In 2010, E S.A. transferred the legal ownership of a trademark to subsidiary S and subsequently entered into an agreement with S for the “licensing of the use of the trademarks”. In 2013, the same trademark was transferred back to E. S.A. As a result of these transactions, E. S.A., between 2010 and 2013, recognised the licence fees paid to S as tax costs, and then, as a result of the re-purchase of those trademarks in 2013 – it again made depreciation write-offs on them, recognising them as tax costs. The tax authority found that E S.A. had reported income lower than what would have been reported had the relationships not existed. E S.A. had  overestimated the tax deductible costs by PLN […] for the depreciation of trademarks, which is a consequence of the overestimation for tax purposes of the initial value of the trademarks repurchased from S – 27 December 2013 – by the amount of PLN […]. The function performed by S between 2010 and 2013 was limited to re-registration of the trademarks with the change of legal ownership. In the tax authority’s view, the expenses incurred by E S.A. for the reverse acquisition of the trademarks did not reflect the transactions that unrelated parties would have entered into, as they do not take into account the functions that E S.A. performed in relation to the trademarks. A tax assessment was issued where – for tax purposes – the transaction had instead been treated as a service contract, where S had provided protection and registration services to E S.A. A complaint was filed by E S.A. Judgement of the Court The Court found that there was no legal basis for re-characterisation in Poland for the years in question and that the issue should instead be resolved by applying the Polish anti-avoidance provision. On that basis, the case was referred back for further consideration. Excerpts “In principle, the tax authorities did not present any argumentation showing from which rules of interpretation they came to the conclusion that such an application of the above-mentioned provisions is legally possible and justified in the present case. It should be noted in this regard that Article 11(1) in fine speaks of the determination of income and tax due without – ‘[…] taking into account the conditions arising from the relationship…’, but does not allow for the substitution of one legal act (a licence agreement) for another act (an agreement for the provision of administration services), and deriving from the latter the legal consequences for the determination of the amount of the tax liability. There should be no doubt in this case that, in fact, the authorities made an unjustified reclassification of the legal act performed in the form of the conclusion of a valid licensing contract, when they concluded (referring to the OECD Guidelines – Annex to Chapter VI – Illustrative Examples of Recommendations on Intangible Assets, example 1, point 4) that the transactions carried out by E. and S. in fact constitute, for the purposes of assessing remuneration, a contract for the provision of trademark administration services and the market price in such a case should be determined for administration services. As the applicant rightly argued, such a possibility exists as of 1 January 2019, since Article 11c(4) uses the expression – “[…] without taking into account the controlled transaction, and where justified, determines the income (loss) of the taxpayer from the transaction appropriate to the controlled transaction”. This is what is meant by the so-called recharacterisation, i.e. the reclassification of the transaction, which is what the tax authorities actually did in the present case. At the same time, the Court does not share the view expressed in the jurisprudence of administrative courts, referring to the content of the justification of the draft amending act, according to which, the solutions introduced in 2019 were of a clarifying rather than normative nature (cf. the judgment of the WSA in Rzeszów of 20 October 2022, I SA/Rz 434/22). The applicant rightly argues in this regard that the new regulation is undoubtedly law-making in nature and that the provisions in force until the end of 2018 did not give the tax authorities such powers. It is necessary to agree with the view expressed in the literature that a linguistic interpretation of Article 11(1) of the A.p.d.o.p. and Article 11c of the A.p.d.o.p. proves that Article 11c of that Act is a normative novelty, as the concepts and premises it regulates cannot be derived in any way from the wording of Art. 11(1) u.p.d.o.p. (cf. H. Litwińczuk, Reclassification (non-recognition) of a transaction made between related parties in the light of transfer pricing regulations before and after 1.01.2019, “Tax Review” of 2019, no. 3).” “It follows from the justification of the contested decisions that, in applying Article 11(1) and (4) of the TAX Act to the facts of this case, the tax authorities referred to the OECD Guidelines, inter alia, to the example provided therein (Anex to Chapter VI – Illustrative Examples of Recommendations on Intangible Assets, example 1, point 4), from which, according to the authorities, it follows that the transactions carried out by E. S.A. and S. for the purposes of assessing remuneration constitute, in fact, a contract for the provision of trademark administration services and, in that case, the market price should be determined for such services. In this context, it should be clarified that the OECD Guidelines (as well as other documents of this organisation), in the light of the provisions of Article 87 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, do not constitute a source of universally binding law. Neither can they determine in a binding manner the basic structural elements of a tax, since the constitutional legislator in Article 217 of the Basic Law has subjected this sphere exclusively to statutory regulations. Since these guidelines do not constitute a source of law, they can therefore neither lead to an extension of the powers of the tax authorities nor of the ...

Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. is a subsidiary within the Japanese Aisan Industry Group which manufactures various engine components – fuel-pump modules, throttle bodies, carburetors for independent car manufactures such as Renault and Toyota. According to the original transfer pricing documentation the Czech company was classified as a limited risk contract manufacturer within the group, but yet it had suffered operating losses for several years. Following a tax audit an assessment was issued resulting in additional corporate income tax for FY 2011 in the amount of CZK 11 897 090, and on top of that a penalty in the amount of CZK 2 379 418. The assessment resulted from application of arm’s length provisions where the profitability of Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. had been determined on the basis of the profitability of comparable companies – TNMM method. An appeal was filed by Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. with the Regional Court which – by judgment of 30 October 2019 – dismissed the appeal and confirmed the additional payment order issued by the tax authorities. In its decision the Regional Court concluded that Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. should have been compensated for carrying out manufacturing services to the benefit of the multinational Aisan Industry group. The court also concluded that Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. was in fact a contract manufacturer – as stated in the original transfer pricing documentation – and not a full-fledged manufacturer as stated in the later “updated” transfer pricing report in which the FAR profile of the company had been significantly altered after receiving the initial assessment. According to the Regional Court, it had been established that the price of the service negotiated between the Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. and its parent company Aisan Industry Co., Ltd. was different from the price that would have been negotiated between independent parties under the same commercial conditions. By selling products to related and unrelated parties at prices determined by the group, Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. did not even achieve a minimum level of operating profitability. In FY 2011 Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. had a negative profit margin of 3,27 %. According to the court Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. should have received a remuneration of CZK 61 080 700 from the Aisan group for the manufacturing services, i.e. the difference between the operating margin it would have achieved at at arm’s length, 1,26 % (the minimum of the profit margin of comparable entities), and the profits it had actually achieved -3.27 %. According to the Regional Court, it was not the pricing of the individual products that was relevant, but rather the overall set-up of Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o.’s operation within the Aisan group as a contract manufacturer bearing disproportionate risks which were not compensated. Therefore it was not appropriate to set a reference price and analyse the individual transactions since the involvement in the group distorted both transactions with related and unrelated parties, as all the prices had been determined by other group entities. An appeal was then filed against the decision of the Regional Court with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The court fully agreed with the decision and conclusions of the Regional Court, which it considered to be correct and well reasoned. Excerpts “In the course of the tax audit, the tax administrator found, on the basis of an analysis of the transfer prices, that the complainant bore risks that were beyond its control and that this fact was not reflected in the pricing policy, which was influenced by the connected persons. The influence of related parties resulted in the complainant selling its products below its operating costs and not being compensated for those losses. ” “Given that the complainant could not influence from whom and for how much it would purchase inputs, nor to whom and for how much it would sell its products (output price), the tax authorities considered the transactions carried out to be controlled, since it was the parent company Aisan JP together with its sister companies ACE and ACA that influenced this, although the risks involved were borne by the complainant.” “As regards the plea that the defendant and the Regional Court erred in law in failing to distinguish between transactions with related parties and those with unrelated parties, that plea is also unfounded. In that regard, it should be noted that the complainant was represented by the companies of the Aisan group, which concluded the transactions to which the complainant was bound. It is clear from the commission agreements that the sister companies ACA and ACE did so in relation to all customers, irrespective of whether they were related or unrelated. The e-mail communications also show the influence of the parent company Aisan JP regarding the final approval of the sale. It is clear from the summary of the functions of the original transfer pricing report that the selection and final approval of material suppliers, setting of delivery terms, price negotiations and negotiation of delivery terms with end customers is without the influence of the complainant. These decisions are made by the parent company Aisan JP and its sister companies ACA and ACE, which also determine the final prices and quantities of products. Although the complainant sells production and purchases materials from unrelated parties, all sales plans are provided by related parties of the Aisan group…..Therefore, in the present case, all transactions carried out by the complainant are considered to be controlled transactions on the basis of a function and risk analysis. The conclusion of both the defendant and the Regional Court that it was not appropriate to analyse individual transactions, since related parties influenced all transactions, is therefore correct.” “The Regional Court and the defendant also correctly stated that the reasons given by the complainant for the negative operating profitability cannot be accepted, also because the complainant did not show negative profitability only in 2011, but it was a long-term trend from 2009 to 2012. For these reasons, the administrative authorities were justified in concluding that the ...

In 2009-2011 Fortis Petroleum Norway AS (FPN) bought seismic data related to oil exploration in the North Sea from a related party, Petroleum GeoServices AS (PGS), for NKR 95.000.000. FBN paid the amount by way of a convertible intra-group loan from PGS in the same amount. FPN also purchased administrative services from another related party, Consema, and later paid a substantial termination fee when the service contract was terminated. The acquisition costs, interest on the loan, costs for services and termination fees had all been deducted in the taxable income of the company for the years in question. Central to this case is the exploration refund scheme on the Norwegian shelf. This essentially means that exploration companies can demand cash payment of the tax value of exploration costs, cf. the Petroleum Tax Act § 3 letter c) fifth paragraph. If the taxpayer does not have income to cover an exploration cost, the company receives payment / refund of the tax value from the state. On 21 November 2018, the Petroleum Tax Office issued two decisions against FPN. One decision (the “Seismic decision”) which applied to the income years 2010 to 2011, where FPN was denied a deduction for the purchase of seismic services from PGS and interest on the associated seller credit, as well as ordinary and increased additional tax (hereinafter the «seismic decision»), and another decision (the “Consema decision”) which applied to the income years 2011 and 2012 where, FPN’s claim for deduction for the purchase of administrative services from Consema for the income years 2011 and 2012 was reduced at its discretion, and where FPN was also denied a deduction for the costs of the services and a deduction for termination fees. Finally in regards of the “Seismic decision” an increased additional tax of a total of 60 per cent, was added to the additional taxation on the basis of the incorrectly deducted seismic purchases as FPN had provided incorrect and incomplete information to the Oil Tax Office. In the “Seismic decision” the tax office argued that FPN used a exploration reimbursement scheme to run a “tax carousel” In the “Consema decision” the tax office found that the price paid for the intra-group services and the termination fee had not been determined at arm’s length. An appeal was filed by Fortis Petroleum Norway AS with the district court where, in December 2020, the case was decided in favour of the tax authorities. An appeal was then filed with the Court of Appel Judgement of the Court of Appeal The court upheld the decisions of the district court and decided in favour of the tax authorities. The Court concluded that the condition for deduction in the Tax Act § 6-1 on incurred costs on the part of Fortis Petroleum Norway AS was not met, and that there was a basis for imposing ordinary and increased additional tax. The Court of Appeal further found that the administrative services and the termination fee were controlled transactions and had not been priced at arm’s length. Excerpts – Regarding the acquisition of seismic exploration Based on the case’s extensive evidence, and especially the contemporary evidence, the Court of Appeal has found that there was a common subjective understanding between FPN and PGS, both at the planning stage, during the conclusion of the agreement, in carrying out the seismic purchases and in the subsequent process. should take place by conversion to a subscription price that was not market-based. Consequently, seismic would not be settled with real values. This was made possible through the common interest of the parties. The parties also never significantly distanced themselves from this agreement. The Court of Appeal has heard testimonies from the management of PGS and FPN, but can not see that these entail any other view on the question of what was agreed. The loan was never repaid, and in the end it was converted to the pre-agreed exchange rate of NOK 167. In the Court of Appeal’s view, there is no other rational explanation for this course than that it was carefully adapted to the financing through 78 per cent of the exploration refund. The share value at the time of conversion was down to zero. The Court of Appeal agrees with the state that all conversion prices between 167 and 0 kroner would have given a share price that reflected the value in FPN better and which consequently had given PGS a better settlement. On this basis, the Court of Appeal believes that the conversion rate did not cover the 22 percent, and that there was a common perception that this was in line with the purpose of the establishment of FPN, namely not to pay “a penny” of fresh capital. The Court of Appeal has also emphasized that the same thing that happened in 2009 was repeated in 2010 and 2011. For 2009, the Oil Tax Office came to the conclusion that it was a pro forma event and a shift in financial risk. In 2010 and 2011, the same actors used the same structure and procedure to finance all costs from the state. It is thus the Court of Appeal’s view that there was a common understanding between the parties to the agreement that the real relationship within was different from that which was signaled to the tax authorities regarding sacrifice and which provided the basis for the deduction. Furthermore, in the Court of Appeal’s view, the loan transactions were not fiscally neutral. The seismic purchases constituted the only source of liquidity and were covered in their entirety by the state. In light of ESA’s decision from 2018 as an element of interpretation, such a loss of fiscal neutrality would indicate that when the company has thus not borne any risk itself, sacrifice has not taken place either. Even if the debt had been real, assuming a sale without a common interest of the parties, in the Court of Appeal’s view in a tax context it could not be decisive, as long as 22 ...

