Terex Italia s.r.l. is a manufacturer of heavy machinery and sold these products to a related distributor in the UK. The remuneration of the distributor had been determined based on application of the TNM-method. Following an audit for FY 2009 and 2010 the tax authorities served Terex a notice of assessment where adjustments was made to the taxable income in respect of a transfer pricing transaction, and in particular contesting the issuance of a credit note, in favour of the English company GENIE UK with the description “sales prices adjustment” recorded in the accounts as a reversal of revenue, in that, according to the Office, as a result of the adjustment made by the note, Terex would have made sales below cost to the English company, carrying out a clearly uneconomic transaction. In the same note, the non-deductibility of costs for transactions with blacklisted countries was contested. Terex lodged appeals against the assessments, but the Provincial Tax Commission upheld them only “in respect of the purchases from Hong Kong”, implicitly rejecting them in respect of the purchases made in Switzerland and explicitly rejecting them in respect of the disputed credit notes. An appeal was later rejected by the Regional Tax Commission. An appeal was then filed by Terex with the Supreme Court. In this appeal Terex stated that “The CTR, for the purposes of identifying the ‘normal value’ of the intra-group transactions relating to the relations with the English company GENIE UK, wrongly disallowed the applicability of the TNMM method (of the ‘net margin’), used by the taxpayer for the years 2009 and 2010 and presupposed the issuance of the contested credit notes and the relative reduction of the declared income, on the other hand, the Office considered that the CUP method (of the ‘price comparison’), used by the tax authorities in the findings relating to the same tax years, was applicable, with the consequent emergence of a higher taxable income, compared to that declared. The same Administration, on the other hand, with reference to the intra-group relations with the same company, located in the tax years 2007 and 2008 and subject to control without censure in the same audit, had not denied the applicability of the TNMM method, used by the taxpayer, which in such cases had led to the issuance of debit notes, with the relative increase in declared income.” Judgement of the Court The Supreme Court upheld part of the judgement (black listed costs) and refered part of it (Transfer pricing method and “sales prices adjustment”) back to the Regional Tax Commission for reconsideration. Excerpts in English 5.1. In particular, with regard to the method applicable for the purpose of determining the “normal value”, it has been clarified, with specific reference to the one referred to as the “TNMM”, that “On the subject of the determination of business income, the regulations set forth in Article 110, paragraph 7, of Presidential Decree no. 917 of 1986, aimed at repressing the economic phenomenon of “transfer pricing”, i.e. the shifting of taxable income following transactions between companies belonging to the same group and subject to different national regulations, requires the determination of weighted transfer prices for similar transactions carried out by companies competing on the market, for which purpose it is possible to use the method developed by the OECD which is based on the determination of the net margin of the transaction (so-called “TNMM”), which is based on the determination of the net margin of the transaction. “TNMM”), provided that the period of investigation is selected, the comparable companies are identified, the appropriate accounting adjustments are made to the financial statements of the tested party, due account is taken of the differences between the tested party and the comparable companies in terms of risks assumed or functions performed, and a reliable indicator of the level of profitability is assumed.” (Cass. 17/05/2022, no. 15668; the principle was shared by, among others, Cass. 12/09/2022, nos. 26695, 26696, 26697 and 26698; Cass. 28/04/2023, no. 11252).” “The adoption of the TNMM is particularly reliable when the functional analysis shows the existence of a party (tested party or tested party) to the controlled transaction that performs simpler functions and assumes less risk than the other party to the transaction (para. 2.64 et seq. OECD). In analogy to the RPM (Resale Price Method) or CPM (Cost Plus Method), it focuses on the profitability of the tested party in the controlled transaction, whereas it differs from it in that it operates at the level of net margins and not gross margins.” “Indeed, according to the OECD Guidelines (OECD, Guidelínes,1995), ‘The selection of a transfer pricing method is always aimed at finding the most appropriate method for a particular case. For this purpose, the following should be taken into account in the selection process: the respective advantages and disadvantages of the methods recognised by the OECD; the consistency of the method considered with the nature of the controlled transaction, as determined in particular through functional analysis; the availability of reliable information (especially on independent comparables) necessary for the application of the selected method and/or the other methods; the degree of comparability between controlled transactions and transactions between independent companies, including the reliability of comparability adjustments that are necessary to eliminate significant differences between them. No method can be used in all eventualities and it is not necessary to demonstrate the non-applicability of a given method to the circumstances of the particular case. Ministerial Circular No. 42 of 12 December 1981 also pointed out that the appropriateness of a transfer pricing method is assessed on a case-by-case basis.” “5.6. The importance that the TNMM has assumed in practice, as the most widely used means of determining transfer prices, has made it the subject of interest of the Eu Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (JTPF) body, set up by the European Commission, which, in 2019, drew up a document (EU JOINT TRANSFER PRICING FORUM, DOC: JTPF/002/2019/EN, SECTION 2), in which it describes its essential characteristics, among which, substantially tracing the ...

In 2017 the European Commission concluded that Luxembourg had granted undue tax benefits to Amazon of around €250 million. According to the Commission, a tax ruling issued by Luxembourg in 2003 – and prolonged in 2011 – lowered the tax paid by Amazon in Luxembourg without any valid justification. The tax ruling enabled Amazon to shift the vast majority of its profits from an Amazon group company that is subject to tax in Luxembourg (Amazon EU) to a company which is not subject to tax (Amazon Europe Holding Technologies). In particular, the tax ruling endorsed the payment of a royalty from Amazon EU to Amazon Europe Holding Technologies, which significantly reduced Amazon EU’s taxable profits. This decision was brought before the European Courts by Luxembourg and Amazon, and in May 2021 the General Court found that Luxembourg’s tax treatment of Amazon was not illegal under EU State aid rules. An appeal was then filed by the European Commission with the European Court of Justice. Judgement of the Court The European Court of Justice upheld the decision of the General Court and annulled the decision of the European Commission. However, it did so for different reasons. According to the Court of Justice, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines were not part of the legal framework against which a selective advantage should be assessed, since Luxembourg had not implemented these guidelines. Thus, although the General Court relied on an incorrect legal framework, it had reached the correct result. Click here for other translation CURIA - Documents ...

A Swiss company, A AG, paid two related parties, B AG and C AG, for services in the financial years 2015 and 2016. These services had been priced using the internal CUP method based on the pricing of services provided by B Ltd to unrelated parties. Following an audit, the tax authorities concluded that the payments made by A AG for the intra-group services were above the arm’s length price and issued a notice of assessment where the price was instead determined using the cost-plus method. According to the tax authorities, the CUP method could not be applied due to a lack of reliable data. Following an appeal the court of first instance ruled mostly in favor of the tax authorities. A AG then appealed to the Federal Administrative Court. Decision of the Court The Federal Administrative Court ruled in favour of A AG. According to the Court, the CUP method is preferred to other methods and other transfer pricing methods should not be applied in cases where data on comparable uncontrolled prices are available. Therefore, the tax authorities had not complied with the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Swiss FAC A-4976-2022_2023-09-04 ...

Menfi Industria s.p.a. is a manufacturer of household goods – appliances, crockery, stainless steel items. Following an audit the tax authorities served Menfi Industria a notice of assessment for FY 2008. According to the tax authorities the company had sold products to another group company, at a price lower than the normal value. The adjustment was determined using the TNMM method. Other non-transfer pricing adjustments were also made in the assessment. An appeal was filed by Menfi Industria, which the court of first instance found to be well-founded in regards of leasing fees, depreciations etc., but in regards of the transfer pricing adjustment the appeal was dismissed. Subsequently, the Lombardy Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the first instance court. Menfi Industria then appealed to the Supreme Court. In its appeal Menfi Industris pointed out that, with regard to the issue of the sale of intra-group assets at a price lower than the normal price, the court of appeal ruled in an apodictic and tautological manner, essentially confining itself to affirming the legitimacy of the recovery only by stating that the methodology applied, i.e. the TNMM, was correct, without offering any specific argument as to the legitimacy. Menfi Industria further argued, that the judgment was contradictory in that, after stating that the arm’s length price was determined by the CUP method, the court in ist conclution stated that the methodology applied was correct, even though it was based on the TNMM. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the Court of Appeal and refered the case back to the court, in a different composition. Excerpts (…) “The appeal court, after pointing out, in its reasoning passage, that ‘normal value is determined by the method of comparing the average price or consideration charged’, arrives at the final consideration that the TNMM method applied is lawful, without this being logically supported by the main premise. This Court, (Cass. civ, No. 15668/2022), with specific reference to the Transactional Net Margin Method or TNMM, in referring to Section B of Part III of Chapter II of the OECD Guidelines of 2010 that regulates it, as, similarly, the subsequent edition of 2017, has had occasion to affirm the principle, which must be given further continuity here, according to which “on the subject of determining business income, the rules set forth in Presidential Decree No. 917 of 1986 Art. 110, paragraph 7, aimed at repressing the economic phenomenon of “transfer pricing”, i.e., the shifting of taxable income following transactions between companies belonging to the same group and subject to different national regulations, requires the determination of weighted transfer prices for similar transactions carried out by companies competing on the market, for which purpose it is possible to use the method developed by the OECD that is based on the determination of the net margin of the transaction (so-called “TNM”), which is the basis for the determination of the net margin of the transaction. “TNMM”), provided that the period of investigation is selected, the comparable companies are identified, the appropriate accounting adjustments are made to the financial statements of the tested party, due account is taken of the differences between the tested party and the comparable companies in terms of risks assumed or functions performed, and a reliable indicator of the level of profitability is assumed”. The judgment under review, as seen, reasoned, in the abstract, with regard to the application prerequisite set forth in Article 110, paragraph 7, cited above, but then deemed legitimate the TNMM method which, on the other hand, is not based on the comparison of the price charged for goods of the same or similar kind at the same state of marketing, but on the basis of the net margin of the transaction, thus showing a substantial contradiction in the motivational path. On the other hand, as has been said, the assessment of the correctness of the TNMM method applied required a verification of the assumptions legitimising its application, but the judgment under appeal totally failed to carry out, in its decisional reasoning, the necessary factual verifications in the identification of the transfer pricing method most appropriate to the case in hand, since it could not give relevance to the generic and abstract motivational passage according to which: ‘in the first analysis, the functions performed by the appellant company and the risks assumed by it were assessed’, since that passage of reasoning, devoid of specific factual elements of reference, cannot identify the necessary argumentative premise for the final conclusion to be correct. The second ground of appeal criticises the judgment, pursuant to Article 360(1)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, for breach and misapplication of Article 110(7) and (9) of Presidential Decree No 917/1986, for having held the TNMM method to be lawful, despite the fact that the aforementioned regulatory provisions require the application of the various traditional transactional methods as a matter of priority.” (…) “With reference to the present case, the appeal court held that the company had provided proof of the intra-Group supplies but then, again in part of its reasoning, stated that it rejected the company’s appeal. There is no possibility, on the basis of the content of the decision, of being able to hold that the expression ‘Evidence that has been provided by the company Menfi’, contains a mere material error, in the sense that, indeed, the court would have wanted to state that the evidence had not been provided: the expression finds its completeness in itself, there being no further motivational passage that would allow the second interpretative option to be preferred, resulting, in this case, in a judgment contrary to that expressly stated by the appeal court. In that regard, the present ground of appeal correctly states the intrinsic and unremediable inconsistency between the finding of fact made by the court and the subsequent ruling rejecting the company’s appeal.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Italy vs Fallimento Menfi Industria spa April 2023 Case ...

SA Exel Industries marketed its products abroad through subsidiaries or independent agents, depending on the territory. In Brazil, India, Argentina, Russia and Portugal it sold its products through subsidiaries under either a buy/sell distributor agreement or a commissionaire agreement. In Iran, Turkey and South Korea it sold through independent agents to whom it paid a commission. The tax authorities considered that the commission paid to the independent agents was a CUP and determined the commission paid to the subsidiaries on that basis. The remuneration of the subsidiaries in excess of the commission (margin) paid to the independent agents was considered to be a transfer of profits abroad. SA Exel Industries appealed against this assessment, arguing that the subsidiaries performed much more important functions than independent agents. It also argued that there were significant market differences, since the subsidiaries operated in highly strategic markets where the major car manufacturers were dominant, while the other markets in which the independent agents operated were anecdotal. The Administrative Court dismissed the appeal and the case was then brought to the Administrative Court of Appeal. Judgement of the Court The Court upheld the decision of the Administrative Court and dismissed SA Exel Industries’ appeal. Excerpt “4. In order to justify the higher amount of remuneration paid to the subsidiaries of the group it heads, compared with the amount paid to independent local intermediaries, SA Exel Industries argues that the geographical markets in which the subsidiaries operated are fundamentally different from those in which the third-party sales agents operated, since they are highly strategic in that they are home to large car manufacturers, whereas the other markets are anecdotal, The subsidiaries responded to major invitations to tender, whereas the local sales agents were involved only in the supply of spare parts and small equipment, and the subsidiaries provided additional marketing, after-sales service, on-site assembly and testing of equipment, and assistance with the collection of debts, as evidenced by the significant human resources at their disposal. 5. Although the turnover achieved in Iran, Turkey and South Korea was generally lower than that achieved through the subsidiaries, it does not appear from the investigation that the characteristics of these markets justify the differences in the remuneration paid to the subsidiaries and to the independent intermediaries, since the turnover achieved by the subsidiaries is not systematically higher than the turnover achieved through independent sales agents. Even supposing that the composition of turnover achieved through independent sales agents is different from that achieved through subsidiaries, the latter including more sales of large equipment through tenders and fewer sales of spare parts and small equipment, which is not apparent from the investigation in the case of certain subsidiaries, it is common ground that the remuneration of independent sales agents does not take account of the nature of the products and equipment sold, since it is invariably set at 20% of turnover, and that the remuneration paid to subsidiaries is, irrespective of the nature of the products, equivalent to the amount of the discount they would have received if they had acted as a buyer-reseller. Finally, it is not apparent from the documents in the files that the services provided by the independent intermediaries are significantly less substantial than the services provided by the subsidiaries in their intermediation activity alone. The mere fact that the subsidiaries have greater material and human resources is not sufficient to presume, in the absence of documents in the file to that effect, that those resources were used in the context of the latter activity. It follows that, contrary to what is maintained, it does not follow from the investigation that the differences in remuneration between subsidiaries and intermediary agents can be explained by the different situation of those suppliers. Although the applicant company argues that the commissions paid to the subsidiaries take account of the margin which they would have made on a purchase/resale of the same product, such an argument is not such as to justify the abovementioned differences in remuneration between the economic agents belonging to the group and those outside it, since they are involved in the same intermediary activity, which is different from the purchase/resale activity. The various doctrines referred to, which are not expressly invoked on the basis of the provisions of Article L. 80 A of the Book of Tax Procedures, do not interpret the tax law differently from the above. 6. It follows that the tax authorities must be regarded as establishing, under the conditions referred to in point 3, the existence of an advantage, and were entitled to reintegrate it into the results of the French company, as the latter did not justify that this advantage would have had at least equivalent counterparts for it.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation CAA de PARIS, 2ème chambre, 01_03_2023, 21PA06438 ...

Prinoth S.p.A. is an Italian manufacturer of snow groomers and tracked vehicles. For a number of years the parent company had been suffering losses while the distribution subsidiaries in the group had substantial profits. Following an audit the tax authorities concluded that the transfer prices applied between the parent company and the distributors in the group had been incorrect. An assessment was issued where the transfer pricing method applied by the group (cost +) was rejected and replaced with a CUP/RPM approach based on the pricing applied when selling to independent distributors. An appeal was filed by Prinoth S.p.A. which was rejected by the Court of first instance. The Court considered “the assessment based on the price comparison method to be well-founded, from which it emerged that in the three-year period from 2006 to 2008 the company had sold to its subsidiaries with a constant mark-up of 11.11 per cent, while in direct sales to end customers it had applied a mark-up of 32 per cent and in sales to dealers a mark-up of 25 per cent, 22 per cent and 20 per cent in the various years, and pointed out that these prices were perfectly comparable, since the products were of the same type, under conditions of free competition and at the same marketing stage; pointed out that the resale price criterion also corroborated these results as well as the profit comparison method, finding that Prinoth, in the years from 2007 to 2011, had suffered losses of approximately €4 million while the subsidiaries had made profits of approximately €20 million, which was not consistent with the choices of an independent operator Finally, the Court did not accept Prinoth’s defence that, due to the particular nature of the products and the marketing methods used, the only appropriate method was the cost-plus method, which was accepted by the first judges but not accepted because it led to completely different results, due to the erroneous data used, because in the master files and local files made available by Prinoth, the costs not relating to production were arbitrarily allocated. These considerations led it to conclude that the company had not met its burden of proof.” Prinoth S.p.A then filed an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Court The Supreme Administrative Court found the reasoning of the regional court lacking and remanded the case back to the Court in a different composition. Excerpt “5. On the other hand, the second and third pleas, to be dealt with together, are well founded. In fact, the aforementioned ruling is entirely anapodic, failing to explain in any way the reasons why the numerous and unambiguous factual elements, represented by the taxpayer company and already relied on in the judgments at first instance, have no impact on the concrete possibility of referring to them for the purpose of identifying the normal value in accordance with the criterion of the price comparison method, being instead potentially capable of affecting the actual comparability of the transactions. The company had in fact deduced, in support of the unusability of the price comparison criterion, and on the basis of its own use of the different cost-plus criterion, that in the intra-group transfers Prinoth did not carry out all the marketing, sales and after-sales activities, as well as after-sales assistance, entrusted to the subsidiaries; and, secondly, that of the risks, that in the intra-group transfers the subsidiaries took upon themselves the risks of inventory, fluctuations in the costs of raw materials and interest rates. Well, the judge cannot, when examining the arguments of the parties or the facts of evidence, limit himself to stating the judgement in which their assessment consists, because this is the only “static” content of the complex motivational statement, but he must also engage, all the more so in a complex case, in the description of the cognitive process through which he passed from his situation of initial ignorance of the facts to the final situation constituted by the judgement, which represents the necessary “dynamic” content of the statement itself (Cass. 20/12/2018, no. 32980; Cass. 29/07/2016, no. 15964; Cass. 23/01/2006, no. 1236). And such an anapodic and generic statement also results in a violation of the OECD Guidelines that allow the application of the price comparison method only in the presence of effectively comparable transactions, otherwise the necessary adjustments must be made. And for the purposes of the comparability of transactions, as seen above, the functions performed by the undertakings and the allocation of risks between the contractual parties play a decisive role, together with the identity of the product, which are capable of affecting the price of the transaction. The second and third pleas must therefore be upheld.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Italy vs Prinoth SPA 20221213 2022 n 36275 ...

Adjusting operating assets and operating profit for differences in accounts receivable. (i) USM is a U.S. company that manufactures parts for industrial equipment and sells them to its foreign parent corporation. For purposes of applying the comparable profits method, 15 uncontrolled manufacturers that are similar to USM have been identified. (ii) USM has a significantly lower level of accounts receivable than the uncontrolled manufacturers. Since the rate of return on capital employed is to be used as the profit level indicator, both operating assets and operating profits must be adjusted to account for this difference. Each uncontrolled comparable’s operating assets is reduced by the amount (relative to sales) by which they exceed USM’s accounts receivable. Each uncontrolled comparable’s operating profit is adjusted by deducting imputed interest income on the excess accounts receivable. This imputed interest income is calculated by multiplying the uncontrolled comparable’s excess accounts receivable by an interest rate appropriate for short-term debt ...

If there are material differences between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions that would affect the gross profit markup, adjustments should be made to the gross profit markup earned in the comparable uncontrolled transaction according to the provisions of § 1.482-1(d)(2). For this purpose, consideration of the operating expenses associated with the functions performed and risks assumed may be necessary, because differences in functions performed are often reflected in operating expenses. If there are differences in functions performed, however, the effect on gross profit of such differences is not necessarily equal to the differences in the amount of related operating expenses. Specific examples of the factors that may be particularly relevant to this method include – (1) The complexity of manufacturing or assembly; (2) Manufacturing, production, and process engineering; (3) Procurement, purchasing, and inventory control activities; (4) Testing functions; (5) Selling, general, and administrative expenses; (6) Foreign currency risks; and (7) Contractual terms (e.g., scope and terms of warranties provided, sales or purchase volume, credit terms, transport terms) ...

