A AB is part of an international group. The group was planning a reorganisation involving a number of intra-group transactions. As part of this reorganisation, A AB would acquire all the shares in B from the group company C. The acquisition would mainly be financed by A AB taking a loan from group company D, which is domiciled in another EU country. The terms of the loan, including the interest rate, would be at market terms. A AB requested an advance ruling to know whether the deduction of the interest expenses on the debt to D could be denied on the grounds that the debt relationship had been incurred exclusively or almost exclusively for the purpose of obtaining a significant tax advantage or because the acquisition of B was not essentially commercially motivated. If the interest was subject to non-deductibility, A AB wanted to know whether this would constitute an unauthorised restriction of the freedom of establishment under the EC Treaty. The Board of Advance Tax Rulings concluded that deductions for interest expenses could not be denied. Not agreeing with this ruling the tax authority filed an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgment of the Court The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the Board of Advance Tax Rulings. Although the interest expenses were covered by the Acquisition Rule, it would be in breach of Article 49 TFEU (freedom of establishment) to deny the interest deductions. Excerpt “16. In the case HFD 2021 ref. 68, the Supreme Administrative Court found, with reference to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Lexel (C-484/19, EU:C:2021:34), that the provision in Chapter 24, Section 18, second paragraph, of the Tax Code constitutes a restriction of the freedom of establishment which cannot be justified if it is applied to interest payments to companies in other Member States in situations where the companies involved would have been subject to the provisions on group contributions if both companies had been Swedish (paragraph 37). 17. According to the second paragraph of Section 18, interest expenses may not be deducted if the debt relationship has arisen exclusively or almost exclusively in order to obtain a significant tax advantage for the community of interest. According to its wording, the provision makes no distinction between interest paid to Swedish and foreign recipients. The reason why the provision is nevertheless considered to constitute a restriction on the freedom of establishment is that, as stated in the preparatory works, it is not intended to cover interest payments between companies covered by the provisions on group contributions. Such an interest payment is not considered to give rise to any tax advantage since the same result can be achieved with group contributions (Proposition 2012/13:1, pp. 254 and 334, and HFD 2021 ref. 68, paragraph 29, with reference to Lexel, paragraphs 35-44). 18. The question is whether there is reason to assess the provision in Chapter 24, section 19, first paragraph, of the Tax Code differently. According to that provision, interest expenses relating to an intra-group loan to finance an intra-group acquisition of participatory rights are not deductible if the acquisition is not essentially motivated by commercial considerations. Nor does that provision, according to its wording, make any distinction between interest paid to Swedish and foreign recipients. 19. In the first paragraph of Section 19, the prohibition of deduction has not, as in the second paragraph of Section 18, been made dependent on the existence of a possible tax advantage, but on what the borrowed capital has been used for, namely an intra-group acquisition of shareholding rights which is not essentially commercially motivated. Although the provision does not expressly state anything about tax benefits, in the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court, it cannot be ignored that it is part of a system of rules whose overall purpose is to counteract tax planning with interest deductions. It is clear from the travaux préparatoires that the provision in Section 19, first paragraph also has this purpose (Government Bill 2017/18:245, pp. 193 and 366 et seq.). 20. It can thus be concluded from the travaux préparatoires that the provision in Section 19, first paragraph, is not intended to cover interest payments that do not entail any tax benefit, which is the case when the companies involved are covered by the provisions on group contributions. The refusal of a deduction for interest paid to companies in other Member States on the basis of the first paragraph of Section 19 may therefore, in the same way as when a deduction is refused on the basis of the second paragraph of Section 18, be regarded as entailing a difference in the treatment of domestic and cross-border situations which is, in principle, impermissible. 21. In HFD 2021 ref. 68, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the difference in treatment resulting from the provision in Chapter 24, Section 18, second paragraph, of the Income Tax Code cannot be justified by overriding reasons of public interest (paragraphs 30-36). As has been shown, the provisions in Section 18, second paragraph, and Section 19, first paragraph, have the same purpose, namely to counteract tax planning with interest deductions. Furthermore, both provisions cover transactions carried out under market conditions and are not limited to purely fictitious or artificial arrangements. The reasoning of the Court in the case is therefore equally relevant to the provision in Section 19(1). Thus, the difference in treatment resulting from that provision cannot be justified either. 22. It follows from the above that the provision in Chapter 24, Section 19, first paragraph, of the Tax Code also constitutes an unauthorised restriction of the freedom of establishment if it is applied to interest payments to companies in other Member States and the companies involved would have been subject to the provisions on group contributions if they had been Swedish. 23. It follows from the conditions submitted that A and D would have been subject to the provisions on group contributions if both companies had been Swedish. The ...

17 January 2024 the Australian Taxation Office published the final version of its Practical Compliance Guideline PCG 2024/1 Intangibles migration arrangements. The PCG has previously been released in drafts as PCG 2021/D4 and PCG 2023/D2 Intangibles arrangements. The final version sets out ATO’s compliance approach to the tax risks associated with certain cross-border related party intangibles arrangements involving: restructures or changes to arrangements involving intangible assets (referred to as ‘migrations’ in the PCG) the mischaracterisation or non-recognition of Australian activities connected with intangible assets. Changes and additions included in the final version: further clarification of the arrangements in scope exclusion of certain arrangements (‘Excluded Intangibles Arrangement’) from the scope inclusion of a ‘white zone’ for arrangements that have been subject to previous ATO audit or reviews further explaining our compliance approach, including the engagement taxpayers can expect based on the compliance risks associated with an arrangement expanding the guidance allowing taxpayers to group intangible assets or arrangements to make it easier for taxpayers apply the PCG providing more information on the reporting requirements taxpayers can expect to complete the reportable tax position schedule. ATO PCG 2024-1 18012024 ...

A Dutch company “Tobacco B.V.” belonging to an internationally operating tobacco group was subjected to (additional assessment) corporate income tax assessments according to taxable amounts of €2,850,670,712 (2013), €2,849,204,122 (2014), €2,933,077,258 (2015) and €3,067,630,743 (2016), and to penalty fines for the year 2014 of €1,614,709, for the year 2015 of €363,205 and for the year 2016 of €125,175,082. In each case, the dispute focuses on whether the fees charged by various group companies for supplies and services can be regarded as business-related. Also in dispute is whether transfer profit should have been recognised in connection with a cessation of business activities. One of the group companies provided factoring services to “Tobacco B.V.”. The factoring fee charged annually for this includes a risk fee to cover the default risk and an annual fee for other services. The court concluded that the risk was actually significantly lower than the risk assumed in determining the risk fee, that the other services were routine in nature and that the factoring fee as a whole should be qualified as impractical. “Tobacco B.V.” has not rebutted the presumption that the disadvantage caused to it by paying the factoring fees was due to the affiliation between it and the service provider. In 2016, a reorganisation took place within the tobacco group in which several agreements concluded between group companies were terminated. The court concluded that there had been a coherent set of legal acts, whereby a Dutch group company transferred its business activities in the field of exporting tobacco products, including the functions carried out therein, the risks assumed therein and the entire profit potential associated therewith, to a group company in the UK. For the adjustment related to the transfer profit, the court relies on the projected cash flows from the business and information known at the time the decision to transfer was taken. The conclusions regarding factoring and the termination of business activities in the Netherlands lead to a deficiency in the tax return for each of the years 2014 to 2016. For these years, “Tobacco B.V.” filed returns to negative taxable amounts. For the years 2014 and 2016, a substantial amount of tax due arises after correction, even if the corrections established by application of reversal and aggravation are disregarded. For the year 2015, the tax due remains zero even after correction. Had the return been followed, this would have resulted in “Tobacco B.V.” being able to achieve, through loss relief, that substantially less tax would be due than the actual tax due. At the time the returns were filed, “Tobacco B.V.” knew that this would result in a substantial amount of tax due not being levied in each of these years and the court did not find a pleading position in this regard. The burden of proof is therefore reversed and aggravated. For the year 2013, this follows from the court’s decision of 17 October 2022, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2022:8937. To finance their activities, the group companies issued listed bonds under the tobacco group’s so-called EMTN Programme, which were guaranteed by the UK parent company. A subsidiary of “Tobacco B.V.” joined in a tax group paid an annual guarantee fee to the UK parent company for this purpose. The court ruled that: – the guarantee fees are not expenses originating from the subsidiary’s acceptance of liability for debts of an affiliated company; – the EMTN Programme is not a credit arrangement within the meaning of the Umbrella Credit Judgment(ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BW6520); – “Tobacco B.V.” has made it clear that a not-for-profit fee can be determined at which an independent third party would have been willing to accept the same liability on otherwise the same terms and conditions; – “Tobacco B.V.” failed to show that in the years in which the guarantee fees were provided, credit assessments did not have to take implied guarantee into account; – “Tobacco B.V.” failed to show that its subsidiary was not of such strategic importance to the group that its derivative rating did not match the group rating, so that the guarantee fees paid are not at arm’s length due to the effect of implied guarantee in their entirety; – “Tobacco B.V.” did not put forward any contentions that could rebut the objectified presumption of awareness that follows from the size of the adjustments (the entire guarantee fee), that the disadvantage suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the payment of the guarantee fees is due to its affiliation with its parent company. A group company charges the claimant, inter alia, a fee corresponding to a percentage of “Tobacco B.V.”‘s profits (profit split) for activities on behalf of the tobacco group that result in cost savings for “Tobacco B.V.”. The court ruled that “Tobacco B.V.” failed to prove that the group company made a unique contribution to the tobacco group that could justify the agreed profit split. The group company also charges “Tobacco B.V.” a fee equivalent to a 12% mark-up on costs for services relating to the manufacture of cigarettes. The court ruled that, in the context of the reversal and aggravation of the burden of proof, it was not sufficient for “Tobacco B.V.” to refer to the functional analysis, as it was based on the incorrect premise that the group company could be compared to a manufacturer. Finally, since April 2012, “Tobacco B.V.” has been paying the group company a 10% fee on the costs excluding raw materials for the production of cigarettes as toll manufacturer, where previously the basis of this fee also included the costs of raw materials. The court noted that the flow of goods remained the same and that “Tobacco B.V.” remained operationally responsible for the production process. The court ruled that it was up to “Tobacco B.V.” to establish and prove facts from which it follows that it was businesslike to change the basis of remuneration, which it did not do sufficiently. Regarding an adjustment made by the tax authorities in relation to reorganisation costs, the court finds that the adjustment was made in error ...

Due to the economic situation of automotive suppliers in Germany in 2006, “Cutting Tech GMBH” established a subsidiary (CB) in Bosnien-Herzegovina which going forward functioned as a contract manufacturer. CB did not develop the products itself, but manufactured them according to specifications provided by “Cutting Tech GMBH”. The majority of “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s sales articles were subject to multi-stage production, which could include various combinations of production processes. In particular, “Cutting Tech GMBH” was no longer competitive in the labour-intensive manufacturing processes (cut-off grinding, turning, milling) due to the high wage level in Germany. Good contribution margins from the high-tech processes (adiabatic cutting, double face grinding) increasingly had to subsidise the losses of the labour-intensive processes. Individual production stages, however, could not be outsourced to external producers for reasons of certification and secrecy. In addition, if the production had been outsourced, there would have been a great danger that a third company would have siphoned off “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s know-how and then taken over the business with “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s customer. This could have led to large losses in turnover for “Cutting Tech GMBH”. Furthermore, some of the labour-intensive work also had to cover one or more finishing stages of the high-tech processes, so that this business was also at risk if it was outsourced. For these reasons, the decision was made to outsource the labour-intensive production processes to Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to become profitable again and to remain competitive in the future. There, there were German-speaking staff with the necessary expertise, low customs duties and a low exchange rate risk. CB functioned as a contract manufacturer with the processes of production, quality assurance and a small administrative unit. Cost advantages existed not only in personnel costs, but also in electricity costs. CB prevented the plaintiff’s good earnings from the high-tech processes in Germany from having to continue to be used to subsidise the low-tech processes. “Cutting Tech GMBH” supplied CB with the material needed for production. The deliveries were processed as sales of materials. “Cutting Tech GMBH” received as purchase prices its cost prices without offsetting profit mark-ups or handling fees/commissions. The material was purchased and supplied to CB by “Cutting Tech GMBH”, which was able to obtain more favourable purchase prices than CB due to the quantities it purchased. The work commissioned by “Cutting Tech GMBH” was carried out by CB with the purchased material and its personnel. CB then sold the products to “Cutting Tech GMBH”. In part, they were delivered directly by CB to the end customers, in part the products were further processed by “Cutting Tech GMBH” or by third-party companies. “Cutting Tech GMBH” determined the transfer prices for the products it purchased using a “contribution margin calculation”. Until 2012, “Cutting Tech GMBH” purchased all products manufactured by CB in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 2013 onwards, CB generated its own sales with the external company P. This was a former customer of “Cutting Tech GMBH”. Since “Cutting Tech GMBH” could not offer competitive prices to the customer P in the case of production in Germany, CB took over the latter’s orders and supplied P with the products it manufactured in accordance with the contracts concluded. CB did not have its own distribution in the years in dispute. The tax audit of FY 2011 – 2013 The auditor assumed that the transfer of functions and risks to CB in 2007/2008 basically fulfilled the facts of a transfer of functions. However, since only a routine function had been transferred, “Cutting Tech GMBH” had rightly carried out the transfer of functions without paying any special remuneration. Due to CB’s limited exposure to risks, the auditor considered that the cost-plus method should be used for transfer pricing. In adjusting the transfer prices, the auditor assumed a mark-up rate of 12%. The material invoiced by “Cutting Tech GMBH” and the scrap proceeds was not included in the cost basis used in the assessment. For 2013, the auditor took into account that the customer P had agreed contracts exclusively with CB and reduced the costs by the costs of the products sold to P. Furthermore, the auditor took the legal view that the entire audit period should be considered uniformly. Therefore, it was appropriate to deduct an amount of €64,897 in 2011, which had been calculated in favour of “Cutting Tech GMBH” in 2010 and not taken into account in the tax assessment notices, in order to correct the error. The auditor did not consider it justified to determine the transfer prices for “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s purchases of goods by means of a so-called contribution margin calculation. Based on the functional and risk analysis, the auditor concluded that CB was a contract manufacturer. On the grounds that this profit of CB was remuneration for a routine function, the auditor refrained from recognising a vGA because of the transfer of client P from the applicant to CB. However, he stated that according to arm’s length royalty rates, values between 1% and 3% could be recognised as royalty “according to general practical experience.” “Cutting Tech GMBH” filed an appeal against the assessment in 2015 and in November 2019 the Tax Court parcially allowed the appeal of “Cutting Tech GMBH” and adjusted the assessment issued by the tax authorities. An appeal and cross appeal against the decision of the Tax Court was then filed with the Federal Tax Court (BFH). Judgement of the BFH The Federal Tax Court overturned the decision of the Tax Court and referred the case back to the Tax Court for another hearing and decision. “The appeals of the plaintiff and the FA are well-founded. They lead to the previous decision being set aside and the matter being referred back to the Fiscal Court for a different hearing and decision (§ 126 Para. 3 Sentence 1 No. 2 FGO). The arm’s length comparison carried out by the lower court to determine the transfer prices for the acquisition of processed products from C by the Plaintiff is not free of legal ...

In 2008 and 2009 the Medtronic group acquired the entire share capital of the Israeli company, Ventor Technologies Ltd, for a sum of $325 million. Subsequent to the acquisition various inter-company agreements were entered into between Ventor Technologies Ltd and Medtronics, but no transfer of intangible assets was recognised by the Group for tax purposes. The tax authorities found that all the intangibles previously owned by Ventor had been transferred to Medtronic and issued an assessment of additional taxable profits. An appeal was filed by Medtronic Ventor Technologies Ltd. Judgement of the District Court The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Click here for English translation Israel-vs-medtronic-ventor-ORG ...

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has released a new draft of Compliance Guidelines on Intangible Arrangements, PCG 2023/D2. When finalised, the guidelines will set out the ATO’s compliance approach to the development, use and transfer of intangible assets. The guidelines focus on tax risks associated with the potential application of the transfer pricing provisions, withholding tax provisions, capital gains tax (CGT), capital allowances, the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) and the diverted profits tax (DPT). Examples of high-risk intangibles arrangements under the draft guidelines include centralisation of intangible assets bifurcation (separation) of intangible assets non-recognition of local intangible assets and DEMPE activities migration of pre-commercialised intangible assets (HTVI) transfer of intangibles assets to a foreign hybrid entity Australia - Draft guidance on Intangibles Arrangements PCG 2023_D2 ...

The case concerned the valuation of intangible assets transferred from a Danish company to an affiliated foreign company. The Tax Tribunal basically agreed with the valuation of the expert appraisers according to the DCF model, but corrected the assumptions with regard to revenue growth in the budget period and the value of the tax advantage. Finally, the Tax Tribunal found that the value of product Y should be included in the valuation, as all rights to product Y were covered by the intra-group transfer. Excerpts “It was the judges’ view that the turnover growth for the budget period should be set in accordance with Company H’s own budgets prepared prior to the transfer. This was in accordance with TPG 2017 paragraphs 6.163 and 6.164 and SKM2020.30.LSR.” “With reference to OECD TPG section 6.178 on adjustment for tax consequences for the buyer and seller and SKM2020.30.LSR, the National Tax Tribunal ruled that the full value of the buyer’s tax asset should be added to the value of the intangible assets when valuing according to the DCF model.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation SKM2023-135 LSR ORG ...

Z is the head of a globally operating group. At group level it was decided to discontinue production at subsidiary “X-BR GMBH” at location A and in future to carry out production as far as possible at location B by group company Y. The production facilities were sold by “X-BR GMBH” to sister companies. The closure costs incurred in the context of the cessation of production were borne by Y. No further payments were made as compensation for the discontinuation of production in A. The tax authorities found that “X-BR GMBH” had transferred functions and thus value to group company Y and issued an assessment of taxable profits. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The Court decided in favour of “X-BR GMBH” and set aside the assessment. According to the court there is no transfer of functions if neither economic assets nor other benefits or business opportunities are transferred nor is there a causal link between the transfer of benefits in the broadest sense and the transfer of the ability to perform a function.” Excerpt “…As a rule, the business opportunity is therefore an intangible asset, such as a customer or client base, a supply right or a specific export market, which can be transferred in return for payment. The advantage that accrues or could accrue to the opportunity can be a one-time advantage (e.g. entry into a contract), but it can also be an ongoing advantage that is reflected in several financial years. However, the advantage must always be so specific that it can be independently assessed by the parties involved. A certain marketability of the opportunity will be required as an essential criterion. If there is no marketability, it is regularly an “opportunity” that cannot be independently exploited. However, a business opportunity does not necessarily have to be a legally secured legal position (BFH judgement of 12 June 1997, I R 14/96). However, the business opportunity must be at least sufficiently concrete that it is amenable to valuation, especially since otherwise it would not be possible to determine an appropriate consideration for it (cf. Ditz DStR 2005, 1916?f.; Wassermeyer/Andresen/Ditz Betriebsstätten-Handbuch/Ditz Rz. 4.55; also Wassermeyer GmbHR 1993, 332). Whether this means that a business opportunity already qualifies as an intangible asset has largely been left open by the BFH (BFH judgement of 13 November 1996, I R 149/94, DStR 1997, 325 [BFH 27.03.1996 – I R 89/95]; BFH judgement of 6 December 1995, I R 40/95, BFHE 180, 38?f.). b) In the present case, there is no concrete business opportunity within the meaning of § 8 (3) KStG. The defendant’s assumption of a vGA is based on the consideration that the discontinuation of a profitable production by an external third party would not have occurred without compensation and that consequently a prevented increase in assets would have resulted from this. However, the defendant was not able to show what the concrete transfer of a chance of profit in the form of an asset position by X was supposed to have consisted of. Rather, in the opinion of the Senate, the transfer of an asset by X was lacking. The production was essentially based on the allocation of production quantities for group-affiliated sales companies by the group’s top management. There were no contractual commitments by the parent company to X that would have secured it a valuable legal position in the form of a supply right or a merely specific order allocation within the group. Own contracts under the law of obligations in the form of supply contracts with third parties existed only to a small extent at the time of the closure. Thus, in the years before the year in dispute, X’s sales outside the group in this area amounted to only between 1.46% and 3.43% of total sales. Accordingly, the profits resulted predominantly from the production and supply of the group’s own distribution companies on the basis of orders which were allocated to X by the parent company without any legal claim to the retention of the order volume. Within the framework of such a constellation, it would have been possible for Y without further ado to reduce the group-internal order allocation to X without compensation due to the reduced order situation in the group. However, if the production volume of X was already based on the order allocation by the parent company, which was “at the discretion of the group’s top management”, X had no independent business opportunity which it could leave to the parent company. In particular, it must be taken into account that X had no legally established position vis-à-vis the parent company with regard to a certain volume of orders. Valuable market positions in the form of contractual relationships with third parties and concluded supply contracts were essentially due to the parent company and not to X. In this respect, the existence of a business opportunity is ruled out. In this respect, the existence of a business opportunity for X, which it left to the parent company free of charge, is ruled out. Even insofar as the defendant believes that X is to be regarded as an independent company and that the group companies are to be treated as third parties in the context of the arm’s length principle, it was primarily Y that had access to the customer relationships with its subsidiaries. This is particularly supported by the fact that the Y allocated the order volume to the X and that the X had not concluded its own orders through contractual agreements with group companies. The Y was therefore itself in a position to control the customer relationships. The transfer of a business opportunity is therefore ruled out. Likewise, there is no granting of a business opportunity by transferring the customer relationships to external customers or a customer base for customers outside the group. Business relations with third parties outside the group and thus a customer base in the sense of external customers outside the group did not exist for X – as ...

As a general rule interest expenses are deductible for the purposes of income taxation of a business activity. However, for companies in a group, e.g. companies in the same group, certain restrictions on the deductibility of interest can apply. In Sweden one of these limitations is that if the debt relates to the acquisition of a participation right from another enterprise in the partnership, the deduction can only be made if the acquisition is substantially justified by business considerations, cf. Chapter 24, Sections 16-20 of the Swedish Income Tax Act. A AB is part of the international X group, which is active in the manufacturing industry. A restructuring is planned within the group which will result in A becoming the group’s Swedish parent company. As part of the restructuring, A will acquire all the shares in B AB, which is currently the parent company of the Swedish part of the group, from group company C, which is resident in another EU country. Payment for the shares will be made partly by a contribution in kind equivalent to at least 75 % of the purchase price and partly by A issuing an interest-bearing promissory note on the remaining amount. A AB requested a preliminary ruling from the Tax Board on whether the rules limiting the right to deduct interest would result in interest expenses incurred as a result of the intra-group acquisition of the shares in B AB not being deductible. The Board found that the restructuring is justified for organisational reasons and that it follows from the preparatory works and previous practice that the acquisition is therefore not commercially justified within the meaning of the legislation in question. According to the Board, the application of Swedish domestic law therefore means that no deduction should be allowed. However, the Board found that it would be contrary to the freedom of establishment under the TFEU to deny A AB deduction for the interest expenses. An appeal was filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Administrative Court in which they requested that the preliminary ruling from the tax board be amended and answer the question by denying A AB a deduction for interest expenses. Judgement of the Court The Court upheld the decision of the Tax Board and allowed deductions for the interest expenses in question. Not for the Swedish rules being contrary to the freedom of establishment under the TFEU but by reason of the interest expenses being justified by business considerations. Excerpts ”15. The interest relates to a debt owed to C which is situated in another EU country. It is clear from the conditions provided that it is only C who is actually entitled to the interest income. Furthermore, the description of the circumstances of, and reasons for, the planned restructuring provided in the application do not constitute grounds for considering that the debt relationship must be created exclusively or almost exclusively in order for the community of interest to obtain a significant tax benefit. Deduction of the interest expenditure should therefore not be refused on the basis of Chapter 24, Section 18. 16. The question is then whether the deduction should be refused on the basis of Chapter 24, Section 19.” … ”26. In this case, a relatively long period of time has elapsed between the external acquisitions of the shares in Y Group’s Parent B – which were completed in 2015 – and the intragroup acquisition of the shares in that company that is now under consideration. However, the acquisition of B has been part of a larger process that has also involved the incorporation of Z Group and eventually W Group into X Group. As this is a process which is typically extensive and complex and which has resulted in the merger of several large manufacturing groups into one, the time lag should not lead to the conclusion that the intra-group acquisition is not substantially justified from a commercial point of view. Furthermore, it appears that the acquisition of the shares in B under consideration would not have taken place if the external acquisitions had not taken place. 27. Since the external acquisitions were made for commercial reasons and the acquisition under consideration in the context of the present restructuring is prompted by the external acquisitions, the acquisition can be considered to be substantially justified on commercial grounds. Accordingly, the deduction of interest expenses should not be denied under Chapter 24, Section 19. 28. The preliminary assessment is therefore confirmed.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation Sweden vs Share-loan AB Case no 3660-22 ...

