(i) FS, a foreign corporation, produces apparel for USP, its U.S. parent corporation. FS purchases its materials from unrelated suppliers and produces the apparel according to designs provided by USP. The district director identifies 10 uncontrolled foreign apparel producers that operate in the same geographic market and are similar in many respect to FS. (ii) Relatively complete data is available regarding the functions performed and risks borne by the uncontrolled producers. In addition, data is sufficiently detailed to permit adjustments for differences in accounting practices. However, sufficient data is not available to determine whether it is likely that all material differences in contractual terms have been identified. For example, it is not possible to determine which parties in the uncontrolled transactions bear currency risks. Because differences in these contractual terms could materially affect price or profits, the inability to determine whether differences exist between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions will diminish the reliability of these results. Therefore, the reliability of the results of the uncontrolled transactions must be enhanced by the application of a statistical method in establishing an arm’s length range pursuant to § 1.482-1(e)(2)(iii)(B) ...

(i) USP, a domestic manufacturer of computer components, sells its products to FS, its foreign distributor. UT1, UT2, and UT3 are domestic computer component manufacturers that sell to uncontrolled foreign purchasers. (ii) Relatively complete data is available regarding the functions performed and risks borne by UT1, UT2, and UT3, and the contractual terms in the uncontrolled transactions. In addition, data is available to ensure accounting consistency between all of the uncontrolled manufacturers and USP. Because the available data is sufficiently complete to conclude that it is likely that all material differences between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions have been identified, the effect of the differences are definite and reasonably ascertainable, and reliable adjustments are made to account for the differences, an arm’s length range can be established pursuant to § 1.482-1(e)(2)(iii)(A) ...

The facts are the same as Example 5, except that sufficient data is not available to determine whether any of the uncontrolled distributors provide warranties or to determine the payment terms of the contracts. Because differences in these contractual terms could materially affect price or profits, the inability to determine whether these differences exist between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions diminishes the reliability of the results of the uncontrolled comparables. However, the reliability of the results may be enhanced by the application of a statistical method when establishing an arm’s length range pursuant to § 1.482-1(e)(2)(iii)(B) ...

If there are material differences between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions that would affect the gross profit margin, adjustments should be made to the gross profit margin earned with respect to the uncontrolled transaction according to the comparability provisions of § 1.482-1(d)(2). For this purpose, consideration of operating expenses associated with functions performed and risks assumed may be necessary, because differences in functions performed are often reflected in operating expenses. If there are differences in functions performed, however, the effect on gross profit of such differences is not necessarily equal to the differences in the amount of related operating expenses. Specific examples of the factors that may be particularly relevant to this method include – (1) Inventory levels and turnover rates, and corresponding risks, including any price protection programs offered by the manufacturer; (2) Contractual terms (e.g., scope and terms of warranties provided, sales or purchase volume, credit terms, transport terms); (3) Sales, marketing, advertising programs and services, (including promotional programs, rebates, and co-op advertising); (4) The level of the market (e.g., wholesale, retail, etc.); and (5) Foreign currency risks ...

USSub is the wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary of FP, a foreign manufacturer. USSub acts as a distributor of goods manufactured by FP. FP and USSub execute an agreement providing that FP will bear any ordinary product liability costs arising from defects in the goods manufactured by FP. In practice, however, when ordinary product liability claims are sustained against USSub and FP, USSub pays the resulting damages. Therefore, the district director disregards the contractual arrangement regarding product liability costs between FP and USSub, and treats the risk as having been assumed by USSub ...

S, a Country X corporation, manufactures small motors that it sells to P, its U.S. parent. P incorporates the motors into various products and sells those products to uncontrolled customers in the United States. The contract price for the motors is expressed in U.S. dollars, effectively allocating the currency risk for these transactions to S for any currency fluctuations between the time the contract is signed and payment is made. As long as S has adequate financial capacity to bear this currency risk (including by hedging all or part of the risk) and the conduct of S and P is consistent with the terms of the contract (i.e., the contract price is not adjusted to reflect exchange rate movements), the agreement of the parties to allocate the exchange risk to S will be respected ...

The facts are the same as in Example 1, except that in Year 1 FD had only $100,000 in total capital, including loans. In subsequent years USM makes no additional contributions to the capital of FD, and FD is unable to obtain any capital through loans from an unrelated party. Nonetheless, USM continues to sell 20,000 widgets annually to FD under the terms of the contract, and USM extends credit to FD to enable it to finance the purchase. FD does not have the financial capacity in Years 1, 2 and 3 to finance the purchase of the widgets given that it could not sell most of the widgets it purchased during those years. Thus, notwithstanding the terms of the contract, USM and not FD assumed the market risk that a substantial portion of the widgets could not be sold, since in that event FD would not be able to pay USM for all of the widgets it purchased ...

FD, the wholly-owned foreign distributor of USM, a U.S. manufacturer, buys widgets from USM under a written contract. Widgets are a generic electronic appliance. Under the terms of the contract, FD must buy and take title to 20,000 widgets for each of the five years of the contract at a price of $10 per widget. The widgets will be sold under FD’s label, and FD must finance any marketing strategies to promote sales in the foreign market. There are no rebate or buy back provisions. FD has adequate financial capacity to fund its obligations under the contract under any circumstances that could reasonably be expected to arise. In Years 1, 2 and 3, FD sold only 10,000 widgets at a price of $11 per unit. In Year 4, FD sold its entire inventory of widgets at a price of $25 per unit. Since the contractual terms allocating market risk were agreed to before the outcome of such risk was known or reasonably knowable, FD had the financial capacity to bear the market risk that it would be unable to sell all of the widgets it purchased currently, and its conduct was consistent over time, FD will be deemed to bear the risk ...