Promgas s.p.a. is 50% owned by the Italian company Eni s.p.a. and 50% owned by the Russian company Gazprom Export. It deals with the purchase and sale of natural gas of Russian origin destined for the Italian market. It sells the gas to a single Italian entity not belonging to the group, Edison spa, on the basis of a contract signed on 24 January 2000. In essence, Promgas s.p.a. performes intermediary function between the Russian company, Gazprom Export (exporter of the gas), and the Italian company, Edison s.p.a. (final purchaser of the gas). Following an audit for FY 2005/06, the tax authorities – based on the Transaction Net Margin Method – held that the operating margin obtained by Promgas s.p.a. (0.23% in 2025 and 0.06% in 2006) were not in line with the results that the company could have achieved at arm’s length. Applying an operating margin of l.39% resulted in a arm’s length profit of €4,227,438.07, for the year 2005, which was €3,426.803.00 higher than the profit declared by the company. Promgas s.p.a. appealed against the notice of assessment, which was upheld by the Provincial Tax Commission of Milan, with sentence no. 356/44/11, notified on 23/12/2011. The tax authorities then filed an appeal with the Regional Tax Commission of Lombardy which upheld the the tax authorities main appeal and rejected the company’s cross appeal. Promgas s.p.a. then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court remanded the cast to the Regional Tax Commission of Lombardy Excerpts “…. 8.1. The failure to examine the facts put forward by the taxpayer company to oppose the set of comparables identified by the Revenue Agency resulted in a defect in the overall reasoning of the contested judgment, as denounced by the appellant company in its fifth and sixth grounds of complaint. 8.2. As is clear from the criteria indicated in the OECD Guidelines referred to above, in order for the application of the TNMM to be reliable, it is necessary to conduct an analysis of comparability that passes through the two moments of the choice of the tested party and the identification of the comparable companies, an identification that, under free market conditions (arm’s length principle), presupposes a “comparison” (internal or external) between the tested party and comparable companies that satisfies the five factors of comparability indicated by the OECD criteria (characteristics of goods and services functional analysis; contractual terms underlying the intra-group transaction; business strategies; economic conditions). It is through such a comparison that the factors that may significantly influence the net profit indicators (see paragraph 7.9 below) are identified on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case. 8.3. Indeed, the reliability of such a method, according to the prevailing practice and interpretation, must pass through the following steps – selection of the tested party for the analysis; – determination of the financial results relating to the controlled transactions – selection of the investigation period; – identification of comparable companies; – accounting adjustments to the financial statements of the tested party and differences in accounting practices, provided that such adjustments are appropriate and possible; – assessment of whether adjustments are appropriate or necessary to take account of differences between the tested party and the identified comparable companies in terms of risks assumed or functions performed; – selection of a reliable profitability profit level indicator (so-called Profit Leverage/ Indicator, or PLI). 8.4. The CTR’s failure to verify the circumstances alleged by the taxpayer, resulted, in essence, in the pretermission of the comparability analysis for the selection of the TNMM applied to the case, and thus, of the procedure for the identification of comparable transactions and the use of relevant information to ensure the reliability of the analysis and the compliance of the PLI, or PLI, with the principle of free competition, or rather, the reliability of the selected TNMM. 9. The seventh ground of appeal – alleging breach of Article 6(1) of Legislative Decree 18/12/1997, no. The seventh ground of appeal – which alleges infringement of Article 6(1) of Legislative Decree No 472 of 18 December 1997, on the ground that the Regional Tax Commission held that the financial penalties applied by the Tax Office were lawful, erroneously excluding the existence of a ground of non-punishability, without specifically verifying the percentage of discrepancy between the amount declared by the company (0.23%) and the amount assessed by the Administration (1.39%) – is considered to be absorbed by the acceptance of the fifth and sixth grounds of appeal. 10. In conclusion, the appeal must be upheld limited to the fifth and sixth grounds of appeal, with absorption of the seventh and dismissal of the remainder. The judgement must be set aside in relation to the upheld grounds, with a reference back to the CTR, in a different composition, for a new examination of the merits of the dispute from the point of view of the standards of comparability relating to the method chosen and the penalty profile also in the light of the more favourable ius superveniens.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Italy-Sez-5-Num-15668-Anno-2022- ...

A S.A. is 51% owned by B SA and 49% by C Corp. A S.A is active in development of energy efficiency projects. In 2015 A S.A took out loans from B and C at an annual interest rate of 3.22xEuribor 12 months, plus a spread of 14%. A S.A had also paid for services to related party D. The tax authorities issued an assessment related to the interest rate on the loan and the service purportedly received and paid for. A complaint was filed by A S.A. with the Administrative Tribunal (CAAD). Judgement of the CAAD The complaint of A S.A was dismissed and the assessment upheld. Excerpts regarding the interest rate “Now, regarding the first argument, it falls immediately by the base, since the Applicant has not proved that it had made any effort to finance itself with the bank and that this effort was unsuccessful. On the contrary, it seems to result from the request for arbitration award that the Claimant and its shareholders have immediately assumed that, given the financial situation that the country was still experiencing in 2014, any request for financing made by a newly created entity and without business expectations would be rejected outright by all banks. For that reason, the Claimant did not prove, nor could it, that the interest it contracted with its shareholders was more favourable to it than what the banks would demand from it. In short, it cannot but be stated that, in view of this, the Defendant could not assume any other position than to investigate whether the shareholders of the Claimant had taken advantage of the socio-financial context of the country to contract a fixed spread of 14%. … As the Respondent summarized very well in its allegations (no. 58) That is, if an independent bank agreed to provide financing to the Claimant, of similar amount and term to the shareholder loans, remunerated at an annual nominal interest rate (TAN) calculated according to the monthly average of the 6-month Euribor rate of the previous month, plus a spread of 3 percentage points, then nothing justifies that the partners require from the company a remuneration for the shareholder loans that includes a spread of 14 percentage points.” Excerpts regarding the services “But it was not only the formal issue that justified the position of the AT and that leads this Court to agree with it. The absence of material evidence that the work had been performed is further compounded by the fact that, during the inspection, the AT found invoices (which the Claimant has registered in its accounts under account “62213 – Specialized work”), issued by the accounting firm “H…, Lda, as well as other “Specialized work”, for services related to the execution and management of the contracts, issued by suppliers B… and I…, which indicates that entities other than D… were involved in the provision of services. The management services for the … and of …, which were ongoing in 2017, and whose invoicing started that year, were performed by B… and I… and not by D… . Thus, the association of all the facts necessarily leads to the non-deductibility of D…’s invoice, since it was up to the Claimant to prove that the work was performed by D… and it failed to do so. As recently decided by the South Administrative Central Court in its ruling of 27 May 2021 in case no. 744/11.1BELRA (available at www.dgsi.pt) I- Invoices are not only relevant documents for the purpose of exercising the right to deduct, but also relevant for the purpose of exercising the AT’s control powers. II- There is no hierarchy between the various requirements imposed on invoices. III- The CJEU has held that the right to deduct is admissible even if some formal requirements are not met by invoices, provided that the material situation is demonstrated. IV- The failure to scrupulously comply with the formalities required in terms of issuing invoices may not compromise the exercise of the right of deduction, provided that the substantive requirements have been complied with and that the AT has all the elements to substantively characterise the transaction, it being understood that the burden of proof will rest with the taxable person. V- As no documentary evidence has been submitted containing a content that enables the gaps in the invoices to be overcome, the right to deduct is not admissible. Therefore, as the Claimant has not complied with the provisions of nos. 3 and 4 of article 23 of the CIRC, by virtue of paragraph c) of no. 1 of article 23-A, the invoice for the provision of services in the amount of €30,000.00, which determines the correction of the taxable income in that amount, cannot be deductible.” “Based on these grounds, the Court decides to consider the request made by the Claimant as totally unfounded” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation CAAD - Jurisprudência 23 March 2022 ...

Information is readily available in many lending markets on the different rates of interest charged for differently rated enterprises and such information may usefully contribute to performing comparability analyses. Financing transactions that the borrowing MNE or another MNE within the group has with external lenders may also be reliable comparables for interest rates charged by associated enterprises (see paragraphs 10.94 and 10.95). Financing transactions undertaken by the borrowing MNE or another entity in the MNE group, for example the MNE group parent, will be reliable comparables only where the differences between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions do not materially affect the interest rate or reasonably accurate adjustments can be made ...

In an ideal scenario, a comparability analysis would enable the identification of financial transactions between independent parties which match the tested transaction in all respects. With the many variables involved, it is more likely that potential comparables will differ from the tested transaction. Where differences exist between the tested transaction and any proposed comparable, it will be necessary to consider whether such differences will have a material impact on the price. If so, it may be possible, where appropriate, to make comparability adjustments to improve the reliability of a comparable. This is more likely to be achievable where the adjustment is based on a quantitative factor and there is good quality data easily available (e.g. on currency differences) than, for instance, in trying to compare loans to borrowers with qualitative differences or where data is not so readily available (e.g. borrowers with different business strategies) ...

Set out below is a description of some of the specific features of intangibles that may prove important in a comparability analysis involving transfers of intangibles or rights in intangibles. The following list is not exhaustive and in a specific case consideration of additional or different factors may be an essential part of a comparability analysis ...

In applying the principles of the Guidelines related to the content and process of a comparability analysis to a transaction involving intangibles, a transfer pricing analysis must consider the options realistically available to each of the parties to the transaction ...

After identifying the relevant transactions involving intangibles, specifically identifying the intangibles involved in those transactions, identifying which entity or entities legally own the intangibles as well as those that contribute to the value of the intangibles, it should be possible to identify arm’s length conditions for the relevant transactions. The principles set out in Chapters I – III of these Guidelines should be applied in determining arm’s length conditions for transactions involving intangibles. In particular, the recommended nine-step process set out in paragraph 3.4 can be helpful in identifying arm’s length conditions for transactions involving intangibles. As an essential part of applying the principles of Chapter III to conduct a comparability analysis under the process described in paragraph 3.4, the principles contained in Sections A, B, and C of this Chapter VI should be considered ...

In order to determine arm’s length conditions for the use or transfer of intangibles it is important to perform a functional and comparability analysis in accordance with Section D. 1 of Chapter I, based on identifying the intangibles and associated risks in contractual arrangements and then supplementing the analysis through examination of the actual conduct of the parties based on the functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed, including control of important functions and economically significant risks. Accordingly the next section, Section A, provides guidance on identifying intangibles. Section B examines legal ownership and other contractual terms, together with guidance on the evaluation of the conduct of the parties based on functions, assets and risks. Section C outlines some typical scenarios involving intangibles, and Section D provides guidance on determining arm’s length conditions including the application of pricing methods and valuation techniques, and provides an approach to determining arm’s length conditions for a specific category of hard-to-value intangibles. Examples illustrating the guidance are contained in the Annex to this chapter ...

Small to medium sized enterprises are entering into the area of transfer pricing and the number of cross-border transactions is ever increasing. Although the arm’s length principle applies equally to small and medium sized enterprises and transactions, pragmatic solutions may be appropriate in order to make it possible to find a reasonable response to each transfer pricing case ...

It is a good practice for taxpayers to set up a process to establish, monitor and review their transfer prices, taking into account the size of the transactions, their complexity, level of risk involved, and whether they are performed in a stable or changing environment. Such a practical approach would conform to a pragmatic risk assessment strategy or prudent business management principle. In practice, this means that it may be reasonable for a taxpayer to devote relatively less effort to finding information on comparables supporting less significant or less material controlled transactions. For simple transactions that are carried out in a stable environment and the characteristics of which remain the same or similar, a detailed comparability (including functional) analysis may not be needed every year ...

When undertaking a comparability analysis, there is no requirement for an exhaustive search of all possible relevant sources of information. Taxpayers and tax administrations should exercise judgment to determine whether particular comparables are reliable ...

One question that arises when putting the need for comparability analyses into perspective is the extent of the burden and costs that should be borne by a taxpayer to identify possible comparables and obtain detailed information thereon. It is recognised that the cost of information can be a real concern, especially for small to medium sized operations, but also for those MNEs that deal with a very large number of controlled transactions in many countries. Paragraph 4.28 and Chapter V contain explicit recognition of the need for a reasonable application of the requirement to document comparability ...

The use of multiple year data does not necessarily imply the use of multiple year averages. Multiple year data and averages can however be used in some circumstances to improve reliability of the range. See paragraphs 3.57-3.62 for a discussion of statistical tools ...

Multiple year data can also improve the process of selecting third party comparables e.g. by identifying results that may indicate a significant variance from the underlying comparability characteristics of the controlled transaction being reviewed, in some cases leading to the rejection of the comparable, or to detect anomalies in third party information ...

Multiple year data will also be useful in providing information about the relevant business and product life cycles of the comparables. Differences in business or product life cycles may have a material effect on transfer pricing conditions that needs to be assessed in determining comparability. The data from earlier years may show whether the independent enterprise engaged in a comparable transaction was affected by comparable economic conditions in a comparable manner, or whether different conditions in an earlier year materially affected its price or profit so that it should not be used as a comparable ...

In order to obtain a complete understanding of the facts and circumstances surrounding the controlled transaction, it generally might be useful to examine data from both the year under examination and prior years. The analysis of such information might disclose facts that may have influenced (or should have influenced) the determination of the transfer price. For example, the use of data from past years will show whether a taxpayer’s reported loss on a transaction is part of a history of losses on similar transactions, the result of particular economic conditions in a prior year that increased costs in the subsequent year, or a reflection of the fact that a product is at the end of its life cycle. Such an analysis may be particularly useful where a transactional profit method is applied. See paragraph 1.151 on the usefulness of multiple year data in examining loss situations. Multiple year data can also improve the understanding of long term arrangements ...

In practice, examining multiple year data is often useful in a comparability analysis, but it is not a systematic requirement. Multiple year data should be used where they add value to the transfer pricing analysis. It would not be appropriate to set prescriptive guidance as to the number of years to be covered by multiple year analyses ...

Data from years following the year of the transaction may also be relevant to the analysis of transfer prices, but care must be taken to avoid the use of hindsight. For example, data from later years may be useful in comparing product life cycles of controlled and uncontrolled transactions for the purpose of determining whether the uncontrolled transaction is an appropriate comparable to use in applying a particular method. The conduct of the parties in years following the transaction will also be relevant in accurately delineating the actual transaction ...

The reasoning that is found at paragraphs 6.181-6.185, which provide guidance on the arm’s length pricing of transactions involving intangibles for which valuation is highly uncertain at the time of the transactions, applies by analogy to other types of transactions with valuation uncertainties. The main question is to determine whether the valuation was sufficiently uncertain at the outset that the parties at arm’s length would have required a price adjustment mechanism, or whether the change in value was so fundamental a development that it would have led to a renegotiation of the transaction. Where this is the case, the tax administration would be justified in determining the arm’s length price for the transaction on the basis of the adjustment clause or re-negotiation that would be provided at arm’s length in a comparable uncontrolled transaction. In other circumstances, where there is no reason to consider that the valuation was sufficiently uncertain at the outset that the parties would have required a price adjustment clause or would have renegotiated the terms of the agreement, there is no reason for tax administrations to make such an adjustment as it would represent an inappropriate use of hindsight. The mere existence of uncertainty should not require an ex post adjustment without a consideration of what independent enterprises would have done or agreed between them ...

The question arises whether and if so how to take account in the transfer pricing analysis of future events that were unpredictable at the time of the testing of a controlled transaction, in particular where valuation at that time was highly uncertain. The question should be resolved, both by taxpayers and tax administrations, by reference to what independent enterprises would have done in comparable circumstances to take account of the valuation uncertainty in the pricing of the transaction ...

Both the arm’s length price-setting and the arm’s length outcome-testing approaches, as well as combinations of these two approaches, are found among OECD member countries. The issue of double taxation may arise where a controlled transaction takes place between two associated enterprises where different approaches have been applied and lead to different outcomes, for instance because of a discrepancy between market expectations taken into account in the arm’s length price-setting approach and actual outcomes observed in the arm’s length outcome-testing approach. See paragraphs 4.38 and 4.39. Competent authorities are encouraged to use their best efforts to resolve any double taxation issues that may arise from different country approaches to year-end adjustments and that may be submitted to them under a mutual agreement procedure (Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention) ...

In other instances, taxpayers might test the actual outcome of their controlled transactions to demonstrate that the conditions of these transactions were consistent with the arm’s length principle, i.e. on an ex post basis (hereinafter “the arm’s length outcome-testing” approach). Such test typically takes place as part of the process for establishing the tax return at year-end ...

In some cases, taxpayers establish transfer pricing documentation to demonstrate that they have made reasonable efforts to comply with the arm’s length principle at the time their intra-group transactions were undertaken, i.e. on an ex ante basis (hereinafter “the arm’s length price-setting” approach), based on information that was reasonably available to them at that point. Such information includes not only information on comparable transactions from previous years, but also information on economic and market changes that may have occurred between those previous years and the year of the controlled transaction. In effect, independent parties in comparable circumstances would not base their pricing decision on historical data alone ...

In principle, information relating to the conditions of comparable uncontrolled transactions undertaken or carried out during the same period of time as the controlled transaction (“contemporaneous uncontrolled transactions”) is expected to be the most reliable information to use in a comparability analysis, because it reflects how independent parties have behaved in an economic environment that is the same as the economic environment of the taxpayer’s controlled transaction. Availability of information on contemporaneous uncontrolled transactions may however be limited in practice, depending on the timing of collection ...

There are timing issues in comparability with respect to the time of origin, collection and production of information on comparability factors and comparable uncontrolled transactions that are used in a comparability analysis. See paragraphs 5.27 and 5.36 of Chapter V for indications with respect to timing issues in the context of transfer pricing documentation requirements ...

A similar investigation should be undertaken for potential comparables returning abnormally large profits relative to other potential comparables ...

Generally speaking, a loss-making uncontrolled transaction should trigger further investigation in order to establish whether or not it can be a comparable. Circumstances in which loss-making transactions/ enterprises should be excluded from the list of comparables include cases where losses do not reflect normal business conditions, and where the losses incurred by third parties reflect a level of risks that is not comparable to the one assumed by the taxpayer in its controlled transactions. Loss-making comparables that satisfy the comparability analysis should not however be rejected on the sole basis that they suffer losses ...

An independent enterprise would not continue loss-generating activities unless it had reasonable expectations of future profits. See paragraphs 1.149-1.151. Simple or low risk functions in particular are not expected to generate losses for a long period of time. This does not mean however that loss-making transactions can never be comparable. In general, all relevant information should be used and there should not be any overriding rule on the inclusion or exclusion of loss-making comparables. Indeed, it is the facts and circumstances surrounding the company in question that should determine its status as a comparable, not its financial result ...

Extreme results might consist of losses or unusually high profits. Extreme results can affect the financial indicators that are looked at in the chosen method (e.g. the gross margin when applying a resale price, or a net profit indicator when applying a transactional net margin method). They can also affect other items, e.g. exceptional items which are below the line but nonetheless may reflect exceptional circumstances. Where one or more of the potential comparables have extreme results, further examination would be needed to understand the reasons for such extreme results. The reason might be a defect in comparability, or exceptional conditions met by an otherwise comparable third party. An extreme result may be excluded on the basis that a previously overlooked significant comparability defect has been brought to light, not on the sole basis that the results arising from the proposed “comparable” merely appear to be very different from the results observed in other proposed “comparables” ...

In determining this point, where the range comprises results of relatively equal and high reliability, it could be argued that any point in the range satisfies the arm’s length principle. Where comparability defects remain as discussed at paragraph 3.57, it may be appropriate to use measures of central tendency to determine this point (for instance the median, the mean or weighted averages, etc., depending on the specific characteristics of the data set), in order to minimise the risk of error due to unknown or unquantifiable remaining comparability defects ...

If the relevant condition of the controlled transaction (e.g. price or margin) falls outside the arm’s length range asserted by the tax administration, the taxpayer should have the opportunity to present arguments that the conditions of the controlled transaction satisfy the arm’s length principle, and that the result falls within the arm’s length range (i.e. that the arm’s length range is different from the one asserted by the tax administration). If the taxpayer is unable to establish this fact, the tax administration must determine the point within the arm’s length range to which it will adjust the condition of the controlled transaction ...

If the relevant condition of the controlled transaction (e.g. price or margin) is within the arm’s length range, no adjustment should be made ...

Where the application of the most appropriate method (or, in relevant circumstances, of more than one method, see paragraph 2.12), produces a range of figures, a substantial deviation among points in that range may indicate that the data used in establishing some of the points may not be as reliable as the data used to establish the other points in the range or that the deviation may result from features of the comparable data that require adjustments. In such cases, further analysis of those points may be necessary to evaluate their suitability for inclusion in any arm’s length range ...

A range of figures may also result when more than one method is applied to evaluate a controlled transaction. For example, two methods that attain similar degrees of comparability may be used to evaluate the arm’s length character of a controlled transaction. Each method may produce an outcome or a range of outcomes that differs from the other because of differences in the nature of the methods and the data, relevant to the application of a particular method, used. Nevertheless, each separate range potentially could be used to define an acceptable range of arm’s length figures. Data from these ranges could be useful for purposes of more accurately defining the arm’s length range, for example when the ranges overlap, or for reconsidering the accuracy of the methods used when the ranges do not overlap. No general rule may be stated with respect to the use of ranges derived from the application of multiple methods because the conclusions to be drawn from their use will depend on the relative reliability of the methods employed to determine the ranges and the quality of the information used in applying the different methods ...

It may also be the case that, while every effort has been made to exclude points that have a lesser degree of comparability, what is arrived at is a range of figures for which it is considered, given the process used for selecting comparables and limitations in information available on comparables, that some comparability defects remain that cannot be identified and/or quantified, and are therefore not adjusted. In such cases, if the range includes a sizeable number of observations, statistical tools that take account of central tendency to narrow the range (e.g. the interquartile range or other percentiles) might help to enhance the reliability of the analysis ...

