Tag: No commercial purpose or rationale

UK vs JTI Acquisitions Company (2011) Ltd, August 2023, Upper Tribunal, Case No [2023] UKUT 00194 (TCC)

JTI Acquisitions Company Ltd was a UK holding company, part of a US group, used as an acquisition vehicle to acquire another US group. The acquisition was partly financed by intercompany borrowings at an arm’s length interest rate. The tax authorities disallowed the interest expense on the basis that the loan was taken out for a unallowable purpose. Judgement of the Upper Tribunal The Court upheld the decision and dismissed JTI Acquisitions Company Ltd’s appeal. According to the Court, a main purpose of the arrangement was to secure a tax advantage for the UK members of the group. The fact that the loans were at arm’s length was relevant but not determinative. UK vs JTI ACQUISITIONS COMPANY (2011) LIMITED ...

UK vs BlackRock, July 2022, Upper Tribunal, Case No [2022] UKUT 00199 (TCC)

In 2009 the BlackRock Group acquired Barclays Global Investors for a total sum of $13,5bn. The price was paid in part by shares ($6.9bn) and in part by cash ($6.6bn). The cash payment was paid by BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC – a US Delaware Company tax resident in the UK – but funded by the parent company by issuing $4bn loan notes to the LLC. In the years following the acquisition Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC claimed tax deductions in the UK for interest payments on the intra-group loans. Following an audit in the UK the tax authorities disallowed the interest deductions. The tax authorities held that the transaction would not have happened between independent parties. They also found that the loans were entered into for an unallowable tax avoidance purpose. A UK taxpayer can be denied a deduction for interest where a loan has an unallowable purpose i.e, where a tax advantage is the company’s main purpose for entering into the loan relationship (section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009). If there is such an unallowable purpose, the company may not bring into account for that period ….so much of any debit in respect of that relationship as is attributable to the unallowable purpose. An appeal was filed by the BlackRock Group. In November 2020 the First Tier Tribunal found that an independent lender acting at arm’s length would have made loans to LLC5 in the same amount and on the same terms as to interest as were actually made by LLC4 (the “Transfer Pricing Issueâ€). The FTT further found that the Loans had both a commercial purpose and a tax advantage purpose but that it would be just and reasonable to apportion all the debits to the commercial purpose and so they were fully deductible by LLC5 (the “Unallowable Purpose Issueâ€). An appeal was then filed with the Upper Tribunal by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Upper Tribunal The Upper Tribunal found that the First Tier Tribunal had erred in law and therefore allowed HMRC’s appeal on both the transfer pricing issue and the unallowable purpose issue. The First Tier Tribunal’s Decision was set aside and the tax authorities amendments to LLC5’s tax returns were confirmed. Transfer Pricing “The actual provision of the loans from LLC4 to LLC5 differed from any arm’s length provision in that the loans would not have been made as between independent enterprises. The actual provision conferred a potential advantage in relation to United Kingdom taxation. The profits and losses of LLC5, including the allowing of debits for the interest and other expenses payable on the Loans, are to be calculated for tax purposes as if the arm’s length provision had been made or imposed instead of the actual provision. In this case, no arm’s length loan for $4 billion would have been made in the form that LLC4 made to LLC5 and hence HMRC’s amendments to the relevant returns should be upheld and confirmed.” Unallowable Purpose “The FTT did not err in finding that LLC5 had both a commercial purpose and an unallowable tax advantage main purpose in entering into the Loans. However, it was wrong to decide that the just and reasonable apportionment was solely to the commercial purpose. But for the tax advantage purpose there would have been no commercial purpose to the Loans and all the relevant facts and circumstances lead inexorably to the conclusion that the loan relationship debits should be wholly attributed to the unallowable tax purpose and so disallowed.” HMRC_v_Blackrock_Holdco_LLC5_UT-2021-000022_-_final_decision_ ...