Contractual terms imputed from economic substance. (i) Company X is a member of a controlled group that has been in operation in the pharmaceutical sector for many years. In years 1 through 4, Company X undertakes research and development activities. As a result of those activities, Company X developed a compound that may be more effective than existing medications in the treatment of certain conditions. (ii) Company Y is acquired in year 4 by the controlled group that includes Company X. Once Company Y is acquired, Company X makes available to Company Y a large amount of technical data concerning the new compound, which Company Y uses to register patent rights with respect to the compound in several jurisdictions, making Company Y the legal owner of such patents. Company Y then enters into licensing agreements with group members that afford Company Y 100% of the premium return attributable to use of the intangible property by its subsidiaries. (iii) In determining whether an allocation is appropriate in year 4, the Commissioner may consider the economic substance of the arrangements between Company X and Company Y, and the parties’ course of conduct throughout their relationship. Based on this analysis, the Commissioner determines that it is unlikely that an uncontrolled taxpayer operating at arm’s length would make available the results of its research and development or perform services that resulted in transfer of valuable know how to another party unless it received contemporaneous compensation or otherwise had a reasonable anticipation of receiving a future benefit from those activities. In this case, Company X’s undertaking the research and development activities and then providing technical data and know-how to Company Y in year 4 is inconsistent with the registration and subsequent exploitation of the patent by Company Y. Therefore, the Commissioner may impute one or more agreements between Company X and Company Y consistent with the economic substance of their course of conduct, which would afford Company X an appropriate portion of the premium return from the patent rights. For example, the Commissioner may impute a separate services agreement that affords Company X contingent-payment compensation for its services in year 4 for the benefit of Company Y, consisting of making available to Company Y technical data, know-how, and other fruits of research and development conducted in previous years. These services benefited Company Y by giving rise to and contributing to the value of the patent rights that were ultimately registered by Company Y. In the alternative, the Commissioner may impute a transfer of patentable intangible property rights from Company X to Company Y immediately preceding the registration of patent rights by Company Y. The taxpayer may present additional facts that could indicate which of these or other alternative agreements best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions, consistent with the parties’ course of conduct in the particular case ...

Non-arm’s length compensation. (i) The facts are the same as in paragraph (i) of Example 4. As in Example 4, assume that, after adjustments are made to improve the reliability of the comparison for any material differences relating to marketing activities, manufacturing or marketing intangible property, and other comparability factors, the royalties paid by independent licensees would provide the most reliable measure of the arm’s length royalty owed by USSub to FP, apart from the additional facts described in paragraph (ii) of this Example 5. (ii) In years 1 through 4, USSub performs certain incremental marketing activities with respect to the AA trademark athletic gear, in addition to the activities required under the terms of the basic license agreement, that are also incremental as compared with those activities observed in the comparables. At the start of year 1, FP enters into a separate services agreement with USSub, which states that FP will compensate USSub quarterly, in an amount equal to specified costs plus X%, for these incremental marketing functions. Further, these written agreements reflect the intent of the parties that USSub receive such compensation from FP throughout the term of the agreement, without regard to the success or failure of the promotional activities. During years 1 through 4, USSub performs marketing activities pursuant to the separate services agreement and in each year USSub receives the specified compensation from FP on a cost of services plus basis. (iii) In evaluating year 4, the Commissioner performs an analysis of independent parties that perform promotional activities comparable to those performed by USSub and that receive separately-stated compensation on a current basis without contingency. The Commissioner determines that the magnitude of the specified cost plus X% is outside the arm’s length range in each of years 1 through 4. Based on an evaluation of all the facts and circumstances, the Commissioner makes an allocation to require payment of compensation to USSub for the promotional activities performed in year 4, based on the median of the interquartile range of the arm’s length markups charged by the uncontrolled comparables described in paragraph (e)(3) of this section. (iv) Given that based on facts and circumstances, the terms agreed by the controlled parties were that FP would bear all risks associated with the promotional activities performed by USSub to promote the AA trademark product in the United States market, and given that the parties’ conduct during the years examined was consistent with this allocation of risk, the fact that the cost of services plus markup on USSub’s services was outside the arm’s length range does not, without more, support imputation of additional contractual terms based on alternative views of the economic substance of the transaction, such as terms indicating that USSub, rather than FP, bore the risk associated with these activities ...

Contractual terms imputed from economic substance. (i) FP, a foreign producer of athletic gear, is the registered holder of the AA trademark in the United States and in other countries worldwide. In year 1, FP enters into a licensing agreement that affords its newly organized United States subsidiary, USSub, exclusive rights to certain manufacturing and marketing intangible property (including the AA trademark) for purposes of manufacturing and marketing athletic gear in the United States under the AA trademark. The contractual terms of this agreement obligate USSub to pay FP a royalty based on sales, and also obligate both FP and USSub to undertake without separate compensation specified types and levels of marketing activities. Unrelated foreign businesses license independent United States businesses to manufacture and market athletic gear in the United States, using trademarks owned by the unrelated foreign businesses. The contractual terms of these uncontrolled transactions require the licensees to pay royalties based on sales of the merchandise, and obligate the licensors and licensees to undertake without separate compensation specified types and levels of marketing activities. In years 1 through 6, USSub manufactures and sells athletic gear under the AA trademark in the United States. Assume that, after adjustments are made to improve the reliability of the comparison for any material differences relating to marketing activities, manufacturing or marketing intangible property, and other comparability factors, the royalties paid by independent licensees would provide the most reliable measure of the arm’s length royalty owed by USSub to FP, apart from the additional facts in paragraph (ii) of this Example 4. (ii) In years 1 through 6, USSub performs incremental marketing activities with respect to the AA trademark athletic gear, in addition to the activities required under the terms of the license agreement with FP, that are also incremental as compared to those observed in the comparables. FP does not directly or indirectly compensate USSub for performing these incremental activities during years 1 through 6. By year 7, AA trademark athletic gear generates a premium return in the United States, as compared to similar athletic gear marketed by independent licensees. In year 7, USSub and FP enter into a separate services agreement under which FP agrees to compensate USSub on a cost basis for the incremental marketing activities that USSub performed during years 1 through 6, and to compensate USSub on a cost basis for any incremental marketing activities it may perform in year 7 and subsequent years. In addition, the parties revise the license agreement executed in year 1, and increase the royalty to a level that attributes to FP substantially all the premium return from sales of the AA trademark athletic gear in the United States. (iii) In determining whether an allocation of income is appropriate in year 7, the Commissioner may consider the economic substance of the arrangements between USSub and FP and the parties’ course of conduct throughout their relationship. Based on this analysis, the Commissioner determines that it is unlikely that, ex ante, an uncontrolled taxpayer operating at arm’s length would engage in the incremental marketing activities to develop or enhance intangible property owned by another party unless it received contemporaneous compensation or otherwise had a reasonable anticipation of a future benefit. In this case, USSub’s undertaking the incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6 is a course of conduct that is inconsistent with the parties’ adoption in year 7 of contractual terms by which FP compensates USSub on a cost basis for the incremental marketing activities that it performed. Therefore, the Commissioner may impute one or more agreements between USSub and FP, consistent with the economic substance of their course of conduct, which would afford USSub an appropriate portion of the premium return from the AA trademark athletic gear. For example, the Commissioner may impute a separate services agreement that affords USSub contingent-payment compensation for the incremental activities it performed during years 1 through 6, which benefited FP by contributing to the value of the trademark owned by FP. In the alternative, the Commissioner may impute a long-term, exclusive United States license agreement that allows USSub to benefit from the incremental activities. As another alternative, the Commissioner may require FP to compensate USSub for terminating USSub’s imputed long-term United States license agreement, a license that USSub made more valuable at its own expense and risk. The taxpayer may present additional facts that could indicate which of these or other alternative agreements best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions, consistent with the parties’ course of conduct in this particular case ...