In some cases, not all comparable transactions examined will have a relatively equal degree of comparability. Where it is possible to determine that some uncontrolled transactions have a lesser degree of comparability than others, they should be eliminated ...

In some cases it will be possible to apply the arm’s length principle to arrive at a single figure (e.g. price or margin) that is the most reliable to establish whether the conditions of a transaction are arm’s length. However, because transfer pricing is not an exact science, there will also be many occasions when the application of the most appropriate method or methods produces a range of figures all of which are relatively equally reliable. In these cases, differences in the figures that comprise the range may be caused by the fact that in general the application of the arm’s length principle only produces an approximation of conditions that would have been established between independent enterprises. It is also possible that the different points in a range represent the fact that independent enterprises engaged in comparable transactions under comparable circumstances may not establish exactly the same price for the transaction ...

Ensuring the needed level of transparency of comparability adjustments may depend upon the availability of an explanation of any adjustments performed, the reasons for the adjustments being considered appropriate, how they were calculated, how they changed the results for each comparable and how the adjustment improves comparability. Issues regarding documentation of comparability adjustments are discussed in Chapter V ...

It is not appropriate to view some comparability adjustments, such as for differences in levels of working capital, as “routine” and uncontroversial, and to view certain other adjustments, such as for country risk, as more subjective and therefore subject to additional requirements of proof and reliability. The only adjustments that should be made are those that are expected to improve comparability ...

It is not always the case that adjustments are warranted. For instance, an adjustment for differences in accounts receivable may not be particularly useful if major differences in accounting standards were also present that could not be resolved. Likewise, sophisticated adjustments are sometimes applied to create the false impression that the outcome of the comparables search is “scientific”, reliable and accurate ...

It bears emphasis that comparability adjustments are only appropriate for differences that will have a material effect on the comparison. Some differences will invariably exist between the taxpayer’s controlled transactions and the third party comparables. A comparison may be appropriate despite an unadjusted difference, provided that the difference does not have a material effect on the reliability of the comparison. On the other hand, the need to perform numerous or substantial adjustments to key comparability factors may indicate that the third party transactions are in fact not sufficiently comparable ...

Comparability adjustments should be considered if (and only if) they are expected to increase the reliability of the results. Relevant considerations in this regard include the materiality of the difference for which an adjustment is being considered, the quality of the data subject to adjustment, the purpose of the adjustment and the reliability of the approach used to make the adjustment ...

An example of a working capital adjustment designed to reflect differing levels of accounts receivable, accounts payable and inventory is provided in the Annex to Chapter III. The fact that such adjustments are found in practice does not mean that they should be performed on a routine or mandatory basis. Rather, the improvement to comparability should be shown when proposing these types of adjustments (as for any type of adjustment). Further, a significantly different level of relative working capital between the controlled and uncontrolled parties may result in further investigation of the comparability characteristics of the potential comparable ...

Examples of comparability adjustments include adjustments for accounting consistency designed to eliminate differences that may arise from differing accounting practices between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions; segmentation of financial data to eliminate significant non- comparable transactions; adjustments for differences in capital, functions, assets, risks ...

The need to adjust comparables and the requirement for accuracy and reliability are pointed out in these Guidelines on several occasions, both for the general application of the arm’s length principle and more specifically in the context of each method. To be comparable means that none of the differences (if any) between the situations being compared could materially affect the condition being examined in the methodology or that reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the effect of any such differences. Whether comparability adjustments should be performed (and if so, what adjustments should be performed) in a particular case is a matter of judgment that should be evaluated in light of the discussion of costs and compliance burden at Section C ...

The process followed to identify potential comparables is one of the most critical aspects of the comparability analysis and it should be transparent, systematic and verifiable. In particular, the choice of selection criteria has a significant influence on the outcome of the analysis and should reflect the most meaningful economic characteristics of the transactions compared. Complete elimination of subjective judgments from the selection of comparables would not be feasible, but much can be done to increase objectivity and ensure transparency in the application of subjective judgments. Ensuring transparency of the process may depend on the extent to which the criteria used to select potential comparables are able to be disclosed and the reasons for excluding some of the potential comparables are able to be explained. Increasing objectivity and ensuring transparency of the process may also depend on the extent to which the person reviewing the process (whether taxpayer or tax administration) has access to information regarding the process followed and to the same sources of data. Issues of documentation of the process of identifying comparables are discussed in Chapter V ...

It would not be appropriate to give systematic preference to one approach over the other because, depending on the circumstances of the case, there could be value in either the “additive” or the “deductive” approach, or in a combination of both. The “additive” and “deductive” approaches are often not used exclusively. In a typical “deductive” approach, in addition to searching public databases it is common to include third parties, for instance known competitors (or third parties that are known to carry out transactions potentially comparable to those of the taxpayer), which may otherwise not be found following a purely deductive approach, e.g. because they are classified under a different industry code. In such cases, the “additive” approach operates as a tool to refine a search that is based on a “deductive” approach ...

One advantage of the “deductive” approach is that it is more reproducible and transparent than the “additive”. It is also easier to verify because the review concentrates on the process and on the relevance of the selection criteria retained. On the other hand, it is acknowledged that the quality of the outcome of a “deductive” approach depends on the quality of the search tools on which it relies (e.g. quality of the database where a database is used and possibility to obtain detailed enough information). This can be a practical limitation in some countries where the reliability and usefulness of databases in comparability analyses are questionable ...

In practice, both quantitative and qualitative criteria are used to include or reject potential comparables. Examples of qualitative criteria are found in product portfolios and business strategies. The most commonly observed quantitative criteria are: Size criteria in terms of Sales, Assets or Number of Employees. The size of the transaction in absolute value or in proportion to the activities of the parties might affect the relative competitive positions of the buyer and seller and therefore comparability. Intangible-related criteria such as ratio of Net Value of Intangibles/Total Net Assets Value, or ratio of Research and Development (R&D)/Sales where available: they may be used for instance to exclude companies with valuable intangibles or significant R&D activities when the tested party does not use valuable intangible assets nor participate in significant R&D activities. Criteria related to the importance of export sales (Foreign Sales/Total Sales), where relevant. Criteria related to inventories in absolute or relative value, where relevant. Other criteria to exclude third parties that are in particular special situations such as start-up companies, bankrupted companies, etc. when such peculiar situations are obviously not appropriate comparisons. The choice and application of selection criteria depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and the above list is neither limitative nor prescriptive ...

The second possibility, the “deductive” approach, starts with a wide set of companies that operate in the same sector of activity, perform similar broad functions and do not present economic characteristics that are obviously different. The list is then refined using selection criteria and publicly available information (e.g. from databases, Internet sites, information on known competitors of the taxpayer). In practice, the “deductive” approach typically starts with a search on a database. It is therefore important to follow the guidance on internal comparables and on the sources of information on external comparables, see paragraphs 3.24-3.39. In addition, the “deductive” approach is not appropriate to all cases and all methods and the discussion in this section should not be interpreted as affecting the criteria for selecting a transfer pricing method set out in paragraphs 2.1-2.12 ...

The first one, which can be qualified as the “additive” approach, consists of the person making the search drawing up a list of third parties that are believed to carry out potentially comparable transactions. Information is then collected on transactions conducted by these third parties to confirm whether they are in effect acceptable comparables, based on the pre-determined comparability criteria. This approach arguably gives well-focused results – all the transactions retained in the analysis are carried out by well-known players in the taxpayer’s market. As indicated above, in order to ensure a sufficient degree of objectivity it is important that the process followed be transparent, systematic and verifiable. The “additive” approach may be used as the sole approach where the person making the search has knowledge of a few third parties that are engaged in transactions that are comparable to the examined controlled transaction. It is worth noting that the “additive” approach presents similarities with the approach followed when identifying internal comparables. In practice, an “additive” approach may encompass both internal and external comparables ...

There are basically two ways in which the identification of potentially comparable third party transactions can be conducted ...

A transactional profit split method might in appropriate circumstances be considered without comparable data, e.g. where the absence of comparable data is due to the presence of unique and valuable intangibles contributed by each party to the transaction (see paragraph 2.119). However, even in cases where comparable data are scarce and imperfect, the selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method should be consistent with the functional analysis of the parties, see paragraph 2.2 ...

The identification of potential comparables has to be made with the objective of finding the most reliable data, recognising that they will not always be perfect. For instance, independent transactions may be scarce in certain markets and industries. A pragmatic solution may need to be found, on a case-by-case basis, such as broadening the search and using information on uncontrolled transactions taking place in the same industry and a comparable geographical market, but performed by third parties that may have different business strategies, business models or other slightly different economic circumstances; information on uncontrolled transactions taking place in the same industry but in other geographical markets; or information on uncontrolled transactions taking place in the same geographical market but in other industries. The choice among these various options will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, and in particular on the significance of the expected effects of comparability defects on the reliability of the analysis ...

The transactional focus of transfer pricing methods and the question of a possible aggregation of the taxpayer’s controlled transactions are discussed at paragraphs 3.9-3.12. A different question is whether non- transactional third party data can provide reliable comparables for a taxpayer’s controlled transactions (or set of transactions aggregated consistently with the guidance at paragraphs 3.9-3.12). In practice, available third party data are often aggregated data, at a company-wide or segment level, depending on the applicable accounting standards. Whether such non- transactional third party data can provide reliable comparables for the taxpayer’s controlled transaction or set of transactions aggregated consistently with the guidance at paragraphs 3.9-3.12 depends in particular on whether the third party performs a range of materially different transactions. Where segmented data are available, they can provide better comparables than company-wide, non-segmented data, because of a more transactional focus, although it is recognised that segmented data can raise issues in relation to the allocation of expenses to various segments. Similarly, company-wide third party data may provide better comparables than third party segmented data in certain circumstances, such as where the activities reflected in the comparables correspond to the set of controlled transactions of the taxpayer ...

Tax administrators may have information available to them from examinations of other taxpayers or from other sources of information that may not be disclosed to the taxpayer. However, it would be unfair to apply a transfer pricing method on the basis of such data unless the tax administration was able, within the limits of its domestic confidentiality requirements, to disclose such data to the taxpayer so that there would be an adequate opportunity for the taxpayer to defend its own position and to safeguard effective judicial control by the courts ...

Taxpayers do not always perform searches for comparables on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis, e.g. in cases where there are insufficient data available at the domestic level and/or in order to reduce compliance costs where several entities of an MNE group have comparable functional analyses. Non-domestic comparables should not be automatically rejected just because they are not domestic. A determination of whether non-domestic comparables are reliable has to be made on a case-by-case basis and by reference to the extent to which they satisfy the five comparability factors. Whether or not one regional search for comparables can be reliably used for several subsidiaries of an MNE group operating in a given region of the world depends on the particular circumstances in which each of those subsidiaries operates. See paragraphs 1.132-1.133 on market differences and multi-jurisdictional analyses. Difficulties may also arise from differing accounting standards ...

There are also proprietary databases that are developed and maintained by some advisory firms. In addition to the issues raised above for commercial databases that are more broadly commercialised, proprietary databases also raise a further concern with respect to their coverage of data if they are based on a more limited portion of the market than commercial databases. When a taxpayer has used a proprietary database to support its transfer prices, the tax administration may request access to the database to review the taxpayer’s results, for obvious transparency reasons ...

Use of commercial databases should not encourage quantity over quality. In practice, performing a comparability analysis using a commercial database alone may give rise to concerns about the reliability of the analysis, given the quality of the information relevant to assessing comparability that is typically obtainable from a database. To address these concerns, database searches may need to be refined with other publicly available information, depending on the facts and circumstances. Such a refinement of the database search with other sources of information is meant to promote quality over standardised approaches and is valid both for database searches made by taxpayers/practitioners and for those made by tax administrations. It should be understood in light of the discussion of the costs and compliance burden created for the taxpayer at paragraphs 3.80-3.83 ...

It may be unnecessary to use a commercial database if reliable information is available from other sources, e.g. internal comparables. Where they are used, commercial databases should be used in an objective manner and genuine attempts should be made to use the databases to identify reliable comparable information ...

A number of limitations to commercial databases are frequently identified. Because these commercial databases rely on publicly available information, they are not available in all countries, since not all countries have the same amount of publicly available information about their companies. Moreover, where they are available, they do not include the same type of information for all the companies operating in a given country because disclosure and filing requirements may differ depending on the legal form of the company and on whether or not it is listed. Care must be exercised with respect to whether and how these databases are used, given that they are compiled and presented for non-transfer pricing purposes. It is not always the case that commercial databases provide information that is detailed enough to support the chosen transfer pricing method. Not all databases include the same level of detail and can be used with similar assurance. Importantly, it is the experience in many countries that commercial databases are used to compare the results of companies rather than of transactions because third party transactional information is rarely available. See paragraph 3.37 for a discussion of the use of non-transactional third party data ...

A common source of information is commercial databases, which have been developed by editors who compile accounts filed by companies with the relevant administrative bodies and present them in an electronic format suitable for searches and statistical analysis. They can be a practical and sometimes cost-effective way of identifying external comparables and may provide the most reliable source of information, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case ...

There are various sources of information that can be used to identify potential external comparables. This sub-section discusses particular issues that arise with respect to commercial databases, foreign comparables and information undisclosed to taxpayers. Additionally, whenever reliable internal comparables exist, it may be unnecessary to search for external ones, see paragraphs 3.27-3.28 ...

On the other hand, internal comparables are not always more reliable and it is not the case that any transaction between a taxpayer and an independent party can be regarded as a reliable comparable for controlled transactions carried on by the same taxpayer. Internal comparables where they exist must satisfy the five comparability factors in the same way as external comparables, see paragraphs 1.33-1.138. Guidance on comparability adjustments also applies to internal comparables, see paragraphs 3.47-3.54. Assume for instance that a taxpayer manufactures a particular product, sells a significant volume thereof to its foreign associated retailer and a marginal volume of the same product to an independent party. In such a case, the difference in volumes is likely to materially affect the comparability of the two transactions. If it is not possible to make a reasonably accurate adjustment to eliminate the effects of such difference, the transaction between the taxpayer and its independent customer is unlikely to be a reliable comparable ...

Step 4 of the typical process described at paragraph 3.4 is a review of existing internal comparables, if any. Internal comparables may have a more direct and closer relationship to the transaction under review than external comparables. The financial analysis may be easier and more reliable as it will presumably rely on identical accounting standards and practices for the internal comparable and for the controlled transaction. In addition, access to information on internal comparables may be both more complete and less costly ...

The presence of minority shareholders may be one factor leading to the outcomes of a taxpayer’s controlled transactions being closer to arm’s length, but it is not determinative in and of itself. The influence of minority shareholders depends on a number of factors, including whether the minority shareholder has a participation in the capital of the parent company or in the capital of a subsidiary, and whether it has and actually exercises some influence on the pricing of intra-group transactions ...

Comparisons of a taxpayer’s controlled transactions with other controlled transactions carried out by the same or another MNE group are irrelevant to the application of the arm’s length principle and therefore should not be used by a tax administration as the basis for a transfer pricing adjustment or by a taxpayer to support its transfer pricing policy ...

A comparable uncontrolled transaction is a transaction between two independent parties that is comparable to the controlled transaction under examination. It can be either a comparable transaction between one party to the controlled transaction and an independent party (“internal comparable”) or between two independent enterprises, neither of which is a party to the controlled transaction (“external comparable”) ...

As explained above, transfer pricing analysis necessitates some information to be available about foreign associated enterprises, the nature and extent of which depends especially on the transfer pricing method used. However gathering such information may present a taxpayer with difficulties that it does not encounter in producing its own information. These difficulties should be taken into account in developing rules and/or procedures on documentation ...

Where the most appropriate transfer pricing method in the circumstances of the case, determined following the guidance at paragraphs 2.1-2.12, is a one-sided method, financial information on the tested party is needed in addition to the information referred to in paragraph 3.20 – irrespective of whether the tested party is a domestic or foreign entity. So if the most appropriate method is a cost plus, resale price or transactional net margin method and the tested party is the foreign entity, sufficient information is needed to be able to reliably apply the selected method to the foreign tested party and to enable a review by the tax administration of the country of the non-tested party of the application of the method to the foreign tested party. On the other hand, once a particular one-sided method is chosen as the most appropriate method and the tested party is the domestic taxpayer, the tax administration generally has no reason to further ask for financial data of the foreign associated enterprise outside of that requested as part of the country-by-country or master file reporting requirements (see Chapter V) ...

Where the most appropriate transfer pricing method in the circumstances of the case, determined following the guidance in paragraphs 2.1- 2.12, is a transactional profit split, financial information on all the parties to the transaction, domestic and foreign, is needed. Given the two-sided nature of this method, the application of a transactional profit split necessitates particularly detailed information on the foreign associated enterprise party to the transaction. This includes information on the five comparability factors in order to appropriately characterise the relationship between the parties and demonstrate the appropriateness of the transactional profit split method, as well as financial information (the determination of the relevant profits to be split and the splitting of the profits both rely on financial information pertaining to all the parties to the transaction, including the foreign associated enterprise). Accordingly, where the most appropriate transfer pricing method in the circumstances of the case is a transactional profit split, it would be reasonable to expect that taxpayers be ready to provide tax administrations with the necessary information on the foreign associated enterprise party to the transaction, including the financial data necessary to calculate the profit split. See Chapter V ...

In order to select and apply the most appropriate transfer pricing method to the circumstances of the case, information is needed on the comparability factors in relation to the controlled transaction under review and in particular on the functions, assets and risks of all the parties to the controlled transaction, including the foreign associated enterprise(s). Specifically, while one-sided methods (e.g. cost plus, resale price or transactional net margin method which are discussed in detail in Chapter II) only require examining a financial indicator or profit level indicator for one of the parties to the transaction (the “tested party” as discussed in paragraphs 3.18-3.19), some information on the comparability factors of the controlled transaction and in particular on the functional analysis of the non-tested party is also needed in order to appropriately characterise the controlled transaction and select the most appropriate transfer pricing method ...

This can be illustrated as follows. Assume that company A manufactures two types of products, P1 and P2, that it sells to company B, an associated enterprise in another country. Assume that A is found to manufacture P1 products using valuable, unique intangibles that belong to B and following technical specifications set by B. Assume that in this P1 transaction, A only performs simple functions and does not make any valuable, unique contribution in relation to the transaction. The tested party for this P1 transaction would most often be A. Assume now that A is also manufacturing P2 products for which it owns and uses valuable unique intangibles such as valuable patents and trademarks, and for which B acts as a distributor. Assume that in this P2 transaction, B only performs simple functions and does not make any valuable, unique contribution in relation to the transaction. The tested party for the P2 transaction would most often be B ...

When applying a cost plus, resale price or transactional net margin method as described in Chapter II, it is necessary to choose the party to the transaction for which a financial indicator (mark-up on costs, gross margin, or net profit indicator) is tested. The choice of the tested party should be consistent with the functional analysis of the transaction. As a general rule, the tested party is the one to which a transfer pricing method can be applied in the most reliable manner and for which the most reliable comparables can be found, i.e. it will most often be the one that has the less complex functional analysis ...

A taxpayer may seek on examination a reduction in a transfer pricing adjustment based on an unintentional over-reporting of taxable income. Tax administrations in their discretion may or may not grant this request. Tax administrations may also consider such requests in the context of mutual agreement procedures and corresponding adjustments (see Chapter IV) ...

It may be necessary to evaluate the transactions separately to determine whether they each satisfy the arm’s length principle. If the transactions are to be analysed together, care should be taken in selecting comparable transactions and regard had to the discussion at paragraphs 3.9-3.12. The terms of set-offs relating to international transactions between associated enterprises may not be fully consistent with those relating to purely domestic transactions between independent enterprises because of the differences in tax treatment of the set-off under different national tax systems or differences in the treatment of the payment under a bilateral tax treaty. For example, withholding tax would complicate a set-off of royalties against sales receipts ...

Recognition of intentional set-offs does not change the fundamental requirement that for tax purposes the transfer prices for controlled transactions must be consistent with the arm’s length principle. It would be a good practice for taxpayers to disclose the existence of set-offs intentionally built into two or more transactions between associated enterprises and demonstrate (or acknowledge that they have relevant supporting information and have undertaken sufficient analysis to be able to show) that, after taking account of the set-offs, the conditions governing the transactions are consistent with the arm’s length principle ...

Intentional set-offs may vary in size and complexity. Such set-offs may range from a simple balance of two transactions (such as a favourable selling price for manufactured goods in return for a favourable purchase price for the raw material used in producing the goods) to an arrangement for a general settlement balancing all benefits accruing to both parties over a period. Independent enterprises would be very unlikely to consider the latter type of arrangement unless the benefits could be sufficiently accurately quantified and the contract is created in advance. Otherwise, independent enterprises normally would prefer to allow their receipts and disbursements to flow independently of each other, taking any profit or loss resulting from normal trading ...

