“LLC AB” had received an interest free “credit line” by a related party which it considered a loan and on that basis notional interest was deducted for tax purposes. The tax authorities disagreed with the qualification of the “credit line” and considered the capital similar to equity. On that basis the notional interest deductions was disallowed, which resulted in additional taxable income. An appeal was filed by “LLC AB” which was dismissed by the Administrative Tribunal in September 2022. An appeal was then filed by “LLC AB” with the Administrative Court. Judgment of the Court The Administrative Court ruled in favor of “LLC AB” and overturned the decision of the Administrative Tribunal and set aside the assessment of the tax authorities. Excerpt (in English) “However, as a last important element, the Court must reiterate the finding already made above that the appellant made only very limited use of the credit line opened to it and that the loan was indeed repaid on December 31, 2018. However, neither the state party nor the first judges questioned this repayment. Therefore, in accordance with the principle of substance over form, and with the hindsight inherent in the analysis carried out at the litigation level after the end of the relevant transactions, the IFL was indeed executed by the parties as a loan that was repaid even well before the contractually agreed maturity date. As a result, the Court concludes that the majority of the relevant points analysed above in the IFL clauses, as well as the performance of the parties involved, confirm the classification of the said contract as a debt instrument which does not form part of the appellant’s equity capital, and which is therefore liable to give rise to the payment and tax deduction of debit interest due to the temporary availability of the stipulated capital. However, the IFL has expressly stipulated that the appellant has no obligation to pay interest, and the appellant has used the notional interest mechanism to record such interest as an operating expense in the amount of … euros, in accordance with the results of the transfer pricing report, in order to comply with the arm’s length principle. The appellant also states, without being contradicted, that its shareholder recorded the same amount as notional interest income for tax purposes. The Court is obliged to note that the appellant puts forward the principle of such notional interest on account of the IFL and the amount retained by it on this account on the basis of the aforementioned report of the limited liability company (CD), and that the State has not formulated any plea in the appeal proceedings seeking to have the principle of such interest rejected or the arm’s length nature of the amount concretely retained by the appellant. As the Court is limited by the grounds on which it has been seized, it cannot itself review the principle of notional interest and the arm’s length nature of the notional interest rate declared by the appellant. Under these conditions, it is led to hold that the tax office, followed by the Director and the first judges, was wrong to reclassify the loan between the appellant and its shareholder as equity capital and to refuse to admit the amount put forward by the appellant as notional interest. It follows from all the foregoing developments that the appeal under review is justified and that, by reversal of the judgment under review, the management decision of January 23, 2020 should be reversed in the sense that the non-accounting adjustment of notional interest in respect of the IFL in the amount of … euros is deductible as an operating expense from the profit generated by the appellant in respect of the 2016 financial year.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation LUX IFL Nov 2023 48125C ...

A S.A. had transferred a dividend receivable to an indirect shareholder for the purpose of acquiring other companies. The tax authorities considered the transfer to be a loan, for which A S.A should have received arm’s length interest and issued an assessment on that basis. A complaint was filed by A S.A. with the tax Court, which ruled in favour of A S.A. and dismissed the assessmemt in 2021 An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Court The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decission of the tax court and dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities. According to the Court the local transfer pricing in article 58 of the CIRC, in the wording in force at the time of the facts did not allow for a recharacterization of a transaction, only for a re-quantification. A recharacterization of the transaction would at the time of the facts only be possible under the Portuguese general anti-abuse clause, which required the tax authorities to prove that the arrangement had been put in place for securing a tax advantage. Such evidence had not been presented. Excerpt “In other words, the fact that the transfer of credits arising from ancillary benefits to non-shareholders is not common is not enough to destroy the characteristics of the ancillary obligation set out in the articles of association, which, as is well known, can be transferred – see art. Furthermore, the Tax Authority’s reasoning reveals a total disregard for the rest of the applicable legal regime, namely the restitution regime provided for in Article 213 of the CSC, which gives them the unquestionable character of quasi-equity benefits. In fact, since the admissibility of supplementary capital contributions in public limited companies has been debated for a long time, but with the majority of legal scholars being in favor of such contributions, the enshrinement in the articles of association of the figure of accessory obligations following the supplementary contributions regime appeared as a solution to the possibility of internal financing of the public limited company, (See, for example, Paulo Olavo Cunha in Direito das Sociedades Comerciais, 3rd edition, Almedina, 2007, pages 441 and 442 (in a contemporary annotation with the legal framework in force at the time). ) . Furthermore, as pointed out by the Deputy Attorney General, whose reasoning, due to its assertiveness, we do not hesitate to refer to again, “This situation is not unrelated to the fact that, in the corporate structure in question, the company “D… ” has a majority stake in the company “A…”, and there is even doctrine that defends “the possibility of transferring the credits resulting from the supplementary installments autonomously from the status of partner” – in an explicit allusion to the view taken by Rui Pinto Duarte (Author cited, “Escritos sobre Direito das Sociedades”, Coimbra Editora, 2008). In conclusion: if the Tax Administration believed that the evidence it had found, to which we have already referred, strongly indicated that the transaction in question was really about the parties providing financing to the company “D…, S.A. “, it was imperative that it had made use of the anti-abuse clause (although there are legal scholars who also include article 58 of the CIRC in the special anti-abuse rules – see Rui Duarte Morais, “Sobre a Notção de “cláusulas antiabusos”, Direito Fiscal, Estudos Jurídicos e Económicos em Homenagem ao Prof. Dr. António Sousa Franco III 2006, p.879 /894) and use the procedure laid down in Article 63 of the CPPT, as the Appellant claims. What is not legitimate, however, in these circumstances, “in view of the letter of the law and the teleology of the transfer pricing system as enshrined in the IRC Code and developed in Ministerial Order 1446-C/2001, is to use this system to carry out a sort of half-correction and, in the other half, i.e., For cases of this nature, there is a specific legal instrument in the legal system – the CGAA – specially designed and aimed at combating this type of practice (Bruno Santiago & António Queiroz Martins, “Os preços de transferência na compra e venda de participações sociais entre entidades relacionadas”, Cadernos Preços de Transferência, Almedina, 2013, Coordenação João Taborda Gama). …” Click here for English translation. Click here for other translation Acordão do Supremo Tribunal Administrativo 0134-10-3-BEPRT ...

The tax authorities issued an assessment of additional taxable income for “D. sp. z o.o.” resulting in additional corporate income tax liability for 2014 in the amount of PLN 2,494,583. The basis for the assessment was the authority’s findings that the company understated its taxable income for 2014 by a total of PLN 49,732,274.05, as a result of the inclusion of deductible expenses interest in the amount of PLN 39,244,375.62, under an intra-group share purchase loan agreements paid to W. S.a.r.l. (Luxembourg) expenses for intra-group services in the amount of USD 2,957,837 (amount of PLN 10,487,898.43) paid to W. Inc. (USA) “D. sp. z o.o.” filed a complaint with the Administrative Court (WSA) requesting annulment of the assessment. In a judgment of 15 September 2020 the Administrative Court dismissed the complaint. In the opinion of the WSA, it was legitimate to adjust the terms of the loan agreement for tax purposes in such a way as to lead to transactions that would correspond to market conditions, thus disregarding the arrangements, cf. the OECD TPG 1995 para. 1.65 and 1.66. Furthermore, according to the court the company did not present credible evidence as to the ‘shareholder’s expenses’ and the fact that significant costs were incurred for analogous services purchased from other entities indicates duplication of expenses. Consequently, it is impossible to verify whether the disputed management services were performed at all. Not satisfied with the decision “D. sp. z o.o.” filed an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The Supreme Administrative Court set aside the decision of the Administrative Court and the tax assessment and refered the case back to the tax authorities for a reexamination. According to the court, there was no legal basis in Poland in 2014 for the non-recognition or recharacterisation of controlled transactions. The Polish arm’s length principle only allowed the tax authorities to price controlled transactions. The provisions (Articles 119a § 1 and § 2 Op) allowing for the substitution of the effects of an artificial legal act, if the main or one of the main purposes of which was to achieve a tax advantage have been in force only since 15 July 2016. And the possibility provided for the tax authority to determine the taxpayer’s income or loss without taking into account the economically irrational transaction undertaken by related parties (Article 11c(4) of the CIT) came into existence even later, as of 1 January 2019. Excerpts “3.2 The tax authorities relied on section 11(1) of the Income Tax Act (as in force in 2014), under which the tax authorities could determine the taxpayer’s income and the tax due without taking into account the conditions established or imposed as a result of the relationship between the contracting entities. However, this income had to be determined by way of estimation, using the methods described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 11 of the Income Tax Act. This is because these are not provisions creating abuse of rights or anti-avoidance clauses. They only allow a different determination of transaction (transfer) prices. The notion of ‘transaction price’ was defined in Article 3(10) of the Op, which, in the wording relevant to the tax period examined in the case, stated that it is the price of the subject of a transaction concluded between related parties. Thus, the essence of the legal institution stipulated in Article 11 of the CIT is not the omission of the legal effects of legal transactions made by the taxpayer or a different legal definition of those transactions, but the determination of their economic effect expressed in the transaction price, disregarding the impact of institutional links between the counterparties (…) It is therefore a legal institution with strictly defined characteristics and can only have the effects provided for in the provisions defining it (as the law stood in 2014). Meanwhile, the application of any provisions allowing the tax authorities to interfere in the legal relations freely formed by taxpayers must be strictly limited and restricted only to the premises defined in those provisions, as they are of a far-reaching interferential nature. Any broadening interpretation of them, as a result of which legal sanction could be obtained by the interference of public administration bodies going further than the grammatical meaning of the words and phrases used in the provisions establishing such powers, is inadmissible.” “3.3 The structure of the DIAS ruling corresponds to the hypothesis of the standard of Article 11c(4) of the 2019 CIT, which was not in force in 2014. Therefore, there was no adequate legal basis for its application with respect to 2014. This legal basis was not provided by Article 11 of the Corporate Income Tax Act in force at that time. This provision regulated the issue of so-called transfer prices, i.e. transaction prices applied between entities related by capital or personality. In this provision, the legislator emphasised the principle of applying the market price (also known as the arm’s length principle), requiring that prices in transactions between related parties be determined in such a way as if the companies were functioning as independent entities, operating on market terms and carrying out comparable transactions in similar market and factual circumstances. When the transaction under review deviates from those between independent parties, in comparable circumstances, then in the event of the occurrence of also other circumstances indicated in Article 11 of the updopdop, the tax authority may require an adjustment of profit. The legislative solutions adopted in Article 11 of the CIT Act (from 1 January 2019 in Article 11a et seq. of the CIT Act) refer to the recommendations contained in the OECD Guidelines on transfer pricing for multinational enterprises and tax administrations. The Guidelines were adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 27 June 1995 and approved for publication by the OECD Council on 13 July 1995 (they have been amended several times, including in 2010 and 2017). While the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not constitute a source of law in the territory ...

“Lux Credit B.V.” took out various credit facilities from related parties [company name 2] s.a.r.l. and [company name 3] s.a.r.l. – both resident in Luxembourg. These were financings whereby “Lux Credit facility B.V.” could draw funds (facilities) up to a pre-agreed maximum amount. In doing so, “Lux Credit B.V.” owed both interest and “commitment fees”. The commitment fees were calculated on the maximum amount of the facility. Interest and commitment fees were owed. The interest payable to [company name 2] and [company name 3], respectively, was calculated by deducting the commitment fees from the interest payable on the amount withdrawn, with interest payable on the amount withdrawn, the commitment fees owed after the due date and the interest owed after the due date. In its returns for the current financial years, “Lux Credit B.V.” charged both interest and commitment fees against taxable profit. Following an audit, an assessment of additional taxable income was issued for the financial years 2012/2013 – 2016/2017. According to the tax authorities, the financial arrangement was not at arm’s length. The interest rate and commitment fees were adjusted and part of the loans were classified as equity. A complaint was filed by “Lux Credit B.V.” Judgement of the District Court The Court found mainly in favour of Credit Facility B.V.. It upheld most of the adjustments relating to commitment fees, but overturned the adjustment to the interest rate. According to the Court, Lux Credit B.V. was entitled to an interest deduction for the years under review, calculated at the contractually agreed interest rate on the amounts actually borrowed. Excerpts “51. With regard to the transfer pricing documentation, the court considers the following. Although the documentation referred to in Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Vpb Act was not available at the time the defendant requested it, the claimant has remedied this defect by again preparing records to substantiate the conditions surrounding the facilities. In the court’s opinion, the defendant did not make it plausible with what it argued that the claimant’s administration contains such defects and shortcomings that it cannot serve as a basis for the profit calculation that must lead to the conclusion that the claimant did not file the required return.10 The court also took into account that the parliamentary history of Section 8b of the 1969 Vpb Act noted that the documentation requirement of Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Vpb Act relates to the availability of information necessary to assess whether the prices and conditions(transfer prices) used in affiliated relationships qualify as arm’s length. 11 In the court’s opinion, the defendant has not argued sufficiently to conclude that the transfer-pricing data further collected, prepared and documented by the claimant and the documents that were present at [company name 2] and [company name 3] on the determination of the credit ratings are so deficient that the claimant has not complied with the obligations of Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Income Tax Act. The fact that source documents for the period, in which the transactions were entered into, have not been preserved and the defendant has comments on the data used by the claimant and disagrees with the outcomes of the claimant, do not alter this.” “56. In the court’s view, the defendant was right to make the adjustments in respect of commitment fees on facilities 1 and 3 for the years under review. The defendant was also correct in imposing the 2014/2015, 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 assessments to correct the commitment fees on Facility 7bn. In assessing whether the defendant was justified in making those corrections, the court relied on what [company name 1] and [company name 2] and [company name 3] agreed on civilly. The agreements between [company name 1] and [company name 2] and [company name 3] explicitly distinguish between interest due and commitment fees due. The court therefore rejects the plaintiff’s position that it must be assessed whether the total of the commitment fee and interest costs remained within the margins of Section 8b of the 1969 Vpb Act, and the commitment fee and interest costs should be considered together as an “all-in rate”. That the terms of Facilities 1, 3 and 7bn show similarities with Payment in Kind loans, as claimed by the claimant, does not make it necessary in this case to deviate from what the parties agreed under civil law. Indeed, the defendant has argued, with reasons, that stipulating headroom for the purpose of funding interest that may be credited, if the same facts and circumstances are present, is not usual in the market but it is usual in the market that over interest to be credited, a charge arises only at the time of the maturity of the interest. It is not usual that a charge – in this case in the form of commitment fees – is already due before the due date. This involves a double burden, as interest is also charged on the commitment fee. On the other hand, the plaintiff has not made it plausible that independent third-party parties were willing to agree such terms in similar circumstances, nor has it made its economic reality plausible. The court also took into account that the claimant did not make any calculations, prior to setting the maximum amount and commitment fees. 57. In the court’s view, the defendant was right to make the adjustments in respect of the commitment fees and interest payable thereon in respect of Facility 5. The defendant has made it plausible that such an agreement between independent third parties will not be concluded. The defendant was right to point out the following aspects:” “In the court’s opinion, with what the defendant has put forward and also in view of what the claimant has put forward in response, the defendant has failed to make it plausible that the interest rates agreed by [company name 1] , [company name 2] and [company name 3] regarding facilities 1, 3 and 7bn are not in line with what would have been agreed by independent parties in the ...

In 2013, Viva Telecom Bulgaria EAD, as borrower/debtor, entered into a convertible loan agreement with its parent company in Luxembourg, InterV Investment S.a.r.l.. According to the agreement, the loan was non-interest bearing and would eventually be converted into equity. The tax authorities considered the arrangement to be a loan and applied an arm’s length interest rate and applied withholding tax to the amount of interest expense calculated. Vivacom appealed to the Administrative Court, which, in a judgment issued in 2019, agreed with the tax authorities’ argument for determining the withholding tax liability. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court requested a ruling from the CJEU, which was issued in case C-257/20. The CJEU ruled that the applicable EU directives do not prevent the application of withholding tax on notional interest. On this basis, the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court issued its decision on the application of withholding tax on notional interest under an interest-free loan agreement. Relying on the conclusions of the CJEU, the court confirmed the withholding tax imposed on the notional interest determined under the concluded financial agreement. The SAC also rejected the local taxpayer’s request to recalculate the tax due under the net basis regime. However, the court relied on a separate transfer pricing benchmark study, which established a market rate in favour of the taxpayer compared to the one initially used by the tax administration, resulting in a reduction of the tax assessment. Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation Bulgaria vs Vivacom SAC 81-2023 ORG ...

