17 January 2024 the Australian Taxation Office published the final version of its Practical Compliance Guideline PCG 2024/1 Intangibles migration arrangements. The PCG has previously been released in drafts as PCG 2021/D4 and PCG 2023/D2 Intangibles arrangements. The final version sets out ATO’s compliance approach to the tax risks associated with certain cross-border related party intangibles arrangements involving: restructures or changes to arrangements involving intangible assets (referred to as ‘migrations’ in the PCG) the mischaracterisation or non-recognition of Australian activities connected with intangible assets. Changes and additions included in the final version: further clarification of the arrangements in scope exclusion of certain arrangements (‘Excluded Intangibles Arrangement’) from the scope inclusion of a ‘white zone’ for arrangements that have been subject to previous ATO audit or reviews further explaining our compliance approach, including the engagement taxpayers can expect based on the compliance risks associated with an arrangement expanding the guidance allowing taxpayers to group intangible assets or arrangements to make it easier for taxpayers apply the PCG providing more information on the reporting requirements taxpayers can expect to complete the reportable tax position schedule. ATO PCG 2024-1 18012024 ...

GSS Holdings had claimed a loss of USD 22.54 million which the IRS disallowed. In disallowing the loss, the IRS claimed that the loss was not an ordinary business loss, but was incurred as part of a series of transactions that resulted in the sale of capital assets between related parties. The trial court upheld the IRS’s adjustment and GSS Holdings appealed to the Court of Federal Claims. The Court of Federal Claims applied a combination of substance over form and step transaction doctrines to combine two transactions and dismissed GSS Holdings’ claims on that basis. GSS Holdings then appealed to the US Court of Appeals. Opinion of the Court The Court of Appeals found that the Federal Claims Court had misapplied the step transaction doctrine and remanded the case for reconsideration under the correct legal standard. Excerpt “As part of this examination, the Claims Court must determine the outset of the series of transactions, keeping in mind that the series of transactions should be considered as a whole. Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989); see also True, 190 F.3d at 1177; Brown v. United States, 868 F.2d 859, 862 (6th Cir. 1989). The parties dispute the timeframe for the outset, with GSS advocating for the 2006 and 2007 timeframe when the Aaardvark LAPA and First Loss Note agreement were negotiated and entered, and the government advocating for the 2011 timeframe when the Aaardvark LAPA was renewed6 and exercised and when the First Loss Note Account payment was made to BNS. See Appellant’s Br. 33, 44–45; Appellee’s Br. 30–31. Once the outset’s timeframe has been assessed, the Claims Court must determine the intent from the outset, which is an- other disputed issue between the parties. See Falconwood, 422 F.3d at 1349; Appellant’s Br. 46–48; Appellee’s Br. 30–37. If the Claims Court does conclude that the separate transactions were “really component parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result,” then the step transaction doctrine applies. See Falconwood, 422 F.3d at 1349 (citation omitted). The Claims Court should conduct this analysis on remand. We are not suggesting any particular outcome; we are simply instructing the Claims Court to apply the correct legal standard. Even if the Claims Court applied an erroneous legal standard, the government contends that the intent was the same regardless of the timeframe, and that the Claims Court agreed. See Appellee’s Br. 37 (first citing Decision at 489 (“A payment from the First Loss Note [A]ccount was always anticipated to be at least a partial offset of losses resulting from the sale of a distressed asset.”); and then citing Decision at 489 n.22 (“The First Loss Note was always intended to absorb the first loss stemming out of a decline in Liberty[] [Street]’s investments.”)); see also Appellee’s Br. 30–34. In other words, the government con- tends that the same outcome would be reached under the correct legal standard. GSS disagrees, contending that the intent differed at various timeframes. See Appellant’s Br. 46–48; Appellant’s Reply Br. 11–15. Since the Claims Court applied an incorrect legal standard, the Claims Court “should make a new determination under the correct standard in the first instance.” Walther, 485 F.3d at 1152 (declining to reach the merits of a similar argument). To the extent any finding of the Claims Court “is derived from the application of an improper legal standard to the facts, it cannot be allowed to stand.” Id. (citations omitted). “In such a circumstance, this court must remand for new factual findings in light of the correct legal standard.” Id. GSS contends that under the correct legal standard, the step transaction doctrine would not operate to collapse the individual steps into a single integrated transaction for tax purposes. See Appellant’s Br. 44–52. In other words, GSS urges this court to reach a determination under the correct legal standard in the first instance. But just as we will not do so at the government’s request, we will not do so at GSS’s request.” Click here for translation 21-2353.OPINION.9-21-2023_2193842 ...

