A taxpayer may seek on examination a reduction in a transfer pricing adjustment based on an unintentional over-reporting of taxable income. Tax administrations in their discretion may or may not grant this request. Tax administrations may also consider such requests in the context of mutual agreement procedures and corresponding adjustments (see Chapter IV) ...

It may be necessary to evaluate the transactions separately to determine whether they each satisfy the arm’s length principle. If the transactions are to be analysed together, care should be taken in selecting comparable transactions and regard had to the discussion at paragraphs 3.9-3.12. The terms of set-offs relating to international transactions between associated enterprises may not be fully consistent with those relating to purely domestic transactions between independent enterprises because of the differences in tax treatment of the set-off under different national tax systems or differences in the treatment of the payment under a bilateral tax treaty. For example, withholding tax would complicate a set-off of royalties against sales receipts ...

Recognition of intentional set-offs does not change the fundamental requirement that for tax purposes the transfer prices for controlled transactions must be consistent with the arm’s length principle. It would be a good practice for taxpayers to disclose the existence of set-offs intentionally built into two or more transactions between associated enterprises and demonstrate (or acknowledge that they have relevant supporting information and have undertaken sufficient analysis to be able to show) that, after taking account of the set-offs, the conditions governing the transactions are consistent with the arm’s length principle ...

Intentional set-offs may vary in size and complexity. Such set-offs may range from a simple balance of two transactions (such as a favourable selling price for manufactured goods in return for a favourable purchase price for the raw material used in producing the goods) to an arrangement for a general settlement balancing all benefits accruing to both parties over a period. Independent enterprises would be very unlikely to consider the latter type of arrangement unless the benefits could be sufficiently accurately quantified and the contract is created in advance. Otherwise, independent enterprises normally would prefer to allow their receipts and disbursements to flow independently of each other, taking any profit or loss resulting from normal trading ...

An intentional set-off is one that associated enterprises incorporate knowingly into the terms of the controlled transactions. It occurs when one associated enterprise has provided a benefit to another associated enterprise within the group that is balanced to some degree by different benefits received from that enterprise in return. These enterprises may indicate that the benefit each has received should be set off against the benefit each has provided as full or part payment for those benefits so that only the net gain or loss (if any) on the transactions needs to be considered for purposes of assessing tax liabilities. For example, an enterprise may license another enterprise to use a patent in return for the provision of know-how in another connection and indicate that the transactions result in no profit or loss to either party. Such arrangements may sometimes be encountered between independent enterprises and should be assessed in accordance with the arm’s length principle in order to quantify the value of the respective benefits presented as set-offs ...

Even in uncontrolled transactions, package deals may combine elements that are subject to different tax treatment under domestic law or an income tax convention. For example, royalty payments may be subject to withholding tax but lease payments may be subject to net taxation. In such circumstances, it may still be appropriate to determine the transfer pricing on a package basis, and the tax administration could then determine whether for other tax reasons it is necessary to allocate the price to the elements of the package. In making this determination, tax administrations should examine the package deal between associated enterprises in the same way that they would analyse similar deals between independent enterprises. Taxpayers should be prepared to show that the package deal reflects appropriate transfer pricing ...

A taxpayer may seek on examination a reduction in a transfer pricing adjustment based on an unintentional over-reporting of taxable income. Tax administrations in their discretion may or may not grant this request. Tax administrations may also consider such requests in the context of mutual agreement procedures and corresponding adjustments (see Chapter IV) ...

It may be necessary to evaluate the transactions separately to determine whether they each satisfy the arm’s length principle. If the transactions are to be analysed together, care should be taken in selecting comparable transactions and regard had to the discussion at paragraphs 3.9-3.12. The terms of set-offs relating to international transactions between associated enterprises may not be fully consistent with those relating to purely domestic transactions between independent enterprises because of the differences in tax treatment of the set-off under different national tax systems or differences in the treatment of the payment under a bilateral tax treaty. For example, withholding tax would complicate a set-off of royalties against sales receipts ...

Recognition of intentional set-offs does not change the fundamental requirement that for tax purposes the transfer prices for controlled transactions must be consistent with the arm’s length principle. It would be a good practice for taxpayers to disclose the existence of set-offs intentionally built into two or more transactions between associated enterprises and demonstrate (or acknowledge that they have relevant supporting information and have undertaken sufficient analysis to be able to show) that, after taking account of the set-offs, the conditions governing the transactions are consistent with the arm’s length principle ...

Intentional set-offs may vary in size and complexity. Such set-offs may range from a simple balance of two transactions (such as a favourable selling price for manufactured goods in return for a favourable purchase price for the raw material used in producing the goods) to an arrangement for a general settlement balancing all benefits accruing to both parties over a period. Independent enterprises would be very unlikely to consider the latter type of arrangement unless the benefits could be sufficiently accurately quantified and the contract is created in advance. Otherwise, independent enterprises normally would prefer to allow their receipts and disbursements to flow independently of each other, taking any profit or loss resulting from normal trading ...

An intentional set-off is one that associated enterprises incorporate knowingly into the terms of the controlled transactions. It occurs when one associated enterprise has provided a benefit to another associated enterprise within the group that is balanced to some degree by different benefits received from that enterprise in return. These enterprises may indicate that the benefit each has received should be set off against the benefit each has provided as full or part payment for those benefits so that only the net gain or loss (if any) on the transactions needs to be considered for purposes of assessing tax liabilities. For example, an enterprise may license another enterprise to use a patent in return for the provision of know-how in another connection and indicate that the transactions result in no profit or loss to either party. Such arrangements may sometimes be encountered between independent enterprises and should be assessed in accordance with the arm’s length principle in order to quantify the value of the respective benefits presented as set-offs ...