In 2011, Petrolia SE established a wholly owned subsidiary in Norway – Petrolia Noco AS – to conduct oil exploration activities on the Norwegian shelf. From the outset, Petrolia Noco AS received a loan from the parent company Petrolia SE. The written loan agreement was first signed later on 15 May 2012. The loan limit was originally MNOK 100 with an agreed interest rate of 3 months NIBOR with the addition of a margin of 2.25 percentage points. When the loan agreement was formalized in writing in 2012, the agreed interest rate was changed to 3 months NIBOR with the addition of an interest margin of 10 percentage points. The loan limit was increased to MNOK 150 in September 2012, and then to MNOK 330 in April 2013. In the tax return for 2012 and 2013, Petrolia Noco AS demanded a full deduction for actual interest costs on the intra-group loan to the parent company Petrolia SE. An assessment was issued by the tax authorities for these years, where the interest deductions had been partially disallowed. The assessment for these years was later upheld in court. For FY 2014, 2015 and 2016, Petrolia Noco AS had also claimed a full deduction for actual interest costs on the entire intra-group loan to the parent company. It is the assessment for these years that is the subject of dispute in this case. The assessment was first brought to the Court of Oslo where a decision in favour of the tax authorities was issued in November 2021. This decision was appealed by Petrolia Noco AS to the Court of Appeal. Judgement of the Court The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and decided in favour of the Norwegian tax authorities. Excerpts “The Court of Appeal also agrees with the state that neither the cost plus method nor a rationality analysis can be considered applicable in this case. With the result the Court of Appeal has reached so far, the CUP method should be preferred – in line with the OECD guidelines. After this, in summary, it appears clear that the interest margin on the intra-group loan is significantly higher than in a comparable and independent market and thus not an arm’s length price. The higher interest implies a reduction in the appellant’s income, cf. Tax Act section 13-1 first paragraph. The Court of Appeal cannot see that the adjustments claimed by the appellant change this. In the Court of Appeal’s view, it is also clear that the reduction in income has its cause in the community of interest. Whether adjustments should be made to the basis of comparison at the time of the price change, the Court of Appeal comes back to when assessing the exercise of discretion. Consequently, there was access to a discretionary determination of the appellant’s income according to Section 13-1 first paragraph of the Tax Act, also with regard to the interest margin.” “In the Court of Appeal’s view, additional costs that would have been incurred by independent parties, but which are not relevant in the controlled transaction, must be disregarded. Reference is made to the OECD guidelines (2020) point C.1.2.2, section 10.96: In considering arm’s length pricing of loans, the issue of fees and charges in relation to the loan may arise. Independent commercial lenders will sometimes charge fees as part of the terms and conditions of the loan, for example arrangement fees or commitment fees in relation to an undrawn facility. If such charges are seen in a loan between associated enterprises, they should be evaluated in the same way as any other intra-group transaction. In doing so, it must be borne in mind that independent lenders’ charges will in part reflect costs incurred in the process of raising capital and in satisfying regulatory requirements, which associated enterprises might not incur. The decisive factor is whether the costs or rights that the effective interest margin in the observed exploration loans between independent parties is an expression of, are also relevant in the intra-group loan. As far as the Court of Appeal understands, the appellant does not claim that various fees or costs incurred in exploration loans from a bank have been incurred in the intra-group loan, and in any case no evidence has been provided for this. In the Court of Appeal’s view, such costs and fees are therefore not relevant in the comparison. The appellant, on the other hand, has stated that the loan limit that Petrolia SE had made available, and the fact that the loan limit was increased if necessary, means that a so-called “commitment fee”, which accrues in loans between independent parties where an unused credit facility is provided, must be considered built into the agreed interest rate. In the Court of Appeal’s view, Petrolia SE cannot be considered to have had any obligation to make a loan limit available or to increase the loan limit if necessary. It appears from the loan agreement point 3.2 that the lender could demand repayment of the loan at its own discretion. The appellant has stated that this did not entail any real risk for the borrower. It is probably conceivable that Petrolia SE did not intend for this clause to be used, and that the appellant had an expectation of this. In this sense, it was a reality in the loan framework. However, it is clear, and acknowledged by the appellant, that the point of financing the appellant through loans rather than higher equity was Petrolia SE’s need for flexibility. Thus, it appears to the Court of Appeal that it is clear that the appellant had no unconditional right to the unused part of the loan limit. The Court of Appeal therefore believes that the Board of Appeal has not made any mistakes by comparing with nominal interest margins. On this basis, the Court of Appeal can also see no reason why it should have been compared with the upper tier of the observed nominal interest margins in the exploration loans between independent parties. In ...

“AB SARL” had in its tax return treated mandatory redeemable preferred shares (MRPS) as debt and the payments made under the MRPS as deductible interest. The tax authorities disagreed and qualified the MRPS as equity and the payments as non-deductible dividends. On that basis an assessment was issued. Judgement of the Administrative Court The Court upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities and qualified the mandatory redeemable preferred shares (MRPS) as equity. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Lux 46132C ...

In 2009-2011 Fortis Petroleum Norway AS (FPN) bought seismic data related to oil exploration in the North Sea from a related party, Petroleum GeoServices AS (PGS), for NKR 95.000.000. FBN paid the amount by way of a convertible intra-group loan from PGS in the same amount. FPN also purchased administrative services from another related party, Consema, and later paid a substantial termination fee when the service contract was terminated. The acquisition costs, interest on the loan, costs for services and termination fees had all been deducted in the taxable income of the company for the years in question. Central to this case is the exploration refund scheme on the Norwegian shelf. This essentially means that exploration companies can demand cash payment of the tax value of exploration costs, cf. the Petroleum Tax Act § 3 letter c) fifth paragraph. If the taxpayer does not have income to cover an exploration cost, the company receives payment / refund of the tax value from the state. On 21 November 2018, the Petroleum Tax Office issued two decisions against FPN. One decision (the “Seismic decision”) which applied to the income years 2010 to 2011, where FPN was denied a deduction for the purchase of seismic services from PGS and interest on the associated seller credit, as well as ordinary and increased additional tax (hereinafter the «seismic decision»), and another decision (the “Consema decision”) which applied to the income years 2011 and 2012 where, FPN’s claim for deduction for the purchase of administrative services from Consema for the income years 2011 and 2012 was reduced at its discretion, and where FPN was also denied a deduction for the costs of the services and a deduction for termination fees. Finally in regards of the “Seismic decision” an increased additional tax of a total of 60 per cent, was added to the additional taxation on the basis of the incorrectly deducted seismic purchases as FPN had provided incorrect and incomplete information to the Oil Tax Office. In the “Seismic decision” the tax office argued that FPN used a exploration reimbursement scheme to run a “tax carousel” In the “Consema decision” the tax office found that the price paid for the intra-group services and the termination fee had not been determined at arm’s length. An appeal was filed by Fortis Petroleum Norway AS with the district court where, in December 2020, the case was decided in favour of the tax authorities. An appeal was then filed with the Court of Appel Judgement of the Court of Appeal The court upheld the decisions of the district court and decided in favour of the tax authorities. The Court concluded that the condition for deduction in the Tax Act § 6-1 on incurred costs on the part of Fortis Petroleum Norway AS was not met, and that there was a basis for imposing ordinary and increased additional tax. The Court of Appeal further found that the administrative services and the termination fee were controlled transactions and had not been priced at arm’s length. Excerpts – Regarding the acquisition of seismic exploration Based on the case’s extensive evidence, and especially the contemporary evidence, the Court of Appeal has found that there was a common subjective understanding between FPN and PGS, both at the planning stage, during the conclusion of the agreement, in carrying out the seismic purchases and in the subsequent process. should take place by conversion to a subscription price that was not market-based. Consequently, seismic would not be settled with real values. This was made possible through the common interest of the parties. The parties also never significantly distanced themselves from this agreement. The Court of Appeal has heard testimonies from the management of PGS and FPN, but can not see that these entail any other view on the question of what was agreed. The loan was never repaid, and in the end it was converted to the pre-agreed exchange rate of NOK 167. In the Court of Appeal’s view, there is no other rational explanation for this course than that it was carefully adapted to the financing through 78 per cent of the exploration refund. The share value at the time of conversion was down to zero. The Court of Appeal agrees with the state that all conversion prices between 167 and 0 kroner would have given a share price that reflected the value in FPN better and which consequently had given PGS a better settlement. On this basis, the Court of Appeal believes that the conversion rate did not cover the 22 percent, and that there was a common perception that this was in line with the purpose of the establishment of FPN, namely not to pay “a penny” of fresh capital. The Court of Appeal has also emphasized that the same thing that happened in 2009 was repeated in 2010 and 2011. For 2009, the Oil Tax Office came to the conclusion that it was a pro forma event and a shift in financial risk. In 2010 and 2011, the same actors used the same structure and procedure to finance all costs from the state. It is thus the Court of Appeal’s view that there was a common understanding between the parties to the agreement that the real relationship within was different from that which was signaled to the tax authorities regarding sacrifice and which provided the basis for the deduction. Furthermore, in the Court of Appeal’s view, the loan transactions were not fiscally neutral. The seismic purchases constituted the only source of liquidity and were covered in their entirety by the state. In light of ESA’s decision from 2018 as an element of interpretation, such a loss of fiscal neutrality would indicate that when the company has thus not borne any risk itself, sacrifice has not taken place either. Even if the debt had been real, assuming a sale without a common interest of the parties, in the Court of Appeal’s view in a tax context it could not be decisive, as long as 22 ...

C is the parent company of the C-group which is involved in the construction business. C is part of a joint venture and for the expansion of these activities a framework agreement on shareholder loans was concluded. Under the agreement two shareholder loans were granted: ***loan*** II totalling 212,935,716.33 euros and ***loan*** III totalling 446,000,000 euros. At issue is whether (***loan*** II and ***loan*** III) are to be regarded as hidden equity capital or debt capital. In regards of loan II a binding ruling had previously been issued stating that the loan was hidden equity. C took the position that both loan II and loan III were to be treated for tax purposes as equity capital. Following an audit the tax authorities assessed both shareholder loans as debt capital and added interest income to the taxable income of C. In regards of the binding ruling previously issued, the authorities stated that the underlying facts had changed to such an extend that the ruling was no longer binding. The court of first instance held in favour of C, and an appeal was then filed by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Court The court upheld the decision of the court of first instance and found that the shareholder loans should be treated as hidden equity capital. Excerpts Loan II “Pursuant to § 118 (7) BAO, there is a legal claim that the assessment under tax law made in the information notice is used as a basis for the levying of the tax if the actual facts do not or only insignificantly deviate from those on which the information notice was based. It is certain that the complainant was issued a legally binding information notice in connection with the interest on the shareholder loan ***loan*** II. This information notice confirms that the loan granted has the character of hidden equity capital; an interest calculation for income tax purposes can therefore be omitted. It is also clear that the facts on which the tax office based the information notice have not changed. However, the tax authority now assumes that the factual elements on which the legal assessment of the information notice was based, and which were actually realised, were irrelevant for the assessment of the hidden equity in the present case.” Loan III “The separation principle is derived from the legal personality of a corporation, which allows for tax-effective service relationships between the shareholder and the corporation (cf. e.g. VwGH 28.04.2011, 2007/15/0031). The limit of the separation principle is the arm’s length principle (cf. Raab/Renner in Lachmayer/Strimitzer/Vock (eds.), Die Körperschaftsteuer (KStG 1988) (32nd ed. 2019) § 8 marginal no. 146). In connection with the granting of shareholder loans, conditions that are not arm’s length speaks in favour of hidden equity (cf. e.g. Ressler/Stürzlinger in Lang/Rust/Schuch/Staringer (eds.) KStG2 (2016) § 8 marginal no. 47). Conditions that are not customary for third parties speak against the existence of a genuine or serious shareholder loan (cf. e.g. VwGH 14.12.2000, 95/15/0127; 26.07.2006, 2004/14/0151). In the opinion of the authority concerned, only the lack of interest speaks in favour of the shareholder loan not being customary for third parties. A single indication was not sufficient to reclassify a shareholder loan as hidden equity. On the other hand, the subjective intention to repay the loan was to be regarded as the basis for the assumption that the loan was in fact debt and not equity. The fact that subjectively there was already an intention to repay at the time the shareholder loan was granted is not questioned in principle by the complainant, who himself points out in justification of the chosen model that a greater flexibility for a possible later repayment should be ensured. In addition, the chosen construction can also be explained on the basis of the company law legislation of ***Land***, according to which a repayment of equity capital is only possible in the context of a capital reduction or in the event of liquidation (cf. the legal opinion submitted on 22 February 2022). For the Federal Supreme Finance Court it is clear that the shareholder loan ***loan*** III was not granted at arm’s length (see in detail the explanations and assessment of the circumstantial evidence as part of the evaluation of the evidence). Thus, in the opinion of the Federal Fiscal Court, there is no shareholder loan to be recognised for tax purposes, but hidden equity. Since no interest is to be paid on equity capital (for tax purposes), the appeal is to be upheld on this point and the interest payment made by the authorities is to be reversed.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Austria vs Capital AG 136078.1.1 ...

Following an audit, Mauser S.p.A. received four notices of assessment relating to the tax periods from 2004 to 2007. These notices contested, in relation to all tax periods, the elusive purpose of a financing operation of Mauser S.p.A. by the non-resident parent company, as it was aimed at circumventing the non-deductibility of interest expense pursuant to Article 98 pro tempore of Presidential Decree No. 917 of 22 December 1986 (TUIR) on the subject of thin capitalisation. The loan, which began in 2004, had resulted in the recognition of €25,599,000.00 among other reserves, indicated as a payment on account of a future capital increase, as well as €55,040,474.29 as an interest-bearing shareholder loan, the latter of which was subsequently partly waived and also transferred to reserves. The loan had also contributed to the generation of losses in the years in question, which had been covered through the use of the aforementioned reserve (as a reserve), whose interest paid to the parent company had then been deducted from taxable income. According to the tax authorities the payment on account of a future capital increase constituted a financial debt towards the sole shareholder and not (as indicated by the taxpayer) a capital contribution, which therefore would not have contributed to the determination of the relevant net equity pursuant to Article 98 TUIR; as a result, the equity imbalance between loans and adjusted net equity pursuant to Article 98, paragraphs 1 and 2, letter a) TUIR pro tempore (net equity increased by the capital contributions made by the shareholder) would have been configured. Consequently, the tax authorities had concluded that the financing transaction as a whole was elusive in nature, as it was of a financial nature and aimed at circumventing the prohibition of the remuneration of the shareholders’ loan in the presence of the thin capitalisation requirements. With the notice relating to the 2006 tax year, Mauser S.p.A. was also charged with a second finding, relating to the infringement of the transfer pricing provisions pursuant to Article 110, paragraph 7 in relation to transactions involving the sale of intra-group assets. The tax authorities, while noting that Mauser S.p.A. had used the cost-plus computation method for the purpose of the correct application of the OECD rules on transfer pricing, had observed that following the merger of Gruppo Maschio SPA – for whose acquisition the above mentioned financing was intended – a merger deficit had resulted, partly allocated to goodwill of the target company. The tax authorities considered that the portion of goodwill amortisable for the year 2006 should be included in the cost base, increasing the percentage of overhead costs as a percentage of production costs, contributing to increase the total cost for the purpose of determining the arm’s length remuneration. Mauser S.p.A. raised preliminary issues relating to the breach of the preventive cross-examination procedure and the forfeiture of the power of assessment, considering the provision of Article 37-bis of Presidential Decree No. 600 of 29 September 1973 to be inapplicable to the case at hand, and also considering the existence of valid economic reasons consisting in the purpose of the acquisition of the company, which was then effectively merged. He then deduced that the method of calculating the transfer prices was erroneous insofar as the Office had included the amortisation quota of the goodwill allocated to the merger deficit. The C.T.P. of Milan upheld the merits of the joined appeals of Mauser S.p.A. An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities and in a ruling dated 19 May 2015, the Lombardy Regional Administrative Court decided in favour of the tax authorities, holding that the loans “were not used in accordance with the rules envisaged in such cases, but were instead used to cover the company’s losses”, and then held that the transfer price recovery was also correct, on the assumption that the amortisation of goodwill was legitimate. Mauser S.p.A. then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court, relying on six grounds. In the first ground of appeal Mauser S.p.A. points out that the grounds of the judgment do not contain adequate evidence of the logical path followed, also in view of the failure to transcribe the judgment at first instance and the arguments of the parties, as well as the statement of the facts of the case. Mauser S.p.A. observes that the confirmation of the finding as to the evasive nature of the financing transaction shows mere adherence to the position of one of the parties to the proceedings without any statement of reasons, nor does it consider what the regulatory provisions subject to assessment would be in relation to both profiles. It also observes how the reasoning relating to the confirmation of the transfer pricing relief refers to facts other than those alleged by the Office. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the first ground of appeal and declared the other grounds of appeal to be absorbed; set aside the judgment under appeal and refered the case back to the Lombardy Regional Administrative Court, in a different composition. Excerpts “The first ground is well founded, agreeing with the conclusions of the Public Prosecutor. The two recoveries made by the Office presuppose – the first – the qualification (for the purposes of the financial imbalance referred to in Art. The two recoveries made by the Office presuppose – the first – the classification (for the purposes of the financial imbalance referred to in Article 98 TUIR pro tempore) of the future capital contribution made by the sole shareholder of the taxpayer company as a debt item and not as a capital reserve item (entered among the other reserves), a fundamental circumstance for the purposes of considering whether or not it contributes to the portion of adjusted shareholders’ equity ‘increased by the capital contributions made by the same shareholder’, capable of constituting the financial imbalance referred to in Article 98 TUIR cited above. Similarly (considering that the Office has moved in the direction of an overall elusive activity), proof is ...

For example, consider a situation in which Company B, a member of an MNE group, needs additional funding for its business activities. In this scenario, Company B receives an advance of funds from related Company C, which is denominated as a loan with a term of 10 years. Assume that, in light of all good-faith financial projections of Company B for the next 10 years, it is clear that Company B would be unable to service a loan of such an amount. Based on facts and circumstances, it can be concluded that an unrelated party would not be willing to provide such a loan to Company B due to its inability to repay the advance. Accordingly, the accurately delineated amount of Company C’s loan to Company B for transfer pricing purposes would be a function of the maximum amount that an unrelated lender would have been willing to advance to Company B, and the maximum amount that an unrelated borrower in comparable circumstances would have been willing to borrow from Company C, including the possibilities of not lending or borrowing any amount (see comments upon “The lender’s and borrower’s perspectives” in Section C.1.1.1 of this chapter). Consequently, the remainder of Company C’s advance to Company B would not be delineated as a loan for the purposes of determining the amount of interest which Company B would have paid at arm’s length ...

In accurately delineating an advance of funds, the following economically relevant characteristics may be useful indicators, depending on the facts and circumstances: the presence or absence of a fixed repayment date; the obligation to pay interest; the right to enforce payment of principal and interest; the status of the funder in comparison to regular corporate creditors; the existence of financial covenants and security; the source of interest payments; the ability of the recipient of the funds to obtain loans from unrelated lending institutions; the extent to which the advance is used to acquire capital assets; and the failure of the purported debtor to repay on the due date or to seek a postponement ...

