“IP-owner Corp” had subsidiaries which used its intangibles in their distribution and manufacturing activities. The subsidiaries did not paid royalty. The tax authorities considered that they should have paid for use of the intangibles and added an arm’s length royalty to the taxable income of “IP-owner Corp”. An appeal was filed with the Seoul Appeals Commission. Decision The Appeals Commission dismisse the appeal and upheld the tax assessment issued by the authorities. Excerpt in English “1) Issue 1 a) A trademark holder has the exclusive and unrestricted right to use a trademark, and therefore, unless the trademark is economically worthless, the use of another’s registered trademark is considered to be an economic benefit in itself. It is economically reasonable for a trademark holder to receive consideration for allowing the use of its trademark, and it is an abnormal trade practice that lacks reasonableness to allow the use of a trademark without consideration. b) The applicant corporation is 20○○.○. After applying and registering the trademark, it has been registered as the sole trademark holder of the trademark in question. However, although it was necessary to collect royalties for the use of the trademark, the applicant corporation refused to collect royalties without economic rationality, which is subject to adjustment of normal price taxation under Article 4(1) of the International Taxation Adjustment Act or denial of calculation of wrongful acts under Article 52(1) of the Corporate Tax Act. c) Accordingly, we find no error in the original decision of the HMRC to deny the applicant a corporate tax credit. 2) Regarding Issue 2 a) The applicant company argues that the technical fees at issue should not be disallowed to the applicant company. b) The manufacturing technology of ○○○○, which the Applicant has developed for a long period of time by establishing a research and development team, constitutes non-public technical information, and the head of the research and development team and then the factory manager of the Chinese subsidiary stated that the research and development team’s findings played an important role for the Chinese subsidiary. The internally drafted contract stipulates the provision of drawings, etc. as technical information, and the amount of royalties to be received from the PRC corporation was considered to be about 3 to 4 per cent of the PRC corporation’s sales. c)The fact that the applicant transferred technical information and technical know-how related to the ○○○○ product to the PRC corporation and did not receive royalties in return is subject to taxation adjustment under Article 4(1) of the Law on International Taxation Adjustment, and the arm’s length price was reasonably calculated in light of the substance and practice of the transaction. d) Accordingly, we find no error in the original decision of the tax authorities to deny the claim for corporate tax credit to the applicant.” Click here for English translation“ Click here for other translation Korea 2023-0250 ...

Eli Lilly ČR imports pharmaceutical products purchased from Eli Lilly Export S.A. (Swiss sales and marketing hub) into the Czech Republic and Slovakia and distributes them to local distributors. The arrangement between the Czech company and the Swiss company is based on a Service Contract in which Eli Lilly ČR is named as the service provider to Eli Lilly Export S.A. (the principal). Eli Lilly ČR was selling the products at a lower price than the price it purchased them for from Eli Lilly Export S.A. According to the company this was due to local price controls of pharmaceuticals. However, Eli Lilly ČR was also paid for providing marketing services by the Swiss HQ, which ensured that Eli Lilly ČR was profitable, despite selling the products at a loss. Eli Lilly ČR reported the marketing services as a provision of services with the place of supply outside of the Czech Republic; therefore, the income from such supply was exempt from VAT in the Czech Republic. In 2016 a tax assessment was issued for FY 2011 in which VAT was added to the marketing services-income. An appeal was filed with the Administrative Court by Eli Lilly, but the Court dismissed the appeal and decided in favour of the tax authorities. An appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Court The appeal of Eli Lilly was again dismissed and the decision of the administrative court – and the assessment of additional VAT upheld. “The complainant’s objections were not capable of overturning the conclusion that the supply of marketing services and the supply of the distribution (sale) of medicines were provided to different entities and that, in the eyes of the average customer, they were not one indivisible supply.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation Czech vs Eli Lilly Cr August 2023 6 Afs 125-2022 - 59 ...

Two issues were adressed in this case – transfer pricing and withholding taxes. The transfer pricing issue concerned whether the Danish tax authorities (SKAT) had been entitled to issue an assessment on controlled transactions made between “Soy A/S” and a flow-through company in the group located in a low tax jurisdiction. The withholding tax issue concerned whether the 13 transfers actually constituted taxable dividends under section 31, D of the Danish Corporation Tax Act, which “Soy A/S” was subsequently liable for not having withheld tax at source, cf. section 69(1) of the Danish Withholding Tax Act. Judgement of the High Court In regards of the transfer pricing issue, the High Court found that the company’s TP documentation was subject to a number of deficiencies which meant that the documentation did not provide the tax authorities with a sufficient basis for assessing whether the transactions were made in accordance with the arm’s length principle. The High Court emphasised, among other things, that the documentation did not sufficiently describe how prices and terms had actually been determined. The High Court also emphasised that there had only been a very general description and very sparse information about the sister company’s business activities, contractual terms and financial circumstances, including no information about to whom and at what prices the goods from the sister company were resold. SKAT was therefore entitled to make a discretionary assessment of the company’s taxable income. The High Court found no basis to set aside SKAT’s estimate, as the company had neither demonstrated that the estimate was exercised on an erroneous basis nor led to a manifestly unreasonable result. The High Court emphasised, among other things, the extent and nature of the deficiencies in the information basis and the fact that SKAT had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain additional information for use in the tax assessment. As regards the arm’s length interval used by SKAT, the High Court found, after an overall assessment, that SKAT had been entitled to use the interquartile range and adjusted the price to the third quartile. The High Court stated that the company had a central and value-creating function in the group, and that the comparability analysis was based on “limited risk distributors”, which were not directly comparable with the company. The High Court also found that the foreign sister company had to be considered a pure flow-through company that had no independent business justification in the group. In this connection, the High Court stated that there had been changing information about the sister company’s employees and that there was no documentation that there had been employees to carry out the alleged activities in the company. The analyses prepared after the tax assessment, including the capital adjustment test and the berry ratio analysis, as well as the other factors invoked by the company could not lead to a different assessment. In regards of the withholding tax issue the High Court found that the foreign sister company could only be considered to have acted as a flow-through company that did not bear any risk with the commodity trade. The High Court emphasised, among other things, that no hedging contracts had been presented. In light of the other circumstances of the case, the High Court found that the 13 transfers, which did not take place until 2010, could not be considered to have been made pursuant to the aforementioned agency agreement. The High Court stated that in the situation at hand, the company had a heightened burden of proof that there was no basis for considering the payments as subsidies/dividends with derived liability for withholding tax. The High Court found that the Danish company had not met this burden of proof through the testimony of the company’s former CEO and auditor. Finally, the High Court found that the Danish company was aware of all the circumstances surrounding the transfers to the foreign sister company in Y1 country, and that the transfers were very significant without documentation. On this basis, the High Court found that the Danish company had acted negligently and was therefore liable for the missing withholding tax, cf. section 69(1) of the current Withholding Tax Act, cf. section 65(1). Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Denmark vs Soy-Oil AS June 2023 ...

In its application for an individual interpretation, R. S.A. stated that it distributes fast moving goods in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. It purchases these goods from the company E. based in H. and sells them to independent wholesale distributors and retailers. At the applicant’s request, the Minister of Finance in 2015 issued a decision on a advance price agreement, recognising the correctness of the selection and application of the transactional net margin method in the applicant’s purchase of goods from a related party for further distribution in the Baltic States. In the activities covered by the decision, R. S.A. performs the functions of a distributor with limited risk and limited marketing functions and incurs the associated operating costs, which consist of both its own costs (purchase from group entities of, inter alia, advisory, legal, technical, organisational, financial and marketing/sales services) and external costs (including the costs of services purchased from other entities, also related parties, subsequently re-invoiced to the beneficiaries of those services). According to the decision, R. S.A. should have a constant profitability, determined on the basis of the operating profit ratio (operating profit related to the activities covered by the decision, shown in the income statement before financial income and expenses), with only selling and general administrative expenses included in operating expenses. To this end, an algorithm for the calculation of the transaction price in transactions for the purchase of goods was defined, which includes all types of costs referred to as operating costs, which also include the costs of intra-group services mentioned in the application, incurred in connection with the applicant’s distribution and marketing activities. R. S.A. asked whether the described costs of intragroup services, due to the fact that they are already covered by the issued decision on the prior price agreement, are subject to the restrictions under Article 15e(15) of the Corporate Income Tax Act – taking the position that these restrictions do not apply. In an individual interpretation the Director of the National Fiscal Information considered R. S.A.’s position to be incorrect. He pointed out that the prior price agreement was not concluded for the purpose of determining the amount of prices/expenses for the purchase of services from the other related parties in the group, and the decision issued in this respect involves an analysis of the conditions established only between the specified related parties, so it cannot be considered that also the services purchased from other related parties and included in the algorithm for calculating the transaction price constitute a confirmed element of the prior price agreement. Therefore, the restriction arising from Article 15e(1) of the APS will apply to the costs of intra-group services. R. S.A. challenged this interpretation before the Administrative Court. The court noted that the interpreting authority did not fully and exhaustively refer to the applicant’s position contained in the request for an interpretation, namely that the costs of intra-group services constituting the content of the interpretation question were included in the algorithm for calculating the transaction price. An appeal was then filed by the authorities with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court. The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the Administrative Court. Excerpts “As aptly noted by the Provincial Administrative Court in the justification of the appealed judgment, since the operating costs inquired about by the applicant in its request for an individual interpretation of the tax law provisions were an element of the algorithm for calculation of remuneration in the transaction covered by the decision on the previous price agreement, which decision includes an analysis of the conditions established between certain related entities, it cannot be concluded that the services purchased from other related entities and included in that algorithm do not constitute a confirmed element of that agreement; the criterion that is decisive here is the subject matter criterion and not the entity criterion – provided that the profitability of the assessed entity in the distribution activity is not adversely affected as a certain percentage of the sales revenue agreed in the decision. Therefore, if it follows from the description of the facts presented in the request for interpretation that the algorithm for calculation of the transaction price includes all types of operating costs, including the aforementioned costs of intragroup services to which the question relates, then also these costs constitute an element of a confirmed prior price agreement. Therefore, the Director of the National Fiscal Information unfoundedly alleged that the Voivodship Administrative Court in Warsaw breached Article 15e(15) in conjunction with Article 15e(1) of the A.p.d.o.p. by misinterpreting and, consequently, misapplying it. The assumption that Article 15e, paragraph 15 of the A.p.d.o.p. refers to the subjective scope of validity of the decision on price agreement referred to in Article 20a of the A.p.p. corresponds to the content of Article 15e, paragraph 15 of the A.p.d.o.p., which directly indicates the correctness of calculation of remuneration for services, fees and charges in the period to which the decision refers. There is also an entity criterion, but it refers to the addressee of the decision provided for in Article 20a of the P.P.O., i.e. – in the case at hand – the applicant Company. Although the decision on the previous price agreement includes an analysis of the conditions established between certain related entities, its essence is the determination of the correctness of the algorithm for calculation of the transaction price, and this correctness is not affected by the subjective side of the service provider, if it is still a related entity. Therefore, there is no normative basis for the conclusion proposed by the interpreting authority that, in the case of the acquisition of services included in the algorithm for calculating the transaction price from other related entities, the costs of these intra-group services – the characteristics of which have not changed in a manner affecting the correctness of the algorithm – are subject to limitations in inclusion in tax deductible costs under Article 15e(1) of the APS. The allegations of ...

SGGE W T is a Spanish branch of SGG that carries out distribution and marketing activities related to the information technology network products and services. SGG is part of the KF group which “is an international group that provides solutions and services in the Information Technology (IT) sector, starting its activity in . .. as a distributor of access and communications networks”. The group “is the result of several corporate operations, mainly company acquisitions and mergers carried out to increase its share in world markets” and “is mainly organized in three divisions (SGG, QR and …) according to the IT areas (Technology, Integration and Consulting) in which they operate”. Following an audit of FY 2015 and 2016 the tax authorities issued assessments of additional income to the Spanish branch. One of the issues identified was SGGE’s remuneration for its sales and marketing activities. According to the tax authorities, the income of the Spanish branch was below the lower quartile of the range established under the TNMM. On this basis, the income was adjusted to the median. The tax authorities had also disallowed deductions for the cost of intra-group services. An appeal was filed by SGGE W T. Judgement of the Court The Court partially upheld and partially dismissed the appeal. Excerpt from the judgement concerning IQR and Median “Thus, this Court only appreciates, from the motivation of the Inspection, that there would be -according to the assessment- some defects of comparability that persist, unavoidable as a consequence of the selection process of comparable elements through databases, and of the limits of the available information, but it is not detailed what errors or circumstances concur in the selection of the comparable elements or what limits the available information has. It should be noted that when the Inspectorate, as transcribed above, refers to the fact that there are still defects in comparability, given that the resulting range does not include relatively equal results, it adds, paraphrasing the Guidelines, that these are defects that cannot be identified and quantified. Rule 3.57 of the OECD Guidelines – also transcribed above – refers to defects in comparability that cannot be identified or quantified and are therefore not susceptible to adjustment. Notwithstanding the foregoing, regardless of the possibility of identifying or quantifying such defects, the choice of the median, provided for in rule 3.62 of the OECD Guidelines, requires – as clearly stated by the Audiencia Nacional and this TEAC – that the Inspectorate must disclose the defects of comparability, and reasons must be given for the defect or defects of comparability that are found to persist and that cause the range not to include very reliable and relatively equal results. We have seen that when section 3.57 of the Guidelines refers to defects that cannot be identified or quantified, it immediately links it to the fact that this makes a specific adjustment impossible. This is perfectly logical, because if they could be concretely identified and quantified, the adjustment would be feasible. It is one thing if they cannot be identified in the sense of being precisely specified and quantified so that they can be adjusted or corrected, and another if elements or areas are detected which, due to their special circumstances or lack of documentation, allow us to conjecture that there is still a deficiency in comparability that cannot be corrected, for which reason there is no other recourse but to resort to the median. Therefore, the mere appeal to this generic reference cannot be considered sufficient; otherwise, the requirement to state reasons that the Audiencia Nacional and this TEAC maintain would be sterile. At the very least, it should be explained what errors or failures in the process of selecting comparables, or what limitations in the information available, determine, as a consequence, that there are such unidentifiable or unquantifiable defects in comparability. In the present case, the reasoning contained in the assessment notification -page 148- only talks about defects that are a consequence of the selection process and the limitations of the available information, but does not detail any aspects that could allow this reviewing body to assess which are the specific circumstances of the selection process that allow to consider that it will lead to unidentifiable or quantifiable defects of comparability; nor the specific circumstances of the available information from which it can be extracted that the limitations of the same (not identified by the Inspection in the aforementioned motivation) will lead to unidentifiable or quantifiable defects of comparability. Likewise, it is striking that the Inspection refers to defects derived from the process of selection of comparables when, in the Fourth Ground of Law of the agreement, in response to allegations, a table is drawn up in which five entities selected by the Inspection, which are the object of allegations by the taxpayer, are eliminated from the comparables, indicating that “the interquartile range derived from the remaining entities would not offer values very different from those resulting from the entities taken by the Inspection”. Also noteworthy is the statement made on page 209 of the contested resolution in which, in response to the allegation that the services of one of the comparable entities (…, S.A.) represent around 40% and 49% of the total income, in 2015 and 2016, respectively, it is stated that this “in no way implies that in all the other entities selected as comparable by the inspection this same circumstance is present”, indicating that in case it were so (that the percentage of 40% or 49% of the income from the provision of services were present in the other entities) “in no way would invalidate the sample of entities selected by the inspection since they are entities that carry out activities similar to those of the obligor and that constitute the best possible comparable”. It is striking that the Inspectorate states that the selected entities “constitute the best possible comparable” and that, nevertheless, the adjustment is based on the choice of the median “as the point in the range that ...

Eli Lilly ČR imports pharmaceutical products purchased from Eli Lilly Export S.A. (Swiss sales and marketing hub) into the Czech Republic and Slovakia and distributes them to local distributors. The arrangement between the local company and Eli Lilly Export S.A. is based on a Service Contract in which Eli Lilly ČR is named as the service provider to Eli Lilly Export S.A. (the principal). Eli Lilly ČR was selling the products at a lower price than the price it purchased them for from Eli Lilly Export S.A. According to the company this was due to local price controls of pharmaceuticals. At the same time, Eli Lilly ČR was also paid for providing marketing services by the Swiss HQ, which ensured that Eli Lilly ČR was profitable, despite selling the products at a loss. Eli Lilly ČR reported the marketing services as a provision of services with the place of supply outside of the Czech Republic; therefore, the income from such supply was exempt from VAT in the Czech Republic. In 2016 a tax assessment was issued for FY 2011 in which VAT was added to the marketing services-income and later similar assessments were issued for the following years. An appeal was filed with the District Court by Eli Lilly which was dismissed by the Court. An appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Court The Supreme Administrative Court ruled in favor of Eli Lilly – annulled the judgement of the District Court and set aside the assessment of the tax authorities. “The Supreme Administrative Court found no reason to depart from the conclusions of the judgment in Case No 3 Afs 54/2020, even on the basis of the defendant’s additional arguments. Indeed, the applicant can be fully accepted that it is at odds with the reasoning of the Supreme Administrative Court and puts forward arguments on issues which are rather irrelevant to the assessment of the case. First of all, the defendant does not dispute in any relevant way that the disputed supplies were provided to two different entities (the distribution of medicines to the complainant’s customers and the provision of marketing services to Eli Lilly Export), and that the ‘average customer’ cannot perceive those supplies as a single supply. This conclusion does not in any way undermine the defendant’s reiteration of the complainant’s assertion at the income tax audit that, for the purposes of assessing the correctness of the transfer pricing set between the complainant and Eli Lilly Export in terms of section 23(7) of the Income Tax Act, the marketing service should be regarded as an integral part of the distribution of the medicines and cannot be viewed in isolation when assessing profitability. In terms of transfer pricing, the economic interdependence of the two activities was assessed, which was essential only to determine whether the profitability of each activity should be compared separately with entities carrying out only the relevant activity. However, the aggregate assessment of these activities in terms of Section 23(7) of the Income Tax Act, which involves offsetting profits and losses from different types of business activities and comparing profitability with entities performing a similar role (i.e. performing both marketing and distribution), does not necessarily mean that there is a single transaction for VAT purposes. This issue is assessed separately in accordance with the aspects of the VAT Act and the VAT Directive respectively. [32] Nor can the defendant’s other arguments, which it repeats in support of the conclusion that the provision of marketing services constitutes a supply incidental to the domestic sale of medicines, be accepted. It does not follow from the judgment in Case 3 Afs 54/202073 that the concept of ‘third party consideration’ cannot exist. The Supreme Administrative Court has not denied that the total value of the consideration received from the final customer for the purposes of determining the tax base may, in general, also include payments from third parties (see, for example, paragraphs 62 et seq. of the judgment referred to above). However, in the context of the present case, in the case of the distribution of pharmaceuticals, the Court held that the consideration for marketing services could not be regarded as part of the value of the consideration, since those services were not provided to ‘customers’ who were merely recipients of marketing information. The consideration for those services was not then spent on behalf of or for the benefit of the customers. As regards the defendant’s reference to the judgment of the CJEU in Firma Z, the conclusions expressed there concern a different factual situation and legal issue. The substantive issue was the offsetting of a reduction in the taxable amount of one supply against the taxable amount of another supply, which is excluded under the common VAT system. However, as noted above, in the present case the complainant does not supply any other supply to its customers at the same time as the pharmaceuticals. Therefore, if the conclusion of the tax administration were accepted, it would have received a higher amount of VAT than the amount paid for the supply which was the only supply received by the customer from the complainant (the pharmaceuticals). The complainant’s final, potential or immediate customers cannot be the recipients of a marketing service at all (see above). [33] Nor can the defendant’s view that the method of pricing the marketing services shows an ‘unquestionable link’ between the marketing services and the sale of medicines be accepted. In that connection, the defendant points out that the pricing of marketing services is not based solely on the costs of marketing, but also on the costs of distributing the goods (medicines). It therefore concludes that it is a payment by a third party (Eli Lilly Export) on top of the price of the medicines which the complainant sells at regulated prices. This argument of the defendant cannot stand. As a general rule, it is a matter for the parties to negotiate the price or the method of calculating it. Furthermore, ...

On 9 December 2022 OECD published a consultation document on Amount B as part of the ongoing work on OECD’s two-pillar solution to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy. Amount B is one of the components of Pillar One and aims to simplify and streamline application of the arm’s length principle in regards to in-country baseline marketing and distribution activities. A particular concern of low capacity jurisdictions has been the relative unavailability of appropriate local market comparables through which arm’s length prices can be established. Amount B will address this issue by providing a basis to establish an arm’s length price in all cases using suitable comparables, wherever they are geographically drawn from. The consultation document outlines the main design elements of Amount B  – scope, pricing methodology and the current status of discussions concerning an appropriate implementation framework. Deadline for submission of comments is 25 January 2023. public-consultation-document-pillar-one-amount-b-2022 ...

Universal Pictures International Spain SL is a distributor of films on the Spanish Market. It distributes films both from related parties (Universal Pictures) and from unrelated parties. Following an audit, the Spanish tax authorities issued an assessment where the remuneration received for distribution of films from related parties had been compared to the remuneration received from distribution of films from unrelated parties and where the pricing of the controlled transactions had been adjusted accordingly . Not satisfied with the assessment of additional income a complaint was filed by Universal Pictures International Spain SL. Judgement of the Court The Court predominantly held in favor of Universal Pictures International Spain SL. The distribution activities performed in regards of films from related parties were limited risk whereas the activities performed in regards of distribution of films from unrelated parties were fully fledged. Hence the pricing of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions was not comparable. However, the comparables in the benchmark analysis on which Universal Pictures International Spain SL had based the pricing of controlled transactions was not all considered sufficiently comparable by the court and on that basis the case was referred back for reconsideration. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation SAN_5855_2022 ...