An intentional set-off is one that associated enterprises incorporate knowingly into the terms of the controlled transactions. It occurs when one associated enterprise has provided a benefit to another associated enterprise within the group that is balanced to some degree by different benefits received from that enterprise in return. These enterprises may indicate that the benefit each has received should be set off against the benefit each has provided as full or part payment for those benefits so that only the net gain or loss (if any) on the transactions needs to be considered for purposes of assessing tax liabilities. For example, an enterprise may license another enterprise to use a patent in return for the provision of know-how in another connection and indicate that the transactions result in no profit or loss to either party. Such arrangements may sometimes be encountered between independent enterprises and should be assessed in accordance with the arm’s length principle in order to quantify the value of the respective benefits presented as set-offs ...

Even in uncontrolled transactions, package deals may combine elements that are subject to different tax treatment under domestic law or an income tax convention. For example, royalty payments may be subject to withholding tax but lease payments may be subject to net taxation. In such circumstances, it may still be appropriate to determine the transfer pricing on a package basis, and the tax administration could then determine whether for other tax reasons it is necessary to allocate the price to the elements of the package. In making this determination, tax administrations should examine the package deal between associated enterprises in the same way that they would analyse similar deals between independent enterprises. Taxpayers should be prepared to show that the package deal reflects appropriate transfer pricing ...

While some separately contracted transactions between associated enterprises may need to be evaluated together in order to determine whether the conditions are arm’s length, other transactions contracted between such enterprises as a package may need to be evaluated separately. An MNE may package as a single transaction and establish a single price for a number of benefits such as licences for patents, know-how, and trademarks, the provision of technical and administrative services, and the lease of production facilities. This type of arrangement is often referred to as a package deal. Such comprehensive packages would be unlikely to include sales of goods, however, although the price charged for sales of goods may cover some accompanying services. In some cases, it may not be feasible to evaluate the package as a whole so that the elements of the package must be segregated. In such cases, after determining separate transfer pricing for the separate elements, the tax administration should nonetheless consider whether in total the transfer pricing for the entire package is arm’s length ...

Another example where a taxpayer’s transactions may be combined is related to portfolio approaches. A portfolio approach is a business strategy consisting of a taxpayer bundling certain transactions for the purpose of earning an appropriate return across the portfolio rather than necessarily on any single product within the portfolio. For instance, some products may be marketed by a taxpayer with a low profit or even at a loss, because they create a demand for other products and/or related services of the same taxpayer that are then sold or provided with high profits (e.g. equipment and captive aftermarket consumables, such as vending coffee machines and coffee capsules, or printers and cartridges). Similar approaches can be observed in various industries. Portfolio approaches are an example of a business strategy that may need to be taken into account in the comparability analysis and when examining the reliability of comparables. See paragraphs 1.134-1.138 on business strategies. However, as discussed in paragraphs 1.149-1.151, these considerations will not explain continued overall losses or poor performance over time. Moreover, in order to be acceptable, portfolio approaches must be reasonably targeted as they should not be used to apply a transfer pricing method at the taxpayer’s company-wide level in those cases where different transactions have different economic logic and should be segmented. See paragraphs 2.84-2.85. Finally, the above comments should not be misread as implying that it would be acceptable for one entity within an MNE group to have a below arm’s length return in order to provide benefits to another entity of the MNE group, see in particular paragraph 1.150 ...

Ideally, in order to arrive at the most precise approximation of arm’s length conditions, the arm’s length principle should be applied on a transaction-by-transaction basis. However, there are often situations where separate transactions are so closely linked or continuous that they cannot be evaluated adequately on a separate basis. Examples may include: a) some long-term contracts for the supply of commodities or services, b) rights to use intangible property, and c) pricing a range of closely-linked products (e.g. in a product line) when it is impractical to determine pricing for each individual product or transaction. Another example would be the licensing of manufacturing know-how and the supply of vital components to an associated manufacturer; it may be more reasonable to assess the arm’s length terms for the two items together rather than individually. Such transactions should be evaluated together using the most appropriate arm’s length method. A further example would be the routing of a transaction through another associated enterprise; it may be more appropriate to consider the transaction of which the routing is a part in its entirety, rather than consider the individual transactions on a separate basis. See example 26 of the Annex I to Chapter VI ...

The review of the controlled transaction(s) under examination aims at identifying the relevant factors that will influence the selection of the tested party (where needed), the selection and application of the most appropriate transfer pricing method to the circumstances of the case, the financial indicator that will be tested (in the case of a transactional profit method), the selection of comparables and where relevant the determination of comparability adjustments ...

The “broad-based analysis” is an essential step in the comparability analysis. It can be defined as an analysis of the industry, competition, economic and regulatory factors and other elements that affect the taxpayer and its environment, but not yet within the context of looking at the specific transactions in question. This step helps understand the conditions in the taxpayer’s controlled transaction as well as those in the uncontrolled transactions to be compared, in particular the economic circumstances of the transaction (see paragraphs 1.130-1.133) ...

See paragraph 3.82 for a discussion of a process to establish, monitor and review transfer prices ...

In practice, this process is not a linear one. Steps 5 to 7 in particular might need to be carried out repeatedly until a satisfactory conclusion is reached, i.e. the most appropriate method is selected, especially because the examination of available sources of information may in some instances influence the selection of the transfer pricing method. For instance, in cases where it is not possible to find information on comparable transactions (step 7) and/or to make reasonably accurate adjustments (step 8), taxpayers might have to select another transfer pricing method and repeat the process starting from step 4 ...

Below is a description of a typical process that can be followed when performing a comparability analysis. This process is considered an accepted good practice but it is not a compulsory one, and any other search process leading to the identification of reliable comparables may be acceptable as reliability of the outcome is more important than process (i.e. going through the process does not provide any guarantee that the outcome will be arm’s length, and not going through the process does not imply that the outcome will not be arm’s length). Step 1: Determination of years to be covered. Step 2: Broad-based analysis of the taxpayer’s circumstances. Step 3: Understanding the controlled transaction(s) under examination, based in particular on a functional analysis, in order to choose the tested party (where needed), the most appropriate transfer pricing method to the circumstances of the case, the financial indicator that will be tested (in the case of a transactional profit method), and to identify the significant comparability factors that should be taken into account. Step 4: Review of existing internal comparables, if any. Step 5: Determination of available sources of information on external comparables where such external comparables are needed taking into account their relative reliability. Step 6: Selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method and, depending on the method, determination of the relevant financial indicator (e.g. determination of the relevant net profit indicator in case of a transactional net margin method). Step 7: Identification of potential comparables: determining the key characteristics to be met by any uncontrolled transaction in order to be regarded as potentially comparable, based on the relevant factors identified in Step 3 and in accordance with the comparability factors set forth at Section D.1 of Chapter I. Step 8: Determination of and making comparability adjustments where appropriate. Step 9: Interpretation and use of data collected, determination of the arm’s length remuneration ...

As part of the process of selecting the most appropriate transfer pricing method (see paragraph 2.2) and applying it, the comparability analysis always aims at finding the most reliable comparables. Thus, where it is possible to determine that some uncontrolled transactions have a lesser degree of comparability than others, they should be eliminated (see also paragraph 3.56). This does not mean that there is a requirement for an exhaustive search of all possible sources of comparables as it is acknowledged that there are limitations in availability of information and that searches for comparables data can be burdensome. See also discussion of compliance efforts at paragraphs 3.80-3.83 ...

General guidance on comparability is found in Section D of Chapter I. By definition, a comparison implies examining two terms: the controlled transaction under review and the uncontrolled transactions that are regarded as potentially comparable. The search for comparables is only part of the comparability analysis. It should be neither confused with nor separated from the comparability analysis. The search for information on potentially comparable uncontrolled transactions and the process of identifying comparables is dependent upon prior analysis of the taxpayer’s controlled transaction and of the economically relevant characteristics or comparability factors (see Section D.1 of Chapter I). A methodical, consistent approach should provide some continuity or linkage in the whole analytical process, thereby maintaining a constant relationship amongst the various steps: from the preliminary analysis of the conditions of the controlled transaction, to the selection of the transfer pricing method, through to the identification of potential comparables and ultimately a conclusion about whether the controlled transactions being examined are consistent with the arm’s length principle as described in  paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention ...

A comparability analysis must be performed in all cases in order to select and apply the most appropriate transfer pricing method, and the process for selecting and applying a transactional net margin method should not be less reliable than for other methods. As a matter of good practice, the typical process for identifying comparable transactions and using data so obtained which is described at paragraph 3.4 or any equivalent process designed to ensure robustness of the analysis should be followed when applying a transactional net margin method, just as with any other method. That being said, it is recognised that in practice the level of information available on the factors affecting external comparable transactions is often limited. Determining a reliable estimate of an arm’s length outcome requires flexibility and the exercise of good judgment. See paragraph 1.13 ...

Another practical strength of the transactional net margin method is that, as with any one-sided method, it is necessary to examine a financial indicator for only one of the associated enterprises (the “tested” party). Similarly, it is often not necessary to state the books and records of all participants in the business activity on a common basis or to allocate costs for all participants as is the case with the transactional profit split method. This can be practically advantageous when one of the parties to the transaction is complex and has many interrelated activities or when it is difficult to obtain reliable information about one of the parties. However, a comparability (including functional) analysis must always be performed in order to appropriately characterise the transaction between the parties and choose the most appropriate transfer pricing method, and this analysis generally necessitates that some information on the five comparability factors in relation to the controlled transaction be collected on both the tested and the non-tested parties. See paragraphs 3.20-3.23 ...

An additional consideration is whether there is a plausible expectation that following the business strategy will produce a return sufficient to justify its costs within a period of time that would be acceptable in an arm’s length arrangement. It is recognised that a business strategy such as market penetration may fail, and the failure does not of itself allow the strategy to be ignored for transfer pricing purposes. However, if such an expected outcome was implausible at the time of the transaction, or if the business strategy is unsuccessful but nonetheless is continued beyond what an independent enterprise would accept, the arm’s length nature of the business strategy may be doubtful and may warrant a transfer pricing adjustment. In determining what period of time an independent enterprise would accept, tax administrations may wish to consider evidence of the commercial strategies evident in the country in which the business strategy is being pursued. In the end, however, the most important consideration is whether the strategy in question could plausibly be expected to prove profitable within the foreseeable future (while recognising that the strategy might fail), and that a party operating at arm’s length would have been prepared to sacrifice profitability for a similar period under such economic circumstances and competitive conditions ...

When evaluating whether a taxpayer was following a business strategy that temporarily decreased profits in return for higher long-run profits, several factors should be considered. Tax administrations should examine the conduct of the parties to determine if it is consistent with the purported business strategy. For example, if a manufacturer charges its associated distributor a below-market price as part of a market penetration strategy, the cost savings to the distributor may be reflected in the price charged to the distributor’s customers or in greater market penetration expenses incurred by the distributor. A market penetration strategy of an MNE group could be put in place either by the manufacturer or by the distributor acting separately from the manufacturer (and the resulting cost borne by either of them), or by both of them acting in a co-ordinated manner. Furthermore, unusually intensive marketing and advertising efforts would often accompany a market penetration or market share expansion strategy. Another factor to consider is whether the nature of the relationship between the parties to the controlled transaction would be consistent with the taxpayer bearing the costs of the business strategy. For example, in arm’s length transactions a company acting solely as a sales agent with little or no responsibility for long-term market development would generally not bear the costs of a market penetration strategy. Where a company has undertaken market development activities at its own risk and enhances the value of a product through a trademark or trade name or increases goodwill associated with the product, this situation should be reflected in the analysis of functions for the purposes of establishing comparability ...

Timing issues can pose particular problems for tax administrations when evaluating whether a taxpayer is following a business strategy that distinguishes it from potential comparables. Some business strategies, such as those involving market penetration or expansion of market share, involve reductions in the taxpayer’s current profits in anticipation of increased future profits. If in the future those increased profits fail to materialise because the purported business strategy was not actually followed by the taxpayer, the appropriate transfer pricing outcome would likely require a transfer pricing adjustment. However legal constraints may prevent re-examination of earlier tax years by the tax administrations. At least in part for this reason, tax administrations may wish to subject the issue of business strategies to particular scrutiny ...

Business strategies also could include market penetration schemes. A taxpayer seeking to penetrate a market or to increase its market share might temporarily charge a price for its product that is lower than the price charged for otherwise comparable products in the same market. Furthermore, a taxpayer seeking to enter a new market or expand (or defend) its market share might temporarily incur higher costs (e.g. due to start-up costs or increased marketing efforts) and hence achieve lower profit levels than other taxpayers operating in the same market ...

Business strategies must also be examined in delineating the transaction and in determining comparability for transfer pricing purposes. Business strategies would take into account many aspects of an enterprise, such as innovation and new product development, degree of diversification, risk aversion, assessment of political changes, input of existing and planned labour laws, duration of arrangements, and other factors bearing upon the daily conduct of business. Such business strategies may need to be taken into account when determining the comparability of controlled and uncontrolled transactions and enterprises ...

In cases where similar controlled transactions are carried out by an MNE group in several countries and where the economic circumstances in these countries are in effect reasonably homogeneous, it may be appropriate for this MNE group to rely on a multiple-country comparability analysis to support its transfer pricing policy towards this group of countries. But there are also numerous situations where an MNE group offers significantly different ranges of products or services in each country, and/or performs significantly different functions in each of these countries (using significantly different assets and assuming significantly different risks), and/or where its business strategies and/or economic circumstances are found to be significantly different. In these latter situations, the recourse to a multiple-country approach may reduce reliability ...

The geographic market is another economic circumstance that should be identified. The identification of the relevant market is a factual question. For a number of industries, large regional markets encompassing more than one country may prove to be reasonably homogeneous, while for others, differences among domestic markets (or even within domestic markets) are very significant ...

The existence of a cycle (e.g. economic, business, or product cycle) is one of the economic circumstances that should be identified. See paragraph 3.77 in relation to the use of multiple year data where there are cycles ...

Arm’s length prices may vary across different markets even for transactions involving the same property or services; therefore, to achieve comparability requires that the markets in which the independent and associated enterprises operate do not have differences that have a material effect on price or that appropriate adjustments can be made. As a first step, it is essential to identify the relevant market or markets taking account of available substitute goods or services. Economic circumstances that may be relevant to determining market comparability include the geographic location; the size of the markets; the extent of competition in the markets and the relative competitive positions of the buyers and sellers; the availability (risk thereof) of substitute goods and services; the levels of supply and demand in the market as a whole and in particular regions, if relevant; consumer purchasing power; the nature and extent of government regulation of the market; costs of production, including the costs of land, labour, and capital; transport costs; the level of the market (e.g. retail or wholesale); the date and time of transactions; and so forth. The facts and circumstances of the particular case will determine whether differences in economic circumstances have a material effect on price and whether reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the effects of such differences. More detailed guidance on the importance in a comparability analysis of the features of local markets, especially local market features that give rise to location savings, is provided in Section D.6 of this chapter ...

In practice, it has been observed that comparability analyses for methods based on gross or net profit indicators often put more emphasis on functional similarities than on product similarities. Depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, it may be acceptable to broaden the scope of the comparability analysis to include uncontrolled transactions involving products that are different, but where similar functions are undertaken. However, the acceptance of such an approach depends on the effects that the product differences have on the reliability of the comparison and on whether or not more reliable data are available. Before broadening the search to include a larger number of potentially comparable uncontrolled transactions based on similar functions being undertaken, thought should be given to whether such transactions are likely to offer reliable comparables for the controlled transaction ...

Depending on the transfer pricing method, this factor must be given more or less weight. Among the methods described at Chapter II of these Guidelines, the requirement for comparability of property or services is the strictest for the comparable uncontrolled price method. Under the comparable uncontrolled price method, any material difference in the characteristics of property or services can have an effect on the price and would require an appropriate adjustment to be considered (see in particular paragraph 2.16). Under the resale price method and cost plus method, some differences in the characteristics of property or services are less likely to have a material effect on the gross profit margin or mark-up on costs (see in particular paragraphs 2.29 and 2.47). Differences in the characteristics of property or services are also less sensitive in the case of the transactional profit methods than in the case of traditional transaction methods (see in particular paragraph 2.75). This however does not mean that the question of comparability in characteristics of property or services can be ignored when applying transactional profit methods, because it may be that product differences entail or reflect different functions performed, assets used and/or risks assumed by the tested party. See paragraphs 3.18–3.19 for a discussion of the notion of tested party ...

Differences in the specific characteristics of property or services often account, at least in part, for differences in their value in the open market. Therefore, comparisons of these features may be useful in delineating the transaction and in determining the comparability of controlled and uncontrolled transactions. Characteristics that may be important to consider include the following: in the case of transfers of tangible property, the physical features of the property, its quality and reliability, and the availability and volume of supply; in the case of the provision of services, the nature and extent of the services; and in the case of intangible property, the form of transaction (e.g. licensing or sale), the type of property (e.g. patent, trademark, or know-how), the duration and degree of protection, and the anticipated benefits from the use of the property. For further discussion of some of the specific features of intangibles that may prove important in a comparability analysis involving transfers of intangibles or rights in intangibles, see Section D.2.1 of Chapter VI ...

The difference between ex ante and ex post returns discussed in particular in Section D of Chapter VI arises in large part from risks associated with the uncertainty of future business outcomes. As discussed in paragraph 1.78 the ex ante contractual assumption of risk should provide clear evidence of a commitment to assume risk prior to the materialisation of risk outcomes. Following the steps in this section, the transfer pricing analysis will determine the accurate delineation of the transaction with respect to risk, including the risk associated with unanticipated returns. A party which, under these steps, does not assume the risk, nor contributes to the control of that risk, will not be entitled to unanticipated profits (or required to bear unanticipated losses) arising from that risk. In the circumstances of Example 3 (see paragraph 1.85), this would mean that neither unanticipated profits nor unanticipated losses will be allocated to Company A. Accordingly, if the asset in Example 3 were unexpectedly destroyed, resulting in an unanticipated loss, that loss would be allocated for transfer pricing purposes to the company or companies that control the investment risk, contribute to the control of that risk and have the financial capacity to assume that risk, and that would be entitled to unanticipated profits or losses with respect to the asset. That company or companies would be required to compensate Company A for the return to which it is entitled as described in paragraph 1.103 ...

A party should always be appropriately compensated for its control functions in relation to risk. Usually, the compensation will derive from the consequences of being allocated risk, and therefore that party will be entitled to receive the upside benefits and to incur the downside costs. In circumstances where a party contributes to the control of risk, but does not assume the risk, compensation which takes the form of a sharing in the potential upside and downside, commensurate with that contribution to control, may be appropriate ...

Guidance on the relationship between risk assumption in relation to the provision of funding and the operational activities for which the funds are used is given in paragraphs 6.60-6.64. The concepts reflected in these paragraphs are equally applicable to investments in assets other than intangibles ...

The consequences of risk allocation in Example 3 in paragraph 1.85 depend on analysis of functions under step 3. Company A does not have control over the economically significant risks associated with the investment in and exploitation of the asset, and those risks should be aligned with control of those risks by Companies B and C. The functional contribution of Company A is limited to providing financing for an amount equating to the cost of the asset that enables the asset to be created and exploited by Companies B and C. However, the functional analysis also provides evidence that Company A has no capability and authority to control the risk of investing in a financial asset. Company A does not have the capability to make decisions to take on or decline the financing opportunity, or the capability to make decisions on whether and how to respond to the risks associated with the financing opportunity. Company A does not perform functions to evaluate the financing opportunity, does not consider the appropriate risk premium and other issues to determine the appropriate pricing of the financing opportunity, and does not evaluate the appropriate protection of its financial investment. In the circumstances of Example 3, Company A would not be entitled to any more than a risk-free return as an appropriate measure of the profits it is entitled to retain, since it lacks the capability to control the risk associated with investing in a riskier financial asset. The risk will be allocated to the enterprise which has control and the financial capacity to assume the risk associated with the financial asset. In the circumstances of example, this would be Company B. Company A does not control the investment risk that carries a potential risk premium. An assessment may be necessary of the commercial rationality of the transaction based on the guidance in Section D.2 taking into account the full facts and circumstances of the transaction. (Company A could potentially be entitled to less than a risk-free return if, for example, the transaction is disregarded under Section D.2.) ...

In the circumstances of Example 2 in paragraph 1.84, the significant risks associated with generating a return from the manufacturing activities are controlled by Company A, and the upside and downside consequences of those risks should therefore be allocated to Company A. Company B controls the risk that it fails to competently deliver services, and its remuneration should take into account that risk, as well as its funding costs for the acquisition of the manufacturing plant. Since the risks in relation to the capacity utilisation of the asset are controlled by Company A, Company A should be allocated the risk of under-utilisation. This means that the financial consequences related to the materialisation of that risk including failure to cover fixed costs, write-downs, or closure costs should be allocated to Company A ...

In the circumstances of Example 1 in paragraph 1.83, Company A assumes and controls the development risk and should bear the financial consequences of failure and enjoy the financial consequences of success. Company B should be appropriately rewarded for the carrying out of its development services, incorporating the risk that it fails to do so competently ...