Particular labels or descriptions assigned to financial transactions do not constrain the transfer pricing analysis. Each situation must be examined on its own merits, and subject to the prefatory language in the previous paragraph, accurate delineation of the actual transaction under Chapter I will precede any pricing attempt ...

Although countries may have different views on the application of Article 9 to determine the balance of debt and equity funding of an entity within an MNE group, the purpose of this section is to provide guidance for countries that use the accurate delineation under Chapter I to determine whether a purported loan should be regarded as a loan for tax purposes (or should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital) ...

Although this guidance reflects an approach of accurate delineation of the actual transaction in accordance with Chapter I to determine the amount of debt to be priced, it is acknowledged that other approaches may be taken to address the issue of the balance of debt and equity funding of an entity under domestic legislation before pricing the interest on the debt so determined. These approaches may include a multi-factor analysis of the characteristics of the instrument and the issuer ...

Where it is considered that the arrangements made in relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would have been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner in comparable circumstances, the guidance at Section D.2 of Chapter I may also be relevant ...

In the context of the preceding paragraphs, this subsection elaborates on how the concepts of Chapter I, in particular the accurate delineation of the actual transaction under Section D.1, may relate to the balance of debt and equity funding of an entity within an MNE group ...

Commentary to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention notes at paragraph 3(b) that Article 9 is relevant “not only in determining whether the rate of interest provided for in a loan contract is an arm’s length rate, but also whether a prima facie loan can be regarded as a loan or should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital.” ...

It may be the case that the balance of debt and equity funding of a borrowing entity that is part of an MNE group differs from that which would exist if it were an independent entity operating under the same or similar circumstances. This situation may affect the amount of interest payable by the borrowing entity and so may affect the profits accruing in a given jurisdiction ...

G.K. Ktf was a subsidiary of a company registered in the United Kingdom. On 29 December 2010 G.K. Ktf entered into a loan agreement with a Dutch affiliate, G.B. BV, under which G.B. BV, as lender, granted a subordinated unsecured loan of HUF 3 billion to G.K. Ktf. Interest was set at a fixed annual rate of 11.32%, but interest was only payable when G.K. Ktf earned a ‘net income’ from its activities. The maturity date of the loan was 2060. The loan was used by G.K. Ktf to repay a debt under a loan agreement concluded with a Dutch bank in 2006. The bank loan was repaid in 2017/2018. The interest paid by G.K. Ktf under the contract was deducted as an expense of HUF 347,146,667 in 2011 and HUF 345,260,000 in 2012. But, in accordance with Dutch tax law – the so called participation exemption – G.B BV did not include the interest as taxable income in its tax return. The tax authorities carried out an audit for FY 2011-2012 and by decision of 17 January 2018 an assessment was issued. According to the assessment G.K. Ktf had underpaid taxes in an amount of HUF 88,014,000. A penalty of HUF 43,419,000 and a late payment penalty of HUF 5,979,000 had been added. According to the tax authorities, a contract concluded by a member of a group of companies for a term of more than 50 years, with an interest payment condition other than that of a normal loan and without capitalisation of interest in the event of default, does not constitute a loan but a capital contribution for tax purposes. This is indicated by the fact that it is subordinated to all other creditors, that the payment of interest is conditional on the debtor’s business performance and that no security is required. The Dutch tax authorities have confirmed that in the Netherlands the transaction is an informal capital injection and that the interest paid to the lender is tax exempt income under the ‘participation exemption’. Hence the interest paid cannot be deducted from the tax base. The parties intended the transaction to achieve a tax advantage. Not agreeing with the decision G.K. Ktf took the case to court. The Court of first instance upheld the decision of the tax authorities. The case was then appealed to the Court of Appeal which resulted in the case being remanded to the court of first instance for reconsideration. After reconsidering the case, a new decision was issued in 2019 where the disallowed deduction of interest was upheld with reference to TPG 1995 para. 1.64, 1.65 and 1.66. The Court of first instance also found that the interest rate on the loan from BV was several times higher than the arm’s length interest rate. G.K Ktf then filed a new appeal with the Court of appeal. Judgement of the Court of Appeal. The Court held that the contested part of the tax authority’s decision and the final judgment of the court of first instance were unlawful and decided in favor of G.K. Ktf. For the years in question, legislation allowing for recharacterisation had still not been enacted in Hungary, and the conditions for applying the “abuse of rights” provision that was in force, was not established by the tax authorities. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Hungary vs G.K. Ktf. Kfv.35306_2021_9 ...

Dominion Petroleum Dkenya’s principal activity was exploration of oil and gas. The tax authorities carried out an in-depth audit of Dominion’s operations and tax affairs for the years of income 2011 to 2016, which resulted in the following taxes being raised: Withholding Income Tax (WHT) on imported services – KES 114,993,666.00; WHT on deemed interest – KES 504,643,172.00 and; Reverse Value Added Tax(VAT) on imported services– KES 714,258,472.00 all totaling KES 1,333,895,311.00. An appeal was filed by Dominion with the Tax Appeals Tribunal where, in a judgment dated 24th July 2020, the Tribunal set aside the Commissioner’s Objection decision on Reverse VAT and WHT on Deemed Interest to the extent of the period prior to 1st January 2014. Further, it upheld the Commissioner’s Objection Decision on WHT on local services on condition that the amount of KES 656,892,892.00 paid by Dominion Petroleum to Apache Kenya Limited for seismic data be excluded from the assessment as it was not subject to WHT. In addition, it directed Dominion Petroleum to provide the Commissioner with documentation in support of the errors occasioned by the migration from its Pronto to SUN systems within thirty (30) days of the Tribunal’s ruling to facilitate computation of the WHT payable. The tax authorities was not satisfied with the decision in regards to VAT and withholding tax on deemed interest and filed an appeal with the High Court. Judgement of the High Court The High Court decided partially in favour of the tax authorities and partially in favour of Dominion Petroleum. Excerpts “WHT on deemed interest 23. WHT is a method of tax collection whereby the payer is responsible for deducting tax at source from payments due to the payee and remitting the tax so deducted to the Commissioner. Under section 10(1) of the ITA, the resident company paying interest and deemed interest is required to pay WHT to the Commissioner as follows: 10. Income from management or professional fees, royalties, interest and rents (1) For the purposes of this Act, where a resident person or a person having a permanent establishment in Kenya makes a payment to any other person in respect of- (c) interest and deemed interest 24. Under section 16(3) of the ITA “Deemed Interest” is defined as “….an amount of interest equal to the average ninety-one day Treasury Bill rate, deemed to be payable by a resident person in respect of any outstanding loan provided or secured by the non-resident, where such loans have been provided free of interest.” In essence, it is applicable on interest free borrowing and loans received from foreign-controlled entities in Kenya. Further by section 35(1) of the ITA, a person upon payment of a non-resident person not having a permanent establishment in Kenya in respect of interest which is chargeable to tax is required to deduct withholding tax at the appropriate non-resident rate which is provided for in the Third Schedule to the ITA. 25. Resolution of this issue involves around the nature of financial agreements entered into by the Respondent and its affiliate companies. The Commissioner contends that the agreement between the Respondent and its related companies were interest free outright loan agreements and any payments made to them by the Respondent thereunder fell within the definition of “Deemed Interest”. It observes that all of the Respondent’s related party lenders disclosed in their audited financial statements that the loans were interest free and that the Respondent attempted to introduce a 0.1% rate on one of the loans with Dominion Petroleum Acquisition Limited through contracts dated 5th February 2015 and 10th February 2015 respectively which were backdated to an effective date of 1st January 2014. The Commissioner thus accuses the Respondent of attempting to circumvent provisions of the ITA regarding treatment of interest free loans. 26. The Commissioner faults the Tribunal for holding that the “inter-company loans” do not fit the description of a loan as defined under section 16(3) of the ITA when the parties themselves had decided to call those arrangements ‘loans’ and that there is no such thing as “quasi-equity” from the definition in section 16(3) aforesaid which provides that, ‘’“all loans” means loans, overdrafts, ordinary trade debts, overdrawn current accounts or any other form of indebtedness for which the company is paying a financial charge, interest, discount or premium.” The Commissioner urges the court to take cognizance of the fact that this very chicanery called tax planning is the reason we have an entire body of practice called Transfer Pricing to ensure that related-parties transact at arm’s length as though they are related. (…) 34. I hold that the main factor of consideration is whether there was any interest provided for in the financing agreements amounted to a loan; if there was no interest, then WHT on ‘Deemed Interest’ would apply at the 91-day Treasury Bill rate; if there was interest, WHT would still apply at the rate provided for in the Third Schedule of the ITA. What should be noted is that whichever the case, WHT would still apply. 35. In its judgment, at para. 110, the Tribunal observed that the said agreements were “…all unsecured, interest-free and have no definitive repayment plan…”. Further, at Para. 115, the Tribunal noted that the agreements in question dated 28th March and 24th September 2014 both provided for an earlier effective date and had no interest clause. These agreements were later amended by the contracts dated 5th February 2015 and 10th February 2015 respectively to include an interest clause at the rate of 0.1% with an effective date of 1st January 2014. 36. I am in agreement with the Tribunal that in the absence of any demonstrable fraud or illegality, the parties are free to make amendments to their agreements. I also note that the parties may make an agreement that includes equity and borrowing. In this case, there was clearly a lending transaction and the inclusion of the 0.1% interest rate means that “Deemed Interest” could no longer apply at least from 1st January 2014. However, ...

This case deals with a non-interest bearing intragroup loan granted by Pompea S.p.A. to a foreign subsidiary and deductibility of interest expenses incurred by Pompea S.p.A. to obtain the funding needed to grant this loan to the subsidiary. The company was of the opinion that interest free inter-company loans were not covered by the Italien arm’s length provision at the time where the loan in question was established. The Italien tax authorities claimed that the arrangement was covered by the transfer pricing regulations art. 110 paragraph 7, and that an arm’s length interest had to be paid on the loan. They also found that interest on the bank loan was not deductible. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Court found that non-interest-bearing loan, was covered by the rules laid down in Article 110(7) of the TUIR (the Italien arm’s length provisions). Furthermore, the court found that the OECD 2010 TP Guidelines were unambiguous in clarifying (Chapter VII of the 2010 Guidelines, paras. 7.14 and 7.15 with respect to the identification and remuneration of loans as intragroup services, and 7.19, 7.29 and 7.31 with respect to the determination of the payment), that the remuneration of an intragroup loan must normally take the form of the payment of an interest rate corresponding to that which would have been expected between independent enterprises in comparable circumstances’. With regard to the deductibility of interest expense deriving from the bank loan, the Court found that these were related to the entire business activity carried out by the group and therefor deductible. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation 27636_2021 ...

Times Infotainment Media Ltd (TIML India), is in the entertainment business, including running an FM Broadcasting channel in India. It successfully participated in the auction of the radio business of Virgin radio in March 2008 in the United Kingdom. To complete the acquisition, it acquired two SPV companies, namely TML Golden Square Limited and TIML Global Limited. TIML India wholly held TIML Global which in turn wholly held TIML Golden. TIML India received funding from its parent Bennet Coleman & Co. Limited and remitted money primarily as an interest-free loan to TIML Global on 27 June 2008. TIML Global, on behalf of TIL Golden, paid UKP 53.51 million for the acquisition of Virgin Radio Shares. The acquisition of shares in Virgin Radios by TIML Golden was completed on 30 June 2008. TIML India booked the transaction in its accounts as a loan to TIML Global Limited, but the arm’s length interest rate on the loan was claimed at zero percent. The tax authorities computed the arm’s length interest rate of the loan transaction using the CUP method. A Dispute Resolution Panel later determined the arm’s length rate of interest on the intercompany loan based on the State Bank of India’s Prime Lending Rate. Not satisfied TIML India brought the case to the Indian Tax Tribunal. Here they reiterated claims made before lower authorities that the loan was given to acquiring a controlling stake in the company outside India in the same business of the taxpayer. Hence, the transaction was akin to stewardship activity and did not require any benchmarking analysis. It was also argued that the loan was entered purely out of commercial expediency, and the intent of giving the loan should be considered. The funds provided were quasi-equity in nature. Decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal The Tribunal decided in favor of TIML India and set aside the tax assessment. The Tribunal noted that the transaction was remittance to a wholly-owned subsidiary for making further payment of the cost of acquisition of a target company. The SPV was formed primarily to acquire Virgin Radios and was entirely funded from the internal resources of the taxpayer and Indian parent company. The agreement to acquire the Virgin Radios was reached long before the subsidiaries came into existence. It is not a loan simpliciter to TIML Global but in the nature of an advance to TIML-Global with a corresponding obligation to use the funds advanced in the specified manner. The end-use of funds to acquire Virgin Radios was essentially an integral part of the entire transaction. The Tribunal noted that the remittance of funds to TIML Global was for this limited and controlled purpose of acquiring the target companies, and the sequence of events and the material on record unambiguously confirm this factual situation. On that basis the remittance transaction to TIML Global cannot be considered on a standalone basis and can only be viewed in conjunction with the restricted use of these funds, for the strictly limited purpose, by TIML Global. The Tribunal noted that the funding transaction in the case at hand differs from transactions between typical lenders and borrowers and as such is not comparable to a loan transaction. The essence of the transaction is targeted acquisition and providing enabling funds for that purpose. Such a transaction cannot be a loan simpliciter on a commercial basis, which essentially implies that such a borrower can use the funds so received in such manner, even if subject to broad guidelines for purpose test, in furtherance of the borrower’s business interests. The Tribunal observed that a transaction between an SPV and the entity creating such an SPV – as long as it is for a specific transaction structured by the owner entity –  is inherently incapable of taking place between independent enterprises. When a strict condition about end-use, and that end-use is being decided by the owner of the SPV in advance that the SPV was not even in existence, is an inherent part of the transaction of funds being remitted is anything and could not be an uncontrolled condition. The Tribunal held that requirement of arm’s length standards could never be met under the CUP Method, so far as the nature of the present transaction is concerned and observed that when the borrower has no discretion of using the funds gainfully, the commercial interest rates do not come into play at all. The Tribunal ruled that the arm’s length price of the transaction by using the CUP method is NIL. Times_Infotainment_Media_Ltd_vs_Dcit_Rg_1_3_Mumbai_on_30_August_2021 (1) (1) ...

Lux PPL SARL received a profit participating loan (PPL) from a related company in Jersey to finance its participation in an Irish company.  The participation in the Irish company was set up in the form of debt (85%) and equity (15%). The profit participating loan (PPL) carried a fixed interest of 25bps and a variable interest corresponding to 99% of the profits derived from the participation in the Irish company, net of any expenses, losses and a profit margin. After entering the arrangement, Lux PPL SARL filed a request for an binding ruling with the Luxembourg tax administration to verify that the interest  charge under the PPL would not qualify as a hidden profit distribution subject to the 15% dividend withholding tax. The tax administration issued the requested binding ruling on the condition that the ruling would be terminate if the total amount of the interest charge on the PPL exceeded an arm’s length charge. Later, Lux PPL SARL received a dividend of EUR 30 million from its participation in the Irish company and at the same time expensed interest on the PPL in its tax return in an amount of EUR 29,630,038. The tax administration found that the interest charged on the PPL exceeded the arm’s length remuneration. An assessment was issued according to which a portion of the interest expense was denied and instead treated as a hidden dividend subject to the 15% withholding tax. Lux PPL SARL filed an appeal to the Administrative Tribunal in which they argued that the tax ruling was binding on the tax administration. In regards to interest charge, Lux PPL SARL argued that according to the OECD TPG, if the range comprises results of relatively equal and high reliability, it could be argued that any point in the range satisfies the arm’s length principle. Judgement of the Administrative Tribunal The Tribunal found the appeal of Lux PPL SARL justified and set aside the decision of the tax administration. According to the Tribunal, the arm’s length interest charge under the PPL could be determined by a comparison with interest on fixed interest loan and any interest charge within the arm’s length range would satisfy the arm’s length principle. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Lux vs LUXPPL SA July 2021 Case No 43264 ...

A foreign group had transferred funds to a branch in Peru and claimed that the transfer was a capital contribution – and not a loan. Following an audit the tax authorities issued an assessment, where the funds were considered a loan and withholding taxes on the determined interest payments was lifted. An appeal was filed by the group. Judgement of the Tax Court The Tax Court set aside the assessment and decided in favour of the group. Excerpts ” In this regard, the table presented shows that four of the elements considered by the law were taken into account, which were duly substantiated. Thus, with regard to the amounts of the transfers at the beginning and end of the year, it can be seen that these were between $570 million and $780 million, while the comparable operations presented amounts of between $100 million and $1 billion. In relation to the term or amortisation period, in the case of the operation under analysis, it was determined that since it was not paid during the 2013 financial year, the term of the comparables should not be less than one year; therefore, in the case of the comparables, terms ranging from 3 to 5 years were identified. Regarding the start date of the comparable loans, it was considered that the subscription date should be at least two years, considering that, according to the information available, the transfer of funds from the parent company started in that period and it was assessed that they should be in force throughout 2013. With regard to the guarantees, it was concluded that the comparable operations are secured loans, while those analysed are not, which suggests that the Administration is acting conservatively, as the loans received from the related party under their current conditions (without guarantee) would imply the application of a higher interest rate than those selected as comparable. From the evaluation carried out, it can be seen that the Administration carried out the analysis of some of the characteristics applicable to the case in question, as considered in article 11O of the Income Tax Law Regulations; However, it is noted that it has not taken into account some other elements of the operation that are relevant in order to establish a comparable financial transaction and that may have an impact on the setting of the interest rate to be charged, such as the solvency of the debtor and the risk rating, elements considered by paragraph d) of article 32-A of the Income Tax Law and paragraph a) of numeral 1 of article 110 of the regulations of the aforementioned law. In this regard, it has not been proven that the Administration had carried out a correct comparability analysis for the transaction subject to assessment, i.e. a due comparison of the transaction under examination with a transaction carried out between independent parties under the same or similar conditions, in accordance with the provisions of article 32-A, paragraph d) of the Income Tax Law and article 110 of the regulations of the aforementioned law, in order to establish the market value of the interest rate agreed between the appellant and its related party in the 2013 financial year. That in accordance with the foregoing, the aforementioned objection is not duly substantiated, and therefore, it should be lifted; and consequently, the appealed decision should be revoked and the contested determination should be annulled. ” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation 2021_1_05569 ...