Following an audit, the Greek tax authorities determined that the profit of “Pharma Distributor Ltd” for sales and service activities had not been determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle. The tax authorities issued an assessment of additional taxable income, rejecting the resale price method used by “Pharma Distributor Ltd” and instead applying the TNMM. An appeal was filed by “Pharma Distributor Ltd”. Judgement of the Tax Court The Court dismissed the appeal in part and allowed it in part. The tax authorities’ assessment was largely upheld in relation to sales activities, where it was found that the prices charged by “Pharma Distributor Ltd” were outside the interquartile range. In relation to the service activities, the Court found that the remuneration for these activities was within the arm’s length range and therefore annulled the assessment. Excerpts “In the light of the above, as regards the applicant company’s intra-group transactions Nos 1 to 4, there is a question of non-compliance with the arm’s length principle, since the ratio of net profit margin (partial result) to sales for the applicant company’s trading sector, for the tax period 01/01/2019-31/12/2019, amounts to 1.45%, i.e. it is outside the limits of the 1st (2.38%) and the 3rd quartile (7.11%) of the net profit margin to total sales ratios of the comparable companies in the sample. As regards the applicant’s intra-group transaction No 5, its pricing is in line with the principle of equidistance, as the ratio of net profit margin (partial result) to sales for the applicant’s industrial sector, for the tax period 01/01/2019-31/12/2019, amounts to 2.86%, i.e. it is within the limits of the 1st (2.21%) and the 3rd quartile (13.91%) of the net profit margin to total sales ratios of the comparable companies in the sample. Therefore, the following accounting difference is calculated for compliance with the arm’s length principle, which is added to the accounting differences of the financial year in application of article 50 of Law4172/2013.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Greece Case No 3712_2022 ...

The US group, Avery Dennison, manufactures and distributes labelling and packaging materials in more than 50 countries around the world. The remuneration of the distribution and marketing activities performed Avery Dennison Chile S.A. had been determined to be at arm’s length by application of a “full range” analysis based on the resale price minus method. Furthermore, surplus capital from the local company had been placed at the group’s financial centre in Luxembourg, Avery Management KGAA, at an interest rate of 0,79% (12-month Libor). According the tax authorities in Chile the remuneration of the local company had not been at arm’s length, and the interest rate paid by the related party in Luxembourg had been to low, and on that basis an assessment was issued. A complaint was filed by Avery Dennison with the Tax Tribunal and in March 2021 the Tribunal issued a decision in favour of Avery Dennison Chile S.A. “Hence, the Respondent [tax authorities] failed to prove its allegations that the marketing operations carried out by the taxpayer during the 2012 business year with related parties not domiciled or resident in Chile do not conform to normal market prices between unrelated parties..” “Although the OECD Guidelines recommend the use of the interquartile range as a reliable statistical tool (point 3.57), or, in cases of selection of the most appropriate point of the range “the median” (point 3.61), its application is not mandatory in the national tax administration…” “the Claimant [taxpayer]carried out two financing operations with its related company Avery Management KGAA, domiciled in Luxembourg, which contains one of the treasury centres of the “Avery Dennison” conglomerate, where the taxpayer granted two loans for US $3.200.000.- in 2010 and another for US $1.1000.000.- in 2011.” “In relation to the financial transactions, the transfer pricing methodology used and the interests agreed by the plaintiff have been confirmed. Consequently, Assessment No. 210, dated 30 August 2016, should be annulled and, consequently, this Tax and Customs Court will uphold the claim presented in these proceedings.” An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The Court upheld the decision of the Tax Tribunal and set aside the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Excerpts “(…) Fourth: That the OECD regulations – while article 38 of the LIR was in force – should be understood as a guide with indications or suggestions for determining prices assigned between related parties with respect to those charged between independent parties. The aim is to eliminate distortions that may arise between companies with common ownership and to respect market rules. Notwithstanding the above recognition, Article 38 of the LIR regulated transfer prices and even though its normative content was minimal and insufficient to provide an adequate response on the matter, its text must be followed for the purposes of resolving the conflict in question, especially if one considers that the third paragraph of the provision states that when prices between related companies are not in line with the values charged between independent companies for similar transactions, “the Regional Directorate may challenge them, taking as a reference basis for such prices a reasonable profitability for the characteristics of the transaction, or the production costs plus a reasonable profit margin. The same rule shall apply with respect to prices paid or owed for goods or services provided by the parent company, its agencies or related companies, when such prices do not conform to normal market prices between unrelated parties, and may also consider the resale prices to third parties of goods acquired from an associated company, minus the profit margin observed in similar operations with or between independent companies”. The following paragraph adds that if the company does not carry out the same type of operations with independent companies, the Regional Directorate “may challenge the prices based on the values of the respective products or services on the international market (…) for this purpose (…) it shall request a report from the National Customs Service, the Central Bank of Chile or the bodies that have the required information”. It can be inferred from the transcribed rule that the use of external comparables is only authorised if the company does not carry out any type of transaction of goods and services with independent companies; that the challenge must be well-founded; and that the taxpayer and the SII are free to use the method that seems most appropriate to them as long as the legal requirements are met. It is also relevant to note that the domestic regulations at that date did not contemplate all the methods included in the OECD guidelines and it is inappropriate, under article 38 of the LIR, to resort directly to such guidelines in respect of situations not provided for in the domestic regulations, i.e., in relation to methods not included in the aforementioned provision. An interpretation contrary to the above would infringe the principle of legality of taxes or legal reserve, according to which only the law can impose, eliminate, reduce or condone taxes of any kind or nature, establish exemptions or modify existing ones and determine their form, proportionality or progress. Fifth: That the contested act shows that the method used by the SII for the entire period under review, business year 2012, corresponds to the so-called “Transactional Net Margin Method” for marketing operations, and the ” Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method” for financial operations, The Court therefore agrees with the findings of the lower court in grounds 22 to 25 of the judgment under review regarding the lack of the necessary grounds for the administrative act, in that the tax authority, although obliged to do so, omitted to analyse the transactions in accordance with the legislation in force at the date on which they were carried out…” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Chile vs Avery Dennison Chile May 2022 ...

DELSEY España distributes and sells suitcases and other travel accessories of the DESLEY brand on the Spanish market and belongs to the French multinational group of the same name. The Spanish distributor had declared losses for FY 2005-2010 and was subject to a transfer pricing audit for FY 2011 to 2014. Based on the audit, the tax authorities concluded that the losses in FY 2005-2010 was a result of controlled transactions not being priced at arm’s length. The same was concluded for FY 2011 and 2012. The CUP method and RPM method applied by the taxpayer was found to be inappropriate and was replaced with the TNMM by the tax authorities. An appeal was filed by Delsey España S.A. Judgement of the Court The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the assessment. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Spain vs Delsey STSJ_CAT_1467_2022 ORG1 ...

42. The facts in this example are the same as those set out in Example 10 with the following additions: At the end of Year 3, Primair stops manufacturing watches and contracts with a third party to manufacture them on its behalf. As a result, Company S will import unbranded watches directly from the manufacturer and undertake secondary processing to apply the R name and logo and package the watches before sale to the final customer. It will then sell and distribute the watches in the manner described in Example 10. As a consequence, at the beginning of Year 4, Primair and Company S renegotiate their earlier agreement and enter into a new long term licensing agreement. The new agreement, to start at the beginning of Year 4, is for five years, with Company S having an option for a further five years. Under the new agreement, Company S is granted the exclusive right within country Y to process, market and distribute watches bearing the R trademark in consideration for its agreement to pay a royalty to Primair based on the gross sales of all such watches. Company S receives no compensation from Primair in respect of the renegotiation of the original marketing and distribution agreement. It is assumed for purposes of this example that the purchase price Company S pays for the watches from the beginning of Year 4 is arm’s length and that no consideration with respect to the R name is embedded in that price. 43. In connection with a tax audit conducted by country Y tax administrations in Year 6, it is determined, based on a proper functional analysis, that the level of marketing expenses Company S incurred during Years 1 through 3 far exceeded those incurred by independent marketers and distributors with similar long term marketing and distribution agreements. It is also determined that the level and intensity of marketing activity undertaken by Company S exceeded that of independent marketers and distributors, and that the relatively greater activity has been successful in expanding volumes and/or increasing the Primair group’s overall margins from sales in country Y. Given the extent of the market development activities undertaken by Company S, including its strategic control over such activities, it is evident from the comparability and functional analysis that Company S has assumed significantly greater costs and assumed greater risks than comparable independent enterprises. There is also evidence that the individual entity profit margins realised by Company S are significantly lower than the profit margins of comparable independent marketers and distributors during the corresponding years of similar long-term marketing and distribution arrangements. 44. The country Y audit also identifies that in Years 4 and 5, Company S bears the costs and associated risks of its marketing activities under the new long-term licensing arrangement with Primair, and because of the long-term nature of the agreement, Company S may have an opportunity to benefit (or suffer a loss) from its activities. However, Company S has undertaken market development activities and incurred marketing expenditure far beyond what comparable independent licensees with similar long-term licensing agreements undertake and incur for their own benefit, resulting in significantly lower anticipated profit margins for Company S than those of comparable enterprises. 45. Based on these facts, Company S should be compensated with an additional return for the market development functions it performs, the assets it uses and the risks it assumes. For Years 1 through 3, the possible bases for such an adjustment would be as described in Example 10. For Years 4 and 5 the bases for an adjustment would be similar, except that the adjustment could reduce the royalty payments from Company S to Primair, rather than the purchase price of the watches. Depending on the facts and circumstances, consideration could also be given to whether Company S should have received compensation in connection with the renegotiation of the arrangement at the end of Year 3 in accordance with the guidance in Part II of Chapter IX ...

39. The facts in this example are the same as in Example 9 with the following additions: By the end of Year 3, the R brand is successfully established in the country Y market and Primair and Company S renegotiate their earlier agreement and enter into a new long-term licensing agreement. The new agreement, which is to commence at the beginning of Year 4, is for five years with Company S having an option for a further five years. Under this agreement, Company S agrees to pay a royalty to Primair based on the gross sales of all watches bearing the R trademark. In all other respects, the new agreement has the same terms and conditions as in the previous arrangement between the parties. There is no adjustment made to the price payable by Company S for the branded watches as a result of the introduction of the royalty. Company S’s sales of R brand watches in Years 4 and 5 are consistent with earlier budget forecasts. However, the introduction of the royalty from the beginning of year 4 results in Company S’s profit margins declining substantially. 40. Assume that there is no evidence that independent marketers/distributors of similar branded products have agreed to pay royalties under similar arrangements. Company S’s level of marketing expenditure and activity, from Year 4 on, is consistent with that of independent enterprises. 41. For transfer pricing purposes, it would not generally be expected that a royalty would be paid in arm’s length transactions where a marketing and distribution entity obtains no rights for transfer pricing purposes in trademarks and similar intangibles other than the right to use such intangibles in distributing a branded product supplied by the entity entitled to the income derived from exploiting such intangibles. Furthermore, the royalty causes Company S’s profit margins to be consistently lower than those of independent enterprises with comparable functions performed, assets used and risks assumed during the corresponding years of similar long-term marketing and distribution arrangements. Accordingly, a transfer pricing adjustment disallowing the royalties paid would be appropriate based on the facts of this example ...

35. The facts in this example are the same as in Example 9, except that Company S now enters into a three-year royalty-free agreement to market and distribute the watches in the country Y market, with no option to renew. At the end of the three-year period, Company S does not enter into a new contract with Primair. 36. Assume that it is demonstrated that independent enterprises do enter into short-term distribution agreements where they incur marketing and distribution expenses, but only where they stand to earn a reward commensurate with the functions performed, the assets used, and the risks assumed within the time period of the contract. Evidence derived from comparable independent enterprises shows that they do not invest large sums of money in developing marketing and distribution infrastructure where they obtain only a short-term marketing and distribution agreement, with the attendant risk of non-renewal without compensation. The potential short-term nature of the marketing and distribution agreement is such that Company S could not, or may not be able to, benefit from the marketing and distribution expenditure it incurs at its own risk. The same factors mean that Company S’s efforts may well benefit Primair in the future. 37. The risks assumed by Company S are substantially higher than in Example 9 and Company S has not been compensated on an arm’s length basis for bearing these additional risks. In this case, Company S has undertaken market development activities and borne marketing expenditures beyond what comparable independent enterprises with similar rights incur for their own benefit, resulting in significantly lower profit margins for Company S than are made by comparable enterprises. The short term nature of the contract makes it unreasonable to expect that Company S has the opportunity of obtaining appropriate benefits under the contract within the limited term of the agreement with Primair. Under these circumstances, Company S is entitled to compensation for its at risk contribution to the value of the R trademark and trade name during the term of its arrangement with Primair. 38. Such compensation could take the form of direct compensation from Primair to Company S for the anticipated value created through the marketing expenditures and market development functions it has undertaken. Alternatively, such an adjustment could take the form of a reduction in the price paid by Company S to Primair for R watches during Years 1 through 3 ...

26. The facts in this example are the same as in Example 8, except as follows: Under the contract between Primair and Company S, Company S is now obligated to develop and execute the marketing plan for country Y without detailed control of specific elements of the plan by Primair. Company S bears the costs and assumes certain of the risks associated with the marketing activities. The agreement between Primair and Company S does not specify the amount of marketing expenditure Company S is expected to incur, only that Company S is required to use its best efforts to market the watches. Company S receives no direct reimbursement from Primair in respect of any expenditure it incurs, nor does it receive any other indirect or implied compensation from Primair, and Company S expects to earn its reward solely from its profit from the sale of R brand watches to third party customers in the country Y market. A thorough functional analysis reveals that Primair exercises a lower level of control over the marketing activities of Company S than in Example 8 in that it does not review and approve the marketing budget or design details of the marketing plan. Company S bears different risks and is compensated differently than was the case in Example 8. The contractual arrangements between Primair and Company S are different and the risks assumed by Company S are greater in Example 9 than in Example 8. Company S does not receive direct cost reimbursements or a separate fee for marketing activities. The only controlled transaction between Primair and Company S in Example 9 is the transfer of the branded watches. As a result, Company S can obtain its reward for its marketing activities only through selling R brand watches to third party customers. As a result of these differences, Primair and Company S adopt a lower price for watches in Example 9 than the price for watches determined for purposes of Example 8. As a result of the differences identified in the functional analysis, different criteria are used for identifying comparables and for making comparability adjustments than was the case in Example 8. This results in Company S having a greater anticipated total profit in Example 9 than in Example 8 because of its higher level of risk and its more extensive functions. 27. Assume that in Years 1 through 3, Company S embarks on a strategy that is consistent with its agreement with Primair and, in the process, performs marketing functions and incurs marketing expenses. As a result, Company S has high operating expenditures and slim margins in Years 1 through 3. By the end of Year 2, the R trademark and trade name have become established in country Y because of Company S’s efforts. Where the marketer/distributor actually bears the costs and associated risks of its marketing activities, the issue is the extent to which the marketer/distributor can share in the potential benefits from those activities. Assume that the enquiries of the country Y tax administrations conclude, based on a review of comparable distributors, that Company S would have been expected to have performed the functions it performed and incurred its actual level of marketing expense if it were independent from Primair. 28. Given that Company S performs the functions and bears the costs and associated risks of its marketing activities under a long-term contract of exclusive distribution rights for the R watches, there is an opportunity for Company S to benefit (or suffer a loss) from the marketing and distribution activities it undertakes. Based on an analysis of reasonably reliable comparable data, it is concluded that, for purposes of this example, the benefits obtained by Company S result in profits similar to those made by independent marketers and distributors bearing the same types of risks and costs as Company S in the first few years of comparable long-term marketing and distribution agreements for similarly unknown products. 29. Based on the foregoing assumptions, Company S’s return is arm’s length and its marketing activities, including its marketing expenses, are not significantly different than those performed by independent marketers and distributors in comparable uncontrolled transactions. The information on comparable uncontrolled arrangements provides the best measure of the arm’s length return earned by Company S for the contribution to intangible value provided by its functions, risks, and costs. That return therefore reflects arm’s length compensation for Company S’s contributions and accurately measures its share of the income derived from exploitation of the trademark and trade name in country Y. No separate or additional compensation is required to be provided to Company S ...

20. Primair, a resident of country X, manufactures watches which are marketed in many countries around the world under the R trademark and trade name. Primair is the registered owner of the R trademark and trade name. The R name is widely known in countries where the watches are sold and has obtained considerable economic value in those markets through the efforts of Primair. R watches have never been marketed in country Y, however, and the R name is not known in the country Y market. 21. In Year 1, Primair decides to enter the country Y market and incorporates a wholly owned subsidiary in country Y, Company S, to act as its distributor in country Y. At the same time, Primair enters into a long-term royalty-free marketing and distribution agreement with Company S. Under the agreement, Company S is granted the exclusive right to market and distribute watches bearing the R trademark and using the R trade name in country Y for a period of five years, with an option for a further five years. Company S obtains no other rights relating to the R trademark and trade name from Primair, and in particular is prohibited from re-exporting watches bearing the R trademark and trade name. The sole activity of Company S is marketing and distributing watches bearing the R trademark and trade name. It is assumed that the R watches are not part of a portfolio of products distributed by Company S in country Y. Company S undertakes no secondary processing, as it imports packaged watches into country Y ready for sale to the final customer. 22. Under the contract between Primair and Company S, Company S purchases the watches from Primair in country Y currency, takes title to the branded watches and performs the distribution function in country Y, incurs the associated carrying costs (e.g. inventory and receivables financing), and assumes the corresponding risks (e.g. inventory, credit and financing risks). Under the contract between Primair and Company S, Company S is required to act as a marketing agent to assist in developing the market for R watches in country Y. Company S consults with Primair in developing the country Y marketing strategy for R watches. Primair develops the overall marketing plan based largely on its experience in other countries, it develops and approves the marketing budgets, and it makes final decisions regarding advertising designs, product positioning and core advertising messages. Company S consults on local market issues related to advertising, assists in executing the marketing strategy under Primair’s direction, and provides evaluations of the effectiveness of various elements of the marketing strategy. As compensation for providing these marketing support activities, Company S receives from Primair a service fee based on the level of marketing expenditure it incurs and including an appropriate profit element. 23. Assume for the purpose of this example that, based upon a thorough comparability analysis, including a detailed functional analysis, it is possible to conclude that the price Company S pays Primair for the R watches should be analysed separately from the compensation Company S receives for the marketing it undertakes on behalf of Primair. Assume further that based upon identified comparable transactions, the price paid for the watches is arm’s length and that this price enables Company S to earn an arm’s length level of compensation from selling the watches for the distribution function it performs, the assets it uses and the risks it assumes. 24. In Years 1 to 3, Company S embarks on a strategy that is consistent with its agreement with Primair to develop the country Y market for R watches. In the process, Company S incurs marketing expenses. Consistent with the contract, Company S is reimbursed by Primair for the marketing expenses it incurs, and is paid a mark-up on those expenses. By the end of Year 2, the R trademark and trade name have become well established in country Y. The compensation derived by Company S for the marketing activities it performed on behalf of Primair is determined to be arm’s length, based upon comparison to that paid to independent advertising and marketing agents identified and determined to be comparable as part of the comparability analysis. 25. Under these circumstances, Primair is entitled to retain any income derived from exploiting the R trademark and trade name in the country Y market that exceeds the arm’s length compensation to Company S for its functions and no transfer pricing adjustment is warranted under the circumstances ...

16. Primero is the parent company of an MNE group engaged in the pharmaceutical business and does business in country M. Primero develops patents and other intangibles relating to Product X and registers those patents in countries around the world. 17. Primero retains its wholly owned country N subsidiary, Company S, to distribute Product X throughout Europe and the Middle East on a limited risk basis. The distribution agreement provides that Primero, and not Company S, is to bear product recall and product liability risk, and provides further that Primero will be entitled to all profit or loss from selling Product X in the territory after providing Company S with the agreed level of compensation for its distribution functions. Operating under the contract, Company S purchases Product X from Primero and resells Product X to independent customers in countries throughout its geographical area of operation. In performing its distribution functions, Company S follows all applicable regulatory requirements. 18. In the first three years of operations, Company S earns returns from its distribution functions that are consistent with its limited risk characterisation and the terms of the distribution contract. Its returns reflect the fact that Primero, and not Company S, is entitled to retain income derived from exploitation of the intangibles with respect to Product X. After three years of operation, it becomes apparent that Product X causes serious side effects in a significant percentage of those patients that use the product and it becomes necessary to recall the product and remove it from the market. Company S incurs substantial costs in connection with the recall. Primero does not reimburse Company S for these recall related costs or for the resulting product liability claims. 19. Under these circumstances, there is an inconsistency between Primero’s asserted entitlement to returns derived from exploiting the Product X intangibles and its failure to bear the costs associated with the risks supporting that assertion. A transfer pricing adjustment would be appropriate to remedy the inconsistency. In determining the appropriate adjustment, it would be necessary to determine the true transaction between the parties by applying the provisions of Section D. 1 of Chapter I. In doing so, it would be appropriate to consider the risks assumed by each of the parties on the basis of the course of conduct followed by the parties over the term of the agreement, the control over risk exercised by Primero and Company S, and other relevant facts. If it is determined that the true nature of the relationship between the parties is that of a limited risk distribution arrangement, then the most appropriate adjustment would likely take the form of an allocation of the recall and product liability related costs from Company S to Primero. Alternatively, although unlikely, if it is determined on the basis of all the relevant facts that the true nature of the relationship between the parties includes the exercising control over product liability and recall risk by Company S, and if an arm’s length price can be identified on the basis of the comparability analysis, an increase in the distribution margins of Company S for all years might be made to reflect the true risk allocation between the parties ...