Following the guidance in this section, the accurately delineated transaction should then be priced in accordance with the tools and methods available to taxpayers and tax administrations set out in the following chapters of these Guidelines and taking into account the financial and other consequences of risk-assumption, and the remuneration for risk management. The assumption of a risk should be compensated with an appropriate anticipated return, and risk mitigation should be appropriately remunerated. Thus, a taxpayer that both assumes and mitigates a risk will be entitled to greater anticipated remuneration than a taxpayer that only assumes a risk, or only mitigates, but does not do both ...

In exceptional circumstances, it may be the case that no associated enterprise can be identified that both exercises control over the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk. As such a situation is not likely to occur in transactions between third parties, a rigorous analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case will need to be performed, in order to identify the underlying reasons and actions that led to this situation. Based on that assessment, the tax administrations will determine what adjustments to the transaction are needed for the transaction to result in an arm’s length outcome. An assessment of the commercial rationality of the transaction based on Section D.2 may be necessary ...

If it is established in step 4(ii) that the associated enterprise assuming the risk based on steps 1 – 4(i) does not exercise control over the risk or does not have the financial capacity to assume the risk, then the risk should be allocated to the enterprise exercising control and having the financial capacity to assume the risk. If multiple associated enterprises are identified that both exercise control and have the financial capacity to assume the risk, then the risk should be allocated to the associated enterprise or group of associated enterprises exercising the most control. The other parties performing control activities should be remunerated appropriately, taking into account the importance of the control activities performed ...

In light of the potential complexity that may arise in some circumstances when determining whether an associated enterprise assuming a risk controls that risk, the test of control should be regarded as being met where comparable risk assumptions can be identified in a comparable uncontrolled transaction. To be comparable those risk assumptions require that the economically relevant characteristics of the transactions are comparable. If such a comparison is made, it is particularly relevant to establish that the enterprise assuming comparable risk in the uncontrolled transaction performs comparable risk management functions relating to control of that risk to those performed by the associated enterprise assuming risk in the controlled transaction. The purpose of the comparison is to establish that an independent party assuming a comparable risk to that assumed by the associated enterprise also performs comparable risk management functions to those performed by the associated enterprise ...

If it is established that the associated enterprise assuming the risk as analysed under step 4(i) either does not control the risk or does not have the financial capacity to assume the risk, then the analysis described under step 5 needs to be performed ...

Where two or more parties to the transaction assume a specific risk (as analysed under step 4(i)), and in addition they together control the specific risk and each has the financial capacity to assume their share of the risk, then that assumption of risk should be respected. Examples may include the contractual assumption of development risk under a transaction in which the enterprises agree jointly to bear the costs of creating a new product ...

Furthermore, in some cases, there may be more than one party to the transaction exercising control over a specific risk. Where the associated enterprise assuming risk (as analysed under step 4(i)) controls that risk in accordance with the requirements set out in paragraphs 1.65 – 1.66, all that remains under step 4(ii) is to consider whether the enterprise has the financial capacity to assume the risk. If so, the fact that other associated enterprises also exercise control over the same risk does not affect the assumption of that risk by the first-mentioned enterprise, and step 5 need not be considered ...

In some cases, the analysis under step 3 may indicate that there is more than one MNE that is capable of exercising control over a risk. However, control requires both capability and functional performance in order to exercise control over a risk. Therefore, if more than one party is capable of exercising control, but the entity contractually assuming risk (as analysed under step 4(i)) is the only party that actually exercises control through capability and functional performance, then the party contractually assuming the risk also controls the risk ...

In the circumstances of Example 3, analysis under step 4(i) shows that the assumption of utilisation risk by Company A is consistent with its contractual arrangements with Company C, but under step 4(ii) it is determined that Company A does not control risks that it assumes associated with the investment in and exploitation of the asset. Company A has no decision-making function which allows it to control its risks by taking decisions that affect the outcomes of the risks. Under step 4(ii) the party assuming risk does not control that risk, and further consideration is required under step 5 ...

If the circumstances of Example 2 remain the same except for the fact that, while the contract specifies that Company A assumes supply chain risks, Company B is not reimbursed by Company A when there was a failure to secure key components on time, the analysis under step 4(i) would show that contractual assumption of risk has not been followed in practice in regard to that supply chain risk, such that Company B in fact assumes the downside consequences of that risk. Based on the information provided in Example 2, Company B does not have any control over the supply chain risk, whereas Company A does exercise control. Therefore, the party assuming risk as analysed under step 4(i), does not under step 4(ii) exercise control over that risk, and further consideration is required under step 5 ...

Under step 4(ii) it should be determined whether the party assuming the risk under the contract, taking into account whether the contractual terms have been applied in the conduct of the parties under step 4(i), controls the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk. If all the circumstances set out in Example 1 remain the same except for the fact that the contract between Company A and Company B allocates development risk to Company B, and if there is no evidence from the conduct of the parties under step 4(i) to suggest that the contractual allocation of risk is not being followed, then Company B contractually assumes development risk but the facts remain that Company B has no capability to evaluate the development risk and does not make decisions about Company A’s activities. Company B has no decision-making function which allows it to control the development risk by taking decisions that affect the outcomes of that risk. Based on the information provided in Example 1, the development risk is controlled by Company A. The determination that the party assuming a risk is not the party controlling that risk means that further consideration is required under step 5 ...

Consider for example, a manufacturer, whose functional currency is US dollars, that sells goods to an associated distributor in another country, whose functional currency is euros, and the written contract states that the distributor assumes all exchange rate risks in relation to this controlled transaction. If, however, the price for the goods is charged by the manufacturer to the distributor over an extended period of time in euros, the currency of the distributor, then aspects of the written contractual terms do not reflect the actual commercial or financial relations between the parties. The assumption of risk in the transaction should be determined by the actual conduct of the parties in the context of the contractual terms, rather than by aspects of written contractual terms which are not in practice applied. The principle can be further illustrated by Example 7 in the Annex to Chapter VI, where there is an inconsistency between the contractual assumption of risk and the conduct of the parties as evidenced by the bearing of costs relating to the downside outcome of that risk ...

In line with the discussion in relation to contractual terms (see Section D.1.1), it should be considered under step 4(i) whether the parties’ conduct conforms to the assumption of risk contained in written contracts, or whether the contractual terms have not been followed or are incomplete. Where differences exist between contractual terms related to risk and the conduct of the parties which are economically significant and would be taken into account by third parties in pricing the transaction between them, the parties’ conduct in the context of the consistent contractual terms should generally be taken as the best evidence concerning the intention of the parties in relation to the assumption of risk ...

The significance of step 4 will depend on the findings. In the circumstances of Examples 1 and above, the step may be straightforward. Where a party contractually assuming a risk applies that contractual assumption of risk in its conduct, and also both exercises control over the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk, then there is no further analysis required beyond step 4(i) and (ii) to determine risk assumption. Companies A and B in both examples fulfil the obligations reflected in the contracts and exercise control over the risks that they assume in the transaction, supported by financial capacity. As a result step 4(ii) is satisfied, there is no need to consider step 5, and the next step to consider is step 6 ...

Carrying out steps 1-3 involves the gathering of information relating to the assumption and management of risks in the controlled transaction. The next step is to interpret the information resulting from steps 1-3 and to determine whether the contractual assumption of risk is consistent with the conduct of the parties and the other facts of the case by analysing (i) whether the associated enterprises follow the contractual terms under the principles of Section D.1.1; and (ii) whether the party assuming risk, as analysed under (i), exercises control over the risk and has the financial capacity to assume risk ...

Company A has acquired ownership of a tangible asset and enters into contracts for the use of the asset with unrelated customers. Under step 1 utilisation of the tangible asset, that is the risk that there will be insufficient demand for the asset to cover the costs Company A has incurred, has been identified as an economically significant risk. Under step 2 it is established that Company A has a contract for the provision of services with another group company, Company C; the contract does not address the assumption of utilisation risk by the owner of the tangible asset, Company A. The functional analysis under step 3 provides evidence that another group company, Company B, decides that investment in the asset is appropriate in light of anticipated commercial opportunities identified and evaluated by Company B and its assessment of the asset’s anticipated useful life; Company B provides specifications for the asset and the unique features required to respond to the commercial opportunities, and arranges for the asset to be constructed in accordance with its specifications, and for Company A to acquire the asset. Company C decides how to utilise the asset, markets the asset’s capabilities to third-party customers, negotiates the contracts with these third party customers, assures that the asset is delivered to the third parties and installed appropriately. Although it is the legal owner of the asset, Company A does not exercise control over the investment risk in the tangible asset, since it lacks any capability to decide on whether to invest in the particular asset, and whether and how to protect its investment including whether to dispose of the asset. Although it is the owner of the asset, Company A does not exercise control over the utilisation risk, since it lacks any capability to decide whether and how to exploit the asset. It does not have the capability to assess and make decisions relating to the risk mitigation activities performed by other group companies. Instead, risks associated with investing in and exploiting the asset, enhancing upside risk and mitigating downside risk, are controlled by the other group companies. Company A does not have control over the economically significant risks associated with the investment in and exploitation of the asset. The functional contribution of the legal owner of the asset is limited to providing financing for an amount equating to the cost of the asset. However, the functional analysis also provides evidence that Company A has no capability and authority to control the risk of investing in a financial asset. Company A does not have the capability to make decisions to take on or decline the financing opportunity, or the capability to make decisions on whether and how to respond to the risks associated with the financing opportunity. Company A does not perform functions to evaluate the financing opportunity, does not consider the appropriate risk premium and other issues to determine the appropriate pricing of the financing opportunity, and does not evaluate the appropriate protection of its financial investment. Companies A, B and C all have financial capacity to assume their respective risks ...

Company B manufactures products for Company A. Under step 1 capacity utilisation risk and supply chain risk have been identified as economically significant in this transaction, and under step 2 it has been established that under the contract Company A assumes these risks. The functional analysis under step 3 provides evidence that Company B built and equipped its plant to Company A’s specifications, that products are manufactured to technical requirements and designs provided by Company A, that volume levels are determined by Company A, and that Company A runs the supply chain, including the procurement of components and raw materials. Company A also performs regular quality checks of the manufacturing process. Company B builds the plant, employs and trains competent manufacturing personnel, and determines production scheduling based on volume levels determined by Company A. Although Company B has incurred fixed costs, it has no ability to manage the risk associated with the recovery of those costs through determining the production units over which the fixed costs are spread, since Company A determines volumes. Company A also determines significant costs relating to components and raw materials and the security of supply. The evaluation of the evidence concludes that Company B performs manufacturing services. Significant risks associated with generating a return from the manufacturing activities are controlled by Company A. Company B controls the risk that it fails to competently deliver services. Each company has the financial capacity to assume its respective risks ...

Company A seeks to pursue a development opportunity and hires a specialist company, Company B, to perform part of the research on its behalf. Under step 1 development risk has been identified as economically significant in this transaction, and under step 2 it has been established that under the contract Company A assumes development risk. The functional analysis under step 3 shows that Company A controls its development risk through exercising its capability and authority in making a number of relevant decisions about whether and how to take on the development risk. These include the decision to perform part of the development work itself, the decision to seek specialist input, the decision to hire the particular researcher, the decision of the type of research that should be carried out and objectives assigned to it, and the decision of the budget allocated to Company B. Company A has mitigated its risk by taking measures to outsource development activities to Company B which assumes the day-to- day responsibility for carrying out the research under the control of Company A. Company B reports back to Company A at predetermined milestones, and Company A assesses the progress of the development and whether its ongoing objectives are being met, and decides whether continuing investments in the project are warranted in the light of that assessment. Company A has the financial capacity to assume the risk. Company B has no capability to evaluate the development risk and does not make decisions about Company A’s activities. Company B’s risk is mainly to ensure it performs the research activities competently and it exercises its capability and authority to control that risk through making decisions about the processes, expertise, and assets it needs. The risk Company B assumes is distinct from the development risk assumed by Company A under the contract, and which is controlled by Company A based on the evidence of the functional analysis ...

In this step the functions in relation to risk of the associated enterprises that are parties to the transaction are analysed. The analysis provides information about how the associated enterprises operate in relation to the assumption and management of the specific, economically significant risks, and in particular about which enterprise or enterprises perform control functions and risk mitigation functions, which enterprise or enterprises encounter upside or downside consequences of risk outcomes, and which enterprise or enterprises have the financial capacity to assume the risk. This step is illustrated by the following examples and conclusions are drawn from these examples in subsequent paragraphs of Section D.1.2 ...

The assumption of risk has a significant effect on determining arm’s length pricing between associated enterprises, and it should not be concluded that the pricing arrangements adopted in the contractual arrangements alone determine which party assumes risk. Therefore, one may not infer from the fact that the price paid between associated enterprises for goods or services is set at a particular level, or by reference to a particular margin, that risks are borne by those associated enterprises in a particular manner. For example, a manufacturer may claim to be protected from the risk of price fluctuation of raw material as a consequence of its being remunerated by another group company on a basis that takes account of its actual costs. The implication of the claim is that the other group company bears the risk. The form of remuneration cannot dictate inappropriate risk allocations. It is the determination of how the parties actually manage and control risks, as set out in the remaining steps of the process of analysing risk, which will determine the assumption of risks by the parties, and consequently dictate the selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method ...

However, it does not follow that every contractual exchange of potentially higher but riskier income for lower but less risky income between associated enterprises is automatically arm’s length. The rest of the steps set out in this section describe the information required to determine how the associated enterprises operate in relation to the assumption and management of risk leading to the accurate delineation of the actual transaction in relation to risk ...

It is economically neutral to take on (or lay off) risk in return for higher (or lower) anticipated nominal income as long as the net present value of both options are equal. Between unrelated parties, for example, the sale of a risky income-producing asset may reflect in part a preference of the seller to accept a lower but more certain amount of nominal income and to forego the possibility of higher anticipated nominal income it might earn if it instead retained and exploited the asset. In a without-recourse debt factoring arrangement between independent enterprises, for example, the seller discounts the face value of its receivables in return for a fixed payment, and so accepts a lower return but has reduced its volatility and laid off risk. The factor will often be a specialised organisation which has the capability to decide to take on risk and to decide on how to respond to the risk, including by diversifying the risk and having the functional capabilities to mitigate the risk and generate a return from the opportunity. Neither party will expect to be worse off as a result of entering into the arrangement, essentially because they have different risk preferences resulting from their capabilities in relation to the specific risk. The factor is more capable of managing the risk than the seller and terms acceptable to both parties can be agreed ...

A contractual assumption of risk constitutes an ex ante agreement to bear some or all of the potential costs associated with the ex post materialisation of downside outcomes of risk in return for some or all of the potential benefit associated with the ex post materialisation of positive outcomes. Importantly, ex ante contractual assumption of risk should provide clear evidence of a commitment to assume risk prior to the materialisation of risk outcomes. Such evidence is a very important part of the tax administration’s transfer pricing analysis of risks in commercial or financial relations, since, in practice, an audit performed by the tax administration may occur years after the making of such up-front decisions by the associated enterprises and when outcomes are known. The purported assumption of risk by associated enterprises when risk outcomes are certain is by definition not an assumption of risk, since there is no longer any risk. Similarly, ex post reallocations of risk by a tax administration when risk outcomes are certain may, unless based on the guidance elsewhere in these Guidelines and in particular Section D.1.2.1, be inappropriate ...

The identity of the party or parties assuming risks may be set out in written contracts between the parties to a transaction involving these risks. A written contract typically sets out an intended assumption of risk by the parties. Some risks may be explicitly assumed in the contractual arrangements. For example, a distributor might contractually assume accounts receivable risk, inventory risk, and credit risks associated with the distributor’s sales to unrelated customers. Other risks might be implicitly assumed. For example, contractual arrangements that provide non- contingent remuneration for one of the parties implicitly allocate the outcome of some risks, including unanticipated profits or losses, to the other party ...

Control over a specific risk in a transaction focusses on the decision-making of the parties to the transaction in relation to the specific risk arising from the transaction. This is not to say, however, that in an MNE group other parties may not be involved in setting general policies that are relevant for the assumption and control of the specific risks identified in a transaction, without such policy-setting itself representing decision making. The board and executive committees of the group, for example, may set the level of risk the group as a whole is prepared to accept in order to achieve commercial objectives, and to establish the control framework for managing and reporting risk in its operations. Line management in business segments, operational entities, and functional departments may identify and assess risk against the commercial opportunities, and put in place appropriate controls and processes to address risk and influence the risk outcomes arising from day-to-day operations. The opportunities pursued by operational entities require the ongoing management of the risk that the resources allocated to the opportunity will deliver the anticipated return. For example, finished product inventory risk in a supply transaction between two associated enterprises may be controlled by the party with the capability to determine the production volumes together with the performance of that decision- making. The way that inventory risk in the transaction between two associated enterprises is addressed may be subject to policy-setting elsewhere in the MNE group about overall levels of working capital tied up in inventory, or co-ordination of appropriate minimum stocking levels across markets to meet strategic objectives. This wider policy-setting however cannot be regarded as decisions to take on, lay off, decline, or mitigate the specific inventory risk in the example of the product supply transaction in this paragraph ...

In the second situation, a multinational toy retailer buys a wide range of products from a number of third-party manufacturers. Most of its sales are concentrated in the last two months of the calendar year, and a significant risk relates to the strategic direction of the buying function, and in making the right bets on trends and determining the products that will sell and in what volumes. Trends and the demand for products can vary across markets, and so expertise is needed to evaluate the right bets in the local market. The effect of the buying risk can be magnified if the retailer negotiates a period of exclusivity for a particular product with the third- party manufacturer ...

In the first situation the MNE group distributes heating oil to consumers. Analysis of the economically relevant characteristics establishes that the product is undifferentiated, the market is competitive, the market size is predictable, and players are price-takers. In such circumstances, the ability to influence margins may be limited. The credit terms achieved from managing the relationship with the oil suppliers fund working capital and are crucial to the distributor’s margin. The impact of the risk on cost of capital is, therefore, significant in the context of how value is created for the distribution function ...

Determining the economic significance of risk and how risk may affect the pricing of a transaction between associated enterprises is part of the broader functional analysis of how value is created by the MNE group, the activities that allow the MNE group to sustain profits, and the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction. The analysis of risk also helps to determine comparability under the guidance in Chapter III. Where potential comparables are identified, it is relevant to determine whether they include the same level of risks and management of risks. The economic significance of risk may be illustrated by the following two situations ...

Risks can be categorised in various ways, but a relevant framework in a transfer pricing analysis is to consider the sources of uncertainty which give rise to risk. The following non-exclusive list of sources of risk is not intended to suggest a hierarchy of risk. Neither is it intended to provide rigid categories of risk, since there is overlap between the categories. Instead, it is intended to provide a framework that may assist in ensuring that a transfer pricing analysis considers the range of risks likely to arise from the commercial or financial relations of the associated enterprises, and from the context in which those relations take place. Reference is made to risks that are externally driven and those that are internally driven in order to help clarify sources of uncertainty. However, there should be no inference that externally driven risks are less relevant because they are not generated directly by activities. On the contrary, the ability of a company to face, respond to and mitigate externally driven risks is likely to be a necessary condition for a business to remain competitive. Importantly, guidance on the possible range of risk should assist in identifying material risks with specificity. Risks which are vaguely described or undifferentiated will not serve the purposes of a transfer pricing analysis seeking to delineate the actual transaction and the actual allocation of risk between the parties. a) Strategic risks or marketplace risks. These are largely external risks caused by the economic environment, political and regulatory events, competition, technological advance, or social and environmental changes. The assessment of such uncertainties may define the products and markets the company decides to target, and the capabilities it requires, including investment in intangibles and tangible assets, as well as in the talent of its human capital. There is considerable potential downside, but the upside is also considerable if the company identifies correctly the impact of external risks, and differentiates its products and secures and continues to protect competitive advantage. Examples of such risks may include marketplace trends, new geographical markets, and concentration of development investment. b) Infrastructure or operational risks. These are likely to include the uncertainties associated with the company’s business execution and may include the effectiveness of processes and operations. The impact of such risks is highly dependent on the nature of the activities and the uncertainties the company chooses to assume. In some circumstances breakdowns can have a crippling effect on the company’s operations or reputation and threaten its existence; whereas successful management of such risks can enhance reputation. In other circumstances, the failure to bring a product to market on time, to meet demand, to meet specifications, or to produce to high standards, can affect competitive and reputational position, and give advantage to companies which bring competing products to market more quickly, better exploit periods of market protection provided by, for example, patents, better manage supply chain risks and quality control. Some infrastructure risks are externally driven and may involve transport links, political and social situations, laws and regulations, whereas others are internally driven and may involve capability and availability of assets, employee capability, process design and execution, outsourcing arrangements, and IT systems. c) Financial risks. All risks are likely to affect a company’s financial performance, but there are specific financial risks related to the company’s ability to manage liquidity and cash flow, financial capacity, and creditworthiness. The uncertainty can be externally driven, for example by economic shock or credit crisis, but can also be internally driven through controls, investment decisions, credit terms, and through outcomes of infrastructure or operational risks. d) Transactional risks. These are likely to include pricing and payment terms in a commercial transaction for the supply of goods, property, or services. e) Hazard risks. These are likely to include adverse external events that may cause damages or losses, including accidents and natural disasters. Such risks can often be mitigated through insurance, but insurance may not cover all the potential loss, particularly where there are significant impacts on operations or reputation ...

