Mark Sp. Z.o.o. R… Cash & C…, S.A. appealed to the Administrative Court, which later annulled the assessment. The tax authorities then filed an appeal with the Administrative Court of Appeal. Judgement of the Court The Court of Appeal revoked the judgement issued by the administrative court and decided in favour of the tax authorities. Extracts “It is clear from the evidence in the case file that the applicant has succeeded in demonstrating that the agreement to transfer rights is not based on effective competition, in the context of identical operations carried out by independent entities. The studies presented by the challenger do not succeed in overturning this assertion, since, as is clear from the evidence (12), they relate to operations and market segments other than the one at issue in the case. The provision for the payment of royalties for the transfer of the brands, together with the unpaid provision of management and promotion services for the brands in question by the applicant, prove that there has been a situation that deviates from full competition, with the allocation of income in a tax jurisdiction other than the State of source, without any apparent justification. The application of the profit splitting method (Article 9 of Ministerial Order 1446-C/2001 of 21 December 2001) does not deserve censure. Intangible assets are at stake, so invoking the comparability of transactions, in cases such as the present one, does not make it possible to understand the relationships established between the companies involved. It should also be noted that the Polish company receiving the royalties has minimal staff costs, and that brand amortisation costs account for 97.72% of its operating costs. As a result, the obligations arising for the defendant from the licence agreement in question are unjustified. In view of the demonstration of the deviation from the terms of an arm’s length transaction, it can be seen that the taxpayer’s declaratory obligations (articles 13 to 16 of Ministerial Order 1446-C/2001, of 21.12.200) have not been complied with, as there is a lack of elements that would justify the necessary adjustment. Therefore, the correction under examination does not deserve to be repaired and should be confirmed in the legal order. By ruling differently, the judgement under appeal was an error of judgement and should therefore be replaced by a decision dismissing the challenge.” Click here for English translation. Click here for other translation ...

Institute of International Research España S.L. belongs to the international group Informa Group Brand, of which Informa PLC, a company listed on the London Stock Exchange, is the parent company. In 2006 it had entered into a licence agreement (“for the use of the Licensed Property, Copyright, Additional Property Derived Alwork, the Mark and Name of the Licensor for the sale of Research and Dissemination Services”) under which it paid 6.5% of its gross turnover to a related party in the Netherlands – Institute of International Research BV. Furthermore, in 2007 it also entered into a “Central Support Services Agreement” with its parent Informa PLC according to which it paid cost + 5% for centralised support services: management, finance, accounting, legal, financial, fiscal, audit, human resources, IT, insurance, consultancy and special services. Following an audit, the tax authorities issued assessments of additional income for the FY 2007 and 2008 in which deductions of the licence payments and cost of intra-group services had been disallowed. Not satisfied with the assessment, Institute of International Research España S.L. filed an appeal. Judgement of the Audiencia Nacional The Court decided in favor of Institute of International Research España S.L. and annulled the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Excerpts “The paid nature of the assignment of the use of the trademark in a case such as the one at hand is something that, in the opinion of the Chamber, does not offer special interpretative difficulties. We refer, for example, to the Resolution of the Central Economic-Administrative Court of 3 October 2013 (R.G.: 2296/2012), in which the presumption of onerousness contained in art. 12. 2 of Royal Legislative Decree 5/2004, of 5 March, approving the revised text of the Non-Resident Income Tax Law, to a case of assignment of the use of certain trademarks made in the framework of a complex services contract by a non-resident entity to an entity resident in Spain and in which the reviewing body declared that: “the importance of the trademark is such (and more so the ones we are now dealing with) that it would be difficult to understand in the opinion of the Inspectorate a purely “instrumental” transfer of use of the same and much less free of charge, as the claimant claims”. The differences found by the contested decision, between the case analysed in that decision and the case at issue here, do not affect the above statement. As the complaint states in this respect, ‘it is clear that this rejection of the entire cost of the use of the trademark and the other items included in the licence agreement is not market-based because the IIR group would simply not allow any third party to benefit from using its trademark to provide services without any consideration in return’. Finally, the fact that the appellant did not pay any amount for the assignment of the use of the trademark to the trademark proprietor until the licence agreement does not justify that it should not have paid it, referring on this point to what has just been reasoned. Nor can the signing of the licence agreement be considered sufficient proof, in the manner of the precise and direct link according to the rules of the human standard of proof of presumptions (art. 386.1 of Law 1/2000, of 7 January, on Civil Procedure), that by that circumstance alone it should be ruled out outright that the licence agreement has not brought any benefit or advantage to IIR España or improved its position and prestige with respect to the previous situation.” “It remains, finally, to examine the effective accreditation (or not) of the reality of these complementary services related to the assignment of the use of the trademark. Following the reasoning of the contested decision, in general terms, there would be four reasons why the justification of the reality of those services cannot be admitted. First, the invoices issued by IIR BV refer to the services provided by the parent company in a very generic manner, which makes it impossible to know the benefit or utility received in each case by the Spanish company. Moreover, the way in which these services are valued -simply referring to the turnover of the subsidiaries- does not take into account any rational criteria. Secondly, IIR España has not substantiated the nature of the alleged services received from its Dutch parent company and their differentiation from management support costs. Thirdly, IIR Spain had already been using the brand name ‘IIR’ since its acquisition by the group in 1987 without it being established that it paid a fee for this. Lastly, the Transfer Pricing Report does not serve as evidence of the nature of the costs and their valuation.” “In the Chamber’s view, we are faced with a question of proof. The tax authorities have not considered the reality of the complementary services to be proven (but not the transfer of the use of the trademark, as explained above) and the plaintiff considers that this evidentiary assessment is erroneous in light of the documents submitted to the proceedings. The Board’s assessment of the evidence adduced by the appellant (both in administrative proceedings and in the application) is favourable to the appellant’s arguments, i.e. that it is sufficient evidence to prove the reality of the ancillary services arising from the licence agreement.” “In the light of this documentation, we consider that the reality of the services ancillary to the assignment of the use of the trademark deriving from the licence agreement is sufficiently justified. It is true that, as the Administration basically states in its response, the intensity or completeness of the different services provided in relation to what is set out in the licence agreement can be discussed, but this debate is not exactly the same as the one we are dealing with here, which consists of deciding whether the additional services in question were actually provided or not. In the Board’s view, the documentary evidence cited above proves that they were and that the licence agreement ...

The case concerned the valuation of intangible assets transferred from a Danish company to an affiliated foreign company. The Tax Tribunal basically agreed with the valuation of the expert appraisers according to the DCF model, but corrected the assumptions with regard to revenue growth in the budget period and the value of the tax advantage. Finally, the Tax Tribunal found that the value of product Y should be included in the valuation, as all rights to product Y were covered by the intra-group transfer. Excerpts “It was the judges’ view that the turnover growth for the budget period should be set in accordance with Company H’s own budgets prepared prior to the transfer. This was in accordance with TPG 2017 paragraphs 6.163 and 6.164 and SKM2020.30.LSR.” “With reference to OECD TPG section 6.178 on adjustment for tax consequences for the buyer and seller and SKM2020.30.LSR, the National Tax Tribunal ruled that the full value of the buyer’s tax asset should be added to the value of the intangible assets when valuing according to the DCF model.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

“Cosmetics sp. z o.o.” is a Polish distributor of cosmetics. It purchases the goods from a related foreign company. The contract concluded between “Cosmetics sp. z o.o.” and the foreign company contained a provision according to which 3% of the price of the goods purchased was to be paid (in the form of royalties) for the right to use the trademarks for the promotion, advertising and sale of the products. However, the invoices issued by the foreign company for the sale of the goods in question did not show the amount paid for the right to use the trademarks as a separate item. The invoices simply stated the price of the goods purchased. “Cosmetics sp. z o.o. requested an “individual interpretation” from the tax authorities as to whether the royalty payments included in the price of the goods were subject to withholding tax in Poland. According to Cosmetics sp. z o.o., the answer should be no, as the “royalty” element was an ancillary part of the main transaction – the purchase of the goods. The tax authority disagreed. According to the authorities, the payment of royalties for the right to use trademarks was not an ancillary element of the main transaction and its importance was not insignificant. Under the CIT Act and the relevant double tax treaty (DTT), the payment of royalties would be subject to withholding tax. Dismissing an appeal filed by Cosmetics sp. z o.o., the Administrative Court held that there were two separate transactions – one for the acquisition of goods and one for the acquisition of the right to use the trademark. Therefore, the tax authority’s interpretation was correct. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the Administrative Court and dismissed the appeal of “Cosmetics sp. z o.o.”. According to the court, it was clear from the agreement that the fee consisted of two transactions, one of which was a licence fee (royalty). Therefore, the claim that the tax authority was trying to separate this payment from the payment for the goods was not justified. Excerpt “The issue in dispute in the case is the taxation withholding tax on the amount paid by the Appellant to a foreign entity on account of the right to use trademarks, included in the agreement on the purchase of goods from that entity. Instead, the resolution of the above problem depends on whether the fee for the use of trademarks remains an ancillary element of the main consideration – the purchase of goods – and should then share the tax fate of that consideration, or whether it constitutes a separate element of the contract, which is subject to a separate method of taxation. The author of the cassation appeal argued that the elements comprising the subject matter of the contract and making up the price paid should be qualified together, as a single consideration. In the opinion of the Company’s attorney, a transaction transferring the right to use trademarks should not be treated as generating a licence fee, since the right is related only to the possibility of further resale of goods, and thus “the scope of the licence granted to the Applicant was significantly limited”. In support of the above argumentation, the attorney referred to the opinion of a representative of international tax doctrine, Professor Michelle Markham. Referring to the excerpt from the publication quoted on p. 6 of the cassation complaint concerning the issue analysed in the case, the panel finds that it is not relevant to the case at hand. Firstly, it is clear from the full context of the quoted sentence that these are considerations on the basis of US tax law regulations. Secondly, the quoted passage refers specifically to such contracts, the subject of which are at least two services (including one intangible service) covered by a single price, where it could be unreasonable to try to separate them for tax purposes. However, we do not face such a situation in the case, as the Company’s agreement with the Establishment clearly separates the remuneration for the right to use trademarks in the amount of 3% of the value of the purchased goods – even if the above amount is not specified on the invoices. Above all, however, the Supreme Administrative Court draws attention to the introduction in the agreement of a provision concerning the granting of a paid licence for the use of trademarks within the scope presented in the application, which is of fundamental importance in the case under consideration. Pursuant to Article 155 of the Act of 30 June 2000. – Industrial Property Law (Journal of Laws of 2019, item 2309; hereinafter: ‘p.w.p.’), the right of protection for a trademark suffers a significant limitation as a result of the exhaustion of the right to market the goods. “Pursuant to Article 155(1) p.w.p., the right of protection for a trademark does not extend to acts concerning goods with the trademark, consisting in particular in offering them for sale or further marketing of goods bearing the trademark, if the goods have been placed on the market in the territory of Poland by the authorised entity or with its consent. (…) By the act of placing the marked goods on the market, by the rightsholder or a third party acting with his consent, the rightsholder’s competence to use the trade mark in such a manner as to further distribute the goods is deemed to be exhausted. Therefore, the purchaser – as the owner of the goods – may continue to resell the goods and, in doing so, to advertise using the holder’s mark. Exhaustion, however, covers only one exclusive competence of the right holder, which is the right to put the marked goods on the market, and concerns only normal distribution processes of the marked goods, understood as a whole, which do not threaten the loss of connection with the goods.” (U. Promińska, Industrial Property Law, 5th edition, LexisNexis 2011, p. 340). Transferring the above considerations to the grounds ...

The tax authorities had issued a notice of assessment which, among other adjustments, disallowed a bad debt loss and certain costs as tax deductible. In addition, royalties paid to the parent company were adjusted on the basis of the arm’s length principle. N…S.A. appealed to the Administrative Court, which partially annulled the assessment. Both the tax authorities and N…S.A. then appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal. Judgement of the Court The Administrative Court of Appeal partially upheld the assessment of the tax authorities, but dismissed the appeal in respect of the royalty payments. According to the Court, a transfer pricing adjustment requires a reference to the terms of the comparable transaction between independent entities and a justification of the comparability factors. Extracts from the judgement related to the controlled royalty payment. “2.2.2.2 Regarding the correction for ‘transfer pricing’, the applicant submits that the Judgment erred in annulling the correction in question since the defendant calculated the royalty payable to the mother company in a manner that deviated from similar transactions between independent entities. It censures the fact that the rappel discount was not included in the computation of net sales for the purposes of computing the royalty under review. “[S]ince rappel is a discount resulting from the permanent nature of the contractual relationship between the supplier and the customer, (in the case of the Defendant, set at one year) constituting a reduction in the customer’s pecuniary benefit structurally linked to the volume of goods purchased, it can hardly be argued that it has a temporary nature, in the sense of ‘momentary’ or of ‘short duration'”; “(…) by excluding the rappel of rebates deductible from the gross value of sales, for the purposes of determining the net value of sales pursuant to Clause 32 of the Licence Agreement, the Tribunal a quo erred in fact”; “[that] on the transfer pricing regime, the AT demonstrated, by the reasoning of fact and law contained in the final inspection report that the existence of special relations between the Defendant and SPN led to the establishment of different contractual conditions, in the calculation of the royalties payable, had they been established, between independent persons”. In this regard, it was written in the contested judgment as follows: “(…) // In fact, the exceptions provided for in clause 32 of the Licence Agreement, which have a broad content, allow the framing of the so-called rappel situations, contracted by the Impugnant with its clients for a determined period of time and subject to periodic review, given their temporary nature. // Which means that, as to the form of calculation of the tax basis of the royalties payable to SPN, no violation of the provisions of the Licence Agreement has occurred. // For this reason, one cannot accept the conclusion of the Tax Authority in the inspection report, that such discounts do not fall within the group of those which, as they have a limited timeframe for their validity, should not be considered as a negative component of the sales for the purposes of calculation of the royalties, in accordance with the contract entered into between the Impugnant and SPN. // In addition, the Tax Authority failed to demonstrate in the inspection report to what extent the conditions practiced in the calculation of the royalties payable by the Impugnant to SPN diverge from the conditions that would be practiced by independent entities, not having been observed the provisions of article 77, no. 3, of the General Tax Law (LGT)”. Assessment. The grounds for the correction under examination appear in item “III.1.1.6 Transfer prices: € 780,318.77” of the Inspection Report. The relevant regulatory framework is as follows: i) “In commercial transactions, including, namely, transactions or series of transactions on goods, rights or services, as well as in financial transactions, carried out between a taxable person and any other entity, subject to IRC or not, with which it is in a situation of special relations, substantially identical terms or conditions must be contracted, accepted and practiced to those that would normally be contracted, accepted and practiced between independent entities in comparable transactions”(12). (ii) ‘When the Directorate-General for Taxation makes corrections necessary for the determination of the taxable profit by virtue of special relations with another taxpayer subject to corporation tax or personal income tax, in the determination of the taxable profit of the latter the appropriate adjustments reflecting the corrections made in the determination of the taxable profit of the former shall be made’.) (iii) “The taxable person shall, in determining the terms and conditions that would normally be agreed, accepted or carried out between independent entities, adopt the method or methods that would ensure the highest degree of comparability between his transactions or series of transactions and other transactions that are substantially the same under normal market conditions or in the absence of special relations…”.) (iv) “The most appropriate method for each transaction or series of transactions is that which is capable of providing the best and most reliable estimate of the terms and conditions that would normally be agreed, accepted or practised at arm’s length, the method which is the most appropriate to achieve the highest degree of comparability between the tied and untied transactions and between the entities selected for the comparison, which has the highest quality and the most extensive amount of information available to justify its adequate justification and application, and which involves the smallest number of adjustments to eliminate differences between comparable facts and situations”. (v) ‘Two transactions meet the conditions for comparable transactions if they are substantially the same, meaning that their relevant economic and financial characteristics are identical or sufficiently similar, so that the differences between the transactions or between the undertakings involved in them are not such as to significantly affect the terms and conditions which would prevail in a normal market situation, or, if they do, so that the necessary adjustments can be made to eliminate the material effects of the differences found’ (16). (vi) “In the case of operations ...

Skechers US Inc. had formed a related party entity, SKII, in 1999 and transferred IP and $18 million in cash to the entity in exchange for 100 percent of the stock. Skechers then licensed the IP back from SKII and claimed a franchise tax deduction for the royalties and also deductions for management fees and interest expenses on the unpaid balance of royalty fees. The Wisconsin tax authorities held that these were sham transaction lacking business purpose and disallowed the deductions. Judgement of the Tax Appeals Commission The Tax Appeals Commission ruled in favor of the tax authorities. Excerpt “(…) The burden of proof is on Petitioner to prove that the Department’s assessment is incorrect by clear and satisfactory evidence. In this case, Petitioner must prove that it had a valid nontax business purpose for entering into the licensing transaction that generated the royalty deductions claimed on its Wisconsin tax returns and that the licensing transaction had economic substance. Both are required. Petitioner did not present persuasive evidence or testimony of either requirement being met. Therefore, the Department’s assessments are upheld. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner did not have a valid nontax business purpose for the creation of SKII. Petitioner did not have a valid nontax business purpose for entering into the licensing transactions between Skechers and SKII that generated the royalty deductions claimed on its Wisconsin tax returns. Petitioner’s licensing transactions between Skechers and SKII did not have economic substance. (…)” ...

A local manufacturer – BASF Argentina S.A. – belonging to the German multinational group – BASF – specialized in chemical products which it produced and sold. For these activities it used imported and national inputs that it transformed through licensed industrial procedures owned by companies of the same group. It had signed 6 technology transfer and trademark use license agreements (CTT) with three related companies, under which it paid a fee for the sale of products manufactured in the country with the licensed technologies and trademarks. BASF Argentina S.A. also imported finished products with the same brands, but only for resale in the country. It claimed that no royalties were paid for these products. The customs authority objected to the non-inclusion of royalties in the import value. Judgement of the Tax Court The Court found that the royalties paid were also part of the value of the imported goods. Excerpt “…In this state of affairs, it is clear that the percentages of 99%, in both charges, allow to conclude, with a reasonable degree of certainty, that the universe of import shipments whose value adjustment was challenged and subject of the proceedings, correspond to inputs acquired from companies of the same economic group whose corporate name includes the name “BASF”, so it is in line with reality to induce that such products carry the ”BASF” technology and, therefore, the “BASF” brand of its manufacturer. And it is precisely the circumstance of inseparability which adds commercial value to the product, bringing certainty to the consumer as to the production process involved in its manufacture. Indeed, over the four years under study, the inputs imported by the plaintiff have been manufactured by more than thirty different companies, located in different parts of the world, which share the characteristic of including the name “BASF” in their corporate name. From this perspective, it is unequivocal that the inputs are manufactured with BASF’s intellectual property and licensed to the Argentine buyer, who, when acquiring them, necessarily imports the product plus the intangible (BASF trademark), guarantee of the manufacturing technology of the tangible. This hypothesis is reinforced by an analysis of the absurd: it is contrary to all logic to suppose that BASF Argentina carries out in 4 years more than 14,000 purchases from more than 30 BASF suppliers all over the world, of inputs manufactured by them, and to suppose that all of them do not have in their real implicit commercial value the BASF technology that assures the buyer – BASF ARGENTINA – a certain quality/prestige/guarantee that comes with knowing, precisely, that it was manufactured by the BASF economic group. And it is this added value that corresponds to the denomination “brand”. In view of the foregoing, the tax representatives are right when they state, in relation to the non-connection maintained by the plaintiff, that what is said does not reflect the commercial reality of the economic group since, according to the declaration of the import dispatches analysed above, the companies supplying the products bear the word “BASF” in their names, from which it is reasonably certain that they would form part of the same economic group with BASF ARGENTINA S. A. A. And, it is worth noting that this conclusion was not undermined by the appellant with evidence sufficiently convincing to remove all doubt. In short, in order for imported inputs to be entitled to a certain intangible, they do not need to be subjected to any industrial process in the national territory, since such circumstance involves another type of taxable event. On the other hand, the generating event in question refers to the importation of goods for consumption for an indefinite period of time; and everything that forms part of the product that enters through customs will form part of the taxable value. Thus, neither the process to which the product was subjected abroad -whose consequence does affect the taxable value of the imported good- nor the process that could affect it while nationalised is under discussion; only the state of the product at the time the HI is perfected, i.e. at the time of release for free circulation -regular imports- is of interest. In short, it is concluded that all the transactions carried out by BASF ARGENTINA and for which it imported BASF branded inputs, must include in the taxable value the real value of the product, understood as the aggregate of the tangible and intangible value. …” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

“3M Parent” is the parent company of the 3M Group and owns the Group’s trademarks. Other intellectual property, including patents and unpatented technology, is owned by “3M Sub-parent”, a second-tier wholly owned US subsidiary of 3M Parent. “3M Brazil” has used trademarks owned by 3M US in its business operations. 3M Brazil’s use of these trademarks was governed by three trademark licences entered into by 3M Parent and 3M Brazil in 1998. Each licence covered a separate set of trademarks. Under the terms of the licences, 3M Brazil paid 3M Parent a royalty equal to 1% of its sales of the trademarked products. Some products sold by 3M Brazil were covered by trademarks covered by more than one of the three trademark licences. For such products, 3M Brazil and 3M Parent calculated the trademark royalties using a stacking principle whereby, for example, if a particular product used trademarks covered by all three trademark licences, the royalties would be 3% of the sales of that product. By calculating royalties using this stacking principle, 3M Brazil paid trademark royalties to 3M Parent in 2006. 3M Brazil also used patents and unpatented technology owned by 3M Sub-parent in its operations. 3M Brazil paid no patent royalties and made no technology transfer payments to 3M Sub-parent. There was no patent licence or technology transfer agreement between 3M Sub-parent and 3M Brazil. On its 2006 consolidated federal income tax return, 3M Parent reported as income the trademark royalties paid by 3M Brazil to 3M Parent in 2006. In the notice of deficiency, the IRS determined that the income of the 3M Parent consolidated group under I.R.C. sec. 482 to reflect 3M Brazil’s use of intellectual property owned by 3M Parent and 3M Sub-parent. The increase in income determined in the notice of deficiency represents an arm’s length compensation for the intellectual property used by 3M Brazil. 3M Parent’s position was that the I.R.C. sec. 482 allocation should be the maximum amount 3M Brazil could have paid for the intellectual property in question under Brazilian law, less related expenses. 3M Parent also contended that the entire regulation was invalid because income could not be allocated to a taxpayer that did not receive income and could not legally receive the income. The IRS’s position was that the I.R.C. sec. 482 adjustment does not take into account the effect of the Brazilian statutory restrictions unless certain conditions are met, and that the Brazilian statutory restrictions did not meet those conditions. The blocked income rules in section 1.482-1(h)(2) require, among other things, that the foreign law restriction apply equally to controlled and uncontrolled parties, be publicly announced, and prevent the payment or receipt of an arm’s length amount in any form. Tax Court opinion The US Tax Court agreed with the IRS that 3M’s US income should be increased by royalties from 3M Brazil’s use of its trademarks and other intellectual property – without regard to the legal restrictions on related party royalty payments in Brazil ...

Surprise Drinks a. s. imports plastic toys from China, generally inspired by animated films (‘the imported goods’), which it added as a gift to a drink sold by it (‘the finished product’). In its customs declarations it did not include royalties paid in the value of the imported toys. According to the customs office, the royalty/licence payments should have been included and therefore the customs office decided to impose a duty of CZK 50 541. An appeal was filed with the Regional Court. According to Surprise Drinks a. s., the customs authorities had erred in its interpretation of the Customs Code of the European Union. It follows from the wording of that provision itself that royalties form part of the customs value of goods only in so far as they relate to the goods being valued. However, it is only the final product, i.e. the beverage, that is the subject of the royalty, not the imported toys and labels. Therefore, the customs authorities’s conclusion that the inclusion of royalties in the customs value of the goods is not affected by the fact that royalties are paid only on the value of the beverage is incorrect. Surprise Drinks a. s. also argued that the second condition for the inclusion of royalties in the customs value under Article 71(1)(c) of the Customs Code, which is that the royalties must be paid by the purchaser as a condition of the sale of the goods being valued, is not fulfilled. Since neither the labels nor the toys are sold separately and the royalties are payable only on the sale of the final product, the applicant is not required to pay royalties as a condition of the sale of the imported goods. Judgement of the Court The Regional Court dismissed the appeal. Excerpts (Unofficial English Translation) “25. This judgment was followed up by the CJEU on 9 July 2006. 2020 in Case C-76/19, interpreting the same provision, and concluded that it must be interpreted as meaning that the proportionate part of the royalties paid by a company to their parent company in consideration for the provision of know-how for the production of final products must be added to the price, actually paid or to be paid for the imported goods in circumstances where those goods are intended, together with other components, to form part of those final products and the former company obtains those goods from sellers other than the parent company, where – royalties have not been included in the price actually paid or payable for those goods, – relate to the imported goods, which presupposes that there is a sufficiently close relationship between the royalties and those goods, – the payment of the royalties is a condition of the sale of the goods in question, so that, if they were not paid, the contract of sale in respect of the imported goods would not be concluded and the goods would not be delivered; and – a reasonable allocation of royalties can be made on the basis of objective and measurable data, which must be verified by the referring court in the light of all the relevant circumstances and, in particular, the legal and factual relationships between the buyers, the individual sellers and the licensor. 26. In the present case, the amount of the royalty is based on the price of the final product to which the imported goods are attached, although the subject matter of the licence agreements is the imported goods, as the court verified from the licence agreements. The situation is therefore the same as in the cited case. Case C-175/15, in that the royalties relate only to the part of the final product on which the royalty is payable. Even in that situation, the CJEU considered the royalties to be part of the customs value of the goods and that conclusion can be applied to the present case. The Regional Court adds that the fact that, if the applicant wished to dispose of the imported goods for their intended purpose, i.e. to attach them as a gift to the final product sold, it could not do so without paying the licence fee, is a matter of concern. Without payment of the licence fee, the beverage and the toy with it could not be legally sold. Thus, although the amount of the licence fee and the time at which it is payable are linked not to the sale of the imported goods but to the sale of the final product of which they form part, payment of the licence fee is a condition of the sale of the product (condition under C-76/19). 27. In the present case, the other conditions set out above in C-76/19 CJEU are also fulfilled. The royalty was not included in the price actually paid or payable for the goods, i.e. actually paid by the applicant to its supplier, since that royalty is paid only at the time of sale of the final product. There is a relationship between the royalty and the imported goods, since the royalty provisions in the licence agreements relate to the imported goods. On the last condition, the possibility of allocating royalties reasonably on the basis of objective and measurable data, the Regional Court will comment below (see paragraph 31 of this judgment). … 32. The Regional Court fully agrees with that assessment, since the applicant does not put forward any arguments which contradict the defendant’s conclusions. According to Article 73 of the Customs Code, the customs authorities may, on application, allow the following amounts to be determined on the basis of specific criteria where those amounts are not quantifiable at the date of acceptance of the customs declaration: (a) the amounts to be included in the customs value in accordance with Article 70(2); and (b) the amounts referred to in Articles 71 and 72; Article 71(c) concerns royalties. Thus, there was nothing to prevent the applicant from requesting specific criteria by which the amounts of the estimated value of the royalties ...