Denmark vs Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS, March 2021, High Court, Cases B-721-13

Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS, a subsidiary in the Heerema group, paid dividends to a parent company in Luxembourg which in turn paid the dividends to two group companies in Panama. The tax authorities found that the company in Luxembourg was not the beneficial owner of the dividends and thus the dividends were not covered by the tax exemption rules of the EU Parent/Subsidiary Directive or the Double Taxation Convention between Denmark and Luxembourg. On that basis an assessment was issued regarding payment of withholding tax on the dividends. An appeal was filed by Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS with the High Court. Judgement of the Eastern High Court The court dismissed the appeal of Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS and decided in favor of the tax authorities. The parent company in Luxembourg was a so-called “flow-through” company which was not the beneficial owner of the dividend and thus not covered by the tax exemption rules of the Parent/Subsidiary Directive and the Double Taxation Convention between Denmark and Luxembourg. The Danish subsidiary was held liable for the non-payment of dividend tax. Excerpt “The actual distribution On 23 May 2007, Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS distributed USD 325 million, corresponding to DKK 1,799,298,000, to its parent company Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA. The amount was set off by the Danish company against a claim on the Luxembourg parent company arising from a loan of the same amount taken out by Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA in Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS on 22 January 2007 to pay the purchase price for the company. Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA acquired Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS from the two companies, Heavy Transport Group Inc. and Incomara Holdings SA, both resident in Panama and owners of both the Danish and Luxembourg companies. The purchase price was transferred from Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA to the Panamanian companies on 24 January 2007. The loan from Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS to Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA of USD 325 million is referred to in the loan agreement between the parties of 22 January 2007 as an ‘interim dividend’ and states that the amount will be paid as a ‘short term loan’ until such time as a resolution is passed at a future general meeting of Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS to distribute a dividend to the parent company in the same amount. The loan agreement also provides that the loan is to be repaid on demand or immediately after the dividend payment has been declared by offsetting it. It is undisputed that the company Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA was set up as an intermediate holding company between the Panamanian companies and Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS with the aim of ensuring that no Danish withholding tax was triggered by the dividend distribution. Moreover, as regards the activities of Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA, it appears that the company, which was apparently set up in 2004 to provide the financing for Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS and, after 22 January 2007, as the parent company of the company, did not have (and does not have) any employees, the administration of the company being outsourced to a group company in Luxembourg, Heerema Group Service SA. It is undisputed that the parent company had no other activity when it took over the Danish company. Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA’s annual accounts for 2007 show that its assets as at 31 December 2007 consisted of cash of USD 148 551 and financial assets of USD 1 255 355 in its subsidiary Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA was obliged and, moreover, was only able to repay the loan of USD 325 million to Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS by offsetting the dividend received and thus had no real power of disposal over the dividend. Consequently, and since the purpose of the transactions was undoubtedly to avoid Danish taxation of the dividends in connection with the repatriation of the funds to the shareholders in Panama, Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA cannot be regarded as the beneficial owner of the dividends within the meaning of Article 10(2) of the Double Taxation Convention and, as a general rule, the tax should not be reduced in accordance with the rules of the Convention. Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA is also not entitled to the tax exemption under the Parent/Subsidiary Directive, as it must be considered as a flow-through company with no independent economic and commercial justification, and must therefore be characterised as an artificial arrangement whose sole purpose was to obtain the tax exemption under the Directive, see the judgment of 26 February 2019 in Joined Cases C-116/16 and C-117/16. Significance of the possibility of liquidation under Article 59 of the current law on limited liability companies However, Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS claims that there is no abuse of the Parent/Subsidiary Directive, since the two shareholders in Panama, Heavy Transport Group Inc. and Incomara Holdings SA, instead of contributing the company Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA to receive and distribute the ordinary dividends of Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS to the Panamanian companies, could have chosen to liquidate the Danish company pursuant to Article 59 of the current Anartsselskabslov, whereby any liquidation proceeds distributed by the parent company in Luxembourg would have been tax-free for the two shareholders. In its judgment of 26 February 2019, paragraphs 108-110, the CJEU has ruled on the situation where there is a double taxation convention concluded between the source State and the third State in which the beneficial owners of the dividends transferred by the flow-through company are resident for tax purposes. The Court held that such circumstances cannot in themselves preclude the existence of an abuse of rights. The Court stated that if it is duly established on the basis of all the facts that the traders have carried out purely formal or artificial transactions, devoid of any economic or ...