“Agri B.V.” is a Dutch subsidiary in an international group processing agricultural products. Following a restructuring in 2009 “Agri B.V.” had declared a profit of € 35 million, including € 2 million in exit profits. In an assessment issued by the tax authorities this amount had been adjusted to more than € 350 million. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The Court of appeal decided predominantly in favour of the tax authorities. An expert was appointed to determine the value of what had been transferred, and based on the valuation report produced by the expert the court set the taxable profit for 2009/2010 to €117 million. Excerpt “The Functional Analysis of [company 9] submitted, the Asset Sale and Purchase Agreements, the Manufacturing Services Agreements and the Consulting services and assistance in conducting business activities agreements show that there was a transfer of more than just separate assets and liabilities. The factual and legal position of [company 2] and [company 1] has changed significantly as a result of the reorganization. In this respect, the Court considered the following. 27. Whereas prior to the reorganization [company 1] operated independently under its own name on the purchasing and sales markets, independently hedged price risks and ran the full risk of good and bad luck in all its activities, after the reorganization it only provides (production) services to [company 3] for a fixed fee for a certain period of time. The claimant’s contention that already with the establishment of the [company 6] in 2000 there was far-reaching coordination as a result of which [company 1] no longer operated completely independently but only as a processing facility is only supported by written statements from employees in 2019. These statements are difficult to reconcile with the 2009 Functional Analysis, in which the [company 6] is not even mentioned. Therefore, the Court does not attach the value that the claimant wishes to see attached to these statements. That [company 3] and [company 4] were involved in the (strategic) planning of [company 1] prior to the reorganization is not surprising in view of the global activities of the group. However, no more can be deduced from the Functional Analysis than that [company 3] and [company 4] were operating in cooperation with [company 1]. That the form in which this cooperation is cast detracts from the independence of [company 1] described elsewhere in the Functional Analysis has not become plausible on the basis of the documents. 28. A similar analysis can be made of [company 2’s] activities before and after the reorganisation. Whereas prior to the reorganisation [company 2] operated independently under its own name on the purchasing and sales markets, independently hedged price risks (not only for its own benefit, but for the benefit of the activities of all group companies that it coordinated worldwide), and ran the full risk of good and bad opportunities in all its activities, after the reorganisation it only provides (production) services to [company 3] for a fixed fee for a limited period of time. 29. The claimant has stated without contradiction that the profitability of [company 4] depends to a large extent on daily global and regional price fluctuations over which [company 4] has no influence, and that the market developments are therefore analysed on a daily basis. From the description of the market expertise of [company 3] after the reorganization in the Functional Analysis (see recital 8), the Court deduces that the market expertise present in the group of [company 4], gained from hedging, taking positions on markets and contract negotiations, forms the basis for the activities of [company 3] after the reorganization. This description explicitly states that this knowledge plays a key role in improving the profitability of the Dutch oilseed business. In that connection, reference is made to the fact that [company 3] will set the price and volume guidelines for purchases and sales, conclude the contracts and take care of the hedging. It is established that all these activities were carried out by [company 1] and [company 2] prior to the reorganisation. It has not become plausible that, prior to the reorganization, [company 3] was already engaged in such similar activities that those of [company 1] and [company 2] can only be regarded as additional. During the reorganization, not only stocks, current purchase and sales contracts, currency contracts and futures, etc. were transferred to [company 3], but also dozens of employees, including traders from [company 1] and [company 2], were transferred to [company 3]. The Court therefore deems it plausible that the aforementioned market expertise was not actually invested in [company 3] itself until the transfer of these employees. 30. The prices agreed as part of the reorganisation only concern the transfer of assets and liabilities. However, in view of the foregoing, this transfer cannot be viewed separately from the concentration of market expertise at [company 3] that was previously held by [company 1] and [company 2]. The fact that the market expertise at the latter company was also supported by employees who were not employed by it does not mean that this knowledge should not be attributed to the company of [company 2]. In addition to market expertise, the power of decision regarding purchases, sales and hedging was also transferred from [company 1] and [company 2] to [company 3]. Since having market expertise, seen against the background of the aforementioned power of decision, plays a key role in the activities of [company 3] after the reorganization aimed at increasing profitability, the Court deems it plausible that a value must be attributed to it separately that has not already been reflected in the agreed prices for the assets and liabilities. The Court also sees support for this conclusion in the circumstance that the turnover and cash flow of [company 1] and [company 2] – as has not been contradicted by the claimant – decreased considerably after the reorganization, while those of [company 3] increased considerably.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ECLI_NL_RBNHO_2022_9062 ...

SA Tropicana Europe Hermes is a French permanent establishment of SA Tropicana Europe, located in Belgium. The French PE carried out the business of bottling fruit juice-based drinks. In 2009, a new distribution contract was concluded with the Swiss company FLTCE, which was accompanied by a restructuring of its business. Before 1 July 2009, Tropicana was engaged in the manufacture of fresh fruit juices in cardboard packs and purchased fresh fruit juices which it pasteurised. As of 1 July 2009, its activity was reduced to that of a contract manufacturer on behalf of FLTCE, which became the owner of the technology and intellectual property rights as well as the stocks. The re-organisation led to a significant reduction in the company’s turnover and profits. Tropicana Europe was subject to two audits, at the end of which the tax authorities notified it of tax reassessments in respect of corporate income tax, withholding tax and business value added contribution (CVAE) for the years 2010 to 2013, together with penalties. It also notified the company of tax adjustments, together with penalties, in respect of the additional contribution to corporation tax for the years 2012 and 2013. According to the tax authorities Tropicana Europe’s new contract was not at arm’s length and constituted an abnormal act of management. Tropicana filed an appeal with the Administrative Court, where the assessment issued by the tax authorities was later set aside. An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities with the Court of Appeal. At issue was whether FLTCE was located in a privileged tax regime and whether there was a link of dependence between Tropicana and FLTCE and thus the basis of the tax assessment. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The court dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities and upheld the decision of the administrative court. Excerpts “As regards the existence of a privileged tax regime : 6. Before the first judges, Tropicana Europe disputed that FLTCE was established in a country with a privileged tax regime within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 238 A of the General Tax Code. The first judges considered that by simply relying on the overall corporate tax rate of 13% in the canton of Bern, in the Swiss Confederation, where FLTCE’s head office is located, and the significant difference between this rate and the corporate tax rate of 33.33% in France, the tax authorities did not establish that FLTCE was established in a country with a privileged tax regime, the tax authorities did not establish that the amount of income tax to which FLTCE is subject is less than half the amount of income tax for which it would have been liable under the conditions of ordinary law in France, if it had been domiciled or established there, and, consequently, that FLTCE would be subject to a preferential tax regime pursuant to the aforementioned provisions of Article 238 A of the French General Tax Code. As this ground of the judgment is not contested on appeal by the Minister, the latter must be considered as renouncing to rely on the establishment of FLTCE in a country whose tax regime is privileged pursuant to the provisions of Article 238 A of the General Tax Code. Consequently, the Minister bears the burden of proof of the existence of a link of dependence between Tropicana Europe and FLTCE.” “As regards the existence of a link of dependence : 7. In order to discharge Tropicana Europe from the taxes it was contesting, the first judges noted that, in order to establish a relationship of dependence between this company and FLTCE, the tax authorities based themselves on the fact that these two companies belonged to the same multinational group, PepsiCo, and deduced that, by relying solely on this factor, the authorities, who bear the burden of proof, did not establish any relationship of dependence between the two companies within the meaning of Article 57 of the General Tax Code. 8. In order to prove the existence of a relationship of dependence between Tropicana Europe and FLTCE, the Minister noted that SA Tropicana Europe Hermes is a permanent establishment of SA Tropicana Europe, located in Belgium, which is 99.99% owned by Seven’Up Nederland BV, which in turn is wholly owned by Pepsico Inc. FLTCE, located in Switzerland in the canton of Bern, is wholly owned by Frito Lay Compagny Gmbh, also located in Switzerland in the same canton. This company has been controlled since 14 December 2011 by PepsiCo Limited located in Gibraltar. While the Minister deduces from all these facts that SA Tropicana Europe and FLTCE are sister companies under the control of the PepsiCo group, he does not provide evidence of legal dependence between SA Tropicana Europe and FLTCE, which are not linked by a capital link between them. Consequently, it is up to the Minister to provide proof of the existence of a de facto dependency link between these two companies. However, the Minister did not provide any other element or indication that would make it possible to detect a de facto dependence between these two companies other than the fact that they belong to the same group. The fact that the two companies belong to the same group does not, in the present case, constitute sufficient proof or evidence of de facto dependence between SA Tropicana Europe and FLTCE in the absence of any other element put forward by the Minister. Consequently, the Minister is not entitled to maintain that, contrary to the assessment made by the first judges, the conditions for the application of Article 57 of the General Tax Code were met in order to base the taxes for which the Administrative Court of Amiens granted discharge.” “As regards the request for substitution of legal basis : … 12. However, this reorganisation was not limited to a simple “change in the invoicing circuit” as the Minister maintains, but led to a significant change in operating conditions since, before 1 July 2009, Tropicana Europe was engaged ...

On 5 July 2022, the Federal Ministry of Finance in Germany published draft legislation regarding application of the arm’s length principle to cross-border relocation of functions. According to the general provisions A function is a business activity that consists of a grouping of similar operational tasks performed by specific units or departments of an enterprise. It is an organic part of an enterprise, without the need for a sub-operation in the tax sense. A transfer of functions within the meaning of section 1(3b) of the Foreign Tax Act occurs if a function, including the associated opportunities and risks as well as any assets or other benefits that may have been transferred or left along with it, is transferred or left in whole or in part so that the acquiring company can perform this function or expand an existing function. The function transferred as a whole in accordance with sentence 1 constitutes the transfer package. Business transactions that are realised within five business years shall be combined as a single transfer of function at the time when the requirements of sentence 1 are economically fulfilled by their joint realisation. In cases of transfer of functions, intangible assets are essential within the meaning of section 1(3b) sentence 2 of the Foreign Tax Act if they are necessary for the transferred function and their arm’s length price amounts in total to more than 25 per cent of the sum of the individual prices of all assets and other benefits of the transfer package and this is credible, taking into account the effects of the transfer of function, which are evident from the records within the meaning of section 2 sentence 2. If an acquiring enterprise independently provides the services previously provided exclusively to the transferring enterprise, in whole or in part, to other enterprises at prices which are higher than the remuneration according to the cost-plus method or which are to be set higher in accordance with the arm’s length principle, a remuneration in accordance with 2 shall be charged to the other enterprises at the time of the first provision for assets and other advantages previously provided free of charge by the transferring enterprise for the provision of services; the assets or other benefits in question shall be deemed to be a transfer package, provided that the other requirements for this are met. A transfer of functions within the meaning of paragraph 2 shall not be deemed to have taken place if there is no restriction on the exercise of the function in question at the transferring company within five years of the assumption of the function by the acquiring company, although the other requirements of paragraph 2, sentence 1 are met (duplication of functions). If such a restriction occurs within this period, a transfer of functions shall be deemed to have taken place at the time when the restriction occurs, unless the taxpayer proves that this restriction is not directly related to the duplication of functions. The legislation will apply retrospectively to covered transactions after 31 December 2021. Click here for unofficial English translation Click here for other translation Germany - draft legislation on transfer of functions ...

In April 2010 Roche pharmaceutical group acquired the entire share capital of the Israeli company, Medingo Ltd, for USD 160 million. About six months after the acquisition, Medingo was entered into 3 inter-group service agreements: a R&D services agreement, pursuant to which Medingo was to provide R&D services in exchange for cost + 5%. All developments under the agreement would be owned by Roche. a services agreement according to which Medingo was to provided marketing, administration, consultation and support services in exchange for cost + 5%. a manufacturing agreement, under which Medingo was to provide manufacturing and packaging services in exchange for cost + 5. A license agreement was also entered, according to which Roche could now manufacture, use, sell, exploit, continue development and sublicense to related parties the Medingo IP in exchange for 2% of the relevant net revenues. Finally, in 2013, Medingo’s operation in Israel was terminated and its IP sold to Roche for approximately USD 45 million. The tax authorities viewed the transactions as steps in a single arrangement, which – from the outset – had the purpose of transferring all the activities of Medingo to Roche. On that basis an assessment was issued according to which the intangibles had been transferred to Roche in 2010. Based on the acquisition price for the shares, the value was determined to approximately USD 160 millions. An appeal was filed by Medingo claiming that there had been no transfer in 2010. Judgement of the District Court The court decided in favor of Medingo and set aside the 2010 tax assessment – but without passing an opinion in relation to the value of the sale of the intellectual property in 2013. Excerpts “96. The guidelines indicate that in a transaction between related parties, two different issues must be examined using the arm’s length principle: transaction characterization and transaction pricing. The characterization of the transaction must first be examined and it must be examined whether it would also have been made between unrelated parties. If the examination reveals that even unrelated parties would have entered into a transaction in the same situation, then it must be further examined whether the price paid for the assets complies with market conditions. It should be noted that in accordance with the guidelines, the characterization of the transaction should not be interfered with in violation of the agreements, except in exceptional circumstances, in which the agreements are fundamentally unfounded, or in no way allow a price to be determined according to the arm’s length principle. “Tax A tax administration should not disregard part or all of the restructuring or substitute other transactions for it unless the exceptional circumstances described in paragraph 1.142 are met”. out circumstances in which the transaction between the parties as accurately delineated can be disregarded for transfer pricing purposes. Because non-recognition can be contentious and a source of double taxation, every effort should be made to determine the actual nature of the transaction and apply arm’s length pricing to the accurately delineated transaction, and to ensure that non-recognition is not used simply because determining an arm’s length price is difficult. e same transaction can be seen between independent parties in comparable circumstances… non-recognition would not apply… the transaction as accurately delineated may be disregarded, and if appropriate, replaced by an alternative transaction, where the arrangements made in relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would have been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner in comparable circumstances, thereby preventing determination of a price that would be acceptable to both of the parties taking into account their respective perspective and the options realistically available to each of them at the time of entering into the transaction “. 97. Further to this, sections 1.146 – 1.148 of the Guideline, 2022, provide two examples of cases in which the characterization of the transaction must be ignored. The second example deals with a case closer to our case, where a one-time payment is paid for R&D services and their products provided – for 20 years. 98. After examining the characterization of the transaction in our case, I found no defect in it. This is a completely different case from those mentioned in the guidelines, and it has been proven to me that transactions with a similar characterization can be conducted and are also conducted between unrelated parties. Thus, throughout the proceedings, the appellant presented various examples of similar license agreements and R&D agreements signed between unrelated parties: In Phase A, the appellant presented various transactions for comparison (P / 2 (to which the respondent did not even refer), p. 332 of the minutes (and within the appeal Of EY Germany and of Gonen in which additional transactions were presented for comparison, including transactions of similar companies in the relevant market.” “104. I also believe that it makes sense to enter into such agreements, especially in the situation of the appellant at that time. Appellant faced considerable obstacles, and her chances of success were not guaranteed, to say the least….” “105. The inter-group agreements secured the appellant’s future in the near term, and gave her more chances to survive. As the appellant’s experts clarified, small companies find it difficult to survive alone in the medical device market (see for example Section 1 of the Michlin Opinion (hence, a licensing and commercialization agreement is common practice in the field and common with contractors with experience and resources); See also paragraph 41 regarding Broadcom).” “110. In conclusion, as long as the appellant and Roche acted in accordance with the inter-group agreements, which are acceptable in industry and in the circumstances of the case there is logic in concluding them, I did not find any invalidity in the characterization of the agreements (see paragraphs 85 and 87 in the Broadcom case).” “….As stated, I believe that even if there was an intention to transfer the activity, there was no final decision until the date of the announcement. Second, and this is the ...

In 2012, Flir Commercial Systems AB sold intangible assets from a branch in Belgium and subsequently claimed a tax relief of more than SEK 2 billion in fictitious Belgian tax due to the sale. The Swedish Tax Agency decided not to allow relief for the Belgian “tax”, and issued a tax assessment where the relief of approximately SEK 2 billion was denied and a surcharge of approximately SEK 800 million was added. An appeal was filed with the Administrative Court, In March 2020 the Administrative Court concluded that the Swedish Tax Agency was correct in not allowing relief for the fictitious Belgian tax. In the opinion of the Administrative Court, the Double tax agreement prevents Belgium from taxing increases in the value of the assets from the time where the assets were owned in Sweden. Consequently, any fictitious tax cannot be credited in the Swedish taxation of the transfer. The Court also considers that the Swedish Tax Agency was correct in imposing a tax surcharge and that there is no reason to reduce the surcharge. The company’s appeal is therefore rejected. An appeal was then filed with the Administrative Court of Appeal Decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal The Court upheld the decision of the Administrative Court and the assessment issued and the penalty added by the tax authorities. The Administrative Court of Appeal found that when assessing the amount of credit to be given for notional tax on a transfer of business, the tax treaty with the other country must also be taken into account. In the case at hand, assets were transferred to the company’s Belgian branch shortly before the assets were disposed of through the transfer of business. The tax treaty limited Belgium’s taxing rights to the increase in value accrued in Belgium after the allocation and a credit could be given up to an amount equal to that tax. In the case at hand, the company had claimed a notional credit for tax on the increase in value that had taken place in Sweden before the assets were transferred to Belgium, while the transferee company in Belgium was not taxed on the corresponding increase in value when the assets were subsequently disposed of, as the Belgian tax authority considered that the tax treaty prevented such taxation. The Court of Appeal held that there were grounds for back-taxation and the imposition of a tax surcharge on the basis of incorrect information. The information provided by the company was not considered sufficient to trigger the Tax Agency’s special investigation obligation and the tax fine was not considered unreasonable even though it amounted to a very large sum. Click here for English Translation Click here for translation Sv Flir 2434-2436-20 ...

83. Birincil acquires 100% of the equity interests in an independent enterprise, Company T for 100. Company T is a company that engages in research and development and has partially developed several promising technologies but has only minimal sales. The purchase price is justified primarily by the value of the promising, but only partly developed, technologies and by the potential of Company T personnel to develop further new technologies in the future. Birincil’s purchase price allocation performed for accounting purposes with respect to the acquisition attributes 20 of the purchase price to tangible property and identified intangibles, including patents, and 80 to goodwill. 84. Immediately following the acquisition, Birincil causes Company T to transfer all of its rights in developed and partially developed technologies, including patents, trade secrets and technical know-how to Company S, a subsidiary of Birincil. Company S simultaneously enters into a contract research agreement with Company T, pursuant to which the Company T workforce will continue to work exclusively on the development of the transferred technologies and on the development of new technologies on behalf of Company S. The agreement provides that Company T will be compensated for its research services by payments equal to its cost plus a mark-up, and that all rights to intangibles developed or enhanced under the research agreement will belong to Company S. As a result, Company S will fund all future research and will assume the financial risk that some or all of the future research will not lead to the development of commercially viable products. Company S has a large research staff, including management personnel responsible for technologies of the type acquired from Company T. Following the transactions in question, the Company S research and management personnel assume full management responsibility for the direction and control of the work of the Company T research staff. Company S approves new projects, develops and plans budgets and in other respects controls the ongoing research work carried on at Company T. All company T research personnel will continue to be employees of Company T and will be devoted exclusively to providing services under the research agreement with Company S. 85. In conducting a transfer pricing analysis of the arm’s length price to be paid by Company S for intangibles transferred by Company T, and of the price to be paid for ongoing R&D services to be provided by Company T, it is important to identify the specific intangibles transferred to Company S and those retained by Company T. The definitions and valuations of intangibles contained in the purchase price allocation are not determinative for transfer pricing purposes. The 100 paid by Birincil for the shares of Company T represents an arm’s length price for shares of the company and provides useful information regarding the value of the business of Company T. The full value of that business should be reflected either in the value of the tangible and intangible assets transferred to Company S or in the value of the tangible and intangible assets and workforce retained by Company T. Depending on the facts, a substantial portion of the value described in the purchase price allocation as goodwill of Company T may have been transferred to Company S together with the other Company T intangibles. Depending on the facts, some portion of the value described in the purchase price allocation as goodwill may also have been retained by Company T. Under arm’s length transfer pricing principles, Company T should be entitled to compensation for such value, either as part of the price paid by Company S for the transferred rights to technology intangibles, or through the compensation Company T is paid in years following the transaction for the R&D services of its workforce. It should generally be assumed that value does not disappear, nor is it destroyed, as part of an internal business restructuring. If the transfer of intangibles to Company S had been separated in time from the acquisition, a separate inquiry would be required regarding any intervening appreciation or depreciation in the value of the transferred intangibles ...

78. Company A owns a government licence for a mining activity and a government licence for the exploitation of a railway. The mining licence has a standalone market value of 20. The railway licence has a standalone market value of 10. Company A has no other net assets. 79. Birincil, an entity which is independent of Company A, acquires 100% of the equity interests in Company A for 100. Birincil’s purchase price allocation performed for accounting purposes with respect to the acquisition attributes 20 of the purchase price to the mining licence; 10 to the railway licence; and 70 to goodwill based on the synergies created between the mining and railway licences. 80. Immediately following the acquisition, Birincil causes Company A to transfer its mining and railway licences to Company S, a subsidiary of Birincil. 81. In conducting a transfer pricing analysis of the arm’s length price to be paid by Company S for the transaction with Company A, it is important to identify with specificity the intangibles transferred. As was the case with Birincil’s arm’s length acquisition of Company A, the goodwill associated with the licences transferred to Company S would need to be considered, as it should generally be assumed that value does not disappear, nor is it destroyed as part of an internal business restructuring. 82. As such, the arm’s length price for the transaction between Companies A and S should take account of the mining licence, the railway licence, and the value ascribed to goodwill for accounting purposes. The 100 paid by Birincil for the shares of Company A represents an arm’s length price for those shares and provides useful information regarding the combined value of the intangibles ...

In determining which party(ies) should be attributed the location savings at arm’s length, it will be important to consider the functions, risks and assets of the parties, as well as the options realistically available to each of them. In this example, assume that there is a high demand for the type of engineering services that the company in Country X sells. Assume also that the subsidiary in Country Y is the only company operating in a lower-cost location that is able to provide such services with the required quality standard, and Company Y is able to withstand competitive pricing pressures because the technical know-how it has established acts as a barrier to competition. Furthermore, the company in Country X does not have the option of engaging qualified engineers in Country X to provide these services, as the cost of their wages would be too high compared to the hourly rate charged to clients. Considering this, the enterprise in Country X does not have many other options available to it than to use this service provider. The remuneration payable by Company X to Company Y should take into account the location savings created by Company Y, in addition to the value of its services including any intangibles used in providing those services. In some instances, the nature of the contributions made by the enterprise in Country X and its subsidiary in Country Y may meet the criteria for the use of a transactional profit split method ...

As another example, assume now that an enterprise in Country X provides highly specialised and quality engineering services to independent clients. It charges a fee to its independent clients based on a fixed hourly rate that compares with the hourly rate charged by competitors for similar services in the same market. Suppose that the wages for qualified engineers in Country X are high. The enterprise subsequently subcontracts a large part of its engineering work to a new subsidiary in Country Y. The subsidiary in Country Y hires equally qualified engineers to those in Country X for substantially lower wages, thus deriving significant location savings for the group formed by the enterprise and its subsidiary Clients continue to deal directly with the enterprise in Country X and are not necessarily aware of the sub-contracting arrangement. For some period of time, the well-known enterprise in Country X can continue to charge its services at the original hourly rate despite the significantly reduced engineer costs. After a certain period of time, however, it is forced due to competitive pressures to decrease its hourly rate (at an amount that would not allow the company in Country X to cover the wages for qualified engineers in Country X, but that would still yield a benefit if those services are provided by qualified engineers in Country Y). Part of the location savings are passed on to its clients. In this case also, the question arises of which party(ies) within the MNE group should, at arm’s length, be attributed the part of the location savings not passed on to the clients: the subsidiary in Country Y, the enterprise in Country X, or both (and if so in what proportions) ...

In such an example, given that the relocated activity is a highly competitive one, it is likely that the enterprise in Country A has the option realistically available to it to use either the affiliate in Country B or a third party manufacturer. As a consequence, it should be possible to find comparables data to determine the conditions in which a third party would be willing at arm’s length to manufacture the clothes for the enterprise. In such a situation, a contract manufacturer at arm’s length would generally be attributed very little, if any, part of the location savings. Doing otherwise would put the associated manufacturer in a situation different from the situation of an independent manufacturer, and would be contrary to the arm’s length principle ...

Take the example of an enterprise that designs, manufactures and sells brand name clothes. Assume that the manufacturing process is basic and that the brand name is famous and represents a highly valuable intangible. Assume that the enterprise is established in Country A where the labour costs are high and that it decides to close down its manufacturing activities in Country A and to relocate them in an affiliate company in Country B where labour costs are significantly lower. The enterprise in Country A retains the rights on the brand name and continues designing the clothes. Further to this restructuring, the clothes will be manufactured by the affiliate in Country B under a contract manufacturing arrangement. The arrangement does not involve the use of any significant intangible owned by or licensed to the affiliate or the assumption of any significant risks by the affiliate in Country B. Once manufactured by the affiliate in Country B, the clothes will be sold to the enterprise in Country A which will on-sell them to third party customers. Assume that this restructuring makes it possible for the group formed by the enterprise in Country A and its affiliate in Country B to derive significant location savings. The question arises whether the location savings should be attributed to the enterprise in Country A, or its affiliate in Country B, or both (and if so in what proportions) ...