21. The facts are the same as in Example 4 except that the functional analysis indicates Company A has no capacity to make decisions to take on or decline the risk-bearing opportunity represented by its participation in the CCA, or to make decisions on whether and how to respond to the risks associated with the opportunity. It also has no capability to mitigate the risks or to assess and make decisions relating to the risk mitigation activities of another party conducted on its behalf. 22. In accurately delineating the transactions associated with the CCA, the functional analysis therefore indicates that Company A does not control its specific risks under the CCA in accordance with the guidance in paragraph 8.15 and consequently is not entitled to a share in the output that is the objective of the CCA ...

73. Första is a consumer goods company organised and operating in country A. Prior to Year 1, Första produces Product Y in country A and sells it through affiliated distribution companies in many countries around the world. Product Y is well recognised and attracts a premium compared to its competitors, to which Första is entitled as the legal owner and developer of the trademark and related goodwill giving rise to that premium. 74. In Year 2, Första organises Company S, a wholly owned subsidiary, in country B. Company S acts as a super distributor and invoicing centre. Första continues to ship Product Y directly to its distribution affiliates, but title to the products passes to Company S, which reinvoices the distribution affiliates for the products. 75. Beginning in Year 2, Company S undertakes to reimburse the distribution affiliates for a portion of their advertising costs. Prices for Product Y from Company S to the distribution affiliates are adjusted upward so that the distribution affiliate operating profit margins remain constant notwithstanding the shift of advertising cost to Company S. Assume that the operating profit margins earned by the distribution affiliates are arm’s length both before and after Year 2 given the concurrent changes in product pricing and the reimbursement of advertising costs. Company S performs no functions with regard to advertising nor does it control any risk related to marketing the products. 76. In Year 3, the prices charged by Första to Company S are reduced. Första and Company S claim such a reduction in price is justified because Company S is now entitled to income related to intangibles. It asserts that such income is attributable to intangibles in respect of Product Y created through the advertising costs it has borne. 77. In substance, Company S has no claim to income derived from the exploitation of intangibles with respect to Product Y. It performs no functions, assumes no risk, and in substance bears no costs related to the development, enhancement, maintenance or protection of intangibles. Transfer pricing adjustments to increase the income of Första in Year 3 and thereafter would be appropriate ...

59. Company A is a fully integrated pharmaceutical company engaged in the discovery, development, production and sale of pharmaceutical preparations. Company A conducts its operations in country X. In conducting its research activities, Company A regularly retains independent Contract Research Organisations (CROs) to perform various R&D activities, including designing and conducting clinical trials with regard to products under development by Company A. However, such CROs do not engage in the blue sky research required to identify new pharmaceutical compounds. Where Company A does retain a CRO to engage in clinical research activities, research personnel at Company A actively participate in designing the CRO’s research studies, provide to the CRO results and information derived from earlier research, establish budgets and timelines for CRO projects, and conduct ongoing quality control with respect to the CRO’s activities. In such arrangements, CROs are paid a negotiated fee for services and do not have an ongoing interest in the profits derived from sales of products developed through their research. 60. Company A transfers patents and related intangibles related to Product M, an early stage pharmaceutical preparation believed to have potential as a treatment for Alzheimer’s disease to Company S, a subsidiary of Company A operating in country Y (the transaction relates strictly to the existing intangibles and does not include compensation for future R&D services of Company A). It is assumed for purposes of this example that the payment of Company S for the transfer of intangibles related to Product M is based on a valuation of anticipated future cash flows. Company S has no technical personnel capable of designing, conducting or supervising required ongoing research activities related to Product M. Company S therefore contracts with Company A to carry on the research programme related to Product M in the same manner as before the transfer of intangibles to Company S. Company S agrees to fund all of the ongoing Product M research, assume the financial risk of potential failure of such research, and to pay for Company A’s services based on the cost plus margins earned by CROs like those with which Company A regularly transacts. 61. The transfer pricing analysis of these facts begins by recognising that, following the transfer, Company S is the legal owner of the Product M intangibles under relevant contracts and registrations. However, Company A continues to perform and control functions and to manage risks related to the intangibles owned by Company S, including the important functions described in paragraph 6.56, and is entitled to compensation for those contributions. Under these circumstances, Company A’s transactions with CRO’s are not comparable to the arrangements between Company S and Company A related to Product M and may not be used as a benchmark for the arm’s length compensation required to be provided to Company A for its ongoing R&D activity with respect to the Product M intangibles. Company S does not perform or control the same functions or control the same risks in its transactions with Company A, as does Company A in its transactions with the CROs. 62. While Company S is the legal owner of the intangibles, it should not be entitled to all of the returns derived from the exploitation of the intangibles. Because Company S lacks the capability to control research related risks, Company A should be treated as bearing a substantial portion of the relevant risk and Company A should also be compensated for its functions, including the important functions described in paragraph 6.56. Company A should be entitled to larger returns than the CROs under these circumstances. 63. A thorough examination of the transaction in this example may show that it should accurately be delineated as the provision of financing by Company S equating to the costs of the acquired intangibles and the ongoing development. As a result, Company S is entitled to only a financing return. The level of the financing return depends on the exercising of control over the financing risk in accordance with the guidance in Section D. 1 of Chapter I and the principles outlined in paragraphs 6.63 and 6.64. Company A would be entitled to retain the remaining income or losses ...