Denmark vs Takeda A/S and NTC Parent S.a.r.l., November 2021, High Court, Cases B-2942-12 and B-171-13

The issue in these two cases is whether withholding tax was payable on interest paid to foreign group companies considered “beneficial owners” via conduit companies covered by the EU Interest/Royalties Directive and DTA’s exempting the payments from withholding taxes. The first case concerned interest accruals totalling approximately DKK 1,476 million made by a Danish company in the period 2007-2009 in favour of its parent company in Sweden in connection with an intra-group loan. The Danish Tax Authorities (SKAT) subsequently ruled that the recipients of the interest were subject to the tax liability in Section 2(1)(d) of the Corporation Tax Act and that the Danish company was therefore obliged to withhold and pay withholding tax on a total of approximately DKK 369 million. The Danish company brought the case before the courts, claiming principally that it was not obliged to withhold the amount collected by SKAT, as it disputed the tax liability of the recipients of the interest attributions. The second case concerned interest payments/accruals totalling approximately DKK 3,158 million made by a Danish company in the period 2006-2008 in favour of its parent company in Luxembourg in respect of an intra-group loan. SKAT also ruled in this case that the interest payments/write-ups were taxable for the recipients and levied withholding tax on them from the Danish company totalling approximately DKK 817 million. The Danish company appealed to the courts, claiming principally that the interest was not taxable. The Eastern High Court, as first instance, dealt with the two cases together. The European Court of Justice has ruled on a number of preliminary questions in the cases, see Joined Cases C-115/16, C-118/16, C119/16 and C-299/16. In both cases, the Ministry of Taxation argued in general terms that the parent companies in question were so-called “flow-through” companies, which were not the “beneficial owners” of the interest, and that the real “beneficial owners” of the interest were not covered by the rules on tax exemption, i.e. the EU Interest/Royalties Directive and the double taxation conventions applicable between the Nordic countries and between Denmark and Luxembourg respectively. Judgement of the Eastern High Court In both cases, the Court held that the parent companies in question could not be regarded as the “beneficial owners” of the interest, since the companies were interposed between the Danish companies and the holding company/capital funds which had granted the loans, and that the corporate structure had been established as part of a single, pre-organised arrangement without any commercial justification but with the main aim of obtaining tax exemption for the interest. As a result, the two Danish companies could not claim tax exemption under either the Directive or the Double Taxation Conventions and the interest was therefore not exempt. On 3 May 2021, the High Court ruled on two cases in the Danish beneficial owner case complex concerning the issue of taxation of dividends. The judgment of the Regional Court in Denmark vs NETAPP ApS and TDC A/S can be read here. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Takeda AS and NTC Parents Sarl Nov 2021 case no b-2942-12 ...