Where significant location savings are derived further to a business restructuring, the question arises of whether and if so how the location savings should be shared among the parties. In addressing this matter, the guidance in Section D.6 of Chapter I is relevant ...

Location savings can be derived by an MNE group that relocates some of its activities to a place where costs (such as labour costs, real estate costs, etc.) are lower than in the location where the activities were initially performed, account being taken of the possible costs involved in the relocation (such as termination costs for the existing operation, possibly higher infrastructure costs in the new location, possibly higher transportation costs if the new operation is more distant from the market, training costs of local employees, etc.). Where a business strategy aimed at deriving location savings is put forward as a business reason for restructuring, the discussion in Section D. 1.5 of Chapter I is relevant ...

There will also be cases where before-and-after comparisons can be made because the transactions prior to the restructuring were not controlled, for instance where the restructuring follows an acquisition, and where adjustments can reliably be made to account for the differences between the pre-restructuring uncontrolled transactions and the post-restructuring controlled transactions. See example at paragraph 9.110. Whether such uncontrolled transactions provide reliable comparables would have to be evaluated in light of the guidance at paragraph 3.2 ...

Based on these findings, it can be concluded that Company A continues to perform the same functions and assume the same risks as before the restructuring took place. In particular, Company A continues to have the capability and actually performs control functions in relation to the risk of exploitation of the intangibles. It also carries on the functions related to the development, maintenance and execution of the worldwide marketing strategy. Company Z has no capability to perform control functions, and does not in fact perform the control functions needed to assume the intangible related risks. Accordingly, the accurate delineation of the transaction after the restructuring may lead to the conclusion that this is in substance a funding arrangement between Company A and Company Z, rather than a restructuring for the centralisation of intangible management. An assessment may be necessary of the commercial rationality of the transaction based on the guidance in Section D.2 of Chapter I taking into account the full facts and circumstances of the transaction ...

Then a restructuring takes place. Legal ownership of the trademarks, trade names and other intangibles represented by the brand is transferred by Company A to a newly set up affiliate, Company Z in Country Z in exchange for a lump sum payment. After the restructuring, Company A is remunerated on a cost plus basis for the services it performs for Company Z and the rest of the group. The remuneration of the affiliated contract manufacturers and distributors remains the same. The remaining profits after remuneration of the contract manufacturers, distributors, and Company A head office services are paid to Company Z. The accurate delineation of the transactions before and after the restructuring determines that: Company Z is managed by a local trust company. It does not have people (employees or directors) who have the capability to perform, and who in fact do not perform control functions in relation to the risks associated with the ownership or the strategic development of the trademarks, trade names or other intangibles represented by the brand. It also does not have the financial capacity to assume these risks. High ranking officials from Company A’s head office fly to Country Z once a year to formally validate the strategic decisions necessary to operate the company. These decisions are prepared by Company A’s head office in Country A before the meetings take place in Country Z. The MNE considers that these activities are service activities performed by Company A’s head office for Z. These strategic decision-making activities are remunerated at cost plus in the same way as the central services are remunerated (e.g. human resource management, legal, tax). The development, maintenance and execution of the worldwide marketing strategy are still performed by the same employees of Company A’s head office and remunerated on a cost plus basis ...

For example, an MNE manufactures and distributes products the value of which is not determined by the technical features of the products, but rather by consumer recognition of the brand. The MNE wants to differentiate itself from its competitors through the development of brands with great value, by implementing a carefully developed and expensive marketing strategy. The trademarks, trade names and other intangibles represented by the brand are owned by Company A in Country A and Company A assumes the risks associated with the ownership, development and exploitation of those intangibles. The development, maintenance and execution of a worldwide marketing strategy are the main value drivers of the MNE, performed by 125 employees at Company A’s head office. The value of the intangibles results in a high consumer price for the products. Company A’s head office also provides central services for the group affiliates (e.g. human resource management, legal, tax). The products are manufactured by affiliates under contract manufacturing arrangements with Company A. They are distributed by affiliates who purchase them from Company A. The profits derived by Company A after having allocated an arm’s length remuneration to the contract manufacturers and distributors are considered to be the remuneration for the intangibles, marketing activities and central services of Company A ...

The analysis of the business before and after the restructuring may reveal that while some functions, assets and risks were transferred, other functions may still be carried out by the “stripped” entity. Typically, as part of the restructuring the entity may have been purportedly stripped of intangibles or risk, but after the restructuring it continues to carry out some or all of the functions it previously performed. Following the restructuring, however, the “stripped” entity performs those functions under contract to a foreign associated enterprise. The accurate delineation of the actual transaction between the foreign associated enterprise and the “stripped” entity will determine the actual commercial or financial relations between them, including whether the contractual terms are consistent with the conduct of the parties and other facts of the case. Arm’s length compensation for each party should be consistent with its actual functions performed, assets used and risks assumed after the restructuring ...

That being said, in business restructurings, before-and-after comparisons could play a role in understanding the restructuring itself and could be part of a before-and-after comparability (including functional) analysis to understand the changes that accounted for the changes in the allocation of profit/loss amongst the parties. In effect, information on the arrangements that existed prior to the restructuring and on the conditions of the restructuring itself could be essential to understand the context in which the post-restructuring arrangements were put in place and to assess whether such arrangements are arm’s length. It can also shed light on the options realistically available to the restructured entity. (See paragraphs 9.27-9.31 for a discussion of options realistically available; see also paragraphs 9.102-9.106 for a discussion of possible factual differences between situations that result from a restructuring and situations that were structured as such from the beginning and of how such differences may affect the options realistically available to the parties in negotiating the terms of the new arrangement and therefore the conditions of the restructuring and/or of the post-restructuring arrangements.) ...

Another issue with before-and-after comparisons is the likely difficulty of valuing the basket of functions, assets and risks that were lost by the restructured entity, keeping in mind that it is not always the case that these functions, assets and risks are transferred to another party ...

One important issue with such before-and-after comparisons is that a comparison of the profits from the post-restructuring controlled transactions with the profits made in controlled transactions prior to the restructuring would not suffice given Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention provides for a comparison to be made with uncontrolled transactions. Comparisons of a taxpayer’s controlled transactions with other controlled transactions are irrelevant to the application of the arm’s length principle and therefore should not be used by a tax administration as the basis for a transfer pricing adjustment or by a taxpayer to support its transfer pricing policy ...

A relevant question is the role if any of comparisons that can be made of the profits actually earned by a party to a controlled transaction prior to and after the restructuring. In particular, it can be asked whether it would be appropriate to determine a restructured entity’s post-restructuring profits by reference to its pre-restructuring profits, adjusted to reflect the transfer or relinquishment of particular functions, assets and risks ...

In other words, in this situation where the taxpayer will have an ongoing business relationship as supplier to the foreign associated enterprise that carries on an activity previously carried on by the taxpayer, the taxpayer and the foreign associated enterprise have the opportunity to obtain economic and commercial benefits through that relationship (e.g. the sale price of goods) which may explain for instance why compensation through an up-front capital payment for transfer of the business was foregone, or why the future transfer price for the products might be different from the prices that would have been agreed absent a restructuring operation. In practice, however, it might be difficult to structure and monitor such an arrangement. While taxpayers are free to choose the form of compensation payments, whether up-front or over time, tax administrations when reviewing such arrangements would want to know how the compensation for the post-restructuring activity was possibly affected to take account of the foregone compensation, if any, for the restructuring itself. Specifically, in such a case, the tax administration would want to look at the entirety of the arrangements, while being provided with a separate evaluation of the arm’s length compensation for the restructuring and for the post-restructuring transactions ...

Another example would be where a taxpayer that operates a manufacturing and distribution activity restructures by disposing of its distribution activity to a foreign associated enterprise to which the taxpayer will in the future sell the goods it manufactures. The foreign associated enterprise would expect to be able to earn an arm’s length reward for its investment in acquiring and operating the business. In this situation, the taxpayer might agree with the foreign associated enterprise to forgo receipt of part or all of the up-front compensation for the business that may be payable at arm’s length, and instead obtain comparable financial benefit over time through selling its goods to the foreign associated enterprise at prices that are higher than the latter would otherwise agree to if the up-front compensation had been paid. Alternatively, the parties might agree to set an up-front compensation payment for the restructuring that is partly offset through future lower transfer prices for the manufactured products than would have been set otherwise. See Part I of this chapter for a discussion of situations where compensation would be payable at arm’s length for the restructuring itself ...

There may in some circumstances be an important inter-relationship between the compensation for the restructuring and an arm’s length reward for operating the business post-restructuring. This can be the case where a taxpayer disposes of business operations to an associated enterprise with which it must then transact business as part of those operations. One example of such a relationship is found in paragraph 9.74 regarding outsourcing ...

The identification of potential comparables has to be made with the objective of finding the most reliable comparables data in the circumstances of the case, keeping in mind the limitations that may exist in availability of information and the compliance costs involved (see paragraphs 3.2 and 3.80). It is recognised that the data will not always be perfect. There are also cases where comparables data are not found, for instance where the restructuring has led to fragmentation of integrated functions across several group companies in a way that is not found between unrelated parties. This does not necessarily mean that the conditions of the controlled transaction as accurately delineated are not arm’s length. Notwithstanding the difficulties that can arise in the process of searching comparables, it is necessary to find a reasonable solution to all transfer pricing cases. Following the guidance at paragraph 2.2, even in cases where comparables data are scarce and imperfect, the choice of the most appropriate transfer pricing method to the circumstances of the case should be consistent with the nature of the controlled transaction, determined in particular through a functional analysis ...

Whenever a comparable is proposed, it is important to ensure that a comparability analysis of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions is performed in order to identify material differences, if any, between them and, where necessary and possible, to adjust for such differences. In particular, the comparability analysis might reveal that the restructured entity continues to perform valuable and significant functions and/or the presence of local intangibles and/or of economically significant risks that remain in the “stripped” entity after the restructuring but are not found in the proposed comparables. See Section A on the possible differences between restructured activities and start-up situations ...

Another example of a possible application of the CUP method would be the case where independent parties provide manufacturing, selling or service activities comparable to the ones provided by the restructured affiliate. Given the recent development of outsourcing activities, it may be possible in some cases to find independent outsourcing transactions that provide a basis for using the CUP method in order to determine the arm’s length remuneration of post-restructuring controlled transactions. This of course is subject to the condition that the outsourcing transactions qualify as uncontrolled transactions and that the review of the five economically relevant characteristics or comparability factors provides sufficient comfort that either no material difference exists between the conditions of the uncontrolled outsourcing transactions and the conditions of the post-restructuring controlled transactions, or that reliable enough adjustments can be made (and are effectively made) to eliminate such differences ...

There are cases where comparables (including internal comparables) are available, subject to possible comparability adjustments being performed. One example of a possible application of the CUP method would be the case where an enterprise that used to transact independently with the MNE group is acquired, and the acquisition is followed by a restructuring of the now controlled transactions. Subject to a review of the five economically relevant characteristics or comparability factors and of the possible effect of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions taking place at different times, it might be the case that the conditions of the pre-acquisition uncontrolled transactions provide a CUP for the post-acquisition controlled transactions. Even where the conditions of the transactions are restructured, it might still be possible, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, to adjust for the transfer of functions, assets and/or risks that occurred upon the restructuring. For instance, a comparability adjustment might be performed to account for the fact that a different party assumes bad debt risk ...

Post-restructuring arrangements may pose certain challenges with respect to the identification of potential comparables in cases where the restructuring implements a business model that is hardly found between independent enterprises. It should be noted that the mere fact that an arrangement is not seen between independent enterprises does not in itself mean that it is not arm’s length nor commercially irrational. Furthermore, every effort should be made to determine the pricing for the restructuring transactions as accurately delineated under the arm’s length principle ...

The selection and application of a transfer pricing method to post-restructuring controlled transactions must derive from the analysis of the economically relevant characteristics of the controlled transaction as accurately delineated. It is essential to understand what the functions, assets and risks involved in the post-restructuring transactions are, and what party performs, uses or assumes them. This requires information to be available on the functions, assets and risks of both parties to a transaction, e.g. the restructured entity and the foreign associated enterprise with which it transacts. The analysis should go beyond the label assigned to the restructured entity, as an entity that is labelled as a “commissionnaire” or “limited risk distributor” can sometimes be found to own valuable local intangibles and to continue to assume significant market risks, and an entity that is labelled as a “contract manufacturer” can sometimes be found to pursue significant development activities or to own and use unique intangibles. In post-restructuring situations, particular attention should be paid to the identification of the valuable intangibles and the economically significant risks that effectively remain with the restructured entity (including, where applicable, local non-protected intangibles), and to whether such an allocation of intangibles and risks satisfies the arm’s length principle. The form of remuneration cannot dictate inappropriate risk allocations. It is the determination of how the parties actually control risks, and whether they have the financial capacity to assume the risks, as set out in the process of analysing risk in Chapter I, which will determine the assumption of risks by the parties, and consequently dictate the selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method. Issues regarding risks and intangibles are discussed in Part I of this chapter ...

The same remarks and questions apply for other types of restructurings, including other types of restructuring of sales activities as well as restructurings of manufacturing activities, research and development activities, or other services activities ...

Where a restructuring involves a transfer to a foreign associated enterprise of risks that were previously assumed by a taxpayer, it may be important to examine whether the transfer of risks only concerns the future risks that will arise from the post-restructuring activities or also the risks existing at the time of the restructuring as a result of pre-conversion activities, i.e. there is a cut-off issue. For instance, consider a situation in which a distributor was assuming bad debt risks which it will no longer assume after its being restructured as a “limited risk distributor”, and that it is being compared with a long-established “limited risk distributor” that never assumed bad debt risk. It may be important when comparing both situations to examine, based on the guidance in Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I, whether the “limited risk distributor” that results from a conversion still assumes the risks associated with bad debts that arose before the restructuring at the time it was full-fledged, or whether all the bad debt risks including those that existed at the time of the conversion were transferred ...

When one compares a situation where a long-established full-fledged distributor is converted into a limited risk distributor with a situation where a limited risk distributor has been in existence in the market for the same duration, there might also be differences because the full-fledged distributor may have performed some functions, borne some expenses (e.g. marketing expenses), assumed some risks and contributed to the development of some intangibles before its conversion that the long-existing “limited risk distributor” may not have performed, borne, assumed or contributed to. The question arises whether at arm’s length such additional functions, assets and risks should only affect the remuneration of the distributor before its being converted, whether they should be taken into account to determine a remuneration of the transfers that take place upon the conversion (and if so how), whether they should affect the remuneration of the restructured limited risk distributor (and if so how), or a combination of these three possibilities. For instance, if it is found that the pre-restructuring activities led the full-fledged distributor to own some intangibles while the long-established limited risk distributor does not, the arm’s length principle may require these intangibles either to be remunerated upon the restructuring if they are transferred by the full-fledged distributor to a foreign associated enterprise, or to be taken into account in the determination of the arm’s length remuneration of the post-restructuring activities if they are not transferred (see Section E.2 of Part I above and Chapter VI of these Guidelines) ...

Some differences in the starting position of the restructured entity compared to the position of a newly set up operation can relate to the established presence of the operation. For instance, if one compares a situation where a long-established full-fledged distributor is converted into a limited risk distributor with a situation where a limited risk distributor is established in a market where the group did not have any previous commercial presence, market penetration efforts might be needed for the new entrant which are not needed for the converted entity. This may affect the comparability analysis and the determination of the arm’s length remuneration in both situations ...

Where there is an ongoing business relationship between the parties before and after the restructuring, there may also be an inter-relationship between on the one hand the conditions of the pre-restructuring activities and/or of the restructuring itself, and on the other hand the conditions for the post-restructuring arrangements, as discussed in Section C below ...

Where an arrangement between associated enterprises replaces an existing arrangement (restructuring), there may be factual differences in the starting position of the restructured entity compared to the position of a newly set up operation. Sometimes, the post-restructuring arrangement is negotiated between parties that have had prior contractual and commercial relationships. In such a situation, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case and in particular on the rights and obligations derived by the parties from these prior arrangements, this may affect the options realistically available to the parties in negotiating the terms of the new arrangement and therefore the conditions of the restructuring and of the post-restructuring arrangements (see paragraphs 9.27-9.31 for a discussion of options realistically available in the context of determining the arm’s length compensation for the restructuring itself). For instance, assume a party has proved in the past to be able to perform well as a full-fledged distributor performing a whole range of marketing and selling functions, employing and developing valuable marketing intangible assets and assuming a range of risks associated with its activity such as inventory risks, bad debt risks and market risks. Assume that its distribution contract is re-negotiated and converted into a “limited risk distribution” contract whereby it will perform limited marketing activities under the supervision of a foreign associated enterprise, employ limited marketing intangibles and assume limited risks in its relationship with the foreign associated enterprise and customers. In such a situation, the restructured distributor would not be in the same position as a newly established distributor ...

In addition, the comparability analysis of an arrangement that results from a business restructuring might reveal some factual differences compared to the one of an arrangement that was structured as such from the beginning, as discussed below. These factual differences do not affect the arm’s length principle or the way the guidance in these Guidelines should be interpreted and applied, but they may affect the comparability analysis and therefore the outcome of this application. See Section D on comparing the pre- and post-restructuring ...

However, business restructuring situations involve change, and the arm’s length principle must be applied not only to the post-restructuring transactions, but also to additional transactions that comprise the business restructuring. The application of the arm’s length principle to those additional transactions is discussed in Part I of this chapter ...

Comparable situations must be treated in the same way, regardless of whether or not they came into existence as a result of a business restructuring of a previously existing structure. The selection and practical application of an appropriate transfer pricing method must be based on the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction leading to the accurate delineation of the actual transaction ...

The arm’s length principle and these Guidelines do not and should not apply differently to post-restructuring transactions as opposed to transactions that were structured as such from the beginning. Doing otherwise would create a competitive distortion between existing players who restructure their activities and new entrants who implement the same business model without having to restructure their business ...

There can be cases where at arm’s length A and C would be willing to share the indemnification costs. In cases where the benefits arising from the restructuring accrue to another party in the MNE group, then that other party may bear the costs of indemnification, either directly or indirectly ...

There can be situations where C would be willing to pay an up-front fee to obtain the rights to the manufacturing contract from A, e.g. if the present value of the expected profits to be derived from its new manufacturing contract makes it worth the investment for C. In such situations, the payment by C might be organised in a variety of ways, for instance it might be that C would be paying A, or that C would be constructively paying A by meeting A’s indemnification obligation to B. It is also possible that C would pay B, for example, in the circumstances where B had certain rights and C would pay B for the transfer of those rights ...

There can be situations where A would be willing to bear the indemnification costs at arm’s length, for instance because it expects that the termination of its agreement with B will make it possible for it to derive costs savings through its new manufacturing agreement with C, and that the present value of these expected costs savings is greater than the amount of the indemnification ...

Assume a manufacturing contract between two associated enterprises, entity A and entity B, is terminated by A (B being the manufacturer). Assume A decides to use another associated manufacturer, entity C, to continue the manufacturing that was previously performed by B. As noted at paragraph 9.78, there should be no presumption that all contract terminations or substantial renegotiations should give a right to indemnification at arm’s length. Assume that it is determined, based on the guidance in this section, that in the circumstances of the case at arm’s length, B would be in a position to claim an indemnification for the detriment suffered from the termination. The question arises as to which party should ultimately bear the indemnification to be paid to B: A (i.e. the party terminating the contract), C (i.e. the party taking over the manufacturing activity previously performed by B), or another party in the MNE group benefitting from the restructuring. The analysis should start from the accurate delineation of the actual transactions comprising the business restructuring, and take into account economically related transactions with other enterprises in the MNE group that may help to delineate the controlled transaction (see paragraphs 1.36-1.38) ...

The transfer pricing analysis of the arm’s length nature of the conditions of the termination or substantial renegotiation of an agreement should take account of both the perspectives of the transferor and of the transferee. Taking account of the transferee’s perspective is important both to value the amount of an arm’s length indemnification, if any, and to determine what party should bear it. It is not possible to derive a single answer for all cases and the response should be based on an examination of the facts and circumstances of the case, and in particular of the rights and other assets of the parties, of the risks assumed by the parties, of the economic rationale for the termination, of the determination of what party(ies) is (are) expected to benefit from it, and of the options realistically available to the parties. This can be illustrated as follows ...

In the case where the conditions made or imposed between associated enterprises with respect to the termination, non-renewal or substantial renegotiation of their existing arrangements differ from the conditions that would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits that would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly ...

A similar issue may arise in the case where a party has undertaken development efforts resulting in losses or low returns in the early period and above-normal returns are expected in periods following the termination of the contract. In such a case, it will be necessary to analyse the actual arrangements very carefully to determine whether the party in substance takes a stake in the results of the development efforts or has merely accepted deferred payment terms. In performing the analysis the guidance relating to control over risk in Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I will be relevant. If the party does control the risks, it might be expected that the party would seek to protect itself from the risk of non-recovery through penalty or indemnification terms. If the party did not control the risks of non-recovery, then the terms are unlikely to be arm’s length ...

As a general matter, mitigation of risk inherent in the investment by a manufacturer is relevant to consider only if the manufacturer assumes the risk. In practice, the investment by an associated enterprise in a manufacturing plant where that enterprise is wholly dependent on another associated enterprise for the capability to generate returns is likely to require careful scrutiny in relation to the identification of risks and how those risks are controlled. As explained in Example 2 in paragraphs 1.84 and 1.102 where significant risks associated with generating a return from the manufacturing activities are controlled solely by another party (which also has the financial capacity to bear that risk), then that other party is allocated the upside and downside consequences of those risks, including under-utilisation, write-down, and closure costs. In that case, the manufacturer should not suffer the financial consequences of an early termination, as it did not control the economically significant risks that contributed to the closure, and in such a case the manufacturer would also not be expected to mitigate risks it did not in fact assume ...

At arm’s length, the manufacturer may mitigate the risks inherent in the investment by: Including in the contract an appropriate indemnification clause or penalties in case of early termination, or an option for the party making the investment to transfer it at a given price to the other party in case the investment becomes useless to the former due to the early termination of the contract by the latter. Factoring the risk linked with the possible termination of the contract into the determination of the remuneration of the activities covered by the contract (e.g. by factoring the risk into the determination of the remuneration of the manufacturing activities where third party comparables that bear comparable risks can be identified, perhaps by including front-end loaded fee structures). In such a case the party making the investment consciously accepts the risk and is rewarded for it; no separate indemnification for the termination of the contract seems necessary ...

An example would be where a manufacturing contract between associated enterprises requires the manufacturer to invest in a new manufacturing unit. Assume an arm’s length return on the investment can reasonably be anticipated by the manufacturer at the time the contract is concluded, subject to the manufacturing contract lasting for at least five years, for the manufacturing activity to produce at least x units per year, and for the remuneration of the manufacturing activity to be calculated on a basis (e.g. y$/unit) that is expected to generate an arm’s length return on the total investment in the new manufacturing unit. Assume that after three years, the associated enterprise terminates the contract in accordance with its terms in the context of a group-wide restructuring of the manufacturing operations. Assume the manufacturing unit is highly specialised and the manufacturer further to the termination would have no other choice than to write off the assets ...

One circumstance that deserves particular attention, is the situation where the now-terminated contract required one party to make a significant investment for which an arm’s length return might only be reasonably expected if the contract was maintained for an extended period of time. This created a financial risk for the party making the investment in case the contract was terminated before the end of such period of time. The degree of the risk would depend on whether the investment was highly specialised or could be used (possibly subject to some adaptations) for other clients. Where the risk was material, it would have been reasonable for independent parties in comparable circumstances to take it into account when negotiating the contract ...

Business restructurings may lead to the termination of the employment contracts of members of an assembled workforce. In this regard, in determining whether the restructuring is undertaken on arm’s length terms , the analysis should consider the facts and circumstances before and after the restructuring related to the assembled workforce, including whether something of value has been transferred upon termination of the arrangements between associated enterprises and, for example, whether there are implicit or explicit restrictive covenants (e.g. non-compete clause) in the employment contracts of the workforce members, which should be reflected in the amount of any indemnification that should be paid to the party previously undertaking the activities through that workforce ...

Another aspect that may be necessary to examine in assessing whether the conditions of an arrangement in relation to an indemnification clause are arm’s length, is the remuneration of the transactions that are the object of the arrangement and the financial conditions of the termination thereof, as both can be inter-related. In effect, the terms of a termination clause (or the absence thereof) may be a significant element of the functional analysis of the transactions and specifically of the analysis of the risks of the parties, and may accordingly need to be taken into account in the determination of an arm’s length remuneration for the transactions. Similarly, the remuneration of the transactions will affect the determination of whether the conditions of the termination of the arrangement are at arm’s length ...

However, in those cases where such comparables data are not found, the determination of whether the indemnification clause (or absence thereof) is arm’s length should take into account the rights and other assets of the parties at the time of entering into the arrangement and of its termination or renegotiation. This analysis might also be assisted by an examination of the options realistically available to the parties, as in some situations, it may be the case that, in comparable circumstances, an independent party would not have had any option realistically available that would be clearly more attractive to it than to accept the conditions of the termination or substantial renegotiation of the contract. The guidance in Section D of Chapter I, as well as the Guidance in Section B of this Part, are applicable ...

