In 2010, E S.A. transferred the legal ownership of a trademark to subsidiary S and subsequently entered into an agreement with S for the “licensing of the use of the trademarks”. In 2013, the same trademark was transferred back to E. S.A. As a result of these transactions, E. S.A., between 2010 and 2013, recognised the licence fees paid to S as tax costs, and then, as a result of the re-purchase of those trademarks in 2013 – it again made depreciation write-offs on them, recognising them as tax costs. The tax authority found that E S.A. had reported income lower than what would have been reported had the relationships not existed. E S.A. had  overestimated the tax deductible costs by PLN […] for the depreciation of trademarks, which is a consequence of the overestimation for tax purposes of the initial value of the trademarks repurchased from S – 27 December 2013 – by the amount of PLN […]. The function performed by S between 2010 and 2013 was limited to re-registration of the trademarks with the change of legal ownership. In the tax authority’s view, the expenses incurred by E S.A. for the reverse acquisition of the trademarks did not reflect the transactions that unrelated parties would have entered into, as they do not take into account the functions that E S.A. performed in relation to the trademarks. A tax assessment was issued where – for tax purposes – the transaction had instead been treated as a service contract, where S had provided protection and registration services to E S.A. A complaint was filed by E S.A. Judgement of the Court The Court found that there was no legal basis for re-characterisation in Poland for the years in question and that the issue should instead be resolved by applying the Polish anti-avoidance provision. On that basis, the case was referred back for further consideration. Excerpts “In principle, the tax authorities did not present any argumentation showing from which rules of interpretation they came to the conclusion that such an application of the above-mentioned provisions is legally possible and justified in the present case. It should be noted in this regard that Article 11(1) in fine speaks of the determination of income and tax due without – ‘[…] taking into account the conditions arising from the relationship…’, but does not allow for the substitution of one legal act (a licence agreement) for another act (an agreement for the provision of administration services), and deriving from the latter the legal consequences for the determination of the amount of the tax liability. There should be no doubt in this case that, in fact, the authorities made an unjustified reclassification of the legal act performed in the form of the conclusion of a valid licensing contract, when they concluded (referring to the OECD Guidelines – Annex to Chapter VI – Illustrative Examples of Recommendations on Intangible Assets, example 1, point 4) that the transactions carried out by E. and S. in fact constitute, for the purposes of assessing remuneration, a contract for the provision of trademark administration services and the market price in such a case should be determined for administration services. As the applicant rightly argued, such a possibility exists as of 1 January 2019, since Article 11c(4) uses the expression – “[…] without taking into account the controlled transaction, and where justified, determines the income (loss) of the taxpayer from the transaction appropriate to the controlled transaction”. This is what is meant by the so-called recharacterisation, i.e. the reclassification of the transaction, which is what the tax authorities actually did in the present case. At the same time, the Court does not share the view expressed in the jurisprudence of administrative courts, referring to the content of the justification of the draft amending act, according to which, the solutions introduced in 2019 were of a clarifying rather than normative nature (cf. the judgment of the WSA in Rzeszów of 20 October 2022, I SA/Rz 434/22). The applicant rightly argues in this regard that the new regulation is undoubtedly law-making in nature and that the provisions in force until the end of 2018 did not give the tax authorities such powers. It is necessary to agree with the view expressed in the literature that a linguistic interpretation of Article 11(1) of the A.p.d.o.p. and Article 11c of the A.p.d.o.p. proves that Article 11c of that Act is a normative novelty, as the concepts and premises it regulates cannot be derived in any way from the wording of Art. 11(1) u.p.d.o.p. (cf. H. Litwińczuk, Reclassification (non-recognition) of a transaction made between related parties in the light of transfer pricing regulations before and after 1.01.2019, “Tax Review” of 2019, no. 3).” “It follows from the justification of the contested decisions that, in applying Article 11(1) and (4) of the TAX Act to the facts of this case, the tax authorities referred to the OECD Guidelines, inter alia, to the example provided therein (Anex to Chapter VI – Illustrative Examples of Recommendations on Intangible Assets, example 1, point 4), from which, according to the authorities, it follows that the transactions carried out by E. S.A. and S. for the purposes of assessing remuneration constitute, in fact, a contract for the provision of trademark administration services and, in that case, the market price should be determined for such services. In this context, it should be clarified that the OECD Guidelines (as well as other documents of this organisation), in the light of the provisions of Article 87 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, do not constitute a source of universally binding law. Neither can they determine in a binding manner the basic structural elements of a tax, since the constitutional legislator in Article 217 of the Basic Law has subjected this sphere exclusively to statutory regulations. Since these guidelines do not constitute a source of law, they can therefore neither lead to an extension of the powers of the tax authorities nor of the ...