The selection and application of a transfer pricing method to post-restructuring controlled transactions must derive from the analysis of the economically relevant characteristics of the controlled transaction as accurately delineated. It is essential to understand what the functions, assets and risks involved in the post-restructuring transactions are, and what party performs, uses or assumes them. This requires information to be available on the functions, assets and risks of both parties to a transaction, e.g. the restructured entity and the foreign associated enterprise with which it transacts. The analysis should go beyond the label assigned to the restructured entity, as an entity that is labelled as a “commissionnaire” or “limited risk distributor” can sometimes be found to own valuable local intangibles and to continue to assume significant market risks, and an entity that is labelled as a “contract manufacturer” can sometimes be found to pursue significant development activities or to own and use unique intangibles. In post-restructuring situations, particular attention should be paid to the identification of the valuable intangibles and the economically significant risks that effectively remain with the restructured entity (including, where applicable, local non-protected intangibles), and to whether such an allocation of intangibles and risks satisfies the arm’s length principle. The form of remuneration cannot dictate inappropriate risk allocations. It is the determination of how the parties actually control risks, and whether they have the financial capacity to assume the risks, as set out in the process of analysing risk in Chapter I, which will determine the assumption of risks by the parties, and consequently dictate the selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method. Issues regarding risks and intangibles are discussed in Part I of this chapter ...

Where a restructuring involves a transfer to a foreign associated enterprise of risks that were previously assumed by a taxpayer, it may be important to examine whether the transfer of risks only concerns the future risks that will arise from the post-restructuring activities or also the risks existing at the time of the restructuring as a result of pre-conversion activities, i.e. there is a cut-off issue. For instance, consider a situation in which a distributor was assuming bad debt risks which it will no longer assume after its being restructured as a “limited risk distributor”, and that it is being compared with a long-established “limited risk distributor” that never assumed bad debt risk. It may be important when comparing both situations to examine, based on the guidance in Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I, whether the “limited risk distributor” that results from a conversion still assumes the risks associated with bad debts that arose before the restructuring at the time it was full-fledged, or whether all the bad debt risks including those that existed at the time of the conversion were transferred ...

When one compares a situation where a long-established full-fledged distributor is converted into a limited risk distributor with a situation where a limited risk distributor has been in existence in the market for the same duration, there might also be differences because the full-fledged distributor may have performed some functions, borne some expenses (e.g. marketing expenses), assumed some risks and contributed to the development of some intangibles before its conversion that the long-existing “limited risk distributor” may not have performed, borne, assumed or contributed to. The question arises whether at arm’s length such additional functions, assets and risks should only affect the remuneration of the distributor before its being converted, whether they should be taken into account to determine a remuneration of the transfers that take place upon the conversion (and if so how), whether they should affect the remuneration of the restructured limited risk distributor (and if so how), or a combination of these three possibilities. For instance, if it is found that the pre-restructuring activities led the full-fledged distributor to own some intangibles while the long-established limited risk distributor does not, the arm’s length principle may require these intangibles either to be remunerated upon the restructuring if they are transferred by the full-fledged distributor to a foreign associated enterprise, or to be taken into account in the determination of the arm’s length remuneration of the post-restructuring activities if they are not transferred (see Section E.2 of Part I above and Chapter VI of these Guidelines) ...

Some differences in the starting position of the restructured entity compared to the position of a newly set up operation can relate to the established presence of the operation. For instance, if one compares a situation where a long-established full-fledged distributor is converted into a limited risk distributor with a situation where a limited risk distributor is established in a market where the group did not have any previous commercial presence, market penetration efforts might be needed for the new entrant which are not needed for the converted entity. This may affect the comparability analysis and the determination of the arm’s length remuneration in both situations ...

Where an arrangement between associated enterprises replaces an existing arrangement (restructuring), there may be factual differences in the starting position of the restructured entity compared to the position of a newly set up operation. Sometimes, the post-restructuring arrangement is negotiated between parties that have had prior contractual and commercial relationships. In such a situation, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case and in particular on the rights and obligations derived by the parties from these prior arrangements, this may affect the options realistically available to the parties in negotiating the terms of the new arrangement and therefore the conditions of the restructuring and of the post-restructuring arrangements (see paragraphs 9.27-9.31 for a discussion of options realistically available in the context of determining the arm’s length compensation for the restructuring itself). For instance, assume a party has proved in the past to be able to perform well as a full-fledged distributor performing a whole range of marketing and selling functions, employing and developing valuable marketing intangible assets and assuming a range of risks associated with its activity such as inventory risks, bad debt risks and market risks. Assume that its distribution contract is re-negotiated and converted into a “limited risk distribution” contract whereby it will perform limited marketing activities under the supervision of a foreign associated enterprise, employ limited marketing intangibles and assume limited risks in its relationship with the foreign associated enterprise and customers. In such a situation, the restructured distributor would not be in the same position as a newly established distributor ...

In particular, in the case of the conversion of a full-fledged distributor into, for example, a limited risk distributor or commissionnaire, it may be important to examine whether the distributor has developed local marketing intangibles over the years prior to its being restructured and if so, what the nature and the value of these intangibles are, and whether they were transferred to an associated enterprise. Where such local intangibles are found to be in existence and to be transferred to a foreign associated enterprise, the arm’s length principle should apply to determine whether and if so how to compensate such a transfer, based on what would be agreed between independent parties in comparable circumstances. In this regard it is relevant to note that the transferor should receive arm’s length compensation (in addition to the arm’s length compensation for the transferred intangibles) when after the restructuring it continues to perform functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of the local intangible transferred (see Section B.2. 1 of Chapter VI). On the other hand, where such local intangibles are found to be in existence and to remain in the restructured entity, they should be taken into account in the functional analysis of the post-restructuring activities. They may accordingly influence the selection and application of the most appropriate transfer pricing method for the post-restructuring controlled transactions, in order that appropriate compensation can be determined ...

Where a local full-fledged operation is converted into an operation assuming limited risk, using limited intangibles and receiving low remuneration, the questions arise of whether this conversion entails the transfer by the restructured local entity to a foreign associated enterprise of valuable intangibles or rights in intangibles and whether there are local intangibles that remain with the local operation ...

At arm’s length, the response is likely to depend on the rights and other assets of the parties, on the profit potential of the distributor and of its associated enterprise in relation to both business models (full-fledged and low risk distributor) as well as the expected duration of the new arrangement. In particular, in evaluating profit potential, it is necessary to evaluate whether historic profits (determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle) are an indicator of future profit potential, or whether there have been changes in the business environment around the time of the restructuring that mean that past performance is not an indicator of profit potential. For example, competing products could have the effect of eroding profitability, and new technology or consumer preferences could render the products less attractive. The consideration of these factors from perspective of the distributor can be illustrated with the following example ...

As another example, assume a full-fledged distributor is operating under a long term contractual arrangement for a given type of transaction. Assume that, based on its rights under the long term contract with respect to these transactions, it has the option realistically available to it to accept or refuse being converted into a limited risk distributor operating for a foreign associated enterprise, and that an arm’s length remuneration for such a low risk distribution activity is estimated to be a stable profit of +2% per year while the excess profit potential associated with the risks would now be attributed to the foreign associated enterprise. Assume for the purpose of this example that the restructuring leads to the renegotiation of the existing contractual arrangements, but it does not entail the transfer of assets other than its rights under the long term contract. From the perspective of the distributor, the question arises as to whether the new arrangement (taking into account both the remuneration for the post-restructuring transactions and any compensation for the restructuring itself) is expected to make it as well off as its realistic – albeit riskier – alternatives. If not, this would imply that the post-restructuring arrangement is not priced at arm’s length and that additional compensation would be needed to appropriately remunerate the distributor for the restructuring, or that an assessment of the commercial rationality of the transaction based on Section D.2 may be necessary. Furthermore, for transfer pricing purposes, it is important to determine whether risks contractually transferred as part of the business restructuring, are assumed by the foreign associated enterprise in accordance with the guidance in Section D. 1 of Chapter I ...

For instance, where a full-fledged distributor is converted into a limited-risk distributor or commissionnaire resulting in the reduction or elimination of risks relating to inventory in the restructured enterprise, in order to determine whether such risk is economically significant the tax administration may want to analyse: The role of inventory in the business model (for example, speed to market, comprehensive range), The nature of the inventory (for example, spare parts, fresh flowers), The level of investment in inventory, The factors giving rise to inventory write-downs or obsolescence (for example, perishability, pricing pressures, speed of technical improvements, market conditions), The history of write-down and stock obsolescence, and whether any commercial changes affect the reliability of historic performance as an indicator of current risk, The cost of insuring against damage or loss of inventory, and The history of damage or loss (if uninsured) ...

A second example relates to the purported transfer of credit risk as part of a business restructuring. The analysis under Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I would take into account the contractual terms before and after the restructuring, but would also examine how the parties operate in relation to the risk before and after the restructuring. The analysis would then examine whether the party that contractually assumes the risk controls the risk in practice through relevant capability and decision-making as defined in paragraph 1.65 and has the financial capacity to assume such risk as defined in paragraph 1.64. It is important to note that a party that before the restructuring did not assume a risk under the analysis of Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I cannot transfer it to another party, and a party that after the restructuring does not assume a risk under the analysis of Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I should not be allocated the profit potential associated with that risk. For example, suppose that before a business restructuring, a full-fledged distributor contractually assumes bad debt risks, which is reflected in the balance sheet at year end. However, the analysis described above establishes that before the business restructuring, decisions about the extension of credit terms to customers and debt recovery were taken by an associated enterprise and not by the distributor, and the associated enterprise reimbursed the costs of irrecoverable debts. It is also determined that the associated enterprise is the only entity that controlled the risk and had the financial capacity to assume the bad debt risk, leading to the conclusion that, before the business restructuring, the risk was not assumed by the distributor. In such a case there is no bad debt risk for the distributor to transfer as part of the business restructuring. In other circumstances it may be found that before the business restructuring the distributor controlled the bad debt risk and had the financial capacity to assume the risk it contractually assumed, but mitigated its risk through indemnification arrangements or debt factoring arrangements with an associated enterprise in exchange for appropriate compensation. Following the business restructuring, the bad debt risk is contractually assumed by that associated enterprise which, as determined under the analysis described above, now controls the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk. The risk has, therefore been transferred but the impact on the profits of the distributor going forward compared with the past resulting from the transfer of this risk alone may be limited, because before the restructuring steps had been taken and costs incurred to mitigate the risk outcomes of the distributor ...

Risks are of critical importance in the context of business restructurings. Usually, in the open market, the assumption of risk associated with a commercial opportunity affects the profit potential of that opportunity, and the allocation of risk assumed between the parties to the arrangement affects how profits or losses resulting from the transaction are allocated through the arm’s length pricing of the transaction. Business restructurings often result in local operations being converted into low risk operations (e.g. “low risk distributors”, or “low risk contract manufacturers”) and being remunerated with a relatively low (but generally stable) return on the grounds that the economically significant risks are assumed by another party to which the profits or losses associated with those risks are allocated. For this reason, an examination of the allocation of risks between associated enterprises before and after the restructuring is an essential part of the functional analysis. Such analysis should allow tax administrations to assess the transfer of the economically significant risks of the business that is restructured and the consequences of that transfer for the application of the arm’s length principle to the restructuring itself and to the post-restructuring transactions ...

Restructurings can take a variety of different forms and may involve two or more members of an MNE group. For example, a simple pre-restructuring arrangement could involve a full-fledged manufacturer producing goods and selling them to an associated full-fledged distributor for on-sale into the market. The restructuring could involve a modification to that two-party arrangement, whereby the distributor is converted to a limited risk distributor or commissionnaire, with risks previously assumed by the full-fledged distributor being assumed by the manufacturer (taking into account the guidance in Section D. 1 of Chapter I. Frequently, the restructuring will be more complicated, with functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by either or both parties to a pre-restructuring arrangement shifting to one or more members of the group ...

For example, a tested party engaged in the marketing and distribution of goods purchased in controlled transactions may have developed marketing intangibles in its geographic area of operation, including customer lists, customer relationships, and customer data. It may also have developed advantageous logistical know-how or software and other tools that it uses in conducting its distribution business. The impact of such intangibles on the profitability of the tested party should be considered in conducting a comparability analysis ...

In a transfer pricing analysis where the most appropriate transfer pricing method is the resale price method, the cost-plus method, or the transactional net margin method, the less complex of the parties to the controlled transaction is often selected as the tested party. In many cases, an arm’s length price or level of profit for the tested party can be determined without the need to value the intangibles used in connection with the transaction. That would generally be the case where only the non-tested party uses intangibles. In some cases, however, the tested party may in fact use intangibles notwithstanding its relatively less complex operations. Similarly, parties to potentially comparable uncontrolled transactions may use intangibles. Where either of these is the case, it becomes necessary to consider the intangibles used by the tested party and by the parties to potentially comparable uncontrolled transactions as one comparability factor in the analysis ...

This section provides supplemental guidance for applying the rules of Chapters I – III in situations where one or both parties to a controlled transaction uses intangibles in connection with the sale of goods or the provision of services, but where no transfer of intangibles or interests in intangibles occurs. Where intangibles are present, the transfer pricing analysis must carefully consider the effect of the intangibles involved on the prices and other conditions of controlled transactions ...

The need to consider the use of intangibles by a party to a controlled transaction involving a sale of goods can be illustrated as follows. Assume that a car manufacturer uses valuable proprietary patents to manufacture the cars that it then sells to associated distributors. Assume that the patents significantly contribute to the value of the cars. The patents and the value they contribute should be identified and taken into account in the comparability analysis of the transaction consisting in the sales of cars by the car manufacturer to its associated distributors, in selecting the most appropriate transfer pricing method for the transactions, and in selecting the tested party. The associated distributors purchasing the cars do not, however, acquire any right in the manufacturer’s patents. In such a case, the patents are used in the manufacturing and may affect the value of the cars, but the patents themselves are not transferred ...

The resale price method begins with the price at which a product that has been purchased from an associated enterprise is resold to an independent enterprise. This price (the resale price) is then reduced by an appropriate gross margin on this price (the “resale price margin”) representing the amount out of which the reseller would seek to cover its selling and other operating expenses and, in the light of the functions performed (taking into account assets used and risks assumed), make an appropriate profit. What is left after subtracting the gross margin can be regarded, after adjustment for other costs associated with the purchase of the product (e.g. customs duties), as an arm’s length price for the original transfer of property between the associated enterprises. This method is probably most useful where it is applied to marketing operations ...

“Yogo Food-Distributor” is a subsidiary in the “Yogo Group” and trades in spices and canned meat and vegetables from the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The main sales markets are Austria and Germany (90%), the remainder being distributed among France, Scandinavia, Great Britain and the Benelux countries. Following an audit the tax authorities issued an assessment of additional taxable income determined by way of a benchmark study into comparable businesses. Yogo Food Distributor was of the opinion that the benchmark-study did not comply with the OECD guidelines in regards of comparability factors and filed a complaint with the Court. Judgement of the Court The contested notices (corporate income tax notices for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012, each dated 13 October 2014) and the preliminary appeal decision (dated 22 September 2017) are annulled pursuant to section 278(1) BAO and the matter is referred back to the tax authority. Excerpt “In order to be able to assess the arm’s length nature of these agreements and the payments made on the basis of these agreements, it is necessary to investigate the following issues: – First, in the sense of a function and risk analysis, it must be determined which assets were used in the context of the complainant’s business activities and which risks it had to bear, in each case in relation to the years in dispute. The contract of 13 December 2002 states that the complainant had “no suppliers/customers or the necessary financial resources”. On the other hand, within the EU, it could provide “warehouse management, logistics, personal customer care, contact with forwarding agents, etc.”. It will “endeavour to explore sales-promoting ideas or identify new products that meet market demand and implement them in agreement with the O-AG”. The O-AG is obliged to “establish the first contact with the customer or to sell the goods on the Western European market”. Financial support is also promised. In payment transactions, the complainant is to act as invoicing party, but all payment flows are to go through O-AG’s accounts. – There are no findings as to which concrete tasks and activities the complainant actually fulfilled or carried out from 2002 onwards and whether the actual circumstances (the conduct of business, the distribution of tasks between the complainant and O-AG, the contracting parties’ powers and possibilities of disposition) still corresponded in the years in dispute to those at the time of the conclusion of the contract in 2002. – With regard to the Supplementary Agreement I-2010 of 26 January 2010, it must be determined which of the economic aspects cited (cost increases in sales, unchanged or reduced sales prices, increased customer bonuses) are suitable to justify a change in the amount of the commission for an individual business year in advance in view of the actual economic relations of the contracting parties (business handling, distribution of tasks, powers and possibilities of disposition) between the complainant and O-AG. – With regard to Supplementary Agreement II-2010 of 26 January 2010, it must be determined which “economic circumstances” justify the granting of a lump-sum support contribution and from which an “increased need for marketing activities and listing expenses” results, this again for a single business year in advance. – With regard to the Supplementary Agreement I-2011 of 29 March 2011, it must be determined, taking into account the results of the functional and risk analysis, to what extent the actual economic circumstances between the complainant and O-AG changed at the time of the conclusion of this agreement compared to those in 2002 (conclusion of the agreement of 13 December 2002). 12.2002), taking into account the wording in the supplementary agreement: “…The complainant thus acts as the successor supplier of Y-Deutschland customers, Y-Deutschland delivers/invoices to the complainant. All expenses/income relating to the change of distribution or the subsequent distribution are for the account/benefit of [the complainant]. O-AG assumes any existing debtor risk at the time of the sales conversion. …” Furthermore, it has to be determined which “imminent additional expenses with regard to marketing activities” are suitable to justify the waiver of the contractually agreed commission “in connection with all sales of the Y-Germany business” and a reduction of the commission (obviously meant – for the remaining sales) for a single business year in advance, this taking into account the complaint’s allegations regarding the take-over of the distribution “of Markte M for the markets Germany, Benelux and France”. In this context, the results of the investigations which led the tax office to qualify these transactions as the “purchase of a distribution area” (preliminary appeal decision) must also be mentioned. – With regard to the Supplementary Agreement I-2012 of 9 January 2012, it must be determined, taking into account the results of the functional and risk analysis, to what extent the “need for increased sales promotion measures” or a product range expansion for an upcoming business period are suitable to justify a lump sum payment of EUR 250,000 from the complainant. Insofar as the tax office, based on the results of the investigation, comes to the conclusion that the contractual agreements concluded by the complainant with O-AG stand up to an arm’s length comparison, findings are to be made, based on corresponding investigations and in compliance with the right to be heard of the parties, as to the extent to which the conclusions on the arm’s length nature of the commission amount, which were apparently drawn from the database studies in the administrative files submitted, are still considered viable, taking into account the results of the functional and risk analysis to be carried out and taking into account the objections of the complainant.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Austria GZ RV-3100163-2018 ...

Sabic India Pvt Ltd was primarily engaged in providing marketing support services to facilitate the selling of fertilizers and chemicals in India on behalf of the Sabic Group holding company. The Indian company did not hold any title to inventories and all products sold were directly invoiced to the holding companies of the taxpayer. To determine the arm’s length remuneration for marketing support services Sabic India Pvt Ltd found that the TNMM was the most appropriate method The tax authorities disagreed and instead held that the CUP method was more appropriate. On that basis an assessment was issued. Judgement of the Tax Appellate Tribunal The Tribunal decided in favor of Sabic India Pvt Ltd and set aside the tax assessment. The Tribunal held that the TNMM cannot be discarded without any valid justification as the method was widely accepted by the Indian revenue since 2009. The Tribunal concluded that the tax authorities were not able to provide any justification for its decision that the methodology was not suitable. Excerpt “Considering the facts of the case in hand in totality in the light of the judicial decisions mentioned here in above we are of the considered view that the lower authorities should have accepted TNMM as the most appropriate method on the business profile qua the international transaction of the assessee as was accepted in A.Y.2009-10 to 2014-15. We accordingly direct the AO/ TPO to delete the TP adjustment of Rs.361320620/- appeal filed by the assessee is accordingly allowed.” Click here for other translation INdia vs Sabic_India_Pvt_Ltd_Gurgaon New_Delhi_on_8_June_2021 ...