Even in uncontrolled transactions, package deals may combine elements that are subject to different tax treatment under domestic law or an income tax convention. For example, royalty payments may be subject to withholding tax but lease payments may be subject to net taxation. In such circumstances, it may still be appropriate to determine the transfer pricing on a package basis, and the tax administration could then determine whether for other tax reasons it is necessary to allocate the price to the elements of the package. In making this determination, tax administrations should examine the package deal between associated enterprises in the same way that they would analyse similar deals between independent enterprises. Taxpayers should be prepared to show that the package deal reflects appropriate transfer pricing ...

Nordea Nordic Baltic AB was the manager of funds and a central distributor in Sweden of certain funds registered in Luxembourg. The company entered into a new distribution agreement that replaced two previous agreements. According to this new agreement, the remuneration to the company was lower than under the previous agreement. The company considered that the compensation under the old agreements had been too high which therefore compensated for (set-off) the lower compensation received according to the new agreement. The Court of Appeal stated that the set-off principle must be applied with caution. A basic precondition should be that these are transactions that have arisen within the framework of the same contractual relationship. It did not matter if the company was overcompensated by another party to the agreement. Any overcompensation in previous years from the same contracting party could also not be taken into account as it was the result of a different pricing strategy within the framework of another contract. For internal set-offs to be considered they must be related to transactions between the same contracting parties and covered by the same pricing strategy within the same agreement. Click here for translation Stockholm KR 4811-14 Dom 2015-10-29 ...

Svenske Shell AB imported crude oil from its UK sister company SIPC over a five-year period. Imports included the purchase and shipping of crude oil to the port of Gothenburg i Sweden from different parts of the world. The price of the oil was based on a framework agreement entered into between the parties, while the freight was calculated based on templates with no direct connection to the actual individual transport. The tax authorities considered that the pricing in both parts was incorrect and therefore partially refused deduction of the costs of oil imports. The assessment (and the later judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court) was based on the wording of the former Swedish “arm’s length” provision dating back to 1965. Decision of Court The Court did not consider that a price deviation has been sufficiently established where the applied price of only a single transaction deviates from the market price. Applying such a narrow view on price comparisons in general lacks support in the preparatory work, nor can it be justified in the light of the purpose of the legislation, which is to prevent unauthorized transfers of profits abroad. Where the controlled parties have continuous business transactions with each other, it is more aligned with the purpose of the legislation to focus on the more long-term effects of the bases and methods of pricing applied during the period under review. This means that “overprices” and “underprices” that have occurred within the same tax year should normally be offset against each other. According to the Court, it is therefore often necessary to make an overall assessment of the Swedish and foreign company’s business transactions with each other. The Court also concluded that it is sometimes possible to deviate from the principle of separate tax year’s when applying the arm’s length provisions. A pricing system that in a longer perspective is fully acceptable from an arm’s point of view can lead to overcharging in one year and undercharging in another year. It can also lead to costs in the form of premiums for a number of years leading to higher incomes or losses at a later stage. For a period of three years, Swedish Shell had applied one and the same business strategy with regard to its oil purchases. The strategy was considered justified for business reasons, which meant that the results during two of the tax years were taken into account in the assessment of the results in the third year. The price method used in the case was the market price method (CUP). This method was chosen as no material had been presented that could form the basis for using any of the other methods. The price test and choice of method had to be made in the light of the information available on the price conditions in the crude oil and freight markets. The Court stated that a market comparison presupposed that the contractual conditions and the market situation could be established. The sale of crude oil from SIPC to Svenska Shell had taken place on CIF terms (cost, insurance and freight) in the sense that SIPC had been responsible for shipping and insurance of the oil sold. It could have been worthwhile, the Court held, to base the arm’s length test on a comparison between that total price and the CIF prices which occurred in similar transactions on the market between independent parties. However, there was no investigation of such CIF prices and in fact it was the case that SIPC’s and Svenska Shell’s contractual relations in significant parts had no direct equivalent on the market during the relevant time period. Even though the sale of crude oil had taken place on CIF terms, the contractual relationship between Svenska Shell and SIPC had contained separate agreements on the pricing of crude oil and shipping. As a result of these agreements, prices of oil were more similar to FOB (free on board) prices and the prices of freight could be linked to standards that directly or indirectly reflected market prices. A separate price comparison of oil and shipping was therefore possible. According to the Court, there were also other reasons for making such a separate assessment of the prices, since the fundamental problems that arose during the arm’s length examination in the two areas differed in significant respects. Swedish Shell claimed that SIPC had the function of an independent trader and therefore took out a certain trading margin on crude oil sales. The Swedish Tax Agency claimed that SIPC was only a group-wide service body and therefore not entitled to any profit margin at all. However, the Swedish Tax Agency accepted a certain remuneration for the services provided by SIPC. The Court found that SIPC had borne certain risks in its purchasing and sales activities and that these risks were such that a certain trading profit was justified. To assess the trading margin when pricing crude oil, different types of list prices were used as a comparison. Some of these list prices contained a certain trading margin that amounted to different levels. The Court found that it was not possible to determine any general levels for the size of the trading margin based on the material. An acceptable margin therefore had to be estimated in the individual case. The Court did not find it clear that the trading margin taken by SIPC on crude oil exceeded the level that would have been agreed between independent parties. When it came to the pricing of crude oil, different price types were used based on price quotations in different markets. The Court assessed the extent to which the different price types could be used for purpose of pricing the controlled transaction. One of the price types used was the US list prices. These were average prices that the US tax authorities produced as comparative prices for one year at a time. The list consisted of a large number of sales worldwide. The Court found that these list prices were based on a ...