South Africa vs ABSA bank, March 2021, High Court, Case No 2019/21825

During FY 2014 – 2018 a South African company, ABSA, on four occasions bought tranches of preference shares in another South African company, PSIC 3. This entitled ABSA to dividends. The dividends received from PSIC 3 by ABSA were declared as tax free. The income in PSIC 3 was based on dividend payments on preference shares it owned in another South African company, PSIC 4. The income in PSIC 4 was from a capital outlay to an off shore trust, D1 Trust. The trust then lent money to MSSA, a South African subsidiary of the Macquarie Group, by means of subscribing for floating rate notes. The D1 Trust made investments by way of the purchase of Brazilian Government bonds. It then derived interest thereon. In turn, PSIC 4 received interest on its capital investment in D1 Trust. The South African Revenue Service held that ABSA had been a party to a tax avoidance scheme covered by local anti-avoidance provisions and first issued a notice of assessment and later a tax assessment according to which the income was taxable. According to the Revenue Service, the critical aspect of this series of transactions was the investment in Brazilian Government bonds by D1 Trust. This led to the view that Absa was a party to an arrangement comprising all these transactions and that ABSA had received an impermissible tax benefit in the form of a tax-free dividend. The proper result according to the Revenue Service ought to have been that interest income was received by Absa which would attract tax. ABSA brought the case to court, disputing having been a “party” to an “impermissible avoidance arrangement” and procuring a “tax benefit”. ABSA stated that it bought the preference shares in PSIC 3 on the understanding that PSIC 3 and MSSA had a back-to-back relationship and that the funds would flow directly to MSSA to repay debt to its parent the Macquarie Group. Absa was unaware of the intermediation of PSIC 4 and the D1 Trust, and of the D1 Trust’ s Brazilian transaction. Hence it could not, in this state of ignorance, have participated in an impermissible tax avoidance arrangement, nor did it have a tax avoidance motive in mind, and nor did it procure a tax benefit to which it was not entitled. Judgement of the High Court The court ruled in favour of ABSA. The court observed that a taxpayer has to be, not merely present, but participating in the arrangement. “The fact that it might be the unwitting recipient of a benefit from a share of the revenue derived from an impermissible arrangement cannot constitute “taking part” in such an arrangement.” “That premise [that ABSA was a party to a tax avoidance scheme] was incorrect in law because the factual premise did not establish that Absa was a party to such arrangement nor that it had an intention to escape an anticipated tax liability nor that it received relief from a tax liability as result of acquiring preference shares in PSIC 3.” Click here for translation SARS vs ASBA Bank_SATC ...

UK vs Blackrock, November 2020, First-tier Tribunal, Case No TC07920

In 2009 the BlackRock Group acquired Barclays Global Investors for a total sum of $13,5bn . The price was paid in part by shares ($6.9bn) and in part by cash ($6.6bn). The cash payment was paid by BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC – a US Delaware Company tax resident in the UK – but funded by the parent company by issuing $4bn loan notes to the LLC. In the years following the acquisition Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC claimed tax deductions in the UK for interest payments on the intra-group loans. Following an audit in the UK the tax authorities disallowed the interest deductions. The tax authorities held that the transaction would not have happened between independent parties. They also found that the loans were entered into for an unallowable tax avoidance purpose. A UK taxpayer can be denied a deduction for interest where a loan has an unallowable purpose i.e, where a tax advantage is the company’s main purpose for entering into the loan relationship (section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009). If there is such an unallowable purpose, the company may not bring into account for that period ….so much of any debit in respect of that relationship as is attributable to the unallowable purpose. The Court ruled in favor of BlackRock and allowed tax deduction for the full interest payments. According to the Court it was clear that the transaction would not have taken place in an arm’s length transaction between independent parties. However there was evidence to establish that there could have been a similar transaction in which an independent lender. Hence, the court concluded that BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC could have borrowed $4bn from an independent lender at similar terms and conditions. In regards to the issue of “unallowable purposes” the court found that securing a tax advantage was a consequence of the loan. However,  Blackrock LLC 5 also entered into the transactions with the commercial purpose of acquiring Barclays Global Investors. The Court considered that both reasons were “main purposes” and apportioned all of the debits (interest payments) to the commercial purpose. UK vs Blackrock November 2020 TC07920 ...