SGGE W T is a Spanish branch of SGG that carries out distribution and marketing activities related to the information technology network products and services. SGG is part of the KF group which “is an international group that provides solutions and services in the Information Technology (IT) sector, starting its activity in . .. as a distributor of access and communications networks”. The group “is the result of several corporate operations, mainly company acquisitions and mergers carried out to increase its share in world markets” and “is mainly organized in three divisions (SGG, QR and …) according to the IT areas (Technology, Integration and Consulting) in which they operate”. Following an audit of FY 2015 and 2016 the tax authorities issued assessments of additional income to the Spanish branch. One of the issues identified was SGGE’s remuneration for its sales and marketing activities. According to the tax authorities, the income of the Spanish branch was below the lower quartile of the range established under the TNMM. On this basis, the income was adjusted to the median. The tax authorities had also disallowed deductions for the cost of intra-group services. An appeal was filed by SGGE W T. Judgement of the Court The Court partially upheld and partially dismissed the appeal. Excerpt from the judgement concerning IQR and Median “Thus, this Court only appreciates, from the motivation of the Inspection, that there would be -according to the assessment- some defects of comparability that persist, unavoidable as a consequence of the selection process of comparable elements through databases, and of the limits of the available information, but it is not detailed what errors or circumstances concur in the selection of the comparable elements or what limits the available information has. It should be noted that when the Inspectorate, as transcribed above, refers to the fact that there are still defects in comparability, given that the resulting range does not include relatively equal results, it adds, paraphrasing the Guidelines, that these are defects that cannot be identified and quantified. Rule 3.57 of the OECD Guidelines – also transcribed above – refers to defects in comparability that cannot be identified or quantified and are therefore not susceptible to adjustment. Notwithstanding the foregoing, regardless of the possibility of identifying or quantifying such defects, the choice of the median, provided for in rule 3.62 of the OECD Guidelines, requires – as clearly stated by the Audiencia Nacional and this TEAC – that the Inspectorate must disclose the defects of comparability, and reasons must be given for the defect or defects of comparability that are found to persist and that cause the range not to include very reliable and relatively equal results. We have seen that when section 3.57 of the Guidelines refers to defects that cannot be identified or quantified, it immediately links it to the fact that this makes a specific adjustment impossible. This is perfectly logical, because if they could be concretely identified and quantified, the adjustment would be feasible. It is one thing if they cannot be identified in the sense of being precisely specified and quantified so that they can be adjusted or corrected, and another if elements or areas are detected which, due to their special circumstances or lack of documentation, allow us to conjecture that there is still a deficiency in comparability that cannot be corrected, for which reason there is no other recourse but to resort to the median. Therefore, the mere appeal to this generic reference cannot be considered sufficient; otherwise, the requirement to state reasons that the Audiencia Nacional and this TEAC maintain would be sterile. At the very least, it should be explained what errors or failures in the process of selecting comparables, or what limitations in the information available, determine, as a consequence, that there are such unidentifiable or unquantifiable defects in comparability. In the present case, the reasoning contained in the assessment notification -page 148- only talks about defects that are a consequence of the selection process and the limitations of the available information, but does not detail any aspects that could allow this reviewing body to assess which are the specific circumstances of the selection process that allow to consider that it will lead to unidentifiable or quantifiable defects of comparability; nor the specific circumstances of the available information from which it can be extracted that the limitations of the same (not identified by the Inspection in the aforementioned motivation) will lead to unidentifiable or quantifiable defects of comparability. Likewise, it is striking that the Inspection refers to defects derived from the process of selection of comparables when, in the Fourth Ground of Law of the agreement, in response to