A Oy was part of the A group, whose parent company was A Corporation, a US corporation. A Oy had acted as the group’s limited risk distribution company in Finland. The transfer prices of the group companies had been determined on a mark-to-market basis using the net transaction margin method and the group companies’ operating profit on a mark-to-market basis had been determined on the basis of US GAAP, the accounting standard commonly applied within the group. The target profit level for the group’s limited risk distribution companies, including A Ltd, was set at 0,5 % in the group’s transfer pricing documentation, based on a comparables analysis. In 2011, the competent authorities of the countries of residence of the A Group’s European manufacturing companies had entered into an Advance Transfer Pricing Agreement (APA) under which transfer pricing is monitored in accordance with the Group’s common accounting standard, US GAAP, and the market-based operating profit level for the limited risk distributors is 0.5%. The tax authorities in the countries of residence of certain European limited risk distributors had also issued rulings approving a profit level of 0.5% for local distributors. A Ltd had made a deduction in its 2011 financial statements to adjust its 2010 operating profit level to match the profit level under A Group’s transfer pricing principles. The company had filed a corrected tax return for the 2010 tax year, in which the adjustment was reported as a deduction from taxable income. When the company’s tax return for the 2010 tax year had been resubmitted, the Tax Administration had considered that the company had to achieve a level of operating profit in line with market conditions on the basis of financial statements prepared in accordance with Finnish accounting legislation. In addition, the Tax Administration had removed from the comparators in the comparison file submitted by the company those peer companies whose reported annual operating profit levels had been lower than or equal to 0 %. The tax administration had set the company’s normal market operating profit at 1 %. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the level of A Oy’s arm’s length profit could be determined on the basis of US GAAP accounting standards, since the A group generally prepared its financial statements in accordance with these accounting standards and since the group monitored transfer pricing on the basis of the accounts kept in accordance with US GAAP accounting standards. The Supreme Administrative Court also considered that the prior transfer pricing agreement between the competent authorities of the countries of residence of the European manufacturing companies of the A group and the decisions of the tax authorities of the countries of residence of the other limited risk distribution companies had to be given probative value. In addition to these considerations, taking into account that loss-making peers that meet the conditions of the comparability analysis are not to be rejected merely because they suffer losses, the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed that the 0,5 % profit determined for A Ltd under US GAAP was, in the circumstances of the present case, at arm’s length. The Supreme Administrative Court did not immediately take up the issue of how to calculate the taxable income of A Oy when the company’s US GAAP profit for the financial year 2010 was 0,5 %, but annulled the decisions of the Administrative Court and the Tax Adjustment Board and the resubmitted tax return for the tax year 2010 and remitted the case to the Tax Administration for reconsideration. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation KHO2021-73ORG ...

A Korean subsidiary in the “Semiconductor-group” was active in distribution and sales services. At issue was which transfer pricing method was the most appropriate for determining the arm’s length remuneration for these activities in FY 2013. Judgement of the Court The Court dismissed the claims of the company and upheld the decision of the tax authorities. Excerpt “However, the following circumstances that can be comprehensively acknowledged in the foregoing evidence and description in Evidence A No. 21, namely, (1) OECD Transfer Price Taxation Guidelines 2.101 stipulate that in order for a Gross Margin Ratio to be applied, a taxpayer shall not perform other important functions (manufacturing functions, etc.) that must be compensated using other transfer price methods or financial indicators in a related transaction, which are very sensitive to cost classification, such as operating expenses and other expenses, and thus may cause problems of comparability and irrelevant costs; and (2) Charles H. Berry, which devised the Gross Margin Method of the Transactional Net Margin Method, stated in the paper “Berry Ratios” that, in a case where a company performs other functions in addition to simple sales activities, the distinction between the cost of sales and the cost of operations is unclear and thus the gross margin ratio of sales can be artificially changed, and thus the Gross Margin Method of the Transactional Net Margin Method may not be applied. (3) Although the Plaintiff may perform a service installation and guarantee business, part sales business, in light of the above laws, it is difficult to apply the gross profit margin method among the transactional net margin methods to the Plaintiff’s sales support service transactions (even if the gross profit margin method among the Transactional Net Margin Methods can be applied, as the Plaintiff claims, the following circumstances that can comprehensively acknowledge the purpose of the entire pleadings in each of the descriptions of A Nos. 18 and 19, that is, (1), the codes of 508 companies extracted by the Plaintiff according to the industrial classification codes of the Korean Standard Industrial Classification are “46539: Other industrial machinery and equipment wholesale business, 46592: Medical, Precision and Scientific Equipment wholesale business, 46594: Machinery and equipment for electricity, wholesale business, 46599, and other wholesale business,” (1) In the case of the Plaintiff’s direct comparison of the technical support services and the wholesale business of the Plaintiff, which can be directly determined by the method (1) Four comparable companies were selected, and the difference in the degree of holding inventory assets, trade receivables, and purchase obligations was adjusted for comparability. Considering the characteristics of the Plaintiff in which inventory assets, trade receivables, and purchase obligations do not exist, it is difficult to deem that such adjustment is an ordinary net profit margin that can be generally accepted. Therefore, we do not accept the Plaintiff’s allegation in this part.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Korea 270521 ...

The US group, Avery Dennison, manufactures and distributes labelling and packaging materials in more than 50 countries around the world. The remuneration of the distribution and marketing activities performed Avery Dennison Chile S.A. had been determined to be at arm’s length by application of a “full range” analysis. Furthermore, surplus capital from the local company had been placed at the group’s financial centre in Luxembourg, Avery Management KGAA, at an interest rate of 0,79% (12-month Libor). According the tax authorities in Chile the remuneration of the local company had not been at arm’s length, and the interest rate paid by the related party in Luxembourg had been to low. Judgement of the Tax Tribunal The Tribunal decided in favour of Avery Dennison Chile S.A. “Hence, the Respondent [tax authorities] failed to prove its allegations that the marketing operations carried out by the taxpayer during the 2012 business year with related parties not domiciled or resident in Chile do not conform to normal market prices between unrelated parties..” “Although the OECD Guidelines recommend the use of the interquartile range as a reliable statistical tool (point 3.57), or, in cases of selection of the most appropriate point of the range “the median” (point 3.61), its application is not mandatory in the national tax administration…” “the Claimant [taxpayer]carried out two financing operations with its related company Avery Management KGAA, domiciled in Luxembourg, which contains one of the treasury centres of the “Avery Dennison” conglomerate, where the taxpayer granted two loans for US $3.200.000.- in 2010 and another for US $1.1000.000.- in 2011.” “In relation to the financial transactions, the transfer pricing methodology used and the interests agreed by the plaintiff have been confirmed. Consequently, Assessment No. 210, dated 30 August 2016, should be annulled and, consequently, this Tax and Customs Court will uphold the claim presented in these proceedings.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation CH vs Avery Dennison 16-9-0001493-0 ...

A fully fledged Norwegian distributor in the H group was restructured and converted into a Limited risk distributor. The tax authorities issued an assessment where the income of the Norwegian distributor was adjusted to the median in a benchmark study prepared by the tax authorities, based on the “Transactional Net Margin Method” (TNMM method). Decision of the Tax Board In a majority decision, the Tax Board determined that the case should be send back to the tax administration for further processing. Excerpt “…The majority agrees with the tax office that deficits over time may give reason to investigate whether the intra-group prices are set on market terms. However, the case is not sufficiently informed for the tribunal to take a final position on this. In order to determine whether the income has been reduced as a result of incorrect pricing of intra-group transactions and debits, it is necessary to analyze the agreed prices and contract terms. A comparability analysis will be needed, cf. OECD TPG Chapter III, including especially OECD TPG Section 3.4. to be able to determine whether the intra-group prices have been at arm’s length. When analysing the controlled transactions and identifying possible comparable uncontrolled transactions, reference must be made to the comparability factors as instructed in OECD TPG section 1.36. A functional analysis must be performed to identify which party to the contractual relationship is to form the basis for the choice of pricing method in accordance with OECD TPG clause 3.4, step 3, as well as a market analysis to identify how this may affect the price in the controlled transactions. See OECD TPG Section 3.7, step 2. In the majority’s view, the tax office is closest to making the necessary analyzes and assessments of the above matters. The majority therefore believes that the decision should be revoked and sent back to the tax office for possible new processing, cf. the Tax Administration Act § 13-7 (3).” Click here for translation Spørsmål om inntekten til selskapet er ...

When considering the risks assumed by a party to a controlled transaction, tax administrations should carefully consider the commercial rationale for any purported change in the risks assumed by a party before and after the outbreak of COVID-19 (and taking into consideration the accurate delineation of such purported change). In particular, concerns may arise where before the outbreak of COVID-19 a taxpayer argues that a “limited-risk” distributor did not assume any marketplace risk and hence was only entitled to a low return, but after the outbreak argues that the same distributor assumes some marketplace risk (for example, due to changes in risk management functions) and hence should be allocated In this scenario, consideration should be given to re-examining whether prior to the outbreak of COVID-19 the “limited-risk” distributor genuinely did not assume any marketplace risk, whether after the outbreak the “limited risk” distributor did not actually assume any marketplace risk, and/or whether the assumption of this risk following the outbreak of COVID-19 is a result of a business restructuring. If a prior risk allocation is recognised under an accurate delineation, in order for a reallocation of that risk to be recognised under a subsequent updated accurate delineation, such new risk allocation must be supported by an analysis of all the facts and circumstances and relevant evidence should be obtained and documented to substantiate the position. In this respect, the guidance in Chapter IX of the OECD TPG may be relevant. In general, consideration should be given to whether a taxpayer is taking inconsistent positions pre- and post- pandemic and, if so, whether either position is consistent with the accurate delineation of the transaction ...

In determining whether or not a “limited-risk” entity may incur losses, the risks assumed by an entity will be particularly important. This reflects the fact that at arm’s length, the allocation of risks between the parties to an arrangement affects how profits or losses resulting from the transaction are allocated.23 For example, where there is a significant decline in demand due to COVID-19, a “limited-risk” distributor (classified as such, for example, based on limited inventory ownership – such as through the use of “flash title” and drop-shipping – and therefore limited risk of inventory obsolescence) that assumes some marketplace risk (based on the accurate delineation of the transaction) may at arm’s length earn a loss associated with the playing out of this risk. The extent of the loss that may be earned at arm’s length will be determined by the conditions and the economically relevant characteristics of the accurately delineated transaction compared to those of comparable uncontrolled transactions, including application of the most appropriate transfer pricing method and following the guidance in Chapter II of this note and Chapters II and III of the OECD TPG. In the example provided in this paragraph, the TNMM or potentially the resale- minus method depending on the more detailed facts and circumstances, might be used as the most appropriate method to test the arm’s length nature of the return, and third party comparable distributors might in these circumstances earn a loss, which may, for example, arise if the decline in demand means that the value of sales is insufficient to cover local fixed costs. It should be noted that the comparables chosen should be suitable in light of the accurate delineation of the transaction, in particular with reference to the risks assumed by each of the counterparties to the transaction. However, it will not be appropriate for a “limited-risk” distributor that does not assume any marketplace risk or another specific risk to bear a portion of the loss associated with the playing out of that risk. For instance, a “limited risk” distributor that does not assume credit risk should not bear losses derived from the playing out of the credit risk. For this reason, when determining whether an entity operating under limited risk arrangements can sustain losses the guidance in Chapter I of the OECD TPG, particularly as it relates to the analysis of risks in commercial or financial relations,24 will be particularly relevant. 23 Paragraph 1.58 of Chapter I of the OECD TPG. 24  Paragraphs 1.56 -1.106 of Chapter I of the OECD TPG ...

In all circumstances it will be necessary to consider the specific facts and circumstances when determining whether a so-called “limited-risk” entity could incur losses at arm’s length. This is reflected in the OECD TPG which states that “simple or low risk functions in particular are not expected to generate losses for a long period of time”,22 and therefore holds open the possibility that simple or low risk functions may incur losses in the short-run. In particular, when examining the specific facts and circumstances, the analysis should be informed by the accurate delineation of the transaction and the performance of a robust comparability analysis. For example, where the losses incurred by third parties reflect a level of risks that is not comparable to the one assumed by the taxpayer in its controlled transaction then such a comparable should be excluded from the list of comparables (see paragraph 3.65 of the OECD TPG). 22  Paragraph 3.64 of Chapter III of the OECD TPG ...

When performing transfer pricing analyses, the activities performed by an entity may lead it to be characterised as “limited-risk” where it has a relatively lower level of functions and risks. 20 Though the term “limited-risk” is commonly used, since the term is not defined in the OECD TPG, the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by “limited-risk” entities vary, and therefore it is not possible to establish a general rule that entities so-described should or should not incur losses. It should also be noted that neither the mere labelling of activities as “limited-risk” nor the fact that an entity receives a fixed remuneration means by itself that an entity operates on a limited risk basis in a controlled transaction.21 Further, no supposition should be made regarding the most appropriate transfer pricing method to apply in any set of circumstances without first undertaking a full and accurate delineation of the transaction, which then will help inform the choice of method made when performing the appropriate comparability analysis. 20 Paragraph 9.2 of Chapter IX of the OECD TPG. 21  Paragraph 1.81 of Chapter I of the OECD TPG ...

The issue in the case before the Supreme Administrative Court was whether an Irish company had a PE in France in a situation where employees of a French company in the same group carried out marketing, representation, management, back office and administrative assistance services on behalf of the group. The following facts were used to substantiate the presence of a French PE: French employees negotiated the terms of contracts and were involved in drafting certain contractual clauses with the customers. Contracts were automatically signed by the Irish company – whether this action corresponded to a simple validation of the contracts negotiated and drawn up by the managers and employees in France. Local advertising programs were developed and monitored by employees in France. French employees acted to third parties as employees of the Irish company. Customers did not distinguish between the Irish and the French company. In a 2018 decision the Administrative Court had found that none of these factors established that employees in France had been authorized to act on behalf of and in the name of the Irish company. The Administrative Court instead based the decision on whether contracts could be entered and services could be rendered without prior approval of the contracts by the Irish parent entity. The Court concluded that French employees could not commit its Irish principal contractually and services could not be rendered until the customer contract had been approved by the Irish company. The Supreme Administrative Court (CAA) overturned the decision of the Administrative Court. “...it is clear from the documents in the file submitted to the trial judges that the French company has the human resources to enable it to provide the services of the Irish company independently, in particular the human resources to enable it to decide to conclude a contract with an advertiser for the provision of services operated by the Irish company.” “…the French company must be regarded as having the appropriate technical resources to make it possible for the Irish company to provide the services autonomously, even though no data center used to carry out the linking functions is located in France, nor, for that matter, in Ireland.” On the issue of permanent establishment, see also the French Zimmer decision from 2010 and the later Google decision from 2017. Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation France vs Valueclick CAA DEC2020 ...

Software A/S was a fully fledged Danish distributor of software an related services up until 2010 where the company was converted into a commissionaire dealing on behalf of a newly established sales and marketing hub in Switzerland. Following an audit, the Danish tax authorities issued a assessment where additional taxable income from the transfer of intangibles to Switzerland in 2010 had been determined by application of the DCF valuation model. As no transfer pricing documentation had been prepared on the transfer, the assessment was issued on a discretionary basis. Software A/S filed a complaint to the Danish Tax Court. The Tax Court found that the tax authorities did not have the authority to make a discretionary assessment. It was emphasized that the company in its transfer pricing documentation had described the relevant circumstances for the restructuring. Furthermore, the company had analyzed functions and risks and prepared comparability analyzes for transactions before and after the restructuring. However, the Tax Court found that the authorities had proved that during the restructuring, valuable intangible assets had been transferred, which were to be priced in accordance with Danish arm’s length provisions. For this purpose, the Tax Court applied the valuation model prepared by the tax authorities, but where the expected useful life of the assets was limited to only 10 years – and not indefinite as determined by the authorities – resulting in a lower value. Click here for other translation DK vs Software Distributor September 2020 ...

At issue in this case was the remuneration of a Polish manufacturing subsidiary in an international group dealing in the production and sale of metal packaging for food products, including beverage cans, food cans, household cans and metal lids for jars etc. The Polish tax authorities had issued an tax assessment for FY 2009 – 2012 based on a TNMM benchmark study where financial results of comparable independent manufactures operating in the packaging industry showed that the the Polish manufacturing site had underestimated revenues obtained from the sale of goods to related entities The Court of first instance held in favor of the tax authorities. The case was then brought before the Administrative Court of Appeal. In the Court’s view, the authorities did not subject the case to thorough verification in accordance with the legal standards on which the decision was based – including, in particular, the analysis of comparable transactions (CUP’s). In the Court’s opinion, the authorities have illegally equated the fact of the loss achieved by the applicant with the data resulting from the general financial ratios for the entire activity of the applicant in 2013. The economic rationality of the transaction should be assessed, in the opinion of the Court, through the prism of the benefit that a specific entity may obtain from the transaction and not in relation to general financial ratios of the compared entities covering the entirety of their activity for a given year. For as long as the tax authority does not prove that the difference in price conditions was only for the purpose of tax avoidance and did not result from economic conditions, the abovementioned Article 11 cannot be applied (cf. glossary to the judgment of the Supreme Court of 22 April 1999, Case No III RN 184/98, OSP 2000, No 5, p. 264). Click here for translation Poland vs C group August 2020 ...

“G Pharma Ltd” is a distributor of generic and specialised pharmaceutical products purchased exclusively from affiliated suppliers. It has no significant intangible assets nor does it assume any significant risks. However for 17 consecutive years it has had losses. Following an audit, the tax authorities issued an assessment, where the income of G Pharma Ltd was determined by application of the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM). According to the tax authorities a limited risk distributor such as G Pharma Ltd would be expected to be compensated with a small, guaranteed, positive profitability. G Pharma Ltd disagreed with the assessment and filed an appeal. Judgement of the Court The court dismissed the appeal of G Pharma Ltd and upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Excerpts “First, the reasons for the rejection of the final comparable sample of two companies were set out in detail and then the reasons for using the net profit margin as an appropriate indicator of profitability for the chosen method of documenting intra-group transactions were documented in a clear and substantiated manner, citing the relevant OECD guidelines, in order to establish whether or not the principle of equidistance was respected. Subsequently, since the claim concerning the inclusion of the company ……………………. in the final sample of comparable companies was accepted, the calculations of the arm’s length thresholds were provided in order to assess whether or not the arm’s length principle was respected. Following the above, the method of calculation of the resulting difference due to the non-respect of the arm’s length principle in the intra-group invoicing of the applicant’s transactions with the related companies of the group was analysed. Consequently, the applicant’s claims in respect of the first plea in law of the application are not upheld and are rejected as unfounded in law and in substance. Because the applicant itself, as documented in detail in the documentation file, arrived at the above method of documentation, which it nevertheless applied on incorrect bases. The choice of the gross profit margin as an appropriate indicator of profitability is incorrect as it is not provided for in the OECD guidelines” “based on the above, it would be expected that it would be compensated with a small, guaranteed, positive profitability. Instead, the picture it presents over time is one of a company with consistently disproportionately high losses from inception to the present day beyond any notion of business sense or contrary to normal commercial transactions, which demonstrates the need to adjust its intragroup pricing given the fact that all of its purchases and a significant portion of its operating expenses are intragroup transactions. Since the applicant’s claim that ‘in calculating the adjustment to its operating profitability, due to non-compliance with the arm’s length principle, account should also be taken of the adjustments to the tax adjustment already made by the accounting differences declared by the company’ cannot be accepted and is rejected, since this is a comparison between dissimilar figures, that is to say, a comparison between the applicant’s tax result and the accounting results of comparable companies in the sample. Because the applicant’s claim that, ‘any adjustment to its operating profitability should be based on the 1st quartile value and not that of the median’, is not accepted and is rejected, as, when assessing the operating profile, the applicant performs additional functions beyond a mere reseller and in particular than the comparable companies in the final sample as it has a disproportionately high cost of operating expenses to gross income compared to the comparable companies. Moreover, none of the comparable undertakings in the final sample is representative of the industry as they all have similar gross revenues to the applicant and therefore similar market share in the pharmaceutical industry. The choice of the median is the most appropriate because it eliminates possible comparability deficits (differences in factors and circumstances) that may exist between the applicant and the undertakings in the sample. Because the tax audit has come to the clear and well-founded conclusion that the pricing policy pursued by the applicant with its related undertakings does not comply with the arm’s length principle and is outside the acceptable limits. Since it follows from the foregoing that the contested income tax assessment measure was lawfully adopted, the applicant’s claims to the contrary must be rejected as unfounded.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ΔΕΔ 1582-2020 ...

A Greek MNE Group, “Agri Ltd”, was active and specialised in wholesale trade of agricultural machinery, parts and tools. In 2012 a German company was established by the group to distribute products in the Central European region. The pricing of the goods sold by Agri Ltd. to the German distributor was determined by testing the income of Agri Ltd using a TNMM. Following an audit the tax authorities issued a revised tax assessment, where the pricing of the inter-company transactions had instead been determined by applying a traditional cost plus method where the German subsidiary was the tested party. The resulting assessment was appealed by Agri Ltd. Judgement of the Court The court dismissed the appeal of Argri Ltd. “Since the tax audit, documented and clearly concluded that the cost plus margin method should have been chosen for the sales of the applicant to its subsidiary, the findings of the audit, as recorded in the 18.12.2019 Partial Income Tax Audit Report, are considered valid, acceptable and fully justified. Since it is clear from the above that the impugned income tax adjustment order was lawfully issued, the applicant’s contentions to the contrary are rejected as unfounded.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ΔΕΔ Α 1514-2020 ...