Netherlands vs Hunkem̦ller B.V., January 2020, AG opinion Рbefore the Supreme Court, Case No ECLI:NL:PHR:2020:102

To acquire companies and resell them with capital gains a French Investment Fund distributed the capital of its investors (€ 5.4 billion in equity) between a French Fund Commun de Placement à Risques (FCPRs) and British Ltds managed by the French Investment Fund. For the purpose of acquiring the [X] group (the target), the French Investment Fund set up three legal entities in the Netherlands, [Y] UA, [B] BV, and [C] BV (the acquisition holding company). These three joint taxed entities are shown as Fiscal unit [A] below. The capital to be used for the acquisition of [X] group was divided into four FCPRs that held 30%, 30%, 30% and 10% in [Y] respectively. To get the full amount needed for the acquisition, [Y] members provided from their equity to [Y]: (i) member capital (€ 74.69 million by the FCPRs, € 1.96 million by the Fund Management, € 1.38 million by [D]) and (ii) investment in convertible instruments (hybrid loan at 13% per annum that is not paid, but added interest-bearing: € 60.4 million from the FCPRs and € 1.1 million from [D]). Within Fiscal unit [A], all amounts were paid in [B], which provided the acquisition holding company [C] with € 72.64 million as capital and € 62.36 million as loan. [C] also took out loans from third parties: (i) a senior facility of € 113.75 million from a bank syndicate and (ii) a mezzanine facility of € 35 million in total from [D] and [E]. On November 22, 2010, the French [F] Sàrl controlled by the French Investment Fund agreed on the acquisition with the owners of the target. “Before closing”, [F] transferred its rights and obligations under this agreement to [C], which purchased the target shares on January 21, 2011 for € 265 million, which were delivered and paid on January 31, 2011. As a result, the target was removed from the fiscal unit of the sellers [G] as of 31 January 2011 and was immediately included in the fiscal unit [A]. [C] on that day granted a loan of € 25 million at 9% to its German subsidiary [I] GmbH. Prior to the transaction the sellers and the target company had agreed that upon sale certain employees of the target would receive a bonus. The dispute is (i) whether the convertibles are a sham loan; (ii) if not, whether they actually function as equity under art. 10 (1) (d) Wet Vpb; (iii) if not, whether their interest charges are partly or fully deductible business expenses; (iv) if not, or art. 10a Wet Vpb stands in the way of deduction, and (v) if not, whether fraus legis stands in the way of interest deduction. Also in dispute is (vi) whether tax on the interest received on the loan to [I] GmbH violates EU freedom of establishment and (viii) whether the bonuses are deducted from the interested party or from [G]. Amsterdam Court of Appeal: The Court ruled that (i) it is a civil law loan that (ii) is not a participant loan and (iii) is not inconsistent or carries an arm’s length interest and that (iv) art. 10a Wet Vpb does not prevent interest deduction because the commitment requirement of paragraph 4 is not met, but (v) that the financing structure is set up in fraud legislation, which prevents interest deduction. The Court derived the motive from the artificiality and commercial futility of the financing scheme and the struggle with the aim and intent of the law from the (i) the norm of art. 10a Corporate Income Tax Act by avoiding its criteria artificially and (ii) the norm that an (interest) charge must have a non-fiscal cause in order to be recognized as a business expense for tax purposes. Re (vi), the Court holds that the difference in treatment between interest on a loan to a joined tax domestic subsidiary and interest on a loan to an non-joined tax German subsidiary is part of fiscal consolidation and therefore does not infringe the freedom of establishment. Contrary to the Rechtbank, the Court ruled ad (viii) that on the basis of the total profit concept, at least the realization principle, the bonuses are not borne by the interested party but by the sellers. Excerpts regarding the arm’s length principle “In principle, the assessment of transfer prices as agreed upon between affiliated parties will be based on the allocation of functions and risks as chosen by the parties. Any price adjustment by the Tax and Customs Administration will therefore be based on this allocation of functions and risks. In this respect it is not important whether comparable contracts would have been agreed between independent parties. For example, if a group decides to transfer the intangible assets to one group entity, it will not be objected that such a transaction would never have been agreed between independent third parties. However, it may happen that the contractual terms do not reflect economic reality. If this is the case, the economic reality will be taken into account, not the contractual stipulation. In addition, some risks cannot be separated from certain functions. After all, in independent relationships, a party will only be willing to take on a certain risk if it can manage and bear that risk.” “The arm’s-length principle implies that the conditions applicable to transactions between related parties are compared with the conditions agreed upon in similar situations between independent third parties. In very rare cases, similar situations between independent parties will result in a specific price. In the majority of cases, however, similar situations between independent third parties may result in a price within certain ranges. The final price agreed will depend on the circumstances, such as the bargaining power of each of the parties involved. It follows from the application of the arm’s-length principle that any price within those ranges will be considered an acceptable transfer price. Only if the price moves outside these margins, is there no longer talk of an arm’s-length price since a third party acting in ...