54. Shuyona is the parent company of an MNE group. Shuyona is organised in and operates exclusively in Country X. The Shuyona group is involved in the production and sale of consumer goods. In order to maintain and, if possible, improve its market position, ongoing research is carried out by the Shuyona group to improve existing products and develop new products. The Shuyona group maintains two R&D centres, one operated by Shuyona in country X, and the other operated by Company S, a subsidiary of Shuyona, operating in country Y. The relationships between the Shuyona R&D centre and the Company S R&D centre are as described in Example 14. 55. In Year 1, Shuyona sells all rights to patents and other technology related intangibles, including rights to use those intangibles in ongoing research, to a new subsidiary, Company T, organised in country Z. Company T establishes a manufacturing facility in country Z and begins to supply products to members of the Shuyona group around the world. For purposes of this example, it is assumed that the compensation paid by Company T in exchange for the transferred patents and related intangibles is based on a valuation of anticipated future cash flows generated by the transferred intangibles at the time of the transfer. 56. At the same time as the transfer of patents and other technology related intangibles, Company T enters into a contract research agreement with Shuyona and a separate contract research agreement with Company S. Pursuant to these agreements, Company T contractually agrees to bear the financial risk associated with possible failure of future R&D projects, agrees to assume the cost of all future R&D activity, and agrees to pay Shuyona and Company S a service fee based on the cost of the R&D activities undertaken plus a mark-up equivalent to the profit mark-up over cost earned by certain identified independent companies engaged in providing research services. 57. Company T has no technical personnel capable of conducting or supervising the research activities. Shuyona continues to develop and design the R&D programme related to further development of the transferred intangibles, to establish its own R&D budgets, to determine its own levels of R&D staffing, and to make decisions regarding whether to pursue or terminate particular R&D projects. Moreover, Shuyona continues to supervise and control the R&D activities in Company S in the manner described in Example 14. 58. The transfer pricing analysis begins by identifying the commercial or financial relations between the parties and the conditions and economically relevant circumstances attaching to those relations in order that the controlled transaction is accurately delineated under the principles of Chapter I, Section D. 1. Key assumptions in this example are that Company T functions as a manufacturer and performs no activities in relation to the acquisition, development or exploitation of the intangibles and does not control risks in relation to the acquisition of the intangibles or to their further development. Instead, all development activities and risk management functions relating to the intangibles are performed by Shuyona and Company S, with Shuyona controlling the risk. A thorough examination of the transaction indicates that it should accurately be delineated as the provision of financing by Company T equating to the costs of the acquired intangibles and the ongoing development. A key assumption in this example is that, although Company T contractually assumes the financial risk and has the financial capacity to assume that risk, it does not exercise control over that risk in accordance with the principles outlined in paragraphs 6.63 and 6.64. As a result, in addition to its manufacturing reward, Company T is entitled to no more than a risk-free return for its funding activities. (For further guidance see Section D. 1 of Chapter I, and in particular paragraph 1.103.) ...

49. Shuyona is the parent company of an MNE group. Shuyona is organised in and operates exclusively in country X. The Shuyona group is involved in the production and sale of consumer goods. In order to maintain and, if possible, improve its market position, ongoing research is carried out by the Shuyona group to improve existing products and develop new products. The Shuyona group maintains two R&D centres, one operated by Shuyona in country X, and the other operated by Company S, a subsidiary of Shuyona, operating in country Y. 50. The Shuyona group sells two lines of products. All R&D with respect to product line A is conducted by Shuyona. All R&D with respect to product line B is conducted by the R&D centre operated by Company S. Company S also functions as the regional headquarters of the Shuyona group in North America and has global responsibility for the operation of the business relating to product line B. However, all patents developed through Company S research efforts are registered by Shuyona. Shuyona makes no or only a nominal payment to Company S in relation to the patentable inventions developed by the Company S R&D centre. 51. The Shuyona and Company S R&D centres operate autonomously. Each bears its own operating costs. Under the general policy direction of Shuyona senior management, the Company S R&D centre develops its own research programmes, establishes its own budgets, makes determinations as to when R&D projects should be terminated or modified, and hires its own R&D staff. The Company S R&D centre reports to the product line B management team in Company S, and does not report to the Shuyona R&D centre. Joint meetings between the Shuyona and Company S R&D teams are sometimes held to discuss research methods and common issues. 52. The transfer pricing analysis of this fact pattern would begin by recognising that Shuyona is the legal owner/registrant of intangibles developed by Company S. Unlike the situation in Example 14, however, Shuyona neither performs nor exercises control over the research functions carried out by Company S, including the important functions related to management, design, budgeting and funding that research. Accordingly, Shuyona’s legal ownership of the intangibles does not entitle it to retain or be attributed any income related to the product line B intangibles. Tax administrations could arrive at an appropriate transfer pricing outcome by recognising Shuyona’s legal ownership of the intangibles but by noting that, because of the contributions of Company S in the form of functions, assets, and risks, appropriate compensation to Company S for its contributions could be ensured by confirming that Company S should make no royalty or other payment to Shuyona for the right to use any successfully developed Company S intangibles, so that the future income derived from the exploitation of those intangibles by Company S would be allocated to Company S and not to Shuyona. 53. If Shuyona exploits the product line B intangibles by itself, Shuyona should provide appropriate compensation to Company S for its functions performed, assets used and risks assumed related to intangible development. In determining the appropriate level of compensation for Company S, the fact that Company S performs all of the important functions related to intangible development would likely make it inappropriate to treat Company S as the tested party in an R&D service arrangement ...