Arditi S.p.A. is an Italian group in the lighting industry. It has a subsidiary in Hong Kong which in turn holds the shares in a Chinese subsidiary where products are manufactured. Following an audit the tax authorities held that the entities in Hong Kong and China had used the trademark owned by the Italian parent without paying royalties, and on the basis of the arm’s length principle a 5% royalty was added to the taxable income of Arditi S.p.A. Arditi appealed against this assessment alleging that it had never received any remuneration for the use of its trademark by the subsidiary, and in any case that the tax authorities had not determined the royalty in accordance with the arm’s length principle. The Court of first instance upheld the appeal of Arditi and set aside the assessment. An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities. The Court of Appeal set aside the decision of the Court of first instance finding the assessment issued by the tax authorities regarding royalties well-founded. An appeal was then filed by Arditi with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Court The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal of Arditi and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal and thus the assessment of additional royalty income issued by the tax authorities. Excerpts “1.1. The plea is unfounded. In fact, it should be recalled that “On the subject of the determination of business income, the rules set forth in Article 110, paragraph 7, Presidential Decree no. 917 of 1986, aimed at repressing the economic phenomenon of “transfer pricing”, i.e. the shifting of taxable income as a result of transactions between companies belonging to the same group and subject to different national regulations, does not require the administration to prove the elusive function, but only the existence of “transactions” between related companies at a price apparently lower than the normal price, while it is the taxpayer’s burden, by virtue of the principle of proximity of proof pursuant to art. 2697 of the Civil Code and on the subject of tax deductions, the onus is on the taxpayer to prove that such ‘transactions’ took place for market values to be considered normal within the meaning of Art. 9, paragraph 3, of the same decree, such being the prices of goods and services practiced in conditions of free competition, at the same stage of marketing, at the time and place where the goods and services were purchased or rendered and, failing that, at the nearest time and place and with reference, as far as possible, to price lists and rates in use, thus not excluding the usability of other means of proof” (Cass. 19/05/2021, n. 13571). Now, the use of a trade mark must be presumed not to have a normal value of zero, which can also be expressed, as the judgment under appeal does, by the exceptionality of the relative gratuitousness. This places the onus on the taxpayer to prove that such gratuitousness corresponds to the normal value, that is, to the normality of the fact that such use takes place without consideration.” (…) “3. The third plea alleges failure to examine a decisive fact, in relation to Article 360(1)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, since the appeal judges failed to assess the circumstance that a large part of the production of the Chinese subsidiary was absorbed by the Italian parent company. 3.1. This plea is inadmissible, since with it the taxpayer tends to bring under this profile the examination of the exceptional nature of the gratuitousness of the use of the mark, held by the CTR. In fact, the latter was well aware of the null value of the consideration for the use of the trade mark, while the fact that the trade mark itself was the subject of co-use was expressly taken into consideration by the appellate court, and the fact that its transfer free of charge in any case corresponded to a ‘valid economic reason’, constitutes a mere deduction, whereas the failure to mention the circumstance that the majority of the Chinese company’s transactions were directed to another subsidiary (this time a Brazilian one), without entering into the merits of its relevance, constitutes at most an aspect concerning the assessment of a single element of the investigation, which cannot be denounced under the profile under examination (Cass. 24/06/2020, n. 12387).” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

SA SACLA, which trades in protective clothing and footwear as well as small equipment, was subject of a tax audit covering the FY 2007, 2008 and 2009. In a proposed assessment issued in December 2011, the tax authorities increased its taxable income on the basis of Article 57 of the General Tax Code, by considering that SACLA, by selling, a set of brands/trademarks held by it for EUR 90,000 to a Luxembourg company, Involvex, which benefited from a preferential tax regime, had carried out an indirect transfer of profits in the form of a reduction in the selling price. In a ruling of February 2020, the Lyon Administrative Court of Appeal, after dismissing the plea of irregularity in the judgment, decided that an expert would carry out an valuation to determine whether the sale price of the trademarks corresponded to their value. The valuation should take into consideration an agreed exemption from payment of royalties for a period of five years granted by Involvex to SA SACLA. The expert report was filed on 8 April 2021 and after receiving the report SA SACLA asked the court to change the judgment by considering that the value of the transferred trademarks should be set at a sum of between 1.3 and 2.1 million euros and that penalties for deliberate breach should be discharged. By judgement of 19 August 2021 the court dismissed the request filed by SACLA and determined the value of the trademarks – in accordance with the expert report – to be 5,897,610 euros. “The value of the trademarks transferred by SACLA, initially declared by that company in the amount of EUR 90,000 excluding tax, was corrected by the tax authorities to EUR 11,288,000 excluding tax, and was then reduced by the judgment under appeal to EUR 8,733,348 excluding tax. It follows from the investigation, in particular from the expert’s report filed on 8 April 2021, that this value, taking into account the exemption from payment of royalties granted by the purchaser of the trademarks in the amount of 2,400,000 euros excluding tax and after taking into account corporate income tax, must be established at the sum of 5,897,610 euros excluding tax. The result is a difference between the agreed price and the value of the trade marks transferred in the amount of EUR 5 807 610 excluding tax, which constitutes an advantage for the purchaser. The applicant, who merely contests the amount of that advantage, does not invoke any interest or consideration of such a nature as to justify such an advantage. In these circumstances, the administration provides the proof that it is responsible for the existence of a reduction in the price of the sale of assets and the existence of an indirect transfer of profits abroad.” An appeal was then filed by SACLA with the Supreme Administrative Court Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court set aside articles 3 and 6 of the Judgement from the Administrative Court of Appeal. “Article 3: The judgment of the Lyon Administrative Court of 10 October 2017 is reversed insofar as it is contrary to the present judgment. … … Article 6: The remainder of the parties’ submissions is rejected.” Excerpts “2. In a judgment before the law of 13 February 2020, the Lyon Administrative Court of Appeal decided that, before ruling on the Sacla company’s request, an expert appraisal would be carried out in order to determine whether the sale price of the trademarks sold by that company corresponded to their value, taking into consideration, in particular, the waiver of payment of royalties for a period of five years granted by the purchasing company, Involvex, to the Sacla company. In order to fulfil the mission entrusted to them by the court, the expert and his assistant first considered four methods, then abandoned the method of comparables and the method of capitalisation of royalties, and finally retained only two methods, the method of historical costs and the method of discounting future flows, from which they derived a weighted average. It follows from the statements in the judgment under appeal that the court, after considering that the historical cost method did not allow the effect of corporation tax to be taken into account with any certainty and led to a valuation almost eight times lower than the discounted cash flow method, rejected the former method and adopted only the latter and considered that there was no need to carry out a weighting, since, in its view, the discounted cash flow method proved to be the most accurate. (3) It follows from the statements in the judgment under appeal that the court, after fixing the value of the trade marks transferred by Sacla at EUR 8 733 348 exclusive of tax, an amount also retained by the administrative court, intended to apply the discount recommended by the expert report of 7 April 2021 in order to take account of the exemption from payment of royalties granted for five years by the purchaser of the trade marks. In fixing the amount of that discount at EUR 2 400 000 exclusive of tax, whereas the expert report which it intended to apply estimated it, admittedly, at that amount in absolute terms, but by applying a rate of 37% to a value of the trade marks transferred estimated at EUR 6 500 000, the Court distorted that expert report and gave insufficient reasons for its judgment. (4) It follows from the foregoing that, without needing to rule on the other grounds of appeal, Articles 3 to 6 of the contested judgment should be set aside and, in the circumstances of the case, the State should be ordered to pay the sum of EUR 3 000 to Coverguards Sales under Article L. 761-1 of the Code of Administrative Justice.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

“XZ Insurance SA” is the parent company in a group engaged in insurance activities in its various branches, both life and non-life, finance, investment property and services. An audit was conducted for FY 2013-2016 and in 2020 an assessment was issued in relation to both controlled transactions and other transactions. Among outher issued the tax authorities determined that “XZ Insurance SA” did not receive any royalty income from the use of the XZ trademark by to other entities of the group, both domestic and foreign. In the assessment the tax authorities determined the arm’s length royalty percentage for use of the trademarks to be on average ~0,5%. “In order to estimate the market royalty, the first aspect to be studied is the existence of an internal comparable or comparable trademark assignment contracts. And we have already stated that the absence of valid internal and external comparables has led us to resort to the use of other generally accepted valuation methods and techniques. In this respect, it should be noted that this situation is frequent when valuing transactions related to intangibles, and the Guidelines have expressly echoed this situation (in particular, in paragraphs 6.138, 6.153, 6.156, 6.157 and 6.162, which are transcribed in section 6.2 of this Report).” A complaint was filed by “XZ Insurance SA” Judgement of the TEAC The TEAC dismissed the complaint of “XZ Insurance SA” and upheld the tax assessment. Excerpts from the decision concerning the assessment of income for use of the trademarks by other group companies “On this issue, it is worth pointing out an idea that the complainant uses recurrently in its written submissions. The complainant considers that if there is no growth in the number of policies and premiums, it should not be argued that the use of the XZ brand generates a profit in the subsidiaries. However, as the Inspectorate has already replied, it is not possible to identify the increase in the profit of the brand with the increase in premiums, nor that the growth, in certain countries, of the entities is exclusively due to the value of the brand. Logically, increases and decreases in premiums are due to multiple factors, including the disposable income of the inhabitants of each country, tax regulations, civil liability legislation, among others, and we cannot share the complainant’s view that the brand does not generate a profit in the event of a decrease in premiums in the market. Furthermore, insofar as the enforceability of the royalty is conditioned by the fact that the assignment produces a profit for the company using the brand, there is greater evidence as to the usefulness of the brand in the main markets in which the group operates and in which it is most relevant: Spain, COUNTRY_1, Latin American countries, COUNTRY_2, COUNTRY_3, COUNTRY_4 and COUNTRY_5. Finally, one aspect that draws the attention of this TEAC is the contrast between what the complainant demands that the administration should do and the attitude of the administration in the inspection procedure. On the one hand, it demands that the administration carry out a detailed analysis of the valuation of the profit generated by the trademark for the group, but, on the other hand, there is a total lack of contribution on the part of the entity in providing specific information on the valuation of the trademark that could facilitate the task it demands of the administration. In fact, this information was requested by the Inspectorate, to which it replied that “there are no studies available on the value or awareness and relevance of the XZ brand in the years under inspection” (…) “It follows from the above that it has not been proven that the different entities of the group made direct contributions or contributions that would determine that, effectively, the economic ownership of the trademark should be shared. Therefore, this TEAC must consider, given the existing evidence, that both the legal and economic ownership of the trademark corresponds to the entity XZ ESPAÑA. In short, it is clear from the facts set out above that certain entities of the group used, and use, for the marketing of their services and products, a relevant and internationally established trademark, the “XZ” trademark, which gives them a prestige in the market that directly and undoubtedly has an impact on their sales figures, with the consequent increase in their economic profit. It is clear from the above that there was, in the years audited, a transfer of use of an established, international brand, valued by independent third parties (according to the ONFI report, according to …, between … and …. million euros in the years under review) and maintained from a maintenance point of view (relevant advertising and promotional expenses). Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, as does the Inspectorate, that, in a transaction of this type – the assignment of the “XZ” trademark – carried out at arm’s length, a payment for the use of the intangible asset would have been made to its owner, without prejudice to the fact that the value assigned to the assignment of use of the aforementioned trademark may be disputed; but what seems clear, and this is what the TEAC states, is that it is an intangible asset whose assignment of use has value. In conclusion, the TEAC considers that the entity owning the trademark (XZ SPAIN) had an intangible asset and transferred its use, for which it should receive income; by transferring the use of the asset to group entities, both domiciled in Spain and abroad, it is appropriate to calculate that income for XZ SPAIN by applying the regime for related-party transactions.” (…) “In section 6 of the report, as we have already analysed, ONFI attempts to find external comparables, insofar as there are no internal comparables within the group, reaching the conclusion that they cannot be identified in the market analysed. Consequently, it proceeds to estimate the royalty that XZ Spain should receive, by applying other methodologies that allow an approximation to the arm’s length price, based ...

Google Ireland licenses Google AdWords technology to its subsidiary in India and several other countries across the world. The Tax Tribunal in India found that despite the duty of Google India to withhold tax at the time of payment to Google Ireland, no tax was withheld. This was considered tax evasion, and Google was ordered to pay USD 224 million. The case was appealed by Google to the High Court, where the case was remanded to the Income Tax Appellate Authority for re-examination. Judgement of the ITAT After re-examining the matter on the orders of the Karnataka High Court, the Income Tax Appellate Authority concluded that the payments made by the Google India to Google Ireland between 2007-08 and 2012-13 was not royalties and therefore not subject to withholding tax. Excerpts “30. On a consideration of all the above agreements and the facts on record, we find that none of the rights as per section 14(a)/(b) and section 30 of the Copyright Act, 1957 have been transferred by Google Ireland to the assessee in the present case. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited v. CIT & Anr. (supra), mere use of or right to use a computer program without any transfer of underlying copyright in it as per section 14(a)/(b) or section 30 of the Copyright Act, 1957 will not be satisfying the definition of Royalty under the Act / DTAA. Similarly, use of confidential information, software technology, training documents and others are all ‘literary work’ with copyrights in it owned by the foreign entity and there was no transfer or license of copyrights in favour of the assessee company. Hence, the impugned payments cannot be characterised as ‘Royalty’ under the DTAA. 31. The lower authorities have held that the assessee has been granted the use of or right to use trademarks, other brand features and the process owned by Google Ireland for the purpose of distribution of Adwords program and consequently the sums payable to Google Ireland are royalty. As per Article 12 of India – Ireland DTAA, consideration for the use of or right to use any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process is regarded as royalty. In the present case, as per the distribution agreement, “Google Brand Features” means the Google trade names, trademarks, service marks, logos, domain names, and other distinctive brand features, with some but not all examples at “http://www.google.com/permissions/trademarks.html” (or such other URL that Google may provide from time to time), and such other trade names, trademarks, service marks, logos, domain names, or other distinctive brand features that Google may provide to Distributor for use solely under this Agreement. As per para 6 of the distribution agreement, each party shall own all right, title and interest, including without limitation all Intellectual Property Rights, relating to its Brand Features and Google Irland grants to the assessee / distributor nonexclusive and nonsublicensable licence during the Term to display Google Brand Features solely for the purpose of distributor’s marketing and distribution of AdWords Program under the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in this Agreement. It is thus evident that the trademark and other brand features are not used independently or de hors the distribution agreement but they are incidental or ancillary for the purpose of carrying out the marketing and distribution of Adword program. The Delhi High Court in DIT v Sheraton International Inc [2009] 313 ITR 267 held that when the use of trade mark, trade name etc are incidental to the main service of advertisement, publicity and sales promotion and further when there is no consideration payable for such use of trade mark, trade name etc, the consideration cannot be characterised as royalty. Applying the said principle, in the present case, use of Google Brand Features etc are de hors any consideration payable to Google Ireland and further they are incidental and ancillary for achieving the main purpose of marketing and distributing the Google Adwords Program. Hence, the lower authorities were not right in treating the payments as Royalty. 32. As regards the applicability of ‘use of or right to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment” the CIT(A) held that the assessee cannot be said to have gained right to use any scientific equipment, since, Google Ireland has not parted with the copyright it holds in the Adwords program and hence it cannot be said that any kind of technical knowhow has been transferred to the assessee company. The CIT(A) was not in agreement with the AO on the above issue without prejudice to his view in holding that the remitted amount is royalty on different grounds. The revenue has not challenged the said finding of CIT(A). Hence, the impugned payments cannot be regarded as made for ‘use of or right to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment’. The remaining portion of definition of ‘Royalty’ under the India – Ireland DT AA is consideration for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience. The AO has not characterised the impugned payments as a consideration for the above. In any case, CIT(A) has given a finding that it cannot be said that any kind of technical knowhow has been transferred to the assessee company. This has not been challenged by the revenue. 33. Thus on an overall analysis of the entire facts on record, we hold that the impugned payments cannot be regarded as royalty under the India – Ireland DTAA. It is true that the Google Adword program was commercially and profitably exploited in a commercial sense and profitable manner in India to generate revenues from Indian customers or advertisers. This is the business or commercial aspect of the transaction. However, the stand of the lower authorities that the impugned payments are in the nature of Royalty cannot be upheld especially under Article 12 of the India – Ireland DTAA merely because the marketing, distribution and ITES activities are carried out in India and revenues are ...

Transfer of intangible to offshore manufacturer. (i) DevCo is a U.S. developer, producer and marketer of widgets. DevCo develops a new “high tech widget” (htw) that is manufactured by its foreign subsidiary ManuCo located in Country H. ManuCo sells the htw to MarkCo (a U.S. subsidiary of DevCo) for distribution and marketing in the United States. The taxable year 1996 is under audit, and the district director examines whether the royalty rate of 5 percent paid by ManuCo to DevCo is an arm’s length consideration for the htw technology. (ii) Based on all the facts and circumstances, the district director determines that the comparable profits method will provide the most reliable measure of an arm’s length result. ManuCo is selected as the tested party because it engages in relatively routine manufacturing activities, while DevCo engages in a variety of complex activities using unique and valuable intangibles. Finally, because ManuCo engages in manufacturing activities, it is determined that the ratio of operating profit to operating assets is an appropriate profit level indicator. (iii) Uncontrolled taxpayers performing similar functions cannot be found in country H. It is determined that data available in countries M and N provides the best match of companies in a similar market performing similar functions and bearing similar risks. Such data is sufficiently complete to identify many of the material differences between ManuCo and the uncontrolled comparables, and to make adjustments to account for such differences. However, data is not sufficiently complete so that it is likely that no material differences remain. In particular, the differences in geographic markets might have materially affected the results of the various companies. (iv) In a separate analysis, it is determined that the price that ManuCo charged to MarkCo for the htw’s is an arm’s length price under § 1.482-3(b). Therefore, ManuCo’s financial data derived from its sales to MarkCo are reliable. ManuCo’s financial data from 1994-1996 is as follows: 1994 1995 1996 Average Assets $24,000 $25,000 $26,000 $25,000 Sales to MarkCo 25,000 30,000 35,000 30,000 Cost of Goods Sold 6,250 7,500 8,750 7,500 Royalty to DevCo (5%) 1,250 1,500 1,750 1,500 Other 5,000 6,000 7,000 6,000 Operating Expenses 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 Operating Profit 17,750 21,500 25,250 21,500 (v) Applying the ratios of average operating profit to operating assets for the 1994 through 1996 taxable years derived from a group of similar uncontrolled comparables located in country M and N to ManuCo’s average operating assets for the same period provides a set of comparable operating profits. The interquartile range for these average comparable operating profits is $3,000 to $4,500. ManuCo’s average reported operating profit for the years 1994 through 1996 ($21,500) falls outside this range. Therefore, the district director determines that an allocation may be appropriate for the 1996 taxable year. (vi) To determine the amount, if any, of the allocation for the 1996 taxable year, the district director compares ManuCo’s reported operating profit for 1996 to the median of the comparable operating profits derived from the uncontrolled distributors’ results for 1996. The median result for the uncontrolled comparables for 1996 is $3,750. Based on this comparison, the district director increases royalties that ManuCo paid by $21,500 (the difference between $25,250 and the median of the comparable operating profits, $3,750) ...

(i) Facts. The year 1 facts are the same as in Example 3. In year 2, FP and USSub enter into a separate services agreement that obligates FP to perform incremental marketing activities, not specified in the year 1 license, by advertising AA trademarked athletic gear in selected international sporting events, such as the Olympics and the soccer World Cup. FP’s corporate advertising department develops and coordinates these special promotions. The separate services agreement obligates USSub to pay an amount to FP for the benefit to USSub that may reasonably be anticipated as the result of FP’s incremental activities. The separate services agreement is not a qualified cost sharing arrangement under § 1.482-7T. FP begins to perform the incremental activities in year 2 pursuant to the separate services agreement. (ii) Whether an allocation is warranted with respect to the incremental marketing activities performed by FP under the separate services agreement would be evaluated under § 1.482-9. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to anticipate that FP’s activities would increase the value of USSub’s license as well as the value of FP’s trademark. Accordingly, the incremental activities by FP may constitute in part a controlled services transaction for which USSub must compensate FP. The analysis of whether an allocation is warranted would include a comparison of the compensation provided for the services with the results obtained under a method pursuant to § 1.482-9, selected and applied in accordance with the best method rule of § 1.482-1(c). (iii) Whether an allocation is appropriate with respect to the royalty under the license agreement would be evaluated under §§ 1.482-1 through 1.482-3, this section, and §§ 1.482-5 and 1.482-6. The comparability analysis would include consideration of all relevant factors, such as the term and geographical exclusivity of USSub’s license, the nature of the intangible property subject to the license, and the marketing activities required to be undertaken by both FP and USSub pursuant to the license. This comparability analysis would take into account that the compensation for the incremental activities performed by FP was provided for in the separate services agreement, rather than embedded in the royalty paid for use of the AA trademark. For illustrations of application of the best method rule, see § 1.482-8, Example 10, Example 11, and Example 12 ...

(i) Facts. The year 1 facts are the same as in Example 3. In year 2, FP and USSub enter into a separate services agreement that obligates USSub to perform certain incremental marketing activities to promote AA trademark athletic gear in the United States, above and beyond the activities specified in the license agreement executed in year 1. In year 2, USSub begins to perform these incremental activities, pursuant to the separate services agreement with FP. (ii) Whether an allocation is warranted with respect to USSub’s incremental marketing activities covered by the separate services agreement would be evaluated under §§ 1.482-1 and 1.482-9, including a comparison of the compensation provided for the services with the results obtained under a method pursuant to § 1.482-9, selected and applied in accordance with the best method rule of § 1.482-1(c). (iii) Whether an allocation is warranted with respect to the royalty under the license agreement is determined under § 1.482-1, and this section through § 1.482-6. The comparability analysis would include consideration of all relevant factors, such as the term and geographical exclusivity of the license, the nature of the intangible property subject to the license, and the nature of the marketing activities required to be undertaken pursuant to the license. The comparability analysis would take into account that the compensation for the incremental activities by USSub is provided for in the separate services agreement, rather than embedded in the royalty paid for use of the AA trademark. For illustrations of application of the best method rule, see § 1.482-8 Examples 10, 11, and 12 ...

(i) Facts. The year 1 facts are the same as in Example 3, with the following exceptions. In year 2, USSub undertakes certain incremental marketing activities in addition to those required by the contractual terms of the license for the AA trademark executed in year 1. The parties do not execute a separate agreement with respect to these incremental marketing activities performed by USSub. The license agreement executed in year 1 is of sufficient duration that it is reasonable to anticipate that USSub will obtain the benefit of its incremental activities, in the form of increased sales or revenues of trademarked products in the U.S. market. (ii) To the extent that it was reasonable to anticipate that USSub’s incremental marketing activities would increase the value only of USSub’s intangible property (that is, USSub’s license to use the AA trademark for a specified term), and not the value of the AA trademark owned by FP, USSub’s incremental activities do not constitute a contribution for which an allocation is warranted under paragraph (f)(4)(i) of this section ...

(i) Facts. FP, a foreign producer of athletic gear, is the registered holder of the AA trademark in the United States and in other countries. In year 1, FP licenses to a newly organized U.S. subsidiary, USSub, the exclusive rights to use certain manufacturing and marketing intangible property to manufacture and market athletic gear in the United States under the AA trademark. The license agreement obligates USSub to pay a royalty based on sales of trademarked merchandise. The license agreement also obligates FP and USSub to perform without separate compensation specified types and levels of marketing activities. In year 1, USSub manufactures and sells athletic gear under the AA trademark in the United States. (ii) The consideration for FP’s and USSub’s respective marketing activities is embedded in the contractual terms of the license for the AA trademark. Accordingly, pursuant to paragraph (f)(4)(i) of this section, ordinarily no separate allocation would be appropriate with respect to the embedded contributions in year 1. See § 1.482-9(m)(4). (iii) Whether an allocation is warranted with respect to the royalty under the license agreement would be analyzed under § 1.482-1, and this section through § 1.482-6. The comparability analysis would include consideration of all relevant factors, such as the term and geographical exclusivity of the license, the nature of the intangible property subject to the license, and the nature of the marketing activities required to be undertaken pursuant to the license. Pursuant to paragraph (f)(4)(i) of this section, the analysis would also take into account the fact that the compensation for the marketing services is embedded in the royalty paid for use of the AA trademark, rather than provided for in a separate services agreement. For illustrations of application of the best method rule, see § 1.482-8 Examples 10, 11, and 12 ...

(i) FP, a foreign corporation, licenses to USS, its U.S. subsidiary, a new air-filtering process that permits manufacturing plants to meet new environmental standards. The license runs for a 10-year period, and the profit derived from the new process is projected to be $15 million per year, for an aggregate profit of $150 million. (ii) The royalty rate for the license is based on a comparable uncontrolled transaction involving a comparable intangible under comparable circumstances. The requirements of paragraphs (f)(2)(ii)(B)(1) through (5) of this section have been met. Specifically, FP and USS have entered into a written agreement that provides for a royalty in each year of the license, the royalty rate is considered arm’s length for the first taxable year in which a substantial royalty was required to be paid, the license limited the use of the process to a specified field, consistent with industry practice, and there are no substantial changes in the functions performed by USS after the license was entered into. (iii) In examining Year 4 of the license, the district director determines that the aggregate actual profits earned by USS through Year 4 are $30 million, less than 80% of the projected profits of $60 million. However, USS establishes to the satisfaction of the district director that the aggregate actual profits from the process are less than 80% of the projected profits in Year 3 because an earthquake severely damaged USS’s manufacturing plant. Because the difference between the projected profits and actual profits was due to an extraordinary event that was beyond the control of USS, and could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time the license was entered into, the requirement under § 1.482-4(f)(2)(ii)(D) has been met, and no adjustment under this section is made ...

(i) The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that Eurodrug’s actual profits earned were much higher than the projected profits, as follows: Profit projections Actual profits Year 1 200 250 Year 2 250 500 Year 3 500 800 Year 4 350 700 Year 5 100 600 Total 1400 2850 (ii) In examining USdrug’s tax return for Year 5, the district director considers the actual profits realized by Eurodrug in Year 5, and all past years. Accordingly, although Years 1 through 4 may be closed under the statute of limitations, for purposes of determining whether an adjustment should be made with respect to the royalty rate in Year 5 with respect to Nosplit, the district director aggregates the actual profits from those years with the profits of Year 5. However, the district director will make an adjustment, if any, only with respect to Year 5 ...

(i) USdrug, a U.S. pharmaceutical company, has developed a new drug, Nosplit, that is useful in treating migraine headaches and produces no significant side effects. A number of other drugs for treating migraine headaches are already on the market, but Nosplit can be expected rapidly to dominate the worldwide market for such treatments and to command a premium price since all other treatments produce side effects. Thus, USdrug projects that extraordinary profits will be derived from Nosplit in the U.S. and European markets. (ii) USdrug licenses its newly established European subsidiary, Eurodrug, the rights to produce and market Nosplit for the European market for 5 years. In setting the royalty rate for this license, USdrug makes projections of the annual sales revenue and the annual profits to be derived from the exploitation of Nosplit by Eurodrug. Based on the projections, a royalty rate of 3.9% is established for the term of the license. (iii) In Year 1, USdrug evaluates the royalty rate it received from Eurodrug. Given the high profit potential of Nosplit, USdrug is unable to locate any uncontrolled transactions dealing with licenses of comparable intangible property. USdrug therefore determines that the comparable uncontrolled transaction method will not provide a reliable measure of an arm’s length royalty. However, applying the comparable profits method to Eurodrug, USdrug determines that a royalty rate of 3.9% will result in Eurodrug earning an arm’s length return for its manufacturing and marketing functions. (iv) In Year 5, the U.S. income tax return for USdrug is examined, and the district director must determine whether the royalty rate between USdrug and Eurodrug is commensurate with the income attributable to Nosplit. In making this determination, the district director considers whether any of the exceptions in § 1.482-4(f)(2)(ii) are applicable. In particular, the district director compares the profit projections attributable to Nosplit made by USdrug against the actual profits realized by Eurodrug. The projected and actual profits are as follows: Profit projections Actual profits Year 1 200 250 Year 2 250 300 Year 3 500 600 Year 4 350 200 Year 5 100 100 Total 1400 1450 (v) The total profits earned through Year 5 were not less than 80% nor more than 120% of the profits that were projected when the license was entered into. If the district director determines that the other requirements of § 1.482-4(f)(2)(ii)(C) were met, no adjustment will be made to the royalty rate between USdrug and Eurodrug for the license of Nosplit ...

(i) FP, is a foreign company that designs, manufactures and sells industrial equipment. FP has developed proprietary components that are incorporated in its products. These components are important in the operation of FP’s equipment and some of them have distinctive features, but other companies produce similar components and none of these components by itself accounts for a substantial part of the value of FP’s products. (ii) FP licenses its U.S. subsidiary, USSub, exclusive North American rights to use the patented technology for producing component X, a heat exchanger used for cooling operating mechanisms in industrial equipment. Component X incorporates proven technology that makes it somewhat more efficient than the heat exchangers commonly used in industrial equipment. FP also agrees to provide technical support to help adapt component X to USSub’s products and to assist with initial production. Under the terms of the license agreement USSub pays FP a royalty equal to 3 percent of sales of USSub equipment incorporating component X. (iii) FP does not license unrelated parties to use component X, but many similar components are transferred between uncontrolled taxpayers. Consequently, the district director decides to apply the comparable uncontrolled transaction method to evaluate whether the 3 percent royalty for component X is an arm’s length royalty. (iv) The district director uses a database of company documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to identify potentially comparable license agreements between uncontrolled taxpayers that are on file with the SEC. The district director identifies 40 license agreements that were entered into in the same year as the controlled transfer or in the prior or following year, and that relate to transfers of technology associated with industrial equipment that has similar applications to USSub’s products. Further review of these uncontrolled agreements indicates that 25 of them involved components that have a similar level of technical sophistication as component X and could be expected to play a similar role in contributing to the total value of the final product. (v) The district director makes a detailed review of the terms of each of the 25 uncontrolled agreements and finds that 15 of them are similar to the controlled agreement in that they all involve – (A) The transfer of exclusive rights for the North American market; (B) Products for which the market could be expected to be of a similar size to the market for the products into which USSub incorporates component X; (C) The transfer of patented technology; (D) Continuing technical support; (E) Access to technical improvements; (F) Technology of a similar age; and (G) A similar duration of the agreement. (vi) Based on these factors and the fact that none of the components to which these license agreements relate accounts for a substantial part of the value of the final products, the district director concludes that these fifteen intangibles have similar profit potential to the component X technology. (vii) The 15 uncontrolled comparables produce the following royalty rates: License Royalty rate (percent) 1 1.0 2 1.0 3 1.25 4 1.25 5 1.5 6 1.5 7 1.75 8 2.0 9 2.0 10 2.0 11 2.25 12 2.5 13 2.5 14 2.75 15 3.0 (viii) Although the uncontrolled comparables are clearly similar to the controlled transaction, it is likely that unidentified material differences exist between the uncontrolled comparables and the controlled transaction. Therefore, an appropriate statistical technique must be used to establish the arm’s length range. In this case the district director uses the interquartile range to determine the arm’s length range. Therefore, the arm’s length range covers royalty rates from 1.25 to 2.5 percent, and an adjustment is warranted to the 3 percent royalty charged in the controlled transfer. The district director determines that the appropriate adjustment corresponds to a reduction in the royalty rate to 2.0 percent, which is the median of the uncontrolled comparables ...

Non-arm’s length compensation. (i) The facts are the same as in paragraph (i) of Example 4. As in Example 4, assume that, after adjustments are made to improve the reliability of the comparison for any material differences relating to marketing activities, manufacturing or marketing intangible property, and other comparability factors, the royalties paid by independent licensees would provide the most reliable measure of the arm’s length royalty owed by USSub to FP, apart from the additional facts described in paragraph (ii) of this Example 5. (ii) In years 1 through 4, USSub performs certain incremental marketing activities with respect to the AA trademark athletic gear, in addition to the activities required under the terms of the basic license agreement, that are also incremental as compared with those activities observed in the comparables. At the start of year 1, FP enters into a separate services agreement with USSub, which states that FP will compensate USSub quarterly, in an amount equal to specified costs plus X%, for these incremental marketing functions. Further, these written agreements reflect the intent of the parties that USSub receive such compensation from FP throughout the term of the agreement, without regard to the success or failure of the promotional activities. During years 1 through 4, USSub performs marketing activities pursuant to the separate services agreement and in each year USSub receives the specified compensation from FP on a cost of services plus basis. (iii) In evaluating year 4, the Commissioner performs an analysis of independent parties that perform promotional activities comparable to those performed by USSub and that receive separately-stated compensation on a current basis without contingency. The Commissioner determines that the magnitude of the specified cost plus X% is outside the arm’s length range in each of years 1 through 4. Based on an evaluation of all the facts and circumstances, the Commissioner makes an allocation to require payment of compensation to USSub for the promotional activities performed in year 4, based on the median of the interquartile range of the arm’s length markups charged by the uncontrolled comparables described in paragraph (e)(3) of this section. (iv) Given that based on facts and circumstances, the terms agreed by the controlled parties were that FP would bear all risks associated with the promotional activities performed by USSub to promote the AA trademark product in the United States market, and given that the parties’ conduct during the years examined was consistent with this allocation of risk, the fact that the cost of services plus markup on USSub’s services was outside the arm’s length range does not, without more, support imputation of additional contractual terms based on alternative views of the economic substance of the transaction, such as terms indicating that USSub, rather than FP, bore the risk associated with these activities ...