A foreign group had transferred funds to one of its branches, Perupetro, in Peru and claimed that the transfer was a capital contribution – and not a loan. Following an audit the tax authorities issued an assessment, where the funds transferred were considered a loan and withholding taxes on the interest payments had been lifted. An appeal was filed by Perupetro. Perupetro held that the transfers of funds made by its non-domiciled parent company in its favour in the financial year 2014 constitute assigned capital (capital contributions) and not loans as considered by the Administration. It pointed out that the tax authorities has not followed the procedure established by the Income Tax Law and the OECD Guidelines to delineate the operation observed, a situation that would have allowed it to note that it does not qualify as a loan. Perupetro further claimed that the tax authorities had not carried out a correct comparability analysis for the transaction subject to assessment, i.e. a proper comparison of the transaction under examination with a transaction carried out between independent parties under the same or similar conditions, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph d) of article 32-A of the Income Tax Law and article 110 of the regulations of the aforementioned law, in order to establish the market value of the interest rate agreed between the appellant and its related party in the 2014 financial year. Judgement of the Tax Court The Tax Court sets aside the assessment and decided in favour of Perupetro. Excerpts ” From the evaluation carried out, it can be seen that the Administration carried out the analysis of some of the characteristics applicable to the case in question, as considered in article 110 of the Income Tax Law Regulations; However, it is noted that it has not taken into account some other elements of the operation that are relevant in order to establish a comparable financial transaction and that may have an impact on the setting of the interest rate to be charged, such as the solvency of the debtor and the risk rating, elements considered by paragraph d) of article 32-A of the Income Tax Law and paragraph a) of numeral 1 of article 110 of the regulations of the aforementioned law. In this regard, it has not been proven that the Administration had carried out a correct comparability analysis for the transaction subject to assessment, i.e. a proper comparison of the transaction under examination with a transaction carried out between independent parties under the same or similar conditions, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph d) of article 32-A of the Income Tax Law and article 110 of the regulations of the aforementioned law, in order to establish the market value of the interest rate agreed between the appellant and its related party in the 2014 financial year. That in accordance with the foregoing, the objection of the Administration is not duly substantiated, and it is therefore appropriate to lift it and, consequently, revoke the appealed ruling and annul the contested determination ruling.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation 2021_1_05562 ...

Lender GmbH acquired all shares in T GmbH from T in 2012 (year in dispute) for a purchase price of … €. To finance the purchase price of the shares, Lender GmbH took out a loan from its sole shareholder, D GmbH, a loan in the amount of … €, which bore interest at 8% p.a. (shareholder loan). The interest was not to be paid on an ongoing basis, but only on expiry of the loan agreement on 31.12.2021. No collateral was agreed. D GmbH, for its part, borrowed funds in the same amount and under identical terms and conditions from its shareholders, among others from its Dutch shareholder N U.A. In addition Lender GmbH received a bank loan in the amount of … €, which had an average interest rate of 4.78% p.a. and was fully secured. Finally Lender GmbH also received a vendor loan from the vendor T in the amount of … €, which bore an interest of 10 % p.a. and was not secured. The shareholder loan was subordinated to all other liabilities. The tax office issued a tax assessment in 2016 with regard to interest payments on the shareholder loan. According to the tax authorities an interest rate of of 5 % would have been agreed between independent parties. The difference up to the actual interest rate of 8% was therefore considered a hidden profit distribution(vGA) and added to the income of Lender GmbH. A complaint filed by Lender GmbH against the tax assessment was unsuccessful (Cologne Fiscal Court, Judgment of 29.06.2017 – 10 K 771/16.) The appeal before the Bundesfinanzhof was directed against this judgment. Lender GmbH claims that there has been an infringement of substantive law and requests that the contested judgment be set aside and that the the 2012 corporate income tax assessment be annulled. The tax authorities requests that the appeal be rejected. Judgment of the Court (Bundesfinanzhof) When determining the arm’s length loan interest rate for an unsecured shareholder loan, the statutory subordination of shareholder loans (section 39(1)(5) InsO) does not preclude a risk premium when determining the interest rate to compensate for the lack of loan collateralisation. It is contrary to general principles of practice if the court assumes without factual findings that a third party would agree on the same interest rate for a subordinated and unsecured loan as for a secured and senior loan. The judgment of the Cologne Fiscal Court of 29 June 2017 – 10 K 771/16 is set aside and the case is referred back to the Cologne Fiscal Court for a different hearing and decision. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Germany vs Corp May 2021 Bundesfinanzhof 62-17 ...

Engie (former GDF Suez) is a French electric utility company. Engie Treasury Management S.à.r.l., a treasury company, and Engie LNG Supply, S.A, a liquefied natural gas trading company, are both part of the Engie group. In November 2017, Total has signed an agreement with Engie to acquire its LNG business, including Engie LNG Supply. In 2018 the European Commission has found that Luxembourg allowed two Engie group companies to avoid paying taxes on almost all their profits for about a decade. This is illegal under EU State aid rules because it gives Engie an undue advantage. Luxembourg must now recover about €120 million in unpaid tax. The Commission’s State aid investigation concluded that the Luxembourg tax rulings gave Engie a significant competitive advantage in Luxembourg. It does not call into question the general tax regime of Luxembourg. In particular, the Commission found that the tax rulings endorsed an inconsistent tax treatment of the same structure leading to non-taxation at all levels. Engie LNG Supply and Engie Treasury Management each significantly reduce their taxable profits in Luxembourg by deducting expenses similar to interest payments for a loan. At the same time, Engie LNG Holding and C.E.F. avoid paying any tax because Luxembourg tax rules exempt income from equity investments from taxation. This is a more favourable treatment than under the standard Luxembourg tax rules, which exempt from taxation income received by a shareholder from its subsidiary, provided that income is in general taxed at the level of the subsidiary. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the tax rulings issued by Luxembourg gave a selective advantage to the Engie group which could not be justified. Therefore, the Commission decision found that Luxembourg’s tax treatment of Engie endorsed by the tax rulings is illegal under EU State aid rules. The decision was appealed to the European General Court by Luxembourg and Engie. Judgement of the Court The General Court decided in favour of the Commission and held that a set of tax rulings issued by Luxembourg artificially reduced Engie’s tax bill by around €120 million. The tax rulings endorsed two financing structures put in place by Engie that treated the same transaction both as debt and as equity, with the result that its profits remained untaxed. The General Court has also confirmed that State aid enforcement can be a tool to tackle abusive tax planning structures that deviate from the objectives of the general tax system. See the Press Release of the Court Click here for Unofficial English Translation Click here for other translation CELEX_62018TJ0516_FR_TXT ...

A non-interest-bearing loan had been granted by GI Group S.p.A., to a related company – Goldfinger Limited – in Hong Kong, in order to acquire a 56% shareholding in the Chinese company Ningbo Gi Human Resources Co. Limited. The Italien tax authorities had issued an assessment, where an interest rate on the loan had been determined and an amount equal to the interest calculated on that basis had been added to the taxable income of GI Group S.p.A. GI Group brought this assessment to the Regional Tax Commission where a decision was rendered setting aside the assessment. This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme court upheld the appeal of the tax authorities and referred the case back to the Regional Tax Commission. According to the Supreme Court, the decision of the Tax Commission dit not comply with the principles of law concerning the subject matter of evidence and the burden of proof on tax authorities and the taxpayer. Excerpts: “…In conclusion, according to the Court, “such discipline, being aimed at repressing the economic phenomenon of transfer pricing, i.e. the shifting of taxable income as a result of transactions between companies belonging to the same group and subject to different national laws, does not require the administration to prove the avoidance function, but only the existence of “transactions” between related companies at a price apparently lower than the normal one” “according to the application practice of the Italian Revenue Agency (Circular No. 6/E of 30 March 2016 on leveraged buy-outs), the reclassification of debt (or part of it) as a capital contribution should represent an “exceptional measure”. Moreover, it is not excluded that free intra-group financing may have a place in the legal system where it can be demonstrated that the deviation from the arm’s length principle is due to “commercial reasons” within the group, related to the role that the parent company assumes in supporting the other companies of the group; “ “…the Regional Commission did not comply with the (aforementioned) principles of law concerning the subject-matter of the evidence and the criterion for sharing the burden of proof, between the tax authorities and the taxpayer, on the subject of international transfer pricing. In essence, the examination of the trial judge had to be oriented along two lines: first, it had to verify whether or not the tax office had provided the evidence, to which it was entitled, that the Italian parent company had carried out a financing transaction in favour of the foreign subsidiary, as a legitimate condition for the recovery of the taxation of the interest income on the loan, on the basis of the market rate observable in relation to loans with sufficiently “comparable” characteristics and provided to entities with the same credit rating as the associated debtor company (see the OECD Report 2020), the determination of which is quaestio facti referred to the judge of merit; secondly, once this preliminary profile had been established, also on the basis of the principle of non-contestation, it had to be verified whether, for its part, the company had demonstrated that the non-interest-bearing loan was due to commercial reasons within the group, or in any event was consistent with normal market conditions or whether, on the contrary, it appeared that that type of transaction (i.e. the loan of money) between independent companies operating in the free market would have taken place under different conditions. Instead, as stated above (see p. 2 of the “Findings”), the C.T.R. required the Office to demonstrate facts and circumstances extraneous to the onus pro bandi of the Administration, such as the existence of an interest of Goldfinger Ltd in obtaining and remunerating the loan and, again, that there had been other similar onerous intra-group loans; Click here for English translation Click here for other translation IT vs GI Group Sez. 5 Num. 13850 Anno 2021 ...

In 2011, Petrolia SE established a wholly owned subsidiary in Norway – Petrolia Noco AS – to conduct oil exploration activities on the Norwegian shelf. From the outset, Petrolia Noco AS received a loan from the parent company Petrolia SE. The written loan agreement was first signed later on 15 May 2012. The loan limit was originally MNOK 100 with an agreed interest rate of 3 months NIBOR with the addition of a margin of 2.25 percentage points. When the loan agreement was formalized in writing in 2012, the agreed interest rate was changed to 3 months NIBOR with the addition of an interest margin of 10 percentage points. The loan limit was increased to MNOK 150 in September 2012, and then to MNOK 330 in April 2013. In the tax return for 2012 and 2013, Petrolia Noco AS demanded a full deduction for actual interest costs on the intra-group loan to the parent company Petrolia SE. Following an audit for FY 2012 and 2013, the tax authorities concluded that parts of the intra-group loan should be reclassified from loan to equity due to thin capitalization. Thus, only a deduction was granted for part of the interest costs. Furthermore, the authorities reduced the interest rate from 10 per cent to 5 per cent. For the income years 2012 and 2013, this meant that the company’s interest costs for distribution between the continental shelf and land were reduced by NOK 2,499,551 and NOK 6,482,459, respectively, and financial expenses by NOK 1,925,963 and NOK 10,188,587,respectively. The assessment was first brought to the Court of Oslo where a decision in favour of the tax authorities was issued in November 2019. This decision was appealed by Petrolia Noco AS to the Court of Appeal. Judgement of the Court The Court of Appeal also decided in favour of the Norwegian tax authorities. Excerpts “The Court adds for this reason that the appellant had higher debt ratio than the company could have had if the loan should have been taken up from an independent lender. In the Court of Appeal’s view, the fact that the appellant actually took out such a high loan as the intra-group loan is solely due to the fact that the lender was the company’s parent company. For this reason, there was a ” reduction ” in the appellant income ” due to” the community of interest. There is thus access to discretion in accordance with the Tax Act § 13-1 first paragraph.” “Thus, there is no basis for the allegation that the Appeals Board’s decision is based on an incorrect fact on this point, and in any case not a fact to the detriment of the appellant. Following this, the Court of Appeal finds that there are no errors in the Appeals Board’s exercise of discretion with regard to the determination of the company’s borrowing capacity. The decision is therefore valid with regard to the thin capitalization.” “The Court of Appeal otherwise agrees with the respondent that the cost- plus method cannot be considered applicable in this case. Reference is made to LB-2016-160306, where it is stated : For loans, however, there is a market, and the comparable prices are margins on loans with similar risk factors at the same time of lending . The cost- plus method provides no guidance for pricing an individual loan. An lender will, regardless of its own costs , not achieve a better interest rate on lending than what is possible to achieve in the market. The Court of Appeal agrees with this, and further points out that the risk picture for Petrolia Noco AS and Petrolia SE was fundamentally different. The financing costs of Petrolia SE therefore do not provide a reliable basis for assessing the arm’s length interest rate on the loan to Petrolia Noco AS.” “…the Court of Appeal can also see no reason why it should have been compared with the upper tier of the observed nominal interest margins in the exploration loans between independent parties. In general, an average such as the Appeals Board has been built on must be assumed to take into account both positive and negative possible variables in the uncontrolled exploration loans in a responsible manner. The Court of Appeal cannot otherwise see that the discretion is arbitrary or highly unreasonable. The decision is therefore also valid with regard to the price adjustment.” Click here for translation NO vs Petrolia march 2021 Dom_ LB-2020-5842 ...

In 2005 “B Lender S.A” transferred a supplementary capital contributions to company C. The capital was to be paid back in 31 October 2009 and was provided interest-free. Tax Authorities adjusted the taxable income of “B Lender S.A” with an amount of EUR 1,586,272.23, of which EUR 1,575,958.86 was attributable to interest on capital transactions, which it reclassified as interest-bearing loan under the arm’s length provisions of article 58 of the CIRC. The assessment of additional income was upheld by a decision from the tax court. An appeal was then filed by “B Lender S.A.” Decision of Supreme Administrative Court The Supreme Administrative Court set aside the decision of the tax court and decided in favour of A “B Lender S.A.” Experts “The question translates, in short, into knowing whether the arm’s length principle requires or imposes that a transaction of performance of ancillary services, within the scope of a group of companies be taxed as if it earned interest, even if, in fact, it has been agreed that it does not earn interest. This is not a simple matter to be clarified and requires a prior conceptual and legal framework, which it is important to follow. … It is clear from the above that the tax authorities will act in accordance with the general rule allowing the reclassification of the transaction carried out by the parties, under the terms of the provisions of the above-mentioned rule. The defendant’s action, on the specific point of the material reclassification of the transaction in question, is not only not illegal, but is also anchored in this basic parameter of action, permitted and imposed by the law “which sets out and defines the general principles governing Portuguese tax law and the powers of the tax authorities and guarantees of taxpayers” [see LGT, preamble]. On the other hand, what the appellant foresees as a requalification of the transaction is nothing more than the association of the transaction to the typical contract in which it may be subsumed, in accordance with the command contained in the legal rule which regulates the figure of accessory payments (cf. the said Art 287(1) of the CSC). The classification of the “transfer of funds” operation, through the provision of ancillary services, as a loan therefore appears legitimate and the tax facts at issue herein do not involve any error of factual or legal assumptions. Going forward, what is important to decipher at this point is whether s 58 is such as to require or impose that the transaction in question be interest-bearing for tax purposes. … In the section dedicated to “guidance on the application of the arm’s length principle” (“C.”), one can read, with relevance to the solution of the present case: “The application of the arm’s length principle is generally based on a comparison between the conditions applied in a linked transaction and the conditions applied in a transaction between independent enterprises. For that comparison to be meaningful, the economic characteristics of the situations considered must be sufficiently comparable. (…) In order to determine the degree of comparability, and in particular the adjustments to be made in order to achieve that comparability, it is necessary to understand the way in which independent companies assess the terms of possible transactions. When weighing the terms of a possible transaction, independent companies will compare it with other options realistically available to them and will only conclude the transaction if they have no other clearly more advantageous alternative. For example, a company is unlikely to accept a price offered for one of its products by an independent company if it knows that other potential customers are willing to pay more under similar conditions. This element is relevant to the issue of comparability since independent firms generally take into account all economically significant differences between the options realistically available to them (…) when considering those options. Consequently, when making comparisons arising from the application of the arm’s length principle, the tax administration must also take such differences into account when defining whether the situations considered are comparable and what adjustments may be necessary for the purposes of such comparability.” [paragraph 1.15 of the document]. The same summary of the OECD guidelines on the matter reveals, in paragraph 1.36, as to the recognition of transactions actually carried out (ii.), and with particular acuity for the issue we are dealing with: “1.36.. The identification by the Tax Administration of a connected transaction should be based on the transaction that has actually taken place between the parties and on the way it has been structured by the parties, in accordance with the methods used by the taxpayer insofar as they are consistent with the methods set out in Chapters II and III. Save in exceptional cases, the tax administration shall not abstract from or substitute other transactions for the actual transactions. Restructuring legitimate business operations would amount to a wholly arbitrary procedure, the iniquity of which would be further aggravated by double taxation if the other tax administration involved took a different view on how the operation should be structured. 1.37. There are, however, two specific cases where, exceptionally, the tax authorities may be justified in disregarding the structure adopted by a taxpayer to carry out the linked transaction. The first case arises where there is a disagreement between the form of the transaction and its economic substance. The tax authorities may then disregard the qualification made by the parties and reclassify it according to its substance. This first case can be illustrated by the example of a company investing in an associated company in the form of an interest-bearing loan when, at arm’s length, given the economic situation of the borrowing company, the investment would not normally take that form. The tax authorities will then be entitled to qualify the investment by reference to its economic substance and to treat the loan as a capital subscription”. From the excerpts transcribed it is clear the guideline to be adopted in the treatment of the issue ...