1. Premiere is the parent company of an MNE group. Company S is a wholly owned subsidiary of Premiere and a member of the Premiere group. Premiere funds R&D and performs ongoing R&D functions in support of its business operations. When its R&D functions result in patentable inventions, it is the practice of the Premiere group that all rights in such inventions be assigned to Company S in order to centralise and simplify global patent administration. All patent registrations are held and maintained in the name of Company S. 2. Company S employs three lawyers to perform its patent administration work and has no other employees. Company S does not conduct or control any of the R&D activities of the Premiere group. Company S has no technical R&D personnel, nor does it incur any of the Premiere group’s R&D expense. Key decisions related to defending the patents are made by Premiere management, after taking advice from employees of Company S. Premiere’s management, and not the employees of Company S, controls all decisions regarding licensing of the group’s patents to both independent and associated enterprises. 3. At the time of each assignment of rights from Premiere to Company S, Company S makes a nominal EUR 100 payment to Premiere in consideration of the assignment of rights to a patentable invention and, as a specific condition of the assignment, simultaneously grants to Premiere an exclusive, royalty free, patent licence, with full rights to sub-licence, for the full life of the patent to be registered. The nominal payments of Company S to Premiere are made purely to satisfy technical contract law requirements related to the assignments and, for purposes of this example, it is assumed that they do not reflect arm’s length compensation for the assigned rights to patentable inventions. Premiere uses the patented inventions in manufacturing and selling its products throughout the world and from time to time sublicenses patent rights to others. Company S makes no commercial use of the patents nor is it entitled to do so under the terms of the licence agreement with Premiere. 4. Under the agreement, Premiere performs all functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangibles except for patent administration services. Premiere contributes and uses all assets associated with the development and exploitation of the intangible, and assumes all or substantially all of the risks associated with the intangibles. Premiere should be entitled to the bulk of the returns derived from exploitation of the intangibles. Tax administrations could arrive at an appropriate transfer pricing solution by delineating the actual transaction undertaken between Premiere and Company S. Depending on the facts, it might be determined that taken together the nominal assignment of rights to Company S and the simultaneous grant of full exploitation rights back to Premiere reflect in substance a patent administration service arrangement between Premiere and Company S. An arm’s length price would be determined for the patent administration services and Premiere would retain or be allocated the balance of the returns derived by the MNE group from the exploitation of the patents ...

Funding and risk-taking are integrally related in the sense that funding often coincides with the taking of certain risks (e.g. the funding party contractually assuming the risk of loss of its funds). The nature and extent of the risk assumed, however, will vary depending on the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction. The risk will, for example, be lower when the party to which the funding is provided has a high creditworthiness, or when assets are pledged, or when the investment funded is low risk, compared with the risk where the creditworthiness is lower, or the funding is unsecured, or the investment being funded is high risk. Moreover, the larger the amount of the funds provided, the larger the potential impact of the risk on the provider of the funding ...

Group members that use assets in the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of an intangible should receive appropriate compensation for doing so. Such assets may include, without limitation, intangibles used in research, development or marketing (e.g. know-how, customer relationships, etc.), physical assets, or funding. One member of an MNE group may fund some or all of the development, enhancement, maintenance, and protection of an intangible, while one or more other members perform all of the relevant functions. When assessing the appropriate anticipated return to funding in such circumstances, it should be recognised that in arm’s length transactions, a party that provides funding, but does not control the risks or perform other functions associated with the funded activity or asset, generally does not receive anticipated returns equivalent to those received by an otherwise similarly-situated investor who also performs and controls important functions and controls important risks associated with the funded activity. The nature and amount of compensation attributable to an entity that bears intangible-related costs, without more, must be determined on the basis of all the relevant facts, and should be consistent with similar funding arrangements among independent entities where such arrangements can be identified. See the guidance in Section D.1.2.1.6 of Chapter I, and in particular Example 3 in paragraphs 1.85 and 1.103, which illustrate a situation where the party providing funding does not control the financial risk associated with the funding ...

In exceptional circumstances, it may be the case that no associated enterprise can be identified that both exercises control over the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk. As such a situation is not likely to occur in transactions between third parties, a rigorous analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case will need to be performed, in order to identify the underlying reasons and actions that led to this situation. Based on that assessment, the tax administrations will determine what adjustments to the transaction are needed for the transaction to result in an arm’s length outcome. An assessment of the commercial rationality of the transaction based on Section D.2 may be necessary ...

If it is established that the associated enterprise assuming the risk as analysed under step 4(i) either does not control the risk or does not have the financial capacity to assume the risk, then the analysis described under step 5 needs to be performed ...

In the circumstances of Example 3, analysis under step 4(i) shows that the assumption of utilisation risk by Company A is consistent with its contractual arrangements with Company C, but under step 4(ii) it is determined that Company A does not control risks that it assumes associated with the investment in and exploitation of the asset. Company A has no decision-making function which allows it to control its risks by taking decisions that affect the outcomes of the risks. Under step 4(ii) the party assuming risk does not control that risk, and further consideration is required under step 5 ...

If the circumstances of Example 2 remain the same except for the fact that, while the contract specifies that Company A assumes supply chain risks, Company B is not reimbursed by Company A when there was a failure to secure key components on time, the analysis under step 4(i) would show that contractual assumption of risk has not been followed in practice in regard to that supply chain risk, such that Company B in fact assumes the downside consequences of that risk. Based on the information provided in Example 2, Company B does not have any control over the supply chain risk, whereas Company A does exercise control. Therefore, the party assuming risk as analysed under step 4(i), does not under step 4(ii) exercise control over that risk, and further consideration is required under step 5 ...

Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. is a subsidiary within the Japanese Aisan Industry Group which manufactures various engine components – fuel-pump modules, throttle bodies, carburetors for independent car manufactures such as Renault and Toyota. According to the original transfer pricing documentation the Czech company was classified as a limited risk contract manufacturer within the group, but yet it had suffered operating losses for several years. Following a tax audit an assessment was issued resulting in additional corporate income tax for FY 2011 in the amount of CZK 11 897 090, and on top of that a penalty in the amount of CZK 2 379 418. The assessment resulted from application of arm’s length provisions where the profitability of Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. had been determined on the basis of the profitability of comparable companies – TNMM method. An appeal was filed by Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. with the Regional Court. Judgement of the Regional Court The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the assessment of the tax authorities. In its decision the Regional Court concluded that Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. should have been compensated for carrying out manufacturing services to the benefit of the multinational Aisan Industry group. The court also concluded that Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. was in fact a contract manufacturer – as stated in the original transfer pricing documentation – and not a full-fledged manufacturer as stated in the later “updated” transfer pricing report in which the FAR profile of the company had been significantly altered after receiving the initial assessment. According to the Regional Court, it had been established that the price of the service negotiated between the Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. and its parent company Aisan Industry Co., Ltd. was different from the price that would have been negotiated between independent parties under the same commercial conditions. By selling products to related and unrelated parties at prices determined by the group, Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. did not even achieve a minimum level of operating profitability. In FY 2011 Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. had a negative profit margin of 3,27 %. According to the court Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o. should have received a remuneration of CZK 61 080 700 from the Aisan group for the manufacturing services, i.e. the difference between the operating margin it would have achieved at at arm’s length, 1,26 % (the minimum of the profit margin of comparable entities), and the profits it had actually achieved -3.27 %. According to the Regional Court, it was not the pricing of the individual products that was relevant, but rather the overall set-up of Aisan Industry Czech, s.r.o.’s operation within the Aisan group as a contract manufacturer bearing disproportionate risks which were not compensated. Therefore it was not appropriate to set a reference price and analyse the individual transactions since the involvement in the group distorted both transactions with related and unrelated parties, as all the prices had been determined by other group entities. Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation 15Af_105_2015_29 ...