Contractual terms imputed from economic substance. (i) FP, a foreign producer of athletic gear, is the registered holder of the AA trademark in the United States and in other countries worldwide. In year 1, FP enters into a licensing agreement that affords its newly organized United States subsidiary, USSub, exclusive rights to certain manufacturing and marketing intangible property (including the AA trademark) for purposes of manufacturing and marketing athletic gear in the United States under the AA trademark. The contractual terms of this agreement obligate USSub to pay FP a royalty based on sales, and also obligate both FP and USSub to undertake without separate compensation specified types and levels of marketing activities. Unrelated foreign businesses license independent United States businesses to manufacture and market athletic gear in the United States, using trademarks owned by the unrelated foreign businesses. The contractual terms of these uncontrolled transactions require the licensees to pay royalties based on sales of the merchandise, and obligate the licensors and licensees to undertake without separate compensation specified types and levels of marketing activities. In years 1 through 6, USSub manufactures and sells athletic gear under the AA trademark in the United States. Assume that, after adjustments are made to improve the reliability of the comparison for any material differences relating to marketing activities, manufacturing or marketing intangible property, and other comparability factors, the royalties paid by independent licensees would provide the most reliable measure of the arm’s length royalty owed by USSub to FP, apart from the additional facts in paragraph (ii) of this Example 4. (ii) In years 1 through 6, USSub performs incremental marketing activities with respect to the AA trademark athletic gear, in addition to the activities required under the terms of the license agreement with FP, that are also incremental as compared to those observed in the comparables. FP does not directly or indirectly compensate USSub for performing these incremental activities during years 1 through 6. By year 7, AA trademark athletic gear generates a premium return in the United States, as compared to similar athletic gear marketed by independent licensees. In year 7, USSub and FP enter into a separate services agreement under which FP agrees to compensate USSub on a cost basis for the incremental marketing activities that USSub performed during years 1 through 6, and to compensate USSub on a cost basis for any incremental marketing activities it may perform in year 7 and subsequent years. In addition, the parties revise the license agreement executed in year 1, and increase the royalty to a level that attributes to FP substantially all the premium return from sales of the AA trademark athletic gear in the United States. (iii) In determining whether an allocation of income is appropriate in year 7, the Commissioner may consider the economic substance of the arrangements between USSub and FP and the parties’ course of conduct throughout their relationship. Based on this analysis, the Commissioner determines that it is unlikely that, ex ante, an uncontrolled taxpayer operating at arm’s length would engage in the incremental marketing activities to develop or enhance intangible property owned by another party unless it received contemporaneous compensation or otherwise had a reasonable anticipation of a future benefit. In this case, USSub’s undertaking the incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6 is a course of conduct that is inconsistent with the parties’ adoption in year 7 of contractual terms by which FP compensates USSub on a cost basis for the incremental marketing activities that it performed. Therefore, the Commissioner may impute one or more agreements between USSub and FP, consistent with the economic substance of their course of conduct, which would afford USSub an appropriate portion of the premium return from the AA trademark athletic gear. For example, the Commissioner may impute a separate services agreement that affords USSub contingent-payment compensation for the incremental activities it performed during years 1 through 6, which benefited FP by contributing to the value of the trademark owned by FP. In the alternative, the Commissioner may impute a long-term, exclusive United States license agreement that allows USSub to benefit from the incremental activities. As another alternative, the Commissioner may require FP to compensate USSub for terminating USSub’s imputed long-term United States license agreement, a license that USSub made more valuable at its own expense and risk. The taxpayer may present additional facts that could indicate which of these or other alternative agreements best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions, consistent with the parties’ course of conduct in this particular case ...

Medtronic had used the comparable uncontrolled transactions (CUT) method to determine the arm’s length royalty rates received from its manufacturing subsidiary in Puerto Rico for use of IP under an inter-group license agreement. The tax authorities found that Medtronic left too much profit in Puerto Rico. Using a “modified CPM” the IRS concluded that at arm’s length 90 percent of Medtronic’s “devices and leads” profit should have been allocated to the US parent and only 10 percent to the operations in Puerto Rico. Medtronic brought the case to the Tax Court. The Tax Court applied its own analysis and concluded that the Pacesetter agreement was the best CUT to calculate the arm’s length result for license payments. This decision from the Tax Court was then appealed by the IRS to the Court of Appeals. In 2018, the Court of Appeal found that the Tax Court’s factual findings had been insufficient. The Court of Appeals stated taht: “The Tax Court determined that the Pacesetter agreement was an appropriate comparable uncontrolled transaction (CUT) because it involved similar intangible property and had similar circumstances regarding licensing. We conclude that the Tax Court’s factual findings are insufficient to enable us to conduct an evaluation of that determination.” The Tax Court did not provide (1) sufficient detail as to whether the circumstances between Siemens Pacesetter, Inc. (Pacesetter), and Medtronic US were comparable to the licensing agreement between Medtronic US and Medtronic Puerto Rico (MPROC) and whether the Pacesetter agreement was one created in the ordinary course of business; (2) an analysis of the degree of comparability of the Pacesetter agreement’s contractual terms and those of the MPROC’s licensing agreement; (3) an evaluation of how the different treatment of intangibles affected the comparability of the Pacesetter agreement and the MPROC licensing agreement; and (4) the amount of risk and product liability expense that should be allocated between Medtronic US and MPROC. According to the Court of Appeal these findings were “… essential to its review of the Tax Court’s determination that the Pacesetter agreement was a CUT, as well as necessary to its determination whether the Tax Court applied the best transfer pricing method for calculating an arm’s length result or whether it made proper adjustments under its chosen method“. Hence, the case was remanded to the Tax Court for further considerations. Opinion of the US Tax Court Following the re-trial, the Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer did not meet its burden to show that its allocation under the CUT method and its proposed unspecified method satisfied the arm’s length standard. “Increasing the wholesale royalty rate to 48.8% results in an overall profit split of 68.72% to Medtronic US/Med USA and 31.28% profit split to MPROC and a R&D profits split of 62.34% to Medtronic US and 37.66% to MPROC. The resulting profit split reflects the importance of the patents as well as the role played by MPROC. The profit split is more reasonable than the profit split of 56.8% to Medtronic US/Med USA and 43.2% to MPROC resulting from petitioner’s unspecified method with a 50–50 allocation. According to respondent’s expert Becker, MPROC had incurred costs of 14.8% of retail prices. The evidence does not support a profit split which allocates 43.2% of the profits to MPROC when it has only 14.8% of the operating cost.” “We conclude that wholesale royalty rate is 48.8% for both leads and devices, and the royalty rate is the same for both years in issue. According to the regulations an unspecified method will not be applied unless it provides the most reliable measure of an arm’s-length result under the principles of the best method rule. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(d). Under the best method rule, the arm’s-length result of a controlled transaction must be determined under the method that, under the facts and circumstances, provides the most reliable method of getting an arm’s-length result. Id. § 1.482-1(c)(1). We have concluded previously that petitioner’s CUT method, petitioner’s proposed unspecified method, the Court’s adjusted CUT method in Medtronic I, respondent’s CPM, and respondent’s modified CPM do not result in an arm’s-length royalty rate and are not the best method. Only petitioner suggested a new method, its proposed unspecified method; however, for reasons previously explained, that method needed adjustment for the result to be arm’s length. “Our adjustments consider that the MPROC licenses are valuable and earn higher profits than the licenses covered by the Pacesetter agreement. We also looked at the ROA in the Heimert analysis and from the evidence cannot determine what the proper ROA should be. The criticisms each party had of the other’s methods were factored into our adjustment. Respondent’s expert Becker testified that you may not like the logic of a method but ultimately the answer is fine. Because neither petitioner’s proposed CUT method nor respondent’s modified CPM was the best method, our goal was to find the right answer. The facts in this case are unique because of the complexity of the devices and leads, and we believe that our adjustment is necessary for us to bridge the gap between the parties’ methods. A wholesale royalty rate of 48.8% for both devices significantly bridges the gap between the parties. Petitioner’s expert witness Putnam proposed a CUT which resulted in a blended wholesale royalty rate of 21.8%; whereas respondent’s expert Heimert’s original CPM analysis resulted in a blended wholesale royalty rate of 67.7%. In Medtronic I we concluded that the blended wholesale royalty rate was 38%, and after further trial, we conclude that the wholesale royalty rate is 48.8%, which we believe is the right answer.” Click here for other translation ...

As part of a multinational tax integrity package aimed to address the tax avoidance practices of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and improve transparency through better public reporting of MNEs’ tax information, the Australian Treasury issued a Consultation Paper in August 2022. This paper seeks to consult on the implementation of proposals to: amend Australia’s existing thin capitalisation rules to limit interest deductions for MNEs in line with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s recommended approach under Action 4 of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) program (Part 1); introduce a new rule limiting MNEs’ ability to claim tax deductions for payments relating to intangibles and royalties that lead to insufficient tax paid (Part 2); and ensure enhanced tax transparency by MNEs (Part 3), through measures such as public reporting of certain tax information on a country‑by‑country basis; mandatory reporting of material tax risks to shareholders; and requiring tenderers for Australian government contracts to disclose their country of tax domicile. The changes contemplated seek to target activities deliberately designed to minimise tax, while also considering the need to attract and retain foreign capital and investment in Australia, limit potential additional compliance cost considerations for business, and continue to support genuine commercial activity ...

The ATO is currently reviewing treaty shopping arrangements designed to obtain the benefit of a reduced withholding tax (WHT) rate under a double-tax agreement (DTA) in relation to royalty or dividend payments from Australia. Typically, this benefit is sought via the interposition of one or more related entities between an Australian resident and the ultimate recipient of the royalty or dividend, where the interposed entity is a resident of a treaty partner jurisdiction. The ultimate recipient is generally located in a jurisdiction that either does not have a DTA with Australia or, where it is a treaty partner of Australia, the DTA provides a less favourable treaty benefit. A key purpose of Australia’s treaty network is to eliminate double taxation without creating opportunities for tax avoidance practices, such as treaty shopping arrangements. We are concerned that some taxpayers have entered into, or are considering implementing, arrangements interposing entities in treaty jurisdictions to obtain a more favourable tax outcome under a DTA in the form of reduced WHT rates. These taxpayers may not be entitled to such benefits under our DTAs. Arrangements that pose a potential risk of treaty shopping may display some of the following features and we are likely to make further enquiries where such factors exist: • Structures and restructures involving the interposition of an existing or newly incorporated entity between Australia and the ultimate recipient of royalties or unfranked dividends. • The interposed entity may have significant existing operations and employees and the taxpayer may contend that commercial benefits and/or synergies flow to the Australian operations or the interposed entity. • Royalty or unfranked dividend payments (or potential future royalty or unfranked dividend payments) to the interposed entity are (or would be) subject to WHT at reduced rates under the relevant DTA compared with Australian domestic law or the applicable WHT rate under the DTA between Australia and the country of residence of the ultimate recipient ...

The French Accor hotel group was the subject of an tax audit related to FY 2010, during which the tax authorities found that Accor had not invoiced a fee for the use of its trademarks by its Brazilian subsidiary, Hotelaria Accor Brasil, in an amount of 8,839,047. The amount not invoiced was considered a deemed distribution of profits and the tax authorities applied a withholding tax rate of 25% to the amount which resulted in withholding taxes in an amount of EUR 2.815.153. An appeal was filed by Accor with the Administrative Court. In a judgment of 7 July 2020, the Administrative Court partially discharged Accor from the withholding tax up to the amount of the application of the conventional reduced rate of 15% (related to dividends), and rejected the remainder of the claim. The Administrative Court considered that income deemed to be distributed did not fall within the definition of dividends under article 10 of the tax treaty with Brazil and could not, in principle, benefit from the reduced rate. However in comments of an administrative instruction from 1972 (BOI 14-B-17-73, reproduced in BOI-INT-CVB-BRA, 12 August 2015) relating to the Franco-Brazilian tax treaty, it was stated, that the definition of dividends used by the agreement covers “on the French side, all products considered as distributed income within the meaning of the CGI”. The Administrative Court noted that such a definition would necessarily include distributed income within the meaning of the provisions of Article 109 of the CGI”. The tax authorities appealed against this judgment. Judgement of the Administrative Court of Appeal The Court allowed the appeal of the tax authorities and set aside the judgment in which the Administrative Court had partially discharged Accor from the withholding tax to which it was subject in respect of the year 2010. “Under the terms of Article 10 of the tax treaty concluded between the French Republic and the Federative Republic of Brazil on 10 September 1971: “1. Dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State. / 2. However, dividends may be taxed in the State in which the company paying the dividends has its tax domicile and according to the laws of that State, but the tax so charged shall not exceed 15 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends / (…) 5. (a) The term “dividend” as used in this Article means income from shares, “jouissance” shares or “jouissance” warrants, mining shares, founders’ shares or other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in profits, as well as income from other corporate units which is assimilated to income from shares by the taxation law of the State of which the company making the distribution is resident. (…) “. It follows from these stipulations that the dividends mentioned in Article 10 of the Franco-Brazilian Convention must be defined as the income distributed by a company to its members by virtue of a decision taken by the general meeting of its shareholders or unit holders under the conditions provided for by the law of 24 July 1966, as amended, on commercial companies, which does not include income deemed to be distributed within the meaning of Article 109(1) of the French General Tax Code. Neither these stipulations, nor any other clause of the Franco-Brazilian agreement, prevent the taxation in France of income considered as distributed to Hotelaria Accor Brasil by Accor, according to French tax law, at the common law rate set, at the date of the taxation in dispute, at 25% of this income by Article 187 of the General Tax Code.” “The Accor company claims, on the basis of Article L. 80 A of the Book of Tax Procedures, of the instruction of 8 December 1972 referenced BOI n° 14-B-17-72 relating to the tax treaty concluded between France and Brazil on 10 September 1971, which provides that: “According to paragraph 5 of Article 10, the term dividends means income from shares, jouissance shares or warrants, mining shares, founders’ shares or other profit shares with the exception of debt claims and, in general, income assimilated to income from shares by the tax legislation of the State of which the distributing company is resident. / This definition covers, on the French side, all income considered as distributed income within the meaning of the Code général des Impôts (art. 10, paragraph 5b). “However, this interpretation was brought back by an instruction referenced 4 J-2-91 of July 2, 1991, published in the Bulletin officiel des impôts n° 133 of July 11, 1991, relating to the impact of international treaties on the withholding tax applicable to income distributed outside France, according to which: “the advantages which benefit [the partners and the persons having close links with the partners] and which are considered as distributed income in domestic law retain this character in treaty law when the applicable treaty refers to dividends and gives a definition similar to that of the OECD model. On the other hand, when they benefit persons other than the partners, these benefits are subject to the treaty provisions relating to “undesignated” income, i.e. income that does not fall into any of the categories expressly defined by the applicable treaty”. Annex 1 to this instruction specifically states, with regard to Brazil, that income paid to a beneficiary who is not a shareholder of the distributing company is subject to withholding tax at the ordinary law rate of 25%. These statements must be regarded as having reported, on this particular point, the administrative interpretation contained in paragraph 2351 of the instruction of 8 December 1972. In this respect, it is irrelevant that the instruction of 8 December 1972 was fully reproduced and published by the BOFIP on 12 September 2012 under the reference BOI-INT-CVB-BRA, after the tax year in question. It follows that Accor cannot claim the benefit of the reduced conventional tax rate.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

On 16 June 2022 McDonald’s France entered into an settlement agreement according to which it will pay €1.245 billion in back taxes and fines to the French tax authorities. The settlement agreement resulted from investigations carried out by the French tax authorities in regards to abnormally high royalties transferred from McDonald’s France to McDonald’s Luxembourg following an intra group restructuring in 2009. McDonald’s France doubled its royalty payments from 5% to 10% of restaurant turnover, and instead of paying these royalties to McDonald’s HQ in the United States, going forward they paid them to a Swiss PE of a group company in Luxembourg, which was not taxable of the amounts. During the investigations it was discovered that McDonald’s royalty fees could vary substantially from one McDonald’s branch to the next without any justification other than tax savings for the group. This conclusion was further supported by statements of the managers of the various subsidiaries as well as documentation seized which showed that the 100% increase in the royalty rate was mainly explained by a higher profitability of McDonald’s in France and a corresponding increase in taxes due. The investigations led the French tax authorities to question the overall economic substance of the IP company in Luxembourg and the contractual arrangements setup by the McDonald’s group. After being presented with the findings of the investigations and charged with tax fraud etc. McDonald’s was offered a public interest settlement agreement (CJIP) under Article 41-1-2 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure. The final settlement agreement between McDonald’s and the French authorities was announced in a press release from the Financial Public Prosecutor (English translation below). On 16 June 2022, the President of the Paris Judicial Court validated the judicial public interest agreement (CJIP) concluded on 31 May 2022 by the Financial Public Prosecutor (PRF) and the companies MC DONALD’S FRANCE, MC DONALD’S SYSTEM OF FRANCE LLC and MCD LUXEMBOURG REAL ESTATE S.A.R.L pursuant to Article 41-1-2 of the Criminal Procedure Code. under Article 41-1-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the terms of the CJIP, MC DONALD’S FRANCE, MC DONALD’S SYSTEM OF FRANCE LLC and MCD LUXEMBOURG REAL ESTATE S.A.R.L, undertake to pay the French Treasury a public interest fine totalling 508,482,964 euros. Several French companies of the MC DONALD’S group have also signed a global settlement with the tax authorities, putting an end to the administrative litigation. The sum of the duties and penalties due under the overall settlement and the public interest fine provided for under the CJIP amounts to a total of EUR 1,245,624,269. Subject to the payment of the public interest fine, the validation of the CJIP extinguishes the public prosecution against the signatory companies. This agreement follows a preliminary investigation initiated by the PNF on 4 January 2016 after the filing of a complaint by the works council of MC DONALD’S OUEST PARISIEN. Opened in particular on the charge of tax fraud, the investigation had been entrusted to the Central Office for Combating Corruption and Financial and Fiscal Offences (OCLCIFF). This is the 10ᵉ CJIP signed by the national financial prosecutor’s office. The Financial Public Prosecutor Jean-François Bohnert Validated Settlement Agreement of 16 June 2022 English translation of the Validated Settelment Agreement Preliminary Settlement Agreement of 31 May 2022 with statement of facts and resulting taxes and fines English translation of the Preliminary Settlement Agreement of 31 May 2022 ...

In view of its purpose and the comments made on Article 12 of the OECD Model Convention, the Conseil d’État found that Article 12(2) of the Franco-New Zealand tax treaty was applicable to French source royalties whose beneficial owner resided in New Zealand, even if the royalties had been paid to an intermediary company established in a third country. The Supreme Court thus set aside the previous 2020 Judgement of the Administrative Court of Appeal. The question of whether the company in New Zealand actually qualified as the beneficial owner of the royalties for the years in question was referred to the Court of Appeal. Excerpt “1. It is clear from the documents in the file submitted to the judges of the court of first instance that the company Planet, which carries on the business of distributing sports programmes to fitness clubs, was subject to reminders of withholding tax in respect of sums described as royalties paid to the companies Les Mills Belgium SPRL and Les Mills Euromed Limited, established in Belgium and Malta respectively, in respect of the financial years 2011 to 2014 in consideration of the sub-distribution of collective fitness programmes developed by the company Les Mills International LTD, established in New Zealand. The Planet company is appealing to the Court of Cassation against the judgment of 15 July 2020 by which the Marseille Administrative Court of Appeal, on appeal by the Minister for Public Action and Accounts, annulled the judgment of 18 May 2018 of the Marseille Administrative Court insofar as it had discharged it from these reminders and reinstated these taxes. 2. If a bilateral agreement concluded with a view to avoiding double taxation can, by virtue of Article 55 of the Constitution, lead to the setting aside, on such and such a point, of national tax law, it cannot, by itself, directly serve as a legal basis for a decision relating to taxation. Consequently, it is up to the tax judge, when he is seized of a challenge relating to such a convention, to look first at the national tax law in order to determine whether, on this basis, the challenged taxation has been validly established and, if so, on the basis of what qualification. It is then up to the court, if necessary, by comparing this classification with the provisions of the convention, to determine – on the basis of the arguments put forward before it or even, if it is a question of determining the scope of the law, of its own motion – whether or not this convention is an obstacle to the application of the tax law. 3. Under Article 12 of the Convention of 30 November 1979 between France and New Zealand for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income: “1. Royalties arising in a State and paid to a resident of the other State may be taxed in that other State / 2. However, such royalties may also be taxed in the State in which they arise and according to the laws of that State, but if the person receiving the royalties is the beneficial owner the tax so charged shall not exceed 10 per cent of the gross amount of the royalties / 3. The term “royalties” as used in this Article means payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work, including cinematograph films and works recorded for radio or television broadcasting, any patent a trademark, a design or model, a secret plan, formula or process, as well as for the use of or the right to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment and for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience. In view of their purpose, and as clarified by the comments of the Tax Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on Article 12 of the Model Convention drawn up by that organisation, published on 11 April 1977, and as is also clear from the same comments published on 23 October 1997, 28 January 2003 and 15 July 2014 and most recently on 21 November 2017, the provisions of Article 12(2) of the Franco-New Zealand tax treaty are applicable to French source royalties whose beneficial owner resides in New Zealand, even if they have been paid to an intermediary established in a third country. 4. It is clear from the statements in the judgment under appeal that, in order to determine whether the sums in question constituted royalties, the court examined the classification of the sums paid by the company Planet to the Belgian company Les Mills Belgium SPRL in 2011 and to the Maltese company Les Mills Euromed Limited from 2012 to 2014, in the light of the stipulations of the Franco-New Zealand tax convention of 30 November 1979 alone. In limiting itself, in holding that this agreement was applicable to the dispute, to noting that the tax authorities maintained that the New Zealand company Les Mills International LTD should, pursuant to an agency agreement signed on 2 December 1998 between that company and the company Planet, be regarded as the actual beneficiary of the sums in dispute paid by the French company to the Belgian and Maltese companies, without itself ruling on its status as the actual beneficiary of the said sums for the four years in dispute, the court erred in law.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

On 30 November 2012, X sold its trademarks to subsidiary C which in turn sold the trademarks to subsidiary D. X and D then entered into a trademark license agreement according to which X would pay license fees to D. These license fees were deducted by X in its 2013 tax return. The tax authorities claimed that X had understated its taxabel income as the license fees paid by X to D for the use of trademarks were not related to obtaining or securing a source of revenue. The decision stated that in the light of the principles of logic and experience, the actions taken by the taxpayer made no sense and were not aimed at achieving the revenue in question, but instead at generating costs artificially – only for tax purposes. An appeal was filed by X. Judgement of the Administrative Court The court set aside the assessment of the tax authorities and decided in favor of X. According to the court taxpayers are not obliged to conduct their business in such a way as to pay the highest possible taxes, and gaining benefits from so-called tax optimization not prohibited by law, was allowed in 2013. The Polish anti-avoidance clause has only been in force since 15 July 2016. Furthermore, although it may have been possible to set aside legal effects of the transactions under the previous provision in Article 24b § 1 of the C.C.P., the Constitutional Tribunal in its verdict of 11 May 2004, declared this provision to be inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Excerpts “In the Court’s view, the authorities’ findings fail to comply with the provisions applied in the case, including in particular Article 15 of the CIT Act. The legal transactions described in the appealed decision indeed constitute an optimisation mechanism. However, the realised transaction scheme is not potentially devoid of economic as well as tax rationales. The actions performed were undoubtedly also undertaken in order to achieve the intended tax result, i.e. optimisation of taxation. It should be strongly emphasised that none of the actions taken were ostensible. All of the applicant’s actions were as real as possible. Noticing the obvious reality of the above transactions, the tax authorities did not even attempt to apply the institution regulated in Article 199a of the CIT Act. The omission of legal effects of the transactions performed would probably have been possible in the former legal order, under Article 24b § 1 of the C.C.P., but this provision is no longer in force. The Constitutional Tribunal in its verdict of 11 May 2004, ref. no. K 4/03 (Journal of Laws of 2004, no. 122, item 1288) declared this provision to be inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. On the other hand, the anti-avoidance clause introduced by the Act of 13 May 2016 amending the Tax Ordinance Act and certain other acts (Journal of Laws 2016, item 846) has been in force only since 15 July 2016. Pursuant to the amended Article 119a § 1 o.p. – an act performed primarily for the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit, contradictory in given circumstances to the object and purpose of the provision of the tax act, does not result in obtaining a tax benefit if the manner of action was artificial (tax avoidance). Issues related to the application of the provisions of this clause in time are regulated by Article 7 of the Amending Act, according to which the provisions of Articles 119a-119f of the Act amended in Article 1 apply to the tax advantage obtained after the date of entry into force of this Act. Thus, the anti-avoidance clause applies to tax benefits obtained after the date of entry into force of the amending law, i.e. from 15 July 2016, which, moreover, was not in dispute in the present case. Considering the above, it should be pointed out that the tax authorities in the case at hand had no authority to use such argumentation as if the anti-avoidance clause applied. In the legal state in force in 2013. (applicable in the present case) the general anti-avoidance clause was not in force. This state of affairs amounts to a prohibition on the tax authorities disregarding the tax consequences of legal transactions carried out primarily for the purpose of obtaining a tax advantage.” Click here for English translation. Click here for other translation ...

In 2011 Samsung signed the contract with Microsoft for use of software-patent in Android-based smartphone and tablets, and for the years 2012-2015 Samsung paid royalties to a Microsoft subsidiary, MS Licensing GP, while saving 15 percent for withholding tax. The royalties paid by Samsung to Microsoft during these years amounted to 4.35 trillion won, of which 15%, or 653.7 billion won, was paid as withholding tax. In June 2016, Microsoft filed a claim for a tax refund in a amount of 634 billion won with the Tax Office. According to Microsoft royalty paid for patent rights not registered in Korea is not domestic source income, and should not be subject to withholding tax. The request was refused by the tax authorities. Microsoft then filed a lawsuit against the tax authorities in 2017. Microsoft argued that the withholding tax imposed on income from a patent unregistered in Korea resulted in double taxation. The Trail court issued a decision in favour of Microsoft. The decision of the Trail court was brought before the Court of Appeal by the tax authorities. The authorities argued that royalties paid by Samsung also included payments for Microsoft technologies whose legal status was not clear and thus subject to withholding tax. In 2019 the appellate court rejected the tax authorities appeal. An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remanded the case to the appeals court, ordering additional proceedings to re-calculate the tax refund amount. According to the court royalties paid by Samsung for patent rights not registered in Korea by Microsoft do not correspond to domestic source income subject to withholding tax. However, the calculations should have been revised in accordance with facts of the case. Excerpts “Tax Office argued in the lower court that ‘the royalties in this case include consideration for the use of copyright, know-how, and trade secrets, which are subject to withholding tax as domestic source income’. Since it can be considered that they have been added or changed, the trial court should have considered and judged these claims.” “Considering the context of the Korea-US tax treaty and the ordinary meaning of its words, Articles 6 (3) and 14 (4) of the Korea-U.S. Tax Convention According to the principle of territoriality, the patentee’s right to use the patent exclusively for the production, use, transfer, rental, import, or display of the patented product is only effective in the territory of the country in which the patent right is registered. In the case of obtaining a patent license in Korea by registering a patent right, only the income paid in exchange for the use of the patent license is defined as domestic sourced income, and the patent right cannot be infringed outside the country where the patent right is registered, so the use or consideration for the use of the patent right cannot occur. “Therefore, if a US corporation has registered a patent right abroad but not in Korea, the income received by the US corporation in connection with it cannot be considered for its use, so It cannot be viewed as source income.” “On a different premise, in the lower court’s judgment that the claim of the Dongsuwon Tax Office was not subject to the court’s examination, there was an error that affected the judgment by misunderstanding the jurisprudence regarding the subject of the court’s examination”. Click here for translation ...