allegations, a table is drawn up in which five entities selected by the Inspection, which are the object of allegations by the taxpayer, are eliminated from the comparables, indicating that “the interquartile range derived from the remaining entities would not offer values very different from those resulting from the entities taken by the Inspection”. Also noteworthy is the statement made on page 209 of the contested resolution in which, in response to the allegation that the services of one of the comparable entities (…, S.A.) represent around 40% and 49% of the total income, in 2015 and 2016, respectively, it is stated that this “in no way implies that in all the other entities selected as comparable by the inspection this same circumstance is present”, indicating that in case it were so (that the percentage of 40% or 49% of the income from the provision of services were present in the other entities) “in no way would invalidate the sample of entities selected by the inspection since they are entities that carry out activities similar to those of the obligor and that constitute the best possible comparable”. It is striking that the Inspectorate states that the selected entities “constitute the best possible comparable” and that, nevertheless, the adjustment is based on the choice of the median “as the point in the range that ...

“Fertilizer Licence SA” (“A”) transferred its trademarks to “B” in 2013, previously financed the transfer through a cash contribution, and then, following the transfer, paid royalties to “A” in exchange for the ability to use the assets. According to the tax authorities, a situation where an entity transfers its assets to another entity, finances the transfer and then pays for access to use those assets does not reflect the conditions that unrelated parties would establish. An unrelated party, in order to obtain such licence fees from another unrelated party, would first have to incur the costs of manufacturing or acquiring the trademarks and to finance these costs itself without the involvement of the licensee. An independent entity which has finances the creation or purchase of an intangible asset, should not incur further costs for the use of that asset. Furthermore, in determining the licence fee to “B” for the use of trademarks, “A” relied on formal legal ownership, granting “B” a share in the revenues generated by “A” despite the fact that “B” did not take any part in the creation of these revenues. As a result, almost all the profits of “A” were transferred as royalties to company “B”. According to the authority, such an approach is inconsistent with the arm’s length principle. The remuneration of “B” (the legal owner of trademarks) did not take into account the functions performed by entities in creating the value of trademarks nor the risks and assets involved in the creation. The authority concluded that “B” was not entitled to share in the profit of “A”, because “B” was only the legal owner of internally created trademarks in the group and performed no significant DEMPE functions, had not used significant assets nor borne significant risks. This role of “B” entitled only to reimbursement of the costs incurred for the registration and legal protection of trademarks added a arm’s length margin for this type of services. As a result of the findings, the authority of first instance concluded that “A” had overstated tax deductible costs in connection with the disclosure of trademark licence fees as costs. “A” had reported income lower than it would have expected if the above-mentioned relationships had not existed. In the opinion of the authority of the second instance, an independent entity would not have entered, on the terms and conditions set by the company and its affiliates, into transactions leading to the divestment of ownership of valuable assets necessary for its operations, additionally financing their acquisition by another company, taking up shares in return with a nominal value significantly lower than the value of the lost assets (subsequently not receiving any dividends therefrom), and additionally being forced to incur additional costs as a result of the need to pay licence fees for the use of the trademarks held earlier. An appeal was filed by “A”. Judgement of the Court Excerpts “What is important in the case, however, is the conclusion of the authorities that in fact the legal relationship justifying the incurrence of expenses recognised as tax deductible costs is a contract for the provision of services consisting only in the administration of trademarks. The Court notes, however, that this conclusion is in conflict with the position of the authorities, which did not question the validity of the legal transactions resulting in the transfer of the rights to the trade marks to company ‘B’ and thus to another entity. As the applicant rightly submits, it cannot be disregarded in this case