73. Första is a consumer goods company organised and operating in country A. Prior to Year 1, Första produces Product Y in country A and sells it through affiliated distribution companies in many countries around the world. Product Y is well recognised and attracts a premium compared to its competitors, to which Första is entitled as the legal owner and developer of the trademark and related goodwill giving rise to that premium. 74. In Year 2, Första organises Company S, a wholly owned subsidiary, in country B. Company S acts as a super distributor and invoicing centre. Första continues to ship Product Y directly to its distribution affiliates, but title to the products passes to Company S, which reinvoices the distribution affiliates for the products. 75. Beginning in Year 2, Company S undertakes to reimburse the distribution affiliates for a portion of their advertising costs. Prices for Product Y from Company S to the distribution affiliates are adjusted upward so that the distribution affiliate operating profit margins remain constant notwithstanding the shift of advertising cost to Company S. Assume that the operating profit margins earned by the distribution affiliates are arm’s length both before and after Year 2 given the concurrent changes in product pricing and the reimbursement of advertising costs. Company S performs no functions with regard to advertising nor does it control any risk related to marketing the products. 76. In Year 3, the prices charged by Första to Company S are reduced. Första and Company S claim such a reduction in price is justified because Company S is now entitled to income related to intangibles. It asserts that such income is attributable to intangibles in respect of Product Y created through the advertising costs it has borne. 77. In substance, Company S has no claim to income derived from the exploitation of intangibles with respect to Product Y. It performs no functions, assumes no risk, and in substance bears no costs related to the development, enhancement, maintenance or protection of intangibles. Transfer pricing adjustments to increase the income of Första in Year 3 and thereafter would be appropriate ...

54. Shuyona is the parent company of an MNE group. Shuyona is organised in and operates exclusively in Country X. The Shuyona group is involved in the production and sale of consumer goods. In order to maintain and, if possible, improve its market position, ongoing research is carried out by the Shuyona group to improve existing products and develop new products. The Shuyona group maintains two R&D centres, one operated by Shuyona in country X, and the other operated by Company S, a subsidiary of Shuyona, operating in country Y. The relationships between the Shuyona R&D centre and the Company S R&D centre are as described in Example 14. 55. In Year 1, Shuyona sells all rights to patents and other technology related intangibles, including rights to use those intangibles in ongoing research, to a new subsidiary, Company T, organised in country Z. Company T establishes a manufacturing facility in country Z and begins to supply products to members of the Shuyona group around the world. For purposes of this example, it is assumed that the compensation paid by Company T in exchange for the transferred patents and related intangibles is based on a valuation of anticipated future cash flows generated by the transferred intangibles at the time of the transfer. 56. At the same time as the transfer of patents and other technology related intangibles, Company T enters into a contract research agreement with Shuyona and a separate contract research agreement with Company S. Pursuant to these agreements, Company T contractually agrees to bear the financial risk associated with possible failure of future R&D projects, agrees to assume the cost of all future R&D activity, and agrees to pay Shuyona and Company S a service fee based on the cost of the R&D activities undertaken plus a mark-up equivalent to the profit mark-up over cost earned by certain identified independent companies engaged in providing research services. 57. Company T has no technical personnel capable of conducting or supervising the research activities. Shuyona continues to develop and design the R&D programme related to further development of the transferred intangibles, to establish its own R&D budgets, to determine its own levels of R&D staffing, and to make decisions regarding whether to pursue or terminate particular R&D projects. Moreover, Shuyona continues to supervise and control the R&D activities in Company S in the manner described in Example 14. 58. The transfer pricing analysis begins by identifying the commercial or financial relations between the parties and the conditions and economically relevant circumstances attaching to those relations in order that the controlled transaction is accurately delineated under the principles of Chapter I, Section D. 1. Key assumptions in this example are that Company T functions as a manufacturer and performs no activities in relation to the acquisition, development or exploitation of the intangibles and does not control risks in relation to the acquisition of the intangibles or to their further development. Instead, all development activities and risk management functions relating to the intangibles are performed by Shuyona and Company S, with Shuyona controlling the risk. A thorough examination of the transaction indicates that it should accurately be delineated as the provision of financing by Company T equating to the costs of the acquired intangibles and the ongoing development. A key assumption in this example is that, although Company T contractually assumes the financial risk and has the financial capacity to assume that risk, it does not exercise control over that risk in accordance with the principles outlined in paragraphs 6.63 and 6.64. As a result, in addition to its manufacturing reward, Company T is entitled to no more than a risk-free return for its funding activities. (For further guidance see Section D. 1 of Chapter I, and in particular paragraph 1.103.) ...

Funding and risk-taking are integrally related in the sense that funding often coincides with the taking of certain risks (e.g. the funding party contractually assuming the risk of loss of its funds). The nature and extent of the risk assumed, however, will vary depending on the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction. The risk will, for example, be lower when the party to which the funding is provided has a high creditworthiness, or when assets are pledged, or when the investment funded is low risk, compared with the risk where the creditworthiness is lower, or the funding is unsecured, or the investment being funded is high risk. Moreover, the larger the amount of the funds provided, the larger the potential impact of the risk on the provider of the funding ...

In exceptional circumstances, it may be the case that no associated enterprise can be identified that both exercises control over the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk. As such a situation is not likely to occur in transactions between third parties, a rigorous analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case will need to be performed, in order to identify the underlying reasons and actions that led to this situation. Based on that assessment, the tax administrations will determine what adjustments to the transaction are needed for the transaction to result in an arm’s length outcome. An assessment of the commercial rationality of the transaction based on Section D.2 may be necessary ...