Rayonnages de France paid royalties and management fees to a related Portuguese company. Following an audit for FY 2010 – 2012 the French tax authorities denied tax deductions for the payments by reference to the the arm’s length principle. The court of first instance decided in favor of the tax authorities and Rayonnages de France then filed an appeal with the CAA of Douai. Judgement of the CAA The Court of appeal upheld the decision of the court of first instance and decided in favor of the tax authorities. Excerpt “However, as the Minister points out, in order to be eligible for deduction, the management services invoiced by VJ Trans.Fer to SARL Rayonnages de France must necessarily cover tasks distinct from those relating to the day-to-day management of the latter company, which were the responsibility of Mr B. as statutory manager of SARL Rayonnages de France, it being for the latter to determine, where appropriate, the remuneration to be paid to Mr B. in this connection. However, as the Minister points out, SARL Rayonnages de France, whose allegations tend to confirm that the management services invoiced by the company VJ Trans.Fer are the same as the tasks covered by its statutory management, does not provide any evidence to justify the provision of additional or even complementary services by this company, in a situation in which it is not disputed that SARL Rayonnages de France had, in the premises rented by it at the address of its registered office, the necessary means to enable it to keep its accounts and manage its invoicing, and that it had commissioned an accounting firm to assist it. Furthermore, it is not disputed that SARL Rayonnages de France no longer employed any employees after the transfer of its production activity to Portugal in July 2009, so that, as the Minister also points out, it cannot justify any need for management services in respect of the financial years ending in 2011 and 2012. As a result, SARL Rayonnages de France cannot be regarded as providing the proof, which is incumbent on it at this stage, of the existence of a consideration, effective and favourable to its own operation, for the sums it paid, during the two tax years in question, to the company VJ Trans.Fer as fees for management services, regardless of the assessment made by the Portuguese tax authorities as to the nature of those sums and even if they did not constitute additional remuneration for Mr B…. Consequently, C.. was entitled to consider the sums paid in this respect by SARL Rayonnages de France to the company VJ Trans.Fer, established in Portugal and placed under its control, as an indirect transfer of profits. Consequently, it was right to tax these sums in the hands of the company paying them, SARL Rayonnages de France, on the basis of the aforementioned provisions of Articles 57 and 39 of the General Tax Code.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In 2016 the British company Avon Cosmetics Limited (ACL) became the sole licensor of intellectual property rights for Europe, Africa and the Middle East within the Avon Cosmetics Group and was authorised to issue sub-licences to other group companies, including the Czech subsidiary, Avon Cosmetics spol. s r.o.. ACL charged a fee for issuing a sub-licence equal to an agreed-upon percentage of net sales but was then contractually obliged to pay a similar fee to the US companies, Avon Products Inc. and Avon Internetional Operations Inc. ACL applied for relief from WHT on the royalty payments from the Czech subsidiary. The tax authorities concluded that ACL was not the beneficial owner of the royalty income but only an conduit or intermediary. The legal conditions for granting the exemption were not met. ACL did not obtain any real benefit from the royalty fees and was not authorised to freely decide on use of the income as it was contractually obliged to pay on a similar amount to the US companies. On that basis the application for relief was denied. An appeal was filed by ACL. Judgement of the Municipal Court The court upheld the decision of the tax authorities and dismissed the appeal of ACL. Excerpts “In accordance with the Czech statutory framework enshrined in the Income Tax Act and also with EU legislation, namely Council Directive 2003/49/EC, which is implemented into Czech law by the Income Tax Act, a beneficial owner is not an entity which receives royalty payments for another person as an intermediary. Thus, the real owner of the said income must be the entity whose income increases its assets and enriches it. The beneficial owner uses the income without restriction and does not pass it on, even in part, to another person. The Court of Justice of the European Union came to the same conclusion in its judgment of 26 February 2019 in Joined Cases C-115/16, C-118/16, C-119/16 and C-299/19, where it stated that ‘The concept of “beneficial owner of interest” within the meaning of the Directive must therefore be interpreted as referring to the entity which actually benefits from the interest paid to it. Article 1(4) of the same directive supports that reference to economic reality by specifying that a company of a Member State is to be regarded as the beneficial owner of interest or royalties only if it receives them for itself and not for another person as an intermediary, such as an agent, trustee or principal’, to which the applicant referred in its application. The Supreme Administrative Court also commented on this issue in its decision of 12 November 2019, No. 10 Afs 140/2018-32, where it stated that “The recipient of (sub)royalties is the beneficial owner of the royalties only if he can use and enjoy them without limitation and is not obliged by law or contract to pass the payments to another person (Article 19(6) of Act No. 586/1992 Coll., on Income Taxes)”. Although the applicant refers to those decisions in support of its argument, in the Court’s view those decisions support the interpretation relied on by the defendant and the court in this case. Nowhere in the reasoning of the decisions does it appear that the applicant’s conclusion, which is strongly simplistic, is that the only criterion is whether the recipient of the royalties has an obligation to pass them on to another person.” “In so far as the applicant argues that it exercised other rights and obligations vis-à-vis the individual local companies after taking over the licence rights, which also involved the applicant’s liability for the acts and omissions of the sub-licence holders, and that it is not merely a ‘flow-through’ company, and then ties its argumentation to a possible abuse of rights, the Court observes that the above-mentioned decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union cannot be interpreted as meaning that, unless an abuse of rights is proved, the defendant is obliged to grant the applicant an exemption from royalty tax. Both the law and the above-mentioned case-law define the concept of beneficial owner, which the applicant has failed to prove in the proceedings (the Court refers in detail to the detailed reasoning of the contested decision). Thus, it is not relevant whether the applicant legitimately carries on an economic activity in the more general sense or whether it receives royalties on its own account, but whether it is the beneficial owner of the royalties (it benefits from them itself), which are two different facts. It is therefore relevant to the assessment of the case what the nature of the applicant’s activity is, not whether an abuse of rights is established. In the Court’s view, the applicant’s activity does not satisfy the condition of beneficial owner of the royalties as defined by the case-law referred to above.” “The applicant further points out that it collects royalties from Avon Cosmetics spol. s r.o. in the amount of xxxxx % of net sales for the grant of the sub-licence, whereas it only pays to Avon Products Inc. and Avon International Operations Inc. an amount equivalent to xxxxx % of net sales. In assessing this point of claim, the Court agrees with the defendant, which concludes that the applicant does not derive any real benefit from the royalty income and is not entitled to take a free decision on it, since it is obliged to pay almost all of it to the above-mentioned companies. That conclusion is also supported by other facts on which the defendant bases its conclusion, which are based on the contractual documentation submitted and with the assessment of which the Court agrees (e.g. the payability of the royalty received and the sub-licence fee paid, which is set at a similar level; the fact that ownership of the property rights remains with Avon Products Inc. and Avon International Operations Inc., which, moreover, have reserved the right to carry out inspections not only of the applicant but also of the sub-licence holders). What is relevant for this ...

The provisions of paragraph 2.10 related to the use of rules of thumb apply to determinations of a correct transfer price in any controlled transaction, including cases involving the use or transfer of intangibles. Accordingly, a rule of thumb cannot be used to evidence that a price or apportionment of income is arm’s length, including in particular an apportionment of income between a licensor and a licensee of intangibles ...

Even in uncontrolled transactions, package deals may combine elements that are subject to different tax treatment under domestic law or an income tax convention. For example, royalty payments may be subject to withholding tax but lease payments may be subject to net taxation. In such circumstances, it may still be appropriate to determine the transfer pricing on a package basis, and the tax administration could then determine whether for other tax reasons it is necessary to allocate the price to the elements of the package. In making this determination, tax administrations should examine the package deal between associated enterprises in the same way that they would analyse similar deals between independent enterprises. Taxpayers should be prepared to show that the package deal reflects appropriate transfer pricing ...

The following example illustrates the concept of differences between written contractual terms and conduct of the parties, with the result that the actual conduct of the parties delineates the transaction. Company S is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Company P. The parties have entered into a written contract pursuant to which Company P licenses intellectual property to Company S for use in Company S’s business; Company S agrees to compensate Company P for the licence with a royalty. Evidence provided by other economically relevant characteristics, and in particular the functions performed, establishes that Company P performs negotiations with third-party customers to achieve sales for Company S, provides regular technical services support to Company S so that Company S can deliver contracted sales to its customers, and regularly provides staff to enable Company S to fulfil customer contracts. A majority of customers insist on including Company P as joint contracting party along with Company S, although fee income under the contract is payable to Company S. The analysis of the commercial or financial relations indicates that Company S is not capable of providing the contracted services to customers without significant support from Company P, and is not developing its own capability. Under the contract, Company P has given a licence to Company S, but in fact controls the business risk and output of Company S such that it has not transferred risk and function consistent with a licensing arrangement, and acts not as the licensor but the principal. The identification of the actual transaction between Company P and Company S should not be defined solely by the terms of the written contract. Instead, the actual transaction should be determined from the conduct of the parties, leading to the conclusion that the actual functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed by the parties are not consistent with the written licence agreement ...

The Russian company LLC OTIS LIFT carries out service and maintenance activities for lifts and escalators both under the registered trademarks and designations of Otis and lifts and escalators of other manufacturers. A License Agreement was in force between the Russian subsidiary and its US parent OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY (NJ) (Licensor). In accordance with the License Agreement, LLC OTIS LIFT should pay to OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY (NJ) an amount equal to three and a half percent (3.5%) of the net amount invoiced by Otis Lift for Goods and Services as payment for the right to manufacture, promote, sell, install, repair and maintain Goods under the registered trademarks and designations “Otis”. Hence, the License Agreement did not provide for charging royalties from the revenue for the services provided by LLC OTIS LIFT for the maintenance of lift equipment of third-party manufacturers. Following an audit it was established that in violation of the terms and conditions of the license agreement the royalties accrued LLC OTIS LIFT in favour of the Licensor – OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY (NJ) were calculated and paid from the total amount of all invoices issued to customers for maintenance services and not only from invoices for maintenance of goods under the trademarks. Hence the company overstated its expenses. On that basis an assessment of additional taxable income was issued. This assessment of additional income was brought to court by LLC OTIS. Judgement of the Arbitration Court The court dismissed the complaint of LLC OTIS LIFT and decided in favor of the tax authorities. Excerpts “In support of its conclusion that the expenses for the payment of royalties for the use of the designation “Otis” in the provision of services for maintenance of lifts, escalators under other trademarks and designations are economically justified, the Company provides the following arguments: during the audited period the Company used the trademark “Otis” in its corporate name in all its activities, including the provision of services for maintenance of lift equipment of third party manufacturers; However, the Court considers it necessary to note the following. In view of the fact that royalties represent an equitable payment for the right to use intellectual property, it should be noted that the formula established by the license agreement for calculating the royalty as a percentage of revenue related only to sales and maintenance of Otis-branded goods is economically justified, since Otis Group has designed, developed, improved, maintained, promoted and protected intellectual property related directly to the goods produced. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that it is the Otis group that has the most knowledge, the most technology and the most competence to maintain its own equipment. At the same time, there is no reason to believe that the unique knowledge of the Company’s service personnel in the design and maintenance of Otis-branded lift equipment, including from foreign group companies, gives them an unconditional advantage in repairing and servicing equipment of other manufacturers. In the course of additional tax control measures the issue of using the business reputation of the Licensor in the course of rendering services on maintenance of the lift equipment of third-party manufacturers was investigated. In particular, whether potential contractors were guided by the company’s brand, trademark, reputation of the company in the world and other characteristics when choosing the Company as a supplier of maintenance services for lift equipment. The analysis of the documents submitted by the Company’s counterparties does not establish whether the potential counterparties were guided by the company’s brand, trademark and reputation in the world when selecting the Company as a supplier of services for maintenance of lift equipment. In accordance with paragraph 1 of Art. 252 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation, the taxpayer reduces the income received by the amount of the costs incurred. Expenses are considered to be justified and documented expenses made (incurred) by the taxpayer. Reasonable expenses are economically justified costs, the assessment of which is expressed in monetary form. Therefore, the argument that the Company’s expenses on payment of the license fees for the use of the “Otis” trademark in the course of providing maintenance services for lift equipment of third parties does not comply with the provisions of Article 252 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation on documentary confirmation and justification of the expenses charged by the taxpayer to expenses. Regarding the fact that the Company’s use of the Licensor’s intangible assets relating to the Otis trademark had a positive effect on the cost of maintenance services for third-party lift equipment, it should be noted that the Company has not provided any evidence of this and (or) calculations of this benefit effect.” “Thus, the Company’s argument that it used OTIS know-how when servicing lift equipment of third party manufacturers rather than the requirements stipulated by the Russian legislation is unfounded. Otis Lift LLC also failed to document that in providing maintenance services for third-party lift equipment, the use of the Licensor’s intangible assets relating to the Otis trademarks gave them a competitive advantage over other manufacturers and service companies engaged in the maintenance of such equipment or had any other positive effect on the cost of services for the maintenance of third-party lift equipment. Since the Company has not provided any evidence of this and (or) calculations of such benefit effect. Thus, there is no objective connection between the incurred expenses on payment of the license fee to OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY (NJ) and the focus of the Company’s activities on obtaining profit when providing services for repair of lift equipment of third-party manufacturers. Furthermore, the Company’s argument that the tax authority suggests the Company’s gratuitous use of the Licensor’s tangible assets is unfounded and contrary to the facts of the case, as the Inspectorate has not made any claims against the Company in respect of license fees for maintenance of lift equipment (goods) under the registered trademark “OTIS”. On the basis of the above, the applicant’s claims are not subject to satisfaction.” Click here for English translation Click here ...

ResMed – a world-leading digital health company – in an October 2021 publication of results for the first quarter of FY 2022, informs that a $381.7 million tax settlement agreement has been entered with the Australian Tax Office. The dispute concerns the years 2009 through 2018, in which the ATO alleged that ResMed should have paid additional Australian taxes on income derived from the company’s Singapore operations. Excerpts from the announcement “Operating cash flow for the quarter was negative $65.7 million and was impacted by a payment to the Australian Tax Office of $284.8 million, which was the settlement amount of $381.7 million net of prior remittances.” “During the quarter, concluded the settlement agreement with the Australian Taxation Office (“ATO”), which fully resolves the transfer pricing dispute for all prior years since 2009. ResMed previously recognized a tax reserve in êscal year 2021 in anticipation of the settlement. The net impact of the settlement was $238.7 million ($381.7 million gross less credits and deductions of $143.0 million). The settlement provides closure for historic Australian tax matters and greater clarity into the future. As a result of the ATO settlement and due to movements in foreign currencies, recognized a $4.1 million reduction in tax credits during the quarter, which was recorded as an increase in income tax expense.“ Back in 2015 ResMed rigorously defended its tax position in a submission to the Australien Senate Economics Reference Committee following an inquiry into Corporate Tax Avoidance practices ...

In a November 2020 opinion the US Tax Court agreed with the IRS that Coca-Cola’s US-based income should be increased by $9 billion in a dispute over royalties from its foreign-based licensees. Coca-Cola filed a Motion to Reconsider June 2, 2021 – 196 days after the Tax Court had served its opinion. Judgement of the tax court The Tax Court denied the motion to reconsider. There is a 30-day deadline to move for reconsideration and the court concluded that Coca-Cola was without a valid excuse for the late filing and that the motion would have failed on the merits in any event ...

In 2019, the Danish parent company of the group, EAC Invest A/S, had been granted a ruling by the tax tribunal that, in the period 2008-2011, due to, inter alia, quite exceptional circumstances involving currency restrictions in Venezuela, the parent company should not be taxed on interest on a claim for unpaid royalties relating to trademarks covered by licensing agreements between the parent company and its then Venezuelan subsidiary, Plumrose Latinoamericana C.A. The Tax tribunal had also found that neither a payment of extraordinary dividends by the Venezuelan subsidiary to the Danish parent company in 2012 nor a restructuring of the group in 2013 could trigger a deferred taxation of royalties. The tax authorities appealed against the decisions to the High Court. Judgement of the High Court The High Court upheld the decisions of the tax tribunal with amended grounds and dismissed the claims of the tax authorities. Excerpts: Interest on unpaid royalty claim “The High Court agrees that, as a starting point, between group-related parties such as H1 and the G2 company, questions may be raised regarding the interest on a receivable arising from a failure to pay royalties, as defined in section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act. The question is whether, when calculating H1’s taxable income for the income years in question, there is a basis for fixing interest income to H1 on the unpaid royalty claim by G2, within the meaning of Paragraph 2 of the Tax Assessment Act. Such a fixing of interest must, where appropriate, be made on terms which could have been obtained if the claim had arisen between independent parties. The right to an adjustment is thus based, inter alia, on the assumptions that the failure to pay interest on the royalty claim has no commercial justification and that there is in fact a basis for comparison in the form of contractual terms between a debtor for a claim in bolivar in Venezuela and a creditor in another country independent of the debtor.” … “In the light of the very special circumstances set out above, and following an overall assessment, the Court considers that there are no grounds for finding that the failure to recover H1’s royalty claim from G2 was not commercially justified. The High Court also notes that the Ministry of Taxation has not demonstrated the existence of a genuine basis for comparison in the form of contractual terms for a claim in bolivar between a debtor in Venezuela and a creditor in a third country independent of the debtor. The High Court therefore finds that there is no basis under Section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act, cf. Section 3B(5) of the Tax Control Act, cf. Para 8 cf. Section 5(3), there is a basis for increasing G3-A/S’s income in the income years in question by a fixed rate of interest on the unpaid royalty claim with G2 company.” Dividend distribution in 2012 reclassified as royalty “…the Court of Appeal, after an overall assessment, accepts that the fact that the G2 company did not waive outstanding royalty receivables was solely a consequence of the very specific currency restrictions in Venezuela, that the payment of dividends was commercially motivated and was not due to a common interest between H1 and the G2 company, and that therefore, under Article 2(2) of the Tax Code, there is no need to pay dividends to the G2 company. 1(3), there are grounds for reclassifying the dividend distribution as a taxable deduction from the royalty claim, as independent parties could not have acted as claimed by the Tax Ministry.” Claim in respect of purchase price for shares in 2013 set-off against dividend reclassified as royalty “… For the reasons given by the Tax Court and, moreover, in the light of the very special circumstances of Venezuela set out above, the Court finds that there is no basis under section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act for reclassifying the claim of the G2 company against H2, in respect of the share purchase price for the G9 company, from a set-off against dividends due to an instalment of royalties due.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Neopost Italia s.r.l. had paid service fees and royalties to its French parent. Following an audit, deductions for these intra-group transactions was adjusted by the tax authorities due to non compliance with the arm’s length principle and lack of documentation. However, for the purpose of determining an arm’s length remuneration a benchmark study had been performed by the tax authorities in which one of the comparables was not independent. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the tax authorities. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case to the court of first instance. In regards to the comparable company in the benchmark that was not independent, the Supreme Court found that: “it is entirely arbitrary, in comparing the two companies, to assert that the price charged by one of the two is the market price while the other is not”; this is a ruling that affects the unlawfulness of the method used by the Office (or, rather, the identification of the comparator), which is a prerequisite for the tax assessment.” In regards to the plea of “failure of the Court of Appeal to examine decisive facts of the case” the Supreme Court found that this was not grounds for setting aside a judgement: “…failure to examine the evidence does not in itself constitute a failure to examine a decisive fact if the historical fact relevant to the case was nevertheless taken into consideration by the court, even though the judgment did not take account of all the evidence. “…the reasoning, albeit brief, exists and is legitimately made by reference to the judgement of the first instance, while the impeachment does not even identify the historical fact whose examination was omitted by the appeal judge.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A Oy, the parent company of group A, had not charged a royalty (the so-called concept fee) to all local companies in the group. The tax authorities had determined the level of the local companies’ arm’s length results and thus the amounts of royalties not collected from them on the basis of the results of nine comparable companies. The comparable companies’ performance levels were -0,24 %, 0,60 %, 1,07 %, 2,90 %, 3,70 %, 5,30 %, 8,40 %, 12,30 % and 13,50 %. The interquartile range of the results had been 1.1-8.4% and the median 3.7%. The tax inspectors had set the routine rate of return for all local companies at 4,5 %, which was also used by A Ltd as the basis for the concept fee. A’s taxes had been adjusted accordingly to the detriment of the company. Before the Supreme Administrative Court, A Oy claimed that the adjustment point for taxable income should be the upper limit of the full range of 13,5 % in the first instance and the upper limit of the quartile range of 8,4 % in the second instance. The Supreme Administrative Court, taking into account the number of comparable companies, the dispersion of their results and the width of the overall range, as well as the fact that the results of five comparable companies had been below the 4.5% used in the A Ltd Concept Fee scheme, held that, in determining the level of the arm’s length results of the group’s local companies, the range could have been narrowed to the interquartile range of the results of the comparable companies within the meaning of paragraph 3.57 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The royalties charged to the local companies would have been at market rates if A Oy had charged the local companies a concept fee or other royalty so that the local companies’ results would have been within the interquartile range. In such a case, A Oy’s trading income would not have been lower than it would otherwise have been, within the meaning of Article 31(1) of the Tax Procedure Act, as a result of the non-arm’s length pricing. To the extent that the level of the results of the local companies had exceeded the quartile range, the amounts of the additions to the company’s taxable income should have been calculated by adjusting the results of the local companies to the arm’s length level, i.e. to the upper limit of the quartile range of 8,4 %. The Supreme Administrative Court therefore annulled the tax adjustments made to the detriment of the company and cancelled the increases in the company’s taxable income in so far as they were based on the local companies’ profit margins between 4,5 % and 8,4 % for the tax years 2010 to 2012. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

SA SACLA, which trades in protective clothing and footwear, as well as small equipment, was the subject of an tax audit covering the FY 2007, 2008 and 2009. In a proposed assessment issued in December 2011, the tax authorities increased its taxable income, on the basis of Article 57 of the General Tax Code, by considering that SACLA, by selling, a set of brands held by it for EUR 90,000 to a Luxembourg company, Involvex, which benefited from a preferential tax regime, had carried out an indirect transfer of profits in the context of a reduction in the selling price. In a ruling of February 2020, the Lyon Administrative Court of Appeal, after dismissing the plea of irregularity in the judgment, decided that an expert would carry out an valuation to determine whether the sale price of the trademarks corresponded to their value. The valuation should take into consideration an agreed exemption from payment of royalties for a period of five years granted by Involvex to SA SACLA. The expert report was filed on 8 April 2021. After receiving the expert report SA SACLA asked the court to change the judgment by considering that the value of the transferred trademarks should be set at a sum of between 1.3 and 2.1 million euros and that penalties for deliberate breach should be discharged. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The court dismissed the request filed by SACLA and determined the value of the trademarks – in accordance with the expert report – to be 5,897,610 euros. Excerpt “The value of the trademarks transferred by SACLA, initially declared by that company in the amount of EUR 90,000 excluding tax, was corrected by the tax authorities to EUR 11,288,000 excluding tax, and was then reduced by the judgment under appeal to EUR 8,733,348 excluding tax. It follows from the investigation, in particular from the expert’s report filed on 8 April 2021, that this value, taking into account the exemption from payment of royalties granted by the purchaser of the trademarks in the amount of 2,400,000 euros excluding tax and after taking into account corporate income tax, must be established at the sum of 5,897,610 euros excluding tax. The result is a difference between the agreed price and the value of the trade marks transferred in the amount of EUR 5 807 610 excluding tax, which constitutes an advantage for the purchaser. The applicant, who merely contests the amount of that advantage, does not invoke any interest or consideration of such a nature as to justify such an advantage. In these circumstances, the administration provides the proof that it is responsible for the existence of a reduction in the price of the sale of assets and the existence of an indirect transfer of profits abroad.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

While living in France, Israel Daniel Amram (IDA) devised an idea for the development of a unique and efficient computerized interface that would link insurance companies and physicians and facilitate financial accounting between medical service providers and patients. IDA registered the trademark “SEPHIRA” and formed a company in France under the name SAS SEPHIRA . IDA then moved to Israel and formed Sephira & Offek Ltd. Going forward the company in Israel would provid R&D services to SAS SEPHIRA in France. All of the taxable profits in Israel was labled as “R&D income” which is taxed at a lower rate in Israel. Later IDA’s rights in the trademark was sold to Sephira & Offek Ltd in return for €8.4m. Due to IDA’s status as a “new Immigrant” in Israel profits from the sale was tax exempt. Following the acquisition of the trademark, Sephira & Offek Ltd licensed the trademark to SAS SEPHIRA in return for royalty payments. In the books of Sephira & Offek Ltd, the trademark was labeled as “goodwill” and amortized. Following an audit the tax authorities determined that the sale of the trademark was an artificial transaction. Furthermore, they found that part of the profit labeled by Sephira & Offek Ltd as R&D income (subject to a lower taxation in Israel) should instead be labeled as ordinary income. On that basis an assessment was issued. Sephira & Offek Ltd and IDA disapproved of the assessment and took the case to Court. Judgement of the Court The court ruled in favor of the tax authorities. The trademark  transaction was artificial, as commercial reasons for the transaction (other than tax optimization) had been provided. The whole arrangement was considered non-legitimate tax planning. The court also agreed that part of the income classified by the company as R&D income (subject to reduced taxes) should instead be taxed as ordinary income. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

SA Compagnie Gervais Danone was the subject of an tax audit at the end of which the tax authorities questioned, among other things, the deduction of a compensation payment of 88 million Turkish lira (39,148,346 euros) granted to the Turkish company Danone Tikvesli, in which the french company holds a minority stake. The tax authorities considered that the payment constituted an indirect transfer of profits abroad within the meaning of Article 57 of the General Tax Code and should be considered as distributed income within the meaning of Article 109(1) of the Code, subject to the withholding tax provided for in Article 119a of the Code, at the conventional rate of 15%. SA Compagnie Gervais Danone brought the tax assessment to the administrative court. In a decision of 9 July 2019 the Court discharged SA Compagnie Gervais Danone from the taxes in dispute. This decision was appealed to Administrative Court of Appeal by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Court The Administrative Court of Appeal decided in favor of the tax authorities and annulled the decision of the administrative court. Excerpts from the Judgement “Firstly, it appears from the investigation that SA Compagnie Gervais Danone entered in its accounts for the financial year ending in 2011 a subsidy recorded under the name “loss compensation Danone Tikvesli”, paid to its Turkish subsidiary facing financial difficulties characterised by a negative net position of almost 40 million euros as at 31 December 2010, a deficit situation incompatible with Turkish regulations. The deductibility of this aid was allowed, in proportion to the 22.58% stake held by SA Compagnie Gervais Danone in this company. In view of the relationship of dependence between the applicant company and its beneficiary subsidiary, it is for SA Compagnie Gervais Danone to justify the existence of the consideration it received in return. In order to justify its commercial interest in taking over the whole of the subsidy intended to compensate for its subsidiary’s losses, Compagnie Gervais Danone argues that it was imperative for it to remain present on the Turkish dairy products market, a strategically important market with strong development potential, in order to preserve the brand’s international reputation, and that it expected to receive royalties from its subsidiary in a context of strong growth. However, the 77.48% majority shareholder, Danone Hayat Icecek, a company incorporated under Turkish law and wholly owned by Holding Internationale de boisson, the bridgehead company of the Danone group’s ‘water’ division, had an equal financial interest in preserving the brand’s reputation, so that this reason does not justify the fact that the cost of refinancing Danone Tikvesli had to be borne exclusively by SA Compagnie Gervais Danone. Although the applicant company relies on the strategic importance of the Turkish dairy products market, having regard to Turkish eating habits, its population growth, the country’s GDP growth rate and its exports to the Middle East, the extracts from two press articles from 2011 and 2015 and the undated table of figures which it produces in support of that claim do not make it possible to take the alleged growth prospects as established. Moreover, these general considerations are contradicted, as the administration argues, by the results of the exploitation by Danone Tikvesli of its exclusive licence contract for the production and distribution of Groupe Danone branded dairy products, since it is common ground that SA Compagnie Gervais Danone, which had not received any royalties from its subsidiary since the acquisition of the latter in 1998, did not benefit from any financial spin-off from this licensing agreement until 2017, the royalties received since 2017, which in any case are subsequent to the years of taxation, being moreover, as the court noted, out of all proportion to the subsidy of more than 39 million euros paid in 2011. In these circumstances, the tax authorities must be considered as providing evidence that, as the expected consideration was not such as to justify the commercial interest of SA Compagnie Gervais Danone in granting this aid to Danone Tikvesli, this subsidy constituted, for the fraction exceeding its shareholding, an abnormal act of management constituting a transfer of profits abroad within the meaning of Article 57 of the General Tax Code.” “It follows from the foregoing that the Minister for the Economy, Finance and Recovery is entitled to maintain that it was wrongly that, by the contested judgment, the Montreuil Administrative Court discharged SA Compagnie Gervais Danone from the taxes in dispute. It is therefore appropriate to annul the judgment and to make SA Gervais Danone liable for these taxes.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

“Uniclick B.V.” had performed all the important DEMPE functions with regard to intangible assets as well as managing all risks related to development activities without being remunerated for this. Royalty-income related to the activities had instead been received by a foreign group company incorporated in Ireland and with its place of management in Luxembourg. In 2012, the administration sent notices of amendment to the tax return to the respondent for assessment years 2006 and 2010. The tax administration stated that “Uniclick B.V.”, through its director B.T. and employees M.C. and S.M., invented and developed the Uniclic technology in 1996 and continued to exploit it, and that the subsequent transfer of rights to the Uniclic invention to U.B. BV was simulated. The administration added the profits foregone annually by the “Uniclick B.V.”, i.e. the royalties received by F. from third party licensees less the costs borne by F., to “Uniclick B.V’s” taxable base. “Uniclick B.V.” disagreed with this and argued, among other things, that the tax administration had failed in demonstrating that the transfer of the Uniclic invention and the right to patent had been recognised by various third parties and was not fiscally motivated. “Uniclick B.V.” further disputed the existence of tax evasion and raised a number of breaches of procedural rules – including retrospective application of the DEMPE concept introduced in the 2017 Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The tax administration maintained its position and sent the notices of assessment. The assessment was appealed by “Uniclick B.V.” and the court of first instance found the appeal admissible and dismissed the assessment. This decision was then appealed by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The Court of Appeal concluded that the administration failed in its burden of proof that the transfer prices applied between F. and Uniclick B.V for assessment year 2010 were not in accordance with the arm’s length principle. The administration did not show that Uniclick B.V. granted an abnormal or gratuitous advantage to F. in income year 2009, which should be added to its own profit by virtue of Article 26 WIB92. Since the existence of the abnormal or gratuitous advantage was not proven, it was not necessary to discuss the claim of the tax administration, put forward in secondary order, to determine what an arm’s length remuneration would be in respect of the functions performed, assets owned and risk born by “Uniclick B.V.” Excerpt “The discussion between the parties regarding the applicability of the OECD TPG 2017 is legally relevant notwithstanding the question whether it is decisive in the factual assessment (see factual assessment in section 4.3.3 below). The OECD guidelines are intended to provide insight into how the at arm’s length principle can be applied in practice and contain recommendations for determining transfer pricing policy. The OECD guidelines as such have no direct effect in Belgium but are used as a starting point in the area of transfer pricing. From the conclusion of the Belgian State supporting the filed subsidiary assessment, it is clear that the administration bases the valuation of the abnormal or gratuitous benefit at least partially on the 2017 version of the OECD TPG. However, the 1995, 2010 and 2017 versions of the OECD TPG differ in a number of respects and to varying degrees. These differences range from mere clarifications that do not impact on the content of previous versions to completely newly developed parts, namely recommendations that were not included, even implicitly, in previous versions. One of these completely newly developed parts that have only been included in the 2017 OECD TPG concerns the DEMPE functional analysis method as well as the method of ex post outcomes of hard-to-value intangibles, on which the Belgian State bases the subsidiary assessment at issue at least in part. The subsidiary assessment relates to the 2010 tax year/the 2009 income year in which the economic context and the regulatory framework applicable in 2009 had to be taken into account. The only OECD TPG available at the time were the 1995 OECD TPG. In the light of this, the administration is permitted to base the valuation on the 1995 OECD TPG (which, moreover, as stated above, are merely a non-binding instrument). The administration is also permitted to base the valuation on later versions of the OECD TPG (such as those of 2010), but only to the extent that these contain useful clarifications, without further elaboration, of the 1995 OECD TPG. The 2017 OECD TPG were published after 2009 and to the extent that the recommendations contained therein have evolved significantly since the 1995 OECD TPG, they cannot be applied in the current dispute. In particular, the DEMPE functional analysis method and the method of a posteriori results of intangibles that are difficult to value cannot be usefully applied in the present dispute from a temporal point of view, as these are tools that are only set out in the 2017 OECD TPG. Moreover, this position is also confirmed in Circular 2020/C/35 of 25 February 2020, which summarises and further interprets the 2017 OECD TPG, in which the administration explicitly states in para. 284 that the provisions of the Circular are in principle only applicable to transactions between related companies taking place as of 1 January 2018 (see also EU General Court judgment, 12 May 2021, cases T-816/17 and T-318/18, Luxembourg-lreland-Amazon v. Commission, para. 146- 155).” Click Here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

In 2017 the European Commission concluded that Luxembourg granted undue tax benefits to Amazon of around €250 million.  Following an in-depth investigation the Commission concluded that a tax ruling issued by Luxembourg in 2003, and prolonged in 2011, lowered the tax paid by Amazon in Luxembourg without any valid justification. The tax ruling enabled Amazon to shift the vast majority of its profits from an Amazon group company that is subject to tax in Luxembourg (Amazon EU) to a company which is not subject to tax (Amazon Europe Holding Technologies). In particular, the tax ruling endorsed the payment of a royalty from Amazon EU to Amazon Europe Holding Technologies, which significantly reduced Amazon EU’s taxable profits. This decision was brought before the European Court of Justice by Luxembourg and Amazon. Judgement of the EU Court  The European General Court found that Luxembourg’s tax treatment of Amazon was not illegal under EU State aid rules. According to a press release ” The General Court notes, first of all, the settled case-law according to which, in examining tax measures in the light of the EU rules on State aid, the very existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation, with the result that, in order to determine whether there is a tax advantage, the position of the recipient as a result of the application of the measure at issue must be compared with his or her position in the absence of the measure at issue and under the normal rules of taxation. In that respect, the General Court observes that the pricing of intra-group transactions carried out by an integrated company in that group is not determined under market conditions. However, where national tax law does not make a distinction between integrated undertakings and standalone undertakings for the purposes of their liability to corporate income tax, it may be considered that that law is intended to tax the profit arising from the economic activity of such an integrated undertaking as though it had arisen from transactions carried out at market prices. In those circumstances, when examining a fiscal measure granted to such an integrated company, the Commission may compare the tax burden of that undertaking resulting from the application of that fiscal measure with the tax burden resulting from the application of the normal rules of taxation under national law of an undertaking, placed in a comparable factual situation, carrying on its activities under market conditions. In addition, the General Court points out that, in examining the method of calculating an integrated company’s taxable income endorsed by a tax ruling, the Commission can find an advantage only if it demonstrates that the methodological errors which, in its view, affect the transfer pricing do not allow a reliable approximation of an arm’s length outcome to be reached, but rather lead to a reduction in the taxable profit of the company concerned compared with the tax burden resulting from the application of normal taxation rules. In the light of those principles, the General Court then examines the merits of the Commission’s analysis in support of its finding that, by endorsing a transfer pricing method that did not allow a reliable approximation of an arm’s length outcome to be reached, the tax ruling at issue granted an advantage to LuxOpCo.  In that context, the General Court holds, in the first place, that the primary finding of an advantage is based on an analysis which is incorrect in several respects. Thus, first, in so far as the Commission relied on its own functional analysis of LuxSCS in order to assert, in essence, that contrary to what was taken into account in granting the tax ruling at issue, that company was merely a passive holder of the intangible assets in question, the General Court considers that analysis to be incorrect. In particular, according to the General Court, the Commission did not take due account of the functions performed by LuxSCS for the purposes of exploiting the intangible assets in question or the risks borne by that company in that context.  Nor did it demonstrate that it was easier to find undertakings comparable to LuxSCS than undertakings comparable to LuxOpCo, or that choosing LuxSCS as the tested entity would have made it possible to obtain more reliable comparison data. Consequently, contrary to its findings in the contested decision, the Commission did not, according to the General Court, establish that the Luxembourg tax authorities had incorrectly chosen LuxOpCo as the ‘tested party’ in order to determine the amount of the royalty. Secondly, the General Court holds that, even if the ‘arm’s length’ royalty should have been calculated using LuxSCS as the ‘tested party’ in the application of the TNMM, the Commission did not establish the existence of an advantage since it was also unfounded in asserting that LuxSCS’s remuneration could be calculated on the basis of the mere passing on of the development costs of the intangible assets borne in relation to the Buy-In agreements and the cost sharing agreement without in any way taking into account the subsequent increase in value of those intangible assets. Thirdly, the General Court considers that the Commission also erred in evaluating the remuneration that LuxSCS could expect, in the light of the arm’s length principle, for the functions linked to maintaining its ownership of the intangible assets at issue. Contrary to what appears from the contested decision, such functions cannot be treated in the same way as the supply of ‘low value adding’ services, with the result that the Commission’s application of a mark-up most often observed in relation to intra-group supplies of a ‘low value adding’ services is not appropriate in the present case. In view of all the foregoing considerations, the General Court concludes that the elements put forward by the Commission in support of its primary finding are not capable of establishing that LuxOpCo’s tax burden was artificially reduced as a result of an overpricing of the royalty. In the second place, after examining the ...