Contractual terms imputed from economic substance. (i) FP, a foreign producer of wristwatches, is the registered holder of the YY trademark in the United States and in other countries worldwide. In year 1, FP enters the United States market by selling YY wristwatches to its newly organized United States subsidiary, USSub, for distribution in the United States market. USSub pays FP a fixed price per wristwatch. USSub and FP undertake, without separate compensation, marketing activities to establish the YY trademark in the United States market. Unrelated foreign producers of trademarked wristwatches and their authorized United States distributors respectively undertake similar marketing activities in independent arrangements involving distribution of trademarked wristwatches in the United States market. In years 1 through 6, USSub markets and sells YY wristwatches in the United States. Further, in years 1 through 6, USSub undertakes incremental marketing activities in addition to the activities similar to those observed in the independent distribution transactions in the United States market. FP does not directly or indirectly compensate USSub for performing these incremental activities during years 1 through 6. Assume that, aside from these incremental activities, and after any adjustments are made to improve the reliability of the comparison, the price paid per wristwatch by the independent, authorized distributors of wristwatches would provide the most reliable measure of the arm’s length price paid per YY wristwatch by USSub. (ii) By year 7, the wristwatches with the YY trademark generate a premium return in the United States market, as compared to wristwatches marketed by the independent distributors. In year 7, substantially all the premium return from the YY trademark in the United States market is attributed to FP, for example through an increase in the price paid per watch by USSub, or by some other means. (iii) In determining whether an allocation of income is appropriate in year 7, the Commissioner may consider the economic substance of the arrangements between USSub and FP, and the parties’ course of conduct throughout their relationship. Based on this analysis, the Commissioner determines that it is unlikely that, ex ante, an uncontrolled taxpayer operating at arm’s length would engage in the incremental marketing activities to develop or enhance intangible property owned by another party unless it received contemporaneous compensation or otherwise had a reasonable anticipation of receiving a future benefit from those activities. In this case, USSub’s undertaking the incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6 is a course of conduct that is inconsistent with the parties’ attribution to FP in year 7 of substantially all the premium return from the enhanced YY trademark in the United States market. Therefore, the Commissioner may impute one or more agreements between USSub and FP, consistent with the economic substance of their course of conduct, which would afford USSub an appropriate portion of the premium return from the YY trademark wristwatches. For example, the Commissioner may impute a separate services agreement that affords USSub contingent-payment compensation for its incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6, which benefited FP by contributing to the value of the trademark owned by FP. In the alternative, the Commissioner may impute a long-term, exclusive agreement to exploit the YY trademark in the United States that allows USSub to benefit from the incremental marketing activities it performed. As another alternative, the Commissioner may require FP to compensate USSub for terminating USSub’s imputed long-term, exclusive agreement to exploit the YY trademark in the United States, an agreement that USSub made more valuable at its own expense and risk. The taxpayer may present additional facts that could indicate which of these or other alternative agreements best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions, consistent with the parties’ course of conduct in the particular case ...

Reliability of adjustment for differences in volume. (i) FS manufactures product XX and sells that product to its parent corporation, P. FS also sells product XX to uncontrolled taxpayers at a price of $100 per unit. Except for the volume of each transaction, the sales to P and to uncontrolled taxpayers take place under substantially the same economic conditions and contractual terms. In uncontrolled transactions, FS offers a 2% discount for quantities of 20 per order, and a 5% discount for quantities of 100 per order. If P purchases product XX in quantities of 60 per order, in the absence of other reliable information, it may reasonably be concluded that the arm’s length price to P would be $100, less a discount of 3.5%. (ii) If P purchases product XX in quantities of 1,000 per order, a reliable estimate of the appropriate volume discount must be based on proper economic or statistical analysis, not necessarily a linear extrapolation from the 2% and 5% catalog discounts applicable to sales of 20 and 100 units, respectively ...

Differences in volume. USP, a United States agricultural exporter, regularly buys transportation services from FSub, its foreign subsidiary, to ship its products from the United States to overseas markets. Although FSub occasionally provides transportation services to URA, an unrelated domestic corporation, URA accounts for only 10% of the gross revenues of FSub, and the remaining 90% of FSub’s gross revenues are attributable to FSub’s transactions with USP. In determining the degree of comparability between FSub’s uncontrolled transaction with URA and its controlled transaction with USP, the difference in volumes involved in the two transactions and the regularity with which these services are provided must be taken into account if such difference would have a material effect on the price charged. Inability to make reliable adjustments for these differences would affect the reliability of the results derived from the uncontrolled transaction as a measure of the arm’s length result ...

The following examples illustrate this paragraph (d)(3)(ii) ...

In the absence of a written agreement, the district director may impute a contractual agreement between the controlled taxpayers consistent with the economic substance of the transaction. In determining the economic substance of the transaction, greatest weight will be given to the actual conduct of the parties and their respective legal rights (see, for example, § 1.482-4(f)(3) (Ownership of intangible property)). For example, if, without a written agreement, a controlled taxpayer operates at full capacity and regularly sells all of its output to another member of its controlled group, the district director may impute a purchasing contract from the course of conduct of the controlled taxpayers, and determine that the producer bears little risk that the buyer will fail to purchase its full output. Further, if an established industry convention or usage of trade assigns a risk or resolves an issue, that convention or usage will be followed if the conduct of the taxpayers is consistent with it. See UCC 1-205. For example, unless otherwise agreed, payment generally is due at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive goods. See UCC 2-310 ...

The contractual terms, including the consequent allocation of risks, that are agreed to in writing before the transactions are entered into will be respected if such terms are consistent with the economic substance of the underlying transactions. In evaluating economic substance, greatest weight will be given to the actual conduct of the parties, and the respective legal rights of the parties (see, for example, § 1.482-4(f)(3) (Ownership of intangible property)). If the contractual terms are inconsistent with the economic substance of the underlying transaction, the district director may disregard such terms and impute terms that are consistent with the economic substance of the transaction ...

