A domestic general partnership (OHG) was the sole shareholder of an Italian corporation (A). OHG had unsecured interest bearing claims against A. During the years of the dispute, the partnership waived part of its claims against A in return for a debtor warrant. Following an audit an adjustment to the taxable income of OHG was issued by the tax authorities. The assessment was later set aside by the administrative court but on appeal by the tax authorities the BFH in 2019 upheld the assessment. A constitutional complaint was lodged against this ruling. Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court The Court upheld the complaint and overturned the BFH judgment and referred the case back to the BFH. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Germany Nov 2023 Bundesverfassungsgericht 2 BvR 1079-20 ...

JTI Acquisitions Company Ltd was a UK holding company, part of a US group, used as an acquisition vehicle to acquire another US group. The acquisition was partly financed by intercompany borrowings at an arm’s length interest rate. The tax authorities disallowed the interest expense on the basis that the loan was taken out for a unallowable purpose. Judgement of the Upper Tribunal The Court upheld the decision and dismissed JTI Acquisitions Company Ltd’s appeal. According to the Court, a main purpose of the arrangement was to secure a tax advantage for the UK members of the group. The fact that the loans were at arm’s length was relevant but not determinative. UK vs JTI ACQUISITIONS COMPANY (2011) LIMITED ...

SGL CARBON SPA paid interest on loans received from the German parent of the SGL Group. The tax authorities considered, that the interest rate applied to the intra-group loan was significantly higher than the average interest rate applied in the German market. The interest rate was therefore determined based on external CUPs SGL disagreed with the resulting assessment and brought the case before the Italien Courts. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court ruled in favor of SGL. “The first plea is well founded. The Provincial Tax Commission, in fact, in its judgment at first instance held that the notice of assessment which is the subject of the present dispute was unlawful, on the basis of two distinct rationes decidendi. In particular, the Provincial Tax Commission pointed out, first of all, the erroneousness of the criterion (so-called external comparison) employed by the Revenue Agency for the identification of normal value and, conversely, the legitimacy of the criterion (so-called of the internal comparison) applied by the taxpayer and consequent deductibility of interest: “the provision in Article 9 of Presidential Decree No. 917/1986 directs the case in preference for the comparison of interest rates towards the so-called internal comparison. The different procedure of the so-called external comparison, applied in this case, should have been accompanied by the Agency’s reasoning and argued with the assessment of the borrower’s reliability taking into account that the applicant closes its financial statements with a significant loss (… ) In relation to the monthly interest rates drawn by the Agency from the February 2006 Deutsche Bundesbank report for one-year loans to non-lenders, the Commission does not deny them a content of truth, but points out that such data would have required careful examination in order to identify the criteria of their formation, and allow the lode adjustment for comparison in a homogeneous context with the case at hand.” Secondly, the C.T.P. notes the non-existence of transfer of taxable income from Italy to Germany and, therefore, the non-existence of a condition for the applicability of the transfer pricing rules: ‘The Commission notes that the burden of financing borne by the parent company is greater than the burden borne by the appellant and this difference in burden makes it possible to verify the absence of transfer of income from Italy to Germany’. Secondly, the C.T.P. notes the non-existence of transfer of taxable income from Italy to Germany and, therefore, the non-existence of a condition for the applicability of the transfer pricing rules: ‘The Commission notes that the burden of financing borne by the parent company is greater than the burden borne by the appellant and this difference in burden makes it possible to verify the absence of transfer of income from Italy to Germany’.“ Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Italy vs SGL Carbon 040523 SC 11625-2023 ...

In 2009 the BlackRock Group acquired Barclays Global Investors for a total sum of $13,5bn. The price was paid in part by shares ($6.9bn) and in part by cash ($6.6bn). The cash payment was paid by BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC – a US Delaware Company tax resident in the UK – but funded by the parent company by issuing $4bn loan notes to the LLC. In the years following the acquisition Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC claimed tax deductions in the UK for interest payments on the intra-group loans. Following an audit in the UK the tax authorities disallowed the interest deductions. The tax authorities held that the transaction would not have happened between independent parties. They also found that the loans were entered into for an unallowable tax avoidance purpose. A UK taxpayer can be denied a deduction for interest where a loan has an unallowable purpose i.e, where a tax advantage is the company’s main purpose for entering into the loan relationship (section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009). If there is such an unallowable purpose, the company may not bring into account for that period ….so much of any debit in respect of that relationship as is attributable to the unallowable purpose. An appeal was filed by the BlackRock Group. In November 2020 the First Tier Tribunal found that an independent lender acting at arm’s length would have made loans to LLC5 in the same amount and on the same terms as to interest as were actually made by LLC4 (the “Transfer Pricing Issue”). The FTT further found that the Loans had both a commercial purpose and a tax advantage purpose but that it would be just and reasonable to apportion all the debits to the commercial purpose and so they were fully deductible by LLC5 (the “Unallowable Purpose Issue”). An appeal was then filed with the Upper Tribunal by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Upper Tribunal The Upper Tribunal found that the First Tier Tribunal had erred in law and therefore allowed HMRC’s appeal on both the transfer pricing issue and the unallowable purpose issue. The First Tier Tribunal’s Decision was set aside and the tax authorities amendments to LLC5’s tax returns were confirmed. Transfer Pricing “The actual provision of the loans from LLC4 to LLC5 differed from any arm’s length provision in that the loans would not have been made as between independent enterprises. The actual provision conferred a potential advantage in relation to United Kingdom taxation. The profits and losses of LLC5, including the allowing of debits for the interest and other expenses payable on the Loans, are to be calculated for tax purposes as if the arm’s length provision had been made or imposed instead of the actual provision. In this case, no arm’s length loan for $4 billion would have been made in the form that LLC4 made to LLC5 and hence HMRC’s amendments to the relevant returns should be upheld and confirmed.” Unallowable Purpose “The FTT did not err in finding that LLC5 had both a commercial purpose and an unallowable tax advantage main purpose in entering into the Loans. However, it was wrong to decide that the just and reasonable apportionment was solely to the commercial purpose. But for the tax advantage purpose there would have been no commercial purpose to the Loans and all the relevant facts and circumstances lead inexorably to the conclusion that the loan relationship debits should be wholly attributed to the unallowable tax purpose and so disallowed.” HMRC_v_Blackrock_Holdco_LLC5_UT-2021-000022_-_final_decision_ ...

UPS Asia is a company incorporated under the laws of Singapore and is engaged in the business of provision of supply chain management including the provision of freight forwarding and logistic services. In 2012 UPS Asia had entered into a Regional Transportation Services Agreement with UPS SCS (India) Pvt. Ltd. for the provisions of freight and logistics services. Under the Transportation Agreement, UPS Asia arranged to perform international freight transportation and provide overseas support services, while UPS India performed freight and logistics services in India to its India customers and to UPS Asia. Following an audit an assessment was issued according to which UPS Asia had a PE in India in the form of UPS India. Furthermore, profits of Rs.2,09,53,496 was considered attributable to operation in India. The tax authorities held that UPS India constitutes a PE of UPS Asia in India within the meaning of Article 5 of India–Singapore DTAA. Not satisfied with the assessment UPS Asia filed an appeal and submitted that UPS India was remunerated in accordance with the arm’s length principle (article 9) and, therefore, no further profit was required to be attributed (Article 7) to UPS India in the present case. Judgement of the Tax Appellate Tribunal The Tribunal allowed the appeal of UPS and set aside the assessment. Excerpt ” … 9. …. Thus, respectfully following the decision of the Co–ordinate Bench rendered in assessee’s own case cited supra, we hold that when the Indian A.E. is remunerated at arm’s length price no further profit attribution is required and the issue of existence of P.E. becomes wholly tax neutral. Accordingly, the addition made by the Assessing Officer is directed to be deleted. 10. In the result, appeal by the assessee is allowed in terms of our aforesaid findings. .. Click here for html-version. India vs UPS-Asia-Group-Pte.-Ltd. March 2022-ITAT-Mumbai ...

Although countries may have different views on the application of Article 9 to determine the balance of debt and equity funding of an entity within an MNE group, the purpose of this section is to provide guidance for countries that use the accurate delineation under Chapter I to determine whether a purported loan should be regarded as a loan for tax purposes (or should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital) ...

Commentary to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention notes at paragraph 3(b) that Article 9 is relevant “not only in determining whether the rate of interest provided for in a loan contract is an arm’s length rate, but also whether a prima facie loan can be regarded as a loan or should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital.” ...

For transfer pricing purposes, the aim of the analysis is to determine whether, under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, conditions have been made or imposed in transactions comprising a business restructuring that differ from those that would be made or imposed between independent enterprises; and, if so, to determine the profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, and include them in the profits of that enterprise and tax them accordingly ...

The purpose of this Chapter VI is to provide guidance specially tailored to determining arm’s length conditions for transactions that involve the use or transfer of intangibles. Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention is concerned with the conditions of transactions between associated enterprises, not with assigning particular labels to such transactions. Consequently, the key consideration is whether a transaction conveys economic value from one associated enterprise to another, whether that benefit derives from tangible property, intangibles, services or other items or activities. An item or activity can convey economic value notwithstanding the fact that it may not be specifically addressed in Chapter VI. To the extent that an item or activity conveys economic value, it should be taken into account in the determination of arm’s length prices whether or not it constitutes an intangible within the meaning of paragraph 6.6 ...

Under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, where the conditions made or imposed in the use or transfer of intangibles between two associated enterprises differ from those that would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits that would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly ...