There are many definitions of risk, but in a transfer pricing context it is appropriate to consider risk as the effect of uncertainty on the objectives of the business. In all of a company’s operations, every step taken to exploit opportunities, every time a company spends money or generates income, uncertainty exists, and risk is assumed. A company is likely to direct much attention to identifying uncertainties it encounters, in evaluating whether and how business opportunities should be pursued in view of their inherent risks, and in developing appropriate risk mitigation strategies which are important to shareholders seeking their required rate of return. Risk is associated with opportunities, and does not have downside connotations alone; it is inherent in commercial activity, and companies choose which risks they wish to assume in order to have the opportunity to generate profits. No profit- seeking business takes on risk associated with commercial opportunities without expecting a positive return. Downside impact of risk occurs when the anticipated favourable outcomes fail to materialise. For example, a product may fail to attract as much consumer demand as projected. However, such an event is the downside manifestation of uncertainty associated with commercial opportunities. Companies are likely to devote considerable attention to identifying and managing economically significant risks in order to maximise the positive returns from having pursued the opportunity in the face of risk. Such attention may include activities around determining the product strategy, how the product is differentiated, how to identify changing market trends, how to anticipate political and social changes, and how to create demand. The significance of a risk depends on the likelihood and size of the potential profits or losses arising from the risk. For example, a different flavour of ice-cream may not be the company’s sole product, the costs of developing, introducing, and marketing the product may have been marginal, the success or failure of the product may not create significant reputational risks so long as business management protocols are followed, and decision-making may have been effected by delegation to local or regional management who can provide knowledge of local tastes. However, ground-breaking technology or an innovative healthcare treatment may represent the sole or major product, involve significant strategic decisions at different stages, require substantial investment costs, create significant opportunities to make or break reputation, and require centralised management that would be of keen interest to shareholders and other stakeholders ...

Assume that an investor hires a fund manager to invest funds on its account. Depending on the agreement between the investor and the fund manager, the latter may be given the authority to make portfolio investments on behalf of the investor on a day-to-day basis in a way that reflects the risk preferences of the investor, although the risk of loss in value of the investment would be borne by the investor. In such an example, the investor is controlling its risks through four relevant decisions: the decision about its risk preference and therefore about the required diversification of the risks attached to the different investments that are part of the portfolio, the decision to hire (or terminate the contract with) that particular fund manager, the decision of the extent of the authority it gives to the fund manager and objectives it assigns to the latter, and the decision of the amount of the investment that it asks this fund manager to manage. Moreover, the fund manager would generally be required to report back to the investor on a regular basis as the investor would want to assess the outcome of the fund manager’s activities. In such a case, the fund manager is providing a service and managing his business risk from his own perspective (e.g. to protect his credibility). The fund manager’s operational risk, including the possibility of losing a client, is distinct from his client’s investment risk. This illustrates the fact that an investor who gives to another person the authority to perform risk mitigation activities such as those performed by the fund manager does not necessarily transfer control of the investment risk to the person making these day-to-day decisions ...

The concept of control may be illustrated by the following examples. Company A appoints a specialist manufacturer, Company B to manufacture products on its behalf. The contractual arrangements indicate that Company B undertakes to perform manufacturing services, but that the product specifications and designs are provided by Company A, and that Company A determines production scheduling, including the volumes and timing of product delivery. The contractual relations imply that Company A bears the inventory risk and the product recall risk. Company A hires Company C to perform regular quality controls of the production process. Company A specifies the objectives of the quality control audits and the information that Company C should gather on its behalf. Company C reports directly to Company A. Analysis of the economically relevant characteristics shows that Company A controls its product recall and inventory risks by exercising its capability and authority to make a number of relevant decisions about whether and how to take on risk and how to respond to the risks. Besides that Company A has the capability to assess and take decisions relating to the risk mitigation functions and actually performs these functions. These include determining the objectives of the outsourced activities, the decision to hire the particular manufacturer and the party performing the quality checks, the assessment of whether the objectives are adequately met, and, where necessary, to decide to adapt or terminate the contracts ...

Risk mitigation refers to measures taken that are expected to affect risk outcomes. Such measures may include measures that reduce the uncertainty or measures that reduce the consequences in the event that the downside impact of risk occurs. Control should not be interpreted as requiring risk mitigation measures to be adopted, since in assessing risks businesses may decide that the uncertainty associated with some risks, including risks that may be fundamental to their core business operations, after being evaluated, should be taken on and faced in order to create and maximise opportunities ...

References to control over risk should not necessarily be taken to mean that the risk itself can be influenced or that the uncertainty can be nullified. Some risks cannot be influenced, and are a general condition of commercial activity affecting all businesses undertaking that activity. For example, risks associated with general economic conditions or commodity price cycles are typically beyond the scope of an MNE group to influence. Instead control over risk should be understood as the capability and authority to decide to take on the risk, and to decide whether and how to respond to the risk, for example through the timing of investments, the nature of development programmes, the design of marketing strategies, or the setting of production levels ...

The capability to perform decision-making functions and the actual performance of such decision-making functions relating to a specific risk involve an understanding of the risk based on a relevant analysis of the information required for assessing the foreseeable downside and upside risk outcomes of such a decision and the consequences for the business of the enterprise. Decision-makers should possess competence and experience in the area of the particular risk for which the decision is being made and possess an understanding of the impact of their decision on the business. They should also have access to the relevant information, either by gathering this information themselves or by exercising authority to specify and obtain the relevant information to support the decision-making process. In doing so, they require capability to determine the objectives of the gathering and analysis of the information, to hire the party gathering the information and making the analyses, to assess whether the right information is gathered and the analyses are adequately made, and, where necessary, to decide to adapt or terminate the contract with that provider, together with the performance of such assessment and decision-making. Neither a mere formalising of the outcome of decision-making in the form of, for example, meetings organised for formal approval of decisions that were made in other locations, minutes of a board meeting and signing of the documents relating to the decision, nor the setting of the policy environment relevant for the risk (see paragraph 1.76), qualifies as the exercise of a decision-making function sufficient to demonstrate control over a risk ...

Control over risk involves the first two elements of risk management defined in paragraph 1.61; that is (i) the capability to make decisions to take on, lay off, or decline a risk-bearing opportunity, together with the actual performance of that decision-making function and (ii) the capability to make decisions on whether and how to respond to the risks associated with the opportunity, together with the actual performance of that decision-making function. It is not necessary for a party to perform the day-to-day mitigation, as described in (iii) in order to have control of the risks. Such day-to-day mitigation may be outsourced, as the example in paragraph 1.63 illustrates. However, where these day-to-day mitigation activities are outsourced, control of the risk would require capability to determine the objectives of the outsourced activities, to decide to hire the provider of the risk mitigation functions, to assess whether the objectives are being adequately met, and, where necessary, to decide to adapt or terminate the contract with that provider, together with the performance of such assessment and decision-making. In accordance with this definition of control, a party requires both capability and functional performance as described above in order to exercise control over a risk ...

Financial capacity to assume risk can be defined as access to funding to take on the risk or to lay off the risk, to pay for the risk mitigation functions and to bear the consequences of the risk if the risk materialises. Access to funding by the party assuming the risk takes into account the available assets and the options realistically available to access additional liquidity, if needed, to cover the costs anticipated to arise should the risk materialise. This assessment should be made on the basis that the party assuming the risk is operating as an unrelated party in the same circumstances as the associated enterprise, as accurately delineated under the principles of this section. For example, exploitation of rights in an income-generating asset could open up funding possibilities for that party. Where a party assuming risk receives intra-group funding to meet the funding demands in relation to the risk, the party providing the funding may assume financial risk but does not, merely as a consequence of providing funding, assume the specific risk that gives rise to the need for additional funding. Where the financial capacity to assume a risk is lacking, then the allocation of risk requires further consideration under step 5 ...

Risk management is not the same as assuming a risk. Risk assumption means taking on the upside and downside consequences of the risk with the result that the party assuming a risk will also bear the financial and other consequences if the risk materialises. A party performing part of the risk management functions may not assume the risk that is the subject of its management activity, but may be hired to perform risk mitigation functions under the direction of the risk-assuming party. For example, the day-to-day mitigation of product recall risk may be outsourced to a party performing monitoring of quality control over a specific manufacturing process according to the specifications of the party assuming the risk ...

Some risk management functions can be undertaken only by the party performing functions and using assets in creating and pursuing commercial opportunities, while other risk management functions can be undertaken by a different party. Risk management should not be thought of as necessarily encompassing a separate function, requiring separate remuneration, distinct from the performance of the activities that optimise profits. For example, the development of intangibles through development activities may involve mitigating risks relating to performing the development according to specifications at the highest possible standards and on time; the particular risks might be mitigated through the performance of the development function itself. For example, if the contractual arrangement between the associated enterprises is a contract R&D arrangement that is respected under the requirements of this section, remuneration for risk mitigation functions performed through the development activity would be incorporated into the arm’s length services payment. Neither the intangible risk itself, nor the residual income associated with such risk, would be allocated to the service provider. See also Example 1 in paragraph 1.83 ...

In this section references are made to terms that require initial explanation and definition. The term “risk management” is used to refer to the function of assessing and responding to risk associated with commercial activity. Risk management comprises three elements: (i) the capability to make decisions to take on, lay off, or decline a risk-bearing opportunity, together with the actual performance of that decision-making function, (ii) the capability to make decisions on whether and how to respond to the risks associated with the opportunity, together with the actual performance of that decision-making function, and (iii) the capability to mitigate risk, that is the capability to take measures that affect risk outcomes, together with the actual performance of such risk mitigation ...

The steps in the process set out in the rest of this section for analysing risk in a controlled transaction, in order to accurately delineate the actual transaction in respect to that risk, can be summarised as follows: Identify economically significant risks with specificity (see Section D.1.2.1.1). Determine how specific, economically significant risks are contractually assumed by the associated enterprises under the terms of the transaction (see Section D. 1.2.1.2). Determine through a functional analysis how the associated enterprises that are parties to the transaction operate in relation to assumption and management of the specific, economically significant risks, and in particular which enterprise or enterprises perform control functions and risk mitigation functions, which enterprise or enterprises encounter upside or downside consequences of risk outcomes, and which enterprise or enterprises have the financial capacity to assume the risk (see Section D. 1.2.1.3). Steps 2-3 will have identified information relating to the assumption and management of risks in the controlled transaction. The next step is to interpret the information and determine whether the contractual assumption of risk is consistent with the conduct of the associated enterprises and other facts of the case by analysing (i) whether the associated enterprises follow the contractual terms under the principles of Section D. 1.1; and (ii) whether the party assuming risk, as analysed under (i), exercises control over the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk (see Section D. 1.2.1.4). Where the party assuming risk under steps 1-4(i) does not control the risk or does not have the financial capacity to assume the risk, apply the guidance on allocating risk (see Section D. 1.2.1.5). The actual transaction as accurately delineated by considering the evidence of all the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction as set out in the guidance in Section D. 1, should then be priced taking into account the financial and other consequences of risk assumption, as appropriately allocated, and appropriately compensating risk management functions (see Section D. 1.2.1.6) ...

This section provides guidance on the nature and sources of risk relevant to a transfer pricing analysis in order to help identify relevant risks with specificity. In addition, this section provides guidance on risk assumption under the arm’s length principle. The detailed guidance provided in this section on the analysis of risks as part of a functional analysis covering functions, assets, and risks, should not be interpreted as indicating that risks are more important than functions or assets. The relevance of functions, assets and risks in a specific transaction will need to be determined through a detailed functional analysis. The expanded guidance on risks reflects the practical difficulties presented by risks: risks in a transaction can be harder to identify than functions or assets, and determining which associated enterprise assumes a particular risk in a transaction can require careful analysis ...

The assumption of risks associated with a commercial opportunity affects the profit potential of that opportunity in the open market, and the allocation of risks assumed between the parties to the arrangement affects how profits or losses resulting from the transaction are allocated at arm’s length through the pricing of the transaction. Therefore, in making comparisons between controlled and uncontrolled transactions and between controlled and uncontrolled parties it is necessary to analyse what risks have been assumed, what functions are performed that relate to or affect the assumption or impact of these risks and which party or parties to the transaction assume these risks ...

Risk is inherent in business activities. Enterprises undertake commercial activities because they seek opportunities to make profits, but those opportunities carry uncertainty that the required resources to pursue the opportunities either will be greater than expected or will not generate the expected returns. Identifying risks goes hand in hand with identifying functions and assets and is integral to the process of identifying the commercial or financial relations between the associated enterprises and of accurately delineating the transaction or transactions ...

A functional analysis is incomplete unless the material risks assumed by each party have been identified and considered since the actual assumption of risks would influence the prices and other conditions of transactions between the associated enterprises. Usually, in the open market, the assumption of increased risk would also be compensated by an increase in the expected return, although the actual return may or may not increase depending on the degree to which the risks are actually realised. The level and assumption of risk, therefore, are economically relevant characteristics that can be significant in determining the outcome of a transfer pricing analysis ...

The functional analysis may show that the MNE group has fragmented highly integrated functions across several group companies. There may be considerable interdependencies between the fragmented activities. For example, the separation into different legal entities of logistics, warehousing, marketing, and sales functions may require considerable co-ordination in order that the separate activities interact effectively. Sales activities are likely to be highly dependent on marketing, and fulfilment of sales, including the anticipated impact of marketing activities, would require alignment with stocking processes and logistics capability. That required co-ordination may be performed by some or all of the associated enterprises performing the fragmented activities, performed through a separate co-ordination function, or performed through a combination of both. Risk may be mitigated through contributions from all the parties, or risk mitigation activities may be undertaken mainly by the co-ordination function. Therefore, when conducting a functional analysis to identify the commercial or financial relations in fragmented activities, it will be important to determine whether those activities are highly interdependent, and, if so, the nature of the interdependencies and how the commercial activity to which the associated enterprises contribute is co-ordinated ...

The functional analysis should consider the type of assets used, such as plant and equipment, the use of valuable intangibles, financial assets, etc., and the nature of the assets used, such as the age, market value, location, property right protections available, etc ...

Therefore, the process of identifying the economically relevant characteristics of the commercial or financial relations should include consideration of the capabilities of the parties, how such capabilities affect options realistically available, and whether similar capabilities are reflected in potentially comparable arm’s length arrangements ...

The actual contributions, capabilities, and other features of the parties can influence the options realistically available to them. For example, an associated enterprise provides logistics services to the group. The logistics company is required to operate warehouses with spare capacity and in several locations in order to be able to cope in the event that supply is disrupted at any one location. The option of greater efficiency through consolidation of locations and reduction in excess capacity is not available. Its functions and assets may, therefore, be different to those of an independent logistics company if that independent service provider did not offer the same capabilities to reduce the risk of disruption to supply ...

In transactions between two independent enterprises, compensation usually will reflect the functions that each enterprise performs (taking into account assets used and risks assumed). Therefore, in delineating the controlled transaction and determining comparability between controlled and uncontrolled transactions or entities, a functional analysis is necessary. This functional analysis seeks to identify the economically significant activities and responsibilities undertaken, assets used or contributed, and risks assumed by the parties to the transactions. The analysis focuses on what the parties actually do and the capabilities they provide. Such activities and capabilities will include decision-making, including decisions about business strategy and risks. For this purpose, it may be helpful to understand the structure and organisation of the MNE group and how they influence the context in which the MNE operates. In particular, it is important to understand how value is generated by the group as a whole, the interdependencies of the functions performed by the associated enterprises with the rest of the group, and the contribution that the associated enterprises make to that value creation. It will also be relevant to determine the legal rights and obligations of each of the parties in performing their functions. While one party may provide a large number of functions relative to that of the other party to the transaction, it is the economic significance of those functions in terms of their frequency, nature, and value to the respective parties to the transactions that is important ...

The following example illustrates the concept of determining the actual transaction where a transaction has not been identified by the MNE. In reviewing the commercial or financial relations between Company P and its subsidiary companies, it is observed that those subsidiaries receive services from an independent party engaged by Company P. Company P pays for the services, the subsidiaries do not reimburse Company P directly or indirectly through the pricing of another transaction and there is no service agreement in place between Company P and the subsidiaries. The conclusion is that, in addition to a provision of services by the independent party to the subsidiaries, there are commercial or financial relations between Company P and the subsidiaries, which transfer potential value from Company P to the subsidiaries. The analysis would need to determine the nature of those commercial or financial relations from the economically relevant characteristics in order to determine the terms and conditions of the identified transaction ...

Where no written terms exist, the actual transaction would need to be deduced from the evidence of actual conduct provided by identifying the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction. In some circumstances the actual outcome of commercial or financial relations may not have been identified as a transaction by the MNE, but nevertheless may result in a transfer of material value, the terms of which would need to be deduced from the conduct of the parties. For example, technical assistance may have been granted, synergies may have been created through deliberate concerted action (as discussed in Section D.8), or know-how may have been provided through seconded employees or otherwise. These relations may not have been recognised by the MNE, may not be reflected in the pricing of other connected transactions, may not have been formalised in written contracts, and may not appear as entries in the accounting systems. Where the transaction has not been formalised, all aspects would need to be deduced from available evidence of the conduct of the parties, including what functions are actually performed, what assets are actually used, and what risks are actually assumed by each of the parties ...

The following example illustrates the concept of differences between written contractual terms and conduct of the parties, with the result that the actual conduct of the parties delineates the transaction. Company S is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Company P. The parties have entered into a written contract pursuant to which Company P licenses intellectual property to Company S for use in Company S’s business; Company S agrees to compensate Company P for the licence with a royalty. Evidence provided by other economically relevant characteristics, and in particular the functions performed, establishes that Company P performs negotiations with third-party customers to achieve sales for Company S, provides regular technical services support to Company S so that Company S can deliver contracted sales to its customers, and regularly provides staff to enable Company S to fulfil customer contracts. A majority of customers insist on including Company P as joint contracting party along with Company S, although fee income under the contract is payable to Company S. The analysis of the commercial or financial relations indicates that Company S is not capable of providing the contracted services to customers without significant support from Company P, and is not developing its own capability. Under the contract, Company P has given a licence to Company S, but in fact controls the business risk and output of Company S such that it has not transferred risk and function consistent with a licensing arrangement, and acts not as the licensor but the principal. The identification of the actual transaction between Company P and Company S should not be defined solely by the terms of the written contract. Instead, the actual transaction should be determined from the conduct of the parties, leading to the conclusion that the actual functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed by the parties are not consistent with the written licence agreement ...

Where there is doubt as to what transaction was agreed between the associated enterprises, it is necessary to take into account all the relevant evidence from the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction. In doing so one must bear in mind that the terms of the transaction between the enterprises may change over time. Where there has been a change in the terms of a transaction, the circumstances surrounding the change should be examined to determine whether the change indicates that the original transaction has been replaced through a new transaction with effect from the date of the change, or whether the change reflects the intentions of the parties in the original transaction. Particular care should be exercised where it appears that any changes may have been triggered by knowledge of emerging outcomes from the transaction. Changes made in the purported assumption of a risk when risk outcomes are known do not involve an assumption of risk since there is no longer any risk, as discussed in paragraph 1.78 ...

In transactions between independent enterprises, the divergence of interests between the parties ensures (i) that contractual terms are concluded that reflect the interests of both of the parties, (ii) that the parties will ordinarily seek to hold each other to the terms of the contract, and (iii) that contractual terms will be ignored or modified after the fact generally only if it is in the interests of both parties. The same divergence of interests may not exist in the case of associated enterprises or any such divergences may be managed in ways facilitated by the control relationship and not solely or mainly through contractual agreements. It is, therefore, particularly important in considering the commercial or financial relations between associated enterprises to examine whether the arrangements reflected in the actual conduct of the parties substantially conform to the terms of any written contract, or whether the associated enterprises’ actual conduct indicates that the contractual terms have not been followed, do not reflect a complete picture of the transactions, have been incorrectly characterised or labelled by the enterprises, or are a sham. Where conduct is not fully consistent with economically significant contractual terms, further analysis is required to identify the actual transaction. Where there are material differences between contractual terms and the conduct of the associated enterprises in their relations with one another, the functions they actually perform, the assets they actually use, and the risks they actually assume, considered in the context of the contractual terms, should ultimately determine the factual substance and accurately delineate the actual transaction ...

If the characteristics of the transaction that are economically relevant are inconsistent with the written contract between the associated enterprises, the actual transaction should generally be delineated for purposes of the transfer pricing analysis in accordance with the characteristics of the transaction reflected in the conduct of the parties ...

The following example illustrates the concept of clarifying and supplementing the written contractual terms based on the identification of the actual commercial or financial relations. Company P is the parent company of an MNE group situated in Country P. Company S, situated in Country S, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Company P and acts as an agent for Company P’s branded products in the Country S market. The agency contract between Company P and Company S is silent about any marketing and advertising activities in Country S that the parties should perform. Analysis of other economically relevant characteristics and in particular the functions performed, determines that Company S launched an intensive media campaign in Country S in order to develop brand awareness. This campaign represents a significant investment for Company S. Based on evidence provided by the conduct of the parties, it could be concluded that the written contract may not reflect the full extent of the commercial or financial relations between the parties. Accordingly, the analysis should not be limited by the terms recorded in the written contract, but further evidence should be sought as to the conduct of the parties, including as to the basis upon which Company S undertook the media campaign ...