...

Determining the degree of comparability between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions requires a comparison of the significant contractual terms that could affect the results of the two transactions. These terms include – (1) The form of consideration charged or paid; (2) Sales or purchase volume; (3) The scope and terms of warranties provided; (4) Rights to updates, revisions or modifications; (5) The duration of relevant license, contract or other agreements, and termination or renegotiation rights; (6) Collateral transactions or ongoing business relationships between the buyer and the seller, including arrangements for the provision of ancillary or subsidiary services; and (7) Extension of credit and payment terms. Thus, for example, if the time for payment of the amount charged in a controlled transaction differs from the time for payment of the amount charged in an uncontrolled transaction, an adjustment to reflect the difference in payment terms should be made if such difference would have a material effect on price. Such comparability adjustment is required even if no interest would be allocated or imputed under § 1.482-2(a) or other applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code or regulations ...

...

Whether a controlled transaction produces an arm’s length result is generally evaluated by comparing the results of that transaction to results realized by uncontrolled taxpayers engaged in comparable transactions under comparable circumstances. For this purpose, the comparability of transactions and circumstances must be evaluated considering all factors that could affect prices or profits in arm’s length dealings (comparability factors). While a specific comparability factor may be of particular importance in applying a method, each method requires analysis of all of the factors that affect comparability under that method. Such factors include the following – (i) Functions; (ii) Contractual terms; (iii) Risks; (iv) Economic conditions; and (v) Property or services ...

The terms and conditions of a financial transaction between independent enterprises are usually explicitly stated in a written agreement. However, between associated enterprises the contractual arrangements may not always provide information in sufficient detail or may be inconsistent with the actual conduct of the parties or other facts and circumstances. It is therefore necessary to look to other documents, the actual conduct of the parties – notwithstanding that such consideration may ultimately result in the conclusion that the contractual form and actual conduct are in alignment – and the economic principles that generally govern relationships between independent enterprises in comparable circumstances in order to accurately delineate the actual transaction in accordance with Section D.1.1 of Chapter I ...

Another aspect that may be necessary to examine in assessing whether the conditions of an arrangement in relation to an indemnification clause are arm’s length, is the remuneration of the transactions that are the object of the arrangement and the financial conditions of the termination thereof, as both can be inter-related. In effect, the terms of a termination clause (or the absence thereof) may be a significant element of the functional analysis of the transactions and specifically of the analysis of the risks of the parties, and may accordingly need to be taken into account in the determination of an arm’s length remuneration for the transactions. Similarly, the remuneration of the transactions will affect the determination of whether the conditions of the termination of the arrangement are at arm’s length ...

Where no written terms exist, or where the facts of the case, including the conduct of the parties, differ from the written terms of any agreement between them or supplement these written terms, the actual transaction must be deduced from the facts as established, including the conduct of the parties (see Section D. 1.1 of Chapter I). It is, therefore, good practice for associated enterprises to document their decisions and intentions regarding the allocation of significant rights in intangibles. Documentation of such decisions and intentions, including written agreements, should generally be in place at or before the time that associated enterprises enter into transactions leading to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles ...

Legal rights and contractual arrangements form the starting point for any transfer pricing analysis of transactions involving intangibles. The terms of a transaction may be found in written contracts, public records such as patent or trademark registrations, or in correspondence and/or other communications among the parties. Contracts may describe the roles, responsibilities and rights of associated enterprises with respect to intangibles. They may describe which entity or entities provide funding, undertake research and development, maintain and protect intangibles, and perform functions necessary to exploit the intangibles, such as manufacturing, marketing and distribution. They may describe how receipts and expenses of the MNE associated with intangibles are to be allocated and may specify the form and amount of payment to all members of the group for their contributions. The prices and other conditions contained in such contracts may or may not be consistent with the arm’s length principle ...

The following example illustrates the concept of determining the actual transaction where a transaction has not been identified by the MNE. In reviewing the commercial or financial relations between Company P and its subsidiary companies, it is observed that those subsidiaries receive services from an independent party engaged by Company P. Company P pays for the services, the subsidiaries do not reimburse Company P directly or indirectly through the pricing of another transaction and there is no service agreement in place between Company P and the subsidiaries. The conclusion is that, in addition to a provision of services by the independent party to the subsidiaries, there are commercial or financial relations between Company P and the subsidiaries, which transfer potential value from Company P to the subsidiaries. The analysis would need to determine the nature of those commercial or financial relations from the economically relevant characteristics in order to determine the terms and conditions of the identified transaction ...

Where no written terms exist, the actual transaction would need to be deduced from the evidence of actual conduct provided by identifying the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction. In some circumstances the actual outcome of commercial or financial relations may not have been identified as a transaction by the MNE, but nevertheless may result in a transfer of material value, the terms of which would need to be deduced from the conduct of the parties. For example, technical assistance may have been granted, synergies may have been created through deliberate concerted action (as discussed in Section D.8), or know-how may have been provided through seconded employees or otherwise. These relations may not have been recognised by the MNE, may not be reflected in the pricing of other connected transactions, may not have been formalised in written contracts, and may not appear as entries in the accounting systems. Where the transaction has not been formalised, all aspects would need to be deduced from available evidence of the conduct of the parties, including what functions are actually performed, what assets are actually used, and what risks are actually assumed by each of the parties ...

The following example illustrates the concept of differences between written contractual terms and conduct of the parties, with the result that the actual conduct of the parties delineates the transaction. Company S is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Company P. The parties have entered into a written contract pursuant to which Company P licenses intellectual property to Company S for use in Company S’s business; Company S agrees to compensate Company P for the licence with a royalty. Evidence provided by other economically relevant characteristics, and in particular the functions performed, establishes that Company P performs negotiations with third-party customers to achieve sales for Company S, provides regular technical services support to Company S so that Company S can deliver contracted sales to its customers, and regularly provides staff to enable Company S to fulfil customer contracts. A majority of customers insist on including Company P as joint contracting party along with Company S, although fee income under the contract is payable to Company S. The analysis of the commercial or financial relations indicates that Company S is not capable of providing the contracted services to customers without significant support from Company P, and is not developing its own capability. Under the contract, Company P has given a licence to Company S, but in fact controls the business risk and output of Company S such that it has not transferred risk and function consistent with a licensing arrangement, and acts not as the licensor but the principal. The identification of the actual transaction between Company P and Company S should not be defined solely by the terms of the written contract. Instead, the actual transaction should be determined from the conduct of the parties, leading to the conclusion that the actual functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed by the parties are not consistent with the written licence agreement ...