K. sp. z o.o. is a Polish company belonging to an international group. The main activity of K is local sale of goods purchased from a intra group supplier. K is best characterized as a limited risk distributor and as such should achieve an certain predetermined level of profitability as a result of its activities. In order to achieve the determined level of profitability, the group had established that, if the operating margin actually achieved by the distributor during a given period is less or more than the assumed level of profit, it will be adjusted. The year-end adjustment will not be directly related to the prices of goods purchased from the intra-group supplier and will be made after the end of each financial year. The Administrative Court decided that the year-end adjustment is not sufficiently linked to obtaining, maintaining or securing the company’s income. Hence the adjustment cannot be recognized as a deductible cost within the meaning of Article 15 Section 1 of the CIT Act. The decision of the Administrative Court was appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court by K. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the result reached by the Administrative Court according to which year-end adjustments (for the years in question) was not recognised as tax deductible costs. “Although the assessment presented was lacking in the grounds of the judgment under appeal, the manner in which the case was decided by dismissing the application is correct.” Excerpts from the reasoning of the Supreme Administrative Court “The legal problem examined in this case relates to the use by the applicant company of a mechanism applied in economic practice, in group settlements, referred to as a ‘compensating adjustment’. Generally speaking, that mechanism consists in an upward (true-up) or downward (true down) adjustment of the price between the supplier and the distributor, depending on whether the latter obtains income from sales to third parties which exceeds or is less than the margin fixed in the agreement between those entities. In the present case, the essence of the dispute concerns the tax consequences, in terms of corporation tax, of offsetting the net operating margin downwards (true down), under an agreement concluded by the applicant with the controlling company (the supplier). That means that the applicant (distributor) transfers funds to the supplier at an amount corresponding to the excess of the margin set in the contract concluded previously by those entities. There is no doubt that those entities (supplier and distributor) constitute related companies within the meaning of the transfer pricing rules. However, in the case in question, the disputed problem does not concern the assessment of whether the settlements between the supplier and the distributor comply with the arm’s of lengh rules established in the interpretation of Article 11 of the CFR in force on the date of issue of the interpretation of Article 11 of the CFR, to what extent determining whether the downward adjustment of the operating margin described in the application may be recognised as a deductible cost within the meaning of Article 15(1) of the CFR. According to this provision, in the wording referring to the realities of the case, deductible expenses are costs incurred in order to obtain revenue from a source of revenue or to preserve or secure a source of revenue, except for the costs listed in Article 16(1). Since the definition of a legal deductible expense is of a general nature, each cost (including expenditure) incurred by a taxpayer should be subject to individual assessment, with a view to examining the existence of a causal link between its incurrence and the generation of revenue (a real chance of generating revenue) or preserving or securing the source of revenue. Exceptions – both positive and negative – may of course be provided for by the legislator. However, the Supreme Administrative Court, in its composition adjudicating on this case, is of the opinion that the cash transfer incurred by the appellant to the supplier does not meet the criteria set out in Article 15(1) of the Polish Code of Civil Procedure, and in the legal status in force before 1 January 2019 there was no specific provision in the Tax Act allowing for the cost settlement of transfer price adjustments.” BE AWARE! – the result of the decision – non deductibility of downward year-end adjustments – is only applicable in Poland for years prior to 2019 “On the other hand, in the legal status in force before 2019, a typical transfer pricing arrangement concerned settlements between related companies for the direct supply of goods or services. For the sake of order, it should be recalled that until the end of 2018 the legislator, both in the Corporate Income Tax Act, the Personal Income Tax Act and the Value Added Tax Act, did not use the term “transfer prices” but used the term “transaction prices”. The term “transfer prices” was commonly used in the judicature and the literature and there is no doubt that both concepts are related to the same subject matter. The notion of “transaction price” was defined in Art. 3.10 of the Act of 29 August 1997 – Tax Ordinance (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 800 as amended). According to this regulation, the transaction price was to be understood as the price of the subject of the transaction concluded between related entities within the meaning of the tax law regulations concerning personal income tax, corporate income tax and value added tax. “As a result, in the legal status prior to 2019, the margin adjustment, meaning in fact an adjustment of the Company’s profitability, made on the basis of the adopted transfer pricing policy, does not meet the prerequisites resulting from art. 15 section 1 of the Corporate Income Tax Act, and in particular the most important prerequisite, i.e. connection with income. The very nature of the income adjustment excludes that it is a fee for services provided by the supplier to the distributor.” “The situation has fundamentally changed as of 1 January 2019, due ...

Eli Lilly ČR imports pharmaceutical products purchased from Eli Lilly Export S.A. (Swiss sales and marketing hub) into the Czech Republic and Slovakia and distributes them to local distributors. The arrangement between the local company and Eli Lilly Export S.A. is based on a Service Contract in which Eli Lilly ČR is named as the service provider to Eli Lilly Export S.A. (the principal). Eli Lilly ČR was selling the products at a lower price than the price it purchased them for from Eli Lilly Export S.A. According to the company this was due to local price controls of pharmaceuticals. Eli Lilly ČR was also paid for providing marketing services by the Swiss HQ, which ensured that Eli Lilly ČR was profitable, despite selling the products at a loss. Eli Lilly ČR reported the marketing services as a provision of services with the place of supply outside of the Czech Republic; therefore, the income from such supply was exempt from VAT in the Czech Republic. In 2016 a tax assessment was issued for FY 2011 in which VAT was added to the marketing services-income. Judgement of the Court The Court dismissed the appeal of Eli Lilly CR s.r.o. and decided in favour of the tax authorities. According to the court marketing services constituted partial supply that was part of the distribution activities and should have been considered, from the VAT perspective, a secondary activity used for the purpose of obtaining benefit from the main activity. Therefore, Eli Lilly CR s.r.o should have been paying VAT on income from the marketing services. “a customer purchasing medicinal products from the claimant is the recipient of a single indivisible supply (distribution and marketing),” “the aim of such marketing is certainly to increase the customer awareness of medicines distributed by the claimant, and, as a result to increase the marketability of these medicines” For Eli Lilly Export S.A., marketing was a secondary benefit. Eli Lilly CR s.r.o. was the owner of the products when the marketing services were provided. Eli Lilly Export S.A. was not the manufacturer of the products and did not hold the distribution license for the Czech market. Therefore, Eli Lilly Export S.A. could not be the recipient of the marketing services provided by Eli Lilly CR s.r.o. Hence, the payment received by Eli Lilly CR s.r.o. for marketing services was in fact “a payment received from a third person”. An appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court was filed on 14 February 2020 by Eli Lilly CR. Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation Czech vs Eli Lilly 2020 ...

Following a restructuring of the Italien Piaggio group, SAS Piaggio France by a contract dated January 2 2007, was changed from an exclusive distributor of vehicles of the “Piaggio” brand in France to a commercial agent for its Italian parent company. The tax authorities held that this change had resulted in a transfer without payment for the customers and applied the provisions of article 57 of the general tax code (the arm’s length principle). A tax assessment was issued whereby the taxable income of SAS Piaggio France was added a profit of 7.969.529 euros on the grounds that the change in the contractual relations between the parties had resultet in a transfer of customers for which an independent party would have been paid. The Judgement of the Court The court helt in favor of the tax authorities and added an additional profit of 7.969.529 to the taxable income of the SaS Piaggio France for the transfer of customers to the Italian parent company. SAS Piaggio France had until 2007 an exclusive distribution activity in Franch of vehicles of the brand “Piaggio”, which were bought, imported and then resold in its own name to French dealers. For this activity, SAS Piaggio France had developed its own strategy for the French market. It has established and managed a vast network of dealers for which it determined the volumes and models to buy as well as its own commercial policy in terms of pricing and after-sales service. It also and assumed the risks of managing its stock of piaggio products of which it was the owner as well as the commercial risks resulting from possible unpaid or unsold goods. Under these conditions, SAS Piaggio France must be regarded as having created its own customer base – regardless of the strong reputation of the “Piaggio” brand in France – by the network of dealers and the corresponding business. In holding that the transformation of SAS Piaggio France from an exclusive distributor into a simple commercial agent for Piaggio and C SpA did not entail any transfer of customers that should be compensated, the judgement from the court administrative appeal was inexact in the legal characterization of the facts. Click here for translation Conseil_d_État_10ème_-_9ème_chambres_réunies_04_10_2019_418817_Inédit_au_recueil_Lebon ...

PriceSmart Inc (PSMT) operates a retail chain including approximately 25 department stores in the Caribbean and Central America. PSMT’s local branch had recognised losses in their profit tax returns for the years 2001 to 2006. In 2009, the tax authorities audited the tax returns for the years 2002 to 2006. At issue was the definition and interpretation of the various functions of the interested party and the risks incurred. In particular, the dispute concerned transfer pricing typologies, and whether the local branch could be characterised as a ‘Limited Risk Distributor’ or as a ‘Buy-Sell Distributor’ with a ‘proprietary’ risk in respect of, inter alia, accounts receivable, stock and currency. The tax authorities characterised the local branch as a ‘Limited Distributor’ as it was not the local branch but PSMT Inc. that determined the marketing strategy, mix of products. The branch hasd virtually no decision-making influence in this, because its tasks and activities are determined by functions and employees of PSMT outside Aruba and the decision-making power of branch was limited to simple operational activities. In view of these observations an assesment was issued where a ‘cost-plus’ method of 3% of the costs was applied to calculate the arm’s length profit. After receiving The Council’s preliminary assessment a settlement was reached between the parties according to which losses for 2000 and 2001 were accepted and for the following years a net operating margin of 1.5% (return on sales) were to be applied. Click here for translation Netherlands 160919 no 201-45712 ...

The district court of Paris has approved a  “convention judiciaire d’intérêt public” negotiated between the French state and Google for an amount of € 500 million plus another agreement with the French tax authorities which amounts to 465 million euros. The agreement puts an end to the French lawsuits against Google for aggressive tax evasion, and litigation with the tax administration relating to adjustments for the periods going from 2005 to 2018. The CJIP “convention judiciaire d’intérêt public“, was established by Article 22 of Law No. 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016 in France on transparency and fight against corruption. By Law No. 2018-898 of October 23, 2018 the law was extended to cover cases for tax evasion. According to the CJIP legal actions can be ended in return for the payment of a fine. The dispute concerned the existence of a permanent establishment of Google Ireland in France. In Googles European headquarters in Ireland the corporate tax rate is (12.5%). However, according to the French tax authorities most of the profits related to the French marked was attributable to a Permanent establishment in France. The case was first brought before the Administrative Court in Paris (July 2017) and then the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal (April 2019). Both courts found in favor of Google and canceled the tax adjustments. The state then brought the case before the French Supreme Court and now – to end the proceedings – Google has entered into the CJIP agreement. According to the agreement Google will not have to admit to tax avoidance or evasion. Click here for translation Google France The full CJIP agreement between France and Google have been published on the website of the French Agency for Anti-corruption. Click here for translation Google 190903_CJIP ...

The Absolut Company AB had been issued an assessment of additional taxable income of SEK 247 mio. The assessment was based on the position that (1) The Absolut Company AB had been selling below the arm’s length price to an US group company – The Absolut Spirit Company Inc. (ASCI), and (2) that acquired distribution services from ASCI that had been priced above the arm’s length price. In 2018 the Swedish Administrative Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the tax administration. The Swedish Supreme Administrative Court has now ruled in favor of The Absolute Company AB. According to the Supreme Administrative Court the Swedish Tax Agency did not fulfill the burden of proof. The Supreme Administrative Court further states that the full range of results in the benchmark study could be applied and that a multiple year analysis of the tested party data can be used to support an arm’s length result. Click here for translation Sweden vs Absolut AB 2019 ...

Acer Computer Ibérica S.A. (ACI) is part of the multinational ACER group, which manufactures and distributes personal computers and other electronic devices. Acer Europe AG (AEAG), a group entity in Switzerland, centralises the procurement of the subsidiaries established in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, and acts as the regional management centre for that geographical area. ACI is responsible for the wholesale marketing of electronic equipment and material, as well as in the provision of technical service related to these products in Spain and Portugal. ACI is characterized as a limited risk distributor by the group. At issue was deductibility of payments resulting from factoring agreements undertaken ACI with unrelated banks, adopted to manage liquidity risks arising from timing mismatches between its accounts payable and accounts receivable. Based on an interpretation of the limited risk agreement signed between ACI and its principal AEAG, the tax authorities disregarded the allocation of the risk – and hence allocation of the relevant costs – to ACI. The tax authorities considered that the financial costs arising from the relocation of cancelled orders, those arising from differences in the criteria for calculating collection and payment deadlines and those arising from delays in shipments are due to the application of incorrect criteria for the accounting and invoicing of certain transactions. It also considers that the assumption of those costs by ACI is in contradiction with its classification as a low-risk distributor and does not comply with the distribution of functions and risks between ACI and AEAG, which results from the distribution contract and the transfer pricing report. An assessment for FY 2006 – 2008 where the costs were added back to the taxable income of Acer Computer Ibérica S.A. was issued. Judgement of the Federal Court The court dismissed the appeal of Acer and upheld the tax assessment in which deductions for the costs in question had been disallowed. Excerpts “The interpretation of the contract terms which we uphold follows the above mentioned OECD Guidelines: In arm’s length transactions, the contract terms generally define, expressly or implicitly, how responsibilities, risks and results are allocated between the parties.” “However, it is irrelevant, in view of the foregoing on the assumption of risk, that ACI’s financing costs are higher than those of comparable undertakings (as the tax authorities maintain), since the refusal of deductibility is based on the fact that the costs claimed to be deductible are not borne by the appellant in accordance with the terms of the contract.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation Spain vs Acer March 2019 AN ORG ...

The Guideline outlines ATO’s compliance approach to the transfer pricing outcomes associated with the following activities of inbound distributors: distributing goods purchased from related foreign entities for resale, and distributing digital products or services where the intellectual property in those products or services is owned by related foreign entities Such activities, together with any related activities involving the provision of ancillary services, are referred to in this Guideline as ‘inbound distribution arrangements’. This Guideline applies to inbound distribution arrangements of any scale. The framework in the Guideline is used to assess the transfer pricing risk of inbound distribution arrangements and tailor our engagement with you. Where this Guideline applies, we rate the transfer pricing risk of your inbound distribution arrangements having regard to a combination of quantitative and qualitative factors. If an inbound distribution arrangements fall outside the low transfer pricing risk category, the transfer pricing outcomes of the arrangements can be expected to be monitor, tested and/or verified. The framework set out in the Guideline can be used to: assess the transfer pricing risk of inbound distribution arrangements understand the compliance approach given the transfer pricing risk profile of the inbound distribution arrangements mitigate the transfer pricing risk of the inbound distribution arrangements Structure of the Guideline The Guideline is structured as follows: the main body sets out general principles relevant to our framework for assessing transfer pricing risk and applying compliance resources to inbound distribution arrangements to which the Guideline applies, and the schedules set out quantitative and qualitative indicators relevant to distributors generally or based on their industry sector, including those that operate in the life science, information and communication technology (ICT) and motor vehicle industries. This Guideline does not provide advice or guidance on the technical interpretation or application of Australia’s transfer pricing rules or other tax provisions. ATO transfer pricing issues related to inbound distribution arrangementspdf ...

In this case Nestlé Zambia had reported continuous losses for more than five years. Following an Transfer Pricing audit covering years 2010 – 2014, the tax administration  issued an assessment whereby profits were adjusted to ZMW 56,579,048 resulting in additional taxes of ZMW13,860,103 plus penalties and other levies. The assessment was based on Nestlé Zambia being characterised as a limited risk distributor instead of a full fledged dristributor. Nestlé  Zambia held that the tax administrations characterisation of the entity as a limited risk distributor was incorrect and that the assessment had not been performed in accordance with the arm’s length principle.  The Tribunal ruled in favor of Nestlé, except for it’s position on the characterisation of the entity as a limited risk distributor (ground four cf. the excerp below). “The summary of our findings is  that  there  was  basis  for  initiating  a  transfer pricing audit in this case because as has been stated in  Paragraph  1.129  of  the OECD Guidelines that, “When an associated enterprise consistently realises losses while the Multinational enterprise group as a whole is profitable, the facts could trigger some special scrutiny of transfer pricing issues.”  We opine that the Appellant being in continuous loss making position,  triggered  an  enquiry  into  transfer  pricing  issues but the manner in  which  the  Respondent  went  about  the  enquiry  was wrong. There could be transfer pricing issues that require  scrutiny  particularly  in light of  the  testimony  from  AWl  that  the  Appellant  is  continuously  making losses while it’s related parties are making profits. The Appellant succeeds in Grounds One, Two, Three, Five and Six but fails in Ground Four. The net effect is therefore that the assessment by the Respondent that the Appellant was liable to pay a sum of ZMW13,860,103.00 was wrongly arrived at. This is so because the said assessment was based on inaccurate transfer pricing results emanating from use of an inappropriate transfer pricing method, disproportionate comparables and an unjustified add back of unrealized exchange losses. By reason of the foregoing, the assessment by the Respondent is accordingly and hereby set aside.” Zambia vs Nestle March 2019 ...

The Danish tax authorities were of the opinion that Microsoft Denmark had not been properly remunerated for performing marketing activities due to the fact that OEM sales to Danish customers via MNE OEM’s had not been included in the calculation of local commissions. According to the Market Development Agreement (MDA agreement) concluded between Microsoft Denmark and MIOL with effect from 1 July 2003, Microsoft Denmark received the largest amount of either a commission based on sales invoiced in Denmark or a markup on it’s costs. Microsoft Denmark’s commission did not take into account the sale of Microsoft products that occurred through the sale of computers by multinational computer manufacturers with pre-installed Microsoft software to end users in Denmark – (OEM sales). In court, Microsoft required a dismissal. In a narrow 3:2 decision the Danish Supreme Court found in favor of Microsoft. “…Microsoft Denmark’s marketing may have had some derivative effect, especially in the period around the launch in 2007 of the Windows Vista operating system, which made higher demands on the computers. On the other hand, it must be assumed that also the recommendations of Microsoft products made by the multinational computer manufacturers under agreements between, among others, Dell and Microsoft Denmark’s American parent company, which, in return, gave discounts to computer manufacturers, may have had an effect on, among other things. sales of Package licenses in Denmark, whereby Microsoft Denmark, in its remuneration, benefited from this marketing effort. The significance of the various companies’ marketing efforts and the interaction between them has not been elucidated during the case, and we find it unlikely that Microsoft Denmark’s marketing had an effect on the sale of MNA OEM licenses in the US and other countries outside Denmark, which exceeded the importance of computer manufacturers marketing for the sale of package licenses, which were included in the basis for the remuneration of Microsoft Denmark. … Based on the above, we do not find that Microsoft Denmark’s remuneration for the company’s marketing efforts was not in accordance with the arm’s length principle.” Click here for translation DK vs MS Marketing-and Sales Commissioner ...

Circular on transfer pricing – profitability rates and ranges for certain transactions – Limited Risk Distributors (LRDs) tnf-israel-12-oct9-2018 ...

Circular on transfer pricing – profitability rates and ranges for certain transactions – Limited Risk Distributors (LRDs) tnf-israel-11-oct9-2018 ...

The Danish Tax Ministry and Microsoft meet in Court in a case where the Danish tax authorities had issued an assessment of DKK 308 million. The Danish tax authorities were of the opinion that Microsoft had not been properly remunerated for performing marketing activities due to the fact that OEM sales to Danish customers via MNE OEM’s had not been included in the calculation of local commissions. In court, Microsoft required a dismissal with reference to the fact that Sweden, Norway and Finland had either lost or resigned similar tax cases against Micorosoft. The National Court ruled in favor of Microsoft. The decision was later confirmed by the Supreme Court. Click here for translation DK vs MS Marketing-and Sales Commissioner ...

The issue in the case before the Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris was whether an Irish company had a PE in France in a situation where employees of a French company in the same group carried out marketing, representation, management, back office and administrative assistance services on behalf of the group. The following facts were used to substantiate the presence of a French PE: French employees negotiated the terms of contracts and were involved in drafting certain contractual clauses with the customers. Contracts were automatically signed by the Irish company – whether this action corresponded to a simple validation of the contracts negotiated and drawn up by the managers and employees in France. Local advertising programs were developed and monitored by employees in France. French employees acted to third parties as employees of the Irish company. Customers did not distinguish between the Irish and the French company. However, the Administrative Court found that none of these factors established that employees in France had been authorized to act on behalf of and in the name of the Irish company. The Court instead based the decision on whether contracts could be entered and services could be rendered without prior approval of the contracts by the Irish parent entity. The Court concluded that French employees could not commit its Irish principal contractually and services could not be rendered until the customer contract had been approved by the Irish company. The decision of the Administrative Court has now been appealed to the French Supreme Court. On the issue of permanent establishment, see also the French Zimmer decision from 2010 and the later Google decision from 2017. Click here for translation CAA_de_PARIS_9ème_chambre_01_03_2018_17PA01538_Inédit_au_recueil_Lebon ...

The issue in the case before the Administrative Court of Appeal of Paris was whether an Irish company had a PE in France in a situation where employees of a French company in the same group carried out marketing, representation, management, back office and administrative assistance services on behalf of the group. The following facts were used to substantiate the presence of a French PE: French employees negotiated the terms of contracts and were involved in drafting certain contractual clauses with the customers. Contracts were automatically signed by the Irish company – whether this action corresponded to a simple validation of the contracts negotiated and drawn up by the managers and employees in France. Local advertising programs were developed and monitored by employees in France. French employees acted to third parties as employees of the Irish company. Customers did not distinguish between the Irish and the French company. However, the Administrative Court found that none of these factors established that employees in France had been authorized to act on behalf of and in the name of the Irish company. The Court instead based the decision on whether contracts could be entered and services could be rendered without prior approval of the contracts by the Irish parent entity. The Court concluded that French employees could not commit its Irish principal contractually and services could not be rendered until the customer contract had been approved by the Irish company. The decision of the Administrative Court has now been appealed to the French Supreme Court. On the issue of permanent establishment, see also the French Zimmer decision from 2010 and the later Google decision from 2017. Click here for translation CAA_de_PARIS_9ème_chambre_01_03_2018_17PA01538_Inédit_au_recueil_Lebon ...