Unicomer (St. Vincent) Ltd. is engaged in the business of selling household furniture and appliances. In FY 2013 and 2014 Unicomer entered into an “insurance arrangement” involving an unrelated party, United insurance, and a related party, Canterbury. According to the tax authorities United Insurance had been used as an intermediate/conduit to funnel money from the Unicomer to Canterbury, thereby avoiding taxes in St. Vincent. In 2017 the Inland Revenue Department issued an assessments of additional tax in the sum of $12,666,798.23 inclusive of interest and penalties. The basis of the assessment centered on Unicomer’s treatment of (1) credit protection premiums (hereinafter referred to as “CPI”) under the insurance arrangement, (2) tax deferral of hire-purchase profits and (3) deductions for royalty payments. Unicomer appealed the assessment to the Appeal Commission where a decision was rendered in 2018. The Appeal Commission held that the CPI payments were rightfully disallowed by the tax authorities and that withholding tax was chargeable on these payments; the deferral of hire purchase profits was also disallowed; but royalty expenses were allowed. This decision was appealed by Unicomer to the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court predominantly ruled in favor of the tax authorities. The court upheld the decision of the Appeal Commission to disallow deductions for CPI’s and confirmed that withholding tax on these payments was chargeable. The deferral of taxation of hire-purchase profits was also disallowed by the court. However, although the additional taxes should of course be collected by the tax authorities, the procedure that had been followed after receiving the decision of the Appeal Commission – contacting the bank of Unicomer and having them pay the additional taxes owed by the company – was considered wholly unacceptable and amounted to an abuse of the power. The taxes owed should be collected following correct procedures. Click here for translation ...

A fully fledged Norwegian distributor in the H group was restructured and converted into a Limited risk distributor. The tax authorities issued an assessment where the income of the Norwegian distributor was adjusted to the median in a benchmark study prepared by the tax authorities, based on the “Transactional Net Margin Method” (TNMM method). Decision of the Tax Board In a majority decision, the Tax Board determined that the case should be send back to the tax administration for further processing. Excerpt “…The majority agrees with the tax office that deficits over time may give reason to investigate whether the intra-group prices are set on market terms. However, the case is not sufficiently informed for the tribunal to take a final position on this. In order to determine whether the income has been reduced as a result of incorrect pricing of intra-group transactions and debits, it is necessary to analyze the agreed prices and contract terms. A comparability analysis will be needed, cf. OECD TPG Chapter III, including especially OECD TPG Section 3.4. to be able to determine whether the intra-group prices have been at arm’s length. When analysing the controlled transactions and identifying possible comparable uncontrolled transactions, reference must be made to the comparability factors as instructed in OECD TPG section 1.36. A functional analysis must be performed to identify which party to the contractual relationship is to form the basis for the choice of pricing method in accordance with OECD TPG clause 3.4, step 3, as well as a market analysis to identify how this may affect the price in the controlled transactions. See OECD TPG Section 3.7, step 2. In the majority’s view, the tax office is closest to making the necessary analyzes and assessments of the above matters. The majority therefore believes that the decision should be revoked and sent back to the tax office for possible new processing, cf. the Tax Administration Act § 13-7 (3).” Click here for translation ...

At issue in the case of India vs. Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Private Limited, was whether payments for purchase of computer software to foreign suppliers or manufacturers could be characterised as royalty payments. The Supreme Court held that such payments could not be considered payments for use of the underlying copyrights/intangibles. Hence, no withholding tax would apply to these payments for the years prior to the 2012. Furthermore, the 2012 amendment to the royalty definition in the Indian tax law could not be applied retroactively, and even after 2012, the definition of royalty in Double Tax Treaties would still override the definition in Indian tax law. Excerpt from the conclusion of the Supreme Court “Given the definition of royalties contained in Article 12 of the DTAAs mentioned in paragraph 41 of this judgment , it is clear that there is no obligation on the persons mentioned in section 195 of the Income Tax Act to deduct tax at source, as the distribution agreements/EULAs in the facts of these cases do not create any interest or right in such distributors/end-users, which would amount to the use of or right to use any copyright. The provisions contained in the Income Tax Act (section 9(1)(vi), along with explanations 2 and 4 thereof), which deal with royalty, not being more beneficial to the assessees, have no application in the facts of these cases. Our answer to the question posed before us, is that the amounts paid by resident Indian end-users/distributors to non-resident computer software manufacturers/suppliers, as consideration for the resale/use of the computer software through EULAs/distribution agreements, is not the payment of royalty for the use of copyright in the computer software, and that the same does not give rise to any income taxable in India, as a result of which the persons referred to in section 195 of the Income Tax Act were not liable to deduct any TDS under section 195 of the Income Tax Act. The answer to this question will apply to all four categories of cases enumerated by us in paragraph 4 of this judgment.” ...

DIGITEX INFORMATICA S.L. had entered into a substantial service contract with an unrelated party in Latin America, Telefonica, according to which the DIGITEX group would provide certain services for Telefonica. The contract originally entered by DIGITEX INFORMATICA S.L. was later transferred to DIGITEX’s Latin American subsidiaries. But after the transfer, cost and amortizations related to the contract were still paid – and deducted for tax purposes – by DIGITEX in Spain. The tax authorities found that costs (amortizations, interest payments etc.) related to the Telefonica contract – after the contract had been transferred to the subsidiaries – should have been reinvoiced to the subsidiaries, and an assessment was issued to DIGITEX for FY 2010 and 2011 where these deductions had been disallowed. DIGITEX on its side argued that by not re-invoicing the costs to the subsidiaries the income received from the subsidiaries increased. According to the intercompany contract, DIGITEX would invoice related entities 1% of the turnover of its own customers for branding and 2% of the turnover of its own or referred customers for know-how. However, no invoicing could be made if the operating income of the subsidiaries did not exceed 2.5% of turnover, excluding the result obtained from operations carried out with local clients. Judgement of the Court The Audiencia Nacional dismissed the appeal of DIGITEX and decided in favour of the tax authorities. Excerpt “1.- The income derived from the local contracts for customer analysis and migration services corresponds to the appellant Group entities and designated as PSACs, i.e. to the same affiliates. Therefore, the taxpayer should have re-invoiced the costs of the project to these subsidiaries, according to the revenue generated in each of them. And this by application of the principle of correlation between income and expenditure set out in RD 1514/2007. The plaintiff should not be surprised by this consideration insofar as this was done, at least partially, in the financial year 2010, in which it already re-invoiced EUR 339 978.55. Consequently, it cannot be said that the defendant administration went against its own actions when it took the view that the plaintiff in 2009 should have recorded in its accounts an intangible asset of EUR 50 million, in view of what happened later, in 2010, when the contracts with the subsidiaries were concluded and the PSACs became PSACs. Therefore, it was the plaintiff itself that went against its own actions, acting differently between 2010 and 2011 when it came to allocating the costs derived from the intangible amortisation and the financial expenses of the loan contracted. 2.- Even if we were to admit that the services provided by the plaintiff have added value by incorporating both a trademark licence and know-how, this does not mean that such re-invoicing does not have to be carried out, when, as has been said, in 2009 DIGITEX INFORMATICA S.L was acting as PSAC under the mediation contract, but as a result of the new contracts entered into with the Latin American subsidiaries in 2010, this position as PSAC was assumed by the said subsidiaries present in the seven Latin American countries. As regards the method of determining the profit, it is appropriate to refer to the operating margin expressly contained in the contracts concluded by the plaintiff with the subsidiaries and not to the general margin determined by the plaintiff in accordance with folio 32 et seq. of the application (according to the final result of the profit and loss account), despite the reports provided by the appellant. And so it is that the latter cannot contradict itself by going against its own acts to the point of altering the literal nature of the contracts, even if it indicates that the will of the parties in the other to the contrary, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1281 of the CC.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

Transactions had taken place between Vibac S.p.A. and related foreign group companies related to use of trademarks and royalty/license payments. It was up to the Vibac S.p.A. to demonstrate that the remuneration received from related companies for use of the trademark of the products had been at arm’s length. According to the company the royalty had been set at a low price to ensure that the foreign subsidiaries were more competitive. An upward adjustment was issued by the tax authorities rejecting the taxpayer’s argument that the below market royalty was explained by the need to enable its foreign subsidiary to penetrate more effectively the US market. The tax authorities argued that such a strategy could only be justifiable in a limited period. The tax authorities determined the arm’s length royalty payment by application of the Resale Price Method (RPM). However, due to the uniqueness of the asset transferred, which hardly allows the identification of comparable transactions, the same circular, while not excluding that in some cases one of the basic criteria adopted for the transfer of tangible goods (comparison, resale or increased cost) may be applied, points out that it should not be overlooked that a licence agreement depends essentially on the forecasts of the result that may be achieved by the licensee in the territory to which the right of exploitation refers and that it is, therefore, necessary to develop subsidiary valuation methods, always inspired by the principle of the arm’s length price, i.e. the price that would have been agreed upon between independent undertakings. With regard to the determination of the fee concerning the use of intangible assets, the circular notes that it is greatly affected by the specific characteristics of the economic sector to which the intangible right refers and that, in general, it is commensurate with the turnover of the licensee, so that the reference to these indices is a valid initial data for the assessment of the “normal value”. Vibac S.p.A. did not approve of the assessment an brought the case to court. The court of first instance held in favour of the tax authorities. This decision was then appealed to Corte di Cassazione. Judgement of the Court The Italien Corte di Cassazione upheld the decision of the court of first instance and dismissed the appeal of Vibac S.p.A. Excerpts: Indeed, the rationale of the abovementioned domestic tax legislation is to be found in the safeguarding of the principle of free competition, as set out in Article 9 of the OECD Model Convention, which is to be interpreted in the light of the specific features of tax law on tax arbitrage. In fact, the rationale of the domestic tax rules referred to above is to be found in the safeguarding of the principle of free competition, set out in Article 9 of the OECD Model Convention, which provides for the possibility of taxing profits arising from intra-group transactions that have been governed by conditions different from those that would have been agreed between independent companies in comparable transactions carried out on the free market; it is therefore necessary to verify the economic substance of the transaction and to compare it with similar transactions carried out, in comparable circumstances, in free market conditions between independent parties and to assess its compliance with these (Court of Cassation no. 5645 of 2020, id. no. 9615 of 2019; id. 27018 of 2017). Thus, company policy, taken in itself, is not a necessary and sufficient cause of justification for derogating from the normal value rule. Since the normal value of a transaction is a function of the economic characteristics of the transaction, the transaction from which the normal value is to be derived will concern (a) goods and services of the same kind, (b) at the same marketing stage, (c) at the same time and (d) in the same market where the goods or services were acquired. In order to achieve the highest possible degree of comparability, the second part of Article 9 TUIR states that “for the determination of normal value”, reference should be made, “as far as possible, to the price lists or tariffs of the person who supplied the goods or services”. The presence of varied intra-group commercial transactions fully captures the estimative meaning of Article 9, as well as the OECD model. The adoption of the Resale Price Method is advocated, not only by Circular 22.9.1980 (No. 32/9/2267), but also and above all by the 1995 OECD Report. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A Colombian taxpayer had filed an unconstitutionality complaint against Article 70 (partial) of Law 1819 of 2016, “Whereby a structural tax reform is adopted, mechanisms for the fight against tax evasion and avoidance are strengthened, and other provisions are enacted.” The Constitutional Court ruled that the Colombian GAAR legislation was not unconstitutional. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Coca Cola, a U.S. corporation, was the legal owner of the intellectual property (IP) necessary to manufacture, distribute, and sell some of the best-known beverage brands in the world. This IP included trade- marks, product names, logos, patents, secret formulas, and proprietary manufacturing processes. Coca Cola licensed foreign manufacturing affiliates, called “supply points,” to use this IP to produce concentrate that they sold to unrelated bottlers, who produced finished beverages for sale  to distributors and retailers throughout the world. Coca Cola’s contracts with its supply points gave them limited rights to use the IP in performing their manufacturing and distribution functions but gave the supply points no ownership interest in that IP. During 2007-2009 the supply points compensated Coca Cola for use of its IP under a formulary apportionment method to which Coca Cola and IRS had agreed in 1996 when settling Coca Cola’s tax liabilities for 1987-1995. Under that method the supply points were permitted to satisfy their royalty obligations by paying actual royalties or by remitting dividends. During 2007-2009 the supply points remitted to Coca Cola dividends of about $1.8 billion in satisfaction of their royalty obligations. The 1996 agreement did not address the transfer pricing methodology to be used for years after 1995. Upon examination of Coca Cola’s 2007-2009 returns IRS determined that Coca Cola’s methodology did not reflect arm’s-length norms because it over-compensated the supply points and undercompensated Coca Cola for the use of its IP. IRS reallocated income between Coca Cola and the supply points employing a comparable profits method (CPM) that used Coca Cola’s unrelated bottlers as comparable parties. These adjustments increased Coca Cola’s aggregate taxable income for 2007- 2009 by more than $9 billion. The US Tax Court ruled on November 18 that Coca-Cola’s US-based income should be increased by about $9 billion in a dispute over the appropriate royalties owned by its foreign-based licensees for the years from 2007 to 2009. The court reduced the IRS’s adjustment by $1.8 billion because the taxpayer made a valid and timely choice to use an offset treatment when it came to dividends paid by foreign manufacturing affiliates to satisfy royalty obligations ...

The tax authorities had issued an assessment according to which royalty payments from Colgate Palmolive España S.A (CP España) to Switzerland were not considered exempt from withholding taxes under the Spanish-Swiss DTA since the company in Switzerland was not the Beneficial Owner of the royalty-income. The assessment was set aside by the National Court in a decision issued in November 2018. The Supreme court were to clarify the conformity with the law of the judgement of the Audiencia Nacional, following in the wake of the order of admission which, in a similar manner to that proposed in appeal no. 5448/2018, ruled in favour of the taxpayer on 3 February last, asks the following questions. a) to clarify the objective and temporal limits of the so-called dynamic interpretation of the DTAs signed by the Kingdom of Spain on the basis of the OECD Model Convention – as in this case the Spanish-Swiss DTA – when, despite the fact that the concept of beneficial owner is not provided for in article 12 of the DTA, this figure is applied in accordance with the Commentaries to the OECD Model Convention (drawn up at a date subsequent to the initial formalisation of the Convention), despite the fact that the beneficial owner was not introduced in Article 12 (relating to royalties) in subsequent amendments to the DTA, but was introduced in other provisions (Articles 10 and 11) for other concepts such as dividends or interest. b) Whether dynamic interpretation, if possible, allows the applicator of the rule, including the Court in proceedings, to correct the actual meaning or literal tenor of the rules agreed in the Convention, which occupies a preferential place in our system of sources (Article 96 EC), in order to avoid treaty overriding or unilateral modification. c) Clarify whether the Commentaries to the OECD Model Convention (here drawn up at a date subsequent to the signing of the Convention) constitute a source of law in their own right (Articles 117 EC and 1. 6 of the Civil Code), as they are not, as we have stated – STS of 19 October 2016, pronounced in appeal no. 2558/2015-, as they are not strictly speaking legal rules that are binding on the Courts of Justice and which, therefore, can be the basis for a ground for cassation in their hypothetical infringement and whether, consequently, the Courts can rely on their indications or opinions to stop applying a double taxation Convention and directly apply the national law, which results in a qualitatively higher taxation. These questions coincide substantially, with slight variations in formulation, with those examined in appeal no. 5448/2018, which gave rise to the favourable judgment -for the taxpayer- of 3 February 2020. This leads us to specify the neuralgic points of the problem raised here, as far as they coincide, for the decision of the appeal in cassation and the formation of jurisprudential doctrine in this matter: a) what is the dynamic interpretation of the Conventions and whether it is an expression that can find equivalents in our legal tradition; b) whether the OECD model agreements or their commentaries, by their origin and nature, are legal rules that the courts of justice must take into account when interpreting the rules agreed in the Conventions, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 94 and 96 of our EC; c) whether such commentaries, guidelines or interpretative models can take precedence over the hermeneutical rules, either those agreed between the signatory states or in other conventions and treaties, or those of their respective domestic legal systems, and by virtue of what source of legitimacy; d) whether this dynamic interpretation can be used to interpret an article of the Convention on the basis of the content of other subsequent rules of the same Convention, in any event not in force at the time of application of the withholdings required here; and e) whether Spain can unilaterally interpret, on the basis of this rule, the concept of royalties, as well as that of beneficial owner, in order to deny that it is present in the paying company. Judgement of the Supreme Court The court held in favour of Colgate and set aside the decision of the tax authorities. Excerpts “The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply if the beneficial owner of the interest, who is a resident of a Contracting State, carries on a business in the other Contracting State from which the interest arises through a fixed establishment situated in that other State and the debt-claim giving rise to the interest is effectively connected with that fixed establishment. In such a case the provisions of Article 7 shall apply”. As already indicated, it should be stressed that the wording of Article 12 (royalties) did not include any reference to the concept of beneficial owner (despite having had the opportunity at the time of the amendment of the Convention). Moreover, to date, the concept of “beneficial owner” has not been introduced in Article 12 either, despite the fact that there has been a second amendment of the Spain-Switzerland DTA through the Protocol made in Madrid on 27 July 2011 (BOE of 11 June 2013) – “Protocol of 2011”. That is to say, without prejudice to the incorporation of the concept of “beneficial owner” in the 1977 and 1995 Model Conventions and the subsequent amendments made to the conventional text that came to reflect this and other modifications introduced in the Model Convention, the fact is that the literal wording of the sections that interest us here in Article 12 of the Spain-Switzerland DTA maintains, to date, its original wording. That is to say, the States have agreed to modify and adapt the CDI to the new standards set out in the Model, but only in those provisions expressly agreed by both States and among which the provision relating to royalties was not included […]”. “By their very nature, the above considerations lead us to the need to annul and set aside the lower court judgment, on the ...

The Administrative Court of Appeal (CAA) set aside a judgement of the administrative court and upheld the tax authorities claims of withholding taxes on royalties paid by Société Planet to companies in Belgium and Malta irrespective of the beneficial owner of those royalties being a company in New Zealand. Hence, Article 12(2) of the Franco-New Zealand tax treaty was not considered applicable to French source royalties whose beneficial owner resided in New Zealand, where they had been paid to an intermediary company established in a third country. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In a decision of 30 August 2016 the European Commission concluded that Ireland’s tax benefits to Apple were illegal under EU State aid rules, because it allowed Apple to pay substantially less tax than other businesses. The decision of the Commission concerned two tax rulings issued by Ireland to Apple, which determined the taxable profit of two Irish Apple subsidiaries, Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe, between 1991 and 2015. As a result of the rulings, in 2011, for example, Apple’s Irish subsidiary recorded European profits of US$ 22 billion (c.a. €16 billion) but under the terms of the tax ruling only around €50 million were considered taxable in Ireland. Ireland appealed the Commission’s decision to the European Court of Justice. The Judgement of the European Court of Justice The General Court annuls the Commission’s decision that Ireland granted illegal State aid to Apple through selective tax breaks because the Commission did not succeed in showing to the requisite legal standard that there was an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. According to the Court, the Commission was wrong to declare that Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe had been granted a selective economic advantage and, by extension, State aid. The Court considers that the Commission incorrectly concluded, in its primary line of reasoning, that the Irish tax authorities had granted Apple’s Irish subsidiaries an advantage as a result of not having allocated the Apple Group intellectual property licences to their Irish branches. According to the Court, the Commission should have shown that that income represented the value of the activities actually carried out by the Irish branches themselves, in view of the activities and functions actually performed by the Irish branches of the two Irish subsidiaries, on the one hand, and the strategic decisions taken and implemented outside of those branches, on the other. In addition, the Court considers that the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating, in its subsidiary line of reasoning, methodological errors in the contested tax rulings which would have led to a reduction in chargeable profits in Ireland. The defects identified by the Commission in relation to the two tax rulings are not, in themselves, sufficient to prove the existence of an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. Furthermore, the Court considers that the Commission did not prove, in its alternative line of reasoning, that the contested tax rulings were the result of discretion exercised by the Irish tax authorities and that, accordingly, Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe had been granted a selective advantage ...

The question in this case was whether royalty payments from a loss making Danish subsidiary Adecco A/S (H1 A/S in the decision) to its Swiss parent company Adecco SA (G1 SA in the decision – an international provider of temporary and permanent employment services active throughout the entire range of sectors in Europe, the Americas, the Middle East and Asia – for use of trademarks and trade names, knowhow, international network intangibles, and business concept were deductible expenses for tax purposes or not. In  2013, the Danish tax authorities (SKAT) had amended Adecco A/S’s taxable income for the years 2006-2009 by a total of DKK 82 million. Adecco A/S submitted that the company’s royalty payments were operating expenses deductible under section 6 (a) of the State Tax Act and that it was entitled to tax deductions for royalty payments of 1.5% of the company’s turnover in the first half of 2006 and 2% up to and including 2009, as these prices were in line with what would have been agreed if the transactions had been concluded between independent parties and thus compliant  with the requirement in section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act (- the arm’s length principle). In particular, Adecco A/S claimed that the company had lifted its burden of proof that the basic conditions for deductions pursuant to section 6 (a) of the State Tax Act were met, and the royalty payments thus deductible to the extent claimed. According to section 6 (a) of the State Tax Act expenses incurred during the year to acquire, secure and maintain income are deductible for tax purposes. There must be a direct and immediate link between the expenditure incurred and the acquisition of income. The company hereby stated that it was not disputed that the costs were actually incurred and that it was evident that the royalty payment was in the nature of operating costs, since the company received significant economic value for the payments. The High Court ruled in favor of the Danish tax authorities and concluded as follows: “Despite the fact that, as mentioned above, there is evidence to suggest that H1 A/S’s payment of royalties for the use of the H1 A/S trademark is a deductible operating expense, the national court finds, in particular, that H1 A/S operates in a national Danish market, where price is by far the most important competitive parameter, that the company has for a very long period largely only deficit, that it is an agreement on payment to the company’s ultimate parent company – which must be assumed to have its own purpose of being represented on the Danish market – and that royalty payments must be regarded as a standard condition determined by G1 SA independent of the market in which the Danish company is working, as well as the information on the marketing costs incurred in the Danish company and in the Swiss company compared with the failure to respond to the relevant provocations that H1 A/S has not lifted the burden of proof that the payments of royalties to the group-affiliated company G1 SA, constitutes a deductible operating expense, cf. section 6 (a) of the State Tax Act. 4.5 and par. 4.6, the national court finds that the company’s royalty payment cannot otherwise be regarded as a deductible operating expense.” Adecco appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the High Court and ruled in favor of Adecco. The Supreme Court held that the royalty payments had the nature of deductible operating costs. The Supreme Court also found that Adecco A/S’s transfer pricing documentation for the income years in question was not insufficient to such an extent that it could be considered equal to lack of documentation. The company’s income could therefore not be determined on a discretionary basis by the tax authorities. Finally, the Supreme Court did not consider that a royalty rate of 2% was not at arm’s length, or that Adecco A/S’s marketing in Denmark of the Adecco brand provided a basis for deducting in the royalty payment a compensation for a marketing of the global brand. Click here for translation ...

“Metal Plating Corp” is engaged in manufacturing and selling plating chemicals and had entered into a series of controlled transactions with foreign group companies granting licenses to use intangibles (know-how related to technology and sales) – and provided technical support services by sending over technical experts. The company had used a CUP method to price these transactions based on “internal comparables”. The tax authorities found that the amount of the consideration paid to “Metal Plating Corp” for the licenses and services had not been at arm’s length and issued an assessment where the residual profit split method was applied to determine the taxable profit for the fiscal years FY 2007-2012. “Metal Plating Corp” on its side held that it was inappropriate to use a residual profit split method and that there were errors in the calculations performed by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Court The Court dismissed the appeal of “Metal Plating Corp” and affirmed the assessment made by the Japanese tax authority. On the company’s use of the CUP method the Court concluded that there were significant differences between the controlled transactions and the selected “comparable” transactions in terms of licences, services and the circumstances under which the transactions were took place. Therefore the CUP method was not the most appropriate method to price the controlled transactions. The Court recognised that “Metal Plating Corp” had intangible assets created by its research and development activities. The Court also recognised that the subsidiaries had created intangible assets by penetrating regional markets and cultivating and maintaining customer relationships. The Court found the transactions should be aggregated and that the price should be determined for the full packaged deal – not separately for each transaction. Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

Due to the economic situation of automotive suppliers in Germany in 2006, “Cutting Tech GMBH” established a subsidiary (CB) in Bosnien-Herzegovina which going forward functioned as a contract manufacturer. CB did not develop the products itself, but manufactured them according to specifications provided by “Cutting Tech GMBH”. The majority of “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s sales articles were subject to multi-stage production, which could include various combinations of production processes. In particular, “Cutting Tech GMBH” was no longer competitive in the labour-intensive manufacturing processes (cut-off grinding, turning, milling) due to the high wage level in Germany. Good contribution margins from the high-tech processes (adiabatic cutting, double face grinding) increasingly had to subsidise the losses of the labour-intensive processes. Individual production stages, however, could not be outsourced to external producers for reasons of certification and secrecy. In addition, if the production had been outsourced, there would have been a great danger that a third company would have siphoned off “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s know-how and then taken over the business with “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s customer. This could have led to large losses in turnover for “Cutting Tech GMBH”. Furthermore, some of the labour-intensive work also had to cover one or more finishing stages of the high-tech processes, so that this business was also at risk if it was outsourced. For these reasons, the decision was made to outsource the labour-intensive production processes to Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to become profitable again and to remain competitive in the future. There, there were German-speaking staff with the necessary expertise, low customs duties and a low exchange rate risk. CB functioned as a contract manufacturer with the processes of production, quality assurance and a small administrative unit. Cost advantages existed not only in personnel costs, but also in electricity costs. CB prevented the plaintiff’s good earnings from the high-tech processes in Germany from having to continue to be used to subsidise the low-tech processes. “Cutting Tech GMBH” supplied CB with the material needed for production. The deliveries were processed as sales of materials. “Cutting Tech GMBH” received as purchase prices its cost prices without offsetting profit mark-ups or handling fees/commissions. The material was purchased and supplied to CB by “Cutting Tech GMBH”, which was able to obtain more favourable purchase prices than CB due to the quantities it purchased. The work commissioned by “Cutting Tech GMBH” was carried out by CB with the purchased material and its personnel. CB then sold the products to “Cutting Tech GMBH”. In part, they were delivered directly by CB to the end customers, in part the products were further processed by “Cutting Tech GMBH” or by third-party companies. “Cutting Tech GMBH” determined the transfer prices for the products it purchased using a “contribution margin calculation”. Until 2012, “Cutting Tech GMBH” purchased all products manufactured by CB in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 2013 onwards, CB generated its own sales with the external company P. This was a former customer of “Cutting Tech GMBH”. Since “Cutting Tech GMBH” could not offer competitive prices to the customer P in the case of production in Germany, CB took over the latter’s orders and supplied P with the products it manufactured in accordance with the contracts concluded. CB did not have its own distribution in the years in dispute. The tax audit of FY 2011 – 2013 The auditor assumed that the transfer of functions and risks to the CB in 2007/2008 basically fulfilled the facts of a transfer of functions. However, since only a routine function had been transferred, “Cutting Tech GMBH” had rightly carried out the transfer of functions without paying any special remuneration. Due to CB’s limited exposure to risks, the auditor considered that the cost-plus method should be used for transfer pricing. In adjusting the transfer prices, the auditor assumed a mark-up rate of 12%. The material invoiced by “Cutting Tech GMBH” and the scrap proceeds was not included in the cost basis used in the assessment. For 2013, the auditor took into account that the customer P had agreed contracts exclusively with CB and reduced the costs by the costs of the products sold to P. Furthermore, the auditor took the legal view that the entire audit period should be considered uniformly. Therefore, it was appropriate to deduct an amount of €64,897 in 2011, which had been calculated in favour of “Cutting Tech GMBH” in 2010 and not taken into account in the tax assessment notices, in order to correct the error. The auditor did not consider it justified to determine the transfer prices for “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s purchases of goods by means of a so-called contribution margin calculation. Based on the functional and risk analysis, the auditor concluded that CB was a contract manufacturer. On the grounds that this profit of CB was remuneration for a routine function, the auditor refrained from recognising a vGA because of the transfer of client P from the applicant to CB. However, he stated that according to arm’s length royalty rates, values between 1% and 3% could be recognised as royalty “according to general practical experience.” “Cutting Tech GMBH” filed an appeal against the assessment in 2015. Judgement of the Fiscal Court The Fiscal Court adjusted the assessment issued by the tax authorities and thus parcially allowed the appeal of “Cutting Tech GMBH”. Excerpts “In the case at issue, the decisive cause for the plaintiff losing the customer P is not to be seen in the transfer of business to CB. The applicant lost the customer because it could not offer him competitive prices. The takeover of the business with P by CB is thus not the cause of the loss of the customer. The plaintiff’s factual submission is undisputed in this respect and is confirmed by the small profit that CB made from the business according to the calculations of the foreign auditor.” “The FA was correct to add € … to the taxable income in the year 2013 due to the supply of materials to CB for the processing of its business with ...