General guidance on comparability is found in Section D of Chapter I. By definition, a comparison implies examining two terms: the controlled transaction under review and the uncontrolled transactions that are regarded as potentially comparable. The search for comparables is only part of the comparability analysis. It should be neither confused with nor separated from the comparability analysis. The search for information on potentially comparable uncontrolled transactions and the process of identifying comparables is dependent upon prior analysis of the taxpayer’s controlled transaction and of the economically relevant characteristics or comparability factors (see Section D.1 of Chapter I). A methodical, consistent approach should provide some continuity or linkage in the whole analytical process, thereby maintaining a constant relationship amongst the various steps: from the preliminary analysis of the conditions of the controlled transaction, to the selection of the transfer pricing method, through to the identification of potential comparables and ultimately a conclusion about whether the controlled transactions being examined are consistent with the arm’s length principle as described in  paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention ...

A transactional profit method examines the profits that arise from particular controlled transactions. The transactional profit methods for purposes of these Guidelines are the transactional profit split method and the transactional net margin method. Profit arising from a controlled transaction can be a relevant indicator of whether the transaction was affected by conditions that differ from those that would have been made by independent enterprises in otherwise comparable circumstances ...

This Part provides a discussion of transactional profit methods that may be used to approximate arm’s length conditions where such methods are the most appropriate to the circumstances of the case, see paragraphs 2.1 – 2.12. Transactional profit methods examine the profits that arise from particular transactions among associated enterprises. The only profit methods that satisfy the arm’s length principle are those that are consistent with Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and follow the requirement for a comparability analysis as described in these Guidelines. In particular, so-called “comparable profits methods” or “modified cost plus/resale price methods” are acceptable only to the extent that they are consistent with these Guidelines ...

Methods that are based on profits can be accepted only insofar as they are compatible with Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, especially with regard to comparability. This is achieved by applying the methods in a manner that approximates arm’s length pricing. The application of the arm’s length principle is generally based on a comparison of the price, margin or profits from particular controlled transactions with the price, margin or profits from comparable transactions between independent enterprises. In the case of a transactional profit split method, it is based on an approximation of the division of profits that independent enterprises would have expected to realise from engaging in the transaction(s) (see paragraph 2.114) ...

A practical difficulty in applying the arm’s length principle is that associated enterprises may engage in transactions that independent enterprises would not undertake. Such transactions may not necessarily be motivated by tax avoidance but may occur because in transacting business with each other, members of an MNE group face different commercial circumstances than would independent enterprises. Where independent enterprises seldom undertake transactions of the type entered into by associated enterprises, the arm’s length principle is difficult to apply because there is little or no direct evidence of what conditions would have been established by independent enterprises. The mere fact that a transaction may not be found between independent parties does not of itself mean that it is not arm’s length ...

The arm’s length principle is viewed by some as inherently flawed because the separate entity approach may not always account for the economies of scale and interrelation of diverse activities created by integrated businesses. There are, however, no widely accepted objective criteria for allocating between associated enterprises the economies of scale or benefits of integration resulting from group membership. The issue of possible alternatives to the arm’s length principle is discussed in Section C below ...

The arm’s length principle has also been found to work effectively in the vast majority of cases. For example, there are many cases involving the purchase and sale of commodities and the lending of money where an arm’s length price may readily be found in a comparable transaction undertaken by comparable independent enterprises under comparable circumstances. There are also many cases where a relevant comparison of transactions can be made at the level of financial indicators such as mark-up on costs, gross margin, or net profit indicators. Nevertheless, there are some significant cases in which the arm’s length principle is difficult and complicated to apply, for example, in MNE groups dealing in the integrated production of highly specialised goods, in unique intangibles, and/or in the provision of specialised services. Solutions exist to deal with such difficult cases, including the use of the transactional profit split method described in Chapter II, Part III of these Guidelines in those situations where it is the most appropriate method in the circumstances of the case ...

There are several reasons why OECD member countries and other countries have adopted the arm’s length principle. A major reason is that the arm’s length principle provides broad parity of tax treatment for members of MNE groups and independent enterprises. Because the arm’s length principle puts associated and independent enterprises on a more equal footing for tax purposes, it avoids the creation of tax advantages or disadvantages that would otherwise distort the relative competitive positions of either type of entity. In so removing these tax considerations from economic decisions, the arm’s length principle promotes the growth of international trade and investment ...

It is important to put the issue of comparability into perspective in order to emphasise the need for an approach that is balanced in terms of, on the one hand, its reliability and, on the other, the burden it creates for taxpayers and tax administrations. Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention is the foundation for comparability analyses because it introduces the need for: A comparison between conditions (including prices, but not only prices) made or imposed between associated enterprises and those which would be made between independent enterprises, in order to determine whether a re-writing of the accounts for the purposes of calculating tax liabilities of associated enterprises is authorised under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (see paragraph 2 of the Commentary on Article 9); and A determination of the profits which would have accrued at arm’s length, in order to determine the quantum of any re-writing of accounts ...

The authoritative statement of the arm’s length principle is found in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, which forms the basis of bilateral tax treaties involving OECD member countries and an increasing number of non-member countries. Article 9 provides: [Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two [associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. By seeking to adjust profits by reference to the conditions which would have obtained between independent enterprises in comparable transactions and comparable circumstances (i.e. in “comparable uncontrolled transactions”), the arm’s length principle follows the approach of treating the members of an MNE group as operating as separate entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified business. Because the separate entity approach treats the members of an MNE group as if they were independent entities, attention is focused on the nature of the transactions between those members and on whether the conditions thereof differ from the conditions that would be obtained in comparable uncontrolled transactions. Such an analysis of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, which is referred to as a “comparability analysis”, is at the heart of the application of the arm’s length principle. Guidance on the comparability analysis is found in Section D below and in Chapter III ...

It should not be assumed that the conditions established in the commercial and financial relations between associated enterprises will invariably deviate from what the open market would demand. Associated enterprises in MNEs sometimes have a considerable amount of autonomy and can often bargain with each other as though they were independent enterprises. Enterprises respond to economic situations arising from market conditions, in their relations with both third parties and associated enterprises. For example, local managers may be interested in establishing good profit records and therefore would not want to establish prices that would reduce the profits of their own companies. Tax administrations should keep these considerations in mind to facilitate efficient allocation of their resources in selecting and conducting transfer pricing examinations. Sometimes, it may occur that the relationship between the associated enterprises may influence the outcome of the bargaining. Therefore, evidence of hard bargaining alone is not sufficient to establish that the transactions are at arm’s length ...

In seeking to achieve the balance between the interests of taxpayers and tax administrators in a way that is fair to all parties, it is necessary to consider all aspects of the system that are relevant in a transfer pricing case. One such aspect is the allocation of the burden of proof. In most jurisdictions, the tax administration bears the burden of proof, which may require the tax administration to make a prima facie showing that the taxpayer’s pricing is inconsistent with the arm’s length principle. It should be noted, however, that even in such a case a tax administration might still reasonably oblige the taxpayer to produce its records to enable the tax administration to undertake its examination of the controlled transactions. In other jurisdictions the taxpayer may bear the burden of proof in some respects. Some OECD member countries are of the view that Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention establishes burden of proof rules in transfer pricing cases which override any contrary domestic provisions. Other countries, however, consider that Article 9 does not establish burden of proof rules (cf. paragraph 4 of the Commentary on Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention). Regardless of which party bears the burden of proof, an assessment of the fairness of the allocation of the burden of proof would have to be made in view of the other features of the jurisdiction’s tax system that have a bearing on the overall administration of transfer pricing rules, including the resolution of disputes. These features include penalties, examination practices, administrative appeals processes, rules regarding payment of interest with respect to tax assessments and refunds, whether proposed tax deficiencies must be paid before protesting an adjustment, the statute of limitations, and the extent to which rules are made known in advance. It would be inappropriate to rely on any of these features, including the burden of proof, to make unfounded assertions about transfer pricing. Some of these issues are discussed further in Chapter IV ...

In applying the foregoing principles to the taxation of MNEs, one of the most difficult issues that has arisen is the establishment for tax purposes of appropriate transfer prices. Transfer prices are the prices at which an enterprise transfers physical goods and intangible property or provides services to associated enterprises. For purposes of these Guidelines, an “associated enterprise” is an enterprise that satisfies the conditions set forth in Article 9, sub-paragraphs 1a) and 1b) of the OECD Model Tax Convention. Under these conditions, two enterprises are associated if one of the enterprises participates directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital of the other or if “the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital” of both enterprises (i.e. if both enterprises are under common control). The issues discussed in these Guidelines also arise in the treatment of permanent establishments as discussed in the Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments that was adopted by the OECD Council in July 2010, which supersedes the OECD Report Model Tax Convention: Attribution of Income to Permanent Establishments (1994). Some relevant discussion may also be found in the OECD Report International Tax Avoidance and Evasion (1987) ...

The main mechanisms for resolving issues that arise in the application of international tax principles to MNEs are contained in these bilateral treaties. The Articles that chiefly affect the taxation of MNEs are: Article 4, which defines residence; Articles 5 and 7, which determine the taxation of permanent establishments; Article 9, which relates to the taxation of the profits of associated enterprises and applies the arm’s length principle; Articles 10, 11, and 12, which determine the taxation of dividends, interest, and royalties, respectively; and Articles 24, 25, and 26, which contain special provisions relating to non-discrimination, the resolution of disputes, and exchange of information ...