Where there is doubt as to what transaction was agreed between the associated enterprises, it is necessary to take into account all the relevant evidence from the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction. In doing so one must bear in mind that the terms of the transaction between the enterprises may change over time. Where there has been a change in the terms of a transaction, the circumstances surrounding the change should be examined to determine whether the change indicates that the original transaction has been replaced through a new transaction with effect from the date of the change, or whether the change reflects the intentions of the parties in the original transaction. Particular care should be exercised where it appears that any changes may have been triggered by knowledge of emerging outcomes from the transaction. Changes made in the purported assumption of a risk when risk outcomes are known do not involve an assumption of risk since there is no longer any risk, as discussed in paragraph 1.78 ...

In transactions between independent enterprises, the divergence of interests between the parties ensures (i) that contractual terms are concluded that reflect the interests of both of the parties, (ii) that the parties will ordinarily seek to hold each other to the terms of the contract, and (iii) that contractual terms will be ignored or modified after the fact generally only if it is in the interests of both parties. The same divergence of interests may not exist in the case of associated enterprises or any such divergences may be managed in ways facilitated by the control relationship and not solely or mainly through contractual agreements. It is, therefore, particularly important in considering the commercial or financial relations between associated enterprises to examine whether the arrangements reflected in the actual conduct of the parties substantially conform to the terms of any written contract, or whether the associated enterprises’ actual conduct indicates that the contractual terms have not been followed, do not reflect a complete picture of the transactions, have been incorrectly characterised or labelled by the enterprises, or are a sham. Where conduct is not fully consistent with economically significant contractual terms, further analysis is required to identify the actual transaction. Where there are material differences between contractual terms and the conduct of the associated enterprises in their relations with one another, the functions they actually perform, the assets they actually use, and the risks they actually assume, considered in the context of the contractual terms, should ultimately determine the factual substance and accurately delineate the actual transaction ...

If the characteristics of the transaction that are economically relevant are inconsistent with the written contract between the associated enterprises, the actual transaction should generally be delineated for purposes of the transfer pricing analysis in accordance with the characteristics of the transaction reflected in the conduct of the parties ...

The following example illustrates the concept of clarifying and supplementing the written contractual terms based on the identification of the actual commercial or financial relations. Company P is the parent company of an MNE group situated in Country P. Company S, situated in Country S, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Company P and acts as an agent for Company P’s branded products in the Country S market. The agency contract between Company P and Company S is silent about any marketing and advertising activities in Country S that the parties should perform. Analysis of other economically relevant characteristics and in particular the functions performed, determines that Company S launched an intensive media campaign in Country S in order to develop brand awareness. This campaign represents a significant investment for Company S. Based on evidence provided by the conduct of the parties, it could be concluded that the written contract may not reflect the full extent of the commercial or financial relations between the parties. Accordingly, the analysis should not be limited by the terms recorded in the written contract, but further evidence should be sought as to the conduct of the parties, including as to the basis upon which Company S undertook the media campaign ...

However, the written contracts alone are unlikely to provide all the information necessary to perform a transfer pricing analysis, or to provide information regarding the relevant contractual terms in sufficient detail. Further information will be required by taking into consideration evidence of the commercial or financial relations provided by the economically relevant characteristics in the other four categories (see paragraph 1.36): the functions performed by each of the parties to the transaction, taking into account assets used and risks assumed, together with the characteristics of property transferred or services provided, the economic circumstances of the parties and of the market in which the parties operate, and the business strategies pursued by the parties. Taken together, the analysis of economically relevant characteristics in all five categories provides evidence of the actual conduct of the associated enterprises. The evidence may clarify aspects of the written contractual arrangements by providing useful and consistent information. If the contract neither explicitly nor implicitly (taking into account applicable principles of contract interpretation) addresses characteristics of the transaction that are economically relevant, then any information provided by the contract should be supplemented for purposes of the transfer pricing analysis by the evidence provided by identifying those characteristics ...

A transaction is the consequence or expression of the commercial or financial relations between the parties. The controlled transactions may have been formalised in written contracts which may reflect the intention of the parties at the time the contract was concluded in relation to aspects of the transaction covered by the contract, including in typical cases the division of responsibilities, obligations and rights, assumption of identified risks, and pricing arrangements. Where a transaction has been formalised by the associated enterprises through written contractual agreements, those agreements provide the starting point for delineating the transaction between them and how the responsibilities, risks, and anticipated outcomes arising from their interaction were intended to be divided at the time of entering into the contract. The terms of a transaction may also be found in communications between the parties other than a written contract ...