The Barzani Brothers (1974) Ltd had provided interest-free financing to affiliated Romanian group companies in the form of “capital notes”. In Israel, financing qualifying as a “capital note” releases the lender from having to report interest income in its annual tax return in relation to the funding. Certain high risk long term funding arrangements may qualify as a “capital notes”. In regards to the intra-group funding provided by the Barzani Brothers Ltd, the Israel tax authorities did not recognize the qualification thereof as “capital notes”. Instead they found the funding provided to be ordinary loans. Labeling a loan agreement “capital note” does not turn the loan agreement into a capital note. On that basis an assessment of taxable interest income was issued to the company. The Court ruled in favor of the tax authorities and rejected the explanations of Barzani Brothers Ltd that the “loan-like agreements” had been executed by mistake, and that the intention had always been to provide long term funding against issuance of capital notes. Click here for translation Israel vs Barazani ...

“PPL AG” had been set up as a limited liability company and in addition to the ordinary share capital, “PPL AG” had issued non-voting shares (participation certificates) to its German parent company and to three German individual investors in an aggregate amount of CHF 1.82 million. “PPL AG” was later converted into a joint stock corporation and on that occasion the participation certificates were converted into Profit Participating Loans (PPL), with an annual interest rate of 7%. In 2015, the Swiss tax administration carried out a tax audit of “PPL AG” for the years 2010-2014 and issued an assessment claiming payment of CHF 94,000 in withholding taxes on constructive dividends. According to the tax administration “PPL AG” had paid excessive amounts of interest to its lenders under the PPLs, exceeding the safe harbour interest rates published by the Swiss tax administration for the years under review. According to the tax administration, the portion of the interest payments exceeding the published safe harbour interest rates constituted constructive dividends. “PPL AG” brought the case to the Federal Administrative Court claiming an annulment of the tax assessment. The Federal Administrative Court ruled in favour of the tax administration and thus rejected the argument put forward by “PPL AG” – that PPLs under the arm’s length principle had to be treated differently than ordinary shareholder loans. All shareholder loans – whether profit participating or not – are subject to the same arm’s-length standard. There is a possibility for the taxpayer to prove that a  higher interest rate than the safe harbour rates published by the tax administration i a specific situation is at arm’s length, but “PPL AG” had failed to do so. The Court concluded that the interest rate of 7% paid by “PPL AG” was excessive, and that the same amount of interest would not have been paid to an independent third-party lender. Judgement of the Federal Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the  Federal Administrative Court and thus dismissed the appeal of “PPL AG”. The Court stated that “PPL AG” had failed to specify any valid special circumstances to justify its entry into PPLs with a higher interest compensation. The specific circumstances of the case – in particular the fact that the lenders had previously been equity participants of PPL AG – suggested that the choice of the PPLs and the setting of the high interest rate were a result of shareholder relation, rather than commercial considerations. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Swiss 2C-578-2019 ...

To acquire companies and resell them with capital gains a French Investment Fund distributed the capital of its investors (€ 5.4 billion in equity) between a French Fund Commun de Placement à Risques (FCPRs) and British Ltds managed by the French Investment Fund. For the purpose of acquiring the [X] group (the target), the French Investment Fund set up three legal entities in the Netherlands, [Y] UA, [B] BV, and [C] BV (the acquisition holding company). These three joint taxed entities are shown as Fiscal unit [A] below. The capital to be used for the acquisition of [X] group was divided into four FCPRs that held 30%, 30%, 30% and 10% in [Y] respectively. To get the full amount needed for the acquisition, [Y] members provided from their equity to [Y]: (i) member capital (€ 74.69 million by the FCPRs, € 1.96 million by the Fund Management, € 1.38 million by [D]) and (ii) investment in convertible instruments (hybrid loan at 13% per annum that is not paid, but added interest-bearing: € 60.4 million from the FCPRs and € 1.1 million from [D]). Within Fiscal unit [A], all amounts were paid in [B], which provided the acquisition holding company [C] with € 72.64 million as capital and € 62.36 million as loan. [C] also took out loans from third parties: (i) a senior facility of € 113.75 million from a bank syndicate and (ii) a mezzanine facility of € 35 million in total from [D] and [E]. On November 22, 2010, the French [F] Sàrl controlled by the French Investment Fund agreed on the acquisition with the owners of the target. “Before closing”, [F] transferred its rights and obligations under this agreement to [C], which purchased the target shares on January 21, 2011 for € 265 million, which were delivered and paid on January 31, 2011. As a result, the target was removed from the fiscal unit of the sellers [G] as of 31 January 2011 and was immediately included in the fiscal unit [A]. [C] on that day granted a loan of € 25 million at 9% to its German subsidiary [I] GmbH. Prior to the transaction the sellers and the target company had agreed that upon sale certain employees of the target would receive a bonus. The dispute is (i) whether the convertibles are a sham loan; (ii) if not, whether they actually function as equity under art. 10 (1) (d) Wet Vpb; (iii) if not, whether their interest charges are partly or fully deductible business expenses; (iv) if not, or art. 10a Wet Vpb stands in the way of deduction, and (v) if not, whether fraus legis stands in the way of interest deduction. Also in dispute is (vi) whether tax on the interest received on the loan to [I] GmbH violates EU freedom of establishment and (viii) whether the bonuses are deducted from the interested party or from [G]. Amsterdam Court of Appeal: The Court ruled that (i) it is a civil law loan that (ii) is not a participant loan and (iii) is not inconsistent or carries an arm’s length interest and that (iv) art. 10a Wet Vpb does not prevent interest deduction because the commitment requirement of paragraph 4 is not met, but (v) that the financing structure is set up in fraud legislation, which prevents interest deduction. The Court derived the motive from the artificiality and commercial futility of the financing scheme and the struggle with the aim and intent of the law from the (i) the norm of art. 10a Corporate Income Tax Act by avoiding its criteria artificially and (ii) the norm that an (interest) charge must have a non-fiscal cause in order to be recognized as a business expense for tax purposes. Re (vi), the Court holds that the difference in treatment between interest on a loan to a joined tax domestic subsidiary and interest on a loan to an non-joined tax German subsidiary is part of fiscal consolidation and therefore does not infringe the freedom of establishment. Contrary to the Rechtbank, the Court ruled ad (viii) that on the basis of the total profit concept, at least the realization principle, the bonuses are not borne by the interested party but by the sellers. Excerpts regarding the arm’s length principle “In principle, the assessment of transfer prices as agreed upon between affiliated parties will be based on the allocation of functions and risks as chosen by the parties. Any price adjustment by the Tax and Customs Administration will therefore be based on this allocation of functions and risks. In this respect it is not important whether comparable contracts would have been agreed between independent parties. For example, if a group decides to transfer the intangible assets to one group entity, it will not be objected that such a transaction would never have been agreed between independent third parties. However, it may happen that the contractual terms do not reflect economic reality. If this is the case, the economic reality will be taken into account, not the contractual stipulation. In addition, some risks cannot be separated from certain functions. After all, in independent relationships, a party will only be willing to take on a certain risk if it can manage and bear that risk.” “The arm’s-length principle implies that the conditions applicable to transactions between related parties are compared with the conditions agreed upon in similar situations between independent third parties. In very rare cases, similar situations between independent parties will result in a specific price. In the majority of cases, however, similar situations between independent third parties may result in a price within certain ranges. The final price agreed will depend on the circumstances, such as the bargaining power of each of the parties involved. It follows from the application of the arm’s-length principle that any price within those ranges will be considered an acceptable transfer price. Only if the price moves outside these margins, is there no longer talk of an arm’s-length price since a third party acting in ...

For example, consider a situation in which Company B, a member of an MNE group, needs additional funding for its business activities. In this scenario, Company B receives an advance of funds from related Company C, which is denominated as a loan with a term of 10 years. Assume that, in light of all good-faith financial projections of Company B for the next 10 years, it is clear that Company B would be unable to service a loan of such an amount. Based on facts and circumstances, it can be concluded that an unrelated party would not be willing to provide such a loan to Company B due to its inability to repay the advance. Accordingly, the accurately delineated amount of Company C’s loan to Company B for transfer pricing purposes would be a function of the maximum amount that an unrelated lender would have been willing to advance to Company B, and the maximum amount that an unrelated borrower in comparable circumstances would have been willing to borrow from Company C, including the possibilities of not lending or borrowing any amount (see comments upon “The lender’s and borrower’s perspectives” in Section C.1.1.1 of this chapter). Consequently, the remainder of Company C’s advance to Company B would not be delineated as a loan for the purposes of determining the amount of interest which Company B would have paid at arm’s length ...

In accurately delineating an advance of funds, the following economically relevant characteristics may be useful indicators, depending on the facts and circumstances: the presence or absence of a fixed repayment date; the obligation to pay interest; the right to enforce payment of principal and interest; the status of the funder in comparison to regular corporate creditors; the existence of financial covenants and security; the source of interest payments; the ability of the recipient of the funds to obtain loans from unrelated lending institutions; the extent to which the advance is used to acquire capital assets; and the failure of the purported debtor to repay on the due date or to seek a postponement ...

Particular labels or descriptions assigned to financial transactions do not constrain the transfer pricing analysis. Each situation must be examined on its own merits, and subject to the prefatory language in the previous paragraph, accurate delineation of the actual transaction under Chapter I will precede any pricing attempt ...

Although countries may have different views on the application of Article 9 to determine the balance of debt and equity funding of an entity within an MNE group, the purpose of this section is to provide guidance for countries that use the accurate delineation under Chapter I to determine whether a purported loan should be regarded as a loan for tax purposes (or should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital) ...

Although this guidance reflects an approach of accurate delineation of the actual transaction in accordance with Chapter I to determine the amount of debt to be priced, it is acknowledged that other approaches may be taken to address the issue of the balance of debt and equity funding of an entity under domestic legislation before pricing the interest on the debt so determined. These approaches may include a multi-factor analysis of the characteristics of the instrument and the issuer ...

Where it is considered that the arrangements made in relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would have been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner in comparable circumstances, the guidance at Section D.2 of Chapter I may also be relevant ...

In the context of the preceding paragraphs, this subsection elaborates on how the concepts of Chapter I, in particular the accurate delineation of the actual transaction under Section D.1, may relate to the balance of debt and equity funding of an entity within an MNE group ...

Commentary to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention notes at paragraph 3(b) that Article 9 is relevant “not only in determining whether the rate of interest provided for in a loan contract is an arm’s length rate, but also whether a prima facie loan can be regarded as a loan or should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital.” ...

It may be the case that the balance of debt and equity funding of a borrowing entity that is part of an MNE group differs from that which would exist if it were an independent entity operating under the same or similar circumstances. This situation may affect the amount of interest payable by the borrowing entity and so may affect the profits accruing in a given jurisdiction ...

The tax authorities had recharacterized debt to equity and disallowed deductions for interest payments etc. Decision of the Supreme Court The Court decided in favour of Transportadora de Energía SA and set aside the debt to equity re-characterisation. The court also points to the relevance of transfer pricing studies. The Court noted that the tax authorities had failed to properly review the transfer pricing documentation and benchmarking of the intra-group financing for transfer pricing purposes, and on that basis set aside the assessment. Click here for English Translation Argentina 26 dec 2FALLO CAF 039109_2014_3_RH002 ...

The draft Guideline provides guidance to entities in applying the arm’s length debt test in Division 820 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 19972 and should be read in conjunction with draft Taxation Ruling TR 2019/D2 Income tax: thin capitalisation – the arm’s length debt test. This Guideline also provides a risk assessment framework that outlines our compliance approach to an application of the arm’s length debt test in certain circumstances that are identified as low risk. The arm’s length debt test is one of the tests available to establish an entity’s maximum allowable debt for thin capitalisation purposes. The test focuses on identifying an amount of debt a notional stand-alone Australian business would reasonably be expected to borrow, and what independent commercial lenders would reasonably be expected to lend on arm’s length terms and conditions. An entity’s debt deductions are reduced to the extent that its adjusted average debt exceeds its maximum allowable debt. The arm’s length debt test may be used to support debt deductions for commercially justifiable levels of debt. In practice, the test is typically only used when an entity is unable to satisfy the safe harbour and worldwide gearing tests (as the compliance burden of applying these tests is generally lower). It is not common for Australian businesses to gear in excess of 60% of their net assets and historically relatively few entities have applied the arm’s length debt test. We consider the choice to apply the arm’s length debt test carries with it the necessity to undertake more rigorous analysis than the safe harbour and worldwide gearing tests. While the arm’s length debt test in some respects draws upon arm’s length concepts that are broadly common to transfer pricing, the test itself is not a transfer pricing analysis, nor does it necessarily proxy an outcome consistent with the arm’s length conditions under Subdivision 815-B. Rather it requires an overlay of factual assumptions that produce a hypothetical entity against which specific factors are to be assessed. This Guideline is limited to providing guidance and a risk assessment framework relating to the application of the arm’s length debt test contained in sections 820-105 and 820-215. It does not set out our approach to reviewing other taxation issues that might arise in relation to debt deductions. ATO ALP debt-draft 2019 ...

The facts in brief are that TMW ASPF CYPRUS (hereinafter referred to as ‘assessee’) is a private limited company incorporated in Cyprus and is engaged in the business of making investments in the real estate sector. The company in the year 2008 had made investments in independent third-party companies in India (hereinafter collectively known as ‘investee companies’) engaged in real estate development vide fully convertible debentures (FCCDs). It was these investments that made the investee companies an associated enterprise of the assessee as per TP provisions. The assessee had also entered agreements, according to which the assessee was entitled to a coupon rate of 4%. Further, after the conversion of the FCCDs into equity shares, the promoter of Indian Companies would buy back at an agreed option price. The option price would be such that the investor gets the original investment paid on subscription to the FCCDs plus a return of 18% per annum. During the impugned assessment year, the Assessee had received  an  interest  income  of  Rs.60,46,895/  –  from  one  of  the  three investee companies and that too only for the first half of the year. No interest was received by the assessee from any other company. The Assessee Company had sent multiple notices and followed up with the investee companies in relation to the defaults and non compliances with the agreed terms of the agreements. However, no resolution could be sought in this regard. The assessee company on account of the downturn in the real estate market and the fact that the companies were in bad financial position and facing cash crunch, waived its right to receive interest under a mutual agreement with the investee. The case of the assessee company was selected for detailed scrutiny and the matter was referred by the Assessing Officer (AO) to the Transfer Pricing officer (TPO) to examine whether the international transactions entered by the assessee during the captioned assessment year were at arm’s length or not. The TPO held that the assessee was to earn an assured return of 18% and determined the arm’s length price of the coupon rate to be 18%, instead of coupon rate of 4%. Accordingly,  taxable  income  was  revised  to  Rs.36,75,86,430/-  in  the draft assessment order by the AO. Decision of the Court: One of the main contention raised before us by the Counsel that assessee being a non resident and Cyprus based company therefore it was entitled to the benefit of India Cyprus DTAA Article 11(1) of India-Cyprus DTAA reads as under :- “Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.” The aforesaid para envisages that for taxing the interest income in the hands of a non-resident, it is necessary that the interest should arise in a contracting state, i.e., twin conditions of accrual as well as the payment are to be satisfied. If there is no accrual or actual payment received then same is to be decided within the scope of Article 11(1).  What  the  TPO/AO  have  sought  to  tax  is that,  assessee was supposed to receive interest of 18%, if the contingent event would have arisen, i.e., if in the event, the option was exercised by the assessee to sell its converted shares to the promoters of investee company at an option price then it would have given the return of 18%.  Thus,  entire  edifice  of  the  TPO/AO  was  based  on  fixation  of contingent event which assessee was supposed to receive. It is also matter of record no such conversion was actualised and assessee remained invested even during the year under consideration. The transfer pricing adjustment has been made on this hypothetical amount of interest receivable. Whether such notional income can be brought to tax even under the transfer pricing provision, has been dealt by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Vodafone India Services (P) Ltd. vs. Union of India (supra), wherein their Lordships have held that even income arising from international transaction must satisfy the test of income under the Act and must  find its home in one of the charging provisions. Here in this case, nowhere the  TPO/AO  has been  able  to establish  that  notional  interest satisfy the test of income arising or received under the charging provision of Income Tax Act. If income is not taxable in terms  of section 4, then chapter X cannot be made applicable, because section 92 provides for computing the income arising from international transactions with regard to the ALP. Only the interest income chargeable to tax can be subject matter of transfer pricing in India. Making any transfer pricing adjustment on interest which has neither been received nor accrued to the assessee cannot be held to be chargeable in terms of the Income Tax Act read with Article 11(1) of DTAA. Here it cannot be the case of accrual of interest also, because none of the investee companies have acknowledge that any interest payment is due, albeit they have been requesting for waiving of interest of even coupon rate of 4%, leave alone the return of 18% which was dependent upon some future contingencies. Assessee despite all its efforts has acceded to such request. Further, in  the  India Cyprus DTAA wherein similar phrase has been used pertaining to FTS and Royalty in India Cyprus DTAA, Hon’ble Bombay High Court held that assessment of royalty or FTS should be made in the year in which amount have actually received and not otherwise. The coordinate bench of Mumbai ITAT in the case of Pramerica ASPF II Cyprus Holding Ltd. vs. DCIT (supra) on exactly similar set of facts, addition on account of notional interest was made; the Tribunal has held  that  the  interest  income  in  question  can  only  be  taxed  on payment  /receipt  basis.  The  relevant  observation  has already  been incorporated above. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court has confirmed the said finding. Similar view has been taken by the ITAT Chennai Bench in the case of DCIT Inzi Control ...