The business activity of A S.A. was wholesale of pharmaceutical products to external pharmacies, hospitals, wholesalers (including: to affiliated wholesalers). The tax authority had noted that the company’s name had been changed in FY 2013, and a loss in the amount of PLN […] had been reported in the company’s tax return. An audit revealed that the Company had transferred significant assets (real estate) to a related entity on non-arm’s length terms. The same real estate was then going forward made available to the company on a fee basis under lease and tenancy agreements. The tax authority issued an assessment where a “restructuring fee” in the amount of PLN […] was added to the taxable income, reflecting the amount which would have been achieved if the transaction had been agreed between independent parties. According to the company the tax authority was not entitled at all to examine the compliance of the terms of these transactions with the terms that would have been agreed between hypothetical independent entities, as the transactions in question were in fact concluded precisely between independent entities. (SKA companies were not CIT taxpayers in 2012, so they did not meet the definition of a “domestic entity” referred to in the aforementioned provision, and therefore a transaction between “related entities” cannot be said to have taken place). Moreover, the institution of “re-characterisation” of a controlled transaction into a proper transaction (according to the authority),could only be applied to transactions taking place after 1 January 2019, pursuant to Article 11e, Section 4 of the A.l.t.p. introduced (from that date). Judgement of the Court The Court decided predominantly in favor of A S.A. and remanded the case back to the tax authorities. Excerpts “The applicant in the course of the case referred to the judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 18 December 2017, III SA/Wa 3661/16 (approved by the NSA in its judgment of 26 November 2020, II FSK 1919/18). The individual interpretation analysed there by the Court assessed a transaction (from 2012) concluded between a limited liability company and a general partnership. According to the WSA in Warsaw, the provisions of Article 11(4) in conjunction with Article 11(1) of the A.l.t.d.o.p. in the wording in force until 31 December 2014 may only be applied to transactions concluded between related parties – ‘domestic entities’ within the meaning of Article 11 of the A.l.t.d.o.p., and the tax authorities may only assess the income of related parties. The wording of Art. 11 of the A.l.t.p. indicates that it is intended to allow the tax authorities to estimate the income of related parties, if these parties, in transactions concluded between themselves, establish or impose terms and conditions that differ from those that would be established between independent parties, leading to an understatement of income. However, there are no grounds for this provision to be applied to transactions concluded by unrelated entities (a limited liability company and a general partnership) solely for the reason that tax on revenue from participation in a partnership is paid by its partners who are also members of the applicant’s management board. Indeed, it was only the provisions introduced by the Act of 29 August 2014 amending the Corporate Income Tax Act, the Personal Income Tax Act and certain other acts, which entered into force on 1 January 2015, that defined an “affiliated entity” as a natural person, a legal person or an organisational unit without legal personality that meets the conditions set out in the Act. If a contrary position were to be adopted Contrary to the authority’s assertions, these rulings do not concern a different factual situation. Although the audited interpretation concerned the necessity to prepare documentation pursuant to Art. 9a of the A.l.t.c., the applicant also directly inquired about classifying the applicant as an entity related to the general partnership. The courts of both instances were firmly in favour of the absence of such a link (dependence) between a capital company and a partnership, in terms of entering into mutual transactions, within the meaning of Article 11 of the A.l.t.p. in the wording in force until 31 December 2014. Thus, as shown above, the application of Article 11 of the A.l.t.d.o.p. in the present case was un-authorised, which makes it timely to consider the application in the analysed factual state of the general principles arising from Article 14 of the A.l.t.d.o.p. and Chapter 3 of this Act (tax deductible costs), which the authorities, for obvious reasons, have not undertaken so far.” “When reconsidering the case, the authority, taking into account the comments presented above, will issue an appropriate decision, containing in the justification of the decision all the elements referred to in Article 210 § 1 of the Polish Civil Code, including those arising from the cited resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation I-SA-Gl-1649-20-Wyrok-WSA-w-Gliwicach ...

The SEIKO EPSON CORPORATION is a multinational group of Japanese origin active in among others areas, production and sale of computer products. The group is present in Spain, EPSON IBÉRICA, but has its European HQ in the Netherlands, EPSON EUROPE BV. The main shareholder and sole director of EPSON IBÉRICA S.A.U. was initially Mr. Jose Augusto. However, following a capital increase on 24 April 1986, EPSON IBÉRICA SAU became the subsidiary of the EPSON Group in Spain and Mr. Jose Augusto became a member of its Board of Directors. Mr. Jose Augusto held positions in both EPSON IBERICA and the Dutch parent company EPSON EUROPA until he left on 31 August 2007. As part of his emoluments, EPSON IBERICA made contributions to a pension plan since 1999, totalling EUR 2,842,047.55, including an extraordinary contribution of EUR 2,200,000.00, which was agreed by its Board of Directors on 22 September 2004 and paid to the insurance company managing the pension plan on 25 May 2005, and another contribution of EUR 132,074.67 on 31 July 2007, which was passed on to the Dutch parent company. The accounting expenses entered in the accounts by EPSON IBERICA in this connection amounted to EUR 2 709 972.88 (EUR 2 842 047.55 – EUR 132 074.67), which the entity entered off the books and which, consequently, were not deducted fiscally. In particular, the accounting expense computed in FY 2004 and 2005 for the amount of the commitment assumed (2.2 million euros) was not deducted in that year, in accordance with the provisions of Article 13.3 “Provision for risk and expenses”, of the Consolidated Text of the Corporate Income Tax Law However, when the beneficiary (Mr. Jose Augusto) of these contributions receives the amounts from the retirement plan, the corresponding contributions made are deductible at EPSON IBERICA. In 2009, Mr. Jose Augusto exercised his right to receive the benefits provided for in that pension plan and, therefore, the entity made a negative adjustment of EUR 2,709,972.89 in its tax return for that year, an adjustment which, in the Inspectorate’s opinion, should have amounted to only EUR 473,477.59, since not all the contributions made to the aforementioned pension plan were deductible. The contributions made after that date, which amounted to 263,174.45 euros (10 % of 2,631,744.41 euros). The remaining 90 % of the contribution from 1 January 2002 is deemed to have been made by the parent company in the Netherlands, EPSON EUROPE. – The settlement agreement acknowledges that the adjustment should have been bilateral, since the expenditure actually occurred, but considers this provision inapplicable because EPSON EUROPA is resident in the Netherlands, and Article 9 of Spain’s double taxation agreement with the Netherlands does not provide for bilateral adjustment. – In its tax return for 2010, EPSON IBERICA offset in full, for an amount of EUR 1 359 101.07, the negative tax base which it had claimed to have from the previous year (2009), but which it no longer had following the audit carried out. EPSON IBERICA did not agree with the aforementioned settlement agreements and the imposition of the penalty relating to the FY 2009 and 2010 and filed economic-administrative claims against them before the Central Economic-Administrative Court. The claims were resolved by the Central Economic-Administrative Tribunal on 4 February 2016, rejecting them. EPSON’s legal representatives then filed a contentious-administrative appeal against the above decision, which was processed under case number 314/2016 before the Second Section of the Contentious-Administrative Chamber of the National High Court, and a judgment rejecting the appeal was handed down on 22 February 2018. The appellant filed a writ requesting a supplement to the previous judgment, and the Chamber issued an order on 14 May 2018, in which it declared that there was no need to supplement the judgment. The High Court also decided in favour of the tax authorities, and this decision was then appealed by EPSON to the Supreme Tribunal. At issue before the Supreme Tribunal was whether or not the tax authorities should have taken into account the disallowed deduction – resulting in a higher income – when determining the arm’s length remuneration of EPSON IBÉRICA which was based on the transactional net margin method (TNMM). Judgement of the Court The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of EPSON IBÉRICA and decided in favour of the tax authorities. Excerpt “The key issue in the present appeal is, in fact, the apportionment of costs between EPSON EUROPA and EPSON IBERICA. The judgment under appeal has chosen to consider the apportionment made by the tax inspectorate to be correct, in the light of the circumstances and the evidence in the proceedings. It is not an arbitrary assessment; it is coherent and reasonable and, therefore, we must abide by its result. The assessments under appeal are therefore in accordance with the law, and the adjustment sought by EPSON IBERICA is not appropriate. Lastly, there is nothing to be said in relation to the penalties, since that issue is not covered by the order for admission. In view of the foregoing, in circumstances such as those described, the answer to the appeal is as follows: ‘the Tax Inspectorate is not obliged to take into consideration the transfer pricing policy of the corporate group, in particular where it is based on the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM), when regularising transactions involving companies in the same multinational group, where it is not possible to make the relevant bilateral adjustment, in order to proceed to a full regularisation of the taxpayer’s situation.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation Spain v Epson STS_1111_2021 ...