Canada vs Loblaw Companies Ltd., September 2018, Canadian tax court, Case No 2018 TCC 182

The Canada Revenue Agency had issued a reassessments related to Loblaw’s Barbadian banking subsidiary, Glenhuron, for tax years 2001 – 2010. The tax authorities had determined that Glenhuron did not meet the requirements to be considered a foreign bank under Canadian law, and therefore was not exempt from paying Canadian taxes. “Loblaw took steps to make Glenhuron look like a bank in order to avoid paying tax. Government lawyers said Glenhuron did not qualify because, among other things, it largely invested the grocery giant’s own funds and was “playing with its own money.“ Tax Court found the transactions entered into by Loblaw regarding Glenhuron did result in a tax benefit but “were entered primarily for purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit and consequently were not avoidance transactions.” The Tax Court concludes as follows: “I do not see any extending the scope of paragraph 95(2)(l) of the Act. No, had there been any avoidance transactions the Appellant would not be saved by the fact it is not caught by a specific anti-avoidance provision.“ “The FAPI rules are complicated, or convoluted as counsel on both sides reminded me, though I needed no reminding. GAAR can be complicated. Taken together they weave a web of intricacy worthy of the 400 pages of written argument presented to me by the Parties. It has not been necessary for me to cover in exhaustive detail every strand of the web. Once I determined how to interpret the financial institution exemption, the complexity disappeared and the case could be readily resolved on the simple basis that Loblaw Financial’s foreign affiliate, a regulated foreign bank with more than the equivalent of five full time employees was conducting business principally with Loblaw and therefore could not avail itself of the financial institution exemption from investment business.“ “With respect to the calculation of the FAPI that arises from my determination, I agree with Loblaw Financial that the financial exchange gains/losses should not be treated on capital account but on income account. It does not matter whether the management fees from the Disputed Entities fall within paragraph 95(2)(b) of the Act as they would be part of GBL’s investment business caught by FAPI in any event.“ LOBLAW-FINANCIAL-HOLDINGS-INC-2076_2015-2998_IT_G ...