Furniture S.A is engaged in the production and sale of furniture and had established a US subsidiary to market and sell furniture overseas. The pricing of the controlled transactions with the US subsidiary had been based on a resale price method, which resulted in prices amounting to 70% of the list price for the products. The Portuguese tax authority issued an assessment for FY 2015 and 2016, where the pricing of the controlled transaction had been adjusted in accordance with the price list resulting in additional taxable profits. Result reached in the arbitration tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the additional assessment of income in respect of the transfer pricing adjustment. Excerpts “…In the contract concluded with E… the Claimant safeguarded direct sales to large customers (with volume to fill a given number of containers). In practice, despite this safeguard, it is apparent from the evidence produced that the only major customer in the US since then has been E… and, in particular, no business was conducted with any major US customer in the years 2015 and 2016. Therefore, it is not possible to identify, as there is no internal comparable in the transactions carried out by the Claimant with unrelated entities in the US market. In fact, the comparable used by the Tax and Customs Authority are the list prices of direct (end) customers of the Claimant, in relation to which the comparability factors required for the application of the transfer pricing regime are not demonstrated, namely the comparable market price method used by the Tax and Customs Authority. In fact, to compare commercial transactions carried out with wholesalers (on the one hand) with transactions carried out with retailers and direct addressees (on the other hand), is to compare substantially different realities, since the intervention of wholesalers in the marketing circuit necessarily implies that prices are charged that ensure them a profit margin, which does not occur in sales made directly to retailers. Indeed, it is unsustainable, from an economic point of view, that, in purchases from the Plaintiff for subsequent resale to retailers, an independent wholesale intermediary would accept a price that would not allow it to remunerate itself with a margin (aimed at covering its costs plus a remuneration). Therefore, it cannot be considered proven that the price that would be charged between the Claimant and E…, if the latter were an independent wholesaler, would be the price charged by the Claimant with retailers. On the other hand, the quantities sold by the Claimant to E… are different (much higher) than those sold to other direct customers of the Claimant in the US market and the quantity of goods sold is one of the factors “likely to influence the price of the transactions” expressly provided for in paragraph a) of no. 5 of Ordinance no. 1446-C/2001. Furthermore, the conditions under which marketing is carried out are also different, as none of the operations carried out with direct retail customers were subject to the conditions agreed in the contract entered into between the Claimant and E… and “the contractual terms and conditions that define, explicitly or implicitly, the manner in which responsibilities, risks and profits are shared between the parties involved in the operation”, are comparability factors that sub-paragraph b) of article 5 of Ordinance 1446-C/2001 requires to be weighed. In this context, it must be taken into account that the deferral of payment allowed to a wholly owned entity does not imply bearing an economic risk similar to that inherent to transactions with independent entities. In this context, as there are unique characteristics in the transactions of the Claimant with E…, the lack of adequacy of the comparable market price method is evident, as it “requires the highest degree of comparability with incidence both on the object and other terms and conditions of the transaction and on the functional analysis of the intervening entities” (article 6, no. 1, of Ministerial Order no. 1446-C/2001). This lack of appropriateness of the comparable market price method is confirmed by paragraph a) of no. 2 of the same article 6 of Ministerial Order 1446-C/2001, from which it follows that, as regards the use of internal comparables, this method cannot be used when there is no “transaction of the same nature having as its object an identical or similar service or product, in like quantity or value, and under substantially identical terms and conditions, with an independent entity in the same or similar markets”. Lastly, it should be emphasised that, as tax arbitration proceedings are an alternative to judicial review proceedings (Article 124(2) of Law 3-B/2010 of 28 April 2010), they are, like the latter, a procedural means of mere legality which aims to eliminate the effects produced by illegal acts, annulling them or declaring their nullity or non-existence [Articles 2 of the RJAT and 99 of the RJAT]. Therefore, the acts must be assessed as they were performed. Therefore, it is not in question to assess whether the application by the Claimant of the transfer pricing regime (for example, in relation to the use of the Minimum Resale Price Method provided for in article 7 of Ministerial Order no. 1446-C/2001) was correct or not, but to determine whether the corrections made by the Tax and Customs Authority have legal support. In the case at issue, the corrections are illegal due to an error in the choice of the comparable market price method and its application to a situation in which the legal requirements for its application are not met. Therefore, it must be concluded that the corrections made by the Portuguese Tax and Customs Authority based on the transfer pricing system are vitiated by error on the assumptions of law. This error justifies the annulment of the corrections, under the terms of article 163, no. 1, of the Administrative Procedure Code, applicable subsidiarily under the terms of article 2, paragraph c), of the LGT. The request for arbitral award regarding these corrections being granted, the knowledge of the remaining defects imputed to ...

Furniture S.A is engaged in the production and sale of furniture and had established a US subsidiary to market and sell furniture overseas. The pricing of the controlled transactions with the US subsidiary had been based on a resale price method, which resulted in prices amounting to 70% of the list price for the products. The Portuguese tax authority issued an assessment, where the pricing of the controlled transaction had been adjusted in accordance with the price list resulting in additional taxable profits. Result reached in the arbitration tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the additional assessment of income in respect of the transfer pricing adjustment. Excerpts “… The application of the principle of comparability must be based on an individual analysis of the transactions, with a view to comparing the conditions practiced in a transaction between related entities and those practiced between independent entities. As it results from the matter of fact given as settled, the creation by the Claimant of a subsidiary based in the United States of America was determined by the bankruptcy of its main US customer and had the purpose of maintaining and boosting the commercial relationship with that market and minimizing the costs of local transportation, storage and packaging of the products sold to retailers and the agency of local intermediaries. The contract for the supply of products and goods entered into between the Claimant and the subsidiary sets out precise rules regarding the commercial relationship established between the parties and the charges that each of the contracting parties assumes in relation to the marketing of the furniture manufactured by the Claimant (clauses five and six). The same contract expressly contemplates the possibility of the direct sale of the products and goods to other customers residing in the United States of America without prior authorisation of the subsidiary (clause four). In this context, the invoicing of the supplies made to the subsidiary for 70% of the price list practiced in the sales directly made by the Applicant in the North American market constitutes a reasonable profit margin, which is intended not only to remunerate the activity of reselling the products, but also to compensate the marketing costs incurred by the counterparty and to which it is contractually bound. It is not possible to consider, under this condition, that the Claimant violates the arm’s length by stipulating, in relation to its subsidiary, a lower price than that practiced in direct sales, when it is certain that the comparison established by the Tax Authority is made with the direct clients of the Claimant without considering the comparability factors between the tied and the non-tied operations, namely with regard to the contractual terms and conditions that define how responsibilities, risks, and profits are shared between the parties involved in any of those operations. Therefore, regardless of the most appropriate method for determining transfer prices, the tax correction, in this regard, proves to be illegal due to the incorrect interpretation and application of the transfer pricing regime by the Claimant.” Click here for English translation. Click here for other translation P14_2021-T - 2021-11-23 ...