At issue in this case was whether or not it is possible to regularize transactions between companies by directly applying art. 9.1 of DTA between Spain and French, without resorting to the transfer pricing methods provided for in local Spanish TP legislation. Application of article 9 and taxing according to local tax legislation is often a question of determining the arm’s length price. But sometimes other rules will apply regardless of the value – for instance anti avoidance legislation where the question is not the price but rather the justification and substance of the transaction. In the present case the arm’s length price of the relevant transaction was not discussed, but rather whether or not transaction of shares had sufficient economic substance to qualify for application of Spanish provisions for tax depreciation of the shares in question. The National Court understood that the share acquisition lacked substance and only had a tax avoidance purpose. It could not be understood that the appellant company has undergone a actual depreciation of its shares to the extent necessary to make a tax deduction. Judgement of the supreme Court The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the National Court. The court pointed out that the regularization of transactions between Spanish and French companies, through the application of art. 9.1 in the DTA, can be carried out without the need to resort to the methods provided for in local legislation for determining the arm’s length value of transactions between related parties. Excerpts “IV.- What has just been stated are the abstract terms of the regulation contained in the aforementioned Article 9.1; and this shows that its individualisation or practical application to some singular facts will raise two different problems. The first will be to determine whether the specific commercial or financial transactions concluded between these two legal persons, Spanish and French, have an explanation that justifies them according to the legal or economic logic that is present in this type of relationship. The second problem will have to be tackled once the first one just mentioned has been positively resolved, or when it has not been raised; and it will consist of quantifying the tax scope of the singular commercial or financial operation whose justification has been recognised or accepted. V.- The above shows that the application of this Article 9.1 Tax Treaty must be accompanied by the application of internal rules; and these may be constituted by Article 16 of the TR/LISOC or by other different internal rules, for the reasons expressed below. Thus, Article 10 TR/LISOC shall be applied when, without questioning the justification of the transactions concluded between entities or persons that deserve to be considered as “associated enterprises”, only the quantification or the value, in market terms, of the object or price of these transactions is in dispute. But other internal rules will have to be applied when what is disputed with regard to these transactions is not the amount of their object but the justification of the legal transaction that materialises them, because this externalises a single purpose of fiscal avoidance and is not justified by circumstances or facts that reveal its legal or economic logic. And these rules, as the Abogado del Estado argues in his opposition to the cassation, may be embodied by those which regulate the powers recognised by the LGT 2003 to the Administration in order to achieve a correct application of the tax rules, such as those relating to assessment, the conflict in the application of the tax rule and simulation (Articles 13, 15 and 16 of that legal text). VI.- The answer which, on the basis of what has just been set out, must be given to the question of objective appeal, defined by the order which agreed the admission of the present appeal, must be that expressed below. That the regularisation of transactions between Spanish and French companies, by means of the application of Article 9.1 of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the French Republic for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of evasion and avoidance of fiscal fraud in the field of income tax and wealth tax of 10 October 1995, can be carried out without the need to resort to the methods provided for determining the market value in related transactions and to the procedure established for that purpose in the internal regulations. ELEVENTH – Decision on the claims raised in the appeal. I.- The application of the above criterion to the controversy tried and decided by the judgment under appeal leads to the conclusion that the infringements alleged in the appeal are not to be assessed. This is for the following reasons. The main question at issue was not the amount or quantification of the transactions which resulted in the acquisition by the appellant SARA LEE SOUTHERN EUROPE SL (SLSE) of shares in SLBA Italia. It was the other: whether or not the acquisition of those shares was sufficiently justified to be considered plausible and valid for making the allocations which had been deducted for the depreciation of securities of SARA LEE BRANDED APPAREL, SRL. The tax authorities and the judgment under appeal, as is clear from the foregoing, understood that this acquisition lacked justification and only had a tax avoidance purpose, because this was the result of the situation of economic losses that characterised the investee company in the years preceding the acquisition. They invoked Article 9.1 of the DTA to point out that, in those circumstances of economic losses, the parameter of comparability with normal or usual transactions between independent companies, which that article establishes in order to accept that a related-party transaction actually existed, could not be assessed in the transactions in question. And they reached the final conclusion that, in those particular circumstances, it cannot be understood that the appellant company has undergone a depreciation of its shares to the extent necessary to make a deduction based on those shares.” Click here for English translation Click here ...

Sapio Industrie Srl had granted an interest-free loan to its German subsidiary, which was in financial difficulties. The tax authorities issued an assessment in which an arm’s length interest rate was determined and added to Sapio Industrie’s taxable income on the basis of the Italian arm’s length principle. Sapio Industrie appealed and both the District Court and later the Regional Court (CTR) ruled in favour of the company and annulled the assessment. The tax authorities then appealed to the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the tax authorities, overturning the contested judgment of the Regional Court (CTR) and referring the case back to the Regional Court, in a different composition. Excerpts “(…)the ‘rationale’ of the legislation in question is to be found in the arm’s length principle set out in paragraph 1 of Art. 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, where it is provided that “(Where) the two (associated) enterprises, in their commercial or financial relations, are bound by conditions accepted or imposed other than those which would be agreed upon between independent companies, profits which, but for those conditions, would have been made by one of the enterprises, but which, by reason of those conditions, have not been made, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly”; the tax authorities may therefore review the appropriateness – in line with the normal market value – of the transactions put in place potentially generating income components, regardless of the negotiating autonomy of the parties and of the contractual agreements established by the economic entities concerned; the possible unsuccessfulness of the financing agreed upon by the parties does not, per se, exclude the application of the provisions on the correct determination of intercompany transfer prices; In essence, in attempting to adjust profits by reference to the conditions that would have occurred between independent companies in comparable transactions and in comparable circumstances (i.e. in ‘comparable transactions between independent parties’), the arm’s length principle adopts an approach of treating the entities of a multinational group as operating as separate entities and not as indissociable subsets of a single group. Since, under the separate entity approach, the entities of a multinational group are treated as independent entities, the focus is on the nature of the transactions entered into between these entities and on whether the terms of these transactions differ from the terms that would have occurred in comparable transactions between independent parties” (thus “OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations”, paragraph B.l, n 1.6); Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Cass 9-10-2020 no 21828 ...

Union Castle Ltd. claimed a tax deduction of £ 39 million related to losses on derivative contracts. After acquiring derivative contracts, Union Castle issued bonus A shares to it’s parent company, Caledonia, which carried a dividend equal to 95% of the cash-flows arising on the close-out of the contracts. Therefore Union Castle had written off 39 million of the value of the contracts in it’s accounts. The tax authorities disagreed that a tax loss had been suffered and issued an assessment disallowing the loss. The Tribunal found in favor of the tax authorities. Capital transactions are subject of the UK transfer pricing rules. Issuing of shares meets the requirements of “making or imposing conditions in commercial and financial relations” as required by Article 9 of the OECD Model Convention. OECD TPG apply to debt financing. Share transactions, which have an effect on income taxation, must be within the UK transfer pricing rules. The Cases was then brought before the Court of Appeal where the appeals were dismissed. “The overall result, if my Lords agree, is that both appeals are dismissed. In the case of Union Castle’s appeal, I agree with the UT’s conclusions on the “loss” and “arise from” issues, but I have come to a different conclusion on the “fairly represent” issue and I would dismiss the appeal on that ground as well as on the “arise from” issue.” Union Castle Mail Steamship vs HMRC ...

In 2010, “Write-Down KG” granted a loan to its Turkish subsidiary (“T”). The loan bore interest at 6% per annum but was unsecured. In 2011, Write-Down KG decided to liquidate T. Write-Down KG therefore wrote off its loan and interest receivable from T and claimed the write-off as a tax deduction. The German tax authorities disallowed the deduction because the loan had been unsecured which was considered not to be at arm’s length. An appeal was lodged with the local tax court, which upheld the tax authorities’ position. An appeal was then made to the Federal Tax Court. Judgement of the Court The court ruled that the waiver of security for a shareholder loan may not be at arm’s length. Such a deviation from the arm’s length principle may lead to a write-off of the loan receivable and thus to a reduction in income. This reduction in income may be reversed on the basis of the arm’s length principle contained in Section 1 of the German Foreign Tax Act. Furthermore, article 9 OECD-MTC does not prohibit such an income adjustment. Excerpts “28. (2) The loan relationship between the plaintiff and T Ltd, who are related parties within the meaning of § 1, para. 2, no. 1 AStG, is a foreign business relationship within the meaning of § 1, para. 5 AStG, the conditions of which include the non-security of the claims. In order to avoid repetitions, reference is made to the statements in the Senate’s ruling in BFHE 263, 525, BStBl II 2019, 394. The plaintiff’s objection at the oral hearing that the transactions were ultimately purely domestic commercial transactions is not comprehensible in view of the loan agreement with T Ltd, which is domiciled in Turkey. 29. (3) Furthermore, the Regional Court bindingly determined (§ 118 (2) FGO) that a third party would not have granted the loan to T Ltd. without providing collateral. 30. Even if the FG did not explicitly extend its findings to the interest claims resulting from the loan, it seems impossible on the basis of the further circumstances established that a lender not affiliated with T Ltd. would not have secured these claims. In particular, it must be taken into account that T Ltd was a newly founded company that did not have any significant fixed assets and that the collateralisation was not dispensable from the point of view of the so-called group retention (cf. again the Senate’s decision in BFHE 263, 525, BStBl II 2019, 394, as well as the Senate’s subsequent decisions in BFH/NV 2020, 183; of 19.06.2019 – I R 54/17, juris; of 14.08.2019 – I R 14/18, juris). In this situation, there is no need to refer the case back to the Fiscal Court for further clarification of the facts. 31. (4) The reduction in income within the meaning of section 1(1) sentence 1 AStG occurred due to (“as a result of”) the lack of collateralisation. In this respect, the Senate also refers to its ruling in BFHE 263, 525, BStBl II 2019, 394. 32. (5) Nor does Article 9(1) of the Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Turkey for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion in the Field of Taxes on Income of 19 September 2011 (BGBl II 2012, 527, BStBl I 2013, 374) – DBA-Türkei 2011 -, which is applicable as of 1 January 2011, preclude the correction of income.” “34. (6) Finally, Union law does not conflict with an income adjustment under section 1, paragraph 1, sentence 1 AStG. Since Turkey is not a Member State of the European Union, reference is made in this respect to the statements in the Senate rulings of 27 February 2019 – I R 51/17 (BFHE 264, 292) and of 14 August 2019 – I R 14/18 (juris). 35. The freedom of movement of capital, which is in principle also protected in dealings with third countries (Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the version of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Official Journal of the European Union 2008, no. C 115, 47 –AEUV–) is superseded by the freedom of establishment, which has priority in this respect (Senate judgements of 6 March 2013 – I R 10/11, BFHE 241, 157, BStBl II 2013, 707; of 19 July 2017 – I R 87/15, BFHE 259, 435, BStBl II 2020, 237). Moreover, it would not be applicable – despite the amendments to Article 1(1) AStG made by the UntStRefG 2008 – also because of the so-called standstill clause of Article 64(1) TFEU (cf. Senate judgment in BFHE 264, 292). Click here for English translation Click here for other translation BFH-Urteil-I-R-19-17 ...

Although countries may have different views on the application of Article 9 to determine the balance of debt and equity funding of an entity within an MNE group, the purpose of this section is to provide guidance for countries that use the accurate delineation under Chapter I to determine whether a purported loan should be regarded as a loan for tax purposes (or should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital) ...