New Zealand vs BNZ Investments Ltd, July 2009, HIGH COURT

The case: Is each of six similar structured finance transactions entered into by the plaintiffs (the BNZ) a ‘tax avoidance arrangement’ void under s BG 1 Income Tax Act 1994? That is the primary issue in these five consolidated proceedings brought by the BNZ against the Commissioner, challenging his assessments issued after he voided each of the transactions pursuant to s BG 1. The BNZ claims the transactions are not caught by s BG 1. A second issue, arising only if s BG 1 applies, is the correctness of the way in which the Commissioner has, pursuant to s GB 1, counteracted the tax advantage obtained by the BNZ under the transactions. The Commissioner disallowed the deductions claimed by the BNZ, as its costs of the transactions. The BNZ claims the deductions should be disallowed only to the extent they are excessive or ‘overmarket’. A third, and perhaps strictly antecedent, issue is whether the guarantee arrangement fee (GAF) or guarantee procurement fee (GPF) charged in each transaction is properly deductible under s BD 2. The transactions are so-called ‘repo’ deals: the BNZ made an equity investment in an overseas entity on terms requiring the overseas counterparty to repurchase that investment when the transaction terminated. The transactions were structured to enable the BNZ to deduct its expenses of earning the income yielded by its investment, while receiving that income free of tax. In the case of the first transaction, that tax relief resulted from a credit for foreign tax paid. The BNZ’s income from the five subsequent transactions was relieved of tax by the conduit regime. That domestic tax ‘asymmetry’ – tax deductible costs earning tax exempted income – made the transactions highly profitable for the BNZ. The BNZ contends each of these transactions involved real obligations, notably those resulting from the BNZ raising $500 million on the New Zealand money market and advancing that to the counterparty upon a repo obligation. Further, the BNZ’s case is that the transactions made legitimate use both of crossborder tax arbitrage and the domestic tax ‘asymmetry’ just described. Cross-border tax arbitrage refers to the different tax treatment of the transaction in New Zealand and the foreign counterparty’s jurisdiction. New Zealand tax law treated the transactions as equity investments, the counterparties’ jurisdictions (the United States of America for the first three transactions; the United Kingdom for the later three) as secured loans. That enabled the counterparties to deduct, as interest, the distribution they made which the BNZ received free of tax in New Zealand. The BNZ submits that the evidence establishes that “tax driven structures and tax arbitrage are common and accepted elements of international financeâ€. The Bank says the central or critical question in the case is the appropriate approach in law to the asymmetry between deductible expenditure and tax relieved income around which these transactions or arrangements were structured. The essential bases on which the Commissioner asserts s BG 1 catches the transactions are: a) They substantially altered the incidence of tax for the BNZ. Indeed, that was their only purpose or effect. It certainly was not a merely incidental purpose or effect. The Commissioner adopted the description of one of his witnesses: … A prime purpose of the profit-maximising actions of these transactions was to use the tax base to make money. They had no commercial purpose or rationale. Absent the tax benefits they generated, the transactions were loss-making, in that the BNZ provided funding to the counterparties at substantially less than its cost of funds. The Commissioner contended “the tax tail wagged the commercial dogâ€. They were not within the scheme and purpose of the regimes they utilised to generate tax exempted income, the foreign tax credit (FTC) and conduit relief regimes respectively. In the case of the FTC regime utilised by the first (Gen Re 1) transaction, the transaction also did not comply with the applicable specific provisions. d) The principal deductible expenses claimed by the BNZ (the fixed rate it paid on an interest rate swap and the GAFs or GPFs) were contrived and artificial. e) The transactions were structured on a formulaic basis, which had the artificial consequence that, the higher the transaction costs, the higher the tax benefits they generated. The six transactions in issue span eight income tax years between 1998 and 2005. Three further transactions, two of them earlier in time, also featured in the evidence. While those three further transactions have a similar structure, they have the distinguishing feature of being New Zealand tax positive. The BNZ obtained binding rulings from the Commissioner on each of those three transactions, which I will call ‘the ruled transactions’. Approximately $416 million of tax hinges on the outcome of these proceedings. Challenge proceedings brought by the Westpac Banking Corporation began in Auckland on 30 June. Proceedings brought by other New Zealand trading banks have yet to come on for trial. If occasional press reports are accurate, the total amount of tax in issue is over $1.5 billion. The Court found in favor of the tax authorities. The case was later settled out of court. New Zealand vs BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 15 july 2009 ...

New Zealand vs Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd., December 2008, Supreme Court, Case No [2008] NZSC 115, SC 43/2007 and 44/2007