A taxpayer with a 98% shareholding in a joint stock company, CH AG, based in Switzerland had provided EUR 30 million as an interest-free shareholder loan to the company. There was no written agreement. CH AG used this capital to provide loans to two affiliated companies in Austria and Germany, each with an interest rate of 2%. The tax authorities added a 2% interest to the the shareholder loans – based on the interest on the loans passed on by CH AG to its affiliated companies. EXCURSION: In the present case, the argumentation of the taxpayer or the tax representative against interest on the loan was also interesting: In the complaint – with reference to the so-called “relatives’ case law” – it was stated that due to a lack of sufficiently clear agreements, lack of collateral, etc., not at all a “loan” in the tax sense is to be assumed, but that the financing in question is rather a question of equity-replacing grants ( hidden deposits ) and therefore no interest rate is justified. In the preliminary appeal decision, the tax authorities replied that the nature of the loan could very well be derived from various documents and information (probate proceedings and accounting treatment at CH AG). OneIn addition, reclassification of the loans in question as hidden contributions or hidden share capital is only permissible under “ special circumstances ”, with reference to the relevant case law. In the opinion of the tax authorities, this question did not arise in the present case because CH AG did not have any financial difficulties at the time the funds were injected and had sufficient equity capital. Judgement of the Court The court found that the shareholder loan was not covered by the scope of the Austrian arm’s length provision which requires the existence of a domestic company or a domestic permanent establishment and is therefore only relevant when determining business income. If no interest has actually accrued, no fictitious interest can be subject to taxation for such an interest-free shareholder loan. The question of whether the amounts given were actually loans or (hidden) equity was left undecided by the court. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Austr vs XY BFG RV-1100628-2016 180719 ...

“PPL AG” had been set up as a limited liability company and in addition to the ordinary share capital, “PPL AG” had issued non-voting shares (participation certificates) to its German parent company and to three German individual investors in an aggregate amount of CHF 1.82 million. “PPL AG” was later converted into a joint stock corporation and on that occasion the participation certificates were converted into Profit Participating Loans (PPL), with an annual interest rate of 7%. In 2015, the Swiss tax administration carried out a tax audit of “PPL AG” for the years 2010-2014 and issued an assessment claiming payment of CHF 94,000 in withholding taxes on constructive dividends. According to the tax administration “PPL AG” had paid excessive amounts of interest to its lenders under the PPLs, exceeding the safe harbour interest rates published by the Swiss tax administration for the years under review. According to the tax administration, the portion of the interest payments exceeding the published safe harbour interest rates constituted constructive dividends. “PPL AG” brought the case to the Federal Administrative Court claiming an annulment of the tax assessment. Ruling of the Federal Administrative Court The Court ruled in favour of the tax administration and thus rejected the argument put forward by “PPL AG” – that PPLs under the arm’s length principle had to be treated differently than ordinary shareholder loans. All shareholder loans – whether profit participating or not – are subject to the same arm’s-length standard. There is a possibility for the taxpayer to prove that a  higher interest rate than the safe harbour rates published by the tax administration i a specific situation is at arm’s length, but “PPL AG” had failed to do so. The Court concluded that the interest rate of 7% paid by “PPL AG” was excessive, and that the same amount of interest would not have been paid to an independent third-party lender. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation A-6360_2017 ...

In this case Aegis Ltd had advanced money to an assosiated enterprice (AE)  and recived preference shares carrying no dividend in return. The Indian Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) held that the “acqusition of preference shares” were in fact equivalent to an interest free loan advanced by Aegis Ltd to the assosiated enterprice and accordingly re-characterised the transaction and issued an assessment for 2009 and 2010 where interest was charged on notional basis. Aegis Ltd disagreed with the assessment of the TPO and brought the case before the Tax Tribunal. The Tribunal did not accept the conclusions of the TPO. “The TPO cannot disregard the apparent transaction and substitute the same without any material of exceptional circumstances pointing out that the assessee had tried to conceal the real transaction or that the transaction in question was sham. The Tribunal observed that the TPO cannot question the commercial expediency of the assessee entered into such transaction.” The Indian Revenue Service then filed an appeal to the High Court of Bombay challenging the dicision of the Tax Tribunal. The High Court of Bombay dismissed the appeal. According to the High Court “The facts on record would suggest that the assessee had entered into a transaction of purchase and sale of shares of an AE. Nothing is brought on record by the Revenue to suggest that the transaction was sham. In absence of any material on record, the TPO could not have treated such transaction as a loan and charged interest thereon on notional basis.” India-vs-Aegis-Ltd-280119-High-Court-of-Bombay ...

The Administrative Court re-characterised a profit-participating loan into equity for tax purposes. The court provided the following reasoning: “Compared with the criteria specified above for a requalification as a disguised contribution of capital, it should firstly be noted that the sums made available to the two subsidiaries were allocated to investments in properties intended in principle to represent investments in the medium or long term as assets of the invested assets and in the absence of a clause providing for a repayment plan or a fixed maturity, the sums were intended to remain at the disposal of the subsidiaries for a period otherwise limited. In addition, this availability of funds did not give rise to any fixed consideration from the two subsidiaries, but only to a share of the appellant in the capital gains generated by hotel disposals, this interest amounting to three quarters of the capital gains obtained by the affiliates.” “...the sums made available to the two subsidiaries by the appellant were not, as a financing from a lender seeking to recover the capital lent, but as a risk-oriented investment. on the value gains of the hotels financed through the two loans, so that these sums are to be assimilated to cash contributions to the subsidiaries and that the normal way of making these sums available would have been the capital increase. Since there is no other particular economic interest justifying the replacement of capital contributions by loans arising from the elements in question or not put forward by one of the parties, it must be concluded that the essential tax interest consisted in the deduction of ” participating interests ” by the subsidiaries in the Dominican Republic as expenses in relation to the taxable gains from affiliates.” “The evidence presented to the Court thus allows the conclusion that the appellant’s claims under the two loan agreements in question are subordinate. In any case, whether the loan is subordinated or not is only one of several factors to be taken into account in the context of the overall analysis if it corresponds to the normal route of financing dictated by serious economic or legal considerations, analysis that the court should have made instead of focusing on the only question of whether or not subordinated loans are cause.” “…it must be concluded that, in view of the conditions to which they were granted, the loans at issue in fact amount to disguised capital injections in addition to the shareholdings…thus qualify as participating in the share capital of these companies within the meaning of § 60 BewG.” Click here for translation LUX vs LuxCo 260717 COUR ADMINISTRATIVE Case No 38357C ...

ARTICLE 9 ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES 1. Where an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. 2. Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise of that State – and taxes accordingly – profits on which an enterprise of the other Contracting State has been charged to tax in that other State and the profits so included are profits which would have accrued to the enterprise of the first mentioned State if the conditions made between the two enterprises had been those which would have been made between independent enterprises, then that other State shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits. In determining such adjustment, due regard shall be had to the other provisions of this Convention and the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall if necessary, consult each other. COMMENTARY ON ARTICLE 9 CONCERNING THE TAXATION OF ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES 1. This Article deals with adjustments to profits that may be made for tax purposes where transactions have been entered into between associated enterprises (parent and subsidiary companies and companies under common control) on other than arm’s length terms. The Committee has spent considerable time and effort (and continues to do so) examining the conditions for the application of this Article, its consequences and the various methodologies which may be applied to adjust profits where transactions have been entered into on other than arm’s length terms. Its conclusions are set out in the report entitled Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations,’ which is periodically updated to reflect the progress of the work of the Committee in this area. That report represents internationally agreed principles and provides guidelines for the application of the arm’s length principle of which the Article is the authoritative statement. Paragraph 1 2. This paragraph provides that the taxation authorities of a Contracting State may, for the purpose of calculating tax liabilities of associated enterprises, re-write the accounts of the enterprises if, as a result of the special relations between the enterprises, the accounts do not show the true taxable profits arising in that State. It is evidently appropriate that adjustment should be sanctioned in such circumstances. The provisions of this paragraph apply only if special conditions have been made or imposed between the two enterprises. No re-writing of the accounts of associated enterprises is authorised if the transactions between such enterprises have taken place on normal open market commercial terms (on an arm’s length basis). 3. As discussed in the Committee on Fiscal Affairs’ Report on “Thin Capitalisation” there is an interplay between tax treaties and domestic rules on thin capitalisation relevant to the scope of the Article. The Committee considers that: a) the Article does not prevent the application of national rules on thin capitalisation insofar as their effect is to assimilate the profits of the borrower to an amount corresponding to the profits which would have accrued in an arm’s length situation; b) the Article is relevant not only in determining whether the rate of interest provided for in a loan contract is an arm’s length rate, but also whether a prima facie loan can be regarded as a loan or should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital; c) the application of rules designed to deal with thin capitalisation should normally not have the effect of increasing the taxable profits of the relevant domestic enterprise to more than the arm’s length profit, and that this principle should be followed in applying existing tax treaties. 4. The question arises as to whether special procedural rules which some countries have adopted for dealing with transactions between related parties are consistent with the Convention. For instance, it maybe asked whether the reversal of the burden of proof or presumptions of any kind which are sometimes found in domestic laws are consistent with the arm’s length principle. A number of countries interpret the Article in such a way that it by no means bars the adjustment of profits under national law under conditions that differ from those of the Article and that it has the function of raising the arm’s length principle at treaty level. Also, almost all member countries consider that additional information requirements which would be more stringent than the normal requirements, or even a reversal of the burden of proof, would not constitute discrimination within the meaning of Article 24. However, in some cases the application of the national law of some countries may result in adjustments to profits at variance with the principles of the Article. Contracting States are enabled by the Article to deal with such situations by means of corresponding adjustments (see below) and under mutual agreement procedures. Paragraph 2 5. The re-writing of transactions bet ween associated enterprises in the situation envisaged in paragraph 1 may give rise to economic double taxation (taxation of the same income in the hands of different persons), in so far as an enterprise of State A whose profits are revised upwards will be liable to tax on an amount of profit which has already been taxed in the hands of its associated enterprise in State B. Paragraph 2 provides that in these circumstances, State B shall make an appropriate adjustment so as to relieve the double taxation. 6. It ...

This issue in this case is qualification of an investment as debt or equity. HP bought preferred stock in Foppingadreef Investments, a Dutch company. Foppingadreef Investments bought contingent interest notes, from which FOP’s preferred stock received dividends that HP claimed as foreign tax credits. HP claimed millions in foreign tax credits between 1997 and 2003, then exercised its option to sell its preferred shares for a capital loss of more than $16 million. The IRS characterized the transaction as debt, and denied the tax credits claimed by Hewlett Packard. First the Tax Court and later the Court of Appeal agreed with the tax authorities. The eleven factors considered by the Court when qualifying an investment as debt/equity the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; the presence or absence of a maturity date; the source of the payments; the right to enforce the payment of principal and interest; participation and management; a status equal to or inferior to that of regular corporate creditors; the intent of the parties; ‘thin’ or adequate capitalization; identity of interest between creditor and stock holder; payment of interest only out of ‘dividend’ money; the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending  institutions. “The parties expend considerable effort arguing over whether “most” of the relevant factors point one way or the other. But our test isn’t a bean-counting exercise. Instead, it’s best understood as a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that are often helpful in guiding a court’s factual determination. And, while such a free-floating inquiry is hardly a paragon of judicial predictability, it’s the necessary evil of a tax code that mistakes a messy spectrum for a simple binary, and has repeatedly failed to offer the courts statutory or regulatory guidance” “With this background in place, we have no difficulty concluding that the Tax Court didn’t err in finding that HP’s investment in FOP is best characterized as debt. While the factors point in different directions, the Tax Court committed no clear error in considering or weighing them. It appropriately found that the formal labels attached to the documents didn’t settle the inquiry. Instead, of particular importance to the Tax Court was the de facto presence of a fixed maturity date, and HP’s de facto creditor’s rights. The Tax Court concluded that the deal had a de facto maturity date because HP had an overwhelming economic incentive to divest itself of FOP after 2003: After that year, FOP would have negative earnings, thereby preventing HP from claiming foreign tax credits. HP knew this, and never expected to stay in the transaction after 2003. HP’s income was also highly predictable: It was entitled to semiannual payments equal to 97% of the after-tax base interest on the notes, and had a contractual remedy against ABN and, if ABN failed to pay interest on the notes, FOP as well. While payment of the dividends was contingent on FOP’s earnings, the transaction was arranged such that FOP’s earnings were all but predetermined. In short, HP’s investment earned it a limited return for a fixed period, and the Tax Court made no error in concluding that the investment was debt.” The Court of Appeal also upheld the determination that a purported capital loss was really a fee paid for a tax shelter, which cannot be deducted. US vs Hewlett Packard 2017 ...

The African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), through the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, have developed this toolkit for African tax authorities seeking to assess transfer pricing risk in the mining industry. The purpose is to strengthen authorities’ capacity to determine whether they should audit particular high-risk “related party transactions.” The toolkit employs a specific risk review approach, which focuses on particular transfer pricing issues that present a high risk to revenue (as distinct from a comprehensive risk review, which tax authorities use when they cannot detect where transfer  pricing issues are likely to arise). A loss of even 1 percent of the value of these transactions is likely to be significant for developing country revenues. These issues are also very prevalent: many African tax authorities report corporate services, including procurement and management, as common causes of tax loss. The four issues of focus are: 1. Marketing arrangements. A related company, for example a marketing hub, buys mineral products from the mine. The key issue is whether the mineral products are transferred to a fully fledged related party marketer that takes ownership of the product, performs value-adding functions and assumes entrepreneurial risk, or, more commonly, a hub that merely provides a support function. 2. Intercompany debt. A subsidiary receives debt from a parent or an affiliate company, often a corporate treasury located in a low-tax jurisdiction, to finance geological exploration or mine development. Debt generates interest payments, which are tax deductible. Most African countries currently limit the maximum amount of debt on which deductible interest payments are available, by way of a debt-to-equity ratio. However, the cost of related party debt (i.e., the interest rate) is difficult for tax authorities to price, leaving the tax base vulnerable to excessive interest deductions. 3. Procurement services. A company purchases mining goods and services on behalf of its subsidiary; the price charged to the subsidiary will include the direct cost, plus a “mark-up.” Usually in such cases the cost base should be the cost of providing the service, not the value of the goods. 4. Management services. The subsidiary pays a fee to a related party in return for a range of administrative, technical and advisory services. 2017_GIZ_Transfer_Pricing_Risk_Tool_EN ...

The Practical Compliance Guideline (Guideline) from the ATO outlines the compliance approach to the taxation outcomes associated with a ‘financing arrangement’, as defined in section 995-1 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 1997), or a related transaction or contract, entered into with a cross border related party. Such an arrangement, transaction or contract is referred to in this Guideline as a ‘related party financing arrangement’. This Guideline does not cover financing arrangements characterised as equity in accordance with Division 974 of the ITAA 1997. The framework in these Guideline and the accompanying schedules are used to assess risk and tailor engagement according to the features of the related party financing arrangement, the profile of the parties to the related party financing arrangement and the choices and behaviours of the group. The tax risk associated with the related party financing arrangement is assessed having regard to a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators. If the related party financing arrangement is rated as low risk, then the Commissioner will generally not apply compliance resources to review the taxation outcomes other than to fact check the appropriate risk rating. If the related party financing arrangement falls outside the low risk category, the Commissioner will monitor, test and/or verify the taxation outcomes. The higher the risk rating, the more likely the arrangements will be reviewed as a matter of priority. The framework set out in this Guideline can be applied to: (a) assess the tax risk of your related party financing arrangement (b) understand the compliance approach we are likely to adopt given the risk profile of your related party financing arrangement (c) work with us to mitigate the transfer pricing risk in relation to your related party financing arrangement and be confident you have reduced your risk exposure, and (d) understand the type of analysis and evidence we would require when assessing the risk outcomes of your related party financing arrangements. ATO Financial transactions 2017 ...

The European Commission has opened an in-depth investigation into Luxembourg’s tax treatment of the GDF Suez group (now Engie). The Commission has concerns that several tax rulings issued by Luxembourg may have given GDF Suez an unfair advantage over other companies, in breach of EU state aid rules. The Commission will assess in particular whether Luxembourg tax authorities selectively derogated from provisions of national tax law in tax rulings issued to GDF Suez. They appear to treat the same financial transaction between companies of GDF Suez in an inconsistent way, both as debt and as equity. The Commission considers at this stage that the treatment endorsed in the tax rulings resulted in tax benefits in favour of GDF Suez, which are not available to other companies subject to the same national taxation rules in Luxembourg. As from September 2008, Luxembourg issued several tax rulings concerning the tax treatment of two similar financial transactions between four companies of the GDF Suez group, all based in Luxembourg. These financial transactions are loans that can be converted into equity and bear zero interest for the lender. One convertible loan was granted in 2009 by LNG Luxembourg (lender) to GDF Suez LNG Supply (borrower); the other in 2011 by Electrabel Invest Luxembourg (lender) to GDF Suez Treasury Management (borrower). The Commission considers at this stage that in the tax rulings the two financial transactions are treated both as debt and as equity. This is an inconsistent tax treatment of the same transaction. On the one hand, the borrowers can make provisions for interest payments to the lenders (transactions treated as loan). On the other hand, the lenders’ income is considered to be equity remuneration similar to a dividend from the borrowers (transactions treated as equity). The tax treatment appears to give rise to double non-taxation for both lenders and borrowers on profits arising in Luxembourg. This is because the borrowers can significantly reduce their taxable profits in Luxembourg by deducting the (provisioned) interest payments of the transaction as expenses. At the same time, the lenders avoid paying any tax on the profits the transactions generate for them, because Luxembourg tax rules exempt income from equity investments from taxation. The final result seems to be that a significant proportion of the profits recorded by GDF Suez in Luxembourg through the two arrangements are not taxed at all. The two arrangements between LNG Luxembourg (lender) and GDF Suez LNG Supply (borrower) as well as Electrabel Invest Luxembourg (lender) and GDF Suez Treasury Management (borrower) work as follows: Under the terms of the convertible zero interest loan the borrower would record in its accounts a provision for interest payments, without actually paying any interest to the lender. Interest payments are tax deductible expenses in Luxembourg. The provisioned amounts represent a large proportion of the profit of each borrower. This significantly reduces the taxes the borrower pays in Luxembourg. Had the lender received interest income, it would have been subject to corporate tax in Luxembourg. Instead, the loans are subsequently converted into company shares in favour of the lender. The shares incorporate the value of the provisioned interest payments and thereby generate a profit for the lenders. However, this profit – which was deducted by the borrower as interest – is not taxed as profit at the level of the lender, because it is considered to be a dividend-like payment, associated with equity investments. State aid Luxembourg GDF Suez sept 2016 ...