“Tobacco S.A.” is the parent company of a group active in the tobacco industry. C. SA is a subsidiary of the group and operates as a toll manufacturer (Toller) on behalf of another subsidiary, B S.A. For the manufacturing services provided C S.A receives a “toll fee” from B S.A. According to the manufacturing service agreement the toll fee is calculated, based on Toller’s production costs plus and the capital invested by Toller in the production. Following an audit the tax authorities issued an additional assessment of corporate income tax and compensatory interest, relating to FY 2009, in the amount of EUR 1,395,039.79. The tax authorities considered that i) to correct the value of the production costs of the year 2009, in the amount corresponding to the deduction of the income with the “Write Off” of several credit balances of third parties over the company, since these deductions were not provided for in the contract; ii) to correct the value of the return on invested capital [which in the contract and also in the sentence is designated by the acronym ROCE] because the rules of the contract for its determination were not respected, which resulted in a lower remuneration by C. S.A. and in a cost saving by its contractual counterpart, leading to a result that is not compatible with the arm’s length principle. An appeal was filed against the assessment, but the tax tribunal of Lisbon dismissed the appeal and upheld the assessment. An appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. Tobacco S.A. claimed that it did not in any way breach the contract for the provision of production services as it applied the POC rules when calculating the toll fee. Thus, it must be concluded that the correction made by the Tax Authority and confirmed by the Court of Appeal and which is claimed to be exclusively based on the incorrect interpretation of the contract by the Appellant is illegal due to the violation of the law. Moreover, according to Tobacco S.A, the tax authorities made an error on the assumptions, since it corrected the calculation of the value of the return on invested capital based on different rules from those which, in its interpretation, result from the contract. The appellant had made the calculations according to the statutory accounts (POC accounts), in compliance with the provisions of Annex B to the contract, and the Tax Authorities decided to correct those values by applying the values contained in Annexes C and D (US GAAP accounting classifications), which, according to the appellant, have the sole function of “allowing uniform intra-group reporting, essentially of a management nature”. “(…) as to the corrections to the ROCE, in the amount of €2,965,761.08, the appellant claims that, by disregarding the POC accounts and considering the US GAAP accounts, the Tax Authorities followed an understanding that does not prove to be correct and is distant from that provided for in the agreements entered into. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the case, as it considered to lack jurisdiction in regards to a judgment on the factual matter. The case was therefore officially transferred to the South Administrative Central Court. Excerpt “… Therefore, the Supreme Administrative Court is reserved the role of a review court, with intervention only in cases where the matter of fact in dispute in the case is stabilised and only the law remains under discussion. In order to assess the competence of the Supreme Administrative Court on the grounds of hierarchy, it is necessary to consider, in principle, only the content of the conclusions of the appeal statements (since these define the object and delimit the scope of the appeal – cf. It is necessary, in principle, to look only at the content of the conclusions of the appeal statement (since the object and scope of the appeal are defined by those conclusions – see Article 635 of the CPC) and check whether, in the light of those conclusions, the questions in dispute are resolved exclusively by applying and interpreting legal norms or whether, on the contrary, consideration of them implies the need to settle questions of fact (either because the appellant maintains that the facts presented as proved in the judgment have not been proved, or because he disagrees with the conclusions of fact to be drawn from them, or, still, because he invokes facts which have not been presented as proved and which are not, in the abstract, irrelevant for the judgment of the case). But not only this, it may also be necessary to compare the conclusions with the very substance of the allegations in the appeal, in particular to check whether they expressly contradict the facts on which the decision is based. And if the appellant raises any issue of fact, the appeal will no longer be based exclusively on points of law, and the competence of the Central Administrative Court will be defined from the outset, regardless of the possibility that this Court may eventually conclude that the disagreement on the factual issue is irrelevant for the decision of the appeal. However, the problem, in this case, of the correct interpretation of the contractual clauses on the basis of which the accounts (the accounting system) that are to serve as the basis for the calculation of the taxable amount are defined, is still a matter of fact. Although it is accepted that it may be qualified as a mixed matter (of fact and law), as it involves, on the one hand, the interpretation of the will of the contractual parties in determining the accounts that they intended to use in the calculation of the taxable amount for the purposes of taxation in Portugal of C……… (factual judgment) and, on the other hand, the normative interpretation of the contractual and legal clauses that define the arm’s length principle in the scope of legal transactions between persons that are in a special relationship with each other (transfer pricing), the truth is ...

The terms and conditions of a financial transaction between independent enterprises are usually explicitly stated in a written agreement. However, between associated enterprises the contractual arrangements may not always provide information in sufficient detail or may be inconsistent with the actual conduct of the parties or other facts and circumstances. It is therefore necessary to look to other documents, the actual conduct of the parties – notwithstanding that such consideration may ultimately result in the conclusion that the contractual form and actual conduct are in alignment – and the economic principles that generally govern relationships between independent enterprises in comparable circumstances in order to accurately delineate the actual transaction in accordance with Section D.1.1 of Chapter I ...

Another aspect that may be necessary to examine in assessing whether the conditions of an arrangement in relation to an indemnification clause are arm’s length, is the remuneration of the transactions that are the object of the arrangement and the financial conditions of the termination thereof, as both can be inter-related. In effect, the terms of a termination clause (or the absence thereof) may be a significant element of the functional analysis of the transactions and specifically of the analysis of the risks of the parties, and may accordingly need to be taken into account in the determination of an arm’s length remuneration for the transactions. Similarly, the remuneration of the transactions will affect the determination of whether the conditions of the termination of the arrangement are at arm’s length ...

Where no written terms exist, or where the facts of the case, including the conduct of the parties, differ from the written terms of any agreement between them or supplement these written terms, the actual transaction must be deduced from the facts as established, including the conduct of the parties (see Section D. 1.1 of Chapter I). It is, therefore, good practice for associated enterprises to document their decisions and intentions regarding the allocation of significant rights in intangibles. Documentation of such decisions and intentions, including written agreements, should generally be in place at or before the time that associated enterprises enter into transactions leading to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles ...

Legal rights and contractual arrangements form the starting point for any transfer pricing analysis of transactions involving intangibles. The terms of a transaction may be found in written contracts, public records such as patent or trademark registrations, or in correspondence and/or other communications among the parties. Contracts may describe the roles, responsibilities and rights of associated enterprises with respect to intangibles. They may describe which entity or entities provide funding, undertake research and development, maintain and protect intangibles, and perform functions necessary to exploit the intangibles, such as manufacturing, marketing and distribution. They may describe how receipts and expenses of the MNE associated with intangibles are to be allocated and may specify the form and amount of payment to all members of the group for their contributions. The prices and other conditions contained in such contracts may or may not be consistent with the arm’s length principle ...

The following example illustrates the concept of determining the actual transaction where a transaction has not been identified by the MNE. In reviewing the commercial or financial relations between Company P and its subsidiary companies, it is observed that those subsidiaries receive services from an independent party engaged by Company P. Company P pays for the services, the subsidiaries do not reimburse Company P directly or indirectly through the pricing of another transaction and there is no service agreement in place between Company P and the subsidiaries. The conclusion is that, in addition to a provision of services by the independent party to the subsidiaries, there are commercial or financial relations between Company P and the subsidiaries, which transfer potential value from Company P to the subsidiaries. The analysis would need to determine the nature of those commercial or financial relations from the economically relevant characteristics in order to determine the terms and conditions of the identified transaction ...