Microsoft Ibérica S.R.L is responsible for distribution and marketing of Microsoft products in Spain. According to an agreement concluded between Microsoft Ibérica and MIOL (Microsoft’s Irish sales and marketing hub) with effect from 1 July 2003, Microsoft Ibérica would received the largest amount of either a commission based on sales invoiced in Spain or a markup on it’s costs. In support of the remuneration according to the agreement, Microsoft had provided a benchmark study. The Spanish tax authorities found that Microsoft Ibérica had not been properly remunerated due to the fact that goodwill amortisations had been eliminated by in the transfer pricing analysis. By including the goodwill amortisations in the analysis, the result of the local company was below the interquartile rang. The authorities further held that the selected comparables in the benchmark study suffered from comparability defects, in that they had less functions and risk than Microsoft Ibérica. An assessment was issued where the results were adjusted to the upper quartile of the benchmark results. The Court of first instance held in favor of Microsoft and set aside the assessment. This decision was appealed to the High Court by the authorities. The High Court overturned the decision and decided in favour of the tax authorities. Excerpts from the Judgement: “We understand that the appellant’s conduct was deliberate, seeking to make the inspection proceedings time-barred. For a year, the Inspectorate was unable to carry out its work normally; in fact, what the Inspectorate did was to waste many hours of work examining the various incomplete accounts which did not comply with the Spanish accounting plan, which the appellant was handing in, wasting hours of work paid for out of the State’s general budget. The appellant, with only two days left, submitted a copy of the accounts which replaced “the computer copies of the accounts on CDs submitted to the inspection on 21/05/20 10, 9/09/2010 and 26/11/2010 which contained errors in the conversion of the accounts from the American chart of accounts to the Spanish chart of accounts”. The Chamber cannot support this conduct of the party by declaring the inspection procedure time-barred, as the delay is attributable to the taxpayer’s conduct. In finding that there is a delay attributable to the taxpayer for 344 days, it is unnecessary to examine the rest of the delays. The Inspector procedure took 705 days, discounting 344 days, the procedure finalised in 361 days, therefore, even if the other delays that are questioned are not attributable to the taxpayer, which in many cases overlap with the delay for not handing over the accounts, the Inspector procedure would have concluded before one year had elapsed.” “The Inspectorate indicated that there was another compelling reason to weigh in support of the application of a value located in the upper interquartile range of the study carried out by the Inspectorate, since within the sample of companies considered comparable there are some, five in particular that carry out service activities (CNAE activity codes 7221-7222), which are more similar than the rest to the activity formally assumed by MICROSOFT IBÉRICA – the provision of marketing services – and whose net margins were higher. The Inspectorate considered this sample of entities to be the most appropriate in terms of comparability, as it would yield a margin with a median of 6.15% (weighted average for the period). The reasoning of the Inspectorate, which was complemented by everything else it argued in the agreement, is considered to be correct, but it should also be considered that this reasoning is complementary to the criteria of the Chamber, which has considered that the contract signed by Microsoft fixed a commission that had to be settled monthly.” “The Chamber cannot share the criteria of the report for the following reasons. The expert assumes an interpretation of the contract signed in 2003 that is contrary to the one we have set out in the corresponding legal basis of this Judgment. It is the function of the Chamber to interpret contracts. The increase in the taxable bases derives directly from those agreed by Microsoft and MIOL, any other consideration being unnecessary. Furthermore, the expert considers that companies with losses have been eliminated without reasonable criteria, when this Chamber has endorsed that this criterion was in accordance with the law. Furthermore, the expert assumes that the appellant does not perform strategic functions, whereas the Chamber has concluded otherwise.” “WE RULE 1) That we DISMISS AND REVERSE the present contentious-administrative appeal number 337/2014, brought by the Solicitor Ms. Sonsoles Díaz-Varela Arrese, on behalf of MICROSOFT IBÉRICA, S.R.L, assisted by the Lawyer Ms. Cristina Fernández Rodríguez against the decision dated 8 May 2014 issued by the Central Economic Administrative Court, and we CONFIRM AND CONFIRM the said decisions as being in accordance with the legal system. 2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the costs incurred in these legal proceedings.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation SPA vs MS SAN_1125_2018 ...

According to Colgate Palmolive, following a restructuring, the local group company in Spain was changed from being a “fully fledged distributor” responsible for all areas of the distribution process to being a “limited risk distributor” (it only performs certain functions). A newly established Swiss company, Colgate Palmolive Europe, instead became the principal entrepreneur in Europe. The changed TP setup had a significant impact on the earnings in the Spanish group company. Net margins was reduced from around 16% before the restructuring, to 3.5% after the restructuring. Following a thorough examination of the functions, assets and risks before and after application of the new setup, the Tax administration held that Colgate Palmolive Europe could not be qualified as the “principal entrepreneur” in Europe. The swiss company was in substance a service provider for which the remuneration should be determined based on the cost plus method. Judgement of the Court The High Court held in favour of the tax administration and dismissed the appeal of Colgate Palmolive. Excerpt “.…the conclusion, in our opinion, can only be that the Administration is right, since in reality – remember that certain functions were already being carried out by the French Headquarter – there is no significant change in the situation existing prior to the restructuring in the years in question. This being so, it is not surprising that the Agreement reasons that “the existence of transactions between related entities, the Spanish and Swiss entities, determines the application of the regime provided for in Article 16 of the Consolidated Text of the Corporate Income Tax Law (TRLIS) and in its implementing regulations, mainly Chapter V of Title I of the Corporate Income Tax Regulations (RIS), taking into account the change of regulation introduced by Law 36/2006 applicable, in the case of Colgate Palmolive, as from the financial year 2007”. Adding that “in relation to the existence of transactions between related companies, it is also necessary to take into account Article 9 of the Spanish-Swiss Double Taxation Agreement, inspired by the OECD Model Agreement, which provides that the profits of associated companies may be adjusted when the conditions present in their commercial or financial relations differ from those that would be agreed between independent entities. This article recognises the so-called arm’s length principle, the interpretation of which must take into account the OECD Doctrine, contained in the Commentary to Article 9 itself and its 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which have been significantly updated in 2010”. As reasoned in the Agreement, the Board shares the reasoning, “according to the exhaustive description contained in the verification file, the characterisation of CP Europe as a “principal trader” is inappropriate, it being more correct to consider that such an entity is in reality a service provider. It is therefore considered that the method chosen by the group to value the transactions is inappropriate and that the appropriate valuation method is the cost plus method. This method, in addition to being a traditional method (and therefore preferable under our internal regulations and the Guidelines), is, in accordance with the OECD Guidelines (paragraph 2.32 and 2.39 in the 2010 version), particularly appropriate for valuing the provision of services”. The fact is that ‘the valuation method applied by Colgate Palmolive is not appropriate, as it results in the residual profit of the group’s operations in Spain being concentrated in the CP Europe entity, which makes no sense if the economic activity of each entity (CP USA, CP Spain and CP Europe) in the overall business in our country is taken into account. The Guidelines themselves highlight in their chapter 7 dedicated to intra-group services (paragraph 7.31, before and after 2010) the cost plus method, together with the comparable free price, as the method to be used to value this type of services between related entities. The work of the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum of the European Union, which also assumes that this is the method most frequently used to value this type of transaction”. The Inspectorate adds, quite reasonably, that “until 2005, the group itself valued transactions between the French Headquarter, with the role of service provider, and the other entities of the group – including CP Spain – using the cost plus method”. The consequence of all the above is that, as stated on p. 73 of the report -reasoning endorsed by the Agreement- “in order to value the transactions between CP Europe and CP Spain, the transactional net margin method, taking CP Spain as the analysed party (Tesdet party), is inappropriate. Instead, it is considered that the most appropriate method for valuing the transactions is the cost plus method, which is based on attributing to the provider of those services – CP Europe – a gross margin on the costs it incurs which are attributable to the Spanish market [it should be recalled that following the analysis carried out it has been concluded that CP Europe cannot be considered as a principal trader, but rather as an entity which performs the functions of a service provider]’. This means that, in the years in question, it is not correct to attribute to CP EUROPE the residual profit derived from the group’s operations in Spain, but rather that this residual profit, deducting the remuneration of the owner of the intangible asset -CP USA- and of the service provider -CEP EUROPE-, should fall on CP SPAIN. The calculations are set out in pp. 74 to 81 of the report, as well as in pp. 59 to 62 of the Agreement. The Board, particularly in the absence of any arguments to the contrary, considers them to be correct. For all the foregoing reasons, the plea is dismissed.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation SP vs Palmolive SAN_1128_2018 ...

In 2016 the Swedish Tax Tribunal ruled against the tax administration in the case of The Absolut (vodka) Company AB. The Administrative Court of Appeal has now overturned the Tribunal’s ruling and consequently SEK 247 mio. are now added to the taxable income of The Absolut Company AB. The Swedish tax administration found that The Absolut Company AB sold Absolut Vodka below the arm’s length price to a group company – The Absolut Spirit Company Inc. (ASCI). Furthermore, the swedish company acquired distribution services from ASCI at a price above the arm’s length price. The Court adresses: – timing of data and information in a Benchmarking search – use of interquartile range or full range – use of multible years data – the issue of hindsight Click here for translation Sweden vs The Absolute Company, Jan 2018, Administrative Court of Appeal, No 1610-16 ...

In a public hearing held 22 August 2017 in Sydney Australia by the Economics References Committee, tech companies IBM, Microsoft, and Apple were called to the witnesses stand to explain about tax avoidance schemes – use of “regional headquarters” in low tax jurisdictions (Singapore, Ireland and the Netherlands) to avoid or reduce taxes. Follow the ongoing Australian hearings into corporate tax avoidance on this site: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Corporatetax45th Transcript from the hearing: Tax Avoidance, Australian Senate Hearing, 22 August 2017 ...

An agreement between a Swedish company, VSM Group AB, and an American distributor, VSM Sewing Inc, stated that the distributor would receive compensation corresponding to an operating margin of three percent. Benchmark studies showed that the agreed compensation was arm’s length. Each year, the company made a year end adjustment to ensure that the pricing was arm’s length. In cases where the outcome was outside the interquartile range, additional invoicing took place so that the operating margin was adjusted to the agreed level. But no additional invoicing took place where the operating margin deviated from what was agreed but was within the interquartile range. The company argued that the pricing was correct as long as the operating margin was within the interquartile range. The company also argued that the agreement between the parties had a different content than the written agreement because the parties consistently applied an understanding of the arrangement that deviated from the written content. The Court of Appeal considered that the wording of the agreement was clearly formulated and lacked room for interpretation. The agreement had also been followed and the compensation had been adjusted to the agreed level in cases where additional invoicing had taken place. The mere fact that the parties deviated from the terms of the written agreement in cases where the level of compensation proved to be within the interquartile range, cannot mean that the agreement is given a different meaning, even if it has been done consistently. The Court of Appeal found that such a deviation would not have been accepted by an independent party and that it was clear that an incorrect pricing had taken place which had a negative effect on the Swedish company’s results. Click here for translation Jönköping KR 2038-2041-15VSM Group AB ...

42. The facts in this example are the same as those set out in Example 10 with the following additions: At the end of Year 3, Primair stops manufacturing watches and contracts with a third party to manufacture them on its behalf. As a result, Company S will import unbranded watches directly from the manufacturer and undertake secondary processing to apply the R name and logo and package the watches before sale to the final customer. It will then sell and distribute the watches in the manner described in Example 10. As a consequence, at the beginning of Year 4, Primair and Company S renegotiate their earlier agreement and enter into a new long term licensing agreement. The new agreement, to start at the beginning of Year 4, is for five years, with Company S having an option for a further five years. Under the new agreement, Company S is granted the exclusive right within country Y to process, market and distribute watches bearing the R trademark in consideration for its agreement to pay a royalty to Primair based on the gross sales of all such watches. Company S receives no compensation from Primair in respect of the renegotiation of the original marketing and distribution agreement. It is assumed for purposes of this example that the purchase price Company S pays for the watches from the beginning of Year 4 is arm’s length and that no consideration with respect to the R name is embedded in that price. 43. In connection with a tax audit conducted by country Y tax administrations in Year 6, it is determined, based on a proper functional analysis, that the level of marketing expenses Company S incurred during Years 1 through 3 far exceeded those incurred by independent marketers and distributors with similar long term marketing and distribution agreements. It is also determined that the level and intensity of marketing activity undertaken by Company S exceeded that of independent marketers and distributors, and that the relatively greater activity has been successful in expanding volumes and/or increasing the Primair group’s overall margins from sales in country Y. Given the extent of the market development activities undertaken by Company S, including its strategic control over such activities, it is evident from the comparability and functional analysis that Company S has assumed significantly greater costs and assumed greater risks than comparable independent enterprises. There is also evidence that the individual entity profit margins realised by Company S are significantly lower than the profit margins of comparable independent marketers and distributors during the corresponding years of similar long-term marketing and distribution arrangements. 44. The country Y audit also identifies that in Years 4 and 5, Company S bears the costs and associated risks of its marketing activities under the new long-term licensing arrangement with Primair, and because of the long-term nature of the agreement, Company S may have an opportunity to benefit (or suffer a loss) from its activities. However, Company S has undertaken market development activities and incurred marketing expenditure far beyond what comparable independent licensees with similar long-term licensing agreements undertake and incur for their own benefit, resulting in significantly lower anticipated profit margins for Company S than those of comparable enterprises. 45. Based on these facts, Company S should be compensated with an additional return for the market development functions it performs, the assets it uses and the risks it assumes. For Years 1 through 3, the possible bases for such an adjustment would be as described in Example 10. For Years 4 and 5 the bases for an adjustment would be similar, except that the adjustment could reduce the royalty payments from Company S to Primair, rather than the purchase price of the watches. Depending on the facts and circumstances, consideration could also be given to whether Company S should have received compensation in connection with the renegotiation of the arrangement at the end of Year 3 in accordance with the guidance in Part II of Chapter IX ...

39. The facts in this example are the same as in Example 9 with the following additions: By the end of Year 3, the R brand is successfully established in the country Y market and Primair and Company S renegotiate their earlier agreement and enter into a new long-term licensing agreement. The new agreement, which is to commence at the beginning of Year 4, is for five years with Company S having an option for a further five years. Under this agreement, Company S agrees to pay a royalty to Primair based on the gross sales of all watches bearing the R trademark. In all other respects, the new agreement has the same terms and conditions as in the previous arrangement between the parties. There is no adjustment made to the price payable by Company S for the branded watches as a result of the introduction of the royalty. Company S’s sales of R brand watches in Years 4 and 5 are consistent with earlier budget forecasts. However, the introduction of the royalty from the beginning of year 4 results in Company S’s profit margins declining substantially. 40. Assume that there is no evidence that independent marketers/distributors of similar branded products have agreed to pay royalties under similar arrangements. Company S’s level of marketing expenditure and activity, from Year 4 on, is consistent with that of independent enterprises. 41. For transfer pricing purposes, it would not generally be expected that a royalty would be paid in arm’s length transactions where a marketing and distribution entity obtains no rights for transfer pricing purposes in trademarks and similar intangibles other than the right to use such intangibles in distributing a branded product supplied by the entity entitled to the income derived from exploiting such intangibles. Furthermore, the royalty causes Company S’s profit margins to be consistently lower than those of independent enterprises with comparable functions performed, assets used and risks assumed during the corresponding years of similar long-term marketing and distribution arrangements. Accordingly, a transfer pricing adjustment disallowing the royalties paid would be appropriate based on the facts of this example ...

35. The facts in this example are the same as in Example 9, except that Company S now enters into a three-year royalty-free agreement to market and distribute the watches in the country Y market, with no option to renew. At the end of the three-year period, Company S does not enter into a new contract with Primair. 36. Assume that it is demonstrated that independent enterprises do enter into short-term distribution agreements where they incur marketing and distribution expenses, but only where they stand to earn a reward commensurate with the functions performed, the assets used, and the risks assumed within the time period of the contract. Evidence derived from comparable independent enterprises shows that they do not invest large sums of money in developing marketing and distribution infrastructure where they obtain only a short-term marketing and distribution agreement, with the attendant risk of non-renewal without compensation. The potential short-term nature of the marketing and distribution agreement is such that Company S could not, or may not be able to, benefit from the marketing and distribution expenditure it incurs at its own risk. The same factors mean that Company S’s efforts may well benefit Primair in the future. 37. The risks assumed by Company S are substantially higher than in Example 9 and Company S has not been compensated on an arm’s length basis for bearing these additional risks. In this case, Company S has undertaken market development activities and borne marketing expenditures beyond what comparable independent enterprises with similar rights incur for their own benefit, resulting in significantly lower profit margins for Company S than are made by comparable enterprises. The short term nature of the contract makes it unreasonable to expect that Company S has the opportunity of obtaining appropriate benefits under the contract within the limited term of the agreement with Primair. Under these circumstances, Company S is entitled to compensation for its at risk contribution to the value of the R trademark and trade name during the term of its arrangement with Primair. 38. Such compensation could take the form of direct compensation from Primair to Company S for the anticipated value created through the marketing expenditures and market development functions it has undertaken. Alternatively, such an adjustment could take the form of a reduction in the price paid by Company S to Primair for R watches during Years 1 through 3 ...

26. The facts in this example are the same as in Example 8, except as follows: Under the contract between Primair and Company S, Company S is now obligated to develop and execute the marketing plan for country Y without detailed control of specific elements of the plan by Primair. Company S bears the costs and assumes certain of the risks associated with the marketing activities. The agreement between Primair and Company S does not specify the amount of marketing expenditure Company S is expected to incur, only that Company S is required to use its best efforts to market the watches. Company S receives no direct reimbursement from Primair in respect of any expenditure it incurs, nor does it receive any other indirect or implied compensation from Primair, and Company S expects to earn its reward solely from its profit from the sale of R brand watches to third party customers in the country Y market. A thorough functional analysis reveals that Primair exercises a lower level of control over the marketing activities of Company S than in Example 8 in that it does not review and approve the marketing budget or design details of the marketing plan. Company S bears different risks and is compensated differently than was the case in Example 8. The contractual arrangements between Primair and Company S are different and the risks assumed by Company S are greater in Example 9 than in Example 8. Company S does not receive direct cost reimbursements or a separate fee for marketing activities. The only controlled transaction between Primair and Company S in Example 9 is the transfer of the branded watches. As a result, Company S can obtain its reward for its marketing activities only through selling R brand watches to third party customers. As a result of these differences, Primair and Company S adopt a lower price for watches in Example 9 than the price for watches determined for purposes of Example 8. As a result of the differences identified in the functional analysis, different criteria are used for identifying comparables and for making comparability adjustments than was the case in Example 8. This results in Company S having a greater anticipated total profit in Example 9 than in Example 8 because of its higher level of risk and its more extensive functions. 27. Assume that in Years 1 through 3, Company S embarks on a strategy that is consistent with its agreement with Primair and, in the process, performs marketing functions and incurs marketing expenses. As a result, Company S has high operating expenditures and slim margins in Years 1 through 3. By the end of Year 2, the R trademark and trade name have become established in country Y because of Company S’s efforts. Where the marketer/distributor actually bears the costs and associated risks of its marketing activities, the issue is the extent to which the marketer/distributor can share in the potential benefits from those activities. Assume that the enquiries of the country Y tax administrations conclude, based on a review of comparable distributors, that Company S would have been expected to have performed the functions it performed and incurred its actual level of marketing expense if it were independent from Primair. 28. Given that Company S performs the functions and bears the costs and associated risks of its marketing activities under a long-term contract of exclusive distribution rights for the R watches, there is an opportunity for Company S to benefit (or suffer a loss) from the marketing and distribution activities it undertakes. Based on an analysis of reasonably reliable comparable data, it is concluded that, for purposes of this example, the benefits obtained by Company S result in profits similar to those made by independent marketers and distributors bearing the same types of risks and costs as Company S in the first few years of comparable long-term marketing and distribution agreements for similarly unknown products. 29. Based on the foregoing assumptions, Company S’s return is arm’s length and its marketing activities, including its marketing expenses, are not significantly different than those performed by independent marketers and distributors in comparable uncontrolled transactions. The information on comparable uncontrolled arrangements provides the best measure of the arm’s length return earned by Company S for the contribution to intangible value provided by its functions, risks, and costs. That return therefore reflects arm’s length compensation for Company S’s contributions and accurately measures its share of the income derived from exploitation of the trademark and trade name in country Y. No separate or additional compensation is required to be provided to Company S ...