The question in this case was whether royalty payments from a loss making Danish subsidiary Adecco A/S (H1 A/S in the decision) to its Swiss parent company Adecco SA (G1 SA in the decision – an international provider of temporary and permanent employment services active throughout the entire range of sectors in Europe, the Americas, the Middle East and Asia – for use of trademarks and trade names, knowhow, international network intangibles, and business concept were deductible expenses for tax purposes or not. In  2013, the Danish tax authorities (SKAT) had amended Adecco A/S’s taxable income for the years 2006-2009 by a total of DKK 82 million. “Section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act. Paragraph 1 states that, when calculating the taxable income, group affiliates must apply prices and terms for commercial or economic transactions in accordance with what could have been agreed if the transactions had been concluded between independent parties. SKAT does not consider it in accordance with section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act that during the period 2006 to 2009, H1 A/S had to pay royalty to G1 SA for the right to use trademark, “know-how intangibles” and “ international network intangibles ”. An independent third party, in accordance with OECD Guidelines 6.14, would not have agreed on payment of royalties in a situation where there is a clear discrepancy between the payment and the value of licensee’s business. During the period 2006 to 2009, H1 A/S did not make a profit from the use of the licensed intangible assets. Furthermore, an independent third party would not have accepted an increase in the royalty rate in 2006, where the circumstances and market conditions in Denmark meant that higher profits could not be generated. H1 A/S has also incurred considerable sales and marketing costs at its own expense and risk. Sales and marketing costs may be considered extraordinary because the costs are considered to be disproportionate to expected future earnings. This assessment takes into account the licensing agreement, which states in Article 8.2 that the termination period is only 3 months, and Article 8.6, which states that H1 A/S will not receive compensation for goodwill built up during the contract period if the contract is terminated. H1 A/S has built and maintained the brand as well as built up “brand value” on the Danish market. The company has contributed to value of intangible assets that they do not own. In SKAT’s opinion, an independent third party would not incur such expenses without some form of compensation or reduction in the royalty payment, cf. OECD Guidelines 6.36 – 6.38. If H1 A/S was not associated with the trademark owners, H1 A/S would, in SKAT’s opinion, have considered other alternatives such as terminating, renegotiating or entering into more profitable licensing agreements, cf. OECD Guidelines 1.34-1.35. A renegotiation is precisely a possibility in this situation, as Article 8.2 of the license agreement states that the agreement for both parties can be terminated at three months’ notice. The control of the group has resulted in H1 A/S maintaining unfavorable agreements, not negotiating better terms and not seeking better alternatives. In addition, SKAT finds that the continuing losses realized by the company are also due to the Group’s interest in being represented on the Danish market. In order for the Group to service the global customers that are essential to the Group’s strategy, it is important to be represented in Denmark in order to be able to offer contracts in all the countries where the customer has branches. Such a safeguard of the Group’s interest would require an independent third party to be paid, and the company must therefore also be remunerated accordingly, especially when the proportion of global customers in Denmark is significantly lower than in the other Nordic countries.“ Adecco A/S submitted that the company’s royalty payments were operating expenses deductible under section 6 (a) of the State Tax Act and that it was entitled to tax deductions for royalty payments of 1.5% of the company’s turnover in the first half of 2006 and 2% up to and including 2009, as these prices were in line with what would have been agreed if the transactions had been concluded between independent parties and thus compliant  with the requirement in section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act (- the arm’s length principle) . In particular, Adecco A/S claimed that the company had lifted its burden of proof that the basic conditions for deductions pursuant to section 6 (a) of the State Tax Act were met, and the royalty payments thus deductible to the extent claimed. According to section 6 (a) of the State Tax Act expenses incurred during the year to acquire, secure and maintain income are deductible for tax purposes. There must be a direct and immediate link between the expenditure incurred and the acquisition of income. The company hereby stated that it was not disputed that the costs were actually incurred and that it was evident that the royalty payment was in the nature of operating costs, since the company received significant economic value for the payments. The High Court ruled in favor of the Danish tax authorities and concluded as follows: “Despite the fact that, as mentioned above, there is evidence to suggest that H1 A/S’s payment of royalties for the use of the H1 A/S trademark is a deductible operating expense, the national court finds, in particular, that H1 A/S operates in a national Danish market, where price is by far the most important competitive parameter, that the company has for a very long period largely only deficit, that it is an agreement on payment to the company’s ultimate parent company – which must be assumed to have its own purpose of being represented on the Danish market – and that royalty payments must be regarded as a standard condition determined by G1 SA independent of the market in which the Danish company is working, as well as the information on the marketing costs incurred in the Danish company and in the Swiss company compared with the failure to respond to ...

In 2008, the Netherlands tax authorities concluded an advance pricing arrangement (APA) with Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV (Starbucks BV), part of the Starbucks group, which, inter alia, roasts coffees. The objective of that arrangement was to determine Starbucks BV’s remuneration for its production and distribution activities within the group. Thereafter, Starbucks BV’s remuneration served to determine annually its taxable profit on the basis of Netherlands corporate income tax. In addition, the APA endorsed the amount of the royalty paid by Starbucks BV to Alki, another entity of the same group, for the use of Starbucks’ roasting IP. More specifically, the APA provided that the amount of the royalty to be paid to Alki corresponded to Starbucks BV’s residual profit. The amount was determined by deducting Starbucks BV’s remuneration, calculated in accordance with the APA, from Starbucks BV’s operating profit. In 2015, the Commission found that the APA constituted aid incompatible with the internal market and ordered the recovery of that aid. The Netherlands and Starbucks brought an action before the General Court for annulment of the Commission’s decision. They principally dispute the finding that the APA conferred a selective advantage on Starbucks BV. More specifically, they criticise the Commission for (1) having used an erroneous reference system for the examination of the selectivity of the APA; (2) having erroneously examined whether there was an advantage in relation to an arm’s length principle particular to EU law and thereby violated the Member States’ fiscal autonomy; (3) having erroneously considered the choice of the transactional net margin method (TNMM) for determining Starbucks BV’s remuneration to constitute an advantage; and (4) having erroneously considered the detailed rules for the application of that method as validated in the APA to confer an advantage on Starbucks BV. In it’s judgment, the General Court annuls the Commission’s decision. First, the Court examined whether, for a finding of an advantage, the Commission was entitled to analyse the tax ruling at issue in the light of the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision. In that regard, the Court notes in particular that, in the case of tax measures, the very existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation and that, in order to determine whether there is a tax advantage, the position of the recipient as a result of the application of the measure at issue must be compared with his position in the absence of the measure at issue and under the normal rules of taxation. The Court goes on to note that the pricing of intra-group transactions is not determined under market conditions. It states that where national tax law does not make a distinction between integrated undertakings and stand-alone undertakings for the purposes of their liability to corporate income tax, that law is intended to tax the profit arising from the economic activity of such an integrated undertaking as though it had arisen from transactions carried out at market prices. The Court holds that, in those circumstances, when examining, pursuant to the power conferred on it by Article 107(1) TFEU, a fiscal measure granted to such an integrated company, the Commission may compare the fiscal burden of such an integrated undertaking resulting from the application of that fiscal measure with the fiscal burden resulting from the application of the normal rules of taxation under the national law of an undertaking placed in a comparable factual situation, carrying on its activities under market conditions. The Court makes clear that the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision is a tool that allows it to check that intra-group transactions are remunerated as if they had been negotiated between independent companies. Thus, in the light of Netherlands tax law, that tool falls within the exercise of the Commission’s powers under Article 107 TFEU. The Commission was therefore, in the present case, in a position to verify whether the pricing for intragroup transactions accepted by the APA corresponds to prices that would have been negotiated under market conditions. The Court therefore rejects the claim that the Commission erred in identifying an arm’s length principle as a criterion for assessing the existence of State aid. Second, the Court reviewed the merits of the various lines of reasoning set out in the contested decision to demonstrate that, by endorsing a method for determining transfer pricing that did not result in an arm’s length outcome, the APA conferred an advantage on Starbucks BV. The Court began by examining the dispute as to the Commission’s principal reasoning. It notes that, in the context of its principal reasoning, the Commission found that the APA had erroneously endorsed the use of the TNMM. The Commission first stated that the transfer pricing report on the basis of which the APA had been concluded did not contain an analysis of the royalty which Starbucks BV paid to Alki or of the price of coffee beans purchased by Starbucks BV from SCTC, another entity of the group. Next, in examining the arm’s length nature of the royalty, the Commission applied the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP method). As a result of that analysis, the Commission considered that the amount of the royalty should have been zero. Last, the Commission considered, on the basis of SCTC’s financial data, that Starbucks BV had overpaid for the coffee beans in the period between 2011 and 2014. The Court holds that mere non-compliance with methodological requirements does not necessarily lead to a reduction of the tax burden and that the Commission would have had to demonstrate that the methodological errors identified in the APA did not allow a reliable approximation of an arm’s length outcome to be reached and that they led to a reduction of the tax burden. As regards the error identified by the Commission in respect of the choice of the TNMM and not of the CUP method, the Court finds that the Commission did not invoke any element to support as such ...

Following an audit Broker A SRL was ordered to submit corrective statements on the corporate income tax for the tax years 2016 and 2017, and not to take over the tax loss from previous years, in the amount of RON 62,773,810 in 2016 and 2017. The tax authorities had found shortcomings in the comparability study drawn up by the company and replaced it with their own study. According to Broaker A SRL the transfer pricing adjustment was unlawful: the measure of reworking the comparability study has no legal basis and was not reasoned by the tax authorities; the findings of the tax inspection bodies are based on a serious error concerning the accounting recognition of A. BV’s income in its records; unlawfulness as regards the adjustment of income in respect of support services. ANAF has made serious errors of calculation by reference to its own reasoning in establishing the adjustments. unlawfulness of the tax decision in relation to the adjustment of expenditure on strategic management services. The findings of the tax inspection team lead directly and directly to double taxation at group level of this income, to which the following criticisms are made: the tax authorities erroneously adjusted income relating to strategic management services which were not the subject of the Support Services Contract between A. SRL and A. BV and which were not provided by the company; the imposition of the obligation to re-invoice A. BV for management services leads to double taxation at group level. Judgement of Supreme Court The Supreme Court found the appeal of Broker A SRL unfounded and upheld the assessment of the tax authorities. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

BHP Group has agreed to pay the state of Western Australia A$250 million to end a dispute over royalties paid on iron ore shipments sold through its Singapore marketing hub. The State government found in January that the world’s biggest miner had underpaid royalties on iron ore shipments sold via Singapore stretching back over more than a decade. BHP reached a deal to pay A$529 million in additional taxes to the Australian government late last year to settle a long-running tax dispute over the miner’s Singapore hub on its income from 2003-2018 ...

The tax authorities had partly disallowed amounts deducted by Nike Argentina for three expenses; royalties for use of trademarks and technical assistance, promotional expenses for sponsorship of the Brazilian Football Confederation, and commissions of Nike Inc. for purchasing agents. Issue one and two was dropped during the process and the remaining issue before the tribunal was expenses related to commissions for purchases according to a contract signed between Nike Argentina and Nike Inc. The tax authorities (AFIP) had found that the 7% commission rate paid by Nike Argentina had not been determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle. The tax authorities stated that the purchase management services were provided by NIAC, and that Nike Inc.’s participation was merely an intermediary, and therefore it charged a much higher percentage than the one invoiced by the company performing the actual management. The Court of Appeal ruled in favor of Nike Argentina. The analysis in the Transfer Price Study based on external comparables supported the 7% commission. See also the prior decision of the Tax Court. Click here for English Translation ...

In dispute was royalty payments from an Indian subsidiary to it’s Israeli Parent company, Netafim, Israel. Following an audit the tax authorities set the royalty to nil. The Court dismissed the Revenue’s tax assessment. “Therefore, even assuming that CUP method has been applied by the Transfer Pricing Officer, it is apparent that he has not undertaken the exercise provided under rule 10B(i)(a) for determining the arm’s length price. Therefore, the contention of the learned Departmental Representative that the arm’s length price of royalty has been determined at nil by applying CUP method is totally unacceptable. Further, in case of Denso India Ltd. (supra), cited by the learned Departmental Representative, the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court has approved the decision of the Transfer Pricing Officer in applying TNMM for benchmarking the arm’s length price of royalty paid. In case of CLSA India Ltd. (supra) and Frigo Glass India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) cited by the learned Authorised Representative, the Tribunal has rejected applicability of CUP method for determining the arm’s length price of royalty payment and has held that TNMM is the most appropriate method to determine the arm’s length price of royalty payment. In the facts of the present appeal, while arguing in favour of applicability of CUP, the learned Departmental Representative has submitted that since the assessee failed to furnish rates at which royalty was paid by other group entities, the Transfer Pricing Officer determined the arm’s length price at nil. The aforesaid argument of the learned Departmental Representative is unacceptable simply for the reason that the Transfer Pricing Officer could not have determined the arm’s length price under CUP by applying the rate of royalty paid by other group entities since they are controlled transactions. Whereas, rule 10B(1)(a) mandates that the price charged for an uncontrolled transaction / transaction should be considered as a CUP. As regards the justifiability of payment of royalty qua RBI/SIA approvals, we must observe that in the decisions cited by the learned Authorised Representative, the Tribunal has held that the rate at which payment of royalty was approved by the RBI/SIA can be considered as arm’s length price. In the case of A.W.Faber Castell India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) cited by the learned Departmental Representative, though, the Tribunal has observed that arm’s length price of royalty needs to be determined in accordance with the Transfer Pricing regulations, however, the bench also observed that if an authority by way of specific approval has allowed a particular rate of payment, it does carry persuasive value and can act as one of the supportive tools for carrying out benchmarking of transaction relating to payment of royalty. Insofar as the decision of the Tribunal in Skol Breweries (supra) cited by the learned Departmental Representative, we must observe that the Tribunal has observed that press note of Ministry of Commerce fixing rate of royalty under FDI policy cannot be considered to be relevant for determination of arm’s length price under the Act. However, following the well settled proposition of law that the view favourable to the assessee has to be taken, we are inclined to follow the decisions cited by the learned Authorised Representative holding that the determination of arm’s length price as approved by the RBI/SIA is valid. On the basis of the aforesaid reasoning, we uphold the decision of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) in deleting the addition made on account of transfer pricing adjustment.” ...

According to the Tax Authorities, the content of Christian Fishbacher S.p.A’s contract with the Swiss parent of the Group, granting limited right of use of the trademark, did not justify a royalty of 3.5%, to which an additional 1.6% was added as a contribution to the investments for the promotion and development of the brand. The appellate judge held that exceeding the values taken as “normal” by the circular 32 of 09/22/1980 not it were justified in the light of the concrete elements of the case is that correctly the Office had re-determined the value of the services within 2%, following the aforementioned Circular, which incorporated the indications of the report drawn up by the OECD in 1979. The circular identifies three levels for assessing the normal value of royalties: the first, not suspected, up to 2%; the second from 2% to 5%, determined on the basis of technical data firm and to the content of the contract , in particular reference usefulness of the licensee; the third over 5% for exceptional cases, justified by the high technological level of the reference economic sector . The decision of the CTR does not appear to conflict with the art. 110, paragraph 7, Tuir . (nor with the Articles 39 and 40 Presidential Decree no.600/73), as the appellate judge held that subsist a series of elements which jointly considered competed to to form a painting circumstantial suitable to ascertain the ascertainment of the Office pursuant to Article 110 , paragraph 7 ; moreover it has assumed the percentages indicated in the circular n.32/1980 as objective parameter for the determination of the “normal value”, in the absence of evidence contrary or different provided by the tax payer. The solution adopted is in line with the principle, regarding the assessment of income taxes, according to which the burden of proof of the assumptions of the deductible costs and charges, competing to determine the business income, including their inherence and their direct attribution to revenue-generating activities lies with the tax payer (see Cass. 02/25/2010, n. 4554; Cass. 30/07/2002, n. 11240). Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

ARPTe Ltd had paid a subsidiary for management services and use of intangibles. The benefit of those payments were challenged by the tax authorities and an assessment was issued where these deductions had been denied. An appeal was filed with the tax court Judgement of the Tax Court The Court set aside the assessment of the tax authorities and decided in favor of ARPTe Ltd. According to the Court ARPTe Ltd had been able to provide sufficient evidence that the management services and intangibles provided by the subsidiary had actually benefited the company. “ Click here for translation ...

A Swiss company manufactured and distributed pharmaceutical and chemical products. The Swiss company was held by a Dutch parent that held another company in France. R&D activities were delegated by the Dutch parent to its French subsidiary and compensated with cost plus 15%. On that basis the Swiss company had to pay a royalty to its Dutch parent of 2.5% of its turnover for using the IP developed. Following an audit the Swiss tax authorities concluded that the Dutch parent did not contribute to the development of IP. In 2006 and 2007, no employees were employed, and in 2010 and 2011 there were only three employees. Hence the royalty agreement was disregarded and an assessment issued where the royalty payments were denied. Instead the R&D agreement between the Dutch parent and the French subsidiary was regarded as having been concluded between the Swiss and French companies Judgement of the Supreme Court The Court agreed with the decision of the tax authorities. The Dutch parent was a mere shell company with no substance. Hence, the royalty agreement was disregarded and replaced with the cost plus agreement with the French subsidiary. The Court found that it must have been known to the taxpayer that a company without substance could not be entitled to profits of the R&D activities. On that basis an amount equal to 75% of the evaded tax had therefore rightly been imposed as a penalty. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In a case on hidden distribution of profits, the Luxembourg tax authorities stated the following on the issue of valuation methods for intangible assets (a patent): “…the evaluation of an intellectual property right is a rather complex subject; that evaluation reports from “independent” experts in this field are often rather subjective; whereas, therefore, reference should be made to a neutral and recognized body for the evaluation of patents, in this case WIPO, which proposes three different methods of valuation, including (a) the cost method, (b) the revenue method, as well as (c) the market method; that the first method of evaluation is to be dismissed from the outset in view of the absence of research and development expenses reported by the Claimant; that the second method is based on the future revenues of the patent invention; therefore, there must be a large enough amount of data to predict future revenues over the life of the patent, which is not the case here, as the tax dispute has only the royalties collected for the years 2013 and 2014; that, finally, the market method consists in the search for a similar patent whose price is known because it has already been the subject of a transaction; whereas, however, this method raises two major problems, on the one hand, the collection of data on patents already having a price because they have been the subject of a transaction, and, on the other hand, the uniqueness and the rarity of each patent that has at least a small similarity; that in view of this finding, a precise and fair evaluation proving impossible, the present instance sets the operating value of the patent of invention on January 1 , 2014 to 1.000.000 euros under § 217 AO…“ Click here for translation ...

The tax authorities had issued an assessment according to which royalty payments from Colgate Palmolive España S.A. (CP España) to Switzerland were not considered exempt from withholding taxes under the Spanish-Swiss DTA since the company in Switzerland was not the Beneficial Owner of the royalty-income. Judgement of the National Court The court held in favour of Colgate and set aside the decision of the tax authorities. SP vs Palmolive SAN_1128_2018 ENG NW”>Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

The ATO is currently reviewing international arrangements that mischaracterise intangible assets[1] and/or activities or conditions connected with intangible assets. The concerns include whether intangible assets have been appropriately recognised for Australian tax purposes and whether Australian royalty withholding tax obligations have been met. Arrangements that allocate all consideration to tangible goods and/or services, arrangements that allocate no consideration to intangible assets, and arrangements that view intangible assets collectively, or conceal intangible assets, may be more likely to result in a mischaracterisation. Where arrangements are between related parties, we are concerned about whether the: amount deducted by the Australian entity under the arrangement meets the arm’s length requirements of the transfer pricing provisions in the taxation law[2] functions performed, assets used and risked assumed by the Australian entity, in connection with the arrangement, are appropriately compensated in accordance with the arm’s length requirements of the transfer pricing provisions in the taxation law. These arrangements typically display most, if not all, of the following features: intangible assets are developed, maintained, protected or owned by an entity located in a foreign jurisdiction (an ‘IP entity’) the Australian entity enters into an arrangement to undertake an activity or a combination of activities the Australian entity requires the use of the relevant intangible assets in order to undertake these activities the Australian entity purchases goods and/or services from an IP entity or a foreign associate of an IP entity in order to undertake these activities the Australian entity agrees to pay an amount, or a series of amounts, to a foreign entity which the Australian entity does not recognise or treat as wholly or partly being for the use of an IP entity’s intangible assets. This Taxpayer Alert (Alert) does not apply to international arrangements which involve an incidental use of an intangible asset. For example, this Alert does not apply to resellers of finished tangible goods where the activity of reselling the goods involves an incidental use of a brand name that appears on the goods and related packaging. Whether a use is incidental in this sense will depend on an analysis of the true relationship and activities of the parties. The fact that an arrangement fails to expressly provide for the use of an intangible asset does not, in itself, determine that a use is incidental ...

In 2011, a Korean company, CJ E&M Co., Ltd concluded a license agreement relating to the domestic distribution of Paramount films, etc. with Hungary-based entity Viacom International Hungary Kft (hereinafter “VIH”), which is affiliated with the global entertainment content group Viacom that owns the film producing company Paramount and music channel MTV. From around that time to December 2013, the Plaintiff paid VIH royalties amounting to roughly KRW 13.5 billion (hereinafter “pertinent royalty income”). CJ E&M Co., Ltd did not withhold the corporate tax regarding the pertinent royalty income according to Article 12(1) of the Convention between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (hereinafter “Korea-Hungary Tax Treaty”). The Hungarian company was interposed between the Korean entertainment company and a Dutch company which previously licensed the rights to the Korean entertainment company. The Korean Tax Authorities (a) deemed that VIH was merely a conduit company established for the purpose of tax avoidance and that the de facto beneficial owner of the pertinent royalty income was Viacom Global Netherlands BV (hereinafter “VGN”), the parent company of VIH based in the Netherlands; (b) applied the Convention between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (hereinafter “Korea- Netherlands Tax Treaty”), rather than the Korea-Hungary Tax Treaty; and (c) imposed the corporate tax withheld totaling KRW 2,391 million (including penalty tax) against the Plaintiff on May 2, 2014 and July 1, 2014, respectively (hereinafter “instant disposition”). The High Court ruled in favor of the tax authorities and held that the Hungarian company was a mere conduit used for treaty shopping purposes. The Korean Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s decision on the grounds that beneficial ownership should not be denied by the mere fact that tax benefits were derived from the relevant tax treaty if the foreign entity was otherwise engaged in genuine business activities in line with the entity’s business purpose. The Supreme Court decided that the Hungarian entity should be entitled to the treaty benefits because it did not bear any legal or contractual obligation to transfer the royalty income and thus should be regarded as the beneficial owner; and  it had the ability to manage and control the license rights that gave rise to the royalty income, and therefore the GAAR should not apply ...

The question in this case was whether payments received by Satyam Computer Services Limited (now Tech Mahindra Ltd) from its Australian clients – that were royalties for the purposes of Article 12 of the tax treaty with India, but not otherwise royalties under Australian tax law – were deemed to be Australian source income by reason of Article 23 of the tax treaty and ss 4 and 5 of the International Tax Agreements Act 1953 and therefore included in the company’s assessable income for Australian tax purposes. The answer provided by the Federal Court confirmed this to be the case. Click here for other translation ...

In this case the IRS was of the opinion, that Medtronic erred in allocating the profit earned from its devises and leads between its businesses located in the United States and its device manufacturer in Puerto Rico. To determine the arm’s length price for Medtronic’s intercompany licensing agreements the comparable profits method was therefor applied by the IRS, rather than the comparable uncontrolled transaction (CUT) used by Medtronic. Medtronic brought the case to the Tax Court. The Tax Court applied its own valuation analysis and concluded that the Pacesetter agreement was the best CUT to calculate the arm’s length result for intangible property. This decision from the Tax Court was then appealed by the IRS to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeal found that the Tax Court’s factual findings were insufficient to enable the Court to conduct an evaluation of Tax Court’s determination. Specifically, the Tax Court failed to: address whether the circumstances of the Pacesetter settlement was comparable to the licensing agreements in this case, the degree of comparability of the contractual terms between the two situations, how the different treatment of intangibles affected the two agreements and the amount of risk and product liability expenses that should be allocated. Thus, the case has been remanded for further consideration ...

Beiersdorf Gh. Ltd. imports and distributes Nivea skin care products from the parent company based in Germany, Beiersdorf AG). The tax authorities, CGRA, had issued an assessment where deductions for royalty payments to the German parent had been denied (non recognition – not legitimate business cost). Furthermore, alledged product discounts paid to third party vendors  had been characterized as sales commissions subject to withholding tax of 10%. Beiersdorf contended the assessment and filed an appeal. The appeal was based on three main grounds: The finding of CGRA that royalty payments made by the Appellant to Beiersdorf AG (BDF) pursuant to an agreement between Appellant and BDF for the use of the Nivea brand should not be allowed as a legitimate business cost because of the failure of the Appellant to comply with prior registration of the Royalty Agreement with the Ghana Investment Promotion Center is wrong in law. The finding of CGRA imposing liabilities with respect to withholding tax is wrong in law. The decision of the CGRA to characterize reimbursements paid to the distributor of Appellant for work done by third party vendors as sales commission paid to the distributors for which a withholding tax of 10% should apply is wrong in law. The decision of the CGRA to disallow Trade Discount and to treat Trade Discounts offered to the distributors of the Appellant as commission payment which should attract a withholding tax of 10% is wrong in law. The Appeal was dismissed by the High Court of Ghana. “It is the opinion of the court therefore that once the Distribution Licence Agreement is a technology transfer agreement, the appellant should have registered the said agreement as required by the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, 2013, Act 865. It was therefore within the remit of the respondent to treat the said royalty fees or payments by the appellant as part of the profits of the appellant and impose the relevant taxes on them. The appellant fails on this ground of appeal which is therefore dismissed.“ “The court finds this ground of appeal to be very lame indeed. This is so because it seeks to imply that once these payments are meant as reimbursement to the so-called Distributors for the cost of the display/show cases, they should not attract withholding tax. However, in actual fact they are payments for services rendered by artisans described as tradesmen and if they had been paid directly to those artisans the payments would have been subject to the deduction of withholding tax. In the opinion of the court therefore, the obligation of the appellant to withhold tax on those payments are not taken away by the mere fact that the payments are rendered through people described as Distributors.“ “In the opinion of the court if it is true that the appellant gave trade discounts to its customers in order to boost its sales,  then the said trade discount  must be clearly stated on the VAT invoices issued to the customers. In the instant action, the respondent conducted a tax audit of the books and other documents kept by the appellant and came out with a finding that the VAT invoices do not show that customers of the appellant have benefitted from any trade discount given by the appellant.“ ...