Once the existence or absence of an indemnification clause in favour of the restructured entity upon termination, non-renewal or substantial renegotiation of the agreements has been determined, the analysis should then focus on assessing whether such indemnification clause and its terms (or absence thereof) are arm’s length. Where comparables data evidence a similar indemnification clause (or absence thereof) in comparable circumstances, the indemnification clause (or absence thereof) in a controlled transaction will be regarded as arm’s length ...

As noted at paragraph 1.46, in transactions between independent enterprises, the divergence of interests between the parties ensures that: (i) contractual terms are concluded that reflect the interest of both parties, (ii) the parties will ordinarily seek to hold each other to the terms of the contract, and (iii) that contractual terms will be ignored or modified after the fact generally only if it is in the interests of both parties. However, this same divergence of interest may not exist in the case of associated enterprises or any such divergences may be managed in ways facilitated by the relationship between the associated enterprises and not solely or mainly through contractual agreements. For this reason, when the facts of the case differ from the written terms of the agreement between the parties or when no written terms exist, the absence or existence (and its terms) of an indemnification clause should be deduced from the conduct of the parties. For instance, it may be that, on the basis of the facts of the case and of the actual conduct of the associated enterprises, it is determined that the term of the contract is longer than established in the written contract, which would entitle the terminated party to some indemnification in case of early termination ...

The accurate delineation of the transaction will identify whether an indemnification clause or arrangement is in place upon termination, non-renewal or re-negotiation of the arrangements. In order to do so, the starting point should be a review of whether an indemnification clause or similar provision for termination, non-renewal or renegotiation is provided for, and of whether the conditions for termination, non-renewal or renegotiation of the contract were respected (e.g. with regard to any required notice period). However, the examination of the terms of the contract between the associated enterprises may not suffice from a transfer pricing perspective as the mere fact that a given terminated, non-renewed or renegotiated contract did not provide an indemnification or similar provision does not necessarily mean that this is arm’s length, as discussed below ...

In the assessment of whether the conditions of the termination or non-renewal of an existing arrangement are arm’s length, the possible recourse that may be offered by the applicable commercial law might provide some helpful insights. The applicable commercial legislation or case law may provide useful information on indemnification rights and terms and conditions that could be expected in case of termination of specific types of agreements, e.g. of a distributorship agreement. Under such rules, it may be that the terminated party has the right to claim before the courts an indemnification irrespective of whether or not it was provided for in the contract. Where the parties belong to the same MNE group, however, the terminated party is unlikely in practice to litigate against its associated enterprise in order to seek such an indemnification, and the conditions of the termination may therefore differ from the conditions that would be made between independent enterprises in similar circumstances ...

Once the restructuring arrangements have been accurately delineated and the options realistically available to the parties have been assessed, the following aspects should be considered: Whether commercial law supports rights to indemnification for the restructured entity under the facts of the case as accurately delineated (see Section F. 1 below); Whether the existence or absence of an indemnification clause or similar provisions (as well as the terms of such a clause where it exists) under the terms of the arrangement, as accurately delineated, is arm’s length (see Section F.2 below). Which party should ultimately bear the costs related to the indemnification of the party that suffers from the termination or re-negotiation of the agreement (see Section F.3 below) ...

There should be no presumption that all contract terminations or substantial renegotiations should give a right to indemnification at arm’s length, as this will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The analysis of whether an indemnification would be warranted at arm’s length should be made on the basis of the accurate delineation of the arrangements before and after the restructuring (based on the guidance in Section D. 1 of Chapter I and Section B. 1 of this Part) and the options realistically available to the parties ...

When the termination or renegotiation of existing arrangements involves the transfer of something of value (e.g. the termination of a distribution contract is sometimes accompanied by a transfer of intangibles), the guidance at Section E applies to the transfer of something of value, and this section considers whether further compensation may be warranted for any detriments suffered ...

Terminations or renegotiations of arrangements generally involve changes in the risk and functional profiles of the parties, with consequences for the allocation of profit potential between them. In addition, the termination or renegotiation of contractual relationships in the context of a business restructuring might cause the restructured entity to suffer detriments such as restructuring costs (e.g. write-off of assets, termination of employment contracts), re-conversion costs (e.g. in order to adapt its existing operation to other customer needs), and/or a loss of profit potential. In these situations, the question arises of whether, at arm’s length, indemnification should be paid to the restructured entity, and if so how to determine such an indemnification ...

Section F addresses the question of whether the restructured entity, at arm’s length, should receive compensation, in the form of indemnification, upon the termination or substantial renegotiation of its existing arrangements, which may or may not involve a transfer of something of value (addressed in the previous section). For the purpose of this chapter, indemnification means any type of compensation that may be paid for detriments suffered by the restructured entity, whether in the form of an up-front payment, of a sharing in restructuring costs, of lower (or higher) purchase (or sale) prices in the context of the post-restructuring operations, or of any other form ...

In outsourcing cases, it may happen that a party voluntarily decides to undergo a restructuring and to bear the associated restructuring costs in exchange for anticipated savings. For instance, assume a taxpayer that is manufacturing and selling products in a high-cost jurisdiction decides to outsource the manufacturing activity to an associated enterprise situated in a low-cost jurisdiction. Further to the restructuring, the taxpayer will purchase from its associated enterprise the products manufactured and will continue to sell them to third party customers. The restructuring may entail restructuring costs for the taxpayer while at the same time making it possible for it to benefit from cost savings on future procurements compared to its own manufacturing costs. Independent parties implementing this type of outsourcing arrangement may not necessarily require explicit compensation from the transferee, for example, where the anticipated benefits for the transferor are greater than its restructuring costs ...

The situation might however be different where the loss-making activity provided other benefits such as synergies with other activities performed by the same taxpayer. There can also be circumstances where a loss-making activity is maintained because it produces some benefits to the group as a whole. In such a case, the question arises whether at arm’s length the entity that maintains the loss-making activity should be compensated by those who benefit from it being maintained. See Section D.3 of Chapter I ...

The question may arise of whether the transferee should in fact be compensated by the transferor for taking over a loss-making activity. The response depends on whether an independent party in comparable circumstances would have been willing to pay for getting rid of the loss-making activity, or whether it would have considered other options such as closing down the activity; and on whether a third party would have been willing to acquire the loss-making activity (e.g. because of possible synergies with its own activities) and if so under what conditions, e.g. subject to compensation. There can be circumstances where an independent party would be willing to pay, e.g. if the financial costs and social risks of closing down the activity would be such that the transferor finds it more advantageous to pay a transferee who will attempt to reconvert the activity and will be responsible for any redundancy plan that may be needed ...

Not every case where a restructured entity experiences a reduction of its functions, assets and risks involves an actual loss of expected future profits. In some restructuring situations, the circumstances may be such that, rather than losing a “profit-making opportunity”, the restructured entity is actually being saved from the likelihood of a “loss-making opportunity”. An entity may agree to a restructuring as a better option than going out of business altogether. If the restructured entity is forecasting future losses absent the restructuring (e.g. it operates a manufacturing plant that is uneconomic due to increasing competition from low-cost imports), then there may be in fact no loss of any profit-making opportunity from restructuring rather than continuing to operate its existing business. In such circumstances, the restructuring might deliver a benefit to the restructured entity from reducing or eliminating future losses if such losses exceed the restructuring costs ...

An example is the case where a manufacturing activity that used to be performed by M1, one entity of the MNE group, is re-located to another entity, M2 (e.g. to benefit from location savings). Assume M1 transfers to M2 its machinery and equipment, inventories, patents, manufacturing processes and know-how, and key contracts with suppliers and clients. Assume that several employees of M1 are relocated to M2 in order to assist M2 in the start of the manufacturing activity so relocated. Assume such a transfer would be regarded as a transfer of an ongoing concern, should it take place between independent parties. In order to determine the arm’s length remuneration, if any, of such a transfer between associated enterprises, it should be compared with a transfer of an ongoing concern between independent parties rather than with a transfer of isolated assets ...

The determination of the arm’s length compensation for a transfer of an ongoing concern does not necessarily amount to the sum of the separate valuations of each separate element that comprises the aggregate transfer. In particular, if the transfer of an ongoing concern comprises multiple contemporaneous transfers of interrelated assets, risks, or functions, valuation of those transfers on an aggregate basis may be necessary to achieve the most reliable measure of the arm’s length price for the ongoing concern. Valuation techniques that are used, in acquisition deals, between independent parties may prove useful to valuing the transfer of an ongoing concern between associated enterprises. The guidance on the use of valuation techniques for transactions involving the transfer of intangibles or rights in intangibles contained in Section D.2.6.3 of Chapter VI should be considered ...

Business restructurings sometimes involve the transfer of an ongoing concern, i.e. a functioning, economically integrated business unit. The transfer of an ongoing concern in this context means the transfer of assets, bundled with the ability to perform certain functions and assume certain risks. Such functions, assets and risks may include, among other things: tangible property and intangibles; liabilities associated with holding certain assets and performing certain functions, such as R&D and manufacturing; the capacity to carry on the activities that the transferor carried on before the transfer; and any resource, capabilities, and rights. The valuation of a transfer of an ongoing concern should reflect all the valuable elements that would be remunerated between independent parties in comparable circumstances. See Section A.4.6 of Chapter VI. For example, in the case of a business restructuring that involves the transfer of a business unit that includes, among other things, research facilities staffed with an experienced research team, the valuation of such ongoing concern should reflect, among other things, the value of the facility and the impact (e.g. time and expense savings) of the assembled workforce on the arm’s length price. For a discussion on the transfer pricing treatment of assembled workforce, see Section D.7 of Chapter I ...

Tax administrations have expressed concerns about cases they have observed in practice where an entity voluntarily terminates a contract that provided benefits to it, in order to allow a foreign associated enterprise to enter into a similar contract and benefit from the profit potential attached to it. For instance, assume that company A has valuable long-term contracts with independent customers that carry significant profit potential for A. Assume that at a certain point in time, A voluntarily terminates its contracts with its customers under circumstances where the latter are legally or commercially obligated to enter into similar arrangements with company B, a foreign entity that belongs to the same MNE group as A. As a consequence, the contractual rights and attached profit potential that used to lie with A now lie with B. If the factual situation is that B could only enter into the contracts with the customers subject to A’s surrendering its own contractual rights to its benefit, and that A only terminated its contracts with its customers knowing that the latter were legally or commercially obligated to conclude similar arrangements with B, this in substance would consist in a tri-partite transaction and it may amount to a transfer of valuable contractual rights from A to B that may have to be remunerated at arm’s length, depending on the value of the rights surrendered by A from the perspectives of both A and B ...

Contractual rights can be valuable intangibles. Where valuable contractual rights are transferred (or surrendered) between associated enterprises, they should be remunerated at arm’s length, taking account of the value of the rights transferred from the perspectives of both the transferor and the transferee ...

In particular, in the case of the conversion of a full-fledged distributor into, for example, a limited risk distributor or commissionnaire, it may be important to examine whether the distributor has developed local marketing intangibles over the years prior to its being restructured and if so, what the nature and the value of these intangibles are, and whether they were transferred to an associated enterprise. Where such local intangibles are found to be in existence and to be transferred to a foreign associated enterprise, the arm’s length principle should apply to determine whether and if so how to compensate such a transfer, based on what would be agreed between independent parties in comparable circumstances. In this regard it is relevant to note that the transferor should receive arm’s length compensation (in addition to the arm’s length compensation for the transferred intangibles) when after the restructuring it continues to perform functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of the local intangible transferred (see Section B.2. 1 of Chapter VI). On the other hand, where such local intangibles are found to be in existence and to remain in the restructured entity, they should be taken into account in the functional analysis of the post-restructuring activities. They may accordingly influence the selection and application of the most appropriate transfer pricing method for the post-restructuring controlled transactions, in order that appropriate compensation can be determined ...

Where a local full-fledged operation is converted into an operation assuming limited risk, using limited intangibles and receiving low remuneration, the questions arise of whether this conversion entails the transfer by the restructured local entity to a foreign associated enterprise of valuable intangibles or rights in intangibles and whether there are local intangibles that remain with the local operation ...

In addition, where the intangible being transferred as a result of the restructuring meets the criteria for being considered a hard-to value-intangible in paragraph 6.189, then the guidance in Section D.4 of Chapter VI is applicable ...

Difficulties can arise in the context of business restructuring where the valuation of an intangible or rights in an intangible at the time of the transaction is highly uncertain. In these cases, the question arises as to how arm’s length pricing should be determined. The question should be resolved, both by taxpayers and tax administrations, by reference to what independent enterprises would have done in comparable circumstances to take account of the valuation uncertainty in the pricing of the transaction. To this aim, the guidance in Section D.3 of Chapter VI is relevant ...

Where the business restructuring provides for a transfer of an intangible followed by a new arrangement whereby the transferor will continue to use the intangible transferred, the entirety of the commercial arrangement between the parties should be examined in order to accurately delineate the transaction. If an independent party were to transfer an asset that it intends to continue exploiting, it would be prudent for it to negotiate the conditions of such a future use (e.g. in a license agreement) concomitantly with the conditions of the transfer. In effect, there will generally be a relationship between the determination of an arm’s length compensation for the transfer, the determination of an arm’s length compensation for the post-restructuring transactions in relation to the transferred intangible, such as future licence fees that may be payable by the transferor to be able to continue using the asset, and the expected future profitability of the transferor from its future use of the asset. For instance, in an arrangement whereby a patent is transferred for a price of 100 in Year N and a licence agreement is concomitantly concluded according to which the transferor will continue to use the patent transferred in exchange for a royalty of 100 per year over a 10-year period, it is likely that at least one of the two prices is not arm’s length or that the arrangement should be delineated as something other than a sale and concomitant license back. In some circumstances, the accurate delineation of the transaction might conclude that the arrangements reflect the provision of financing, as illustrated in Example 16 of Annex I to Chapter VI ...

Also in the case where a local operation disposes of the legal ownership of its intangibles to a foreign associated enterprise and continues to use the intangibles further to the disposal, but does so in a different legal capacity (e.g. as a licensee), the conditions of the transfer should be assessed from both the transferor’s and the transferee’s perspectives. The determination of an arm’s length remuneration for the subsequent ownership, control and exploitation of the transferred intangible should take account of the extent of the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by the parties in relation to the intangible transferred, and in particular analysing control of risks and control of functions performed relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of the intangibles ...

The arm’s length principle requires an evaluation of the conditions made or imposed between associated enterprises, at the level of each of them. The fact that centralisation of legal ownership of intangibles may be motivated by sound commercial reasons at the level of the MNE group does not answer the question whether the conditions of the transfer are arm’s length from the perspectives of both the transferor and the transferee ...

MNE groups may have sound business reasons to centralise ownership of intangibles or rights in intangibles. An example in the context of business restructuring is a transfer of legal ownership of intangibles that accompanies the specialisation of manufacturing sites within an MNE group. In a pre-restructuring environment, each manufacturing entity may be the owner and manager of a series of patents – for instance if the manufacturing sites were historically acquired from third parties with their intangibles. In a global business model, each manufacturing site can be specialised by type of manufacturing process or by geographical area rather than by patent. As a consequence of such a restructuring the MNE group might proceed with the transfer of all the locally owned patents to a central location which will in turn give contractual rights (through licences or manufacturing agreements) to all the group’s manufacturing sites to manufacture the products falling in their new areas of competence, using patents that were initially owned either by the same or by another entity within the group. In such a scenario it will be important to delineate the actual transaction and to understand whether the transfer of legal ownership is for administrative simplicity (as in Example 1 of Annex I to Chapter VI), or whether the restructuring changes the identity of the parties performing or controlling functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles ...

Business restructurings sometimes involve the transfer of the legal ownership of intangibles or rights in intangibles that were previously owned by one or more local operation(s) to a central location situated in another tax jurisdiction (e.g. a foreign associated enterprise that operates as a principal or as a so-called “IP company”). In some cases the transferor continues to use the intangible transferred, but does so in another legal capacity (e.g. as a licensee of the transferee, or through a contract that includes limited rights to the intangible such as a contract manufacturing arrangement using patents that were transferred; or a limited risk distribution arrangement using a trademark that was transferred). In accordance with the guidance in Chapter VI, it is important to remember that the legal ownership of an intangible by itself does not confer any right ultimately to retain returns derived by the MNE group from exploiting that intangible (see 6.42). Instead, the compensation required to be paid to associated enterprises performing or controlling functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles may comprise any share of the total return anticipated to be derived from the intangibles (see 6.54). Therefore, the change in legal ownership of an intangible in a business restructuring may not affect which party is entitled to returns from that intangible ...

The determination of the arm’s length price for a transfer of intangibles or rights in intangibles should be conducted in accordance with the guidance in Section D. 1 of Chapter VI. It will be affected by a number of factors among which are the amount, duration and riskiness of the expected benefits from the exploitation of the intangible, the nature of the intangible right and the restrictions that may be attached to it (restrictions in the way it can be used or exploited, geographical restrictions, time limitations), the extent and remaining duration of its legal protection (if any), and any exclusivity clause that might be attached to the right. See Section D.2. 1 of Chapter VI. Valuation of intangibles can be complex and uncertain. The general guidance on intangibles and on cost contribution arrangements that is found in Chapters VI and VIII is applicable in the context of business restructurings ...

Transfers of intangibles or rights in intangibles raise difficult questions both as to the identification of the intangibles transferred and as to their valuation. Identification can be difficult because not all valuable intangibles are legally protected and registered and not all valuable intangibles are recognised or recorded for accounting purposes. Relevant intangibles might potentially include rights to use industrial assets such as patents, trademarks, trade names, designs or models, as well as copyrights of literary, artistic or scientific work (including software) and intellectual property such as know-how and trade secrets. They may also include customer lists, distribution channels, unique names, symbols or pictures. An essential part of the analysis of a business restructuring is to identify with specificity the relevant intangibles or rights in intangibles that were transferred (if any), whether independent parties would have remunerated their transfer, and what their arm’s length value is ...

In practice, what to do about inventory at the time of the restructuring would likely be taken into account by unrelated parties in agreeing the terms of the total deal, and inventory should be analysed as part of delineating the actual transactions comprising the business restructuring. A key consideration is how to deal with the risks inherent in the inventory, and how to avoid double counting—i.e. the party reducing its risks should not receive a price that takes into account risks it has given up, and cannot exploit. If raw materials costing 100 now have a market price of 80 or 120, then a transfer would crystallise a loss or gain which could be a significant impediment to one of the parties to the restructuring. The matter is likely to be resolved as part of the overall terms of the restructuring and should be analysed accordingly. In practice there may be a transition period where inventory is run down before starting the new arrangements, and thus avoiding transfer of inventory, particularly when there may be several complications beyond transfer pricing involved in transferring legal ownership of inventory cross-border ...

The choice of the appropriate transfer pricing method depends in part on which part of the transaction is the less complex and can be evaluated with the greater certainty (the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by the manufacturer, or the marketing and sales functions that remain to be performed taking account of the assets to be used and risks to be assumed to perform these functions). See paragraphs 3.18-3.19 on the choice of the tested party ...

Assume that in order to migrate from the pre-existing arrangement to the restructured one, the raw materials and finished products that are on the balance sheet of the taxpayer at the time the new arrangement is put in place are transferred to the foreign associated enterprise. The question arises how to determine the arm’s length transfer price for the inventories upon the conversion. This is an issue that can typically be encountered where there is a transition from one business model to another. The arm’s length principle applies to transfers of inventory among associated enterprises situated in different tax jurisdictions. The choice of the appropriate transfer pricing method depends upon the comparability (including functional) analysis of the parties. The functional analysis may have to cover a transition period over which the transfer is being implemented. For instance, in the above example: One possibility could be to determine the arm’s length price for the raw material and finished products by reference to comparable uncontrolled prices, to the extent the comparability factors can be met by such comparable uncontrolled prices, i.e. that the conditions of the uncontrolled transaction are comparable to the conditions of the transfer that takes place in the context of the restructuring. Another possibility could be to determine the transfer price for the finished products as the resale price to customers minus an arm’s length remuneration for the marketing and distribution functions that still remain to be performed. A further possibility would be to start from the manufacturing costs and add an arm’s length mark-up to remunerate the manufacturer for the functions it performed, assets it used and risks it assumed with respect to these inventories. There are however cases where the market value of the inventories is too low for a profit element to be added on costs at arm’s length ...

Assume the arrangement is restructured and the taxpayer now operates as a so-called “toll-manufacturer” and “limited risk distributor”. As part of the restructuring, a foreign associated enterprise is established that acquires various intangibles from various affiliates including the taxpayer. Further to the restructuring, raw materials are to be acquired by the foreign associated enterprise, put in consignment in the premises of the taxpayer for manufacturing in exchange for a manufacturing fee. The stock of finished products will belong to the foreign associated enterprise and be acquired by the taxpayer for immediate re-sale to third party customers (i.e. the taxpayer will only purchase the finished products once it has concluded a sale with a customer). Under this new business model, the foreign associated enterprise contractually assumes the inventory risks that were previously borne by the taxpayer, and meets the requirements of control over the risk and financial capacity to assume the risk ...

Assume a taxpayer, which is a member of an MNE group, used to operate as a “full-fledged” manufacturer and distributor. According to the pre-restructuring business model, the taxpayer purchased raw materials, manufactured finished products using tangible property and intangibles that belonged to it or were rented/licensed to it, performed marketing and distribution functions and sold the finished products to third party customers. In doing so, the taxpayer assumed a series of risks such as inventory risks, bad debt risks and market risks ...

Business restructurings can involve the transfer of tangible assets (e.g. equipment) by a restructured entity to a foreign associated enterprise. One common issue relates to the valuation of inventories that are transferred upon the conversion by a restructured manufacturer or distributor to a foreign associated enterprise (e.g. a principal), where the latter takes title to the inventories as from the implementation of the new business model and supply chain arrangements ...

Sections E. 1 to E.3 below contain a discussion of some typical transfers that can arise in business restructurings: transfers of tangible assets, of intangibles and rights in intangibles, and of activities (ongoing concern) ...

In scenario no. 1, the distributor is surrendering a profit potential with significant uncertainties for a relatively low but stable rate of profitability. Whether an independent party would be willing to do so would depend on its anticipated return under both scenarios, on its level of risk tolerance, on its options realistically available and on possible compensation for the restructuring itself. In case scenario no. 2, it is unlikely that independent parties in the distributor’s situation would agree to relocate the risks and associated profit potential for no additional compensation if they had the option to do otherwise. Scenario no. 3 illustrates the fact that the analysis should take account of the profit potential going forward and that, where there is a significant change in the commercial or economic environment, relying on historical data alone will not be sufficient ...

At arm’s length, the response is likely to depend on the rights and other assets of the parties, on the profit potential of the distributor and of its associated enterprise in relation to both business models (full-fledged and low risk distributor) as well as the expected duration of the new arrangement. In particular, in evaluating profit potential, it is necessary to evaluate whether historic profits (determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle) are an indicator of future profit potential, or whether there have been changes in the business environment around the time of the restructuring that mean that past performance is not an indicator of profit potential. For example, competing products could have the effect of eroding profitability, and new technology or consumer preferences could render the products less attractive. The consideration of these factors from perspective of the distributor can be illustrated with the following example ...

As another example, assume a full-fledged distributor is operating under a long term contractual arrangement for a given type of transaction. Assume that, based on its rights under the long term contract with respect to these transactions, it has the option realistically available to it to accept or refuse being converted into a limited risk distributor operating for a foreign associated enterprise, and that an arm’s length remuneration for such a low risk distribution activity is estimated to be a stable profit of +2% per year while the excess profit potential associated with the risks would now be attributed to the foreign associated enterprise. Assume for the purpose of this example that the restructuring leads to the renegotiation of the existing contractual arrangements, but it does not entail the transfer of assets other than its rights under the long term contract. From the perspective of the distributor, the question arises as to whether the new arrangement (taking into account both the remuneration for the post-restructuring transactions and any compensation for the restructuring itself) is expected to make it as well off as its realistic – albeit riskier – alternatives. If not, this would imply that the post-restructuring arrangement is not priced at arm’s length and that additional compensation would be needed to appropriately remunerate the distributor for the restructuring, or that an assessment of the commercial rationality of the transaction based on Section D.2 may be necessary. Furthermore, for transfer pricing purposes, it is important to determine whether risks contractually transferred as part of the business restructuring, are assumed by the foreign associated enterprise in accordance with the guidance in Section D. 1 of Chapter I ...

Take the example of a conversion of a full-fledged manufacturer into a contract manufacturer. In such a case, while a cost plus reward might be an arm’s length remuneration for undertaking the post-restructuring contract manufacturing operations, a different question is whether there should be indemnification at arm’s length for the change in the existing arrangements which results in the surrender of the riskier profit potential by the manufacturer, taking into account its rights, other assets and economically relevant characteristics. Indemnification is discussed in Section F ...

General guidance on the transfer pricing aspects of risks is found in Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I, and the reallocation of risk following a business restructuring should be analysed under the framework set out in that Section in order to determine whether the party allocated risk following the restructuring controls the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk ...