If it is established that the associated enterprise assuming the risk as analysed under step 4(i) either does not control the risk or does not have the financial capacity to assume the risk, then the analysis described under step 5 needs to be performed ...

In the circumstances of Example 3, analysis under step 4(i) shows that the assumption of utilisation risk by Company A is consistent with its contractual arrangements with Company C, but under step 4(ii) it is determined that Company A does not control risks that it assumes associated with the investment in and exploitation of the asset. Company A has no decision-making function which allows it to control its risks by taking decisions that affect the outcomes of the risks. Under step 4(ii) the party assuming risk does not control that risk, and further consideration is required under step 5 ...

If the circumstances of Example 2 remain the same except for the fact that, while the contract specifies that Company A assumes supply chain risks, Company B is not reimbursed by Company A when there was a failure to secure key components on time, the analysis under step 4(i) would show that contractual assumption of risk has not been followed in practice in regard to that supply chain risk, such that Company B in fact assumes the downside consequences of that risk. Based on the information provided in Example 2, Company B does not have any control over the supply chain risk, whereas Company A does exercise control. Therefore, the party assuming risk as analysed under step 4(i), does not under step 4(ii) exercise control over that risk, and further consideration is required under step 5 ...

An adjustments had been made by the tax authorities to a series of loans granted by GOLDEN ARCHES OF SPAIN SA (GAOS), domiciled in Ireland, to RESTAURANTES MC DONALDS, S.A. (RMSA), throughout the period 2000/2004 for amounts ranging between 10,000,000 and 86,650,000 €, at interest rates between 3,450% and 6,020%. The tax administration held that GAOS “has no structure or means to grant the loan and monitor compliance with its conditions … it does not have its own funds to lend, it receives them from other companies in the group”. The Administration refers to a loan received by GAOS from the parent company at a rate of 0%, which is paid in advance to receive another with an interest rate of 3.3%. The Administration indicates that “nobody, under normal market conditions, cancels a loan to constitute another one under clearly worse conditions”. The arm’s length interest rate was determined by reference to the interest rate RMSA would have paid to an independent bank. In 2005 there were external bank loans in the same company for more than 100,000,000 euros at an average interest rates of 2.57%. Judgement of the Court: “As regards the valuation at market price of the interest rate on the loans or lines of financing …, it has already been shown above that the loans were granted throughout the period 2000/2004 for amounts between 10,000,000 and 86,650,000 euros, with different interest rates ranging between 3.450% and 6.020%. These rates are notably higher than those demanded from RMSA by the banks – independent third parties – that granted it loans, so that in the financial year 2005 there are credit lines of more than 100,000,000 euros at average rates of 2.57% (credit lines for one year and renewable). “This being so, the reasonableness of the judgment cannot be disputed in appealing to the credit obtained by RMSA from independent entities, even though the conditions were different in some of their distinctive features to those of the loans received from GAOS, especially when the Court of First Instance rightly expresses the reasons why such alleged differences are irrelevant.” “…As regards the OECD Guidelines cited as infringed in the plea, this Court has already held that they are not sources of law and therefore cannot be relied on in cassation. Moreover, the reference in Article 16 TRLIS to them as rules inspiring application was introduced in Law 36/2006, which is not applicable ratione temporis to this case. Indeed, as we have recently stated (judgment of 19 October 2016, handed down in appeal no. 2558/2015), article 88.1.d) of the Law of this Jurisdiction allows for the complaint of defects in iudicando in which the contested judgment may have incurred, stating that “1. The appeal must be based on one or some of the following grounds: …d) Infringement of the rules of the legal system or case law that were applicable to resolve the issues under debate”. The infringement invoked in cassation, therefore, must refer precisely to the rules of the legal system, that is to say, to the formal sources which comprise it and which are set out in Article 1.1 of the Civil Code, which establishes that “…the sources of the Spanish legal system are the law, custom and the general principles of law”. Within the material concept of law expressed in the precept, it is possible to include the different manifestations, hierarchically ordered, of normative power (Constitution, international treaties, organic law, ordinary law, regulations, etc.). ), but it is not possible to base a ground of appeal on the infringement of the aforementioned OECD Guidelines, given their lack of normative value, that is to say, of a binding legal source for the Courts of Justice that can be predicated on them, and which this Supreme Court had already declared previously (thus, the Judgment of 18 July 2012, handed down in appeal no. 3779/2009 ), in which such guidelines are considered as mere recommendations to the States and, elsewhere in that judgment, it assigns them an interpretative value. Such a function, that of interpreting legal rules, derives, moreover, from the very role assigned to them by the Explanatory Memorandum to Law 36/2006, of 29 November, on measures for the prevention of tax fraud, which states the following: “…As far as direct taxation is concerned, this reform has two objectives. The first refers to the valuation of these operations according to market prices, thus linking them to the existing accounting criteria applicable to the recording in individual annual accounts of the operations regulated in article 16 of the Consolidated Text of the Corporate Income Tax Law, approved by Royal Legislative Decree 4/2004, of 5 March. In this respect, the acquisition price at which these transactions must be recorded for accounting purposes must correspond to the amount that would be agreed by independent persons or entities under conditions of free competition, understood as the market value, if there is a representative market or, failing that, the amount derived from applying certain generally accepted models and techniques and in harmony with the principle of prudence. In short, the tax regime for related-party transactions is based on the same valuation criterion as that established in the accounting field. In this sense, the tax administration could correct the book value when it determines that the normal market value differs from that agreed by the related persons or entities, with regulation of the tax consequences of the possible difference between the two values. The second objective is to adapt Spanish transfer pricing legislation to the international context, in particular to the OECD guidelines on the subject and to the European Transfer Pricing Forum, in the light of which the amended legislation must be interpreted. In this way, the actions of the Spanish tax authorities are brought into line with those of other countries in the region, while at the same time providing greater security for verification procedures by regulating the obligation of the taxpayer to document the determination of the market value agreed in the related-party transactions ...