Cartorama C.A. had been granted extensive credits by a related party Universal Paper S.A. The tax administration (SRI) claimed that no supplier would grant such credits to Cartorama given the company’s financial situation. Hence the loan was instead considered a equity contribution from Universal Paper S.A. and tax deductions claimed by Cartorama C.A. for interest payments for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 were disallowed. The Company disagreed with the assessment at brought the case to the court. The regional court held in favor of Cartorama C.A. and annulled the assessment, but this decision was then appealed by the tax authorities before the National Court. Judgment of the Court The National Court dismissed the decision of the regional court and confirmed the validity and legitimacy of the assessments issued by the Regional Director of the Internal Revenue Service. Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation Equador Corte nacional RECURSO DE CASACIÓN 488 2012 ...

The Italien company had qualified a funding arrangement in an amount of Lira 500 billion classified by the parties as a non-interest-bearing contribution reserved for a future capital increase. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Italian Supreme Court found that intra-group financing agreements are subject to transfer pricing legislation and that non-interest-bearing financing is generally not consistent with the arm’s-length principle. The court remanded the case to the lower court for further consideration. “”In conclusion, with regard to appeal r.g. no. 12882/2008, the first plea should be upheld, the second absorbed, and the third and fourth declared inadmissible; the judgment under appeal should be set aside in relation to the upheld plea and the case referred to another section of the Regional Tax Commission of Lombardy, which will comply with the principle of law set out in paragraph 3.5…” In regards to the non-interest-bearing financing the Court states in paragraph 3.5: “35… It follows that the valuation “at arm’s length” is irrespective of the original ability of the transaction to generate income and, therefore, of any negotiated obligation of the parties relating to the payment of the consideration (see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, paragraph 1.2). In fact, it is a matter of examining the economic substance of the transaction that has taken place and comparing it with similar transactions carried out, in comparable circumstances, in free market conditions between independent parties and assessing its conformity with these (cf, on the criteria for determining normal value, Court of Cassation no. 9709 of 2015): therefore, the qualification of the non-interest-bearing financing, possibly made by the parties (on whom the relevant burden of proof is incumbent, given the normally onerous nature of the loan agreement, pursuant to article 1815 of the Italian Civil Code), proves to be irrelevant, as it is in itself incapable of excluding the application of the criterion of valuation based on normal value. It should be added that it would be clearly unreasonable, and a source of conduct easily aimed at evading the legislation in question, to consider that the administration can exercise this power of adjustment in the case of transactions with a consideration lower than the normal value and even derisory, while it is precluded from doing so in the case of no consideration.” Click her for English translation Click here for other translation Italy Supreme-Court-15-April-2016-No.-7493.pdf ...

In the INC bank case the tax administration had characterised part of the interest-bearing debt of a local branch of a Dutch bank, ING DIRECT B.V,  as “free” capital, in “accordance” with EU minimum capitalisation requirements and consequently reduced the deductible interest expenses in the taxabel income of the local branch for FY 2002 and 2003. The adjustment had been based on interpretation of the Commentaries to the OECD Model Convention, article 7, which had first been approved in 2008. Judgement of the National Court The court did not agree with the “dynamic interpretation” of Article 7 applied by the tax administration in relation to “free” capital, and ruled in favor of the branch of ING Direct. “In short, in accordance with the terms of the aforementioned DGT Consultation of 1272-98 of 13 July, “Consequently, to the extent that the branch or establishment is that of a banking institution, the interest paid to the head office will be deductible”, the appeal must be upheld in its entirety. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Spain vs INC Bank 100715 Spanish National High Court ...

The German subsidiary of a Canadian group lent significant sums to its under-capitalised UK subsidiary. The debt proved irrecoverable and was written off in 2002 when the UK company ceased trading. At the time, such write-offs were permitted subject to adherence to the principle of dealing at arm’s length. In its determination of profits on October 31, 2002, the German GmbH made a partial write-off of the repayment claim against J Ltd. in the amount of 717.700 €. The tax authorities objected that the unsecured loans were not at arm’s length. The tax authorities subjected the write-down of the claims from the loan, which the authorities considered to be equity-replacing, to the deduction prohibition of the Corporation Tax Act. The authorities further argued that if this was not the case, then, due to the lack of loan collateral, there would be a profit adjustment pursuant to § 1 of the Foreign Taxation Act. Irrespective of this, the unsecured loans had not been seriously intended from the outset and should therefore be considered as deposits. In general, the so-called partial depreciation is not justified because of the so-called back-up within the group. The Supreme Tax Court has held that a write-off of an irrecoverable related-party loan is not subject to income adjustment under the arm’s length rules, although the interest rate should reflect the bad debt risk. The Supreme Tax Court has now held that the lack of security does not invalidate the write-off. The lender was entitled to rely on the solidarity of the group, rather than demanding specific security from its subsidiary as debtor. In any case the arm’s length income adjustment provision of the Foreign Tax Act applied to trading transactions and relationships, but not to those entered into as a shareholder. The loans in question substituted share capital and their write-off was not subject to income adjustment on the grounds that a third party would not have suffered the loss. However, the interest rate charged should reflect the credit risk actually borne. In the meantime, there have been several changes to the relevant statutes. In particular, related-party loan losses can only be deducted if a third party creditor would have granted the finance (or allowed it to remain outstanding) under otherwise similar conditions. Also the Foreign Tax Act definition of “trading” has changed somewhat to bring certain aspects of intercompany finance into the scope of arm’s length adjustments. However, the general conclusion of the court that an arm’s length interest rate must reflect the degree of risk borne by the creditor remains valid In its judgment of 24 June 2015, the Supreme Tax Court made reference to this case-law in relation to Article IV of the DTT United Kingdom 1964, which corresponds in substance to Article 9 (1) of the OECD MA. Accordingly, the reversal of a write-down of an unsecured loan by a domestic parent company to its foreign subsidiary in accordance with Section 1 (1) of the AStG is not lawful. For the fact that § 1 exp. 1 AStG would be overriding agreement, nothing is evident. The wording of the law and also the will of the contracting parties of the DTTA do not permit the interpretation on which the BFH bases its judgments. Thus, according to Article 9 (1) of the DBA-USA 1989 and Article IV of the DTT-UK 1964, which correspond in substance to Article 9 (1) of the OECD-MA, according to their wording as a prerequisite for the correction of “profits” of affiliated companies, that “Are bound in their commercial or financial relations to agreed or imposed conditions other than those which would be mutually agreed by independent companies”. In this case, “the profits which one of the undertakings without these conditions has made, but has not achieved because of these conditions, must be attributed to the profits of that undertaking and taxed accordingly.” On 30 March 2016, the Federal Ministry of Finance issued a non-application decree stating that Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention does not refer to a transfer price adjustment but to a profit adjustment. According to the decree the principles of these two decisions are not to be applied beyond the decided individual cases insofar as the BFH has a blocking effect of DTT standards, which correspond in substance to Art. 9 (1) OECD-MA. The exclusive limitation of the correction on prices or transfer prices postulated by the BFH can not be inferred either from the wording of Article 9 DTT-USA 1989, Article IV DTT-UK 1964 or Article 9 (1) OECD-MA. The OECD Commentary on the OECD MA explicitly refers to the arm’s length terms and states that Article 9 (1) of the OECD-MA is concerned with adjustments to profits and not a price adjustment. If in the audit practice a situation is to be examined which corresponds to the facts of the cases of judgment, it must first be ascertained whether the loan relationship is to be recognized for tax purposes (eg no hidden distribution of profits) and whether the conditions are met pursuant to Section 6 (1) 2 sentence 2 EStG for recognizing a write-down on the loan receivable. If there is a loan relationship to be recognized and a partial depreciation should be carried out on the loan receivable pursuant to § 6 (1) (2) sentence 2 EStG , it must be examined whether the application of § 1 AStG in accordance with the BMF letter of 29 March 2011 (BStBl I S 277) means that the taxable person’s income is to be increased by the amount of the depreciation. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Bundesfinanzhof I R 29-14 ...

C-GmbH was the sole shareholder of I-GmbH. In 2000, I-GmbH, together with another company, set up a US company for the development of the US market, H-Inc., in which the I-GmbH held 60 per cent of the shares. H-Inc. received equity from the two shareholders and also received a bank loan of approx. $ 1.5 million (USD), which the shareholders secured through guarantees. As of December 31, 2003, the balance sheet of H-Inc. showed a deficit not covered by equity of approx. 950,000 USD. On June 30 , 2004,  I-GmbH became the sole shareholder of H-Inc. Then the bank put the H-Inc. granted loans due. Since H-Inc. was not able to serve the bank loan, C-GmbH paid the bank. As of December 31, 2004, the balance sheet of H-Inc. showed a deficit not covered by equity of approx. $ 450,000 , which at December 31 , 2005 amounted to approx. $ 1.6 million, as at 31 December 2006 $ 2.5 million and at December 31, 2007 USD 3.5 million. During the years 2004 to 2007, the I-GmbH granted its US subsidiary 5% interest-bearing, unsecured loans of € 261,756.22 (2004), € 1,103,140 (2005), € 158,553.39 (2006) and € 75,000 (2007) resulting from the liquidity of future profits of H-Inc. should be repaid. Loan receivables were subject to individual value adjustments already in the respective year of their commitment (2004: € 261,052, 2005: € 1,103,140, ​​2006: € 158,000, 2007: € 75,000). In judgment of 17 December 2014, the German Tax Court stated, with reference to its judgment of 11 October 2012, IR 75/11, that the treaty principle of “dealing At arm’s length ” have a blocking effect on the so-called special conditions. The relevant test according to Article 9 (1) of the DTC-USA 1989, which corresponds in substance to Article 9 (1) of the OECD Model Agreement, could only include those circumstances that have an effect on agreed prices. The concept of agreed conditions in Article 9 (1) of the OECD-Model Agreement should, in principle, include everything which is the subject of commercial and financial relations and therefore the subject of contractual exchange between affiliated undertakings, so that both the price and all other terms and conditions should be included. Following these decisions, on 30 March 2016, the Federal Ministry of Finance issued a non-application decree stating that Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention does not refer to a transfer price adjustment but to a profit adjustment. According to the decree the principles of the above decisions are not to be applied beyond the decided individual cases. Se also the later decision from the German Tax Court I R 29/14. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation I R 23-13 ...

A Ab had in 2009 from its majority shareholder B, based in Luxembourg, received a EUR 15 million inter-company loan. A Ab had in 2009 deducted 1,337,500 euros in interest on the loan. The loan had been granted on the basis that the banks financing A’s operations had demanded that the company acquire additional financing, which in the payment scheme would be a subordinated claim in relation to bank loans, and by its nature a so-called IFRS hybrid, which the IFRS financial statements were treated as equity. The loan was guaranteed. The fixed annual interest rate on the loan was 30 percent. The loan could be paid only on demand by A Ab. The Finnish tax authorities argued that the legal form of the inter-company loan agreed between related parties should be disregarded, and the loan reclassified as equity. Interest on the loan would therefore not be deductible for A Ab. According to the Supreme Administrative Court interest on the loan was tax deductible. The Supreme Administrative Court stated that a reclassification of the loan into equity was not possible under the domestic transfer pricing provision alone. Further, the Supreme Administrative Court noted that it had not been demonstrated or even alleged by the tax authorities that the case was to regarded as tax avoidance. The fact that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Sections 1.65, 1.66 and 1.68) could in theory have allowed a reclassification of the legal form of the loan into equity was not relevant because a tax treaty cannot broaden the tax base from that determined under the domestic tax provisions. Consequently, the arm’s length principle included in Article 9 of the tax treaty between Finland and Luxembourg only regarded the arm’s length pricing of the instrument, not the classification of the instrument. Click here for other translation Finland-2014-July-Supreme-Administrative-Court-HFD-2014-119 ...

The application of the WEV (waarde in het economische verkeer) rule is particularly relevant if the non-corporate loan is interest-free or the agreed interest is owed. The interest to be taken into account for tax purposes is then determined on the market value of each interest period at the time it falls due. The assessment of the business nature of the money supply can take place both at the time of supply and during the term. This test must be carried out on both sides, from the perspective of the lending and borrowing company. Referring to what has been said above with regard to the perspective of the entities involved, a situation of an affiliated lender granting a loan to the borrowing group entity that subsequently is insufficiently creditworthy may also constitute a ‘non-business loan’ in the approach of the aforementioned judgment. In my opinion, the same applies to the borrower who, as a result of the linked intra-group loan, sees his creditworthiness drop to a level below BBB-. The Supreme Court considered that the level of interest on a ‘non-bankrupt loan’, a loan with a non-bankrupt default risk, should be determined by reference to the creditworthiness of the lending entity. The Supreme Court did not explain in its judgment how to deal with the creditworthiness of the lending group entity compared to the creditworthiness of the borrowing entity. In case of a higher creditworthiness of the lender compared to the creditworthiness of the borrowing entity, the interest rate that would be charged by the lending group entity itself will be considered as the appropriate interest rate to be taken into account for tax purposes. If the lending group entity does not have a better credit rating than the borrowing group entity, i.e. if it is not itself investment grade, the notional guarantee does not, in principle, add anything. In that case, no more than the risk-free interest rate on the loan can be taken into account. English translation of the opinion issued by the Attorney General – I recommend that the appeal in cassation is declared to be unfounded Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme court decided against the opinion of the Attorney General and concluded that the appeal of X B.V was well founded. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ECLI_NL_HR_2013_BW6552 ...

PepsiCo had devised hybrid securities, which were treated as debt in the Netherlands and equity in the United States. Hence, the payments were treated as tax deductible interest expenses in the Netherlands but as tax free dividend income on equity in the US. The IRS held that the payments received from PepsiCo in the Netherlands should also be characterised as taxable interest payments for federal income tax purposes and issued an assessment for FY 1998 to 2002. PepsiCo brought the assessment before the US Tax Court. Based on a 13 factors-analysis the Court concluded that the payments made to PepsiCo were best characterised as nontaxable returns on capital investment and set aside the assessment. Factors considered were: (1) names or labels given to the instruments; (2) presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; (3) source of payments; (4) right to enforce payments; (5) participation in management as a result of the advances; (6) status of the advances in relation to regular corporate creditors; (7) intent of the parties; (8) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (9) “thinness” of capital structure in relation to debt; (10) ability of the corporation to obtain credit from outside sources; (11) use to which advances were put; (12) failure of debtor to repay; and (13) risk involved in making advances. “And, perhaps most convincingly, the “independent creditor test” underscores that a commercial bank or third party lender would not have engaged in transactions of comparable risk.” “However, after consideration of all the facts and circumstances, we believe that the advance agreements exhibited more qualitative and quantitative indicia of equity than debt.” “We hold that the advance agreements are more appropriately characterized as equity for Federal income tax purposes.” US vs PepsiCo Sep 2012 US Tax Court Opinion, T-C-Memo 2012-269 ...

In this case, the Dutch Supreme Court further outlined the Dutch perspective on the distinction between debt and equity in its already infamous judgments on the so-called extreme default risk loan (EDR loan) L sold a securities portfolio to B for EUR 5.3 million against B’s acknowledgement of debt to L for the same amount. The debt was then converted into a 10 year loan with  an interest rate of 5% and a pledge on the portfolio. Both L and B were then moved to the Netherlands Antilles. Later on L deducted a EUR 1.2 mill. loss on the loan to B due to a decrease in value of the securities portfolio. The Dutch Tax Authorities disallowed the deduction based on the argument, that the loan was not a business motivated loan. The Dutch Supreme Court ruled that in principle civil law arrangement is decisive in regard to taxation. However there are exceptions in which a civil law loan arrangement can be disregarded. A non-business motivated loan is defined as an intercompany loan that carries an interest rate which – given the terms and conditions of the loan – is not at arm’s length, and which a third party would not have granted given the risk involved. In such cases, any losses arising from the loan are not deductible for Dutch corporate tax purposes. But at the same time, the lender still has to report an arm’s length interest which equals the interest that the borrower would have paid in case it had borrowed from a third party with a guarantee from the lender. Click here for translation Netherland-vs-Corp-25-November-2011-Supreme-Court-case-nr-08-05323 ...

In the Filinvest case an assessment had been issued where the tax authorities had imputed interest on an interest free loan. Judgement of the Tax Court The Court set aside the assessment. The tax authorities power to allocate gross income does not include the power to impute ‘theoretical interest’ because there must be actual or, at the very least, probable receipt or realisation by the taxpayer of the income that is being allocated. Philippines vs Filinvest Development Corporation July 2011 Supreme Court 163653y ...

In the Banca di Roma case, the Court of Appeals reiterated that the FTA is not allowed to decide whether a business is to be financed through debt or equity. The terms of Article 57 of the French Tax Code (FTC) do not have the purpose, nor the effect, of allowing the administration to assess the ‘normal’ nature of the choice made by a foreign company to finance through a loan, rather than equity, the activity of an owned or controlled French company, and to deduce, if the need arises, tax consequences (cf. Article 212 of the FTC – thin capitalisation). Click here for translation France vs Banca di Roma 16_12_2010_CAA 08PA05096 ...