In order to determine whether at arm’s length the restructuring itself would give rise to a form of compensation, it is essential to understand the restructuring, including the changes that have taken place, how they have affected the functional analysis of the parties, what the business reasons for and the anticipated benefits from the restructuring were, and what options would have been realistically available to the parties, as discussed in Section B ...

In the context of business restructurings, profit potential should not be interpreted as simply the profits/losses that would occur if the pre-restructuring arrangement were to continue indefinitely. On the one hand, if an entity has no discernible rights or other assets at the time of the restructuring, then it has no compensable profit potential. On the other hand, an entity with considerable rights or other assets at the time of the restructuring may have considerable profit potential, which must ultimately be appropriately remunerated in order to justify the sacrifice of such profit potential ...

In these Guidelines, “profit potential” means “expected future profits”. In some cases it may encompass losses. The notion of “profit potential” is often used for valuation purposes, in the determination of an arm’s length compensation for a transfer of intangibles or of an ongoing concern, or in the determination of an arm’s length indemnification for the termination or substantial renegotiation of existing arrangements, once it is found that such compensation or indemnification would have taken place between independent parties in comparable circumstances ...

An independent enterprise does not necessarily receive compensation when a change in its business arrangements results in a reduction in its profit potential or expected future profits. The arm’s length principle does not require compensation for a mere decrease in the expectation of an entity’s future profits. When applying the arm’s length principle to business restructurings, the question is whether there is a transfer of something of value (an asset or an ongoing concern) or a termination or substantial renegotiation of existing arrangements and that transfer, termination or substantial renegotiation would be compensated between independent parties in comparable circumstances. These two situations are discussed in Sections E and F below ...

Under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, the fact that a business restructuring arrangement is motivated by a purpose of obtaining tax benefits does not of itself warrant a conclusion that it is a non-arm’s length arrangement. The presence of a tax motive or purpose does not of itself justify non-recognition of the parties’ characterisation or structuring of the arrangement. However, tax benefits at a group level do not determine whether the arm’s length principle is satisfied at the entity level for a taxpayer affected by the restructuring (see previous paragraph). Moreover, as indicated in paragraph 1.142, the fact that a MNE group as a whole is left worse off on a pre-tax basis may be a relevant pointer in determining the commercial rationality of the restructuring ...

There can be group-level business reasons for an MNE group to restructure. However, it is worth re-emphasising that the arm’s length principle treats the members of an MNE group as separate entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified business (see paragraph 1.6). As a consequence, it is not sufficient from a transfer pricing perspective that a restructuring arrangement makes commercial sense for the group as a whole: the arrangement must be arm’s length at the level of each individual taxpayer, taking account of its rights and other assets, expected benefits from the arrangement (i.e. any consideration of the post-restructuring arrangement plus, if applicable, any compensation payments for the restructuring itself), and realistically available options. Where a restructuring makes commercial sense for the group as a whole on a pre-tax basis, it is expected that an appropriate transfer price (that is, any compensation for the post-restructuring arrangement plus, if applicable, any compensation payments for the restructuring itself) would generally be available to provide arm’s length compensation for each accurately delineated transaction comprising the business restructuring for each individual group member participating in it ...

In assessing the commercial rationality of a restructuring under the guidance for non-recognition under Section D.2 of Chapter I, the question may arise whether to look at one transaction in isolation or whether to examine it in a broader context, taking account of other transactions that are economically inter-related. It will generally be appropriate to look at the commercial rationality of a restructuring as a whole. For instance, where examining a sale of an intangible that is part of a broader restructuring involving changes to the arrangements relating to the development and use of the intangible, then the commercial rationality of the intangible sale should not be examined in isolation of these changes. On the other hand, where a restructuring involves changes to more than one element or aspect of a business that are not economically inter-related, the commercial rationality of particular changes may need to be separately considered. For example, a restructuring may involve centralising a group’s purchasing function and centralising the ownership of valuable intangible property unrelated to the purchasing function. In such a case, the commercial rationality of centralising the purchasing function and of centralising the ownership of valuable intangible property may need to be evaluated separately from one another ...

Business restructurings often lead MNE groups to implement global business models that are hardly if ever found between independent enterprises, taking advantage of the very fact that they are MNE groups and that they can work in an integrated fashion. For instance, MNE groups may implement global supply chains or centralised functions that may not be found between independent enterprises. This lack of comparables does not mean that the implementation of such global business models is not arm’s length. Every effort should be made to determine the pricing for the restructured transactions as accurately delineated under the arm’s length principle. A tax administration should not disregard part or all of the restructuring or substitute other transactions for it unless the exceptional circumstances described in paragraph 1.142 are met. In those cases, the guidance in Section D.2 of Chapter I may be applicable. The structure that for transfer pricing purposes, replaces that actually adopted by the taxpayers should comport as closely as possible with the facts of the actual transaction undertaken whilst achieving a commercially rational expected result that would have enabled the parties to come to a price acceptable to both of them at the time the arrangement was entered into. For example, where one element of a restructuring arrangement involves the closing down of a factory, the structure adopted for transfer pricing purposes cannot ignore the reality that the factory no longer operates. Similarly, where one element of a restructuring involves the actual relocation of substantive business functions, the structure adopted for transfer pricing purposes cannot ignore the fact that those functions were actually relocated ...

MNEs are free to organise their business operations as they see fit. Tax administrations do not have the right to dictate to an MNE how to design its structure or where to locate its business operations. In making commercial decisions, tax considerations may be a factor. Tax administrations, however, have the right to determine the tax consequences of the structure put in place by an MNE, subject to the application of treaties and in particular of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. This means that tax administrations may make, where appropriate, adjustments to profits in accordance with Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and other types of adjustments allowed by their domestic law (e.g. under general or specific anti-abuse rules), to the extent that such adjustments are compatible with their treaty obligations ...

As part of their transfer pricing documentation, MNE groups are recommended to document their decisions and intentions regarding business restructurings, especially as regards their decisions to assume or transfer significant risks, before the relevant transactions occur, and to document the evaluation of the consequences on profit potential of significant risk allocations resulting from the restructuring. In describing the assumption of risk as part of a business restructuring, it is recommended that taxpayers use the framework set out in Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I ...

In the master file (see Annex I to Chapter V), taxpayers are asked to describe any important business restructuring transactions occurring during the year. In addition, in the local file, taxpayers are asked to indicate whether the local entity has been involved in or affected by business restructurings occurring during the year or immediately past year and to explain the aspects of such transactions affecting the local entity (see Annex II to Chapter V) ...

The reference to the notion of options realistically available is not intended to create a requirement for taxpayers to document all possible hypothetical options realistically available. Rather, the intention is to provide an indication that, if there is a realistically available option that is clearly more attractive, it should be considered in the analysis of the conditions of the restructuring ...

At arm’s length, there are also situations where an entity would have had one or more options realistically available to it that would clearly offer more attractive opportunities to meet their objectives than to accept the conditions of the restructuring (taking into account all the relevant conditions, including the commercial and market conditions going forward, the profit potential of the various options and any compensation or indemnification for the restructuring), including possibly the option not to enter into the restructuring transaction. In such cases, an independent party may not have agreed to the conditions of the restructuring and adjustments to the conditions made or imposed may be necessary ...

At arm’s length, there are situations where the restructured entity would have had no clearly more attractive option realistically available to it than to accept the conditions of the restructuring, e.g. a contract termination – with or without indemnification as discussed at Section F below. In longer-term contracts, this may occur by invoking an exit clause that allows for one party to prematurely exit the contract with just cause. In contracts that allow either party to opt out of the contract, the party terminating the arrangement may choose to do so because it has determined, subject to the terms of the termination clause, that it is more favourable to stop using the function, or to internalise it, or to engage a cheaper or more efficient provider or to seek more lucrative opportunities. If the restructured entity transfers rights or other assets or an ongoing concern to another party, it might however be compensated for such a transfer as discussed in Section E below ...

Thus, in applying the arm’s length principle, the tax administration should evaluate each transaction as accurately delineated under the guidance in Section D of Chapter I and consider the economically relevant characteristics taken into account by the parties in reaching the conclusion that there is no option realistically available that offers a clearly more attractive opportunity to meet their commercial objectives than the restructuring adopted (see paragraph 1.38). In making such assessment, it may be necessary or useful to assess the transactions comprising the business restructuring in the context of a broader arrangement of economically related transactions ...

The arm’s length principle is based on the notion that independent enterprises, when evaluating the terms of a potential transaction, will compare the transaction to the other options realistically available to them, and they will only enter into the transaction if they see no alternative that offers a clearly more attractive opportunity to meet their commercial objective. In other words, independent enterprises would only enter into a transaction if it does not make them worse off than their next best option. Consideration of the other options realistically available may be relevant to comparability analysis, to understand the respective positions of the parties ...

The fact that a business restructuring may be motivated by anticipated synergies does not necessarily mean that the profits of the MNE group will effectively increase after the restructuring. It may be the case that enhanced synergies make it possible for the MNE group to derive additional profits compared to what the situation would have been in the future if the restructuring had not taken place, but there may not necessarily be additional profits compared to the pre-restructuring situation, for instance if the restructuring is needed to maintain competitiveness rather than to increase it. In addition, expected synergies do not always materialise – there can be cases where the implementation of a global business model designed to derive more group synergies in fact leads to additional costs and less efficiency ...

For example, a business restructuring may involve the setting up by an MNE group of a central procurement operation that replaces the procurement activities of several associated enterprises. Similar to the guidance at paragraph 1.180 the MNE group has taken affirmative steps to centralise purchasing in a single group company to take advantage of volume discounts and potential savings in administrative costs. In accordance with the guidance in Chapter I, the benefits due to deliberate concerted group action should be allocated to the associated enterprises whose contributions create the synergies. However, in a business restructuring, the central procurement company may also contractually assume risk associated with buying, holding, and on-selling goods. As stated in the previous section, an analysis of risk under the framework provided in Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I will determine the economic significance of the risk and which party or parties assume that risk. Although the central procurement operation is entitled to profit potential arising from its assumption of the risk associated with buying, holding, and on-selling goods, it is not entitled to retain profits arising from the group purchasing power because it does not contribute to the creation of synergies (see paragraph 1.188) ...

Some businesses have indicated that multinational businesses, regardless of their products or sectors, have reorganised their structures to provide more centralised control and management of manufacturing, research and distribution functions. The pressure of competition in a globalised economy, savings from economies of scale, the need for specialisation and the need to increase efficiency and lower costs have all been described as important in driving business restructurings. Where anticipated synergies are put forward by a taxpayer as an important business reason for the restructuring, it would be a good practice for the taxpayer to document, at the time the restructuring is decided upon or implemented, what these anticipated synergies are and on what assumptions they are anticipated. This is a type of documentation that is likely to be produced at the group level for non-tax purposes, to support the decision-making process of the restructuring. For Article 9 purposes, it would be a good practice for the taxpayer to document the source of these synergies and how these anticipated synergies impact at the entity level in applying the arm’s length principle (see Section D.8 of Chapter I). Care should be taken to ensure that, where deliberate concerted group actions are taken through a business restructuring, the associated enterprises contributing to the synergistic benefit after the restructuring are appropriately remunerated (see the example in the following paragraph). Furthermore, while anticipated synergies may be relevant to the understanding of a business restructuring, care must be taken to avoid the use of hindsight in ex post analyses (see paragraph 3.74) ...

For instance, where a full-fledged distributor is converted into a limited-risk distributor or commissionnaire resulting in the reduction or elimination of risks relating to inventory in the restructured enterprise, in order to determine whether such risk is economically significant the tax administration may want to analyse: The role of inventory in the business model (for example, speed to market, comprehensive range), The nature of the inventory (for example, spare parts, fresh flowers), The level of investment in inventory, The factors giving rise to inventory write-downs or obsolescence (for example, perishability, pricing pressures, speed of technical improvements, market conditions), The history of write-down and stock obsolescence, and whether any commercial changes affect the reliability of historic performance as an indicator of current risk, The cost of insuring against damage or loss of inventory, and The history of damage or loss (if uninsured) ...

In any analysis of risks in controlled transactions, one important issue is to assess whether a risk is economically significant, i.e. it carries significant profit potential, and, as a consequence, whether that risk may explain a significant reallocation of profit potential. The significance of a risk will depend on the likelihood of the risk materialising and the size of the potential profits or losses arising from the risk. Accounting statements may provide useful information on the probability and quantum of certain risks (e.g. bad debt risks, inventory risks), if past performance is an indicator of current risks, but there are also economically significant risks that may not be separately recorded as such in the financial accounts (e.g. market risks). If a risk is assessed to be economically insignificant for the entity, then that risk would not explain a substantial amount of the entity’s profit potential. At arm’s length a party would not be expected to lay off a risk that is perceived as economically insignificant in exchange for a substantial decrease in its profit potential ...

A second example relates to the purported transfer of credit risk as part of a business restructuring. The analysis under Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I would take into account the contractual terms before and after the restructuring, but would also examine how the parties operate in relation to the risk before and after the restructuring. The analysis would then examine whether the party that contractually assumes the risk controls the risk in practice through relevant capability and decision-making as defined in paragraph 1.65 and has the financial capacity to assume such risk as defined in paragraph 1.64. It is important to note that a party that before the restructuring did not assume a risk under the analysis of Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I cannot transfer it to another party, and a party that after the restructuring does not assume a risk under the analysis of Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I should not be allocated the profit potential associated with that risk. For example, suppose that before a business restructuring, a full-fledged distributor contractually assumes bad debt risks, which is reflected in the balance sheet at year end. However, the analysis described above establishes that before the business restructuring, decisions about the extension of credit terms to customers and debt recovery were taken by an associated enterprise and not by the distributor, and the associated enterprise reimbursed the costs of irrecoverable debts. It is also determined that the associated enterprise is the only entity that controlled the risk and had the financial capacity to assume the bad debt risk, leading to the conclusion that, before the business restructuring, the risk was not assumed by the distributor. In such a case there is no bad debt risk for the distributor to transfer as part of the business restructuring. In other circumstances it may be found that before the business restructuring the distributor controlled the bad debt risk and had the financial capacity to assume the risk it contractually assumed, but mitigated its risk through indemnification arrangements or debt factoring arrangements with an associated enterprise in exchange for appropriate compensation. Following the business restructuring, the bad debt risk is contractually assumed by that associated enterprise which, as determined under the analysis described above, now controls the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk. The risk has, therefore been transferred but the impact on the profits of the distributor going forward compared with the past resulting from the transfer of this risk alone may be limited, because before the restructuring steps had been taken and costs incurred to mitigate the risk outcomes of the distributor ...

The framework and detailed guidance for analysing risk laid out in Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I is applicable for purposes of undertaking an analysis of risks in the context of business restructurings, and in particular for determining which party assumes a specific risk by reference to control and financial capacity. It is crucial to apply this framework to determine which party assumes specific risks before the restructuring and which party assumes specific risks following the restructuring. For example, where a restructuring purports to transfer inventory risk, it is relevant to examine not only the contractual terms, but also the conduct of the parties under Step 3 in the framework (e.g. where any inventory write-downs are taken before and after the restructuring, whether there is any indemnification for those inventory write-downs, which party or parties perform risk control functions and have the financial capacity to assume the risks). The results of this analysis may establish that before the restructuring one party assumed the inventory risk and that same party continues to do so after the restructuring notwithstanding a change in contractual terms. In that situation, the risk would continue to be allocated to that same party. References in this Chapter to “transfer of risk”, “relocation of risk, “shifting of risk” or “laying off of risk” should be read in the context of the guidance in Section D. 1 of Chapter I. In particular, the transferee of the risk is considered to assume the risk when the conditions set out in the framework for analysing risk in controlled transactions (Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I) are met ...

Risks are of critical importance in the context of business restructurings. Usually, in the open market, the assumption of risk associated with a commercial opportunity affects the profit potential of that opportunity, and the allocation of risk assumed between the parties to the arrangement affects how profits or losses resulting from the transaction are allocated through the arm’s length pricing of the transaction. Business restructurings often result in local operations being converted into low risk operations (e.g. “low risk distributors”, or “low risk contract manufacturers”) and being remunerated with a relatively low (but generally stable) return on the grounds that the economically significant risks are assumed by another party to which the profits or losses associated with those risks are allocated. For this reason, an examination of the allocation of risks between associated enterprises before and after the restructuring is an essential part of the functional analysis. Such analysis should allow tax administrations to assess the transfer of the economically significant risks of the business that is restructured and the consequences of that transfer for the application of the arm’s length principle to the restructuring itself and to the post-restructuring transactions ...

The accurate delineation of the transactions comprising the business restructuring requires performing a functional analysis that seeks to identify the economically significant activities and responsibilities undertaken, assets used or contributed, and risks assumed before and after the restructuring by the parties involved. Accordingly, the analysis focuses on what the parties actually do and the capabilities, as well as the type and nature of assets used or contributed by the parties in a pre-restructuring and post-restructuring scenarios. See Section D. 1.2 of Chapter I. Given the importance of risk in the analysis of business restructurings, the following section provides specific guidance on the analysis of risk in transactions comprising the business restructuring ...

Where the conditions of a business restructuring have been formalised by the MNE group in writing (e.g. written contractual agreements, correspondence and/or other communications), those agreements provide the starting point for delineating the transactions comprising the business restructuring between the MNEs involved. The contractual terms may describe the roles, responsibilities and rights of the restructured entity under the pre-restructuring arrangement (including in relevant circumstances those existing under contract and commercial law) and of the manner and extent to which those rights and obligations change as a result of the restructuring. However, where no written terms exist, or where the facts of the case, including the conduct of the parties, differ materially from the written terms of any agreement between them or supplement these written terms, the actual transactions comprising the business restructuring must be deduced from the facts as established, including the conduct of the parties (see Section D. 1.1 of Chapter I) ...

In order to determine whether, at arm’s length, compensation would be payable upon a restructuring to any restructured entity within an MNE group, and if so the amount of such compensation as well as the member of the group that should bear such compensation, it is important to accurately delineate the transactions occurring between the restructured entity and one or more other members of the group. For these purposes, the detailed guidance in Section D of Chapter I of these Guidelines is applicable ...

Restructurings can take a variety of different forms and may involve two or more members of an MNE group. For example, a simple pre-restructuring arrangement could involve a full-fledged manufacturer producing goods and selling them to an associated full-fledged distributor for on-sale into the market. The restructuring could involve a modification to that two-party arrangement, whereby the distributor is converted to a limited risk distributor or commissionnaire, with risks previously assumed by the full-fledged distributor being assumed by the manufacturer (taking into account the guidance in Section D. 1 of Chapter I. Frequently, the restructuring will be more complicated, with functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by either or both parties to a pre-restructuring arrangement shifting to one or more members of the group ...

Aspects of identifying the commercial or financial relations between the parties which are particularly relevant to determining the arm’s length conditions of business restructurings, are analysed in the following sections: The accurate delineation of the transactions comprising the business restructuring and the functions, assets and risks before and after the restructuring (see Section B.1); The business reasons for and the expected benefits from the restructuring, including the role of synergies (see Section B.2); The other options realistically available to the parties (see Section B.3) ...

The application of the arm’s length principle to a business restructuring must start, as for any controlled transaction, with the identification of the commercial or financial relations between the associated enterprises involved in the business restructuring and the conditions and economically relevant circumstances attaching to those relations so that the controlled transactions comprising the business restructuring are accurately delineated. In this regard, the general guidance in Section D. 1 of Chapter I is applicable. This guidance requires the examination of the economically relevant characteristics of the commercial or financial relations between the associated enterprises, and in particular the contractual terms of the business restructuring (Section D. 1.1); the functions performed by each party to the restructuring, before and after the restructuring, taking into account assets used and risks assumed (Section D. 1.2); the economic circumstances of the parties (Section D. 1.4) and business strategies (Section D. 1.5). In addition, the analysis should be informed by a review of the business reasons for and the expected benefits from the restructuring, including the role of synergies, and the options realistically available to the parties. As stated in paragraph 1.33, these conditions and economically relevant circumstances of the accurately delineated transactions that comprise the business restructuring will then be compared with the conditions and economically relevant circumstances of comparable transactions between independent enterprises ...

The arm’s length principle requires an evaluation of the conditions made or imposed between associated enterprises, at the level of each of them. The fact that a business restructuring may be motivated by sound commercial reasons at the level of the MNE group, e.g. in order to try to derive synergies at a group level, does not answer the question whether it is arm’s length from the perspectives of each of the restructured entities ...

For transfer pricing purposes, the aim of the analysis is to determine whether, under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, conditions have been made or imposed in transactions comprising a business restructuring that differ from those that would be made or imposed between independent enterprises; and, if so, to determine the profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, and include them in the profits of that enterprise and tax them accordingly ...

A business restructuring may involve cross-border transfers of something of value, e.g. of valuable intangibles, although this is not always the case. It may also or alternatively involve the termination or substantial renegotiation of existing arrangements, e.g. manufacturing arrangements, distribution arrangements, licences, service agreements, etc. The first step in analysing the transfer pricing aspects of a business restructuring is to accurately delineate the transactions that comprise the business restructuring by identifying the commercial or financial relations and the conditions attached to those relations that lead to a transfer of value among the members of the MNE group. This is discussed in Section B. Section C discusses the recognition of accurately delineated transactions that comprise the business restructuring. The relationship between a business restructuring and the reallocation of profit potential is addressed in Section D. The transfer pricing consequences of the transfer of something of value are discussed in Section E of this part and the transfer pricing consequences of the termination or substantial renegotiation of existing arrangements are discussed in Section F ...

This chapter starts from the premise that the arm’s length principle and these Guidelines do not and should not apply differently to restructurings or post-restructuring transactions than to transactions that were structured as such from the beginning. The relevant question under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and the arm’s length principle is whether there are conditions made or imposed in a business restructuring that differ from the conditions that would be made between independent enterprises. This is the theoretical framework in which all the guidance in this chapter should be read. The guidance in this chapter is composed of two parts: the first part provides guidance on the determination of the arm’s length compensation for the restructuring itself; the second part addresses the remuneration of post-restructuring controlled transactions. Both parts should be read together, and applied in accordance with the guidance provided in the rest of these Guidelines, and in particular in Chapter I ...

Domestic anti-abuse rules and CFC legislation are not within the scope of this chapter. The domestic tax treatment of an arm’s length payment, including rules regarding the deductibility of such a payment and how domestic capital gains tax provisions may apply to an arm’s length capital payment, are also not within the scope of this chapter. Moreover, while they raise important issues in the context of business restructurings, VAT and indirect taxes are not covered in this chapter ...

This chapter only covers transactions between associated enterprises in the context of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and does not address the attribution of profits within a single enterprise on the basis of Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, as this is the subject of the Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments ...

Business restructurings are typically accompanied by a reallocation of profit potential among the members of the MNE group, either immediately after the restructuring or over a few years. One major objective of this chapter in relation to Article 9 is to discuss the extent to which such a reallocation of profit potential is consistent with the arm’s length principle and more generally how the arm’s length principle applies to business restructurings. The implementation of integrated business models and the development of global organisations may complicate the application of the arm’s length principle, which determines the profit of members of an MNE group by reference to the conditions which would have been made between independent enterprises in comparable transactions and comparable circumstances. This complexity in applying the arm’s length principle in practice is acknowledged in these Guidelines (see paragraphs 1.10-1.11). Notwithstanding this issue, these Guidelines reflect the OECD Member countries’ strong support for the arm’s length principle and for efforts to describe its application and refine its operation in practice (see paragraphs 1.14-1.15). When discussing the issues that arise in the context of business restructurings, the OECD has kept this complexity in mind in an attempt to develop approaches that are realistic and reasonably pragmatic ...

This chapter contains a discussion of the transfer pricing aspects of business restructurings, i.e. of the application of Article 9 (Associated Enterprises) of the OECD Model Tax Convention and of these Guidelines to business restructurings ...

Some of the reasons reported by business for restructuring include the wish to maximise synergies and economies of scale, to streamline the management of business lines and to improve the efficiency of the supply chain, taking advantage of the development of web-based technologies that has facilitated the emergence of global organisations. Furthermore, business restructurings may be needed to preserve profitability or limit losses, e.g. in the event of an over-capacity situation or in a downturn economy ...

There are also business restructurings whereby more intangibles or risks are allocated to operational entities (e.g. to manufacturers or distributors). Business restructurings can also consist of the rationalisation, specialisation or de-specialisation of operations (manufacturing sites and/or processes, research and development activities, sales, services), including the downsizing or closing of operations. The arm’s length principle and guidance in this chapter apply in the same way to all types of transactions comprising a business restructuring, irrespective of whether they lead to a more centralised or less centralised business model ...

Business restructurings may often involve the centralisation of intangibles, risks, or functions with the profit potential attached to them. They may typically consist of: Conversion of full-fledged distributors (that is, enterprises with a relatively higher level of functions and risks) into limited-risk distributors, marketers, sales agents, or commissionnaires (that is, enterprises with a relatively lower level of functions and risks) for a foreign associated enterprise that may operate as a principal, Conversion of full-fledged manufacturers (that is, enterprises with a relatively higher level of functions and risks) into contract manufacturers or toll manufacturers (that is, enterprises with a relatively lower level of functions and risks) for a foreign associated enterprise that may operate as a principal, Transfers of intangibles or rights in intangibles to a central entity (e.g. a so-called “IP company”) within the group, The concentration of functions in a regional or central entity, with a corresponding reduction in scope or scale of functions carried out locally; examples may include procurement, sales support, supply chain logistics ...