Commentary to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention notes at paragraph 3(b) that Article 9 is relevant “not only in determining whether the rate of interest provided for in a loan contract is an arm’s length rate, but also whether a prima facie loan can be regarded as a loan or should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital.” ...

Gulbrandsen Chemicals manufactures chemicals for industrial customers in the petrochemical and pharmaceutical industry. The Indian Subsidiary, Gulbrandsen India also sold these products to its affiliated enterprises, namely Gulbrandsen Chemicals Inc, USA, and Gulbrandsen EU Limited. In regards of the controlled transactions, the tax authorities noticed that Gulbrandsen India had shifted from use of the internal CUP method to pricing based on the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM). The tax authorities were of the view that, given the facts of the case, the internal CUP was the most appropriate method. It was noted that Gulbrandsen India had sold 40% of its products to the associated enterprises, and earned a margin of PBIT/Cost at 2.07%, as against the sale of 70% of its products in the prior year and earning margin of PBIT/Cost at 3.26%. Following a decision of the Tax Tribunal, where the assessment of the tax authorities was set aside, the tax authorities filed an appeal with the High Court, Judgement of the Court The High Court dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities and upheld the decision of the Tax Tribunal. Excerpt “The Tribunal has taken into consideration the voluminous documentary evidence on record for the purpose of coming to the conclusion of adoption of TNMM by the assessee as the Most Appropriate Method of arriving at ALP.” “In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the decision of the Tribunal is correct and requires no interference and no question of law much less any substantial question of law can be said to have arisen from the impugned order of the Tribunal. In the result, these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed, with no order as to costs.” India vs Gulbrandsen 2020 ...

“HDP Lux SA acquired a building in France and financed the acquisition with a shareholder loan at an interest rate of 12%. The tax authorities issued a tax assessment for FY 2011 and 2012 in which the market interest rate was set at 3.57% and 2.52% respectively and the excess payments were considered as hidden distribution of profit on which withholding tax was applied. Decision of the Administrative Court The court upheld the tax authorities adjustment of the interest paid on the loan and the qualification of the excess payment as a hidden distribution of profits subject to a withholding tax of 15%. In addition, the court held that the OECD Guidelines could not influence the interpretation of the provision on hidden profit distributions, as the domestic provision had been adopted long before the OECD Guidelines, while at the same time recognising that the OECD Guidelines could be used as an “element of appreciation”. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation LUX 42043C ...

C A GmbH managed an unsecured clearing account for a Belgian subsidiary. After financial difficulties in the Belgian subsidiary, C A GmbH waived their claim from the clearing account and booked this in their balance sheet as a loss. However, the tax office disallowed the loss according to § 1 Abs. 1 AStG. Up until now, the Bundesfinanzhof has assumed for cases that are subject to a double taxation agreement (DTA), that Art. 9 para. 1 OECD was limited to so-called price corrections, while the non-recognition of a loan claim or a partial depreciation was excluded (so-called Blocking effect). The Bundesfinanzhof overturned the previous judgment of the FG. According to the court it was not necessary to determine whether it was really a tax credit or a contribution of equity to the Belgian subsidiary. However, this could be left out, since the profit-reducing waiver by C A GmbH should be corrected in any case according to § 1 Abs. 1 AStG. A limitation to so-called price corrections could not be derived either from the wording or the purpose of Article 9 (1) OECD. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation BUNDESFINANZHOF Urteil vom 27-2-2019- I R 73-16 ...

Haier Europe Trading Srl, an Italien subsidiary of the Chinese Haier group (active within home appliances and consumer electronics), challenged an assessment for FY 2007, with which the tax authorities had recovered for taxation the difference with respect to the normal value in relation to transactions of goods with other companies of the group not resident in Italy. An appeal was filed by Haier with the Tax commission which was considered well-founded. The tax authorities then filed an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The Court found that the appeal in regards of transfer pricing was well founded and set aside the Judgement of the Tax Commission. Excerpt “3.2 Now, in the case at hand, the CTR affirms that “in the case at hand, as demonstrated, the prices paid are correct and in line with (i.e. lower than) those of the domestic market”. This ruling, moreover, is followed by the observation that the payment of monetary contributions (for € 11,612,189.50) by the Chinese parent company “as a partial adjustment of the transfer prices” was functional “to support its economic results and ensure that the profitability of the taxpayer company corresponds to that of the market”. In other words, on the one hand an apparent congruence of the transfer prices with market values seems to be affirmed – and therefore with an asserted “normal” value, a value which, moreover, is related to purchases from the subsidiary alone on the domestic market and not in free market conditions between independent parties – while on the other hand the achievement of a profitability corresponding to that of the market requires a substantial monetary contribution by the parent company, the allocation and purpose of which remains unclear in practice. 3.3. It follows, therefore, that the appellate court, in assessing the congruity of the transfers, i.e. whether they took place at a normal price, did not take into account that the alleged normality did not take place in a condition of competitiveness and in the absence of any adequate corrective and applied, in reality, a criterion of normalisation “a posteriori”, having considered the price “normal” not because it complied with the criteria of the law but because it was supplemented, subsequently, by the parent company. It must be reiterated, moreover, that it is settled case law that “the ‘normal value’ of the consideration, in transactions between companies belonging to the same multinational group, pursuant to Article 76 (now 110) of Presidential Decree No. 917 of 22 December 1986, must be inferred from the “normal value” of the consideration of the transaction. 917, must be deduced from a comparison that is highly contextualised in qualitative, commercial, temporal and local terms, aimed at identifying an average value from which only the destabilising factor of non-competitiveness must be expunged, so that the price lists or tariffs of the entity that provided the goods or services constitute the priority criteria, and in the absence thereof, the price lists or tariffs of the chambers of commerce and the professional tariffs, taking into account customary discounts, or, in the case of imposed prices, the measures in force, and, finally, in the absence of such elements, the objectively significant and numerically appreciable data, which it is the taxpayer’s burden to attach” (Cass. No. 17953 of 19/10/2012). 3.4. The CTR, therefore, erred in applying Article 110, Paragraph 7, tuir and the criteria set forth in Article 9, Paragraph 3, tuir, as it was totally incomprehensible whether or not the value of the transactions corresponded to the normal value.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Italy vs Haier Europe Trading Srl 071118 cno 28337-2018 ...

In this case, Union Castle Ltd. calimed a tax deduction of £ 39 million related to losses on derivative contracts. After acquiring derivative contracts, Union Castle issued bonus A shares to it’s parent company, Caledonia, which carried a dividend equal to 95% of the cash-flows arising on the close-out of the contracts. Therefore Union Castle had written off 39 million of the value of the contracts in it’s accounts. The tax authorities disagreed that a tax loss had been suffered and issued an assesment disallowing the loss. The Tribunal found in favor of the tax authorities. Capital transactions are subject of the UK transfer pricing rules. Issuing of shares meets the requirements of “making or imposing conditions in commercial and financial relations” as required by Article 9 of the OECD Model Convention. OECD TPG apply to debt financing. Share transactions, which have an effect on income taxation, must be within the UK transfer pricing rules. Click here for translation Union_Castle_Mail_Steamship_Company_Ltd_and_HMRC ...

EPSON IBÉRICA S.A.U. had deducted the full employee pension costs of a CEO that had worked both for the HQ in the Netherlands and the local Spanish Company. The tax authorities issued an assessment where 90% of the pension costs had been disallowed in regards to the taxable income in Spain. The disallowed percentage of the costs was based on the CEO’s salary allocation between Netherlands (90%) and Spain (10%), cf. the agreement entered between the parties. EPSON IBÉRICA S.A.U. brought the assessment to the Courts. Judgement of the Court The High Court dismissed the appeal of EPSON IBÉRICA S.A.U. and decided in favour of the tax authorities. Excerpt “…this Chamber shares and endorses the detailed reasoning of the TEAC starting from a fundamental fact, that if the contract of 25 June 2004, firmado between Mr. Humberto and Sek, by which the latter was appointed as Riji of Epson, Chairman of Epson Europe BV and President of Epson Ibérica, S.A.U. and of Epson Portugal Informática, S.A., established a distribution of 90% and 10% to be paid by Epson Europe BV and Epson Ibérica SAU, respectively, in order to satisfy the bonus to Mr Hiji, in line with the time worked by Mr Hiji for each of the companies, it is logical that that same proportion should be maintained in respect of the other EUR 2.2 million, as a result of the ‘Your Retirement Package’ and not, as the applicant claims, that that amount should be paid in full by the present appellant. The fact that Mr Humberto had devoted his whole life to the present appellant, before it was called Epson Ibérica, SAU and was absorbed by the multinational group Epson, it was called Tradeteck, is not an obstacle to the inclusion obtained, on the basis not only, as the Inspectorate states, ‘that what he worked until 1986 he would already have received’, but also that it is not congruent with what happened after 2002, the date on which Mr Humberto was appointed President of Epson Europe. BV, a situation or cause from which the contract of 29 June 2004, referred to above, arose. The reasoning of the claim, despite the argumentative effort of the governing document, cannot be admitted, without the invocation of the transfer prices referred to therein being relevant for the resolution of the issue at hand. As regards the impossibility of the bilateral adjustment, we refer to the contested decision. In definitive, the plea must be rejected.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation SP vs EPSON SAN_1065_2018 ...