This case was about the qualification of capital transfers to a US subsidiary – whether the capital should be qualified as a loan (as done by the company) or as a equity contribution (as agrued by the tax administration). The Supreme Court concluded that the capital transfers to the subsidiary as a whole should be classified as loans. The form chosen by the company (loan) had an independent commercial rationale and Section 13-1 of the Tax Code did not allow for reclassification of the capital transfer The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Telecomputing AS. Click here for translation Norway rt-2010-s-790-Telecomputing-rentefritt-lån ...

NatWest is a United Kingdom corporation engaged in international banking activities. For the tax years 1981-1987, NatWest conducted wholesale banking operations in the United States through six permanently established branch locations (collectively “the U.S. Branch”). On its United States federal income tax returns for the years at issue, NatWest claimed deductions for accrued interest expenses as recorded on the books of the U.S. Branch. On audit, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) recomputed the interest expense deduction according to the formula set forth in Treasury Regulation § 1.882-5. The formula excludes consideration of interbranch transactions for the determination of assets, liabilities, and interest expenses. Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5(a)(5) (1981).2 The formula also imputes or estimates the amount of capital held by the U.S. Branch based on either a fixed ratio or the ratio of NatWest’s average total worldwide liabilities to average total worldwide assets. Id. § 1.882-5(b)(2). Pursuant to the IRS’s recalculation of the interest expense deduction, NatWest’s taxable income was increased by approximately $155 million for the years at issue. NatWest concluded that the increased income would result in an additional tax liability of at least $37 million in the United States for which a foreign tax credit would not be available in the United Kingdom. NatWest thus requested, under Article 24 of the 1975 Treaty, that the United Kingdom enter competent authority proceedings with the United States to resolve the double taxation issue. Pursuant to the competent authority proceedings, the United Kingdom presented NatWest with a settlement offer, which NatWest concluded did not sufficiently address its double taxation concerns. NatWest rejected the settlement offer, paid the additional taxes, and filed suit in 1995, claiming that the IRS’s application of § 1.882-5 to an international bank such as NatWest violated the terms of the 1975 Treaty. The 1975 US/UK Double Taxation Treaty contained an Article 7 in similar terms to Article 8 of the 1976 Convention. In the first of three cases, NatWest claimed that the formula used in the Treasury Regulation to calculate deductible interest was inconsistent with Article 7 of the Treaty. The United States Court of Federal Claims upheld the claim. In relation to Article 7 of the US/UK Treaty it said: “The foregoing examination of Article 7 of the Treaty, pre-ratification reports of the Treasury Department and the Senate, and Commentaries intended to assist in interpretation leads to the conclusion that the Treaty contemplates that a foreign banking corporation in the position of plaintiff will be subjected to U.S. taxation only on the profits of its U.S. branch and that such profits should be based on the books of account of such branch maintained as if the branch were a distinct and separate enterprise dealing wholly independently with the remainder of the foreign corporation, provided that the financial records of the branch, especially those reflecting intra-corporate lending transactions, are subject to adjustment as may be necessary for imputation of adequate capital to the branch and to insure use of market rates in computing interest expenses. In addition to normal deductible expenses reflected on the books of the branch, as adjusted, there shall be allowed in the determination of the profits of the U.S. Branch a reasonable allocation of general and administrative expenses incurred for the purposes of the foreign enterprise as a whole.” The Treasury Regulation was held to operate contrary to Article 7 for a number of reasons. It treated the branch as a unit of the bank rather than as a separate entity and applied the formula without regard to the actual assets and liabilities shown on the books of the branch. Judgement of the Court The court allowed the appeal of National Westminster. According to the court there is nothing in the language of Article 7 to suggest that the government is allowed to impose capital requirements on a branch that are the same as those imposed on separately-incorporated banks in order to give meaning to the phrase “separate and distinct.” The phrase “separate and distinct” does not mean the branch should be treated as if it were “separately-incorporated,” but instead “separate and distinct,” means separate and distinct from the rest of the bank of which it is a part. Thus, Article 7 of the Treaty simply allows the taxing authorities to adjust the books and records of the branch to ensure that transactions between the branch and other portions of the foreign bank are properly identified and characterized for tax purposes. There is nothing in the plain words of the Treaty that allows the government to adjust the books and records of the branch to reflect “hypothetical” infusions of capital based upon banking and market requirements that do not apply to the branch. In short, the government’s reading of Article 7 goes too far. NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK PLC v ...

Two inter-company loans were provided to Statoil Angola by it’s Norwegian parent company, Statoil Norway ASA, and a Belgian sister company, Statoil Belgium (SCC). Statoil Angola only had the financial capacity to borrow an amount equal to the loan from Statoil Belgium. Hence, no interest was paid on the loan from Statoil Norway. The tax authorities divided Statoil Angola’s borrowing capacity between the two loans and imputed interest payments on part of the loan from Statoil Norway in an assessment for the years 2000 and 2001. The Supreme Court, in a split 3/2 decision, found that Statoil’s allocation of the full borrowing capacity of Statoil Angola to the loan from the sister company in Belgium was based on commercial reasoning and in accordance with the arm’s length principle. The Court majority argued that Statoil Norway – unlike Statoil Belgium – had a 100% ownership of Statoil Angola, and the lack of interest income would therefore be compensated by an increased value of it’s equity holding in Statoil Angola. Click here for translation Norway vs. Statoil Angola, 2007, HRD RT 2007 - 1025 ...

Conclusion of the Tax Court: “The substance of the transactions is revealed in the lack of arm’s-length dealing between LIIBV and petitioners, the circular flow of funds, and the conduct of the parties by changing the terms of the agreements when needed to avoid deadlines. The Laidlaw entities’ core management group designed and implemented this elaborate system to create the appearance that petitioners were paying interest, while in substance they were not. We conclude that, for Federal income tax purposes, the advances from LIIBV to petitioners for which petitioners claim to have paid the interest at issue are equity and not debt. Thus, petitioners may not deduct the interest at issue for 1986, 1987, and 1988.” NOTE: 13 October 2016 section 385 of the Internal Revenue Code was issued containing regulations for re-characterisation of Debt/Equity for US Inbound Multinationals. Further, US documentation rules in Treasury Regulation § 1.385-2 facilitate analysis of related-party debt instruments by establishing documentation and maintenance requirements, operating rules, presumptions, and factors that impact treatment of a debt instrument as debt or equity. US vs Laidlaw Transportation Inc June 1998 US Tax Court ...

It is generally recommended that a flexible approach should be adopted in which the special conditions of each individual case would be considered, although it is realised that such an approach would call for sufficient qualified staff to carry out a somewhat sophisticated analysis and could, if cases were numerous, thus raise problems for some tax administrations. A hard and fast debt-equity rule would, however, not be appropriate for the solution of problems raised by the determination of the nature of a financial transaction. Financing practices differ too widely from one country to another, and, within a given country, between different categories of enterprises. Most of the countries whose practices are described in the previous paragraphs, therefore, refer to a number of factors which are of significance in distinguishing a loan from an equity contribution .. On the same reasoning, it is considered that a rule based on the fact that the owner of the shares was non-resident would not be appropriate for general adoption either ...

As things stand today, there is a distinct possibility that the same financial transaction could be treated as a loan by one country and as an equity contribution by another, either because the country of the lender takes a different view from the country of the borrower or because borrowers of the same MNE in different countries who are involved in what, to the MNE, seem to be similar transactions are treated differently by different national tax authorities. This is an unsatisfactory situation which it would be desirable to improve. It may be asked therefore, whether it would be possible to envisage that with time, more and more tax authorities would move towards what could be called the ” multiple criteria test “. Or whether, on the contrary, it would be preferable to move towards a simpler, single criterion test, such as the debt-equity ratio, if some agreed range for such a ratio could be found. Finally, the question is sometimes raised whether it would be preferable, and conceivable, to adopt a rule-of-thumb for deciding on cases involving payments to non-residents which would be based upon a threshold level of non-resident ownership whilst leaving other cases which did not reach that critical level to be decided in accordance with company law ...

In a fourth country, the law treats certain payments of interest as distributions of profit in specific circumstances where it is thought desirable to combat possible avoidance devices designed to disguise such distributions as interest. Interest on certain securities which can be converted into shares, and interest which depends to any extent on the results of a company’s business, are therefore treated as distributions. In addition, as a broad anti-avoidance measure, interest paid to a non-resident company by a resident 75 per cent subsidiary or, in certain circumstances, by a 75 per cent subsidiary of a common parent, is also treated as a distribution. In double taxation agreements that country, however, sometimes provides that this special treatment of interest paid to non-resident companies shall not apply except where more than 50 per cent of the share capital of the recipient of the interest is controlled by a resident of that country ...

A third country also takes a pragmatic approach in distinguishing loans from equity contributions. All circumstances of a particular case would be considered to determine whether an alleged loan is to be regarded as ” hidden capital “contribution. No hard and fast debt-equity rule is applied. In practice, it seems to happen rarely that a financial transaction, which is treated as a loan under civil law, would be considered as capital for taxation purposes. No distinction is made between resident and non-resident companies ...

In another country which also would adopt a somewhat flexible approach and, as a rule, would look at the circumstances of each individual case, the general criterion is that of ” unusual financing “. This is applied in a different way to real estate, financing, trading or manufacturing companies, because financing practices are known to differ greatly as between categories of enterprises. For income tax purposes, for example, debts of real estate companies may not exceed 70-80 per cent of the fair market value of the real estate; a different debt-equity ratio is applied to ” societes financieres “, where the debt may not exceed six time the nominal capital plus the reserves. For the other categories of enterprises, debt-equity ratio is not held to be more important than other criteria which, whilst not being spelt out fully in the manner described in the preceding paragraph, could, in particular cases, be similar. No distinction is made between resident and non­resident companies ...

A number of countries adopt a fairly flexible approach, examining the circumstances of each individual case. Thus one country lists several factors, each of which is assumed to be evidence of either a stock or a debt instrument. The courts in that country have weighed these criteria in numerous cases they have had to deal with; but it is reported that each has been decided on the basis of the particular facts. The most important factors 1 that have been taken into consideration by the courts are: whether there is an unconditional written promise to pay a fixed amount of principal at a fixed maturity date; whether the loan is subordinated to the rights of other creditors; the ratio of debt to equity of the company2; whether the debt is convertible into stock or shares of the issuing company; whether the shareholders of the company hold the alleged debt instruments pro rata in relation to their shareholdings; the rights of the holders in the event of a default in the payment of interest 3; whether the parties ” intended ” to create a debtor-creditor relationship or not. In the past, the debt equity ratio was considered to be the single most important factor. But in recent years, the debt-equity ratio has been given greater weight than other factors and the courts now recognise that a very high debt equity ratio may be normal for some industries and attempt to weigh all of the above factors. They apply whether the company in question is the borrower or the lender. A very high ratio of debt to equity could be evidence of a stock instrument, depending on the industry involved. The right to sue the company for the principal amount would be evidence of a debt instrument, but the right to take over the management of the company or acquire voting rights upon default would be evidence of a stock instrument ...

Countries approach differently the question of how to distinguish an equity contribution from a loan. In some states, specific reallocation provisions apply when one of the companies involved is a non-resident. In others, transactions between domestic entities and transactions with non-residents generally follow the same rules. Three main types of solution may be mentioned ...

Financial contributions from a parent company to its subsidiary abroad would be the case in point. Tax authorities in the parent’s country will not require the parent to receive interest if the alleged loan is in fact an equity contribution and will ordinarily consider any interest which has been paid as being, in fact, a receipt of a dividend. Making a distinction between an equity contribution and a loan is, in practice, more important for the country of the subsidiary. It is clear why this should be so. Thus, if it is decided that the financial transaction is, in fact, a disguised equity contribution, the country of the borrower will ordinarily disallow for tax purposes the deduction of interest and will treat it as a dividend payment in which case it may also attract a different rate of withholding tax ...

Since for tax and other reasons equity contributions may be disguised as loans, a distinction has to be made between the two. Where it is determined that a financial transaction is a contribution to the equity of an enterprise, it follows that no interest is due. Thus such cases do not constitute an exception to the general principle that loans should bear interest. As a practical matter, some countries may be less concerned than others with this question, but the principle does not seem disputable ...

In this case the court had to decide whether advances made by a shareholder to a corporation constituted loans or capital contributions. For that purpose a list of 13 factors was established by the court. (1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; (2) The presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; (3) The source of payments; (4) The right to enforce payment of principal and interest; (5) participation in management flowing as a result; (6) the status of the contribution in relation to regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) “thin” or adequate capitalization; (9) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (10) source of interest payments; (11) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending institutions; (12) the extent to which the advance was used to acquire capital assets; and (13) the failure of the debtor to repay on the due date or to seek a postponement. NOTE: 13 October 2016 section 385 of the Internal Revenue Code was issued containing regulations for re-characterisation of Debt/Equity for US Inbound Multinationals. Further, US documentation rules in Treasury Regulation § 1.385-2 facilitate analysis of related-party debt instruments by establishing documentation and maintenance requirements, operating rules, presumptions, and factors that impact treatment of a debt instrument as debt or equity. US vs Mixon 1972 5 Circ Case no 464 F ...

In July, 1956, the appellants (Berkowitz and Kolbert) formed the taxpayer (K B Trail Properties, Inc.). Each of the appellants paid $2500 cash for one-half of the taxpayer’s authorized stock. They advanced the taxpayer $83,000 to begin business because the taxpayer was unable to borrow funds elsewhere. The taxpayer purchased a 99-year lease on business property utilizing these funds and assumed a mortgage of $57,829.20 as part of the purchase price of the lease. Each appellant took notes from the taxpayer totalling $41,500, payable in four installments of $2,500 commencing July 10, 1957, with the unpaid balance due July 10, 1961, with interest at the rate of 6 percent. In October, 1956, to finance the construction of an additional building on a property, the taxpayer borrowed $40,000 at 6 percent interest from a Savings and Loan Association, secured by a mortgage. In December, 1958, the taxpayer purchased the ground under the leasehold for $50,000. This transaction was partially financed by advances from the appellants in the amount of $5,000 each, evidenced by 15 percent notes due in December, 1959. The taxpayer borrowed $30,000 from a New York mortgage company, evidenced by an 8 percent note secured by a second mortgage on the premises. In 1960 the appellants each advanced the taxpayer $4,000. In 1963 they each advanced the taxpayer $3,600. There were no maturity dates for, or written evidence of these advances. Thus through 1963 the appellants had made unsecured advances to the taxpayer of $108,200, and two lending institutions had loaned the taxpayer $70,000 secured by mortgages. Obviously, the taxpayer was thin to the point of being transparent. Although the taxpayer was timely in its payments to the banking institutions, from 1956 through 1963 the taxpayer had paid only $1,980 toward the principal of the advances made by the appellants. There was no plan to reduce the principal further. In 1963 the taxpayer realized $60,000 from the sale of property, but instead of paying off the long overdue “loans” to the appellants, the taxpayer placed the money in a bank account where it drew a maximum of four and one-half percent, while, at the same time, the taxpayer was paying ten to fifteen percent on the principal of the advances made by the appellants. While the appellants, as directors of the taxpayer, made no effort to reduce the principal amount of their “loans” to the taxpayer, they did meet at the end of each year and decide what interest rate to pay. The taxpayer paid interest to the appellant as follows: 1957 — 4%, 1958 — 8%, 1959 — 15%, 1960 — 14%, 1961 — 10%, 1962 — 10%, and 1963 — 13%. On its income tax returns for the years in issue the taxpayer deducted the “interest” it had paid to the appellants during each fiscal year pursuant to section 163(a) of the Code. The Commissioner disallowed these deductions. Section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that there shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness. The tax authorities disallowed these deductions and increased the taxpayer’s income taxes. An appeal was filed by the taxpayer. Judgment of the Court The US Court of Appeal upheld the assessment of the tax authorities. The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that intent was the controlling factor. Instead, the court noted that the parties had objectively manifested their intent, so subjective intent was not determinative. Excerpts “The appellants had the burden to prove that the advances represented indebtedness rather than equity, and the fact that they intended to make loans and not capital contributions to the taxpayer is not determinative of the equity-capital tax issue. Nor is it decisive that the notes were executed in accordance with state law and described by the appellants and the taxpayer as “loans”. Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 3 Cir. 1968, 398 F.2d 694; Tomlinson v. 1661 Corporation, supra. These are just several of the numerous factors to be considered in determining whether the funds advanced to the taxpayer represented capital contributions rather than loans. We have expatiated on the criteria with some specificity as follows: There are at least eleven separate determining factors generally used by the courts in determining whether amounts advanced to a corporation constitute equity capital or indebtedness. They are (1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a maturity date; (3) the source of the payments; (4) the right to enforce the payment of principal and interest; (5) participation in management; (6) a status equal to or inferior to that of regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) `thin’ or adequate capitalization; (9) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (10) payment of interest only out of `dividend’ money; (11) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending institutions. … Applying these criteria to the case sub judice, there can be no doubt that the advances were nothing more than capital transfers as opposed to bona fide indebtedness. Obviously the taxpayer was inadequately capitalized. Considering only the advances made by the appellants, which the taxpayer designated as indebtedness, the ratio of debt to equity would have been about 21 to 1. Adding the institutional indebtedness to the advances made by the appellants would have made the ratio more lopsided.” “The problem is not one of ascertaining “intent” since the parties have objectively manifested their intent. It is a problem of whether the intent and acts of these parties should be disregarded in characterizing the transaction for federal tax purposes. It is not the jury’s function to determine whether the undisputed operative facts add up to debt or equity. This is a question of law. It was correctly decided by the District Court in favor of the government.” Click here for other translation Berkowitz v. United States, 411 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1969) ...