There is no legal or universally accepted definition of business restructuring. In the context of this chapter, business restructuring refers to the cross-border reorganisation of the commercial or financial relations between associated enterprises, including the termination or substantial renegotiation of existing arrangements. Relationships with third parties (e.g. suppliers, sub-contractors, customers) may be a reason for the restructuring or be affected by it ...

In some business restructuring and similar transactions, it may be the case that an assembled workforce is transferred from one associated enterprise to another as part of the transaction. In such circumstances, it may well be that the transfer of the assembled workforce along with other transferred assets of the business will save the transferee the time and expense of hiring and training a new workforce. Depending on the transfer pricing methods used to evaluate the overall transaction, it may be appropriate in such cases to reflect such time and expense savings in the form of comparability adjustments to the arm’s length price otherwise charged with respect to the transferred assets. In other situations, the transfer of the assembled workforce may result in limitations on the transferee’s flexibility in structuring business operations and create potential liabilities if workers are terminated. In such cases it may be appropriate for the compensation paid in connection with the restructuring to reflect the potential future liabilities and limitations ...

R. Sp. z o.o. had requested a binding ruling/interpretation regarding tax deduction for the price paid to a related entity under restructuring. The request was denied by the tax authorities, as the question – according to the authorities – could only be answered under an Advance Pricing Agreement. R. Sp. z.o.o brought the issue before the Administrative Court, where a decision in favour of R. Sp. z.o.o. was issued. An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The Court dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities. The tax authorities could not refuse to issue a binding ruling/interpretation on whether or not a price paid to a related party under restructuring was tax deductible. According to the Court such a question could not only be dispelled by the issuance of an Advance Pricing Agreement. Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation II FSK 990_19 - Wyrok NSA z 2022-01-11 ...

SAS Microchip Technology Rousset (former SAS Atmel Rousset) is a French subsidiary of the American Atmel group, which designs, manufactures, develops and sells a wide range of semiconductor integrated circuits. It was subject to an audit covering the FY 2010 and 2011 and as a result of this audit, the tax authorities imposed additional corporate income tax and an additional assessments for VAT. The administration also subjected SAS Atmel Rousset to withholding tax due to income deemed to be distributed to one of the Atmel group companies. The authorities invoked the provisions of Article 57 of the General Tax Code as the new legal basis for the additional corporate tax contributions and the social contribution on corporate tax, resulting from the reintegration of the capital loss arising from the sale of SAS Fabco shares and the assumption of responsibility for SAS Fabco’s social plan, instead of the provisions of Article 38(1) and Article 39(1) of the same code. The tax administration, which relies on the guidelines recommended in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Public Administrations, argued that the transfer of the production activity, materialised by the sale of the Rousset plant, is part of a global strategy. The parent company of the group will benefit from the gains made through the outsourcing of the production activity, and moreover initiated and conducted the negotiations, as demonstrated by the letter of intent to purchase dated 12 May 2009 from LFoundry GmbH, addressed to the group’s parent company. Similarly, the administration notes that the “Stock Purchase Agreement” and “Wafer Purchase Agreement” relating respectively to the transfer of shares in SAS Fabco, and to the terms of purchase of semiconductors sold by this same company, were signed by Mr A…, Atmel Corporation’s Director of Operations. It follows from all of these elements that the tax authorities must be considered as providing evidence of a practice falling within the scope of Article 57 of the General Tax Code, which establishes a presumption of indirect profit transfer. SAS Microchip Technology Rousset applied to the Marseille administrative court for a discharge of duties and penalties for the taxes to which it was thus subject for the years 2010 and 2011, and in a judgment of 21 June 2019, the administrative court decided in favor of SAS Microchip Technology Rousset and set aside the assessment. The Authorities filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The court dismissed the appeal of the authorities and upheld the decision of the administrative court in favor of SAS Microchip Technology Rousset. Excerpts “…although the administration argues that this operation was entirely led by the group’s parent company’s operations manager, this circumstance, particularly because of the international scope of the project, is not such as to demonstrate that the interests of SAS Microchip Technology Rousset were not taken into account and that the transaction in question was concluded to the exclusive benefit of the American company. It follows from the above that the court was right to consider that the sum in dispute could not be considered as an indirect transfer of profits to the American company Atmel Corporation within the meaning of Article 57 of the General Tax Code. As a result, the tax authorities were not justified in increasing the profit subject to corporate income tax for the financial year ending in 2010 by EUR 72,062,567. “…Furthermore, it is also clear from the information provided by the respondent company that the cost of the additional costs generated by the Manufacturing Services Agreement was much lower than the costs that SAS Microchip Technology Rousset would have had to bear in the event of the restructuring of the Rousset manufacturing unit or its closure. It is clear from the documents in the file that the Flichy firm estimated that the redundancy costs alone would have amounted to EUR 176 800 000, while the community of the Pays d’Aix estimated at EUR 60 million the amount of business tax that would have had to be paid in the event of cessation of the activity. Finally, the fact that the director of operations of the parent company Atmel Corporation took the decisions relating to the transfer of the manufacturing activity of SAS Microchip Technology Rousset is not sufficient to establish that, by accepting the terms of the Manufacturing Services Agreement and by bearing the resulting additional costs, the respondent company did not act in the interest of the company. Consequently, the latter provided proof that the costs in dispute, which it had borne, had been justified by obtaining favourable considerations for its own operations and did not constitute an indirect transfer of profits. The administration was therefore not justified, as the administrative court ruled, in reintegrating the corresponding sum into the taxable profits of SAS Microchip Technology Rousset for the financial year ending in 2011.” Unless it establishes the existence of an abnormal act of management, the tax administration does not have to interfere in the management of companies. Under the combined provisions of Articles 38 and 209 of the General Tax Code, the profit subject to corporation tax is that which derives from operations of any kind carried out by the company, with the exception of those which, because of their purpose or their methods, are alien to normal commercial management. The assumption by an enterprise of costs for which it has no direct consideration or which are not directly incumbent on it is only normal commercial management if it appears that, in granting such advantages, the enterprise has acted in its own interest. It follows from the reasons set out in points 10 and 12, recalling the interest of SAS Microchip Technology Rousset in bearing the additional costs linked to the invoicing conditions provided for in the “Manufacturing Services Agreement” and “Wafer Purchase Agreement” relating to the purchase of wafers from LFoundry, that the administration does not establish an abnormal management act. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A AG, which was founded in 2000 by researchers from the University of Applied Sciences D, has as its object the development and distribution of …, in particular in the areas of ….. It had its registered office in Zurich until the transfer of its registered office to Zug in 2021. By contract dated 16 June 2011, it was taken over by Group E, Country Q, or by an acquisition company founded by it for this purpose, for a share purchase price of EUR …. On the same day, it concluded two contracts with E-Schweiz AG, which was in the process of being founded (entered in the Commercial Register on 7 September 2011), in which it undertook to provide general and administrative services on the one hand and research and development on the other. As of 30 September 2011, A AG sold all ”Intellectual Property Rights” (IPR) and ”Non-Viral Contracts” to E-Company, a company in U with tax domicile on the island of V, for a price of EUR … for the IPR and EUR … for the ”Non-Viral Contracts”. A AG had neither identifiable operating activities nor personnel substance in the financial year from 01.10.2011-30.09.2012 following the shareholding transaction. The transfer of the tangible and intangible business assets and the personnel of A AG to other companies of the E group corresponded to an integration plan that had already been set out in a draft power point presentation of the E group prior to the acquisition of the shares. Following an audit the tax authorities issued an assessment for additional taxable net profit for the tax period 01.01.-30.09.2011 for state and communal taxes and direct federal tax, as well as taxable equity of CHF … for state and communal taxes. The assessed taxable net profit included a hidden profit distribution from the sale of the IPR and customer relationships to the E-Company. The calculations of profits was made as a discretionary estimate. An appeal was filed by A AG with the tax court which was dismissed with respect to the calculations of profits due to the sale of intangible assets at a lower price, but were upheld with respect to the transfer of functions. An appeal was then filed with the administrative court by both A AG and the tax authorities. A AG requested that the assessment of the Tax Office be dismissed with costs and compensation. The Tax Office requested the dismissal of the complaints of the obligated party and the annulment of the decision of the Tax Appeal Court and confirmation of the objection decisions with costs to be borne by the obligated party. Judgement of the Administrative Court The court ruled in favour of the tax authorities and remanded the case to the court of first instance for recalculation. Excerpts “The subject matter of the proceedings are reorganisation measures carried out after the change of shareholders, which were connected with the sale of assets of the obligated party to other group companies and the abandonment of traditional operating activities. The dispute revolves around the question of whether the obligated party provided services to related companies under conditions that do not comply with the principles of tax law regarding the appropriateness of performance and consideration between related parties and whether it therefore provided non-cash benefits or hidden profit distributions that are subject to profit tax.” “According to the correct findings of the Tax Appeals Court, to which reference can be made, the large discrepancy between the values according to the transfer price study of company I and the share purchase price and the result of the PPA was suitable to cast doubt on the correctness of the transfer price study. Even if the objections to the comparability with the PPA were true, the relevance of the PPA (wrongly disputed by the obligated party) could not be verified without the data used in its preparation. The share purchase price was agreed among independent third parties and therefore corresponded to the enterprise value at the time of the acquisition of the shareholding. According to the findings of the lower court, the transfer price study was only subsequently prepared in 2012 and is incomplete in various respects, which was not refuted by the obligated party. The Tax Appeals Court therefore concluded that the requirement had not been fulfilled and that the facts of the case had remained unclear. In particular, there had been uncertainty about the actual value of the intangible rights sold after the investigation had been completed. The Cantonal Tax Office’s assertion that the agreed purchase price for the intangible rights was too low had not been refuted and, based on the comparison with the PPA and the share purchase price, this assertion appeared very likely. The Cantonal Tax Office had therefore provided the main evidence incumbent upon it. Because the cantonal tax office had not been able to carry out its own valuation due to the lack of data, it had rightly proceeded to an estimate. According to the decision of the lower court, the discretionary assessments regarding the profit from the sale of the intangible assets were rightly made.” “Moreover, the burden of proving the obvious incorrectness of the discretionary assessment is placed on the taxpayer, which is not to be equated with a “reversal of the burden of proof” (on the whole Zweifel/Hunziker, Kommentar StHG, Art. 48 N. 44; diesel, Kommentar DBG, Art. 132 N. 37; Zweifel et al., Schweizerisches Steuerverfahrensrecht, § 20 Rz. 22).” “An estimate is “obviously incorrect” if it cannot be objectively justified, in particular if it is recognisably motivated by penalties or fiscal considerations, if it is based on improper bases, methods or aids for estimation or if it cannot otherwise be reasonably reconciled with the circumstances of the individual case as known from the experience of life. Obviously incorrect is therefore an estimate that is based on an abusive use of the estimation discretion, i.e. is arbitrary (Zweifel/Hunziker, Kommentar StHG, Art. 48 N. 59; dieselben, Kommentar DBG, Art. 132 N ...

The business activity of A S.A. was wholesale of pharmaceutical products to external pharmacies, hospitals, wholesalers (including: to affiliated wholesalers). The tax authority had noted that the company’s name had been changed in FY 2013, and a loss in the amount of PLN […] had been reported in the company’s tax return. An audit revealed that the Company had transferred significant assets (real estate) to a related entity on non-arm’s length terms. The same real estate was then going forward made available to the company on a fee basis under lease and tenancy agreements. The tax authority issued an assessment where a “restructuring fee” in the amount of PLN […] was added to the taxable income, reflecting the amount which would have been achieved if the transaction had been agreed between independent parties. According to the company the tax authority was not entitled at all to examine the compliance of the terms of these transactions with the terms that would have been agreed between hypothetical independent entities, as the transactions in question were in fact concluded precisely between independent entities. (SKA companies were not CIT taxpayers in 2012, so they did not meet the definition of a “domestic entity” referred to in the aforementioned provision, and therefore a transaction between “related entities” cannot be said to have taken place). Moreover, the institution of “re-characterisation” of a controlled transaction into a proper transaction (according to the authority),could only be applied to transactions taking place after 1 January 2019, pursuant to Article 11e, Section 4 of the A.l.t.p. introduced (from that date). Judgement of the Court The Court decided predominantly in favor of A S.A. and remanded the case back to the tax authorities. Excerpts “The applicant in the course of the case referred to the judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 18 December 2017, III SA/Wa 3661/16 (approved by the NSA in its judgment of 26 November 2020, II FSK 1919/18). The individual interpretation analysed there by the Court assessed a transaction (from 2012) concluded between a limited liability company and a general partnership. According to the WSA in Warsaw, the provisions of Article 11(4) in conjunction with Article 11(1) of the A.l.t.d.o.p. in the wording in force until 31 December 2014 may only be applied to transactions concluded between related parties – ‘domestic entities’ within the meaning of Article 11 of the A.l.t.d.o.p., and the tax authorities may only assess the income of related parties. The wording of Art. 11 of the A.l.t.p. indicates that it is intended to allow the tax authorities to estimate the income of related parties, if these parties, in transactions concluded between themselves, establish or impose terms and conditions that differ from those that would be established between independent parties, leading to an understatement of income. However, there are no grounds for this provision to be applied to transactions concluded by unrelated entities (a limited liability company and a general partnership) solely for the reason that tax on revenue from participation in a partnership is paid by its partners who are also members of the applicant’s management board. Indeed, it was only the provisions introduced by the Act of 29 August 2014 amending the Corporate Income Tax Act, the Personal Income Tax Act and certain other acts, which entered into force on 1 January 2015, that defined an “affiliated entity” as a natural person, a legal person or an organisational unit without legal personality that meets the conditions set out in the Act. If a contrary position were to be adopted Contrary to the authority’s assertions, these rulings do not concern a different factual situation. Although the audited interpretation concerned the necessity to prepare documentation pursuant to Art. 9a of the A.l.t.c., the applicant also directly inquired about classifying the applicant as an entity related to the general partnership. The courts of both instances were firmly in favour of the absence of such a link (dependence) between a capital company and a partnership, in terms of entering into mutual transactions, within the meaning of Article 11 of the A.l.t.p. in the wording in force until 31 December 2014. Thus, as shown above, the application of Article 11 of the A.l.t.d.o.p. in the present case was un-authorised, which makes it timely to consider the application in the analysed factual state of the general principles arising from Article 14 of the A.l.t.d.o.p. and Chapter 3 of this Act (tax deductible costs), which the authorities, for obvious reasons, have not undertaken so far.” “When reconsidering the case, the authority, taking into account the comments presented above, will issue an appropriate decision, containing in the justification of the decision all the elements referred to in Article 210 § 1 of the Polish Civil Code, including those arising from the cited resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation I-SA-Gl-1649-20-Wyrok-WSA-w-Gliwicach ...

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has issued draft Compliance Guidelines on intangible arrangements, PCG 2021/D4. These Guidelines will (when finalised)  set out the ATO’s compliance approach to international arrangements connected with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangible assets, specifically, the potential application of the transfer pricing, general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) and the diverted profits tax (DPT) provisions. The capital gains tax and capital allowances provisions will also be discussed in this Guideline where these may be considered alongside, or relevant to, the ATO’s transfer pricing, GAAR or DPT risk assessment. The draft Guidelines sets out ATO’s compliance approach to international arrangements connected with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation (DEMPE) of intangible assets and/or involving a migration of intangible assets. The Guidelines applies to Intangibles Arrangements and focuses on tax risks associated with the potential application of the transfer pricing provisions. It also focuses on other tax risks that may be associated with Intangibles Arrangements, specifically the withholding tax provisions, capital gains tax (CGT), capital allowances, the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) and the diverted profits tax (DPT). The Guidelines has been prepared to accompany the release and publication of Taxpayer Alerts TA 2018/2 Mischaracterisation of activities or payments in connection with intangible assets and TA 2020/1 Non-arm’s length arrangements and schemes connected with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangible assets. It is not the intention of the Guidelines to limit, deter or prevent arm’s length dealings involving intangible assets. Rather it is intended that the Guideline will serve as a point of reference and assist in understanding arrangements which is seen as representing a higher risk from a compliance perspective. Examples of high risk arrangements centralisation of intangible assets bifurcation (separation) of intangible assets non-recognition of local intangible assets and DEMPE activities migration of pre-commercialised intangible assets non-arm’s length licence arrangements ATO PCG 2021_D4nw ...

B Restructuring LDA was a distributor within the E group. During FY 2014-2016 a number of manufacturing entities within the group terminated distribution agreements with B Restructuring LDA and subsequently entered into new Distribution Agreements, under similar terms, with another company of the group C. These events were directed by the Group’s parent company, E. The tax authorities was of the opinion, that if these transaction had been carried out in a free market, B would have received compensation for the loss of intangible assets – the customer portfolio and the business and market knowledge (know-how) inherent to the functions performed by B. In other words, these assets had been transferred from B to C. The tax authorities performed a valuation of the intangibles and issued an assessment of additional taxable income resulting from the transaction. E Group disagreed with the assessment as, according to the group, there had been no transaktion between the B and C. Furthermore the group held that there was no transaction or disposal of intangibles, as B could not sell what did not belong to it, namely the client portfolio, which had been, almost in its entirety, raised by the Group, prior to its use by B. Result reached in the arbitration tribunal The Tribunal set aside the assessment of additional income in respect of transfer of intangibles. Excerpts “…The Tax Authorities, anchored in the positions of the OECD, states in the RIT that: “From this perspective, the acceptance by B… of a distribution contract, on which the entirety of its activity depends, containing clauses that (i) harm its individual interest (Clause 11, which provides that the parties waive the right to claim damages in connection with the execution or termination of the contract) […] is a decision that differs from the rationality of pursuing self-interest that would exist in an independent company ” Indeed, the position that independent entities, when transacting with each other, would require consideration for the transfer of assets is understandable. However, it is also true that § 6.13 of the OECD Guidelines underlines that within a Group there are special relationships, with rules specific to the Group, which should not be automatically called into question for failure to respect the arm’s length principle, particularly in transactions involving intangibles. In this context, the RIT is totally silent, and should not be, on the value of the Group’s contribution to B… customers, as based on the evidence, in particular in the logic of application of the excess earnings method (and respective elements contributing to the assets under appraisal). In a transaction between independent parties, the selling party, having previously obtained such a right or intangible asset, certainly through the payment of a consideration, what it would gain is the value arising from its specific contribution, and not the total value of the asset, since a substantial part of it was not developed by it . In the present case, the profit of B… would have to be deducted the value contributed by the group for the portfolio of clients reallocated to C… . If a compensation for the reallocation of B…’s intangibles was accepted, it would also have to be analysed how it would be shared among the Group’s entities that contributed to the generation of the reallocated intangibles. In light of all the foregoing, it can be concluded that the tax acts of assessment of the CIT and the compensatory interest inherent thereto are vitiated by an error in the assumptions and can therefore be annulled on the grounds of substantive defects, by virtue of the AT’s failure to observe the legal criteria of the method for determining the comparable market price (PCM) or other alternative method. Specifically: a. The allegedly comparable price was obtained by the AT from the data of a controlled transaction, and not from a transaction between independent parties – which is not admissible under Article 63 of the IRC Code, Ministerial Order 1446-C/2001 and the OECD Guidelines that enshrine the guidelines to be followed for this purpose; b. The evaluation method used was the discounted cash-flow method, which has as general postulate that the value of an asset (or company) is based on the cash flows that it will release, updated (present value) to the moment when the transaction of that asset (or company) takes place. However, inconsistently, despite invoking that method, the AT did not rely on a projection of cash flows for a multi-year period, basing itself on the profits (and not, as stated, cash flows) of a given year – 2014 (and not, as stated, on a multi-year basis); c. Relevant comparability factors were not taken into account, such as, in the present case, the fact that the “profit” of B… should be deducted the value contributed by the Group for the portfolio of clients reallocated to C…”. Also with regard to the choice of method, in the words of the TCA Sul, in its Judgment of 25 January 2018, rendered in Case No. 06660/13 (available in http://www.dgsi.pt): “Transfer prices, as we have already stated, must be determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle (Pursuant to article 2 of Ordinance no. 1446-C/2001, the arm’s length principle is applicable (i) to controlled transactions between an IRS or IRC taxpayer and a non-resident entity; (ii) to transactions carried out between a non-resident entity and its permanent establishment, including those carried out between a permanent establishment in Portuguese territory and other permanent establishments of the same entity located outside this territory; (iii) controlled transactions carried out between entities resident in Portuguese territory subject to IRS or IRC. And by virtue of Article 58(10) of the CIRC and Article 23 of the above-mentioned Ministerial Order, the arm’s length principle is also applicable to the situations provided for therein. Maybe for this reason, the legislator consecrated an open clause regarding the methods to be adopted to determine the transfer prices (see the wording of paragraph b) of article 4 of Ministerial Order no. 1446-C/2001, of 21st March) ...

When considering the risks assumed by a party to a controlled transaction, tax administrations should carefully consider the commercial rationale for any purported change in the risks assumed by a party before and after the outbreak of COVID-19 (and taking into consideration the accurate delineation of such purported change). In particular, concerns may arise where before the outbreak of COVID-19 a taxpayer argues that a “limited-risk” distributor did not assume any marketplace risk and hence was only entitled to a low return, but after the outbreak argues that the same distributor assumes some marketplace risk (for example, due to changes in risk management functions) and hence should be allocated In this scenario, consideration should be given to re-examining whether prior to the outbreak of COVID-19 the “limited-risk” distributor genuinely did not assume any marketplace risk, whether after the outbreak the “limited risk” distributor did not actually assume any marketplace risk, and/or whether the assumption of this risk following the outbreak of COVID-19 is a result of a business restructuring. If a prior risk allocation is recognised under an accurate delineation, in order for a reallocation of that risk to be recognised under a subsequent updated accurate delineation, such new risk allocation must be supported by an analysis of all the facts and circumstances and relevant evidence should be obtained and documented to substantiate the position. In this respect, the guidance in Chapter IX of the OECD TPG may be relevant. In general, consideration should be given to whether a taxpayer is taking inconsistent positions pre- and post- pandemic and, if so, whether either position is consistent with the accurate delineation of the transaction ...

S GmbH was an Austrian trading company of a group. In the course of business restructuring, the real estate division of the Austrian-based company was initially separated from the “trading operations/brands” division on the demerger date of 31 March 2007. The trademark rights remained with the previous trading company, which was the parent company of the group, now M GmbH. On 25 September 2007, M GmbH transferred all trademark rights to a permanent establishment in Malta, which was set up in the same year, to which it also moved its place of management on 15 January 2008. Licence agreements were concluded between S GmbH and M GmbH, which entitle S GmbH to use the trademarks of M GmbH for advertising and marketing measures in connection with its business operations in return for a (turnover-dependent) licence fee. The tax authorities (re)assessed the corporate income tax for the years 2008 and 2009. The audit had shown that the licence fees were to be attributed in their entirety to S GmbH as the beneficial owner of the trade marks, which meant that the licence payments to M GmbH were also not to be recognised for tax purposes. S GmbH had created the trademark rights, which had been valued at a total value of €383.5 million in the course of its spin-off; the decisions regarding the use, creation, advertising and licensing of the trademark rights continued to lie with the decision-makers of the operational company advertising the revisions at the Austrian group location. The Maltese management was present at meetings with advertising agencies in Austria, but its activities did not actually go beyond support and administration. The aim of the chosen structure had been a tax-saving effect, whereby the actual taxation of the licence income in Malta had been 5%. A complaint filed by S GmbH was dismissed by the Bundesfinanzgericht. S GmbH then filed an appeal with the Verwaltungsgerichtshof. Judgement of the Court The Court dismissed the appeal of S GmbH and upheld the decision of the tax authorities Excerpts: “In the appeal case, the BFG found that the trademark rights had been created before the separation of the companies. No new trademarks had been registered during the audit period. The advertising line was determined by a two-year briefing of the group and was based on the requirements of the licensees. The brand managers of M GmbH participated in the process, but the decisions were made by the organs of the appellant, which spent over €56 million in 2008 and almost €68 million in 2009 on advertising and marketing.. In contrast, M GmbH had hardly incurred any advertising expenses, and its salary expenses were also disproportionate to the tasks of a company that was supposed to manage corporate assets of almost €400 million in trademark rights and to act as the (also economic) owner of these assets. The minimal salary expenditure, which amounted to a total of € 91,791.0 in 2008 and € 77,008.10 in 2009 and was distributed among eight persons (most of whom were part-time employees), could only be explained by the fact that all relevant trademark administration, maintenance and management tasks were, as in the past, handled either by group companies (by way of group-internal marketing activities) or by specialists commissioned by the group (trademark lawyer, advertising agency) and that M GmbH only acted in a supporting capacity. If, against this background, the BFG assumes, despite the formal retention of the legal ownership of the trademark rights, that the economic ownership of the trademark rights, which had already been created at that time, was also transferred to the appellant at the time of the spin-off, this cannot be seen as an unlawful act which the Administrative Court should take up. If, in the case at hand, the appellant nevertheless concluded licence agreements with M GmbH, the reason for this cannot have been the acquisition of the right of use to which it was entitled from the outset as the beneficial owner. The BFG was therefore correct in denying that the amounts paid by the appellant under the heading of “licence payments” were business expenses. …” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation VwGH_2019150162_20201127L00 ...