that the applicant was not the owner of the trade marks but acquired the right to use them on the basis of a licence agreement, for which it should pay remuneration to company ‘B’ (page […] of the application). In principle, the authorities did not present any arguments showing which interpretation rules they applied to reach the conclusion that this manner of applying the abovementioned provisions is legally possible and justified in the present case. It should be pointed out here that Article 11(1) in fine speaks of the determination of income and tax due without – ‘[…] taking into account the conditions resulting from the link …’, but does not permit the substitution of one legal transaction (a licence agreement) for another (an agreement for the provision of administration services) and the derivation of legal effects from the latter in terms of determining the amount of the tax liability. As the applicant rightly argued, such a possibility exists from 1 January 2019, since Article 11c(4) uses the expression- “[…] without taking into account the controlled transaction, and where it is justified, it determines the income (loss) of the taxpayer from the transaction relevant to the controlled transaction”. This is the so-called recharacterisation, i.e. reclassification of transactions, which was actually done by the tax authorities in this case. The company’s claims that the transfer of the trade mark into a separate entity was motivated by a desire to increase the company’s recognition and creditworthiness, which was a normal practice for business entities at the time, are unconvincing. On that point, it should be noted that, operating under the GKO with the same name, the applicant’s recognition and the name under which it operated were already sufficiently well established. As regards the increase in the creditworthiness or market power of the users of the trade mark, the applicant’s contentions on this point too are empty. Moreover, even if it were to be accepted, at least in the context of the activities of ‘A’, that the creditworthiness of ‘A’ had been increased, the advantage which the applicant derives from such an operation would appear to be of little significance. In fact, it obtained this benefit to a significant extent from the formation of relations with “A”, as a result of which the value of its income taxable income, and thus its tax liability in 2015, was significantly reduced. The benefits, mainly tax ones, are also indirectly pointed out by the applicant herself, indicating, inter alia, that there were no grounds ...

This case deals with arm’s length remuneration of a Greek Diary Distributor. Following an audit of “Diary Distributor Ltd.”, the Greek tax authorities determined that the prices paid to related parties for FY 2017 had been above the arm’s length price. On that basis an upwards adjustment of the taxable income was issued. An appeal was filed by “Diary Distributor Ltd.” Judgement of the Court The court dismissed the appeal of “Diary Distributor Ltd.” and upheld the assessment of the tax authorities Click here for English translation Click here for other translation gr-ded-2021-579_en_ath-579_2021 ...

“Uniclick B.V.” had performed all the important DEMPE functions with regard to intangible assets as well as managing all risks related to development activities without being remunerated for this. Royalty-income related to the activities had instead been received by a foreign group company incorporated in Ireland and with its place of management in Luxembourg. In 2012, the administration sent notices of amendment to the tax return to the respondent for assessment years 2006 and 2010. The tax administration stated that “Uniclick B.V.”, through its director B.T. and employees M.C. and S.M., invented and developed the Uniclic technology in 1996 and continued to exploit it, and that the subsequent transfer of rights to the Uniclic invention to U.B. BV was simulated. The administration added the profits foregone annually by the “Uniclick B.V.”, i.e. the royalties received by F. from third party licensees less the costs borne by F., to “Uniclick B.V’s” taxable base. “Uniclick B.V.” disagreed with this and argued, among other things, that the tax administration had failed in demonstrating that the transfer of the Uniclic invention and the right to patent had been recognised by various third parties and was not fiscally motivated. “Uniclick B.V.” further disputed the existence of tax evasion and raised a number of breaches of procedural rules – including retrospective application of the DEMPE concept introduced in the 2017 Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The tax administration maintained its position and sent the notices of assessment. The assessment was appealed by “Uniclick B.V.” and the court of first instance found the appeal admissible and dismissed the assessment. This decision was then