The tax scheme in the Ben Nevis-case involved land owned by the subsidiary of a charitable foundation being licensed to a group of single purpose investor loss attributing qualifying companies (LAQC’s). The licensees were responsible for planting, maintaining and harvesting the forest through a forestry management company. The investors paid $1,350 per hectare for the establishment of the forest and $1,946 for an option to buy the land in 50 years for half its then market value. There were also other payments, including a $50 annual license fee. The land had been bought for around $580 per hectare. This meant that the the investors, if it wished to acquire the land after harvesting the forest, had to pay half its then value, even though they had already paid over three times the value at the inception of the scheme. In addition to the above payments, the investors agreed to pay a license premium of some $2 million per hectare, payable in 50 years time, by which time the trees would be harvested and sold. The investors purported to discharge its liability for the license premium immediately by the issuing of a promissory note redeemable in 50 years time. The premium had been calculated on the basis of the after tax amount that the mature forest was expected to yield. Finally the investors had agreed to pay an insurance premium of $1,307 per hectare and a further premium of $32,000 per hectare payable in 50 years time. The “insurance company” was a shell company established in a low tax jurisdiction by one of the promoters of the scheme. The insurance company did not in reality carry any risk due to arrangements with the land-owning subsidiary and the promissory notes from the group of investors. There was also a “letter of comfort” from the charitable foundation that it would make up any shortfall the insurance company was obliged to pay out. 90 per cent of the initial premiums received by the insurance company were paid to a company under the control of one of the promoters as commission and introduction fees tunneled back as loans to the promoters’ family trusts. Secure loans over the assets and undertakings secured the money payable under the promissory notes for the license premium and the insurance premium. The investors claimed an immediate tax deduction for the insurance premium and depreciated the deduction for the license premium over the 50 years of the license. The Inland Revenue disallowed these deductions by reference to the generel anti avoidance provision in New Zealand. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and ruled in favor of the Inland revenue. The majority of the SC judges rejected the notion that the potential conflict between the general anti-avoidance rule and specific tax provisions requires identifying which of the provisions, in any situation, is overriding. Rather, the majority viewed the specific provisions and the general anti-avoidance provision as working “in tandem”. Each provides a context that assists in determining the meaning and, in particular, the scope of the other. The focus of each is different. The purpose of the general anti-avoidance provision is to address tax avoidance. Tax avoidance may be found in individual steps or in a combination of steps. The purpose of the specific provisions is more targeted and their meaning should be determined primarily by their ordinary meaning, as established through their text in the light of their specific purpose. The function of the anti-avoidance provision is “to prevent uses of the specific provisions which fall outside their intended scope in the overall scheme of the Act.” The process of statutory construction should focus objectively on the features of the arrangements involved “without being distracted by intuitive subjective impressions of the morality of what taxation advisers have set up.” A three-stage test for assessing whether an arrangement is tax avoidance was applied by the Court. The first step in any case is for the taxpayer to satisfy the court that the use made of any specific provision comes within the scope of that provision. In this test it is the true legal character of the transaction rather than its label which will determine the tax treatment. Courts must construe the relevant documents as if they were resolving a dispute between the parties as to the meaning and effect of contractual arrangements. They must also respect the fact that frequently in commerce there are different means of producing the same economic outcome which have different taxation effects. The second stage of the test requires the court to look at the use of the specific provisions in light of arrangement as a whole. If a taxpayer has used specific provisions “and thereby altered the incidence of income tax, in a way which cannot have been within the contemplation and purpose of Parliament when it enacted the provision, the arrangement will be a tax avoidance arrangement.” The economic and commercial effect of documents and transactions may be significant, as well as the duration of the arrangement and the nature and extent of the financial consequences that it will have for the taxpayer. A combination of those factors may be important. If the specific provisions of the Act are used in any artificial or contrived way that will be significant, as it cannot be “within Parliament’s purpose for specific provisions to be used in that manner.” The courts are not limited to purely legal considerations at this second stage of the analysis. They must consider the use of the specific provisions in light of commercial reality and the economic effect of that use. The “ultimate question is whether the impugned arrangement, viewed in a commercially and economically realistic way, makes use of the specific provisions in a manner that is consistent with Parliament’s purpose.” If the arrangement does make use of the specific provisions in a manner consistent with Parliament’s purpose, it will not be tax avoidance. The third stage is to consider whether tax avoidance ...

This case is about a IP sale-and-license-back arrangement. The taxpayer acquired the shares in BV Z (holding). BV Z owns the shares in BV A and BV B (the three BVs form a fiscal unity under the CITA). BV A produces and sells shoes. In 1993, under a self-proclaimed protection clause, BV A sells the trademark of the shoes to BV C, which is also part of the fiscal unity. The protection clause was supposedly intended to protect the trademark in case of default of BV A. Taxpayer had created BV C prior to the sale of the trademark. In 1994, the taxpayer entered into a licensing agreement with BV C: the taxpayer pays NLG 2 to BV C per pair of shoes sold. Next, BV C is then moved to the Netherlands Antilles, which results in the end of the fiscal unity as of January 1, 1994. The roundtrip arrangement, the sale of an intangible and the subsequent payment of licensing fees, is now complete. In 1999 the royalty for use of the trademark was increased from fl. 2 per pair of shoes to fl. 2.50 per pair, resulting in annual royalty payments of fl. 300.000 from A BV to B BV. The Court disallowed tax deductions for the royalty payments. The payments were not proven to be at arm’s length. B BV had no employees to manage the trademarks. There were no business reasons for the transactions, only a tax motive. Hence the sale-and-license back arrangement was disregarded for tax purposes. Also, the licensing agreement were not found to produce effective protection of the brand and was therefore also considered part of a tax planning plan. Taxpayers often seek to maximise differences in tax rates through selling intangibles to a low- tax country and subsequently paying royalties to this country for the use of these intangibles, thereby decreasing the tax-base in the high-tax country. The arm’s length principle requires taxpayers to have valid business purposes for such transactions and requires them to make sure that the royalties are justified – why would an independent company pay royalties to a foreign company for an intangible it previously owned?’ To adress such situations a decree was issued in the Netherlands on August 11, 2004. The decree provided additional rules for transfers of intangibles when the value is uncertain at the time of the transaction (HTVI). It refers to situations in which an intangible is being transferred to a foreign group company and where this company furthermore licenses the intangible back to the transferor and/or related Dutch companies of this company. In these situations a price adjustment clause is deemed to have been entered. The deemed price adjustment clause prevents a sale at a very low price with a consequent high royalty fee to drain the Dutch tax base. Through the price adjustment clause the Dutch tax authorities are guaranteed a fair price for the sale of the intangible. Click here for translation Netherlands-vs-Corp-Maj-2007-IP-sale-and-license-back ...