20. Primair, a resident of country X, manufactures watches which are marketed in many countries around the world under the R trademark and trade name. Primair is the registered owner of the R trademark and trade name. The R name is widely known in countries where the watches are sold and has obtained considerable economic value in those markets through the efforts of Primair. R watches have never been marketed in country Y, however, and the R name is not known in the country Y market. 21. In Year 1, Primair decides to enter the country Y market and incorporates a wholly owned subsidiary in country Y, Company S, to act as its distributor in country Y. At the same time, Primair enters into a long-term royalty-free marketing and distribution agreement with Company S. Under the agreement, Company S is granted the exclusive right to market and distribute watches bearing the R trademark and using the R trade name in country Y for a period of five years, with an option for a further five years. Company S obtains no other rights relating to the R trademark and trade name from Primair, and in particular is prohibited from re-exporting watches bearing the R trademark and trade name. The sole activity of Company S is marketing and distributing watches bearing the R trademark and trade name. It is assumed that the R watches are not part of a portfolio of products distributed by Company S in country Y. Company S undertakes no secondary processing, as it imports packaged watches into country Y ready for sale to the final customer. 22. Under the contract between Primair and Company S, Company S purchases the watches from Primair in country Y currency, takes title to the branded watches and performs the distribution function in country Y, incurs the associated carrying costs (e.g. inventory and receivables financing), and assumes the corresponding risks (e.g. inventory, credit and financing risks). Under the contract between Primair and Company S, Company S is required to act as a marketing agent to assist in developing the market for R watches in country Y. Company S consults with Primair in developing the country Y marketing strategy for R watches. Primair develops the overall marketing plan based largely on its experience in other countries, it develops and approves the marketing budgets, and it makes final decisions regarding advertising designs, product positioning and core advertising messages. Company S consults on local market issues related to advertising, assists in executing the marketing strategy under Primair’s direction, and provides evaluations of the effectiveness of various elements of the marketing strategy. As compensation for providing these marketing support activities, Company S receives from Primair a service fee based on the level of marketing expenditure it incurs and including an appropriate profit element. 23. Assume for the purpose of this example that, based upon a thorough comparability analysis, including a detailed functional analysis, it is possible to conclude that the price Company S pays Primair for the R watches should be analysed separately from the compensation Company S receives for the marketing it undertakes on behalf of Primair. Assume further that based upon identified comparable transactions, the price paid for the watches is arm’s length and that this price enables Company S to earn an arm’s length level of compensation from selling the watches for the distribution function it performs, the assets it uses and the risks it assumes. 24. In Years 1 to 3, Company S embarks on a strategy that is consistent with its agreement with Primair to develop the country Y market for R watches. In the process, Company S incurs marketing expenses. Consistent with the contract, Company S is reimbursed by Primair for the marketing expenses it incurs, and is paid a mark-up on those expenses. By the end of Year 2, the R trademark and trade name have become well established in country Y. The compensation derived by Company S for the marketing activities it performed on behalf of Primair is determined to be arm’s length, based upon comparison to that paid to independent advertising and marketing agents identified and determined to be comparable as part of the comparability analysis. 25. Under these circumstances, Primair is entitled to retain any income derived from exploiting the R trademark and trade name in the country Y market that exceeds the arm’s length compensation to Company S for its functions and no transfer pricing adjustment is warranted under the circumstances ...

16. Primero is the parent company of an MNE group engaged in the pharmaceutical business and does business in country M. Primero develops patents and other intangibles relating to Product X and registers those patents in countries around the world. 17. Primero retains its wholly owned country N subsidiary, Company S, to distribute Product X throughout Europe and the Middle East on a limited risk basis. The distribution agreement provides that Primero, and not Company S, is to bear product recall and product liability risk, and provides further that Primero will be entitled to all profit or loss from selling Product X in the territory after providing Company S with the agreed level of compensation for its distribution functions. Operating under the contract, Company S purchases Product X from Primero and resells Product X to independent customers in countries throughout its geographical area of operation. In performing its distribution functions, Company S follows all applicable regulatory requirements. 18. In the first three years of operations, Company S earns returns from its distribution functions that are consistent with its limited risk characterisation and the terms of the distribution contract. Its returns reflect the fact that Primero, and not Company S, is entitled to retain income derived from exploitation of the intangibles with respect to Product X. After three years of operation, it becomes apparent that Product X causes serious side effects in a significant percentage of those patients that use the product and it becomes necessary to recall the product and remove it from the market. Company S incurs substantial costs in connection with the recall. Primero does not reimburse Company S for these recall related costs or for the resulting product liability claims. 19. Under these circumstances, there is an inconsistency between Primero’s asserted entitlement to returns derived from exploiting the Product X intangibles and its failure to bear the costs associated with the risks supporting that assertion. A transfer pricing adjustment would be appropriate to remedy the inconsistency. In determining the appropriate adjustment, it would be necessary to determine the true transaction between the parties by applying the provisions of Section D. 1 of Chapter I. In doing so, it would be appropriate to consider the risks assumed by each of the parties on the basis of the course of conduct followed by the parties over the term of the agreement, the control over risk exercised by Primero and Company S, and other relevant facts. If it is determined that the true nature of the relationship between the parties is that of a limited risk distribution arrangement, then the most appropriate adjustment would likely take the form of an allocation of the recall and product liability related costs from Company S to Primero. Alternatively, although unlikely, if it is determined on the basis of all the relevant facts that the true nature of the relationship between the parties includes the exercising control over product liability and recall risk by Company S, and if an arm’s length price can be identified on the basis of the comparability analysis, an increase in the distribution margins of Company S for all years might be made to reflect the true risk allocation between the parties ...

The selection and application of a transfer pricing method to post-restructuring controlled transactions must derive from the analysis of the economically relevant characteristics of the controlled transaction as accurately delineated. It is essential to understand what the functions, assets and risks involved in the post-restructuring transactions are, and what party performs, uses or assumes them. This requires information to be available on the functions, assets and risks of both parties to a transaction, e.g. the restructured entity and the foreign associated enterprise with which it transacts. The analysis should go beyond the label assigned to the restructured entity, as an entity that is labelled as a “commissionnaire” or “limited risk distributor” can sometimes be found to own valuable local intangibles and to continue to assume significant market risks, and an entity that is labelled as a “contract manufacturer” can sometimes be found to pursue significant development activities or to own and use unique intangibles. In post-restructuring situations, particular attention should be paid to the identification of the valuable intangibles and the economically significant risks that effectively remain with the restructured entity (including, where applicable, local non-protected intangibles), and to whether such an allocation of intangibles and risks satisfies the arm’s length principle. The form of remuneration cannot dictate inappropriate risk allocations. It is the determination of how the parties actually control risks, and whether they have the financial capacity to assume the risks, as set out in the process of analysing risk in Chapter I, which will determine the assumption of risks by the parties, and consequently dictate the selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method. Issues regarding risks and intangibles are discussed in Part I of this chapter ...

Where a restructuring involves a transfer to a foreign associated enterprise of risks that were previously assumed by a taxpayer, it may be important to examine whether the transfer of risks only concerns the future risks that will arise from the post-restructuring activities or also the risks existing at the time of the restructuring as a result of pre-conversion activities, i.e. there is a cut-off issue. For instance, consider a situation in which a distributor was assuming bad debt risks which it will no longer assume after its being restructured as a “limited risk distributor”, and that it is being compared with a long-established “limited risk distributor” that never assumed bad debt risk. It may be important when comparing both situations to examine, based on the guidance in Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I, whether the “limited risk distributor” that results from a conversion still assumes the risks associated with bad debts that arose before the restructuring at the time it was full-fledged, or whether all the bad debt risks including those that existed at the time of the conversion were transferred ...

When one compares a situation where a long-established full-fledged distributor is converted into a limited risk distributor with a situation where a limited risk distributor has been in existence in the market for the same duration, there might also be differences because the full-fledged distributor may have performed some functions, borne some expenses (e.g. marketing expenses), assumed some risks and contributed to the development of some intangibles before its conversion that the long-existing “limited risk distributor” may not have performed, borne, assumed or contributed to. The question arises whether at arm’s length such additional functions, assets and risks should only affect the remuneration of the distributor before its being converted, whether they should be taken into account to determine a remuneration of the transfers that take place upon the conversion (and if so how), whether they should affect the remuneration of the restructured limited risk distributor (and if so how), or a combination of these three possibilities. For instance, if it is found that the pre-restructuring activities led the full-fledged distributor to own some intangibles while the long-established limited risk distributor does not, the arm’s length principle may require these intangibles either to be remunerated upon the restructuring if they are transferred by the full-fledged distributor to a foreign associated enterprise, or to be taken into account in the determination of the arm’s length remuneration of the post-restructuring activities if they are not transferred (see Section E.2 of Part I above and Chapter VI of these Guidelines) ...

Some differences in the starting position of the restructured entity compared to the position of a newly set up operation can relate to the established presence of the operation. For instance, if one compares a situation where a long-established full-fledged distributor is converted into a limited risk distributor with a situation where a limited risk distributor is established in a market where the group did not have any previous commercial presence, market penetration efforts might be needed for the new entrant which are not needed for the converted entity. This may affect the comparability analysis and the determination of the arm’s length remuneration in both situations ...

Where an arrangement between associated enterprises replaces an existing arrangement (restructuring), there may be factual differences in the starting position of the restructured entity compared to the position of a newly set up operation. Sometimes, the post-restructuring arrangement is negotiated between parties that have had prior contractual and commercial relationships. In such a situation, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case and in particular on the rights and obligations derived by the parties from these prior arrangements, this may affect the options realistically available to the parties in negotiating the terms of the new arrangement and therefore the conditions of the restructuring and of the post-restructuring arrangements (see paragraphs 9.27-9.31 for a discussion of options realistically available in the context of determining the arm’s length compensation for the restructuring itself). For instance, assume a party has proved in the past to be able to perform well as a full-fledged distributor performing a whole range of marketing and selling functions, employing and developing valuable marketing intangible assets and assuming a range of risks associated with its activity such as inventory risks, bad debt risks and market risks. Assume that its distribution contract is re-negotiated and converted into a “limited risk distribution” contract whereby it will perform limited marketing activities under the supervision of a foreign associated enterprise, employ limited marketing intangibles and assume limited risks in its relationship with the foreign associated enterprise and customers. In such a situation, the restructured distributor would not be in the same position as a newly established distributor ...

9.46 At arm’s length, the response is likely to depend on the rights and other assets of the parties, on the profit potential of the distributor and of its associated enterprise in relation to both business models (full-fledged and low risk distributor) as well as the expected duration of the new arrangement. In particular, in evaluating profit potential, it is necessary to evaluate whether historic profits (determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle) are an indicator of future profit potential, or whether there have been changes in the business environment around the time of the restructuring that mean that past performance is not an indicator of profit potential. For example, competing products could have the effect of eroding profitability, and new technology or consumer preferences could render the products less attractive. The consideration of these factors from perspective of the distributor can be illustrated with the following example ...

As another example, assume a full-fledged distributor is operating under a long term contractual arrangement for a given type of transaction. Assume that, based on its rights under the long term contract with respect to these transactions, it has the option realistically available to it to accept or refuse being converted into a limited risk distributor operating for a foreign associated enterprise, and that an arm’s length remuneration for such a low risk distribution activity is estimated to be a stable profit of +2% per year while the excess profit potential associated with the risks would now be attributed to the foreign associated enterprise. Assume for the purpose of this example that the restructuring leads to the renegotiation of the existing contractual arrangements, but it does not entail the transfer of assets other than its rights under the long term contract. From the perspective of the distributor, the question arises as to whether the new arrangement (taking into account both the remuneration for the post-restructuring transactions and any compensation for the restructuring itself) is expected to make it as well off as its realistic – albeit riskier – alternatives. If not, this would imply that the post-restructuring arrangement is not priced at arm’s length and that additional compensation would be needed to appropriately remunerate the distributor for the restructuring, or that an assessment of the commercial rationality of the transaction based on Section D.2 may be necessary. Furthermore, for transfer pricing purposes, it is important to determine whether risks contractually transferred as part of the business restructuring, are assumed by the foreign associated enterprise in accordance with the guidance in Section D. 1 of Chapter I ...

For instance, where a full-fledged distributor is converted into a limited-risk distributor or commissionnaire resulting in the reduction or elimination of risks relating to inventory in the restructured enterprise, in order to determine whether such risk is economically significant the tax administration may want to analyse: The role of inventory in the business model (for example, speed to market, comprehensive range), The nature of the inventory (for example, spare parts, fresh flowers), The level of investment in inventory, The factors giving rise to inventory write-downs or obsolescence (for example, perishability, pricing pressures, speed of technical improvements, market conditions), The history of write-down and stock obsolescence, and whether any commercial changes affect the reliability of historic performance as an indicator of current risk, The cost of insuring against damage or loss of inventory, and The history of damage or loss (if uninsured) ...

A second example relates to the purported transfer of credit risk as part of a business restructuring. The analysis under Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I would take into account the contractual terms before and after the restructuring, but would also examine how the parties operate in relation to the risk before and after the restructuring. The analysis would then examine whether the party that contractually assumes the risk controls the risk in practice through relevant capability and decision-making as defined in paragraph 1.65 and has the financial capacity to assume such risk as defined in paragraph 1.64. It is important to note that a party that before the restructuring did not assume a risk under the analysis of Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I cannot transfer it to another party, and a party that after the restructuring does not assume a risk under the analysis of Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I should not be allocated the profit potential associated with that risk. For example, suppose that before a business restructuring, a full-fledged distributor contractually assumes bad debt risks, which is reflected in the balance sheet at year end. However, the analysis described above establishes that before the business restructuring, decisions about the extension of credit terms to customers and debt recovery were taken by an associated enterprise and not by the distributor, and the associated enterprise reimbursed the costs of irrecoverable debts. It is also determined that the associated enterprise is the only entity that controlled the risk and had the financial capacity to assume the bad debt risk, leading to the conclusion that, before the business restructuring, the risk was not assumed by the distributor. In such a case there is no bad debt risk for the distributor to transfer as part of the business restructuring. In other circumstances it may be found that before the business restructuring the distributor controlled the bad debt risk and had the financial capacity to assume the risk it contractually assumed, but mitigated its risk through indemnification arrangements or debt factoring arrangements with an associated enterprise in exchange for appropriate compensation. Following the business restructuring, the bad debt risk is contractually assumed by that associated enterprise which, as determined under the analysis described above, now controls the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk. The risk has, therefore been transferred but the impact on the profits of the distributor going forward compared with the past resulting from the transfer of this risk alone may be limited, because before the restructuring steps had been taken and costs incurred to mitigate the risk outcomes of the distributor ...

Risks are of critical importance in the context of business restructurings. Usually, in the open market, the assumption of risk associated with a commercial opportunity affects the profit potential of that opportunity, and the allocation of risk assumed between the parties to the arrangement affects how profits or losses resulting from the transaction are allocated through the arm’s length pricing of the transaction. Business restructurings often result in local operations being converted into low risk operations (e.g. “low risk distributors”, or “low risk contract manufacturers”) and being remunerated with a relatively low (but generally stable) return on the grounds that the economically significant risks are assumed by another party to which the profits or losses associated with those risks are allocated. For this reason, an examination of the allocation of risks between associated enterprises before and after the restructuring is an essential part of the functional analysis. Such analysis should allow tax administrations to assess the transfer of the economically significant risks of the business that is restructured and the consequences of that transfer for the application of the arm’s length principle to the restructuring itself and to the post-restructuring transactions ...

Restructurings can take a variety of different forms and may involve two or more members of an MNE group. For example, a simple pre-restructuring arrangement could involve a full-fledged manufacturer producing goods and selling them to an associated full-fledged distributor for on-sale into the market. The restructuring could involve a modification to that two-party arrangement, whereby the distributor is converted to a limited risk distributor or commissionnaire, with risks previously assumed by the full-fledged distributor being assumed by the manufacturer (taking into account the guidance in Section D. 1 of Chapter I. Frequently, the restructuring will be more complicated, with functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by either or both parties to a pre-restructuring arrangement shifting to one or more members of the group ...

For example, a tested party engaged in the marketing and distribution of goods purchased in controlled transactions may have developed marketing intangibles in its geographic area of operation, including customer lists, customer relationships, and customer data. It may also have developed advantageous logistical know-how or software and other tools that it uses in conducting its distribution business. The impact of such intangibles on the profitability of the tested party should be considered in conducting a comparability analysis ...

In a transfer pricing analysis where the most appropriate transfer pricing method is the resale price method, the cost-plus method, or the transactional net margin method, the less complex of the parties to the controlled transaction is often selected as the tested party. In many cases, an arm’s length price or level of profit for the tested party can be determined without the need to value the intangibles used in connection with the transaction. That would generally be the case where only the non-tested party uses intangibles. In some cases, however, the tested party may in fact use intangibles notwithstanding its relatively less complex operations. Similarly, parties to potentially comparable uncontrolled transactions may use intangibles. Where either of these is the case, it becomes necessary to consider the intangibles used by the tested party and by the parties to potentially comparable uncontrolled transactions as one comparability factor in the analysis ...

This section provides supplemental guidance for applying the rules of Chapters I – III in situations where one or both parties to a controlled transaction uses intangibles in connection with the sale of goods or the provision of services, but where no transfer of intangibles or interests in intangibles occurs. Where intangibles are present, the transfer pricing analysis must carefully consider the effect of the intangibles involved on the prices and other conditions of controlled transactions ...

The need to consider the use of intangibles by a party to a controlled transaction involving a sale of goods can be illustrated as follows. Assume that a car manufacturer uses valuable proprietary patents to manufacture the cars that it then sells to associated distributors. Assume that the patents significantly contribute to the value of the cars. The patents and the value they contribute should be identified and taken into account in the comparability analysis of the transaction consisting in the sales of cars by the car manufacturer to its associated distributors, in selecting the most appropriate transfer pricing method for the transactions, and in selecting the tested party. The associated distributors purchasing the cars do not, however, acquire any right in the manufacturer’s patents. In such a case, the patents are used in the manufacturing and may affect the value of the cars, but the patents themselves are not transferred ...

The resale price method begins with the price at which a product that has been purchased from an associated enterprise is resold to an independent enterprise. This price (the resale price) is then reduced by an appropriate gross margin on this price (the “resale price margin”) representing the amount out of which the reseller would seek to cover its selling and other operating expenses and, in the light of the functions performed (taking into account assets used and risks assumed), make an appropriate profit. What is left after subtracting the gross margin can be regarded, after adjustment for other costs associated with the purchase of the product (e.g. customs duties), as an arm’s length price for the original transfer of property between the associated enterprises. This method is probably most useful where it is applied to marketing operations ...

In November 2006 Microsoft Corp. purchased 100% of the shares of Gteko Ltd. (IT Support technology), for USD 90 million. The purchase was made with the intention of integrating Gteko’s technology into Microsoft’s own products. Following this purchase of Gteko Ltd., the employees were transferred to the local Microsoft subsidiary and a few months later another agreement was entered transferring Gteko’s intellectual property/intangibles to Microsoft. This transfer was priced at USD 26 million based on the purchase price allocation (PPA). The tax authorities of Israel found that the price of 26 mio USD used in the transaction was not at arm’s length. It was further argued, that the transaction was not only a transfer of some intangibles but rather a transfer of all assets owned by Gteko as a going concern to Microsoft Corp. The arm’s length price for the transfer was set at USD 80 million. The District Court agreed with the assessment and held that “value does not disappear or evaporate” and that Gteko had not succeeded in arguing why the total values in Gteko should not be equal to the $90 million share price paid. Israel-vs-Gteko-Microsoft-June-2017-District-Court-English-translation-of-ITAs-announcement ...

Dell Spain is part of a multinational group (Dell) that manufactures and sells computers. Dell Ireland, operates as distribution hub for most of Europe. Dell Ireland has appointed related entities to operate as its commissionaires in several countries; Dell Spain and Dell France are part of this commissionaire network. The group operates through a direct sales model and sales to private customers in Spain are conducted by Dell France, through a call centre and a web page. Dell Spain use to operate as a full-fledged distributor, but after entering into a commissionaire agreement Dell Spain now served large customers on behalf of Dell Ireland. A tax assessment was issued by the tax authorities. According to the assessment the activities in Spain constituted a Permanent Establishment of Dell Ireland to which profits had to allocated for FY 2001-2003. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court concludes that the activities of Dell Spain constitutes a Permanent Establishment of Dell Ireland under both the “dependent agent” and “fixed place of business” clauses of the treaty. The expression “acting on behalf of an enterprise” included in article 5.5 of the Spain-Ireland tax treaty does not necessarily require a direct representation between the principal and the commissionaire, but rather refers to the ability of the commissionaire to bind the principal with the third party even when there is no legal agreement between the latter two. Furthermore, the Supreme Court considers that Dell Spain cannot be deemed as an independent agent since it operated exclusively for Dell Ireland under control and instructions from the same. Regarding the “fixed place of business”, the Supreme Court states that having a place at the principal’s disposal also includes the use of such premises through another entity which carries out the principal’s activity under its supervision. This Court also explained that considering a company as a PE is not only based on its capacity to conclude contracts that bind the company but also on the functional and factual correlation between the agent and the company in the sense that the agent has sufficient authority to bind the company in its day to day business, following the instructions of the company and under its control. In regards to question of Employee stock option expences,  the Court partially upheld the claim of Dell and stated “”expenses that are correlated with income” are deductible expenses. Consequently, any expense correlated with income is an accounting expense, and if any accounting expense is a deductible expense in companies, with no exceptions other than those provided for by law” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Spain-vs-Dell-20-june-2016-Supreme-Court-case-nr-2861-2016 ...