Where no written terms exist, the actual transaction would need to be deduced from the evidence of actual conduct provided by identifying the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction. In some circumstances the actual outcome of commercial or financial relations may not have been identified as a transaction by the MNE, but nevertheless may result in a transfer of material value, the terms of which would need to be deduced from the conduct of the parties. For example, technical assistance may have been granted, synergies may have been created through deliberate concerted action (as discussed in Section D.8), or know-how may have been provided through seconded employees or otherwise. These relations may not have been recognised by the MNE, may not be reflected in the pricing of other connected transactions, may not have been formalised in written contracts, and may not appear as entries in the accounting systems. Where the transaction has not been formalised, all aspects would need to be deduced from available evidence of the conduct of the parties, including what functions are actually performed, what assets are actually used, and what risks are actually assumed by each of the parties ...

The following example illustrates the concept of differences between written contractual terms and conduct of the parties, with the result that the actual conduct of the parties delineates the transaction. Company S is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Company P. The parties have entered into a written contract pursuant to which Company P licenses intellectual property to Company S for use in Company S’s business; Company S agrees to compensate Company P for the licence with a royalty. Evidence provided by other economically relevant characteristics, and in particular the functions performed, establishes that Company P performs negotiations with third-party customers to achieve sales for Company S, provides regular technical services support to Company S so that Company S can deliver contracted sales to its customers, and regularly provides staff to enable Company S to fulfil customer contracts. A majority of customers insist on including Company P as joint contracting party along with Company S, although fee income under the contract is payable to Company S. The analysis of the commercial or financial relations indicates that Company S is not capable of providing the contracted services to customers without significant support from Company P, and is not developing its own capability. Under the contract, Company P has given a licence to Company S, but in fact controls the business risk and output of Company S such that it has not transferred risk and function consistent with a licensing arrangement, and acts not as the licensor but the principal. The identification of the actual transaction between Company P and Company S should not be defined solely by the terms of the written contract. Instead, the actual transaction should be determined from the conduct of the parties, leading to the conclusion that the actual functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed by the parties are not consistent with the written licence agreement ...

Where there is doubt as to what transaction was agreed between the associated enterprises, it is necessary to take into account all the relevant evidence from the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction. In doing so one must bear in mind that the terms of the transaction between the enterprises may change over time. Where there has been a change in the terms of a transaction, the circumstances surrounding the change should be examined to determine whether the change indicates that the original transaction has been replaced through a new transaction with effect from the date of the change, or whether the change reflects the intentions of the parties in the original transaction. Particular care should be exercised where it appears that any changes may have been triggered by knowledge of emerging outcomes from the transaction. Changes made in the purported assumption of a risk when risk outcomes are known do not involve an assumption of risk since there is no longer any risk, as discussed in paragraph 1.78 ...

In transactions between independent enterprises, the divergence of interests between the parties ensures (i) that contractual terms are concluded that reflect the interests of both of the parties, (ii) that the parties will ordinarily seek to hold each other to the terms of the contract, and (iii) that contractual terms will be ignored or modified after the fact generally only if it is in the interests of both parties. The same divergence of interests may not exist in the case of associated enterprises or any such divergences may be managed in ways facilitated by the control relationship and not solely or mainly through contractual agreements. It is, therefore, particularly important in considering the commercial or financial relations between associated enterprises to examine whether the arrangements reflected in the actual conduct of the parties substantially conform to the terms of any written contract, or whether the associated enterprises’ actual conduct indicates that the contractual terms have not been followed, do not reflect a complete picture of the transactions, have been incorrectly characterised or labelled by the enterprises, or are a sham. Where conduct is not fully consistent with economically significant contractual terms, further analysis is required to identify the actual transaction. Where there are material differences between contractual terms and the conduct of the associated enterprises in their relations with one another, the functions they actually perform, the assets they actually use, and the risks they actually assume, considered in the context of the contractual terms, should ultimately determine the factual substance and accurately delineate the actual transaction ...

If the characteristics of the transaction that are economically relevant are inconsistent with the written contract between the associated enterprises, the actual transaction should generally be delineated for purposes of the transfer pricing analysis in accordance with the characteristics of the transaction reflected in the conduct of the parties ...

The following example illustrates the concept of clarifying and supplementing the written contractual terms based on the identification of the actual commercial or financial relations. Company P is the parent company of an MNE group situated in Country P. Company S, situated in Country S, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Company P and acts as an agent for Company P’s branded products in the Country S market. The agency contract between Company P and Company S is silent about any marketing and advertising activities in Country S that the parties should perform. Analysis of other economically relevant characteristics and in particular the functions performed, determines that Company S launched an intensive media campaign in Country S in order to develop brand awareness. This campaign represents a significant investment for Company S. Based on evidence provided by the conduct of the parties, it could be concluded that the written contract may not reflect the full extent of the commercial or financial relations between the parties. Accordingly, the analysis should not be limited by the terms recorded in the written contract, but further evidence should be sought as to the conduct of the parties, including as to the basis upon which Company S undertook the media campaign ...

However, the written contracts alone are unlikely to provide all the information necessary to perform a transfer pricing analysis, or to provide information regarding the relevant contractual terms in sufficient detail. Further information will be required by taking into consideration evidence of the commercial or financial relations provided by the economically relevant characteristics in the other four categories (see paragraph 1.36): the functions performed by each of the parties to the transaction, taking into account assets used and risks assumed, together with the characteristics of property transferred or services provided, the economic circumstances of the parties and of the market in which the parties operate, and the business strategies pursued by the parties. Taken together, the analysis of economically relevant characteristics in all five categories provides evidence of the actual conduct of the associated enterprises. The evidence may clarify aspects of the written contractual arrangements by providing useful and consistent information. If the contract neither explicitly nor implicitly (taking into account applicable principles of contract interpretation) addresses characteristics of the transaction that are economically relevant, then any information provided by the contract should be supplemented for purposes of the transfer pricing analysis by the evidence provided by identifying those characteristics ...

A transaction is the consequence or expression of the commercial or financial relations between the parties. The controlled transactions may have been formalised in written contracts which may reflect the intention of the parties at the time the contract was concluded in relation to aspects of the transaction covered by the contract, including in typical cases the division of responsibilities, obligations and rights, assumption of identified risks, and pricing arrangements. Where a transaction has been formalised by the associated enterprises through written contractual agreements, those agreements provide the starting point for delineating the transaction between them and how the responsibilities, risks, and anticipated outcomes arising from their interaction were intended to be divided at the time of entering into the contract. The terms of a transaction may also be found in communications between the parties other than a written contract ...