ARTICLE 9 ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES 1. Where an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. 2. Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise of that State – and taxes accordingly – profits on which an enterprise of the other Contracting State has been charged to tax in that other State and the profits so included are profits which would have accrued to the enterprise of the first mentioned State if the conditions made between the two enterprises had been those which would have been made between independent enterprises, then that other State shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits. In determining such adjustment, due regard shall be had to the other provisions of this Convention and the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall if necessary, consult each other. COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE 9 CONCERNING THE TAXATION OF ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES 1. This Article deals with adjustments to profits that may be made for tax purposes where transactions have been entered into between associated enterprises (parent and subsidiary companies and companies under common control) on other than arm’s length terms. The Committee has spent considerable time and effort (and continues to do so) examining the conditions for the application of this Article, its consequences and the various methodologies which may be applied to adjust profits where transactions have been entered into on other than arm’s length terms. Its conclusions are set out in the report entitled Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations,’ which is periodically updated to reflect the progress of the work of the Committee in this area. That report represents internationally agreed principles and provides guidelines for the application of the arm’s length principle of which the Article is the authoritative statement. Paragraph 1 2. This paragraph provides that the taxation authorities of a Contracting State may, for the purpose of calculating tax liabilities of associated enterprises, re-write the accounts of the enterprises if, as a result of the special relations between the enterprises, the accounts do not show the true taxable profits arising in that State. It is evidently appropriate that adjustment should be sanctioned in such circumstances. The provisions of this paragraph apply only if special conditions have been made or imposed between the two enterprises. No re-writing of the accounts of associated enterprises is authorised if the transactions between such enterprises have taken place on normal open market commercial terms (on an arm’s length basis). 3. As discussed in the Committee on Fiscal Affairs’ Report on “Thin Capitalisation” there is an interplay between tax treaties and domestic rules on thin capitalisation relevant to the scope of the Article. The Committee considers that: a) the Article does not prevent the application of national rules on thin capitalisation insofar as their effect is to assimilate the profits of the borrower to an amount corresponding to the profits which would have accrued in an arm’s length situation; b) the Article is relevant not only in determining whether the rate of interest provided for in a loan contract is an arm’s length rate, but also whether a prima facie loan can be regarded as a loan or should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital; c) the application of rules designed to deal with thin capitalisation should normally not have the effect of increasing the taxable profits of the relevant domestic enterprise to more than the arm’s length profit, and that this principle should be followed in applying existing tax treaties. 4. The question arises as to whether special procedural rules which some countries have adopted for dealing with transactions between related parties are consistent with the Convention. For instance, it maybe asked whether the reversal of the burden of proof or presumptions of any kind which are sometimes found in domestic laws are consistent with the arm’s length principle. A number of countries interpret the Article in such a way that it by no means bars the adjustment of profits under national law under conditions that differ from those of the Article and that it has the function of raising the arm’s length principle at treaty level. Also, almost all member countries consider that additional information requirements which would be more stringent than the normal requirements, or even a reversal of the burden of proof, would not constitute discrimination within the meaning of Article 24. However, in some cases the application of the national law of some countries may result in adjustments to profits at variance with the principles of the Article. Contracting States are enabled by the Article to deal with such situations by means of corresponding adjustments (see below) and under mutual agreement procedures. Paragraph 2 5. The re-writing of transactions bet ween associated enterprises in the situation envisaged in paragraph 1 may give rise to economic double taxation (taxation of the same income in the hands of different persons), in so far as an enterprise of State A whose profits are revised upwards will be liable to tax on an amount of profit which has already been taxed in the hands of its associated enterprise in State B. Paragraph 2 provides that in these circumstances, State B shall make an appropriate adjustment so as to relieve the double taxation. 6. It ...

For transfer pricing purposes, the aim of the analysis is to determine whether, under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, conditions have been made or imposed in transactions comprising a business restructuring that differ from those that would be made or imposed between independent enterprises; and, if so, to determine the profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, and include them in the profits of that enterprise and tax them accordingly ...

The purpose of this Chapter VI is to provide guidance specially tailored to determining arm’s length conditions for transactions that involve the use or transfer of intangibles. Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention is concerned with the conditions of transactions between associated enterprises, not with assigning particular labels to such transactions. Consequently, the key consideration is whether a transaction conveys economic value from one associated enterprise to another, whether that benefit derives from tangible property, intangibles, services or other items or activities. An item or activity can convey economic value notwithstanding the fact that it may not be specifically addressed in Chapter VI. To the extent that an item or activity conveys economic value, it should be taken into account in the determination of arm’s length prices whether or not it constitutes an intangible within the meaning of paragraph 6.6 ...

Under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, where the conditions made or imposed in the use or transfer of intangibles between two associated enterprises differ from those that would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits that would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly ...

General guidance on comparability is found in Section D of Chapter I. By definition, a comparison implies examining two terms: the controlled transaction under review and the uncontrolled transactions that are regarded as potentially comparable. The search for comparables is only part of the comparability analysis. It should be neither confused with nor separated from the comparability analysis. The search for information on potentially comparable uncontrolled transactions and the process of identifying comparables is dependent upon prior analysis of the taxpayer’s controlled transaction and of the economically relevant characteristics or comparability factors (see Section D.1 of Chapter I). A methodical, consistent approach should provide some continuity or linkage in the whole analytical process, thereby maintaining a constant relationship amongst the various steps: from the preliminary analysis of the conditions of the controlled transaction, to the selection of the transfer pricing method, through to the identification of potential comparables and ultimately a conclusion about whether the controlled transactions being examined are consistent with the arm’s length principle as described in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention ...

A transactional profit method examines the profits that arise from particular controlled transactions. The transactional profit methods for purposes of these Guidelines are the transactional profit split method and the transactional net margin method. Profit arising from a controlled transaction can be a relevant indicator of whether the transaction was affected by conditions that differ from those that would have been made by independent enterprises in otherwise comparable circumstances ...

This Part provides a discussion of transactional profit methods that may be used to approximate arm’s length conditions where such methods are the most appropriate to the circumstances of the case, see paragraphs 2.1 – 2.12. Transactional profit methods examine the profits that arise from particular transactions among associated enterprises. The only profit methods that satisfy the arm’s length principle are those that are consistent with Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and follow the requirement for a comparability analysis as described in these Guidelines. In particular, so-called “comparable profits methods” or “modified cost plus/resale price methods” are acceptable only to the extent that they are consistent with these Guidelines ...

Methods that are based on profits can be accepted only insofar as they are compatible with Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, especially with regard to comparability. This is achieved by applying the methods in a manner that approximates arm’s length pricing. The application of the arm’s length principle is generally based on a comparison of the price, margin or profits from particular controlled transactions with the price, margin or profits from comparable transactions between independent enterprises. In the case of a transactional profit split method, it is based on an approximation of the division of profits that independent enterprises would have expected to realise from engaging in the transaction(s) (see paragraph 2.114) ...

A practical difficulty in applying the arm’s length principle is that associated enterprises may engage in transactions that independent enterprises would not undertake. Such transactions may not necessarily be motivated by tax avoidance but may occur because in transacting business with each other, members of an MNE group face different commercial circumstances than would independent enterprises. Where independent enterprises seldom undertake transactions of the type entered into by associated enterprises, the arm’s length principle is difficult to apply because there is little or no direct evidence of what conditions would have been established by independent enterprises. The mere fact that a transaction may not be found between independent parties does not of itself mean that it is not arm’s length ...

The arm’s length principle is viewed by some as inherently flawed because the separate entity approach may not always account for the economies of scale and interrelation of diverse activities created by integrated businesses. There are, however, no widely accepted objective criteria for allocating between associated enterprises the economies of scale or benefits of integration resulting from group membership. The issue of possible alternatives to the arm’s length principle is discussed in Section C below ...

The arm’s length principle has also been found to work effectively in the vast majority of cases. For example, there are many cases involving the purchase and sale of commodities and the lending of money where an arm’s length price may readily be found in a comparable transaction undertaken by comparable independent enterprises under comparable circumstances. There are also many cases where a relevant comparison of transactions can be made at the level of financial indicators such as mark-up on costs, gross margin, or net profit indicators. Nevertheless, there are some significant cases in which the arm’s length principle is difficult and complicated to apply, for example, in MNE groups dealing in the integrated production of highly specialised goods, in unique intangibles, and/or in the provision of specialised services. Solutions exist to deal with such difficult cases, including the use of the transactional profit split method described in Chapter II, Part III of these Guidelines in those situations where it is the most appropriate method in the circumstances of the case ...

There are several reasons why OECD member countries and other countries have adopted the arm’s length principle. A major reason is that the arm’s length principle provides broad parity of tax treatment for members of MNE groups and independent enterprises. Because the arm’s length principle puts associated and independent enterprises on a more equal footing for tax purposes, it avoids the creation of tax advantages or disadvantages that would otherwise distort the relative competitive positions of either type of entity. In so removing these tax considerations from economic decisions, the arm’s length principle promotes the growth of international trade and investment ...

It is important to put the issue of comparability into perspective in order to emphasise the need for an approach that is balanced in terms of, on the one hand, its reliability and, on the other, the burden it creates for taxpayers and tax administrations. Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention is the foundation for comparability analyses because it introduces the need for: A comparison between conditions (including prices, but not only prices) made or imposed between associated enterprises and those which would be made between independent enterprises, in order to determine whether a re-writing of the accounts for the purposes of calculating tax liabilities of associated enterprises is authorised under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (see paragraph 2 of the Commentary on Article 9); and A determination of the profits which would have accrued at arm’s length, in order to determine the quantum of any re-writing of accounts ...

The authoritative statement of the arm’s length principle is found in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, which forms the basis of bilateral tax treaties involving OECD member countries and an increasing number of non-member countries. Article 9 provides: [Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two [associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. By seeking to adjust profits by reference to the conditions which would have obtained between independent enterprises in comparable transactions and comparable circumstances (i.e. in “comparable uncontrolled transactions”), the arm’s length principle follows the approach of treating the members of an MNE group as operating as separate entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified business. Because the separate entity approach treats the members of an MNE group as if they were independent entities, attention is focused on the nature of the transactions between those members and on whether the conditions thereof differ from the conditions that would be obtained in comparable uncontrolled transactions. Such an analysis of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, which is referred to as a “comparability analysis”, is at the heart of the application of the arm’s length principle. Guidance on the comparability analysis is found in Section D below and in Chapter III ...