A Dutch company, Zinc Smelter B.V., transferred part of it’s business to a Swiss group company in 2010. In dispute was whether the payment for the transferred activities had been set at arm’s length, and whether the cost-plus remuneration applied to the Dutch company after the business restructuring constituted an arm’s length remuneration for the remaining activities in the company. The case had previously been presented before the lower court where a decision had been issued in October 2017. After hearings in the Court of Appeal, Zinc Smelter B.V. and the Dutch tax authorities reached a settlement which was laid down in the decision. According to the agreement the profit split method was the correct method for determining the arm’s length remuneration of the Dutch company after the restructuring. Click here for translation ECLI_NL_GHSHE_2020_968 ...

The main activity in a Danish branch of a German group was development, licensing and services related to engines that were being produced by external licensees. Under a restructuring of the group, it was decided that royalty income for a particular engine type previously received by the Danish branch should be transferred to the German company. The Danish branch received a compensation corresponding to the net earnings for a two-year notice period. The tax administration increased the taxable income of the branch claiming that the branch had made valuable contributions to the development of the type of engine in question and thereby obtained co-ownership. The Tax Tribunal found that valuable intangible assets had been transferred, The decision was based on prior contractual arrangements and conduct of the parties.  Click here for other translation SKM 2020-30 ...

Broadcom Semiconductors Ltd is an Israeli company established in 2001 under the name Dune Semiconductors Ltd. The Company is engaged in development, production, and sale of components to routers, switches etc. The shares in Dune Semiconductors were acquired by the Broadcom Corporation (a US group) in 2009 and following the acquisition intellectual property was transferred to the new Parent for a sum of USD 17 million. The company also entered into tree agreements to provide marketing and support services to a related Broadcom affiliate under a cost+10%, to provide development services to a related Broadcom affiliate for cost+8%, and a license agreement to use Broadcom Israel’s intellectual property for royalties of approximately 14% of the affiliate’s turnover. The tax authorities argued that functions, assets, and risks had been transferred leaving only an empty shell in Israel and a tax assessment was issued based on the purchase price for the shares resulting in additional taxes of USD 29 millions. According to the company such a transfer of functions, assets, and risks would only be applicable if Broadcom Israel had been emptied of its activities which  was not the case. Following the restructuring Broadcom Israel continued as a licensor and as a service provider. The financial situation of the company also improved. The position of the company was further supported by the fact that several years following the restructuring, Broadcom Israel sold its intellectual property and was taxed for the capital gain. The District Court held in favor of the company. A business restructuring from a fully fledged principal  to a service provider on a cost-plus basis does not necessarily result in a transfer of value. Judgement of the Court In the judgement the court argues that this case is different from the prior Gteko-case where the Israeli company became an empty shell and financial results were dramatically reduced following the acquisition and restructuring of the company. Unlike the Gteko-case, Broadcom had increased its activities in Israel following the acquisition. The court also emphasized that the tax authorities did not take into consideration options realistically available to the company at the time of the restructuring. For a business restructuring to constitute a sale of functions, assets, and risks property for tax purposes, it must be demonstrated not only that the change occurred, but also that the change did not meet the arm’s length principle. The court confirmed that the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines are applicable as a reference for tax purposes in Israel. Click here for an English translation Broadcom Israel 263420116inew ...

Due to the economic situation of automotive suppliers in Germany in 2006, “Cutting Tech GMBH” established a subsidiary (CB) in Bosnien-Herzegovina which going forward functioned as a contract manufacturer. CB did not develop the products itself, but manufactured them according to specifications provided by “Cutting Tech GMBH”. The majority of “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s sales articles were subject to multi-stage production, which could include various combinations of production processes. In particular, “Cutting Tech GMBH” was no longer competitive in the labour-intensive manufacturing processes (cut-off grinding, turning, milling) due to the high wage level in Germany. Good contribution margins from the high-tech processes (adiabatic cutting, double face grinding) increasingly had to subsidise the losses of the labour-intensive processes. Individual production stages, however, could not be outsourced to external producers for reasons of certification and secrecy. In addition, if the production had been outsourced, there would have been a great danger that a third company would have siphoned off “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s know-how and then taken over the business with “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s customer. This could have led to large losses in turnover for “Cutting Tech GMBH”. Furthermore, some of the labour-intensive work also had to cover one or more finishing stages of the high-tech processes, so that this business was also at risk if it was outsourced. For these reasons, the decision was made to outsource the labour-intensive production processes to Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to become profitable again and to remain competitive in the future. There, there were German-speaking staff with the necessary expertise, low customs duties and a low exchange rate risk. CB functioned as a contract manufacturer with the processes of production, quality assurance and a small administrative unit. Cost advantages existed not only in personnel costs, but also in electricity costs. CB prevented the plaintiff’s good earnings from the high-tech processes in Germany from having to continue to be used to subsidise the low-tech processes. “Cutting Tech GMBH” supplied CB with the material needed for production. The deliveries were processed as sales of materials. “Cutting Tech GMBH” received as purchase prices its cost prices without offsetting profit mark-ups or handling fees/commissions. The material was purchased and supplied to CB by “Cutting Tech GMBH”, which was able to obtain more favourable purchase prices than CB due to the quantities it purchased. The work commissioned by “Cutting Tech GMBH” was carried out by CB with the purchased material and its personnel. CB then sold the products to “Cutting Tech GMBH”. In part, they were delivered directly by CB to the end customers, in part the products were further processed by “Cutting Tech GMBH” or by third-party companies. “Cutting Tech GMBH” determined the transfer prices for the products it purchased using a “contribution margin calculation”. Until 2012, “Cutting Tech GMBH” purchased all products manufactured by CB in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 2013 onwards, CB generated its own sales with the external company P. This was a former customer of “Cutting Tech GMBH”. Since “Cutting Tech GMBH” could not offer competitive prices to the customer P in the case of production in Germany, CB took over the latter’s orders and supplied P with the products it manufactured in accordance with the contracts concluded. CB did not have its own distribution in the years in dispute. The tax audit of FY 2011 – 2013 The auditor assumed that the transfer of functions and risks to the CB in 2007/2008 basically fulfilled the facts of a transfer of functions. However, since only a routine function had been transferred, “Cutting Tech GMBH” had rightly carried out the transfer of functions without paying any special remuneration. Due to CB’s limited exposure to risks, the auditor considered that the cost-plus method should be used for transfer pricing. In adjusting the transfer prices, the auditor assumed a mark-up rate of 12%. The material invoiced by “Cutting Tech GMBH” and the scrap proceeds was not included in the cost basis used in the assessment. For 2013, the auditor took into account that the customer P had agreed contracts exclusively with CB and reduced the costs by the costs of the products sold to P. Furthermore, the auditor took the legal view that the entire audit period should be considered uniformly. Therefore, it was appropriate to deduct an amount of €64,897 in 2011, which had been calculated in favour of “Cutting Tech GMBH” in 2010 and not taken into account in the tax assessment notices, in order to correct the error. The auditor did not consider it justified to determine the transfer prices for “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s purchases of goods by means of a so-called contribution margin calculation. Based on the functional and risk analysis, the auditor concluded that CB was a contract manufacturer. On the grounds that this profit of CB was remuneration for a routine function, the auditor refrained from recognising a vGA because of the transfer of client P from the applicant to CB. However, he stated that according to arm’s length royalty rates, values between 1% and 3% could be recognised as royalty “according to general practical experience.” “Cutting Tech GMBH” filed an appeal against the assessment in 2015. Judgement of the Fiscal Court The Fiscal Court adjusted the assessment issued by the tax authorities and thus parcially allowed the appeal of “Cutting Tech GMBH”. Excerpts “In the case at issue, the decisive cause for the plaintiff losing the customer P is not to be seen in the transfer of business to CB. The applicant lost the customer because it could not offer him competitive prices. The takeover of the business with P by CB is thus not the cause of the loss of the customer. The plaintiff’s factual submission is undisputed in this respect and is confirmed by the small profit that CB made from the business according to the calculations of the foreign auditor.” “The FA was correct to add € … to the taxable income in the year 2013 due to the supply of materials to CB for the processing of its business with ...

Due to the economic situation of automotive suppliers in Germany in 2006, “Cutting Tech GMBH” established a subsidiary (CB) in Bosnien-Herzegovina which going forward functioned as a contract manufacturer. CB did not develop the products itself, but manufactured them according to specifications provided by “Cutting Tech GMBH”. The majority of “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s sales articles were subject to multi-stage production, which could include various combinations of production processes. In particular, “Cutting Tech GMBH” was no longer competitive in the labour-intensive manufacturing processes (cut-off grinding, turning, milling) due to the high wage level in Germany. Good contribution margins from the high-tech processes (adiabatic cutting, double face grinding) increasingly had to subsidise the losses of the labour-intensive processes. Individual production stages, however, could not be outsourced to external producers for reasons of certification and secrecy. In addition, if the production had been outsourced, there would have been a great danger that a third company would have siphoned off “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s know-how and then taken over the business with “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s customer. This could have led to large losses in turnover for “Cutting Tech GMBH”. Furthermore, some of the labour-intensive work also had to cover one or more finishing stages of the high-tech processes, so that this business was also at risk if it was outsourced. For these reasons, the decision was made to outsource the labour-intensive production processes to Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to become profitable again and to remain competitive in the future. There, there were German-speaking staff with the necessary expertise, low customs duties and a low exchange rate risk. CB functioned as a contract manufacturer with the processes of production, quality assurance and a small administrative unit. Cost advantages existed not only in personnel costs, but also in electricity costs. CB prevented the plaintiff’s good earnings from the high-tech processes in Germany from having to continue to be used to subsidise the low-tech processes. “Cutting Tech GMBH” supplied CB with the material needed for production. The deliveries were processed as sales of materials. “Cutting Tech GMBH” received as purchase prices its cost prices without offsetting profit mark-ups or handling fees/commissions. The material was purchased and supplied to CB by “Cutting Tech GMBH”, which was able to obtain more favourable purchase prices than CB due to the quantities it purchased. The work commissioned by “Cutting Tech GMBH” was carried out by CB with the purchased material and its personnel. CB then sold the products to “Cutting Tech GMBH”. In part, they were delivered directly by CB to the end customers, in part the products were further processed by “Cutting Tech GMBH” or by third-party companies. “Cutting Tech GMBH” determined the transfer prices for the products it purchased using a “contribution margin calculation”. Until 2012, “Cutting Tech GMBH” purchased all products manufactured by CB in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 2013 onwards, CB generated its own sales with the external company P. This was a former customer of “Cutting Tech GMBH”. Since “Cutting Tech GMBH” could not offer competitive prices to the customer P in the case of production in Germany, CB took over the latter’s orders and supplied P with the products it manufactured in accordance with the contracts concluded. CB did not have its own distribution in the years in dispute. The tax audit of FY 2011 – 2013 The auditor assumed that the transfer of functions and risks to the CB in 2007/2008 basically fulfilled the facts of a transfer of functions. However, since only a routine function had been transferred, “Cutting Tech GMBH” had rightly carried out the transfer of functions without paying any special remuneration. Due to CB’s limited exposure to risks, the auditor considered that the cost-plus method should be used for transfer pricing. In adjusting the transfer prices, the auditor assumed a mark-up rate of 12%. The material invoiced by “Cutting Tech GMBH” and the scrap proceeds was not included in the cost basis used in the assessment. For 2013, the auditor took into account that the customer P had agreed contracts exclusively with CB and reduced the costs by the costs of the products sold to P. Furthermore, the auditor took the legal view that the entire audit period should be considered uniformly. Therefore, it was appropriate to deduct an amount of €64,897 in 2011, which had been calculated in favour of “Cutting Tech GMBH” in 2010 and not taken into account in the tax assessment notices, in order to correct the error. The auditor did not consider it justified to determine the transfer prices for “Cutting Tech GMBH”‘s purchases of goods by means of a so-called contribution margin calculation. Based on the functional and risk analysis, the auditor concluded that CB was a contract manufacturer. On the grounds that this profit of CB was remuneration for a routine function, the auditor refrained from recognising a vGA because of the transfer of client P from the applicant to CB. However, he stated that according to arm’s length royalty rates, values between 1% and 3% could be recognised as royalty “according to general practical experience.” “Cutting Tech GMBH” filed an appeal against the assessment in 2015. Judgement of the Fiscal Court The Fiscal Court adjusted the assessment issued by the tax authorities and thus parcially allowed the appeal of “Cutting Tech GMBH”. Excerpts “In the case at issue, the decisive cause for the plaintiff losing the customer P is not to be seen in the transfer of business to CB. The applicant lost the customer because it could not offer him competitive prices. The takeover of the business with P by CB is thus not the cause of the loss of the customer. The plaintiff’s factual submission is undisputed in this respect and is confirmed by the small profit that CB made from the business according to the calculations of the foreign auditor.” “The FA was correct to add € … to the taxable income in the year 2013 due to the supply of materials to CB for the processing of its business with ...

The Swedish branch of Technology Partners International Europe Ltd. was loss-making. The branch had no significant people functions but only two employees performing low value-added services. From the Judgement of the Court of Appeal “The distribution of revenue and costs between a British company and its Swedish branch is regulated for the current tax years in Article 7 of the 1983 double taxation agreement with the United Kingdom. Further guidance on the application of this issue can be obtained in the 2008 OECD report on profit allocation. A two-step test according to the so-called functional separate entity approach, as described in the administrative law, must be done. The Court of Appeal agrees, in light of the information provided by the branch during the Swedish Tax Agency’s investigation and because the Nordic manager cannot be linked to the branch, in the administrative court’s assessment that the branch has in the current years lacked so-called significant people functions. Nor has the branch had any function which has meant financially significant activities or areas of responsibility. It is therefore a so-called low risk service provider vis-à-vis the head office. The Swedish Tax Agency has used the net margin method to determine the arm’s length level in the distribution of income. The work has been based on the costs to be attributed to the branch and used a profit margin of 5% on the basis that the branch may in any case be considered to provide so-called low value adding services. The branch has referred to ongoing restructuring work in the Nordic organization in the Group, market and business strategic aspects as well as the assessment made in the Group’s internal pricing policy. However, the Tax Agency may be deemed to have shown that the branch’s income and expenses must be determined in accordance with the appealed decisions. What the branch has presented does not change this assessment. The appeal must therefore be rejected in this part.” Click here for translation Sw vs PE 2019-10-04 ...

Intangibles had been transferred from a Danish subsidiary to a US parent under a written agreement. According to the agreement the Danish subsidiary – which had developed and used it’s own intangibles – would now have to pay royalties for the use of trademarks, know-how and patents owned by the US parent. The tax authorities had issued an assesment on the grounds that the majority of the Danish company’s intangibles had been transferred to the US parent. In the assesment the value of the intangibles had been calculated based on the price paid when the US group acquired the shares in the Danish company. H Group argued that the transferred intangibles no longer carried any value and that the Danish company now used intangibles owned by the US group. The Tax Tribunal found that tax authorities had been entitled to make an assessment as the transaction had not been described in the Transfer pricing documentation. However, the Tribunal considered that the valuation based on the price paid when the US group acquired the shares in the Danish company was too uncertain and instead applied a relief-from-royalty method.  Click here for translation Denmark vs H Group April 2019 ...

R. Sp. z o.o. had requested a binding ruling/interpretation regarding tax deduction for the price paid to a related entity under restructuring. The request was denied by the tax authorities, as the question – according to the authorities – could only be answered under an Advance Pricing Agreement. R. Sp. z.o.o brought the issue before the Administrative Court Judgement of the Administrative Court The Court decided in favour of R. Sp. z.o.o. According to the Court, the tax authorities could not refuse to issue a binding ruling/interpretation on whether or not a price paid to a related party under restructuring was tax deductible. Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation III SA_Wa 263_18 - Wyrok WSA w Warszawie z 2018-09-26 ...

According to Colgate Palmolive, following a restructuring, the local group company in Spain was changed from being a “fully fledged distributor” responsible for all areas of the distribution process to being a “limited risk distributor” (it only performs certain functions). A newly established Swiss company, Colgate Palmolive Europe, instead became the principal entrepreneur in Europe. The changed TP setup had a significant impact on the earnings in the Spanish group company. Net margins was reduced from around 16% before the restructuring, to 3.5% after the restructuring. Following a thorough examination of the functions, assets and risks before and after application of the new setup, the Tax administration held that Colgate Palmolive Europe could not be qualified as the “principal entrepreneur” in Europe. The swiss company was in substance a service provider for which the remuneration should be determined based on the cost plus method. Judgement of the Court The High Court held in favour of the tax administration and dismissed the appeal of Colgate Palmolive. Excerpt “.…the conclusion, in our opinion, can only be that the Administration is right, since in reality – remember that certain functions were already being carried out by the French Headquarter – there is no significant change in the situation existing prior to the restructuring in the years in question. This being so, it is not surprising that the Agreement reasons that “the existence of transactions between related entities, the Spanish and Swiss entities, determines the application of the regime provided for in Article 16 of the Consolidated Text of the Corporate Income Tax Law (TRLIS) and in its implementing regulations, mainly Chapter V of Title I of the Corporate Income Tax Regulations (RIS), taking into account the change of regulation introduced by Law 36/2006 applicable, in the case of Colgate Palmolive, as from the financial year 2007”. Adding that “in relation to the existence of transactions between related companies, it is also necessary to take into account Article 9 of the Spanish-Swiss Double Taxation Agreement, inspired by the OECD Model Agreement, which provides that the profits of associated companies may be adjusted when the conditions present in their commercial or financial relations differ from those that would be agreed between independent entities. This article recognises the so-called arm’s length principle, the interpretation of which must take into account the OECD Doctrine, contained in the Commentary to Article 9 itself and its 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which have been significantly updated in 2010”. As reasoned in the Agreement, the Board shares the reasoning, “according to the exhaustive description contained in the verification file, the characterisation of CP Europe as a “principal trader” is inappropriate, it being more correct to consider that such an entity is in reality a service provider. It is therefore considered that the method chosen by the group to value the transactions is inappropriate and that the appropriate valuation method is the cost plus method. This method, in addition to being a traditional method (and therefore preferable under our internal regulations and the Guidelines), is, in accordance with the OECD Guidelines (paragraph 2.32 and 2.39 in the 2010 version), particularly appropriate for valuing the provision of services”. The fact is that ‘the valuation method applied by Colgate Palmolive is not appropriate, as it results in the residual profit of the group’s operations in Spain being concentrated in the CP Europe entity, which makes no sense if the economic activity of each entity (CP USA, CP Spain and CP Europe) in the overall business in our country is taken into account. The Guidelines themselves highlight in their chapter 7 dedicated to intra-group services (paragraph 7.31, before and after 2010) the cost plus method, together with the comparable free price, as the method to be used to value this type of services between related entities. The work of the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum of the European Union, which also assumes that this is the method most frequently used to value this type of transaction”. The Inspectorate adds, quite reasonably, that “until 2005, the group itself valued transactions between the French Headquarter, with the role of service provider, and the other entities of the group – including CP Spain – using the cost plus method”. The consequence of all the above is that, as stated on p. 73 of the report -reasoning endorsed by the Agreement- “in order to value the transactions between CP Europe and CP Spain, the transactional net margin method, taking CP Spain as the analysed party (Tesdet party), is inappropriate. Instead, it is considered that the most appropriate method for valuing the transactions is the cost plus method, which is based on attributing to the provider of those services – CP Europe – a gross margin on the costs it incurs which are attributable to the Spanish market [it should be recalled that following the analysis carried out it has been concluded that CP Europe cannot be considered as a principal trader, but rather as an entity which performs the functions of a service provider]’. This means that, in the years in question, it is not correct to attribute to CP EUROPE the residual profit derived from the group’s operations in Spain, but rather that this residual profit, deducting the remuneration of the owner of the intangible asset -CP USA- and of the service provider -CEP EUROPE-, should fall on CP SPAIN. The calculations are set out in pp. 74 to 81 of the report, as well as in pp. 59 to 62 of the Agreement. The Board, particularly in the absence of any arguments to the contrary, considers them to be correct. For all the foregoing reasons, the plea is dismissed.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation SP vs Palmolive SAN_1128_2018 ...

A Dutch parent company was providing support services to its foreign subsidiary on a cost-plus basis and received a compensation fee following a business restructuring where headquarter and strategic functions was transferred from the Dutch parent company to Switzerland. The Dutch tax authorities took the view that the compensation paid was insufficient, and that the Dutch parent company was still performing strategic functions for the group. The Court ruled that the taxpayer had fulfilled its legal obligations by preparing thorough transfer pricing documentation and that the burden of proof was on the Dutch tax authorities. The Court ruled that the tax authorities did not provide sufficient arguments to support the adjustment. The original assessment of € 188.342.906 was reduced to a calculated taxable profit of € 42,641,089 and a taxable amount of € 32,067,270. Click here for translation Netherland vs X BV 19 november 2017 Lower Court ...

A Dutch company was engaged in smelting of zinc. The business was then restructured, for which the company received a small compensation payment. Dutch tax authorities disagreed with both the amount of compensation payment and the arm’s-length remuneration of the post restructuring manufacturing activities. Until 2003 the Dutch Company was a fully fledged business. The company owned the assets and controlled the risks relating to the activities. In the years after 2003, the company was involved in several business restructurings: Activities other than the actual production activities were gradually transferred to other group companies, among others the global marketing and services team (GMS), took over purchasing, sales and deployment of personnel. After becoming part of another group in 2007, the company entered a consultancy agreement with another group company under witch strategic and business development, marketing, sales, finance, legal support, IT, staffing and environmental services was now provided on a cost plus 7.5% basis. Under ‘Project X’, a Belgian company was established in April 2009, which concluded both a business transfer agreement and a cooperation agreement with related smelting companies (including the taxpayer). Under the business transfer agreement, the Belgian company purchased the working capital, including raw materials, products and debtors from the smelting companies. Under the cooperation agreement, which had a term of two years, the Belgian company provided the smelting companies with raw materials. The smelting companies would then process the materials and transfer the final products back to the Belgian company. The Belgian company’s remuneration was based on a cost plus 7.5% mark-up and a 3.5% return on equity. Under ‘Project Y’, the group moved its headquarters to a Swiss company. In the new structure, the Swiss company managed the production planning, purchasing, logistics and sales. The former agreement was terminated, for which the Duch company received a compensation payment of about €28 illion. A manufacturing services agreement was concluded between the Swiss company and the Dutch company under which the smelting companies were compensated based on cost plus 10%. In 2010 the Dutch company reported a taxable amount of €32 million. The Dutch tax authorities increased this amount to €187 million, arguing that at arm’s length the compensation payment should have been €185 million instead of €28 million. The tax authorities argued that: The taxpayer unfairly assumed an expected loss of income for the period of only one year, the remaining term of the cooperation agreement; The compensation payment calculated by the taxpayer was lower than past actual annual profits. The tax authorities provided that the calculation should also consider the foregoing of profits and costs relating to activities such as purchasing and selling. The taxpayer incorrectly assumed that the activities of the GMS were not conducted for the account and risk of the taxpayer; The taxpayer made a calculation error of €50 million and the cash flows in a real sense had been discounted against a nominal discount factor; and The tax authorities referred to the uniqueness of activities conducted by the taxpayer based on the costliness of the factory with huge investments and complexity of the process. The tax authorities also argued that the key functions of the taxpayer had not actually changed after moving the headquarters to Switzerland, and that this should be considered in calculating the compensation payment following the transfer. The company argued that: Under Project X activities relating to purchasing, sales and logistics had already been gradually transferred to other group entities before 2010. In determining the compensation payment, it was therefore not necessary to consider the profit potential of these activities that were no longer being performed by the taxpayer. During the negotiation of the compensation payment, consideration was given to its bargaining position and possibilities to request compensation for a period of time longer than the remaining one year of the cooperation agreement. According to the taxpayer, however, it appeared that compensation, due to poor prospects, was not on the agenda. Although large investments were made in the smelting plant, the taxpayer suggested that these investments mainly related to an adjustment of the production process in line with the environmental standards at the time. The smelting plant of the taxpayer was otherwise not distinctive compared with other smelting plants so as to justify a higher compensation payment. As a result of the business restructuring, the functional profile of the taxpayer changed. The taxpayer regarded itself as a toll manufacturer to be remunerated based on a cost-based approach. However, the tax authorities suggested that a profit split method should be applied considering the strongly interrelated activities of the taxpayer and the Swiss headquarters and the ownership of unique intangibles by both sides. In the Court’s view, the Dutch company was a toll manufacturer in 2010, and therefore the net cost plus method was an acceptable method to determine an arm’s-length remuneration of the current and future activities. The Court  also found that the company had complied with the Dutch documentation requirements and had adequately substantiated the use of tcost plus method. The Court therefor ruled that the tax authorities did not meet the burden of proof and the income adjustment was thus annulled. (The decision has been appealed by the tax authorities) Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Netherlands vs Restr Corp September 2017 ...