The European Commission has opened an in-depth investigation into the Netherlands’ tax treatment of Inter IKEA, one of the two groups operating the IKEA business. The Commission has concerns that two Dutch tax rulings may have allowed Inter IKEA to pay less tax and given them an unfair advantage over other companies, in breach of EU State aid rules. Commissioner Margrethe Vestager in charge of competition policy said: “All companies, big or small, multinational or not, should pay their fair share of tax. Member States cannot let selected companies pay less tax by allowing them to artificially shift their profits elsewhere. We will now carefully investigate the Netherlands’ tax treatment of Inter IKEA.” In the early 1980s, the IKEA business model changed into a franchising model. Since then, it has been the Inter IKEA group that operates the franchise business of IKEA, using the “IKEA franchise concept”. What this means more concretely is that Inter IKEA does not own the IKEA shops. All IKEA shops worldwide pay a franchise fee of 3% of their turnover to Inter IKEA Systems, a subsidiary of Inter IKEA group in the Netherlands. In return, the IKEA shops are entitled to use inter alia the IKEA trademark, and receive know-how to operate andexploit the IKEA franchise concept. Thus, Inter IKEA Systems in the Netherlands records all revenue from IKEA franchise fees worldwide collected from the IKEA shops. The Commission’s investigation concerns the tax treatment of Inter IKEA Systems in the Netherlands since 2006. Our preliminary inquiries indicate that two tax rulings, granted by the Dutch tax authorities in 2006 and 2011, have significantly reduced Inter IKEA Systems’ taxable profits in the Netherlands. The Commission has concerns that the two tax rulings may have given Inter IKEA Systems an unfair advantage compared to other companies subject to the same national taxation rules in the Netherlands. This would breach EU State aid rules. Between 2006-2011 (the 2006 tax ruling) The 2006 tax ruling endorsed a method to calculate an annual licence fee to be paid by Inter IKEA Systems in the Netherlands to another company of the Inter IKEA group called I.I. Holding, based in Luxembourg. At that time, I.I. Holding held certain intellectual property rights required for the IKEA franchise concept. These were licensed exclusively to Inter IKEA Systems. Inter IKEA Systems used these intellectual property rights to create and develop the IKEA franchise concept. In other words, it developed, enhanced and maintained the intellectual property rights. Inter IKEA Systems also managed the franchise contracts and collected the franchise fees from IKEA shops worldwide. The annual licence fee paid by Inter IKEA Systems to I.I. Holding, as endorsed by the 2006 tax ruling, made up a significant part of Inter IKEA Systems’ revenue. As a result, a significant part of Inter IKEA Systems’ franchise profits were shifted from Inter IKEA Systems to I.I. Holding in Luxembourg, where they remained untaxed. This is because I.I. Holding was part of a special tax scheme, as a result of which it was exempt from corporate taxation in Luxembourg. After 2011 (the 2011 tax ruling) In July 2006, the Commission concluded that the Luxembourg special tax scheme was illegal under EU State aid rules, and required the scheme to be fully repealed by 31 December 2010. No illegal aid needed to be recovered from I.I. Holding because the scheme was granted under a Luxembourg law from 1929, predating the EC Treaty. This is a historical element of the case and not part of the investigation opened today. However, as a result of the Commission decision I.I. Holding would have had to start paying corporate taxes in Luxembourg from 2011. In 2011, Inter IKEA changed the way it was structured. As a result, the 2006 tax ruling was no longer applicable: Inter IKEA Systems bought the intellectual property rights formerly held by I.I. Holding. To finance this acquisition, Inter IKEA Systems received an intercompany loan from its parent company in Liechtenstein. The Dutch authorities then issued a second tax ruling in 2011, which endorsed the price paid by Inter IKEA Systems for the acquisition of the intellectual property. It also endorsed the interest to be paid under the intercompany loan to the parent company in Liechtenstein, and the deduction of these interest payments from Inter IKEA Systems’ taxable profits in the Netherlands. As a result of the interest payments, a significant part of Inter IKEA Systems’ franchise profits after 2011 was shifted to its parent in Liechtenstein. The Commission’s investigation The Commission considers at this stage that the treatment endorsed in the two tax rulings may have resulted in tax benefits in favour of Inter IKEA Systems, which are not available to other companies subject to the same national taxation rules in the Netherlands. The role of EU State aid control is to ensure that Member States do not give selected companies a better tax treatment than others, via tax rulings or otherwise. More specifically, transactions between companies in a corporate group must be priced in a way that reflects economic reality. This means that the payments between two companies in the same group should be in line with arrangements that take place under comparable conditions between independent companies (so-called “arm’s length principle”). The Commission will now investigate Inter IKEA Systems’ tax treatment under both tax rulings: The Commission will assess whether the annual licence fee paid by Inter IKEA Systems to I.I. Holding, endorsed in the 2006 tax ruling, reflects economic reality. In particular, it will assess if the level of the annual licence fee reflects Inter IKEA Systems’ contribution to the franchise business; The Commission will also assess whether the price Inter IKEA Systems agreed for the acquisition of the intellectual property rights and consequently the interest paid for the intercompany loan, endorsed in the 2011 tax ruling, reflect economic reality. In particular, the Commission will assess if the acquisition price adequately reflects the contribution made by Inter IKEA Systems to the value of the franchise business, and the ...

Coca Cola collects royalties from foreign branches and subsidiaries for use of formulas, brand and other intellectual property. Years ago an agreement was entered by Coca Cola and the IRS on these royalty payments to settle an audit of years 1987 to 1995. According to the agreement Coca-Cola licensees in other countries would pay the US parent company royalties using a 10-50-50 formula where 10% of the gross sales revenue is treated as a normal return to the licensee and the rest of the revenue is split evenly between the licensee and the US parent, with the part going to the US parent paid in the form of a royalty. The agreement expired in 1995, but Coca-Cola continued to use the model for transfer pricing in the following years. Coca-Cola and the Mexican tax authorities had agreed on the same formula and Coca-Cola continued to use the pricing-formula in Mexico on the advice of Mexican counsel. In 2015, the IRS made an adjustment related to 2007 – 2009 tax returns stating that Coca-Cola licensees should have paid a higher royalty to the US parent. On that bases the IRS said that too much income had been declared in Coca Cola’s tax returns in Mexico because a higher royalty should have been deducted. The IRS therefore disallowed $43.5 to $50 million in foreign tax credits in each of the three years for taxes that the IRS said Coca-Cola overpaid in Mexico due to failure to deduct the right amount of royalty payments – voluntary tax payments cannot be claimed as a foreign tax credit in the United States. The court sided with Coca-Cola on this question and concluded that the all practical remedies to reduce Mexican taxes had been exhausted and Coca Cola. Foreign tax credits were to be allowed ...

A Taiwanese distributor in the Jat Health Corporation group had deducted amortizations and royalty payments related to distribution rights. These deductions had been partially denied by the Taiwanese tax administration. The case was brought to court. The Supreme Administrative court dismissed the appeal and upheld the assessment. “The Appellant’s business turnover has increased from $868,217 in FY07 to $1,002,570,293 in FY12, with such a high growth rate, and the Appellant has to bear the increase in business tax, which is not an objective comparative analysis and is not sufficient to conclude that the purchase of the disputed supply rights was necessary or reasonable for the operation of the business.” Click here for English Translation ...

Luxembourg gave illegal tax benefits to Amazon worth around €250 million The European Commission has concluded that Luxembourg granted undue tax benefits to Amazon of around €250 million.  Following an in-depth investigation launched in October 2014, the Commission has concluded that a tax ruling issued by Luxembourg in 2003, and prolonged in 2011, lowered the tax paid by Amazon in Luxembourg without any valid justification. The tax ruling enabled Amazon to shift the vast majority of its profits from an Amazon group company that is subject to tax in Luxembourg (Amazon EU) to a company which is not subject to tax (Amazon Europe Holding Technologies). In particular, the tax ruling endorsed the payment of a royalty from Amazon EU to Amazon Europe Holding Technologies, which significantly reduced Amazon EU’s taxable profits. The Commission’s investigation showed that the level of the royalty payments, endorsed by the tax ruling, was inflated and did not reflect economic reality. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the tax ruling granted a selective economic advantage to Amazon by allowing the group to pay less tax than other companies subject to the same national tax rules. In fact, the ruling enabled Amazon to avoid taxation on three quarters of the profits it made from all Amazon sales in the EU. Amazon’s structure in Europe The Commission decision concerns Luxembourg’s tax treatment of two companies in the Amazon group – Amazon EU and Amazon Europe Holding Technologies. Both are Luxembourg-incorporated companies that are fully-owned by the Amazon group and ultimately controlled by the US parent, Amazon.com, Inc. Amazon EU (the “operating company”) operates Amazon’s retail business throughout Europe. In 2014, it had over 500 employees, who selected the goods for sale on Amazon’s websites in Europe, bought them from manufacturers, and managed the online sale and the delivery of products to the customer.Amazon set up their sales operations in Europe in such a way that customers buying products on any of Amazon’s websites in Europe were contractually buying products from the operating company in Luxembourg. This way, Amazon recorded all European sales, and the profits stemming from these sales, in Luxembourg. Amazon Europe Holding Technologies (the “holding company”) is a limited partnership with no employees, no offices and no business activities. The holding company acts as an intermediary between the operating company and Amazon in the US. It holds certain intellectual property rights for Europe under a so-called “cost-sharing agreement” with Amazon in the US. The holding company itself makes no active use of this intellectual property. It merely grants an exclusive license to this intellectual property to the operating company, which uses it to run Amazon’s European retail business. Under the cost-sharing agreement the holding company makes annual payments to Amazon in the US to contribute to the costs of developing the intellectual property. The appropriate level of these payments has recently been determined by a US tax court. Under Luxembourg’s general tax laws, the operating company is subject to corporate taxation in Luxembourg, whilst the holding company is not because of its legal form, a limited partnership.Profits recorded by the holding company are only taxed at the level of the partners and not at the level of the holding company itself. The holding company’s partners were located in the US and have so far deferred their tax liability. Amazon implemented this structure, endorsed by the tax ruling under investigation, between May 2006 and June 2014. In June 2014, Amazon changed the way it operates in Europe. This new structure is outside the scope of the Commission State aid investigation. The scope of the Commission investigation The role of EU State aid control is to ensure Member States do not give selected companies a better tax treatment than others, via tax rulings or otherwise. More specifically, transactions between companies in a corporate group must be priced in a way that reflects economic reality. This means that the payments between two companies in the same group should be in line with arrangements that take place under commercial conditions between independent businesses (so-called “arm’s length principle”). The Commission’s State aid investigation concerned a tax ruling issued by Luxembourgto Amazon in 2003 and prolonged in 2011. This ruling endorsed a method to calculate the taxable base of the operating company. Indirectly, it also endorsed a method to calculate annual payments from the operating company to the holding company for the rights to the Amazon intellectual property, which were used only by the operating company. These payments exceeded, on average, 90% of the operating company’s operating profits. They were significantly (1.5 times) higher than what the holding company needed to pay to Amazon in the US under the cost-sharing agreement. To be clear, the Commission investigation did not question that the holding company owned the intellectual property rights that it licensed to the operating company, nor the regular payments the holding company made to Amazon in the US to develop this intellectual property. It also did not question Luxembourg’s general tax system as such. Commission assessment The Commission’s State aid investigation concluded that the Luxembourg tax ruling endorsed an unjustified method to calculate Amazon’s taxable profits in Luxembourg. In particular, the level of the royalty payment from the operating company to the holding company was inflated and did not reflect economic reality. The operating company was the only entity actively taking decisions and carrying out activities related to Amazon’s European retail business. As mentioned, its staff selected the goods for sale, bought them from manufacturers, and managed the online sale and the delivery of products to the customer. The operating company also adapted the technology and software behind the Amazon e-commerce platform in Europe, and invested in marketing and gathered customer data. This means that it managed and added value to the intellectual property rights licensed to it. The holding company was an empty shell that simply passed on the intellectual property rights to the operating company for its exclusive use. The holding company was not itself in any way ...

“B-Production” is a subsidiary in a US multinational group and engaged in production and sales. “B-Production” pays services fees and royalties to its US parent. Following an audit, the tax authorities issued an assessment where deductions for these costs had been reduced which in turn resulted in additional taxabel income. An appeal was filed by “B-Production” with the Administrative court which in a judgement of June 2015 was rejected. An appeal was then filed by “B-Production” with the Supreme Administrative Court. In the appeal “B-Production” contested the findings of the Administrative Court that there was a hidden distribution of profits by means of the payment of management fees and duplication (overlapping) of the services at issue under the management contract and the other two agreements between the B-Production and the parent company. B-Production further argued that the evidence in the case refutes the conclusions in the tax assessment and the contested decision that the services rendered did not confer an economic benefit and in addition argues that the costs of royalties and the costs of engineering and control services under the other two contracts are not a formative element of the invoices for management services, a fact which was not considered by the court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The Supreme Administrative Court decided in favour of the tax authorities and dismissed the appeal of B-Production as unfounded. Excerpts “The dispute in the case concerned the recognition of expenses for intra-group services. The NRA Transfer Pricing Manual (Fact Sheet 12) states that intra-group services in practice refers to the centralisation of a number of administrative and management services in a single company (often the parent company), which serves the activities of all or a number of enterprises of a group of related parties selected on a regional or functional basis. The provision of such services is common in multinational companies. The concept of intra-group services covers services provided between members of the same group, in particular technical, administrative, financial, logistical, human resource management (HRM) and any other services. In the present case, the costs in question relate to a contract for the provision of management services dated 26.11.2002, paid by the subsidiary [company], registered in the Republic of Bulgaria, to the parent company, [company], registered in the USA. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (‘the OECD Guidelines’) should therefore be taken into account in the analysis of those costs and, accordingly, in the interpretation and application of the substantive law. According to paragraph 7.5 of the OECD Guidelines, the analysis of intra-group services involves the examination of two key questions: 1/ whether the intra-group services are actually performed and 2/ what the remuneration within the group for those services should be for tax purposes. In the present case, the dispute in the case relates to the answer to the first question, since it is apparent from the reasoning of the audit report, the revenue authorities and the ultimate conclusion of the court of first instance that the services did not confer an economic benefit on the domestic company and constituted a disguised distribution of profits within the meaning of section 1(5)(b) of the Act. “a” of the Tax Code. Therefore, the arguments in the cassation appeal for material breaches of the rules of court procedure – lack of instructions concerning the collection of evidence related to the amount of the price of the intra-group service and the allocation of the burden of proof to establish this fact – are irrelevant to the subject matter of the dispute. Paragraph 7.6 of the OECD Guidelines states that, according to the arm’s length principle, whether an intra-group service is actually performed when an activity is carried out for one or more group members by another group member will depend on whether the activity provides the group member concerned with an economic or commercial advantage to improve its commercial position. This can be determined by analysing whether an independent undertaking would, on comparable terms, be willing to pay for the activity if it were carried out for it by an independent undertaking or whether it would only have carried it out with its own funds. It is correct in principle, as stated in the appeal in cassation, that the analysis of intra-group services and their recognition for tax purposes is based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. For example, the OECD Guidelines lists activities which, according to the criterion in point 7.6, constitute shareholding activities. According to paragraph 7.10, b. “b” of the OECD Guidance, expenses related to the accounting requirements of the parent company, including consolidation for financial statements, are defined as such. The evidence in this case established beyond a reasonable doubt that the management services covered by the contract at issue in this case included the compensation of a responsible financial and accounting manager, including cash flow planning and reporting, preparation of monthly, quarterly and annual reports (American Accounting Standards accounting. These activities, which there is no dispute that they were performed, fall within the definition of Section 7.10 for “shareholder activities.” The remaining activities included in management services, including the costs associated with the use of the software programs referred to in the expert report, are imposed by the parent company’s requirements for control and accountability of the subsidiary under the three sets of activities – managing director, production and finance. There is no merit in the objection in the cassation appeal that the management contract services do not duplicate the costs of the other two contracts. It is established from the conclusion of the FTSE that the costs of engineering and control services and royalties (know-how and patent) are not a formative element of the invoices for management services. The conclusion of the experts was based only on the fact that separate contracts had been concluded for the individual costs and not on an analysis of the elements that formed the fees. According to Annex 6 to the expert report, ...

Herbalife International India is a subsidiary of HLI Inc., USA. It is engaged in the business of dealing in weight management, food and dietary supplements and personal care products. The return of income for the assessment year 2006-07 was filed declaring Nil income. The Indian company had paid royalties and management fees to its US parent and sought to justify the consideration paid to be at arm’s length. In the transfer pricing documentation the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) had been selected as the most appropriate method for the purpose of bench marking the transactions. The case was selected for scrutiny by the tax authorities and following an audit, deductions for administrative services were denied and royalty payments were reduced. Disagreeing with the assessment Herbalife filed an appeal. Decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal The Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal of Herbalife and upheld the tax assessment. Excerpts “The appellant had not filed any additional evidences to prove the administrative services/technical knowhow are actually received by the appellant and thus the assessee company had failed to discharge this onus of proving this aspect. Therefore, even as per the provisions of Indian Evidence Act, the presumption can be drawn that the assessee has no evidence to prove this aspect. Therefore, the AO/TPO was justified in adopting the ALP in respect of payment of administrative services and royalty at Nil. Thus, the grounds of appeal in ground Nos. 2 to 7 are dismissed. In respect of the other grounds of appeal, since we held that there was no proof of receipt of administrative services as well as technical knowhow which is used in the process of manufacturing activity, the question of bundling of transaction or aggregating all other transactions does not arise.” “Thus all the grounds of appeal relating to the royalty and administrative services have been dismissed. Then the only ground of appeal that survives is ground IT(TP)A No.1406/Bang/2010 IT(TP)A No.924/Bang/2012 relating to uphold of disallowance on account of doubtful advance written off of Rs.1,20,16,395/-. The brief facts surrounding this addition are as under:” ...

The European Commission’s investigation on granting of selective tax advantages to Starbucks BV, cf. EU state aid rules ...

By a trademark license agreement dated August 22, 2008, a group company in Luxembourg granted another group company a non-exclusive right to use and exploit the brands registered in the territory of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Benelux and the European Community for an initial period of ten years, renewable tacitly each time for a period of one year and this against a license fee paid and calculated annually corresponding to 3% of this turnover. By letters of 30 January 2015, the Tax Office informed the company that they intended to refuse to deduct the royalties paid to the company for the years 2010, 2011 and 2010. Click here for translation ...

In this case the US Tax Court held that a closing agreement did not result in retroactive indebtedness. Analog Devices Corp. repatriated cash dividends from a foreign subsidiary and claimed an 85% dividends received deduction for FY 2005, cf. US regs § 965. No related party indebtedness was reported by the company which would have limited the deduction available. During the audit of Analog Devises Corp. the IRS claimed that a 2 pct. royalty from the subsidiary should be increased to 6% for FY 2001-2005. This was accepted and Analog Devises Corp. entered into a closing agreement with the IRS. The US Tax Court held that the closing agreement concerning accounts receivable, cf. the increased royalty, was not related party indebtedness for the purposes of § 965 ...

This  case is about the interpretation of Article 7 (the business profits rule) and Article 12 (the royalties provision) of the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income. The issue was misuse of the provision in article 12 about cross-border royalties and article 7 about business profits. The case was brought before the Supreme Court, where special leave to appeal was refused 10 March 2017 ...

The IRS argued that Medtronic Inc failed to accurately account for the value of trade secrets and other intangibles owned by Medtronic Inc and used by Medtronic’s Puerto Rico manufacturing subsidiary in 2005 and 2006 when determening the royalty payments from the subsidiary. In 2016 the United States Tax Court found in favor of Medtronic, sustaining the use of the CUT method to analyze royalty payments. The Court also found that adjustments to the CUT were required. These included additional adjustments not initially applied by Medtronic Inc for know-how, profit potential and scope of product. The decision from the United States Tax Court has been appealed by the IRS in 2017 ...

In 1996, X BV acquired the right to commercially exploit an intangible asset (Z) for a period of 15 years for $ 63.5 million. X BV then entered a franchise agreements with group companies for the use of Z, including a Spanish PE of Y BV. According to the franchise agreement Y BV paid X BV a fee. According to X, in the calculation of the loss carry forward in Spain the franchise fee should not be fully attributed to the PE in Spain due to existing rules on internal roaylties. X states that the loss carry forward amounts to € 13.1 million. The tax authorities increases the loss carry forward with the fee paid to X, for the use of Z by the Spanish PE. According to the tax authorities, the loss carry forward is € 16.1 million. The District Court finds that no amount needs to be taken of the fees that Y BV paid to X BV for the use of Z by the Spannish PE. However, the court finds that financing costs have to be taken into account. The District Court sets the total loss carry forward from Spanish PE to € 14 million. The Supreme Court ruled that the calculation of the District court was not correct. According to the Supreme Court the starting point must be the actual amount paid for the use of Z in Spanish market at the time. It must then be determined which part of the purchase price can be attributed to the use of Z on the Spanish market. Furthermore, the Supreme Court finds that the District Court was right not to take into the fees owed by the Spanish PE to X. The Supreme Court refered the case back to the District Court. Case No 2016:1031 Click here for translation Click here for translation ...

The U.S. Tax Court held in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, stating that neither Internal Revenue Code §482 nor the regulations thereunder require the Respondent to always determine the separate taxable income of each controlled taxpayer in a consolidated group contemporaneously with the making of the resulting adjustments. The Tax Court further held that §482 and the regulations thereunder allow the Respondent to aggregate one or more related transactions instead of making specific adjustments with respect to each type of transaction ...

The Supreme Tax Court has held that a parent company cannot be deemed to have earned income from allowing its Polish subsidiary to register locally in the group name. A German business was active in a field of patented technology associated with its own firm name, “B”. It allowed its Polish subsidiaries to register in that name, “B Sp.z.o.o.”, but made an appropriate charge for the use of the technology. It also did not authorise the Polish companies to use its logo, but left it up to them to design their own. The tax office maintained that the group name was a valuable intangible and demanded an income adjustment to reflect its use by foreign subsidiaries. However, the Supreme Tax Court has now confirmed its previous case law in holding that the mere use of the group name in the company registration of a subsidiary – including the right to trade under that name – does not give rise to a royalty entitlement of the parent. Such entitlement only arises in connection with other associated rights, such as the use of a logo or technology, in which case, the benefit from the use of intangibles should be seen as a package. However, this did not arise in the case at issue, as the rights to the logo had not been assigned and the rights to the technology had been charged for separately. Se also the publication [Verwaltungsanweisung] from the German Bundesministerium der Finanzen (BMF) 2017-04-07-namensnutzung-im-konzern and the prior German ruling on the issue I R 12/99. The prior ruling of the Local Tax Court is found in case No 4 k 1053 11 e. Click here for translation ...

The European Commission has opened an in-depth investigation to examine whether the decision by Luxembourg’s tax authorities with regard to the corporate income tax to be paid by Amazon in Luxembourg comply with the EU rules on state aid. The opening of an in-depth investigation gives interested third parties and the Member States concerned an opportunity to submit comments. It does not prejudge the outcome of the investigation. The tax ruling in favour of Amazon under investigation dates back to 2003 and is still in force. It applies to Amazon’s subsidiary Amazon EU Sàrl, which is based in Luxembourg and records most of Amazon’s European profits. Based on a methodology set by the tax ruling, Amazon EU Sàrl pays a tax deductible royalty to a limited liability partnership established in Luxembourg but which is not subject to corporate taxation in Luxembourg. As a result, most European profits of Amazon are recorded in Luxembourg but are not taxed in Luxembourg. The Commission considers that the amount of this royalty, which lowers the taxable profits of Amazon EU Sàrl each year, might not be in line with market conditions. The Commission has concerns that the ruling could underestimate the taxable profits of Amazon EU Sàrl, and thereby grant an economic advantage to Amazon by allowing the group to pay less tax than other companies whose profits are allocated in line with market terms. The Commission will now continue investigating to determine whether its concerns are confirmed ...

At issue was the existence of a basis for taking into account the deductibility of the costs of services, the costs related to the repurchase and destruction of products and the tax deductibility of royalty expenses charged between related parties. Judgment of the Court The Administrative Court concluded that “Buy/Sell Distributor” had failed to prove that the disputed services charged to it were actually supplied and necessary for it. As regards the costs relating to the redemption and destruction of the products, it held that “Buy/Sell Distributor” was not obliged to bear those costs in view of the functions it performed within the multinational company’s system and the risks it bore. The Court also held that there was no basis for treating the royalty payment as a tax deductible expense. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

“X Beverages S.A.” had entered into an agreement with the ABCDE Group for the use of concentrate and trademarks for the production and sale of beverages in Spain, but according to the agreement, “X Beverages S.A.” only paid for the concentrate. Following an audit for the financial years 2005-2007, the tax authorities issued an assessment which considered part of the payment to be royalties on which withholding tax should have been paid. Court’s Judgement The Court agreed that part of the payment could be qualified as royalties, but the assessment made by the tax authorities had been based on secret comparables – leaving the taxpayer defenceless – and on this basis the Court annulled the assessment. Excerpts “The taxpayer itself seems to recognize that the so-called “Contract of …” contains both a distribution contract and a trademark assignment contract when it says on page 127 of its statement of allegations “Indeed, this authorization of use is necessary to be able to carry out the activity of packaging and distribution that is the object of the contract, and it would not be possible for X to carry out its obligations under the contract if it did not have this authorization to use the trademark. If X did not have the right to use the trademark, it would not be able to package and label the product as required by its principal (Z), nor would it be able to distribute it under said trademark, in accordance with the terms of the contract.” And although the “authorization of use” of the trademark recognized by the taxpayer is qualified by the latter as an obligation and not as a right of the same, seeming to want to reach the conclusion that only if it were a right it would generate a royalty, in the opinion of this Court both aspects (obligation and right) are not mutually exclusive but complementary: X acquires the right to use the trademark and the obligation to use the same with respect to the products (the beverages) made by it with the “concentrates” acquired from the ABCD Group. And without the existence of limits and/or conditions. Limits and/or conditions which, on the other hand, are inherent to any assignment of rights contract, which is never absolute. In the present case, such limits would be that X may not use the trademark to identify other products not made with the “concentrates” purchased from the ABCD Group and that it may not identify the products made with such “concentrates” under another trademark. Both things are logical since the trademark owner remains the owner of the trademark (he only assigns its use in a certain temporal and territorial scope) and must protect its prestige by means of the indicated precautions (previously called limits and/or conditions). Por otro lado, y en contra de lo alegado (pág. 129 of the pleadings), the right to use the trademark is not something merely “instrumental” but something “substantial” to the contracts entered into between the parties in the sense that it is in the interest of the supplier to sell its concentrates and of X to market the products it manufactures with such concentrates under certain trademarks (ABCD or M8), of special diffusion and prestige in the market and whose use implies a volume of sales notably higher than that which it would obtain if it marketed the products under X ‘s own denomination without such diffusion and prestige in the market. The importance of the trademark is such (and more so the ones we are now dealing with) that it would be difficult to understand in the opinion of the Inspectorate a purely “instrumental” transfer of use of the same, and much less free of charge, as the claimant defends. This circumstance is supported by the Inspection in the Valuation Report, which grants to the assignment of the trademark, as an example, percentages of 61.17% of the price of the concentrate in the case of ABCD-1 and 46.18% in the case of ABCD-2.” “Thus, it is clear that the promotion of the ABCD trademark in Spain (not of the products themselves, which is what is made with the “concentrates” acquired by X) generates expenses for the holder of the trademark[2] ( ABCD Group and, specifically,ABCD C…), the inspection revealed that “it does not seem reasonable to think that the ABCD trademarks in Spain only generate expenses and no income” (….) “From a strictly economic perspective, the actions of the ABCD group, assuming such an amount of expenses to make the brand known to the consumer without this action generating any income for the brand in Spain, lacks all rationality”. This is an additional fact taken into account by the Inspectorate for the purpose of confirming the rationality of the fact that the assignment of use of the trademark is not free of charge but that the ABCD Group obtains income from it.” “In the case at hand, we cannot properly speak of “lack of evidence” but more properly of “lack of externalized evidence” since, even if such evidence exists (which this Court, in principle, has no doubt about), it cannot be incorporated into the file that is made available to the interested party, Therefore, the latter is defenseless when it comes to being able to oppose the suitability of the comparables used, so that, as stated in the previously transcribed SAN, we are faced with an “inadequate assessment method” in terms of generating defenselessness in the taxpayer. This Central Court has recently pronounced in the same sense as above in its RG of 05-09-2013 (RG 3780/11). Having said the above with respect to the “subjective motivation”, it should be noted that the objections raised by the taxpayer with respect to the “technical motivation” refer basically to the fact that the data used by the Inspection to assess are not in any case comparable with those of ABCD because ABCD is unique and neither by its product characteristics, nor by the characteristics of the product …. . In ...

The Italian tax authorities had challenged the inter-company royalty paid by Computer Associates SPA, 30% as per contract, to it’s American parent company, registered in Delaware. According to the authorities a royalty of 7% percentage was determined to be at arm’s length and an assessment for FY 1999 was issued, where deduction of the difference in royalty payments was disallowed. The tax authorities noted the advantage for group to reduce the income of Computer Associates SPA, increasing, as a result, that of the parent company, due to the much lower taxation to which the income is subject in the US state of Delaware, where the latter operates (taxation at 36% in Italy, and 8.7% in the State of Delaware). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Computer Associates SPA and concluded that the assessment was in compliance with the law. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

SC Enviro Agro India is a manufacturer of household insecticides and pesticides and had entered into a technology license agreement with a related party – SCCL Japan – and it also purchases the requirement of intermediates from the said company only.  In the years in question, it has purchased intermediates and sold the products to the entities that approved by the SCCL. One of the company to whom most of the products were sold was SCI, a 100% subsidiary of SCCL. In the transfer pricing report SC Enviro Agro India stated that the arrangement with SCCL and SCI was in the nature of contract manufacturing. Following an audit, the tax authorities accepted the price paid/received as arm’s length price for purchase of insecticides and pesticides, intermediates from SCCL and sale of insecticides and pesticides to SCI. But in regards of the royalty payment of 5% to SCCL as per the technology license agreement, the authorities were of the opinion that since the purchase and sales are only from/to associate concerns and not to anybody else, there is no commercial exploitation of technical knowhow. SC Enviro Agro India was nothing but contract manufacturing and as such there was no basis for payment of royalty. Accordingly, deductions for royalty payments were disallowed in assessment year 2003-04 and assessment year 2004-05.  SC Enviro Agro India submitted that it has not paid royalty on entire sales price, but only on the value addition made to the intermediates purchased from the principal company, therefore, no royalty was paid on purchase cost of the raw material and only on the value addition. Furthermore, details of sales made to outside parties i.e. third parties was submitted so as to counter the observations that it has sold only to the related parties. On that basis the tax authorities allowed royalty payment on the sales made to third parties and reduced the assessment. An appeal was filed by SC Enviro Agro India in which it stated that since it had obtained technical knowhow from SCCL, 5% royalty on the entire value addition made should have been allowed rather than restricting to sales made to third parties. SC Enviro Agro India also stated that it was not a contract manufacturer. It was also further stated that since royalty was paid at 5%, it could not be disallow since it was within the safe harbor range of (+)/(-) 5% Judgement of the Court The Court decided in favour of SC Enviro Agro India and dismissed the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Excerpts “…Till assessment year 2003-04 there was no dispute with reference to the payment of royalty and even in the original assessment completed the royalty was allowed as eligible expenditure in the order under section 143(3). In assessment year 2004-05 this issue for the first time was examined by the TPO on the basis of the TP report of assessee wherein assessee submitted that the arrangement is in the nature of contract manufacturers in the FAR analysis. Since this was admitted by assessee, the TPO without examining the nature of agreement or the manufacturing activity of assessee or any other incidental factor came to a conclusion that since assessee admitted to be a contract manufacturer, there is no need to pay any royalty. In his order the TPO also mentions that assessee was not making any sales to outside parties, the fact of which is not correct. On the basis of his observations, he arrived at the royalty arm’s length price at Nil.” “The TPO has to examine whether the price paid or amount paid was at arm’s length or not under the provisions of Transfer Pricing and its rules. The rule does not authorize the TPO to disallow any expenditure on the ground that it was not necessary or prudent for assessee to have incurred the same. On that principle alone, we cannot approve the order of the TPO as it not only considered the facts wrongly but also exceeded the jurisdiction available to the TPO in examining the arm’s length price on a transaction.” “Even though admittedly assessee mentioned in the TP report that the arrangement is in the nature of contract manufacturing, the facts indicates otherwise. The royalty was paid as per the agreement on the value-added price to the SCCL for providing the license and technical knowhow. This payment is independent of whether assessee is full fledged manufacturer or a contract manufacturer or a toll manufacturer and the nature of manufacturing activity cannot have any bearing on the payment of royalty. “ “Since we do not find any reason to restrict the royalty to Nil, we are not in a position to approve the order of the CIT (A) on this issue. Without going into the nitty-gritty of determining whether assessee is a contract manufacturer or a full-fledged manufacturer, since royalty is paid for allowing assessee in utilizing the technical knowhow and the license for manufacturing activity, we are of the opinion that the payment of royalty is wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business. In view of this, we allow assessee’s ground and direct AO to allow the royalty as claimed.” ...