appealed by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The Court of Appeal concluded that the administration failed in its burden of proof that the transfer prices applied between F. and Uniclick B.V for assessment year 2010 were not in accordance with the arm’s length principle. The administration did not show that Uniclick B.V. granted an abnormal or gratuitous advantage to F. in income year 2009, which should be added to its own profit by virtue of Article 26 WIB92. Since the existence of the abnormal or gratuitous advantage was not proven, it was not necessary to discuss the claim of the tax administration, put forward in secondary order, to determine what an arm’s length remuneration would be in respect of the functions performed, assets owned and risk born by “Uniclick B.V.” Excerpt “The discussion between the parties regarding the applicability of the OECD TPG 2017 is legally relevant notwithstanding the question whether it is decisive in the factual assessment (see factual assessment in section 4.3.3 below). The OECD guidelines are intended to provide insight into how the at arm’s length principle can be applied in practice and contain recommendations for determining transfer pricing policy. The OECD guidelines as such have no direct effect in Belgium but are used as a starting point in the area of transfer pricing. From the conclusion of the Belgian State supporting the filed subsidiary assessment, it is clear that the administration bases the valuation of the abnormal or gratuitous benefit at least partially on the 2017 version of the OECD TPG. However, the 1995, 2010 and 2017 versions of the OECD TPG differ in a number of respects and to varying degrees. These differences range from mere clarifications that do not impact on the content of previous versions to completely newly developed parts, namely recommendations that were not included, even implicitly, in previous versions. One of these completely newly developed parts that have only been included in the 2017 OECD TPG concerns the DEMPE functional analysis method as well as the method of ex post outcomes of hard-to-value intangibles, on which the Belgian State bases the subsidiary assessment at issue at least in part. The subsidiary assessment relates to the 2010 tax year/the 2009 income year in which the economic context and the regulatory framework applicable in 2009 had to be taken into account. The only OECD TPG available at the time were the 1995 OECD TPG. In the light of this, the administration is permitted to base the valuation on the 1995 OECD TPG (which, moreover, as stated above, are merely a non-binding instrument). The administration is also permitted to base the valuation on later versions of the OECD TPG (such as those of 2010), but only to the extent that these contain useful clarifications, without further elaboration, of the 1995 OECD TPG. The 2017 OECD TPG were published after 2009 and to the extent that the recommendations contained therein have evolved significantly since the 1995 OECD TPG, they cannot be applied in the current dispute. In particular, the DEMPE functional analysis method and the method of a posteriori results of intangibles that are difficult to value cannot be usefully applied in the present dispute from a temporal point of view, as these are tools that are only set out in the 2017 OECD TPG. Moreover, this position is also confirmed in Circular 2020/C/35 of 25 February 2020, which summarises and further interprets the 2017 OECD TPG, in which the administration explicitly states in para. 284 that the provisions of the Circular are in principle only applicable to transactions between related companies taking place as of 1 January 2018 (see also EU General Court judgment, 12 May 2021, cases T-816/17 and T-318/18, Luxembourg-lreland-Amazon v. Commission, para. 146- 155).” Click Here for English Translation Click here for other translation Belgium DEMPE Gent June 2021 ...

Glencore Australia (CMPL) sold copper concentrate produced in Australia to its Swiss parent, Glencore International AG (GIAG). The tax authorities found, that the price paid by Glencore International AG to Glencore Australia for the copper concentrate in the relevant years according to a price sharing agreement was less than the price that might reasonably be expected to have been paid in an arm’s length dealing between independent parties. The tax assessment was brought to court by Glencore. The Federal Court of Australia found in favor of Glencore. The ruling of the Federal Court was appealed by the Australian tax authorities. On 6 November 2020, a Full Federal Court in a 3-0 ruling dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities. The tax authorities then submitted a application for special leave to the High Court. This application was dismissed by the Court in a judgement issued 20. May 2021. Click here for translation Australia vs Glencore 2021 ...