Gap International Sourcing was engaged in sourcing products from India to other group companies. The activity comprised of assistance in identification of vendors, provision of assistance to vendors in procurement of apparel, inspection and quality control and coordination with vendors to ensure delivery of goods to group companies. The necessary technical and intellectual basis for provision of these services were provided by the group companies. The Indian company used TNMM to benchmark the service fee at full cost plus 15%. The tax administration disregarded the functional profile and characterisation of Gap International Sourcing by assuming that the functional profile was substantially higher than those of limited risk support service providers. The tax administration found that a cost plus form of remuneration did not take into account substantial intangible assets owned by the taxpayer. Intangibles were identified to be human asset intangibles, supply chain intangibles and location savings. Based on above, the tax administration set the arm’s length remuneration at a commission of 5% on the value of the products sourced. The Tribunal held, that for determining the arm’s length price of international transaction, it is importent to take the characterisation of the taxpayer and the relatet party into consideration through a functional analysis. The Tribunal observed the following specifically for Gap International Sourcing: • No significant business risks were assumed. • No capacity to assume business risks. • No human resource intangibles were developed. • No supply chain intangibles were developed. • Location savings could not be attributed to the taxpayer. The Tribunal held that the arm’s-length cost plus mark-up for the taxpayer should be 32% (- as opposed to the cost plus 830% and 660% for the two years under consideration, derived by resorting to a commission based model of 5%). The Tribunal also stated that the arm’s length principle as determined by either the taxpayer or Revenue cannot lead to manifestly absurd or abnormal financial results. Gap_International_Sourcing_..._vs_Assessee_on_17_May,_2016 ...

A Danish production company terminated a 10-year license and distribution agreement with a group distribution company one year prior to expiry of the agreement. The distribution agreement was transferred to another group company and the new distribution company agreed as a successor in interest to pay a “termination fee” to the former distribution company. However, the termination fee was paid by the Danish production company and the amount was depreciated in the tax-return. The Danish company claimed that it was a transfer pricing case and argued that the tax administration could only adjust agreed prices and conditions of the agreement if the requirements for making a transfer pricing correction were met. The Supreme Court stated that the general principles of tax law in the State Tax Act §§ 4-6 also applies to the related companies. Hence, the question was whether the termination fee was held for “acquiring, securing and maintaining the applicant’s income”, cf. the state tax act § 6. The Supreme Court found that payment of the termination fee did not have a sufficient connection to the Danish company’s income acquisition for the payment to be tax deductible. The applicant was therefore not entitled to tax depreciation of the payment. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Danish tax administration. Click here for translation Denmark-vs-Corp-October-2015-Supreme-Court-SKM2015-659HR ...

Mitsui & Co., an Indian subsidiary in a Japanese multinational trading group, was involved in trade support activities which it performed to the benefit of the Japanese parent. The Indian subsidiary provided business support services for a wide range of products. These controlled transactions were benchmarked by the application of the TNMM using Berry Ratio as the PLI. The Indian tax authorities contested the transfer pricing approach. Judgement of the Income Tax Appelant Tribunal The Indian tax court ruled in favor of Mitsui. According to the Court, the Indian subsidiary did not bear any risk related to possession of goods, nor did it bear financial risk, or warranty risk. Mitsui-Sogo-Shosha-TP ...

LG India is a wholly owned subsidiary of LG Korea, a multinational manufacturer of electronic products and electrical appliances. LG Korea and LG India entered into a technical assistance and royalty agreement in 2001 where LG India, as a licensed manufacturer, would pay a 1% royalty to LG Korea for the use of various rights for the manufacture and sale of products in India. The agreement also gave LG India a royalty-free use of the LG brand name and trademarks. The tax tribunal in 2013 held that the advertising, marketing and promotion (AMP) expenditure in excess of the arm’s length range helps to promote the brand of the foreign associated enterprise and that the Indian associated enterprise should necessarily be compensated by the foreign one. In reaching the above conclusion, the special bench applied the “bright line” test used by a US Court in DHL Corp v Commissioner. The 2014 Appeal Case Lg_Electronics_India_Pvt._Ltd.,_..._vs_Assessee_on_8_December,_2014 The Prior 2013 Judgement from the ITA LG_Electronics_AMP_Expenditure_Bright_Line ...

See the documents from the US Senate hearings on offshore profit shifting and abusive tax schemes Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code – Part 1 (Microsoft & Hewlett-Packard) and Part 2 (Apple Inc.), Carl Levin’s opening statements. Profit Shifting Part 1, September 2012 OPENING, LEVIN-Carl US Senate hearing on Profit Shifting, May 2013, OPENING LEVIN-Carl ...

In the French Nestlé water case, the following arguments were made by the company: The administration, which bears the burden of proof under the provisions of Article 57 of the General Tax Code, of paragraphs 38, 39 and 42 of the Instruction 13 l-7-98 of 23 July 199 8 and case law, does not establish the presumption of indirect transfer of profits abroad that would constitute the payment of a fee to the Swiss companies A … SA, company products A … SA and Nestec SA. The mere fact that the association of the mark A … with the mark Aquarel also benefits company A … SA, owner of the mark A …, does not allow to prove the absence of profit and thus of consideration for NWE. The latter company also benefited from the combination of the two brands. Advertising alone are not enough to characterize an indirect transfer of profits abroad; in any case, the administration does not provide any quantified data and in particular no comparable study to assess the amount of the benefit that A … SA derives from the “co-branding” operation. In any event, and assuming that the Court considers that the administration has provided a presumption of proof of indirect transfer of profits abroad, it justifies that NWE benefited from an effective and sufficient counterpart in payment of the royalty to the company A … SA because the global economy of the royalty agreement perfectly respects the interests of the company NWE. The fee mainly pays for the use of the A brand, which has a value in the global agri-food market, of which bottled water is a sub-category; the European Commission notes in its decision of 22 July 1992 (Case No IV / M.190 -A …- Perrier) that the European bottled water market is extremely competitive. Only well-known brands can reasonably expect to survive in the medium to long term and, especially in France, it is important to associate bottled water with notions of health and healthy living during actions. Advertising; Although the A mark was not directly associated with the bottled water market at the time, it is recognized in the food industry as a quality brand, embodying health and lifestyle values, at a reasonable price and should, by associating it with the Aquarel brand, facilitate NWE’s access to the market. The Danone group also chose to join the Taillefine brand when it launched a new brand of water on the market. In this regard, the interview of the Chief Executive Officer of Perrier-Vittel, now A … Waters, carried out in 2001 on Group A’s strategy …, is taken out of context and can not be accepted by the Court. The fee also remunerates the costs of technical assistance and know-how under Article 26 of the contract, which is provided by A … Waters Management and Technology. Finally, the fee also remunerates the risks taken by the owner of the brand A … by associating the name A … with bottled water. The court ruled in favor of Nestlé. Click here for translation France vs Nestle_18_02_2014 CAA no _11VE03460 ...

VingCard / Elsafe had entered into a distribution agreement with related party AAH Inc. The agreement governed the internal price setting so that AAH Inc was guaranteed an annual net margin of between 1% and 5%. The interval was later changed to 1.1% – 2.9% in line with the conclusions in the internal price study. In question was the use of the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) method in connection with pricing. Judgement of the Court The court pointed out that the US distributor company was left with a limited profit which reflected the company’s role in the transaction, and that it should be possible for group companies to enter into such an a agreement. A transfer pricing model which grants guaranteed return to a foreign distributor (return on sales method with a range) as well as true-up payments including year-end adjustments of the income of the distributor, could be accepted from a Norwegian tax perspective. Click here for translation Norway vs Vingcard 2012 SC ...

Wx-Distributor (a subsidiary of the Wx-group i.d.F. Bw.) is responsible for the distribution of household appliances in Austria. It is wholly owned by Z. Deliveries to Wx-Distributor are made by production companies of the Group located in Germany, Italy, France, Slovakia, Poland and Sweden with which it has concluded distribution agreements to determine transfer prices. On average Wx-Distributor had been loss-making in FY 2001-2005. Following an tax audit, the intra-group transfer prices were re-determined for the years 2001 to 2004 by the tax authorities. It was determined that the transfer prices in two years were not within the arm’s length range. The review of the tax authorities had revealed a median EBIT margin of 1.53% and on that basis the operating margin for 2001 were set at 1.5%. For the following years the margin was set at 0.9% due to changed functions (outsourcing of accounts receivable, closure of half the IT department). The resulting adjustments were treated as hidden distribution of profits to the parent company. An appeal was filed by Wx-Distributor. Judgement of the Court The Court decided predominantly in favour of the tax authorities. Excerpts “The functions and risks described above do not justify distribution agreements that do not ensure that the applicant, as a limited risk distributor, will not be able to achieve an overall (cumulative) positive operating result over a reasonable (foreseeable) period of time. This is also the case if this would be associated with higher losses for the independent production companies.” “In the view of the UFS, the use of the median in the event that the EBIT margin achieved is outside the range is to be applied in the present case because, according to the study, there is no ‘highly reliable’ range (cf. Loukota/Jirousek comments on the criticism of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2010 ÖStZ 2011) due to comparability deficiencies. Insofar as the applicant assumes that the correction of the EBIT margin to the median value constitutes an impermissible punitive taxation and possibly seeks an adjustment to the lower bandwidth value, whereby it recognisably refers to a decision of the BFH of 17 October 2001 I R 103/00, according to which an estimate is based on the upper or lower value of the bandwidth of arm’s length transfer prices, which is more favourable for the taxpayer. In addition to the existing comparability deficiencies, which in themselves justify an adjustment to the median, reference should also be made to the transfer pricing study by Baker&McKenzie from 2005, which was also submitted by the applicant. It may be true that transfer prices have to be fixed in advance, but in the case at hand no transfer prices were fixed per transaction carried out; instead, distribution agreements had been concluded in unchanged form since 1999 and the arm’s length nature of these agreements was justified by the results of comparative company studies. From the above point of view, it is permissible to use a study (Baker&McKenzie) for the further assessment of the arm’s length nature of the EBIT margin, which was prepared at a time (here 31 December 2005) that follows the period in which the net returns to be assessed were generated (2001 to 2005), but which refers to data material that originates from this period (2002 to 2004). This is because a comparison of the net returns achieved in the period under review (2001 to 2005) with comparable enterprises based on data from the years 1996 to 1999 can at best be used for planning purposes, but subsequent significant developments in the period under review (e.g. economic downturns…) are not (or cannot be) taken into account. According to Baker&McKenzie, the data material used in this process led to the result of comparable net yields with a median of 2.3% and a quartile range between 1.3% and 3.9%. An appendix to this study, which was prepared especially for the company and deals with the special features of inventory adjustment, accounts receivable and accounts payable, shows a comparable median EBIT return for the company of 2.6% with a quartile range of 1.5% to 4.1%. The values shown were achieved by comparable companies in the audit period and are consistently above the adapted median according to the transfer pricing study by Ernst & Young, which is why the adjustment to the lower range requested by the applicant is also unjustified for this reason. If the UFS bases its assessment of the arm’s length transfer price on the Ernst & Young study and uses the median achieved there, this is because it follows the applicant’s argumentation regarding the price determination required in advance and for this reason bases its considerations regarding comparable net returns on the modified Ernst & Young transfer price study. There are no other particular influencing factors that would make an adjustment of this study necessary. In view of the above considerations, the UFS assumes that the median net return of 1.49% determined in the modified comparative study by Ernst & Young submitted by the applicant is appropriate and should be applied for the audit period.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Austria vs Distributor UFS 30-7-2012 RV-2515-W-0960673-1 ...

In the Microsoft case, the distribution activity of a French subsidiary of an American group was transferred to its Irish sister company. The French subsidiary was then converted into a sales agent of the Irish subsidiary. The Commission rate earned by the French subsidiary was reduced from 25% to 18%. The French tax authorities, taking into account the previous 25% commission rate, considered that it should not have been reduced and reinstated the corresponding income into the French company’s taxable income. To support their position, the French tax authorities conducted a benchmarking study. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the mere fact that the commission rate has been reduced does not demonstrate the transfer of profits abroad. Moreover, the Court confirmed that the transfer of profits abroad was not proved due to the irrelevance of the methods used and of the comparables found by the French tax authorities. The companies were not suitable for comparison because they were not in the same market as Microsoft France and that some of them were not independent companies. Click here for translation France vs Microsoft 2012 ...

Prior to a business restructuring in 1999, the Spanish subsidiary, Roche Vitaminas S.A., was a full-fledged distributor, involved in manufacturing, importing, and selling the pharmaceutical products in the Spanish and Portuguese markets. In 1999 the Spanish subsidiary and the Swiss parent, Roche Vitamins Europe Ltd., entered into a manufacturing agreement and a distribution agreement. Under the manufacturing agreement, the Spanish subsidiary manufactured products  according to directions and using formulas, know-how, patents, and trademarks from the Swiss parent. These manufacturing activities were remunerated at cost plus 3.3 percent. Under the distribution (agency) agreement, the Spanish subsidiary would “represent, protect and promote” the products. These activities were remunerated at 2 percent of sales. The Spanish subsidiary was now characterized as a contract manufacturer and commission agent and the taxable profits in Spain were much lower than before the business restructuring. The Spanish tax authorities argued that the activities constituted a PE in Spain according to article 5 of DTT between Spain and Switzerland. Therefore, part of the profits should be allocated to the Spanish subsidiary in accordance with article 7 of the DTT. Supreme Court Judgement The Supreme Court held that the restructured Spanish entity created a PE of Roche Vitamins Europe Ltd. in Switzerland. The profits attributed to the PE included not only the manufacturing profits but also profits from the distribution activity performed on behalf of Roche Vitamins Europe Ltd. in Switzerland. Excerpts “The administration is therefore correct in stating that the applicant company operated in Spain by means of a permanent establishment…” “In short, what is laid down in these two paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 7 of the Spanish-Swiss Convention (in summary form) is that: (a) If a taxpayer acts in a State, of which he is not a resident, through a permanent establishment, then the profits of that taxpayer may be taxed in that State, but only to the extent that such profits are attributable to the said re-establishment. (b) This means that only the profit that the non-resident would have made in that State if he had had a full presence (as a resident), through a separate and distinct company, will be taxable in that State; but, of course, only in respect of the activity carried out by that establishment. The Audiencia Nacional, contrary to this reading of Article 7, establishes that if a non-resident company has a permanent establishment, then it must be taxed in the State in which that establishment is located for all the activities carried out in the territory of that State, even if they are not carried out through the permanent establishment. Contrary to this, and by application of the only possible interpretation of Article 7(1) and (2) (already explained and in accordance with the criteria of the OECD Tax Committee, as we shall see below), a permanent establishment should only be taxed in the State in which it is located on the profit derived from the activity carried out through the permanent establishment.” “…the sales figure must include all sales made by the permanent establishment. We consider that it is established in the file, contrary to the appellant’s submissions, that those sales must include those made to Portuguese customers, since they were made as a result of the promotional and marketing activities of Roche Vitaminas SA and are therefore attributable to it. It is also common ground that the expenses referred to by the appellant have been taken into account, as is stated in the official document dated 12 July 2002. For the rest, we refer to what was established in the settlement agreement dated 23 April 2003, as well as to the full arguments contained in the judgment under appeal.” Click here for english translation Click here for other translation Spain-vs-Roche-Januar-2014-Supreme-Court-case-nr.-1626-2008 ...

The Irish company Dell Products was taxable in Norway for years 2003-2006. The issue was whether Dell Products had a permenent establishment in Norway, cf. Article 5. 5 in the tax treaty between Ireland and Norway from 2000. Dell Products sold PC’s and equipment by a commission agreement in which the Irish company was Principal and the Norwegian company Dell AS was commissioner. Both the companies are part of the Dell group. Dell AS sold to customers who were large enterprises and the public sector. It was not disputed that the agreement was not legally binding on Dell Products in relation to customers. Dell Products would have a permanent establishment in Norway and may be taxable Norway, if Dell Norway had acted “on behalf of” and had the “authority to conclude contracts on behalf of the” Dell, ref. Tax Treaty Article 5. 5. Unlike the District Court and the Court of Appeal the Supreme Court did not wote in favor of the tax authorities. The wording of the article strongly support that the commissioner must bind the principal in relation to the customer. The article is identical to the OECD Model Convention, and it had the same weight that also the commentary for this support a requirement for judicial bond. Also other legal sources pointed in the same conclusion. When both the wording and other legal sources support this condition, Article 5. 5 cannot lead to an anna result. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that Dell Products did not have a permanent establishment in Norway. Click here for translation Norway Dell-Norge-2011-december-HRD-saknr2011-755 ...

The French company, Zimmer SAS, distributed products for Zimmer Limited. In 1995 the company was converted into a commissionaire (acting in its own name but on behalf of Zimmer Ltd.). The French tax authorities argued that the commissionaire was taxable as a permanent establishment of the principal, because the commissionaire could bind the principal. The Court ruled that the commissionaire could not bind the principal. Therefore, the French commissionaire could not be a permanent establishment of the principal. Click here for English translation France-vs-Zimmer-March-2010-case-nr-304715 ...

Adobe Systems Co., a Japanese subsidiary of Adobe Systems Inc., received remuneration from Dutch and Irish group companies for promotion and marketing of Adobe software sold in Japan The remuneration of Adobe Systems Co. was determined as general administrative expenses plus 1.5% of net sales in Japan. A transfer pricing assessment was issued by the Japanese tax authorities where transfer prices were instead based profit margins derived in comparable transactions. Adobe Systems filed an appeal seeking revokal of the assessment. Tokyo High Court held that the tax assessment should be revoked. The burden of proof in relation to the legitimacy of the transfer pricing method applied was on the tax administration. The transfer pricing method used by the tax authority was not consistent with the resale price method. The method applied by the tax authorities “…cannot be said to be “a method equivalent to the resale price standard method” prescribed in Article 66-4, Paragraph 2, Item 2, b of the Special Taxation Measures Law. Therefore, in this case, there is illegality in the process of calculating the inter-company price using this calculation method...” Click here for English translation Adobe 037584_hanrei 1 ...

Hallmark Marketing Corporation was the exclusive wholesale distributor of Hallmark products in the US and had been granted a royalty-free licence to use the Hallmark trademark in the territory. Hallmark Marketing Corporation was characterised as a routine distributor and its income was determined using the TNMM method with Berry Ratio as the PLI. The New York Division of Taxation disagreed with the use of the Berry Ratio because Hallmark Marketing Corporation also performed manufacturing activities, brand protection functions and owned non-rutine intangible assets. Judgement of the Tax Appeals Commission The Tax Appeals Commission ruled in favour of Hallmark Marketing Corporation. According to the Commission, Hallmark Marketing Corporation was a limited-risk distributor and did not provide any valuable services or non-routine intangibles. US vs Hallmark Marketing Corp Case No 819956 ...

The Bundesfinanzhof confirmed that losses incurred by a simpel distribution entity over a longer period of time trigger a rebuttable presumption in Germany that transfer prices have not been at arm’s length. A German company, Loss Distributor GmbH, imported goods from their Swiss sister company S-AG and had made continious losses over a period of time. The tax authorities found that the purchase prices paid to the S-AG had increased since 1989 and that the German company could not fully pass on the increased purchase price to its customers. Since at the same time the price of the Swiss franc had fallen since 1989, the purchase prices paid to the S-AG in the years of the dispute had been inflated and currency gains had been transferred to Switzerland in this way. A tax assessment was therefor issued. The German company appeal the assessment to the Bundesfinanzhof. The Federal Tax Court ruled in favor of the tax authorities. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Bundesfinanzhof I R 22-04 ...

A German GmbH distributed clothing for its Italian parent. The German tax authorities issued a tax assessment based on hidden profit distribution from the German GmbH in favor of its Italien parent as a result of excessive purchase prices, which led to high and continuous losses in Germany. The tax authorities determined the arm’s length price based on purchase prices, which the German GmbH had paid to external suppliers. However, these purchases accounted for only 5% of the turnover. The German Tax Court affirmed in substance a vGA (hidden profit distribution) as the tax authorities had provided no proff of deviation from arm’s length prices. If a hidden profit distribution is to be accepted, the profit shall be increased by the difference between the actually agreed price and the price agreed by independent contractual parties under similar circumstances – the arm’s length price. Where a range of arm’s length prices is produced, there are no legal basis for adjustment to the median value. The assessment must instead be based on the best value for the taxpayer. Distributors incurring losses for more than three years: The Senate understands its ruling in BFHE 170, 550, BStBl II 1993, 457 to say that whenever a distribution company sells products of an affiliate company and suffers significant losses for more than three years, a rebuttable presumption is triggered that the agreed transfer price has not been at arm’s length. The assumption of a rebuttable presumption means that the taxpayer can explain and prove why the actually agreed transfer price is nevertheless appropriate. This applies if the articles purchased exceeds 95% of the total turnover. The taxpayer may, For example, explain why the actual development is either due to mismanagement or other reasons that were not foreseen and, above all, that timely adaptation measures have been taken. Losses can be accepted over a period of more than three years if the corresponding proof is provided. It may be necessary to extend the period within which profit must be achieved. If proof is not provided and the taxpayer does not take any adaptive measures, a reasonable profit can be estimated and spread over the years. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation I R 103-00 ...

In Reynolds Tobacco, the 2%-3% commission received was considered arm’s-length, even though competitors received 8% for providing similar services. The services provided by the French company were sufficiently different, and this justified the lower commission rate charged. Excerpt from the Judgement “...by virtue of a contract concluded between the two companies on 14 December 1976, Reynolds Tobacco France covers, on behalf of its parent company, the administrative costs entailed by its representation in France in return for a commission of 2 to 3% of the amount of sales; that by maintaining that companies with a similar or comparable activity are remunerated by a commission of the order of 8% without establishing that this rate remunerates services of the same nature, the administration does not provide proof of the transfer of profits that it alleges; that neither the fact that Reynolds Tobacco France considered renegotiating the terms of its contract with the German company, nor the fact that it considered increasing its capital to prevent losses from reaching three-quarters of its capital, are such as to make it possible to consider this proof as having been provided…” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation France vs Raynolds Tobacco ...