The Dutch company, Velcro Holdings BV (“VHBV”), licensed IP from an affiliated company in the Dutch Antilles, Velcro Industries BV (“VIBV”), and sublicensed this IP to a Canadian company, Velcro Canada Inc. (VCI). VHBV was obliged to pay 90% of the royalties received from VCI. within 30 days after receipt to VIBV. At issue was whether VHBV qualified as Beneficial Owner of the royalty payments from VCI and consequently would be entitled to a reduced withholding tax – from 25% (the Canadian domestic rate) to 10% (the rate under article 12 of the treaty between Canada and the Netherlands). The tax authorities considered that VHBV did not qualify as Beneficial Owner and denied application of the reduced withholding tax rate. Judgement of the Tax Court The court set aside the decision of the tax authorities and decided in favor of VCI. Excerpts: “VHBV obviously has some discretion based on the facts as noted above regarding the use and application of the royalty funds. It is quite obvious that though there might be limited discretion, VHBV does have discretion. According to Prévost, there must be “absolutely no discretion” – that is not the case on the facts before the Court. It is only when there is “absolutely no discretion” that the Court take the draconian step of piercing the corporate veil.” “The person who is the beneficial owner is the person who enjoys and assumes all the attributes of ownership. Only if the interest in the item in question gives that party the right to control the item without question (e.g. they are not accountable to anyone for how he or she deals with the item) will it meet the threshold set in Prévost. In Matchwood, the Court found that the taxpayer did not have such rights until the deed was registered; likewise, VIBV is not a party to the license agreements (having fully assigned it, along with its rights and obligations, to VHBV). It no longer has such rights and thus does not have an interest that amounts to beneficial ownership.” “For the reasons given above I believe that the beneficial ownership of the royalties rests in VHBV and not in VIBV and as such, the appeal is allowed and the matter is referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment on that basis and further, the 1995 assessment dated October 25, 1996 is referred back to the Minister for reconsideration and recalculation on the basis that VIBV was a resident of the Netherlands in 1995 and therefore entitled to the benefit of that treaty.” ...

“H-trademark S.A.” applied for a ruling on the tax rules governing a business restructuring where trademarks were transferred to another group company and licensed back – whether Polish arm’s length provisions would apply to the transaction. The company was of the opinion that Polish arm’s length provision (article 11) would not apply, since the arrangement was covered by special Polish provisions related to financial leasing (article 17b-g). Judgement of the Court The Court found that the Polish arm’s length provisions applied to the transaction. Excerpts “In the present case, the legal problem boils down to the correct identification of the nature of the norms arising from Article 11 of the A.p.d.o.p. and its relationship with the provisions on leasing raised by the applicant (Articles 17b – 17g of the A.p.d.o.p.). Indeed, the applicant takes the view that the leasing provisions themselves introduce derogations from market conditions and that, consequently, it is not possible to examine certain activities governed by the leasing provisions on the basis of the criteria provided for in Article 11 of the A.p.d.o.p.” “Therefore, it should be stated that the norm of Article 11 of the A.l.t.d.o.p. constitutes lex specialis in relation to the norms concerning taxation of leasing agreements (Article 17a et seq. of the A.l.d.o.p.). It may therefore also be applied in the case concerning taxation of such agreements. Thus, the Court does not share the view of the Appellant Company that it is the provisions concerning the leasing agreement that constitute lex specialis in relation to Article 11 of the discussed Act. It is also of no significance for the position of the Court that the agreement presented in the description of the future event is not a commonly occurring agreement, and therefore, as the appellant claims, it will not be possible to make determinations on the basis of Article 11 of the A.l.t.d.o.p. This is because the very demonstration that the price would have been different if certain connections on the basis of the aforementioned provision had not occurred is already an element of establishing the facts and conducting tax proceedings in a specific case. Meanwhile, the subject of the present proceedings, was the answer to the question whether the aforementioned provision is excluded in the case of taxation of leasing agreements. In addition, it should be noted that, contrary to the assertions in the application, it was not in the description of the future event, but in the position presented by the party that it stated that: “(…) the initial value of the rights to be used will be determined on the basis of a valuation prepared by an independent entity and will therefore correspond to their market value”.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In this case royalty payments from Sona Okegawa Precision Forgings Ltd. – a contract manufacturer in India – had been disallowed by the tax authorities. The tax authorities “had analyzed this transaction and observed that assessee manufactured the goods and sold those goods to the AE. These goods are specific goods which have been produced for the associate enterprises. The technology has been received from the AE for producing these goods, therefore, the assessee has to be construed as a contract manufacturer for these products. The payment of royalty in the case of a contract manufacturer to the AE is not justified as per OECD guidelines.” Judgement The appeal of the tax authorities was dismissed “…The first aspect is whether the royalty paid by the assessee @ 3% is excessive and not computed at arm’s length price. We find that the assessee has placed on record copy of the letter dated 30.4.1993 written by the RBI, Exchange Control Department to M/s. Sona Steering System Ltd. wherein royalty @ 3% on domestic sales subject to taxes for a period of five years was allowed to be paid. There are similar other correspondence which have been placed on the paper book. Similarly, on page 51 of the paper book, a press note issued in 2003 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce & Industries, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion has been placed. In this press release, royalty payment at 8% on export and 5% on domestic sales has been referred as a reasonable payment for processing the cases for approval. Thus, learned TPO failed to bring any material on the record which can suggests that payment of royalty @ 3% was excessive, one and not at arm’s length price. The other aspect is whether assessee has made the sales to the A.E at arm’s length price or not? This issue has not been considered by the learned TPO in detail. He was unable to collect any material indicating that sales price charges by the assessee was not at arm’s length. In a way, he accepted that sales made by the assessee to Assessing Officer are on arm’s length. Learned First Appellate Authority has considered this aspect also in the finding extracted above. Learned TPO further not brought any material indicating the fact that assessee is a contract manufacturer. He only draws inference in this regard. In assessment year 2004-05, ITAT has considered this aspect and has upheld the order of the Learned CIT(Appeals) deleting such addition. Thus, after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances and the findings of the Learned CIT(Appeals) extracted supra, we do not find any merit in this appeal. It is dismissed.” ...

In Cap Gemini, the Court concluded that the tax administration did not demonstrate the “indirect transfer of benefit” in the absence of a comparability study. The transaction in question consisted of a licence of the Cap Gemini trademark and logo. The French subsidiaries were charged with a 4% royalty, whereas European and American subsidiaries were charged no or lower royalty. The court found that the value of a trademark and logo may differ depending on each situation and market. In the ruling, the court reaffirmed that a transfer pricing assessment must be based on solid evidence. Click here for translation ...

At issue in the Philip Morris case was the scope of the definition of permanent establishments – whether or not activities in Italy performed by Intertaba s.p.a. constituted a permanent establishment of the Philip Morris group. According to the tax authorities the taxpayer had tried to conceal the P.E. in Italy by disguising the fact that the Italian company was also acting in the exclusive interest of the Philip Morris group. On the basis of a tax audit report the Revenue Department – VAT office of Milan, by means of separate adjustment notices for the years 1992 to 1995, charged AAA, and on its behalf BBB s.p.a, for having failed to invoice the amounts paid by the State Monopolies Administration for the supply-distribution in the national territory of cigarettes under the CCC brand. In addition, according to the Administration, the company had failed to self-invoice the amounts for transport and distribution of the tobacco in the national territory. The Court of Appeal set aside the assessment issued by the tax authorities, and the tax authorities in turn filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the court of first instance and remanded the case with the following instructions: “…Ultimately, the activity in question – especially if it relates to the distribution of goods in a large market – does not seem to be comparable to that of a broker or a general or independent agent, which do not give rise to a permanent establishment, as expressly provided for in Article 5(6) of the OECD Model. 3.8. In conclusion, it must be held that the Regional Tax Commission not only failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons for the evidence offered by the office, in particular by failing to provide a full account of the evidence gathered in the inspection by the Guardia di Finanza and to carry out an analytical assessment in the light of the reasons of the parties, but also infringed and/or misapplied the rules and principles contained in the OECD Model and incorporated in the bilateral Italy-Germany Convention. The upholding of the appeal entails the cassation of the contested judgment, with referral to another section of the Regional Tax Commission of Lombardy. The referring judges must therefore, after analytically examining the content of the documentation offered and the findings made in the assessment, an examination of which they must give adequate reasons, comply with the following principles of law: (I) a corporation with its registered office in Italy may take on the role of a multiple permanent establishment of foreign companies belonging to the same group and pursuing a single strategy. In such a case, the reconstruction of the activity carried out by the domestic company, in order to ascertain whether or not it is an ancillary or preparatory activity, must be unitary and related to the group’s program considered as a whole; (II) an independent supply of services rendered in the national territory for consideration, when there is a direct and immediate link between the supply and the consideration, constitutes a transaction subject to VAT and to the related obligations of invoicing or self-billing, declaration and payment of the tax, regardless of whether it is part of a contract providing for other services to be rendered by the recipient and regardless of whether the latter, being a non-resident, has a fixed establishment in Italy; (III) the activity of controlling the exact performance of a contract between a resident and a non-resident person cannot in principle be regarded as an auxiliary activity within the meaning of Article 5(4) of the OECD Model Law and Article 5(3)(e) of the Convention between Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany against double taxation of 18 October 1989, which was ratified and made enforceable in Italy by Law No 459 of 24 November 1992? (IV) the entrusting to a domestic structure of the function of business operations (management) by a company not having its seat in Italy, even if it concerns a certain area of operations, entails the acquisition by that structure of the status of a permanent establishment for the purposes of VAT; (V) the assessment of the requirements of the permanent establishment or fixed establishment, including that of dependence and that of participation in the conclusion of contracts, must be conducted not only at the formal level, but also – and above all – at the substantive level. If it reaches the conclusion that BBB s.p.a. acted as a permanent establishment of AAA, the Regional Commission will have to decide on the issues raised in relation to the finding of omitted invoicing without payment of tax and on the other issues raised in the preliminary appeals, which have been absorbed by the upholding of the complaints on the non-existence of a permanent establishment.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A subsidiary company, which paid royalties for a licence of a trademark to its parent company, could not deduct part of the sums paid as a temporary increase of the royalties by one point because it could not justify the benefit from the use of the trademark. Click here for translation ...

Cyanamid Philippines, INC was engaged in the marketing of various products in the areas of pharmaceutical, animal health and nutrition, and crop protection chemicals as well as medical devices. The tax authorities issued an assessment for deficiency income tax, arising from (a) overstatement of cost of goods due to transfer pricing of products, namely; aurofac and minocycline, which petitioner purchased from its parent company, American Cyanamid; and (b) unnecessary and unreasonable payment of royalties to the latter company for the supply of technical know-how. Judgement of the Tax Court The Court decided in favour of Cyanamid Philippines. According to the court, the tax authorities had acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious manner. There were no apparent attempt to verify the comparability of the pharmaceutical products being compared under a comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method analysis. “It can be gleaned readily from the facts that the physical property and circumstances in the processing and sale of petitioner’s products are not “identical” or “so nearly identical that any difference can either have no effect on price, or such difference can be reflected by a reasonable number of adjustments to the price” of Pfizer’s products.”  “We so hold, therefore, that respondent never had any valid justification to declare the cost of goods of petitioner’s products, aurofac and minocycline, as having been overstated in price when bought from its parent company, American Cyanamid. “ On the issue of Royalties the Court stated “The obligation to pay royalties is founded on a licensing agreement duly sanctioned by proper government agencies. Without the license to use know-how, petitioner cannot engage in the processing and selling of its products. Petitioner continues to exist as a legitimate domestic corporation solely by virtue of its licensing agreement and any attempt to deny it the use of know-how would simply result in the natural cessation of its business. The elements of necessity and reasonableness are easily appreciated in the use of know-how in petitioner’s business. “ “In sum, we uphold the validity and the legality of the payment of royalties for know-how made by petitioner to its parent company, American Cyanamid.”  The decision was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 1999 ...

The Pharmatique Industrie case shows the high comparability standard required by the courts of France. The tax authorities used five similar license agreements in the same pharmaceutical sector, as comparables in a transfer pricing dispute regarding payments of royalties for the use of knowhow and trademarks. Judgement of the Court The court ruled in favour of the tax authorities. Excerpt “.., is not confirmed by a reading of the contracts attached to the file not only the granting of trademarks for the specialities in question, but also, as in the grants put forward by way of comparison by the administration, of manufacturing processes or know-how, the service must be regarded as providing proof of the exaggerated nature and therefore non-deductible nature of the said royalties in the above-mentioned proportion; that in any case, and without it being necessary to examine whether the royalties are deductible in principle, it follows that the company PHARMATIQUE INDUSTRIE is not entitled to maintain that it is wrongly that, by the judgement in question, which is sufficiently reasoned, the Administrative Court of Paris rejected the request of the company Laboratoires Schoum for discharge of the supplements to corporation tax…” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In the Seagate Tech case the US Tax Court was asked to decide on several distinct transfer pricing issues arising out of a transfer pricing adjustments issued by the IRS. Whether respondent’s reallocations of gross income under section 482 for the years in issue are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; whether respondent should bear the burden of proof for any of the issues involved in the instant case; whether petitioner Seagate Technology, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Seagate Scotts Valley), paid Seagate Technology Singapore, Pte. Ltd. (Seagate Singapore), a wholly owned subsidiary of Seagate Scotts Valley, arm’s-length prices for component parts; whether Seagate Scotts Valley paid Seagate Singapore arm’s-length prices for completed disk drives; whether Seagate Singapore paid Seagate Scotts Valley arm’s-length royalties for the use of certain intangibles; whether the royalty fee Seagate Singapore paid Seagate Scotts Valley for disk drives covered under a section 367 private letter ruling applies to all such disk drives shipped to the United States, regardless of where title passed; whether the procurement services fees Seagate Singapore paid Seagate Scotts Valley were arm’s length; whether the consideration Seagate Singapore paid Seagate Scotts Valley pursuant to a cost-sharing agreement was arm’s length; and whether Seagate Scotts Valley is entitled to offsets for warranty payments Seagate Singapore paid to Seagate Scotts Valley ...

During the years in issue, 1975 through 1981, the worldwide operations of Perkin-Elmer (P-E) and its subsidiaries were organized into five operating groups, each of which was responsible for the research, manufacturing, sales, and servicing of its products. The five product areas were analytical instruments, optical systems, computer systems, flame spray equipment and materials, and military avionics. P-E and PECC entered into a General Licensing Agreement dated as of October 1, 1970, by the terms of which P-E granted PECC an exclusive right to manufacture in Puerto Rico and a nonexclusive right to use and sell worldwide the instruments and accessories to be identified in specific licenses. P-E also agreed to furnish PECC with all design and manufacturing information, including any then still to be developed, associated with any licensed products. PECC agreed to pay royalties on the products based upon the “Net Sales Price”, defined as “the net amount billed and payable for *** [licensed products] excluding import duties, insurance, transportation costs, taxes which are separately billed and normal trade discounts.” In practice, P-E and PECC interpreted this definition to mean the amount PECC billed P-E rather than the amount P-E billed upon resale. The specified term of this agreement was until the expiration of the last license entered into pursuant to the agreement. Following an audit the tax authorities issued an assessment of additional income taxes related to controlled transactions between the above parties. The issues presently before the Tax Court for decision were: [1) Whether the tax authorities’s allocations of gross income to P-E under section 482 were arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (2) whether the prices FE paid for finished products to a wholly owned subsidiary operating in Puerto Rico were arm’s-length amounts; (3) whether the prices the subsidiary paid to P-E for parts that went into the finished products were arm’s-length amounts; (4) whether the royalties the subsidiary paid to P-E on sales of the finished products to P-E were arm’s-length amounts; and (5) for prices or royalties that were not arm’s length, what the arm’s-length amounts are ...

BAUSCH & LOMB Inc (B&L Inc) and its subsidiaries were engaged in the manufacture, marketing and sale of soft contact lenses and related products in the United States and abroad. B&L Ireland was organized on February 1, 1980, under the laws of the Republic of Ireland as a third tier, wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner. B&L Ireland was organized for valid business reasons and to take advantage of certain tax and other incentives offered by the Republic of Ireland. Pursuant to an agreement dated January 1, 1981, petitioner granted to B&L Ireland a nonexclusive license to use its patented and unpatented manufacturing technology to manufacture soft contact lenses in Ireland and a nonexclusive license to use certain of its trademarks in the sale of soft contact lenses produced through use of the licensed technology worldwide. In return, B&L Ireland agreed to pay B&L Inc. a royalty equal to five percent of sales. In 1981 and 1982, B&L Ireland engaged in the manufacture and sale of soft contact lenses in the Republic of Ireland. All of B&L Ireland’s sales were made either to B&L Inc or certain of B&L Inc’s wholly owned foreign sales affiliates at a price of $7.50 per lens. The tax authorities determined that the $7.50 sales price did not constitute an arm’s-length consideration for the soft contact lenses sold by B&L Ireland to B&L Inc. Furthermore the authorities determined that, the royalty contained in the January 1, 1981 license agreement did not constitute an arm’s-length consideration for the use by B&L Ireland of B&L Inc’s intangibles. Opinion of the Tax Court A. Determination of Arm’s-Length Prices Between B&L Inc and B&L Ireland for Soft Contact Lenses “… The market price for any product will be equal to the price at which the least efficient producer whose production is necessary to satisfy demand is willing to sell. During 1981 and 1982, the lathing methods were still the predominant production technologies employed in the soft contact lens industry. American Hydron, an affiliate of NPDC and a strong competitor in the contact lens market, was able to produce 466,348 and 762, 379 soft contact lenses using the lathing method in 1981 and 1982, for $6.18 and $6.46 per unit, respectively. It is questionable whether any of B&L Ireland’s competitors, save B&L, could profitably have sold soft contact lenses during the period in issue for less than the $7.50 charged by B&L Ireland. The fact that B&L Ireland could, through its possession of superior production technology, undercut the market and sell at a lower price is irrelevant. Petitioners have shown that the $7.50 they paid for lenses was a ‘market price‘ and have thus ‘earned the right to be free from a section 482 reallocation.‘ United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at 947. Finally, respondent argues that B&L COULD HAVE produced the contact lenses purchased from B&L Ireland itself at lesser cost. However, B&L DID NOT produce the lenses itself. The mere power to determine who in a controlled group will earn income cannot justify a section 482 allocation of the income from the entity who actually earned the income. Bush Hog Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 713, 725 (1964); Polak’s Frutal Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 953, 976 (1954). B&L Ireland was the entity which actually produced the contact lenses. Respondent is limited to determining how the sales to B&L by B&L Ireland would have been priced had the parties been unrelated and negotiating at arm’s length. We have determined that the $7.50 charged was a market price. We thus conclude that respondent abused his discretion and acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in reallocating income between B&L and B&L Ireland based on use of a transfer price for contact lenses other than the $7.50 per lens actually used. When conditions for use of the comparable uncontrolled price method are present, use of that method to determine an arm’s-length price is mandated. Sec. 1.482-2(e)(1)(ii), Income Tax Regs. Therefore, we need not consider petitioner’s alternative position — that application of the resale price method supports the arm’s-length nature of the $7.50 transfer price. We note, however, that application of such method lends further support to the arm’s-length nature of B&L Ireland’s $7.50 sales price. Uncontrolled purchases and resales by American Optical, Southern, Bailey-Smith, and Mid-South indicate gross profit percentages of between 22 and 40 percent were common among soft contact lens distributors. This is confirmed by the testimony of Thomas Sloan, president of Southern, who testified that he tried to purchase lenses from manufacturers at prices which allowed Southern to maintain a reasonable profit margin of between 25 and 40 percent. Applying a 40- percent gross margin to B&L’s average realized price of $16.74 and $15.25 for domestic sales in 1981 and 1982, respectively, indicates a lens cost of $10.04 and $9.15, respectively — well above the $7.50 received by B&L Ireland for its lenses and also above the $8.12 cost to B&L when freight and duty are added.” B. Determination of Arm’s-Length Royalty Payable by B&L Ireland for use of B&L’s Intangibles “… Obviously, no independent party would enter into an agreement for the license of intangibles under circumstances in which the royalty charged would preclude any reasonable expectation of earning a profit through use of the intangibles. We therefore find respondent’s section 482 allocation with respect to the royalty to be arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. Our rejection of the royalty rate advocated by respondent does not, however, require that we accept that proposed by petitioners. G.D. Searle v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. at 367. Both Dr. Arons and Dr. Plotkin testified that in their opinion a royalty of five percent of the transfer price charged for the contact lenses sold by B&L Ireland was inadequate as arm’s-length consideration. On brief, petitioners recalculated the royalty due from B&L Ireland based on five percent of the average realized price (ARP) of Irish-produced lenses, arriving at royalties of $1,072,522 and $3,050,028 for 1981 and 1982, respectively. This translates to a royalty of ...

Sunstrand licenced technology to its Singapore-based subsidiary, SunPac. The United States Tax Court ruled that the amounts paid by Sunstrand to SunPac did not constitute and arm’s-length consideration under Section 482, but also that the IRS overstepped its authority in calculating taxable net income. The Court also eliminated interest penalties imposed by the IRS ...

In Caterpillar, a 5% royalty was found to be an arm’s-length rate for the manufacturing and assembling operations. The court did not accept that there should be different rates for the two different activities. Excerpt from the Judgement “…According to the administration, the rate of the royalty paid by the company “Caterpillar France” is admissible only when it applies to the selling price of equipment entirely manufactured by the company, but not when it affects the gross margin made on equipment that the company has only assembled, since the assembly operations make less use of the technology and know-how acquired by the American company than the machining operations themselves; that, however, the details provided and the documents produced in this respect by the company do not make it possible to make such a distinction between the operations that successively contribute to the production of the finished products; that the uniform rate of the fee cannot, in the circumstances of the case, be regarded as excessive; that, consequently, the Minister is not justified in maintaining that the Administrative Court was wrong to hold that, as regards the tax years 1969 to 1972, the company ‘Caterpillar France’ provided proof that, contrary to what the departmental commission considered, the amount of the royalty paid by it to the company ‘Caterpillar Tractor’ was justified in the light of the rights granted and the services rendered, that, as regards the tax years 1973 to 1976, the administration did not establish that the royalty could have constituted a means of transferring profits, and that, for all these years, the disputed increases could not find a legal basis in the provisions of Article 57 of the General Tax Code;” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

BAUSCH & LOMB Inc (B&L Inc) and its subsidiaries were engaged in the manufacture, marketing and sale of soft contact lenses and related products in the United States and abroad. B&L Ireland was organized on February 1, 1980, under the laws of the Republic of Ireland as a third tier, wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner. B&L Ireland was organized for valid business reasons and to take advantage of certain tax and other incentives offered by the Republic of Ireland. Pursuant to an agreement dated January 1, 1981, petitioner granted to B&L Ireland a nonexclusive license to use its patented and unpatented manufacturing technology to manufacture soft contact lenses in Ireland and a nonexclusive license to use certain of its trademarks in the sale of soft contact lenses produced through use of the licensed technology worldwide. In return, B&L Ireland agreed to pay B&L Inc. a royalty equal to five percent of sales. In 1981 and 1982, B&L Ireland engaged in the manufacture and sale of soft contact lenses in the Republic of Ireland. All of B&L Ireland’s sales were made either to B&L Inc or certain of B&L Inc’s wholly owned foreign sales affiliates at a price of $7.50 per lens. The tax authorities determined that the $7.50 sales price did not constitute an arm’s-length consideration for the soft contact lenses sold by B&L Ireland to B&L Inc. Furthermore the authorities determined that, the royalty contained in the January 1, 1981 license agreement did not constitute an arm’s-length consideration for the use by B&L Ireland of B&L Inc’s intangibles. Opinion of the Tax Court A. Determination of Arm’s-Length Prices Between B&L Inc and B&L Ireland for Soft Contact Lenses “… The market price for any product will be equal to the price at which the least efficient producer whose production is necessary to satisfy demand is willing to sell. During 1981 and 1982, the lathing methods were still the predominant production technologies employed in the soft contact lens industry. American Hydron, an affiliate of NPDC and a strong competitor in the contact lens market, was able to produce 466,348 and 762, 379 soft contact lenses using the lathing method in 1981 and 1982, for $6.18 and $6.46 per unit, respectively. It is questionable whether any of B&L Ireland’s competitors, save B&L, could profitably have sold soft contact lenses during the period in issue for less than the $7.50 charged by B&L Ireland. The fact that B&L Ireland could, through its possession of superior production technology, undercut the market and sell at a lower price is irrelevant. Petitioners have shown that the $7.50 they paid for lenses was a ‘market price‘ and have thus ‘earned the right to be free from a section 482 reallocation.‘ United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at 947. Finally, respondent argues that B&L COULD HAVE produced the contact lenses purchased from B&L Ireland itself at lesser cost. However, B&L DID NOT produce the lenses itself. The mere power to determine who in a controlled group will earn income cannot justify a section 482 allocation of the income from the entity who actually earned the income. Bush Hog Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 713, 725 (1964); Polak’s Frutal Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 953, 976 (1954). B&L Ireland was the entity which actually produced the contact lenses. Respondent is limited to determining how the sales to B&L by B&L Ireland would have been priced had the parties been unrelated and negotiating at arm’s length. We have determined that the $7.50 charged was a market price. We thus conclude that respondent abused his discretion and acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in reallocating income between B&L and B&L Ireland based on use of a transfer price for contact lenses other than the $7.50 per lens actually used. When conditions for use of the comparable uncontrolled price method are present, use of that method to determine an arm’s-length price is mandated. Sec. 1.482-2(e)(1)(ii), Income Tax Regs. Therefore, we need not consider petitioner’s alternative position — that application of the resale price method supports the arm’s-length nature of the $7.50 transfer price. We note, however, that application of such method lends further support to the arm’s-length nature of B&L Ireland’s $7.50 sales price. Uncontrolled purchases and resales by American Optical, Southern, Bailey-Smith, and Mid-South indicate gross profit percentages of between 22 and 40 percent were common among soft contact lens distributors. This is confirmed by the testimony of Thomas Sloan, president of Southern, who testified that he tried to purchase lenses from manufacturers at prices which allowed Southern to maintain a reasonable profit margin of between 25 and 40 percent. Applying a 40- percent gross margin to B&L’s average realized price of $16.74 and $15.25 for domestic sales in 1981 and 1982, respectively, indicates a lens cost of $10.04 and $9.15, respectively — well above the $7.50 received by B&L Ireland for its lenses and also above the $8.12 cost to B&L when freight and duty are added. B. Determination of Arm’s-Length Royalty Payable by B&L Ireland for use of B&L’s Intangibles “… Obviously, no independent party would enter into an agreement for the license of intangibles under circumstances in which the royalty charged would preclude any reasonable expectation of earning a profit through use of the intangibles. We therefore find respondent’s section 482 allocation with respect to the royalty to be arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. Our rejection of the royalty rate advocated by respondent does not, however, require that we accept that proposed by petitioners. G.D. Searle v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. at 367. Both Dr. Arons and Dr. Plotkin testified that in their opinion a royalty of five percent of the transfer price charged for the contact lenses sold by B&L Ireland was inadequate as arm’s-length consideration. On brief, petitioners recalculated the royalty due from B&L Ireland based on five percent of the average realized price (ARP) of Irish-produced lenses, arriving at royalties of $1,072,522 and $3,050,028 for 1981 and 1982, respectively. This translates to a royalty of ...

This case is about valuation (not transfer pricing as such) and is commonly referred to in international valuation practice. In this decisions, the following 15 factors were relied upon to determine the type of monetary payments that would compensate for a patent infringement: 1. The royalties received by the licensor for licensing the intangible, proving or tending to prove an established royalty. 2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other similar intangibles. 3. The nature and scope of the license, such as whether it is exclusive or nonexclusive, restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or customers. 4. The licensor’s policy of maintaining its intangible monopoly by licensing the use of the invention only under special conditions designed to preserve the monopoly. 5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensees, such as whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business or whether they are inventor and promoter. 6. The effect of selling the intangible in promoting sales of other licensor’s products; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of other products that do not include the intangible and the extent of such derivative or “convoyed” sales. 7. The duration of the intangible (patent) and the term of the license. 8. The established profitability of the product that include the intangible, its commercial success and its current popularity. 9. The utility and advantages of the intangible over any old modes or devices that had been used. 10. The nature of the intangible, its character in the commercial embodiment owned and produced by the licensor, and the benefits to those who used it. 11. The extent to which the infringer used the invention and any evidence probative of the value of that use. 12. The portion of the profit or selling price that is customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses. 13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the intangible as distinguished from any other elements, manufacturing process, business risks or significant features or improvements added by the infringer. 14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts. 15. The amount that Georgia-Pacific and a licensee would have agreed upon at the time the infringement began if they had reasonably and voluntarily tried to reach an agreement. Some of the above factors may not apply systematically. Also, if such reasoning were to be relied upon, it would need to be applied in light of the issues at stake (proportionality) ...