Glencore Australia (CMPL) sold copper concentrate produced in Australia to its Swiss parent, Glencore International AG (GIAG). The tax administration found, that the price paid by Glencore International AG to Glencore Australia for the copper concentrate in the relevant years according to a price sharing agreement was less than the price that might reasonably be expected to have been paid in an arm’s length dealing between independent parties. ‘The amended assessments included in the taxpayer’s assessable income additional amounts of $49,156,382 (2007), $83,228,784 (2008) and $108,675,756 (2009) referable to the consideration which the Commissioner considered would constitute an arm’s length payment for the copper concentrate sold to Glencore International AG in each of the relevant years. The Federal Court of Australia found in favor of Glencore. “Accordingly I find that the taxpayer has established that the prices that CMPL was paid by GIAG for the copper concentrate it supplied to GIAG under the February 2007 Agreement were within an arm’s length range and accordingly the taxpayer has discharged the onus of proof on it.” “In view of my conclusions, the objection decisions should be set aside and the amended assessments for the 2007, 2008 and 2009 income years set aside.“ The ruling of the Federal Court was appealed by the Australian tax authorities. On 6 November 2020, a Full Federal Court in a 3-0 ruling dismissed the appeal. Australia vs Glencore November 2020 ...

Glencore Australia (CMPL) sold copper concentrate produced in Australia to its Swiss parent, Glencore International AG (GIAG). The tax administration found, that the price paid by Glencore International AG to Glencore Australia for the copper concentrate in the relevant years according to a price sharing agreement was less than the price that might reasonably be expected to have been paid in an arm’s length dealing between independent parties. ‘The amended assessments included in the taxpayer’s assessable income additional amounts of $49,156,382 (2007), $83,228,784 (2008) and $108,675,756 (2009) referrable to the consideration which the Commissioner considered would constitute an arm’s length payment for the copper concentrate sold to Glencore International AG in each of the relevant years. The Federal Court of Australia found in favor of Glencore. “Accordingly I find that the taxpayer has established that the prices that CMPL was paid by GIAG for the copper concentrate it supplied to GIAG under the February 2007 Agreement were within an arm’s length range and accordingly the taxpayer has discharged the onus of proof on it.” “In view of my conclusions, the objection decisions should be set aside and the amended assessments for the 2007, 2008 and 2009 income years set aside.“ On October 7 2019 it was announced that the Australian Tax Office will appeal the ruling of the Federal Court. 2019FCA1432 ...

During fiscal years 2006–2008, A-Group had been manufacturing and selling products in the construction industry – insulation and other building components. License fees received by the parent company A OY from the manufacturing companies had been determined by application of the CUP method. The remuneration of the sales companies in the group had been determined by application of the resale price method. The Finnish tax administration, tax tribunal and administrative court all found that the comparable license agreements chosen with regard to determining the intercompany license fees had such differences regarding products, contract terms and market areas that they were incomparable. With regard to the sale of the finished products, they found that the resale price method had not been applied on a sufficiently reliable basis. By reference to the 2010 version of the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines, they considered the best method for determining the arm’s length remuneration of the group companies was the residual profit split method. The Supreme Administrative Court found that the choice of transfer pricing method constituted the central starting point for the assessment of whether the companies’ tax declarations were to be regarded as incorrect. In this respect special attention should be paid to the version of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines published at the time where the tax return had been submitted. The arm’s length remuneration could be determined by applying the transfer pricing methods used by the companies, and the tax declarations for the years in question were not incorrect in terms of the transfer pricing method applied. The court further noted that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines act as an important source of interpretation. However, in regard to the choice of transfer pricing method, the court did not approve of using guidance provided in the 2010 for fiscal years 2006 – 2008. The later 2010 version of the guidelines contained fundamentally new interpretative recommendations (best method) compared to the 1995 version, where the traditional methods were considered superior to the transactional profit methods, and where the profit split method was reserved to exceptional circumstances. Click here for translation Finland vs taxpayer 2018 HFD ...