The tax scheme in the Ben Nevis-case involved land owned by the subsidiary of a charitable foundation being licensed to a group of single purpose investor loss attributing qualifying companies (LAQC’s). The licensees were responsible for planting, maintaining and harvesting the forest through a forestry management company. The investors paid $1,350 per hectare for the establishment of the forest and $1,946 for an option to buy the land in 50 years for half its then market value. There were also other payments, including a $50 annual license fee. The land had been bought for around $580 per hectare. This meant that the the investors, if it wished to acquire the land after harvesting the forest, had to pay half its then value, even though they had already paid over three times the value at the inception of the scheme. In addition to the above payments, the investors agreed to pay a license premium of some $2 million per hectare, payable in 50 years time, by which time the trees would be harvested and sold. The investors purported to discharge its liability for the license premium immediately by the issuing of a promissory note redeemable in 50 years time. The premium had been calculated on the basis of the after tax amount that the mature forest was expected to yield. Finally the investors had agreed to pay an insurance premium of $1,307 per hectare and a further premium of $32,000 per hectare payable in 50 years time. The “insurance company” was a shell company established in a low tax jurisdiction by one of the promoters of the scheme. The insurance company did not in reality carry any risk due to arrangements with the land-owning subsidiary and the promissory notes from the group of investors. There was also a “letter of comfort†from the charitable foundation that it would make up any shortfall the insurance company was obliged to pay out. 90 per cent of the initial premiums received by the insurance company were paid to a company under the control of one of the promoters as commission and introduction fees tunneled back as loans to the promoters’ family trusts. Secure loans over the assets and undertakings secured the money payable under the promissory notes for the license premium and the insurance premium. The investors claimed an immediate tax deduction for the insurance premium and depreciated the deduction for the license premium over the 50 years of the license. The Inland Revenue disallowed these deductions by reference to the generel anti avoidance provision in New Zealand. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and ruled in favor of the Inland revenue. The majority of the SC judges rejected the notion that the potential conflict between the general anti-avoidance rule and specific tax provisions requires identifying which of the provisions, in any situation, is overriding. Rather, the majority viewed the specific provisions and the general anti-avoidance provision as working “in tandemâ€. Each provides a context that assists in determining the meaning and, in particular, the scope of the other. The focus of each is different. The purpose of the general anti-avoidance provision is to address tax avoidance. Tax avoidance may be found in individual steps or in a combination of steps. The purpose of the specific provisions is more targeted and their meaning should be determined primarily by their ordinary meaning, as established through their text in the light of their specific purpose. The function of the anti-avoidance provision is “to prevent uses of the specific provisions which fall outside their intended scope in the overall scheme of the Act.†The process of statutory construction should focus objectively on the features of the arrangements involved “without being distracted by intuitive subjective impressions of the morality of what taxation advisers have set up.†A three-stage test for assessing whether an arrangement is tax avoidance was applied by the Court. The first step in any case is for the taxpayer to satisfy the court that the use made of any specific provision comes within the scope of that provision. In this test it is the true legal character of the transaction rather than its label which will determine the tax treatment. Courts must construe the relevant documents as if they were resolving a dispute between the parties as to the meaning and effect of contractual arrangements. They must also respect the fact that frequently in commerce there are different means of producing the same economic outcome which have different taxation effects. The second stage of the test requires the court to look at the use of the specific provisions in light of arrangement as a whole. If a taxpayer has used specific provisions “and thereby altered the incidence of income tax, in a way which cannot have been within the contemplation and purpose of Parliament when it enacted the provision, the arrangement will be a tax avoidance arrangement.†The economic and commercial effect of documents and transactions may be significant, as well as the duration of the arrangement and the nature and extent of the financial consequences that it will have for the taxpayer. A combination of those factors may be important. If the specific provisions of the Act are used in any artificial or contrived way that will be significant, as it cannot be “within Parliament’s purpose for specific provisions to be used in that manner.†The courts are not limited to purely legal considerations at this second stage of the analysis. They must consider the use of the specific provisions in light of commercial reality and the economic effect of that use. The “ultimate question is whether the impugned arrangement, viewed in a commercially and economically realistic way, makes use of the specific provisions in a manner that is consistent with Parliament’s purpose.†If the arrangement does make use of the specific provisions in a manner consistent with Parliament’s purpose, it will not be tax avoidance. The third stage is to consider whether tax avoidance ...