However, the written contracts alone are unlikely to provide all the information necessary to perform a transfer pricing analysis, or to provide information regarding the relevant contractual terms in sufficient detail. Further information will be required by taking into consideration evidence of the commercial or financial relations provided by the economically relevant characteristics in the other four categories (see paragraph 1.36): the functions performed by each of the parties to the transaction, taking into account assets used and risks assumed, together with the characteristics of property transferred or services provided, the economic circumstances of the parties and of the market in which the parties operate, and the business strategies pursued by the parties. Taken together, the analysis of economically relevant characteristics in all five categories provides evidence of the actual conduct of the associated enterprises. The evidence may clarify aspects of the written contractual arrangements by providing useful and consistent information. If the contract neither explicitly nor implicitly (taking into account applicable principles of contract interpretation) addresses characteristics of the transaction that are economically relevant, then any information provided by the contract should be supplemented for purposes of the transfer pricing analysis by the evidence provided by identifying those characteristics ...

A transaction is the consequence or expression of the commercial or financial relations between the parties. The controlled transactions may have been formalised in written contracts which may reflect the intention of the parties at the time the contract was concluded in relation to aspects of the transaction covered by the contract, including in typical cases the division of responsibilities, obligations and rights, assumption of identified risks, and pricing arrangements. Where a transaction has been formalised by the associated enterprises through written contractual agreements, those agreements provide the starting point for delineating the transaction between them and how the responsibilities, risks, and anticipated outcomes arising from their interaction were intended to be divided at the time of entering into the contract. The terms of a transaction may also be found in communications between the parties other than a written contract ...

For a discussion of the relevance of these factors for the application of particular pricing methods, see the consideration of those methods in Chapter II ...

All methods that apply the arm’s length principle can be tied to the concept that independent enterprises consider the options realistically available to them and in comparing one option to another they consider any differences between the options that would significantly affect their value. For instance, before purchasing a product at a given price, independent enterprises normally would be expected to consider whether they could buy an equivalent product on otherwise comparable terms and conditions but at a lower price from another party. Therefore, as discussed in Chapter II, Part II, the comparable uncontrolled price method compares a controlled transaction to similar uncontrolled transactions to provide a direct estimate of the price the parties would have agreed to had they resorted directly to a market alternative to the controlled transaction. However, the method becomes a less reliable substitute for arm’s length transactions if not all the characteristics of these uncontrolled transactions that significantly affect the price charged between independent enterprises are comparable. Similarly, the resale price and cost plus methods compare the gross profit margin earned in the controlled transaction to gross profit margins earned in similar uncontrolled transactions. The comparison provides an estimate of the gross profit margin one of the parties could have earned had it performed the same functions for independent enterprises and therefore provides an estimate of the payment that party would have demanded, and the other party would have been willing to pay, at arm’s length for performing those functions. Other methods, as discussed in Chapter II, Part III, are based on comparisons of net profit indicators (such as profit margins) between independent and associated enterprises as a means to estimate the profits that one or each of the associated enterprises could have earned had they dealt solely with independent enterprises, and therefore the payment those enterprises would have demanded at arm’s length to compensate them for using their resources in the controlled transaction. Where there are differences between the situations being compared that could materially affect the comparison, comparability adjustments must be made, where possible, to improve the reliability of the comparison. Therefore, in no event can unadjusted industry average returns themselves establish arm’s length prices ...

The second phase in which economically relevant characteristics or comparability factors are used in a transfer pricing analysis relates to the process set out in Chapter III of making comparisons between the controlled transactions and uncontrolled transactions in order to determine an arm’s length price for the controlled transaction. To make such comparisons, taxpayers and tax administrations need first to have identified the economically relevant characteristics of the controlled transaction. As set out in Chapter III, differences in economically relevant characteristics between the controlled and uncontrolled arrangements need to be taken into account when establishing whether there is comparability between the situations being compared and what adjustments may be necessary to achieve comparability ...

Independent enterprises, when evaluating the terms of a potential transaction, will compare the transaction to the other options realistically available to them, and they will only enter into the transaction if they see no alternative that offers a clearly more attractive opportunity to meet their commercial objectives. In other words, independent enterprises would only enter into a transaction if it is not expected to make them worse off than their next best option. For example, one enterprise is unlikely to accept a price offered for its product by an independent commercial enterprise if it knows that other potential customers are willing to pay more under similar conditions, or are willing to pay the same under more beneficial conditions. Independent enterprises will generally take into account any economically relevant differences between the options realistically available to them (such as differences in the level of risk) when valuing those options. Therefore, identifying the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction is essential in accurately delineating the controlled transaction and in revealing the range of characteristics taken into account by the parties to the transaction in reaching the conclusion that there is no clearly more attractive opportunity realistically available to meet their commercial objectives than the transaction adopted. In making such an assessment, it may be necessary or useful to assess the transaction in the context of a broader arrangement of transactions, since assessment of the options realistically available to third parties is not necessarily limited to the single transaction, but may take into account a broader arrangement of economically related transactions ...

Economically relevant characteristics or comparability factors are used in two separate but related phases in a transfer pricing analysis. The first phase relates to the process of accurately delineating the controlled transaction for the purposes of this chapter, and involves establishing the characteristics of the transaction, including its terms, the functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed by the associated enterprises, the nature of the products transferred or services provided, and the circumstances of the associated enterprises, in accordance with the categories set out in the previous paragraph. The extent to which any one of the characteristics categorised above is economically relevant in a particular transaction depends on the extent to which it would be taken into account by independent enterprises when evaluating the terms of the same transaction were it to occur between them ...

The economically relevant characteristics or comparability factors that need to be identified in the commercial or financial relations between the associated enterprises in order to accurately delineate the actual transaction can be broadly categorised as follows: The contractual terms of the transaction (D.1.1). The functions performed by each of the parties to the transaction, taking into account assets used and risks assumed, including how those functions relate to the wider generation of value by the MNE group to which the parties belong, the circumstances surrounding the transaction, and industry practices (D.1.2). The characteristics of property transferred or services provided (D.1.3). The economic circumstances of the parties and of the market in which the parties operate (D.1.4). The business strategies pursued by the parties (D.1.5). This information about the economically relevant characteristics of the actual transaction should be included as part of the local file as described in Chapter V in support of a taxpayer’s analysis of its transfer pricing ...

The process then narrows to identify how each MNE within that MNE group operates, and provides an analysis of what each MNE does (e.g. a production company, a sales company) and identifies its commercial or financial relations with associated enterprises as expressed in transactions between them. The accurate delineation of the actual transaction or transactions between the associated enterprises requires analysis of the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction. These economically relevant characteristics consist of the conditions of the transaction and the economically relevant circumstances in which the transaction takes place. The application of the arm’s length principle depends on determining the conditions that independent parties would have agreed in comparable transactions in comparable circumstances. Before making comparisons with uncontrolled transactions, it is therefore vital to identify the economically relevant characteristics of the commercial or financial relations as expressed in the controlled transaction ...

The typical process of identifying the commercial or financial relations between the associated enterprises and the conditions and economically relevant circumstances attaching to those relations requires a broad-based understanding of the industry sector in which the MNE group operates (e.g. mining, pharmaceutical, luxury goods) and of the factors affecting the performance of any business operating in that sector. The understanding is derived from an overview of the particular MNE group which outlines how the MNE group responds to the factors affecting performance in the sector, including its business strategies, markets, products, its supply chain, and the key functions performed, material assets used, and important risks assumed. This information is likely to be included as part of the master file as described in Chapter V in support of a taxpayer’s analysis of its transfer pricing, and provides useful context in which the commercial or financial relations between members of the MNE group can be considered ...

As stated in paragraph 1.6 a “comparability analysis” is at the heart of the application of the arm’s length principle. Application of the arm’s length principle is based on a comparison of the conditions in a controlled transaction with the conditions that would have been made had the parties been independent and undertaking a comparable transaction under comparable circumstances. There are two key aspects in such an analysis: the first aspect is to identify the commercial or financial relations between the associated enterprises and the conditions and economically relevant circumstances attaching to those relations in order that the controlled transaction is accurately delineated; the second aspect is to compare the conditions and the economically relevant circumstances of the controlled transaction as accurately delineated with the conditions and the economically relevant circumstances of comparable transactions between independent enterprises. This section of Chapter I provides guidance on identifying the commercial or financial relations between the associated enterprises and on accurately delineating the controlled transaction. This first aspect of the analysis is distinct from the second aspect of considering the pricing of that controlled transaction under the arm’s length principle. Chapters II and III provide guidance on the second aspect of the analysis. The information about the controlled transaction determined under the guidance in this section is especially relevant for steps 2 and 3 of the typical process of a comparability analysis set out in paragraph 3.4 ...

It is important to put the issue of comparability into perspective in order to emphasise the need for an approach that is balanced in terms of, on the one hand, its reliability and, on the other, the burden it creates for taxpayers and tax administrations. Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention is the foundation for comparability analyses because it introduces the need for: A comparison between conditions (including prices, but not only prices) made or imposed between associated enterprises and those which would be made between independent enterprises, in order to determine whether a re-writing of the accounts for the purposes of calculating tax liabilities of associated enterprises is authorised under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (see paragraph 2 of the Commentary on Article 9); and A determination of the profits which would have accrued at arm’s length, in order to determine the quantum of any re-writing of accounts ...

The authoritative statement of the arm’s length principle is found in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, which forms the basis of bilateral tax treaties involving OECD member countries and an increasing number of non-member countries. Article 9 provides: [Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two [associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. By seeking to adjust profits by reference to the conditions which would have obtained between independent enterprises in comparable transactions and comparable circumstances (i.e. in “comparable uncontrolled transactions”), the arm’s length principle follows the approach of treating the members of an MNE group as operating as separate entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified business. Because the separate entity approach treats the members of an MNE group as if they were independent entities, attention is focused on the nature of the transactions between those members and on whether the conditions thereof differ from the conditions that would be obtained in comparable uncontrolled transactions. Such an analysis of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, which is referred to as a “comparability analysis”, is at the heart of the application of the arm’s length principle. Guidance on the comparability analysis is found in Section D below and in Chapter III ...

Burkert Contromatic Italiana s.p.a. is engaged in sale and services of fluid control systems. The italian company is a subsidiary of the German Bürkert Group. Following a tax audit, the Italian tax authorities issued a notice of assessment for FY 2007 on the grounds that the cost resulting from the transactions with its parent company (incorporated under Swiss law) were higher than the arms length price of these transactions. The company challenged the tax assessment, arguing that the analysis carried out by the Office had been superficial, both because it had examined accounting documents relating to tax years other than the one under examination (2007), and because the Office, in confirming that the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) was the most reliable method, in order to verify whether the margin obtained by the company corresponded to the arm’s length value, had carried out a comparability analysis (aimed at identifying the net remuneration margin obtained by independent third parties in similar transactions), identifying only three comparables.. The tax authorities replied that the analysis carried out using the Transactional Net Margin income method, had revealed an average Return On Sales (R.O.S.) equal to 13.35 %, with the consequent ascertainment of the company’s higher profitability and the recovery for taxation of intra-group costs exceeding the normal value. The Provincial Tax Commission decided in favor of Burkert Contromatic Italiana s.p.a., noting that the choice of companies made by the tax authorities was completely different from that made by the company. In particular, they pointed out that the benchmark analysis carried out by the taxpayer, and attached to the appeal, had the objective of identifying independent companies operating in the national territory engaged in activities comparable to that of the taxpayer itself, i.e. commercial companies that purchased products from third-party suppliers and resold them on the national market to third-party customers; this comparison had indicated an average profitability of 4.85% compared to that ascertained by the Office of 10.26%. It also excluded that the Office had provided clear and irrefutable evidence of the methodology applied in the assessment. An appeal was lodged by the tax authorities, which complained of failure to state reasons or insufficient reasons on decisive facts and infringement of Article 110, paragraph 7, since the grounds of the judgment did not show the reasons in law justifying the acceptance of the appeal. The Regional Tax Commission rejected the appeal of the tax authorities. It held that there was no “omitted and/or grossly inadequate motivation on decisive and controversial facts” on the part of the judges at first instance and even less a violation of the provisions of Article 110, paragraph 7, of the TUIR. The tax authorities  then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. In the appeal the tax authorities stated that it is a clear case of motivation by reference, since the regional tax court confines itself to using vague and general formulas, stating that the judgment of the provincial tax court is “clear” and “well-founded”, without giving any reason to understand why the objections raised by the tax authorities to the judgment at first instance were unfounded and why the reasoning provided by the judge at first instance was shared. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court decided in favor of the tax authorities. It set aside the judgment under appeal and referred the case back to the court of first instance, with a different composition. Excerpts “Referring to the judgment appealed against, the C.T.R. [Commissione tributaria regionale] limited itself to stating that the first judges, ruling on the benchmark analysis, “for the purpose of identifying the companies comparable to the appellant and the relevant interquartile range of market value”, carried out by the Office on the basis of a comparison with three companies, had concluded that the Administration had not offered irrefutable evidence of the methodology applied in the assessment. It did not, however, adequately explain either the reasons why it intended to adhere to the decision of the Provincial Tax Commission and, therefore, the reasons why the method used by the Office could not be considered reliable, or why the method used by the taxpayer company should be preferred, and it failed to examine the specific observations made by the Tax Office, which had clearly and exhaustively set out the methodology actually applied and the results of the audit. In so doing, it failed to explain whether the assessment made by the tax authorities deviated from the criteria that must guide the analysis of intra-group transactions aimed at ascertaining whether the taxpayer company complied with the arm’s length price by comparing it with similar transactions carried out by independent third party companies. The taxpayer’s defence is therefore not adequately argued and the overall reading of the judgment, which also includes the factual premise and the arguments put forward by the parties at the various stages of the proceedings, does not bear witness to an independent assessment by the appeal court because it does not allow for an understanding of the assessment made with regard to the transfer pricing analysis carried out by the Office.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ITA_20220118 ...

Apex Tool Holding France acquired all the shares of Cooper Industrie France, which has since become Apex Tool France. This transaction was financed by a ten-year vendor loan at a rate of 6%. This claim on Apex Tool Holding France was transferred on the same day by the seller to the parent company of this company, which is the head of a global group specialising in tool manufacturing and thus, from that date, the creditor of its subsidiary. Apex Tool Holding France reintegrated the fraction of interest relating to this intra-group loan exceeding the average annual effective rate charged by credit institutions for variable-rate loans granted to companies into its income for the years 2011 to 2013. Apex considered that an interest rate of 6 % was in line with that which it could have obtained from independent financial institutions or organisations under similar conditions. The analysis was set aside by the tax authorities and an assessment was issued where the deduction of interest had been reduced. Apex filed an appeal with the Administrative Court of Appeal. The Court found in favor of the tax authorities in a decision issued in March 2020. An appeal was then filed by Apex with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Court The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal and issued a decision in favor of Apex Tool Group. Excerpts (Unofficial English translation) “3. It is clear from the documents in the file submitted to the trial judges that in order to establish that the rate of 6% at which ATFH1 had paid the loan granted to it by its parent company, which was higher than the rate provided for in the first paragraph of 3° of 1 of Article 39 of the General Tax Code, was not higher than the rate that this company would have obtained from an independent financial institution, the applicant company relied on an initial study drawn up by its counsel. In the absence of previous loans obtained by ATFH1 in 2010, this study first determined the credit rating of the intra-group loan in dispute according to the methodology published by the rating agency Moody’s for the analysis of industrial companies, which took into account the company’s profile, in particular with regard to market data, its size, its profitability, the leverage effect and its financial policy. The rating was set at “BB+”. The study then compared ATHF’s interest rate of 6% with the rates of bond issues over the same period with comparable credit ratings, using data available in the Bloomberg database. The company also relied on an additional study that analysed the arm’s length rate in a sample of bank loans to companies in the non-financial sector with credit ratings ranging from ‘BBB-‘ to ‘BB’. 4. Firstly, in holding that the credit rating assigned to the intra-group loan granted to ATFH1 by the first study in accordance with the methodology set out in point 3 did not reflect the intrinsic situation of that company on the grounds that it had been determined by taking into account the aggregate financial statements of the group that ATHF1 formed with its subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries whereas, as stated in point 2, for the application of the provisions of Articles 39 and 212 of the General Tax Code, the profile of the borrowing company must in principle be assessed in the light of the financial and economic situation of the group that this company forms with its subsidiaries, the Court erred in law. 5. Secondly, it is clear from the documents in the file submitted to the court that the sample of comparable companies used in the supplementary study, the relevance of which had not been contested by the administration, concerned companies in the non-financial sector such as ATFH1 and which had obtained credit ratings ranging from “BBB-” to “BB”, i.e. one notch above and below the “BB+” credit rating determined for the loan in question in the first study. In dismissing this additional study on the sole ground that the companies in the sample belonged to heterogeneous sectors of activity and that, consequently, it was not established that, for a banker, they would have presented the same level of risk as that of ATFH1, whereas the credit rating systems developed by the rating agencies aim to compare the credit risks of the rated companies after taking into account, in particular, their sector of activity, the Court erred in law. “ Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Conseil d'État, 9ème - 10ème chambres réunies, 29_12_2021, 441357 ...

“Construction Service S.A.” is active in Design, Repair and Construction of buildings. During the FY 2011-2013 it paid for services – management services and construction services – rendered from related parties. Following an audit the tax authorities issued an assessment where payments for these services had been adjusted by reference to the arm’s length principle. According to the authorities the benchmark studies in the company’s transfer pricing documentation suffered from comparability defects and moreover it had not been sufficiently demonstrated that the services had been effectively provided. The tax authorities pointed out that since the company is not considered comparable to the taxpayer, the interquartile range would be from 5.15% to 8.30% with a median of 5.70%; therefore, the taxpayer’s operating margin of 4.07% is outside the interquartile range. Not satisfied with the adjustment “Construction Service S.A.” filed an appeal with the Tax Court Judgement of the Tax Court The court ruled in favour of “construction S.A” and revoked the decision of the tax authorities. Excerpts “Without prejudice to the foregoing, we must clarify that the adjustments to the financial information must use, precisely, the financial information, which leads us to disagree with the decision of the taxpayer’s expert to use the information from the income tax return for the calculation of the operating margin, knowing that there are quantitative and qualitative differences with respect to the financial information (page 565 of the Court’s file), and even with the information contained in the transfer pricing studies, which makes his answers to questions 1 and 2 less reliable, since the information used to determine the interquartile range is based on financial information (not tax information) of the comparables.” “In this regard, this Court considers that although the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines indicate in the section entitled “Multi-year data” of the Comparability Analysis Section, in paragraphs 3.75 to 3. 79, the possibility of using data relating to several years for the profitability analysis or multi-year data, the Tax Administration, used information from 2010 to 2012 of comparable companies since the appellant itself indicated in the 2012 Transfer Pricing Study, the total transactions carried out with its related parties abroad, taking into account that it was in this period, in which the transactions were carried out, according to the global financial information of the audited Financial Statements as of 31 December 2012 by , therefore the operating margin that should be adjusted to the median of free competition, the costs of the operations with related parties of ———— to the year 2012, but we agree with the Tax Administration that the additional liquidation for the Income Tax is the one declared for the fiscal period 2013, since it was in that period due to the opted method where the total gross income, costs and expenses were allocated, which includes as already mentioned the adjustment of the operating margin (See fs. 221 to 244 of Volume 1 of the DGI’s file). Therefore, it is not possible for the taxpayer, at this stage, to point out that the Tax Administration should have used the information from the periods of the companies selected as comparable, in accordance with the Transfer Pricing guidelines, taking into consideration the income tax return for the 2013 tax period, which includes the 3 years of operations of the work, i.e. from 2011 to 2013 (instead of 2010-2012), and which yields a profitability indicator or operating margin according to ————, (even though the company ——————– has been rejected, and maintaining those that the DGI did accept), of 4. 58%, a median of 4.67% and 7.85%, which, in its opinion, would place it within the range of compliance with the arm’s length principle. Similarly, we consider it important to point out that in the same way that the taxpayer cannot claim to use its aggregated financial information, ignoring the analysis made in its transfer pricing report submitted in the 2012 period, neither is it correct for the tax authorities to make an adjustment to the taxpayer’s segmented financial information (2012), and use, for the purposes of the additional assessment, the taxpayer’s accumulated income tax return, corresponding to the entire project. It is essential that any adjustment to the taxpayer’s financial/tax information is made in a congruent manner, i.e. taking into account the accumulated activity and not in a partial manner.” “preceding paragraphs and on the OECD’s guidelines in points 1.42, 1.52, 1.53, 1.55, 1.57 and 1.59 of Chapter I, which deals with the Arm’s Length Principle of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines.” “In this sense, this Court has stated in Resolution n.° TAT-RF-002 of 10 January 2020, regarding the possible manipulation of comparables known by the Anglo-Saxon expression “cherry picking”, in the following terms: “just as the criteria for discarding must be applied uniformly by the taxpayer, they must also be applied uniformly by the Tax Administration, regardless of whether the results of the analysis are in favour of or against the Treasury (The three companies challenged by the Tax Administration were those that presented the lowest operating margins: 1. 00%; -0.03% and -23.64% respectively), concluding that “it is incongruous to object to comparables that are in similar circumstances with others that have been accepted, i.e. that have a reasonable level of comparability with the examined party”.” “By virtue of the allegations made by both parties, we consider from the procedural evidence in the file that the process followed to identify potential comparables by both parties has been systematic and verifiable; however, we agree with the taxpayer that the companies selected by them are comparable with ————, and comply with the Principle of Full Competition, therefore, they should be taken into account within the interquartile range, since we consider that the elements of the comparability analysis, indicated by the DGI, are not compromised. In view of the above, as we do not agree with the objection made to this comparable company by the Tax Administration, and as the taxpayer is within the range of full competence, this Court must revoke Resolution no. 201-3306 of ...