It should not be assumed that the conditions established in the commercial and financial relations between associated enterprises will invariably deviate from what the open market would demand. Associated enterprises in MNEs sometimes have a considerable amount of autonomy and can often bargain with each other as though they were independent enterprises. Enterprises respond to economic situations arising from market conditions, in their relations with both third parties and associated enterprises. For example, local managers may be interested in establishing good profit records and therefore would not want to establish prices that would reduce the profits of their own companies. Tax administrations should keep these considerations in mind to facilitate efficient allocation of their resources in selecting and conducting transfer pricing examinations. Sometimes, it may occur that the relationship between the associated enterprises may influence the outcome of the bargaining. Therefore, evidence of hard bargaining alone is not sufficient to establish that the transactions are at arm’s length ...

In seeking to achieve the balance between the interests of taxpayers and tax administrators in a way that is fair to all parties, it is necessary to consider all aspects of the system that are relevant in a transfer pricing case. One such aspect is the allocation of the burden of proof. In most jurisdictions, the tax administration bears the burden of proof, which may require the tax administration to make a prima facie showing that the taxpayer’s pricing is inconsistent with the arm’s length principle. It should be noted, however, that even in such a case a tax administration might still reasonably oblige the taxpayer to produce its records to enable the tax administration to undertake its examination of the controlled transactions. In other jurisdictions the taxpayer may bear the burden of proof in some respects. Some OECD member countries are of the view that Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention establishes burden of proof rules in transfer pricing cases which override any contrary domestic provisions. Other countries, however, consider that Article 9 does not establish burden of proof rules (cf. paragraph 4 of the Commentary on Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention). Regardless of which party bears the burden of proof, an assessment of the fairness of the allocation of the burden of proof would have to be made in view of the other features of the jurisdiction’s tax system that have a bearing on the overall administration of transfer pricing rules, including the resolution of disputes. These features include penalties, examination practices, administrative appeals processes, rules regarding payment of interest with respect to tax assessments and refunds, whether proposed tax deficiencies must be paid before protesting an adjustment, the statute of limitations, and the extent to which rules are made known in advance. It would be inappropriate to rely on any of these features, including the burden of proof, to make unfounded assertions about transfer pricing. Some of these issues are discussed further in Chapter IV ...

In applying the foregoing principles to the taxation of MNEs, one of the most difficult issues that has arisen is the establishment for tax purposes of appropriate transfer prices. Transfer prices are the prices at which an enterprise transfers physical goods and intangible property or provides services to associated enterprises. For purposes of these Guidelines, an “associated enterprise” is an enterprise that satisfies the conditions set forth in Article 9, sub-paragraphs 1a) and 1b) of the OECD Model Tax Convention. Under these conditions, two enterprises are associated if one of the enterprises participates directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital of the other or if “the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital” of both enterprises (i.e. if both enterprises are under common control). The issues discussed in these Guidelines also arise in the treatment of permanent establishments as discussed in the Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments that was adopted by the OECD Council in July 2010, which supersedes the OECD Report Model Tax Convention: Attribution of Income to Permanent Establishments (1994). Some relevant discussion may also be found in the OECD Report International Tax Avoidance and Evasion (1987) ...

The main mechanisms for resolving issues that arise in the application of international tax principles to MNEs are contained in these bilateral treaties. The Articles that chiefly affect the taxation of MNEs are: Article 4, which defines residence; Articles 5 and 7, which determine the taxation of permanent establishments; Article 9, which relates to the taxation of the profits of associated enterprises and applies the arm’s length principle; Articles 10, 11, and 12, which determine the taxation of dividends, interest, and royalties, respectively; and Articles 24, 25, and 26, which contain special provisions relating to non-discrimination, the resolution of disputes, and exchange of information ...

SGL CARBON SPA paid interest on loans received from the German parent of the SGL Group. The tax authorities considered, that the interest rate applied to the intra-group loan was significantly higher than the average interest rate applied in the German market. SGL disagreed and brought the case before the Italien Courts. The Court of first instance ruled in favor of SGL but this decision was set aside by the second instance court. SGL then filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court dismissed SGL’s appeal. “In view of the above, it is – therefore – quite clear that in the application of the method of “price comparison” preference should be given to the so-called internal comparison, based on the price lists and tariffs of the entity that has supplied the goods or services in the relationship between such entity and an independent company, given that it is to the above-mentioned documentary elements of comparison that the Administration must first of all refer, “as far as possible”, and taking into account any “customary discounts”. Secondly, the Administration will have to refer to the price lists and price lists of the chambers of commerce, or to professional tariffs, when examining comparable transactions between independent companies (so-called external comparison) belonging to the same market, i.e. that of the supplier of the goods or services. Finally, and in a completely subsidiary and supplementary way, the Office may have recourse – pursuant to the first part of paragraph 3 of the aforementioned Article 9 – to the “average price” and in “conditions of free competition” for similar goods or services, “in the time and place where the goods or services were acquired or provided, and, failing that, in the nearest time and place”.” All this being said, it is – consequently – quite clear that, in the concrete case, the Financial Administration has correctly applied the above criteria On the basis of such data, therefore, the Office has ascertained that the average interest rate practised on the German financial-credit market, i.e. in the State of residence of the lender, “is lower than that adopted for the financing operation in question”. This leads to the conclusion – entirely correct, as explained above – of the fiscal non-deductibility, from the corporate income relevant for IRES purposes, of the costs represented by said interest, clearly increased in order to increase the profits of the German parent company, reducing those of the Italian subsidiary in order to avoid national taxation, in clear violation of Article 110, paragraph 7 of the CIT decree.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Italy Supreme-Court-25-September-2013-No.-22010.pdf ...

In this case a taxable loss of a debitor following a conversion should be calculated on basis of the proportional part of the claim that was converted. Click here for translation DK SKM 2013-699 ...

Spedition Gmbh entered a written agreement – at year-end – to pay management fees to its Dutch parent for services received during the year. The legal question was the relationship between arm’s-length principle as included in double tax treaties and the norms for income assessments in German tax law. The assessment of the tax office claiming a hidden distribution of profits because of the “retrospective” effect of the written agreement, was rejected by the Court. According to the Court the double tax treaty provisions bases the arm’s length standard on amount, rather than on the reason for, or documentation, of a transaction. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Germany-vs-Corp-October-2012-BUNDESFINANZHOF-Urteil-IR-75-11- ...

A move away from the arm’s length principle would abandon the sound theoretical basis described above and threaten the international consensus, thereby substantially increasing the risk of double taxation. Experience under the arm’s length principle has become sufficiently broad and sophisticated to establish a substantial body of common understanding among the business community and tax administrations. This shared understanding is of great practical value in achieving the objectives of securing the appropriate tax base in each jurisdiction and avoiding double taxation. This experience should be drawn on to elaborate the arm’s length principle further, to refine its operation, and to improve its administration by providing clearer guidance to taxpayers and more timely examinations. In sum, OECD member countries continue to support strongly the arm’s length principle. In fact, no legitimate or realistic alternative to the arm’s length principle has emerged. Global formulary apportionment, sometimes mentioned as a possible alternative, would not be acceptable in theory, implementation, or practice. (See Section C, immediately below, for a discussion of global formulary apportionment) ...

While recognizing the foregoing considerations, the view of OECD member countries continues to be that the arm’s length principle should govern the evaluation of transfer prices among associated enterprises. The arm’s length principle is sound in theory since it provides the closest approximation of the workings of the open market in cases where property (such as goods, other types of tangible assets, or intangible assets) is transferred or services are rendered between associated enterprises. While it may not always be straightforward to apply in practice, it does generally produce appropriate levels of income between members of MNE groups, acceptable to tax administrations. This reflects the economic realities of the controlled taxpayer’s particular facts and circumstances and adopts as a benchmark the normal operation of the market ...

Both tax administrations and taxpayers often have difficulty in obtaining adequate information to apply the arm’s length principle. Because the arm’s length principle usually requires taxpayers and tax administrations to evaluate uncontrolled transactions and the business activities of independent enterprises, and to compare these with the transactions and activities of associated enterprises, it can demand a substantial amount of data. The information that is accessible may be incomplete and difficult to interpret; other information, if it exists, may be difficult to obtain for reasons of its geographical location or that of the parties from whom it may have to be acquired. In addition, it may not be possible to obtain information from independent enterprises because of confidentiality concerns. In other cases information about an independent enterprise which could be relevant may simply not exist, or there may be no comparable independent enterprises, e.g. if that industry has reached a high level of vertical integration. It is important not to lose sight of the objective to find a reasonable estimate of an arm’s length outcome based on reliable information. It should also be recalled at this point that transfer pricing is not an exact science but does require the exercise of judgment on the part of both the tax administration and taxpayer ...

In certain cases, the arm’s length principle may result in an administrative burden for both the taxpayer and the tax administrations of evaluating significant numbers and types of cross-border transactions. Although associated enterprises normally establish the conditions for a transaction at the time it is undertaken, at some point the enterprises may be required to demonstrate that these are consistent with the arm’s length principle. (See discussion of timing and compliance issues at Sections B and C of Chapter III and at Chapter V on Documentation). The tax administration may also have to engage in this verification process perhaps some years after the transactions have taken place. The tax administration would review any supporting documentation prepared by the taxpayer to show that its transactions are consistent with the arm’s length principle, and may also need to gather information about comparable uncontrolled transactions, the market conditions at the time the transactions took place, etc., for numerous and varied transactions. Such an undertaking usually becomes more difficult with the passage of time ...