83. Birincil acquires 100% of the equity interests in an independent enterprise, Company T for 100. Company T is a company that engages in research and development and has partially developed several promising technologies but has only minimal sales. The purchase price is justified primarily by the value of the promising, but only partly developed, technologies and by the potential of Company T personnel to develop further new technologies in the future. Birincil’s purchase price allocation performed for accounting purposes with respect to the acquisition attributes 20 of the purchase price to tangible property and identified intangibles, including patents, and 80 to goodwill. 84. Immediately following the acquisition, Birincil causes Company T to transfer all of its rights in developed and partially developed technologies, including patents, trade secrets and technical know-how to Company S, a subsidiary of Birincil. Company S simultaneously enters into a contract research agreement with Company T, pursuant to which the Company T workforce will continue to work exclusively on the development of the transferred technologies and on the development of new technologies on behalf of Company S. The agreement provides that Company T will be compensated for its research services by payments equal to its cost plus a mark-up, and that all rights to intangibles developed or enhanced under the research agreement will belong to Company S. As a result, Company S will fund all future research and will assume the financial risk that some or all of the future research will not lead to the development of commercially viable products. Company S has a large research staff, including management personnel responsible for technologies of the type acquired from Company T. Following the transactions in question, the Company S research and management personnel assume full management responsibility for the direction and control of the work of the Company T research staff. Company S approves new projects, develops and plans budgets and in other respects controls the ongoing research work carried on at Company T. All company T research personnel will continue to be employees of Company T and will be devoted exclusively to providing services under the research agreement with Company S. 85. In conducting a transfer pricing analysis of the arm’s length price to be paid by Company S for intangibles transferred by Company T, and of the price to be paid for ongoing R&D services to be provided by Company T, it is important to identify the specific intangibles transferred to Company S and those retained by Company T. The definitions and valuations of intangibles contained in the purchase price allocation are not determinative for transfer pricing purposes. The 100 paid by Birincil for the shares of Company T represents an arm’s length price for shares of the company and provides useful information regarding the value of the business of Company T. The full value of that business should be reflected either in the value of the tangible and intangible assets transferred to Company S or in the value of the tangible and intangible assets and workforce retained by Company T. Depending on the facts, a substantial portion of the value described in the purchase price allocation as goodwill of Company T may have been transferred to Company S together with the other Company T intangibles. Depending on the facts, some portion of the value described in the purchase price allocation as goodwill may also have been retained by Company T. Under arm’s length transfer pricing principles, Company T should be entitled to compensation for such value, either as part of the price paid by Company S for the transferred rights to technology intangibles, or through the compensation Company T is paid in years following the transaction for the R&D services of its workforce. It should generally be assumed that value does not disappear, nor is it destroyed, as part of an internal business restructuring. If the transfer of intangibles to Company S had been separated in time from the acquisition, a separate inquiry would be required regarding any intervening appreciation or depreciation in the value of the transferred intangibles ...

78. Company A owns a government licence for a mining activity and a government licence for the exploitation of a railway. The mining licence has a standalone market value of 20. The railway licence has a standalone market value of 10. Company A has no other net assets. 79. Birincil, an entity which is independent of Company A, acquires 100% of the equity interests in Company A for 100. Birincil’s purchase price allocation performed for accounting purposes with respect to the acquisition attributes 20 of the purchase price to the mining licence; 10 to the railway licence; and 70 to goodwill based on the synergies created between the mining and railway licences. 80. Immediately following the acquisition, Birincil causes Company A to transfer its mining and railway licences to Company S, a subsidiary of Birincil. 81. In conducting a transfer pricing analysis of the arm’s length price to be paid by Company S for the transaction with Company A, it is important to identify with specificity the intangibles transferred. As was the case with Birincil’s arm’s length acquisition of Company A, the goodwill associated with the licences transferred to Company S would need to be considered, as it should generally be assumed that value does not disappear, nor is it destroyed as part of an internal business restructuring. 82. As such, the arm’s length price for the transaction between Companies A and S should take account of the mining licence, the railway licence, and the value ascribed to goodwill for accounting purposes. The 100 paid by Birincil for the shares of Company A represents an arm’s length price for those shares and provides useful information regarding the combined value of the intangibles ...

In determining which party(ies) should be attributed the location savings at arm’s length, it will be important to consider the functions, risks and assets of the parties, as well as the options realistically available to each of them. In this example, assume that there is a high demand for the type of engineering services that the company in Country X sells. Assume also that the subsidiary in Country Y is the only company operating in a lower-cost location that is able to provide such services with the required quality standard, and Company Y is able to withstand competitive pricing pressures because the technical know-how it has established acts as a barrier to competition. Furthermore, the company in Country X does not have the option of engaging qualified engineers in Country X to provide these services, as the cost of their wages would be too high compared to the hourly rate charged to clients. Considering this, the enterprise in Country X does not have many other options available to it than to use this service provider. The remuneration payable by Company X to Company Y should take into account the location savings created by Company Y, in addition to the value of its services including any intangibles used in providing those services. In some instances, the nature of the contributions made by the enterprise in Country X and its subsidiary in Country Y may meet the criteria for the use of a transactional profit split method ...

As another example, assume now that an enterprise in Country X provides highly specialised and quality engineering services to independent clients. It charges a fee to its independent clients based on a fixed hourly rate that compares with the hourly rate charged by competitors for similar services in the same market. Suppose that the wages for qualified engineers in Country X are high. The enterprise subsequently subcontracts a large part of its engineering work to a new subsidiary in Country Y. The subsidiary in Country Y hires equally qualified engineers to those in Country X for substantially lower wages, thus deriving significant location savings for the group formed by the enterprise and its subsidiary Clients continue to deal directly with the enterprise in Country X and are not necessarily aware of the sub-contracting arrangement. For some period of time, the well-known enterprise in Country X can continue to charge its services at the original hourly rate despite the significantly reduced engineer costs. After a certain period of time, however, it is forced due to competitive pressures to decrease its hourly rate (at an amount that would not allow the company in Country X to cover the wages for qualified engineers in Country X, but that would still yield a benefit if those services are provided by qualified engineers in Country Y). Part of the location savings are passed on to its clients. In this case also, the question arises of which party(ies) within the MNE group should, at arm’s length, be attributed the part of the location savings not passed on to the clients: the subsidiary in Country Y, the enterprise in Country X, or both (and if so in what proportions) ...

In such an example, given that the relocated activity is a highly competitive one, it is likely that the enterprise in Country A has the option realistically available to it to use either the affiliate in Country B or a third party manufacturer. As a consequence, it should be possible to find comparables data to determine the conditions in which a third party would be willing at arm’s length to manufacture the clothes for the enterprise. In such a situation, a contract manufacturer at arm’s length would generally be attributed very little, if any, part of the location savings. Doing otherwise would put the associated manufacturer in a situation different from the situation of an independent manufacturer, and would be contrary to the arm’s length principle ...

Take the example of an enterprise that designs, manufactures and sells brand name clothes. Assume that the manufacturing process is basic and that the brand name is famous and represents a highly valuable intangible. Assume that the enterprise is established in Country A where the labour costs are high and that it decides to close down its manufacturing activities in Country A and to relocate them in an affiliate company in Country B where labour costs are significantly lower. The enterprise in Country A retains the rights on the brand name and continues designing the clothes. Further to this restructuring, the clothes will be manufactured by the affiliate in Country B under a contract manufacturing arrangement. The arrangement does not involve the use of any significant intangible owned by or licensed to the affiliate or the assumption of any significant risks by the affiliate in Country B. Once manufactured by the affiliate in Country B, the clothes will be sold to the enterprise in Country A which will on-sell them to third party customers. Assume that this restructuring makes it possible for the group formed by the enterprise in Country A and its affiliate in Country B to derive significant location savings. The question arises whether the location savings should be attributed to the enterprise in Country A, or its affiliate in Country B, or both (and if so in what proportions) ...

Where significant location savings are derived further to a business restructuring, the question arises of whether and if so how the location savings should be shared among the parties. In addressing this matter, the guidance in Section D.6 of Chapter I is relevant ...

Location savings can be derived by an MNE group that relocates some of its activities to a place where costs (such as labour costs, real estate costs, etc.) are lower than in the location where the activities were initially performed, account being taken of the possible costs involved in the relocation (such as termination costs for the existing operation, possibly higher infrastructure costs in the new location, possibly higher transportation costs if the new operation is more distant from the market, training costs of local employees, etc.). Where a business strategy aimed at deriving location savings is put forward as a business reason for restructuring, the discussion in Section D. 1.5 of Chapter I is relevant ...

There will also be cases where before-and-after comparisons can be made because the transactions prior to the restructuring were not controlled, for instance where the restructuring follows an acquisition, and where adjustments can reliably be made to account for the differences between the pre-restructuring uncontrolled transactions and the post-restructuring controlled transactions. See example at paragraph 9.110. Whether such uncontrolled transactions provide reliable comparables would have to be evaluated in light of the guidance at paragraph 3.2 ...

Based on these findings, it can be concluded that Company A continues to perform the same functions and assume the same risks as before the restructuring took place. In particular, Company A continues to have the capability and actually performs control functions in relation to the risk of exploitation of the intangibles. It also carries on the functions related to the development, maintenance and execution of the worldwide marketing strategy. Company Z has no capability to perform control functions, and does not in fact perform the control functions needed to assume the intangible related risks. Accordingly, the accurate delineation of the transaction after the restructuring may lead to the conclusion that this is in substance a funding arrangement between Company A and Company Z, rather than a restructuring for the centralisation of intangible management. An assessment may be necessary of the commercial rationality of the transaction based on the guidance in Section D.2 of Chapter I taking into account the full facts and circumstances of the transaction ...

Then a restructuring takes place. Legal ownership of the trademarks, trade names and other intangibles represented by the brand is transferred by Company A to a newly set up affiliate, Company Z in Country Z in exchange for a lump sum payment. After the restructuring, Company A is remunerated on a cost plus basis for the services it performs for Company Z and the rest of the group. The remuneration of the affiliated contract manufacturers and distributors remains the same. The remaining profits after remuneration of the contract manufacturers, distributors, and Company A head office services are paid to Company Z. The accurate delineation of the transactions before and after the restructuring determines that: Company Z is managed by a local trust company. It does not have people (employees or directors) who have the capability to perform, and who in fact do not perform control functions in relation to the risks associated with the ownership or the strategic development of the trademarks, trade names or other intangibles represented by the brand. It also does not have the financial capacity to assume these risks. High ranking officials from Company A’s head office fly to Country Z once a year to formally validate the strategic decisions necessary to operate the company. These decisions are prepared by Company A’s head office in Country A before the meetings take place in Country Z. The MNE considers that these activities are service activities performed by Company A’s head office for Z. These strategic decision-making activities are remunerated at cost plus in the same way as the central services are remunerated (e.g. human resource management, legal, tax). The development, maintenance and execution of the worldwide marketing strategy are still performed by the same employees of Company A’s head office and remunerated on a cost plus basis ...

For example, an MNE manufactures and distributes products the value of which is not determined by the technical features of the products, but rather by consumer recognition of the brand. The MNE wants to differentiate itself from its competitors through the development of brands with great value, by implementing a carefully developed and expensive marketing strategy. The trademarks, trade names and other intangibles represented by the brand are owned by Company A in Country A and Company A assumes the risks associated with the ownership, development and exploitation of those intangibles. The development, maintenance and execution of a worldwide marketing strategy are the main value drivers of the MNE, performed by 125 employees at Company A’s head office. The value of the intangibles results in a high consumer price for the products. Company A’s head office also provides central services for the group affiliates (e.g. human resource management, legal, tax). The products are manufactured by affiliates under contract manufacturing arrangements with Company A. They are distributed by affiliates who purchase them from Company A. The profits derived by Company A after having allocated an arm’s length remuneration to the contract manufacturers and distributors are considered to be the remuneration for the intangibles, marketing activities and central services of Company A ...

The analysis of the business before and after the restructuring may reveal that while some functions, assets and risks were transferred, other functions may still be carried out by the “stripped” entity. Typically, as part of the restructuring the entity may have been purportedly stripped of intangibles or risk, but after the restructuring it continues to carry out some or all of the functions it previously performed. Following the restructuring, however, the “stripped” entity performs those functions under contract to a foreign associated enterprise. The accurate delineation of the actual transaction between the foreign associated enterprise and the “stripped” entity will determine the actual commercial or financial relations between them, including whether the contractual terms are consistent with the conduct of the parties and other facts of the case. Arm’s length compensation for each party should be consistent with its actual functions performed, assets used and risks assumed after the restructuring ...

That being said, in business restructurings, before-and-after comparisons could play a role in understanding the restructuring itself and could be part of a before-and-after comparability (including functional) analysis to understand the changes that accounted for the changes in the allocation of profit/loss amongst the parties. In effect, information on the arrangements that existed prior to the restructuring and on the conditions of the restructuring itself could be essential to understand the context in which the post-restructuring arrangements were put in place and to assess whether such arrangements are arm’s length. It can also shed light on the options realistically available to the restructured entity. (See paragraphs 9.27-9.31 for a discussion of options realistically available; see also paragraphs 9.102-9.106 for a discussion of possible factual differences between situations that result from a restructuring and situations that were structured as such from the beginning and of how such differences may affect the options realistically available to the parties in negotiating the terms of the new arrangement and therefore the conditions of the restructuring and/or of the post-restructuring arrangements.) ...

Another issue with before-and-after comparisons is the likely difficulty of valuing the basket of functions, assets and risks that were lost by the restructured entity, keeping in mind that it is not always the case that these functions, assets and risks are transferred to another party ...

One important issue with such before-and-after comparisons is that a comparison of the profits from the post-restructuring controlled transactions with the profits made in controlled transactions prior to the restructuring would not suffice given Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention provides for a comparison to be made with uncontrolled transactions. Comparisons of a taxpayer’s controlled transactions with other controlled transactions are irrelevant to the application of the arm’s length principle and therefore should not be used by a tax administration as the basis for a transfer pricing adjustment or by a taxpayer to support its transfer pricing policy ...

A relevant question is the role if any of comparisons that can be made of the profits actually earned by a party to a controlled transaction prior to and after the restructuring. In particular, it can be asked whether it would be appropriate to determine a restructured entity’s post-restructuring profits by reference to its pre-restructuring profits, adjusted to reflect the transfer or relinquishment of particular functions, assets and risks ...

In other words, in this situation where the taxpayer will have an ongoing business relationship as supplier to the foreign associated enterprise that carries on an activity previously carried on by the taxpayer, the taxpayer and the foreign associated enterprise have the opportunity to obtain economic and commercial benefits through that relationship (e.g. the sale price of goods) which may explain for instance why compensation through an up-front capital payment for transfer of the business was foregone, or why the future transfer price for the products might be different from the prices that would have been agreed absent a restructuring operation. In practice, however, it might be difficult to structure and monitor such an arrangement. While taxpayers are free to choose the form of compensation payments, whether up-front or over time, tax administrations when reviewing such arrangements would want to know how the compensation for the post-restructuring activity was possibly affected to take account of the foregone compensation, if any, for the restructuring itself. Specifically, in such a case, the tax administration would want to look at the entirety of the arrangements, while being provided with a separate evaluation of the arm’s length compensation for the restructuring and for the post-restructuring transactions ...

Another example would be where a taxpayer that operates a manufacturing and distribution activity restructures by disposing of its distribution activity to a foreign associated enterprise to which the taxpayer will in the future sell the goods it manufactures. The foreign associated enterprise would expect to be able to earn an arm’s length reward for its investment in acquiring and operating the business. In this situation, the taxpayer might agree with the foreign associated enterprise to forgo receipt of part or all of the up-front compensation for the business that may be payable at arm’s length, and instead obtain comparable financial benefit over time through selling its goods to the foreign associated enterprise at prices that are higher than the latter would otherwise agree to if the up-front compensation had been paid. Alternatively, the parties might agree to set an up-front compensation payment for the restructuring that is partly offset through future lower transfer prices for the manufactured products than would have been set otherwise. See Part I of this chapter for a discussion of situations where compensation would be payable at arm’s length for the restructuring itself ...

There may in some circumstances be an important inter-relationship between the compensation for the restructuring and an arm’s length reward for operating the business post-restructuring. This can be the case where a taxpayer disposes of business operations to an associated enterprise with which it must then transact business as part of those operations. One example of such a relationship is found in paragraph 9.74 regarding outsourcing ...

The identification of potential comparables has to be made with the objective of finding the most reliable comparables data in the circumstances of the case, keeping in mind the limitations that may exist in availability of information and the compliance costs involved (see paragraphs 3.2 and 3.80). It is recognised that the data will not always be perfect. There are also cases where comparables data are not found, for instance where the restructuring has led to fragmentation of integrated functions across several group companies in a way that is not found between unrelated parties. This does not necessarily mean that the conditions of the controlled transaction as accurately delineated are not arm’s length. Notwithstanding the difficulties that can arise in the process of searching comparables, it is necessary to find a reasonable solution to all transfer pricing cases. Following the guidance at paragraph 2.2, even in cases where comparables data are scarce and imperfect, the choice of the most appropriate transfer pricing method to the circumstances of the case should be consistent with the nature of the controlled transaction, determined in particular through a functional analysis ...

Whenever a comparable is proposed, it is important to ensure that a comparability analysis of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions is performed in order to identify material differences, if any, between them and, where necessary and possible, to adjust for such differences. In particular, the comparability analysis might reveal that the restructured entity continues to perform valuable and significant functions and/or the presence of local intangibles and/or of economically significant risks that remain in the “stripped” entity after the restructuring but are not found in the proposed comparables. See Section A on the possible differences between restructured activities and start-up situations ...

Another example of a possible application of the CUP method would be the case where independent parties provide manufacturing, selling or service activities comparable to the ones provided by the restructured affiliate. Given the recent development of outsourcing activities, it may be possible in some cases to find independent outsourcing transactions that provide a basis for using the CUP method in order to determine the arm’s length remuneration of post-restructuring controlled transactions. This of course is subject to the condition that the outsourcing transactions qualify as uncontrolled transactions and that the review of the five economically relevant characteristics or comparability factors provides sufficient comfort that either no material difference exists between the conditions of the uncontrolled outsourcing transactions and the conditions of the post-restructuring controlled transactions, or that reliable enough adjustments can be made (and are effectively made) to eliminate such differences ...

There are cases where comparables (including internal comparables) are available, subject to possible comparability adjustments being performed. One example of a possible application of the CUP method would be the case where an enterprise that used to transact independently with the MNE group is acquired, and the acquisition is followed by a restructuring of the now controlled transactions. Subject to a review of the five economically relevant characteristics or comparability factors and of the possible effect of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions taking place at different times, it might be the case that the conditions of the pre-acquisition uncontrolled transactions provide a CUP for the post-acquisition controlled transactions. Even where the conditions of the transactions are restructured, it might still be possible, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, to adjust for the transfer of functions, assets and/or risks that occurred upon the restructuring. For instance, a comparability adjustment might be performed to account for the fact that a different party assumes bad debt risk ...

Post-restructuring arrangements may pose certain challenges with respect to the identification of potential comparables in cases where the restructuring implements a business model that is hardly found between independent enterprises. It should be noted that the mere fact that an arrangement is not seen between independent enterprises does not in itself mean that it is not arm’s length nor commercially irrational. Furthermore, every effort should be made to determine the pricing for the restructuring transactions as accurately delineated under the arm’s length principle ...

The selection and application of a transfer pricing method to post-restructuring controlled transactions must derive from the analysis of the economically relevant characteristics of the controlled transaction as accurately delineated. It is essential to understand what the functions, assets and risks involved in the post-restructuring transactions are, and what party performs, uses or assumes them. This requires information to be available on the functions, assets and risks of both parties to a transaction, e.g. the restructured entity and the foreign associated enterprise with which it transacts. The analysis should go beyond the label assigned to the restructured entity, as an entity that is labelled as a “commissionnaire” or “limited risk distributor” can sometimes be found to own valuable local intangibles and to continue to assume significant market risks, and an entity that is labelled as a “contract manufacturer” can sometimes be found to pursue significant development activities or to own and use unique intangibles. In post-restructuring situations, particular attention should be paid to the identification of the valuable intangibles and the economically significant risks that effectively remain with the restructured entity (including, where applicable, local non-protected intangibles), and to whether such an allocation of intangibles and risks satisfies the arm’s length principle. The form of remuneration cannot dictate inappropriate risk allocations. It is the determination of how the parties actually control risks, and whether they have the financial capacity to assume the risks, as set out in the process of analysing risk in Chapter I, which will determine the assumption of risks by the parties, and consequently dictate the selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method. Issues regarding risks and intangibles are discussed in Part I of this chapter ...

The same remarks and questions apply for other types of restructurings, including other types of restructuring of sales activities as well as restructurings of manufacturing activities, research and development activities, or other services activities ...

Where a restructuring involves a transfer to a foreign associated enterprise of risks that were previously assumed by a taxpayer, it may be important to examine whether the transfer of risks only concerns the future risks that will arise from the post-restructuring activities or also the risks existing at the time of the restructuring as a result of pre-conversion activities, i.e. there is a cut-off issue. For instance, consider a situation in which a distributor was assuming bad debt risks which it will no longer assume after its being restructured as a “limited risk distributor”, and that it is being compared with a long-established “limited risk distributor” that never assumed bad debt risk. It may be important when comparing both situations to examine, based on the guidance in Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I, whether the “limited risk distributor” that results from a conversion still assumes the risks associated with bad debts that arose before the restructuring at the time it was full-fledged, or whether all the bad debt risks including those that existed at the time of the conversion were transferred ...

When one compares a situation where a long-established full-fledged distributor is converted into a limited risk distributor with a situation where a limited risk distributor has been in existence in the market for the same duration, there might also be differences because the full-fledged distributor may have performed some functions, borne some expenses (e.g. marketing expenses), assumed some risks and contributed to the development of some intangibles before its conversion that the long-existing “limited risk distributor” may not have performed, borne, assumed or contributed to. The question arises whether at arm’s length such additional functions, assets and risks should only affect the remuneration of the distributor before its being converted, whether they should be taken into account to determine a remuneration of the transfers that take place upon the conversion (and if so how), whether they should affect the remuneration of the restructured limited risk distributor (and if so how), or a combination of these three possibilities. For instance, if it is found that the pre-restructuring activities led the full-fledged distributor to own some intangibles while the long-established limited risk distributor does not, the arm’s length principle may require these intangibles either to be remunerated upon the restructuring if they are transferred by the full-fledged distributor to a foreign associated enterprise, or to be taken into account in the determination of the arm’s length remuneration of the post-restructuring activities if they are not transferred (see Section E.2 of Part I above and Chapter VI of these Guidelines) ...

Some differences in the starting position of the restructured entity compared to the position of a newly set up operation can relate to the established presence of the operation. For instance, if one compares a situation where a long-established full-fledged distributor is converted into a limited risk distributor with a situation where a limited risk distributor is established in a market where the group did not have any previous commercial presence, market penetration efforts might be needed for the new entrant which are not needed for the converted entity. This may affect the comparability analysis and the determination of the arm’s length remuneration in both situations ...

Where there is an ongoing business relationship between the parties before and after the restructuring, there may also be an inter-relationship between on the one hand the conditions of the pre-restructuring activities and/or of the restructuring itself, and on the other hand the conditions for the post-restructuring arrangements, as discussed in Section C below ...

Where an arrangement between associated enterprises replaces an existing arrangement (restructuring), there may be factual differences in the starting position of the restructured entity compared to the position of a newly set up operation. Sometimes, the post-restructuring arrangement is negotiated between parties that have had prior contractual and commercial relationships. In such a situation, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case and in particular on the rights and obligations derived by the parties from these prior arrangements, this may affect the options realistically available to the parties in negotiating the terms of the new arrangement and therefore the conditions of the restructuring and of the post-restructuring arrangements (see paragraphs 9.27-9.31 for a discussion of options realistically available in the context of determining the arm’s length compensation for the restructuring itself). For instance, assume a party has proved in the past to be able to perform well as a full-fledged distributor performing a whole range of marketing and selling functions, employing and developing valuable marketing intangible assets and assuming a range of risks associated with its activity such as inventory risks, bad debt risks and market risks. Assume that its distribution contract is re-negotiated and converted into a “limited risk distribution” contract whereby it will perform limited marketing activities under the supervision of a foreign associated enterprise, employ limited marketing intangibles and assume limited risks in its relationship with the foreign associated enterprise and customers. In such a situation, the restructured distributor would not be in the same position as a newly established distributor ...

In addition, the comparability analysis of an arrangement that results from a business restructuring might reveal some factual differences compared to the one of an arrangement that was structured as such from the beginning, as discussed below. These factual differences do not affect the arm’s length principle or the way the guidance in these Guidelines should be interpreted and applied, but they may affect the comparability analysis and therefore the outcome of this application. See Section D on comparing the pre- and post-restructuring ...