P.T. Sanken Indonesia Ltd. – an Indonesian subsidiary of Sanken Electric Co., Ltd. Japan – paid royalties to its Japanese parent for use of IP. The royalty payment was calculated based on external sales and therefore did not include sales of products to group companies. The royalty payments were deducted for tax purposes. Following an audit, the tax authorities issued an assessment where deductions for the royalty payments were denied. According to the authorities the license agreement had not been registrered in Indonesia. Furthermore, the royalty payment was found not to have been determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle. P.T. Sanken issued a complaint over the decision with the Tax Court, where the assessment later was set aside. This decision was then appealed to the Supreme Court by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities and upheld the decision of the Tax Court. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines states that to test the existence of transactions to royalty payments on intangible between related parties, four tests/considerations must be performed: a) Willing to pay test (Par 6.14); b) Economic benefit test (Par 6.15); c) Product life cycle considerations (Par 1.50); d) Identify contractual and arrangement for transfer of IP (Par 6.16-6.19 ); To obtain a comparison that is reliable the level of comparability between the transactions must be determined. The degree of comparability must be measured accurately and precisely because it would be “the core” in the accuracy of the results of the selected method . Although the characteristics of products and the provision in the contract on the sale to related parties and independent was comparable, it was not sufficient to justify the conditions of the transactions are  sufficiently comparable; Based on the OECD Guidelines there are five factors of comparability, namely : ( i ) the terms and conditions in the contract ; (ii) FAR analysis ( function , asset and risk ); (iii) the product or service being transacted ; (iv) business strategy ; and (v) economic situation ; In the application of the arm’s length principle, the OECD TP Guidenline provide guidance as follows: 6.23 “In establishing arm’s length pricing in the case of a sale or license of intangible property, it is possible to use the CUP method where the same owner has transferred or licensed comparable intangible property under comparable circumstances to independent enterprises. The amount of consideration charged in comparable trnsaction between independent enterprises in the same industry can also be guide, where this information is available, and a range of pricing may be Appropriate. “That the provisions mentioned in the above , the Panel of Judges Court believes that the payment of royalties can be financed due to meet the requirements that have been set out in the OECD TP Guidenline and have a relationship with 3M ( Getting , Charge and Maintain ) income and therefore on the correction compa ( now Applicant Review Back) in the case a quo not be maintained because it is not in accordance with the provisions of regulatory legislation which applies as stipulated in Article 29, the following explanation of Article 29 paragraph (2) Paragraph Third Act Provisions General and Tata How Taxation in conjunction with Article 4 paragraph (1), Article 6 paragraph (1) and Article 9 paragraph (1) and Article 18 paragraph (3) of Law – Income Tax Law in conjunction with Article 69 paragraph (1) letter e and Article 78 of the Tax Court Law ; Click here for translation putusan_5291_b_pk_pjk_2020 Dec 2021 ...

At issue is the selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method for sale of coal mined by Carbones El Tesoro S.A. in Colombia to its related party abroad, Glencore International AG. Carbones El Tesoro S.A. had determined the transfer price by application of the TNMM method. The tax authorities found that the most appropriate method for pricing the transactions was the CUP method. To that end, the tax authorities applied a database (McCloskey price list) in which the price, was determined by referring to a good similar to that traded (thermal coal) and to the Btus (British Thermal Unit) thereof. On 29 April 2011, the Settlement Management Division of the Barranquilla Regional Tax Directorate issued an assessment by which it modified the income tax return for the taxable year 2007, in the sense of disregarding as a net loss for the year the amount of $30. 509.961.000 and imposed a penalty for inaccuracy of $16.597.418.784, based on the questioning of the method that the taxpayer chose to establish the profit margin in the coal supply operation with its economic partner abroad. Carbones El Tesoro S.A. filed an appeal with the Administrative Court Judgement of the Administrative Court The Court decided in favour of Carbones El Tesoro S.A. and set aside the assessment of the tax authorities. Excerpts “4.4 In accordance with the above, and in accordance with the information provided by the plaintiff in the supporting documentation, the Chamber finds that the plaintiff set out in detail the economic reality of its operation of exploitation, production and sale of coal to its related party abroad, including the business and commercial structure, and the activities that each of the parties involved carried out. From this, it can be seen that the plaintiff operated as a producer with limited risks insofar as the risks assumed were limited to those related to its functions of exploitation, production and transport from the mine to delivery at the port, so that all those risks related to the functions of negotiating the price with the final customer, invoicing, collection, commercialisation, marketing, marketing, sales and distribution of the coal to the final customer were limited to those related to its functions of exploitation, production and transport from the mine to delivery at the port, collection, commercialisation, marketing, logistics and transport – including the contracting of vessels and the respective insurances – from the port of the vessel in Santa Marta to the delivery to the final client, were assumed by the foreign affiliate, since it was the one with the necessary infrastructure and expertise for such work, as indicated in the supporting documentation. 4.5. Considering the supporting documentation submitted by the applicant, the Board notes that the applicant presented the criteria used to eliminate possible comparables on the basis of the functions performed. To this end, it eliminated companies whose function in addition to coal mining was to carry out other activities such as electricity generation and/or distribution, or gas exploration and/or production, companies whose mining activity corresponded to products other than coal, companies that leased coal mines, or that were active in the oil industry without segmenting their financial statements by activity, companies that were in Chapter 11, and companies that did not have sufficient descriptive information on the business (…). This demonstrates that the plaintiff undertook a functional level analysis to support that, under the TNMM method, the information available and used presented a high level of comparability that was more suited to its particular situation. In the same vein, in its functional analysis, the complainant presented aspects related to the company’s management, production planning, mine contracting services, coal mining operations and the way it transported coal. He further stated that his responsibility was to plan the production of the El Tesoro mine, coordinate the receipt of coal purchased from local suppliers and transport it to Santa Marta, where it was loaded onto vessels contracted by his company. In addition, it included information about the market and sales, where it stated that it had not carried out any marketing, sales or distribution activities in relation to the exported products, given that 100% of the sales were made to its related party abroad, the latter being the one who decided the sales strategy. It added that the distribution and logistics of the delivery from the port in Santa Marta was the responsibility of its related party and the risks related to the coal were transferred to it once the coal was loaded onto the vessels (…). 4.6. On the other hand, as stated in legal basis 3, the CUP method compares the price of goods or services agreed between independent parties in comparable transactions. Its use implies that the economic characteristics of the transactions being compared must be analysed to determine a high degree of comparability. Thus, the CUP method is not the most appropriate when the conditions of the good are not sufficiently similar, or when the functions, including the risks assumed by the parties, cannot be adjusted in the particular case. When using commodity price lists (in a recognised and transparent commodity market), relevant circumstances such as the nature of the commodity, volume discounts, timing of transactions, terms of insurance, terms of delivery, and currency, among others, must be considered. In this case, the agreements and contracts that fix the terms of these factors are contrasted with those of third parties, in order to verify whether they coincide with those that would have been agreed in comparable circumstances. Under these premises, the Court finds that the defendant, through the use of the CUP method, applied a database in which the price, even though it referred to a good similar to the one traded – thermal coal – and to the Btus of this, was not sufficient to prove that the prices set in said database were for transactions in which the parties assumed similar functions, risks and negotiation terms as those of the transaction analysed. Nor is there any analysis of the appropriateness ...

This case deals with arm’s length pricing of limited risk manufacturing services. Following an audit of the X Ltd, the prices paid to a foreign manufacturer in the group was determined by the Grees tax authorities to have been above the arm’s length price. On that basis an upwards adjustment of the taxable income of X Ltd. was issued. Judgement of the Court The court dismissed the appeal of the X Ltd. Since the audit findings as recorded in the partial income tax audit report of the Head of the C.E.M.E.P. dated 08/07/2020 are found to be valid, thorough and fully substantiated, the present appeal must be dismissed. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation gr-ded-2021-1674_en_ath-1674_2021 ...

In 2017 the European Commission concluded that Luxembourg granted undue tax benefits to Amazon of around €250 million.  Following an in-depth investigation the Commission concluded that a tax ruling issued by Luxembourg in 2003, and prolonged in 2011, lowered the tax paid by Amazon in Luxembourg without any valid justification. The tax ruling enabled Amazon to shift the vast majority of its profits from an Amazon group company that is subject to tax in Luxembourg (Amazon EU) to a company which is not subject to tax (Amazon Europe Holding Technologies). In particular, the tax ruling endorsed the payment of a royalty from Amazon EU to Amazon Europe Holding Technologies, which significantly reduced Amazon EU’s taxable profits. This decision was brought before the European Court of Justice by Luxembourg and Amazon. Judgement of the EU Court  The European General Court found that Luxembourg’s tax treatment of Amazon was not illegal under EU State aid rules. According to a press release ” The General Court notes, first of all, the settled case-law according to which, in examining tax measures in the light of the EU rules on State aid, the very existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation, with the result that, in order to determine whether there is a tax advantage, the position of the recipient as a result of the application of the measure at issue must be compared with his or her position in the absence of the measure at issue and under the normal rules of taxation. In that respect, the General Court observes that the pricing of intra-group transactions carried out by an integrated company in that group is not determined under market conditions. However, where national tax law does not make a distinction between integrated undertakings and standalone undertakings for the purposes of their liability to corporate income tax, it may be considered that that law is intended to tax the profit arising from the economic activity of such an integrated undertaking as though it had arisen from transactions carried out at market prices. In those circumstances, when examining a fiscal measure granted to such an integrated company, the Commission may compare the tax burden of that undertaking resulting from the application of that fiscal measure with the tax burden resulting from the application of the normal rules of taxation under national law of an undertaking, placed in a comparable factual situation, carrying on its activities under market conditions. In addition, the General Court points out that, in examining the method of calculating an integrated company’s taxable income endorsed by a tax ruling, the Commission can find an advantage only if it demonstrates that the methodological errors which, in its view, affect the transfer pricing do not allow a reliable approximation of an arm’s length outcome to be reached, but rather lead to a reduction in the taxable profit of the company concerned compared with the tax burden resulting from the application of normal taxation rules. In the light of those principles, the General Court then examines the merits of the Commission’s analysis in support of its finding that, by endorsing a transfer pricing method that did not allow a reliable approximation of an arm’s length outcome to be reached, the tax ruling at issue granted an advantage to LuxOpCo.  In that context, the General Court holds, in the first place, that the primary finding of an advantage is based on an analysis which is incorrect in several respects. Thus, first, in so far as the Commission relied on its own functional analysis of LuxSCS in order to assert, in essence, that contrary to what was taken into account in granting the tax ruling at issue, that company was merely a passive holder of the intangible assets in question, the General Court considers that analysis to be incorrect. In particular, according to the General Court, the Commission did not take due account of the functions performed by LuxSCS for the purposes of exploiting the intangible assets in question or the risks borne by that company in that context.  Nor did it demonstrate that it was easier to find undertakings comparable to LuxSCS than undertakings comparable to LuxOpCo, or that choosing LuxSCS as the tested entity would have made it possible to obtain more reliable comparison data. Consequently, contrary to its findings in the contested decision, the Commission did not, according to the General Court, establish that the Luxembourg tax authorities had incorrectly chosen LuxOpCo as the ‘tested party’ in order to determine the amount of the royalty. Secondly, the General Court holds that, even if the ‘arm’s length’ royalty should have been calculated using LuxSCS as the ‘tested party’ in the application of the TNMM, the Commission did not establish the existence of an advantage since it was also unfounded in asserting that LuxSCS’s remuneration could be calculated on the basis of the mere passing on of the development costs of the intangible assets borne in relation to the Buy-In agreements and the cost sharing agreement without in any way taking into account the subsequent increase in value of those intangible assets. Thirdly, the General Court considers that the Commission also erred in evaluating the remuneration that LuxSCS could expect, in the light of the arm’s length principle, for the functions linked to maintaining its ownership of the intangible assets at issue. Contrary to what appears from the contested decision, such functions cannot be treated in the same way as the supply of ‘low value adding’ services, with the result that the Commission’s application of a mark-up most often observed in relation to intra-group supplies of a ‘low value adding’ services is not appropriate in the present case. In view of all the foregoing considerations, the General Court concludes that the elements put forward by the Commission in support of its primary finding are not capable of establishing that LuxOpCo’s tax burden was artificially reduced as a result of an overpricing of the royalty. In the second place, after examining the ...

Transactions had taken place between E.I. S.r.l. and a related Spanish company, S. Sa. where the pricing had been determined based on the cost plus method. An assessment was issued by the tax authorities on the basis of a “comparable” transactions (internal CUP) between the E.I. S.r.l. and an independent third company where the price had been higher. The Court of first instance held in favour of E.I S.r.l. This decision was appealed by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Court The Court dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities and decided in favour of E.I. S.r.l. Excerpts: “The Commission observes that the judges at first instance correctly and in detail reasoned their decisions, with a wealth of detail and a careful examination of all the circumstances examined. On the other hand, the Office has slavishly repeated its observations, merely objecting to the fact that they were not given due consideration by the first instance judges.” “The OECD Guidelines state that: Part 2, B.1, paragraph 2.26: “As a further example, assume that a taxpayer sells 1000 tonnes of a product to an associated enterprise in its multinational group at a price of $80 per tonne and simultaneously sells 500 tonnes of the same product to an independent enterprise at $100 per tonne. In this case it is necessary to assess whether the different quantities should lead to a correction of the transfer price. The relative market should be studied by analysing transactions for similar products in order to determine discounts normally applied depending on the quantity supplied. The example quoted is identical to the case under consideration today; according to the OECD Guidelines, a transfer pricing analysis cannot disregard the need to make an adjustment to the transactions in order to take into account the different quantities supplied to the two parties and to make the quantities comparable;” “National Jurisprudence, on the other hand, is recalled for the Cassation Civil Section, with sentence no. 20805 of 06 September 2017 states that: “(…) the essential aspect of transfer pricing does not concern the justification of the lower price from an economic point of view, but whether the discounts can be considered justified from a fiscal point of view, that is, whether they respond to the principle of free competition, in accordance with the teachings of the Supreme Court.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Sentenza del 12_02_2021 n. 546 - Comm. Trib. Reg. per la Lombardia Sezione_Collegio 9 ...

Transactions had taken place between E.I. S.r.l. and a related Spanish company, S. SA, where the pricing had been determined based on the cost plus method. An assessment was issued by the tax authorities on the basis of a “comparable” transactions (internal CUP) between the E.I. S.r.l. and an independent third company where the price had been higher. An appeal was filed by E.I. S.r.l. with the Provincial Tax Commission where E.I S.r.l. argued that the price difference was due to volume discounts. The Provincial Tax Commission held in favour of E.I S.r.l. An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities with the Regional Tax Commission. Judgement of the Regional Tax Commission The Regional Commission dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities and decided in favour of E.I. S.r.l. Excerpts: “The Commission observes that the judges at first instance correctly and in detail reasoned their decisions, with a wealth of detail and a careful examination of all the circumstances examined. On the other hand, the Office has slavishly repeated its observations, merely objecting to the fact that they were not given due consideration by the first instance judges.” “The OECD Guidelines state that: Part 2, B.1, paragraph 2.26: “As a further example, assume that a taxpayer sells 1000 tonnes of a product to an associated enterprise in its multinational group at a price of $80 per tonne and simultaneously sells 500 tonnes of the same product to an independent enterprise at $100 per tonne. In this case it is necessary to assess whether the different quantities should lead to a correction of the transfer price. The relative market should be studied by analysing transactions for similar products in order to determine discounts normally applied depending on the quantity supplied. The example quoted is identical to the case under consideration today; according to the OECD Guidelines, a transfer pricing analysis cannot disregard the need to make an adjustment to the transactions in order to take into account the different quantities supplied to the two parties and to make the quantities comparable;” “National Jurisprudence, on the other hand, is recalled for the Cassation Civil Section, with sentence no. 20805 of 06 September 2017 states that: “(…) the essential aspect of transfer pricing does not concern the justification of the lower price from an economic point of view, but whether the discounts can be considered justified from a fiscal point of view, that is, whether they respond to the principle of free competition, in accordance with the teachings of the Supreme Court.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Sentenza del 12_02_2021 n. 546 - Comm. Trib. Reg. per la Lombardia Sezione_Collegio 9 ...

A tax assessment had been issued for FY 2013 resulting in additional taxes of to CZK 227,162,210. At first the tax administration disputed that the applicant had purchased 1 TB SSDs for the purpose of earning, maintaining and securing income. It therefore concluded that the Starcom Internatioal had not proved that the conditions for tax deductions were met. On appeal, the tax administrator changed its position and accepted that all the conditions for tax deductions were met, but now instead concluded that Starcom Internatioal was a connected party to its supplier AZ Group Czech s.r.o. It also concluded that the transfer prices had been set mainly for the purpose of reducing the tax base within the meaning of Section 23(7)(b)(5) of the ITA. It was thus for the tax authorities to prove that Starcom Internatioal and AZ Group Czech s.r.o. (‘AZ’) were ‘otherwise connected persons’ and that the prices agreed between them differed from those which would have been agreed between independent persons in normal commercial relations under the same or similar conditions. Judgement of the Regional Court The Court allowed the appeal and decided predominantly in favour of Starcom Internatioal. “It can therefore be summarised that for the application of section 23(7) of the ITA it is necessary to prove that they are related persons within the meaning of the Income Tax Act, while respecting the case law cited above. A further condition is that the tax authority must prove that the prices agreed between these persons differ from the normal prices that would have been agreed between independent persons in normal commercial relations under the same or similar conditions. It is then up to the taxable person (if he wishes to avoid adjusting the tax base) to explain and substantiate the difference found to his satisfaction.” “Since the applicant was fully successful in the proceedings, it was entitled to the costs of the proceedings, which the court ordered the defendant to pay, in accordance with Article 60(1) of the Civil Procedure Code. The applicant’s costs of the proceedings consist of the court fee paid for filing the action in the amount of CZK 3,000, as well as the lawyer’s fee in accordance with Decree No 177/1996 Coll. in the amount of CZK 3,100, pursuant to Article 7(5) in conjunction with Article 9(4)(d) of Decree No 177/1996 Coll, for three acts of legal service – preparation and acceptance of representation and drafting of the application and the reply to the defendant’s statement of defence, as well as three times the overhead allowance of CZK 300 for each of those acts of legal service pursuant to Article 13(4) of the Ordinance and VAT on those amounts, with the exception of the court fee paid pursuant to Article 57(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court ordered the defendant to pay the costs reasonably incurred in the total amount of CZK 15 342 to the applicant’s representative pursuant to Section 149(1) of Act No 99/1963 Coll. of the Civil Procedure Code in conjunction with Section 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation 25Af_18_20210428081536.2019_20210428095738_prevedeno ...

Unique economic conditions arising from COVID-19 and government responses to the pandemic have led to practical challenges for the application of the arm’s length principle. For taxpayers applying transfer pricing rules for the financial years impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and for tax administrations that will be evaluating this application, there is an urgent need to address these practical questions. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2017 (“OECD TPG”) are intended to help tax administrations and multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) find mutually satisfactory solutions to transfer pricing cases and should continue to be relied upon when performing a transfer pricing analysis, including under the possibly unique circumstances introduced by the pandemic. Accordingly, guidance have been issued focusing on how the arm’s length principle and the OECD TPG apply to issues that may arise or be exacerbated in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, rather than on developing specialised guidance beyond what is currently addressed in the OECD TPG. The guidance focuses on four priority issues: (i) comparability analysis; (ii) losses and the allocation of COVID-19 specific costs; (iii) government assistance programmes; and (iv) advance pricing agreements (“APAs”); where it is recognised that the additional practical challenges posed by COVID-19 are most significant.   covid document ...

The comparability of open market transactions or enterprises may be influenced by the receipt of government assistance, affecting both how the parties establish their commercial or financial relations and how they price their transactions. Therefore, when performing a comparability analysis, it may be necessary to take into account the receipt of government assistance when reviewing potential comparables ...