A practical difficulty in applying the arm’s length principle is that associated enterprises may engage in transactions that independent enterprises would not undertake. Such transactions may not necessarily be motivated by tax avoidance but may occur because in transacting business with each other, members of an MNE group face different commercial circumstances than would independent enterprises. Where independent enterprises seldom undertake transactions of the type entered into by associated enterprises, the arm’s length principle is difficult to apply because there is little or no direct evidence of what conditions would have been established by independent enterprises. The mere fact that a transaction may not be found between independent parties does not of itself mean that it is not arm’s length ...

The arm’s length principle is viewed by some as inherently flawed because the separate entity approach may not always account for the economies of scale and interrelation of diverse activities created by integrated businesses. There are, however, no widely accepted objective criteria for allocating the economies of scale or benefits of integration between associated enterprises. The issue of possible alternatives to the arm’s length principle is discussed in Section C below ...

The arm’s length principle has also been found to work effectively in the vast majority of cases. For example, there are many cases involving the purchase and sale of commodities and the lending of money where an arm’s length price may readily be found in a comparable transaction undertaken by comparable independent enterprises under comparable circumstances. There are also many cases where a relevant comparison of transactions can be made at the level of financial indicators such as mark-up on costs, gross margin, or net profit indicators. Nevertheless, there are some significant cases in which the arm’s length principle is difficult and complicated to apply, for example, in MNE groups dealing in the integrated production of highly specialised goods, in unique intangibles, and/or in the provision of specialised services. Solutions exist to deal with such difficult cases, including the use of the transactional profit split method described in Chapter II, Part III of these Guidelines in those situations where it is the most appropriate method in the circumstances of the case ...

There are several reasons why OECD member countries and other countries have adopted the arm’s length principle. A major reason is that the arm’s length principle provides broad parity of tax treatment for members of MNE groups and independent enterprises. Because the arm’s length principle puts associated and independent enterprises on a more equal footing for tax purposes, it avoids the creation of tax advantages or disadvantages that would otherwise distort the relative competitive positions of either type of entity. In so removing these tax considerations from economic decisions, the arm’s length principle promotes the growth of international trade and investment ...

“It is important to put the issue of comparability into perspective in order to emphasise the need for an approach that is balanced in terms of, on the one hand, its reliability and, on the other, the burden it creates for taxpayers and tax administrations. Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention is the foundation for comparability analyses because it introduces the need for: • A comparison between conditions (including prices, but not only prices) made or imposed between associated enterprises and those which would be made between independent enterprises, in order to determine whether a re-writing of the accounts for the purposes of calculating tax liabilities of associated enterprises is authorised under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (see paragraph 2 of the Commentary on Article 9); and • A determination of the profits which would have accrued at arm’s length, in order to determine the quantum of any re-writing of accounts.” ...

The authoritative statement of the arm’s length principle is found in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, which forms the basis of bilateral tax treaties involving OECD member countries and an increasing number of non-member countries. Article 9 provides: [Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two [associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. By seeking to adjust profits by reference to the conditions which would have obtained between independent enterprises in comparable transactions and comparable circumstances (i.e. in “comparable uncontrolled transactions”), the arm’s length principle follows the approach of treating the members of an MNE group as operating as separate entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified business. Because the separate entity approach treats the members of an MNE group as if they were independent entities, attention is focused on the nature of the transactions between those members and on whether the conditions thereof differ from the conditions that would be obtained in comparable uncontrolled transactions. Such an analysis of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, which is referred to as a “comparability analysis”, is at the heart of the application of the arm’s length principle. Guidance on the comparability analysis is found in Section D below and in Chapter III ...

The most direct way to establish whether the conditions made or imposed between associated enterprises are arm’s length is to compare the prices charged in controlled transactions undertaken between those enterprises with prices charged in comparable transactions undertaken between independent enterprises. This approach is the most direct because any difference in the price of a controlled transaction from the price in a comparable uncontrolled transaction can normally be traced directly to the commercial and financial relations made or imposed between the enterprises, and the arm’s length conditions can be established by directly substituting the price in the comparable uncontrolled transaction for the price of the controlled transaction. However, there will not always be comparable transactions available to allow reliance on this direct approach alone, and so it may be necessary to compare other less direct indicia, such as gross margins, from controlled and uncontrolled transactions to establish whether the conditions between associated enterprises are arm’s length. These approaches, direct and indirect, are reflected in the traditional transaction methods described below ...

The commercial or financial relations between associated enterprises can take many forms. These include entering into controlled transactions at an agreed transfer price and/or under certain terms and conditions and arrangements providing benefits to other group members for no consideration. Commercial and financial relations can affect not only a controlled transaction for which a specific transfer price would be at issue, but also the essential characteristics of the business, for example, the proportions and amounts of debt and equity by which an enterprise is capitalised to conduct its business. The issue of thin capitalisation will be discussed in subsequent work ...

The Commentary on paragraph 1 of Article 9 indicates that paragraph 1 authorizes a tax administration “for the purpose of calculating tax liabilities [to] re-write the accounts of the [associated] enterprises if as a result of the special relations between the enterprises the accounts do not show the true taxable profits arising in that State.” The “true taxable profits” are those that would have been achieved in the absence of the conditions that are not arm’s length. The Commentary emphasizes that the Article does not apply where transactions have occurred on “normal open market commercial terms (on an arm’s length basis)”; accounts may be rewritten “only if special conditions have been made or imposed between the two enterprises.” Thus, the issue under Article 9 is whether the conditions in the commercial or financial relations of associated enterprises are arm’s length or whether instead one or more “special conditions” exist (i.e. conditions that are not arm’s length) ...

As stated in Chapter I, paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention provides that where “conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.” ...

In 1964, B KG had waived claims totalling … against B S.A. in France, in which it held an 88% interest. In the course of an audit of B KG’s profits for 1964, the tax authorities did not regard the waiver as a commercial transaction. Instead, they found that the amount waived was a contribution under company law, resulting in additional acquisition costs for the shareholding. A partial write-off of the investment itself was out of the question. B KG’s appeal to the Fiscal Court was dismissed the appeal. The Fiscal Court held that, under Article 5 of the DTC of 21 July 1959 between Germany and France, the reduction in profits resulting from the waiver of the claims could not be taken into account for tax purposes in Germany due to lack of business purpose. B KG appealed against that decision, alleging an infringement of substantive law. Judgment of the Federal Fiscal Court The Court referred the case back to the lower court for reconsideration. The Court held that Article 5 of the then French-German DBA (which is similar in content to Article 9 of the current Model Tax Convention), which allows for an adjustment of taxable profits in favour of one or other Contracting State in the case of a cross-border grouping of enterprises, does not directly create a tax liability. It merely authorises the legislature of each Contracting State to tax profits transferred to the other State under domestic law. With regard to formalities, the Court stated that a judgment of the tax court must contain a clear, complete and self-contained picture of the subject-matter of the dispute, even if it is brief, with emphasis on the submissions of the parties. Where reference is made to pleadings and other documents, they and the subject of the reference must be described with sufficient precision. General references to files and documents are not admissible. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Bundesfinanzhof I R 153-77 ORG ...

As indicated above, in addition to paragraph 8 of the introduction to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises quoted in footnote (2) to paragraph 7 above, other parts of the OECD Guidelines, as well as Article 9(1) of the OECD Model Double Taxation Convention, are of relevance to the subjects dealt with in this report. The relevant texts are as follows : a) Article 9(1) of OECD Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES “Where a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly “. b) OECD Guidelines on taxation “Enterprises should upon request of the taxation authorities of the countries in which they operate, provide, in accordance with the safe guards and relevant procedures of the national laws of these countries, the information necessary to determine correctly the taxes to be assessed in connection with their operations, including relevant information concerning their operations in other countries ; refrain from making use of the particular facilities available to them, such as transfer pricing which does not conform to an arm’s length standard, for modifying in ways contrary to national laws the tax base on which members of the group are assessed. “ c) OECD Guidelines on disclosure of information ” Enterprises should, having due regard to their nature and relative size in the economic context of their operations and to requirements of business confidentiality and to cost, publish in a form suited to improve public understanding a sufficient body of factual information on the structure, activities and policies of the enterprise as a whole, as a supplement, insofar as necessary for this purpose, to information to be disclosed under the national law of the individual countries in which they operate. To this end, they should publish within reasonable time limits, on a regular basis, but at least annually, financial statements and other pertinent information relating to the enterprise as a whole, comprising in particular : i) the structure of the enterprise, showing the name and location of the parent company, its main affiliates, its percentage ownership, direct and indirect, in these affiliates, including shareholdings between them ; ii) the geographical areas 1 where operations are carried out and the principal activities carried on therein by the parent company and the main affiliates ; iii) the operating results and sales by geographical area and the sales in the major lines of business for the enterprise as a whole ; iv) significant new capital investment by geographical area and, as far as practicable, by major lines of business for the enterprise as a whole; v) a statement of the sources and uses of funds by the enterprise as a whole ; vi) the average number of employees in each geographical area ; vii) research and development expenditure for the enterprise as a whole; viii) the policies followed in respect of intra-group pricing ; ix) the accounting policies, including those on consolidation, observed in compiling the published information. “ (For the purposes of the guideline on disclosure of information the term ” geographical area ” means groups of countries or individual countries as each enterprise determines is appropriate in its particular circumstances. While no single method of grouping is appropriate for all enterprises or for all purposes, the factors to be considered by an enterprise would include the significance of operations carried out in individual countries or areas as well as the effects on its competitiveness, geographic proximity, economic affinity, similarities in business environments and the nature, scale and degree of inter-relationship of the enterprises’ operations in the various countries.) ...