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has released a new draft of Compliance Guidelines on Intangible Arrangements, PCG 2023/D2. When finalised, the guidelines will set out the ATO’s compliance approach to the development, use and transfer of intangible assets. The guidelines focus on tax risks associated with the potential application of the transfer pricing provisions, withholding tax provisions, capital gains tax (CGT), capital allowances, the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) and the diverted profits tax (DPT). Examples of high-risk intangibles arrangements under the draft guidelines include centralisation of intangible assets bifurcation (separation) of intangible assets non-recognition of local intangible assets and DEMPE activities migration of pre-commercialised intangible assets (HTVI) transfer of intangibles assets to a foreign hybrid entity Australia - Draft guidance on Intangibles Arrangements PCG 2023_D2 ...

The cases concerned in particular whether Takeda A/S under voluntary liquidation and NTC Parent S.à.r.l. were obliged to withhold tax on interest on intra-group loans granted by foreign group companies. The cases were to be assessed under Danish tax law, the EU Interest/Royalty Directive and double taxation treaties with the Nordic countries and Luxembourg. In a judgment of 9 January 2023, concerning dividends distributed to foreign parent companies, the Supreme Court has ruled on when a foreign parent company is a “beneficial owner” under double taxation treaties with, inter alia, Luxembourg, and when there is abuse of rights under the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive. In the present cases on the taxation of interest, the Supreme Court referred to the judgement of January 2023 on the general issues and then made a specific assessment of the structure and loan relationships of the two groups. The Supreme Court stated that both groups had undergone a restructuring involving, inter alia, the contribution of companies in Sweden and Luxembourg, respectively, and that this restructuring had to be seen as a comprehensive and pre-organised tax arrangement. The Supreme Court held that the contributed companies had to be regarded as flow-through companies which did not enjoy protection under the Interest/Royalty Directive or under the double taxation conventions. According to the information submitted by the parties, it could not be determined what had finally happened to the interest after it had flowed through the contributed companies, and therefore it could not be determined who was the rightful owner of the interest. The Supreme Court then held that the tax arrangements constituted abuse. Takeda under voluntary liquidation and NTC Parent should therefore have withheld interest tax of approximately DKK 369 million and DKK 817 million respectively. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation 116-117-2021-dom-til-hjemmesiden ...

A parent company resident in country Y1 was liable to tax on interest and dividends it had received from its Danish subsidiary. There should be no reduction of or exemption from withholding tax under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive or the Interest and Royalties Directive or under the double taxation treaty between Denmark and country Y1, as neither the parent company nor this company’s own Y1-resident parent company could be considered the rightful owner of the dividends and interest within the meaning of the directives and the treaty, and as there was abuse. The High Court thus found that the Y1-domestic companies were flow-through companies for the interest and dividends, which were passed on to underlying companies in the tax havens Y2-ø and Y3-ø. The High Court found that there was no conclusive evidence that the companies in Y2 were also flow-through entities and that the beneficial owner of the interest and dividends was an underlying trust or investors resident in Y4. The double taxation treaty between Denmark and the Y4 country could therefore not provide a basis for a reduction of or exemption from withholding tax on the interest and dividends. Nor did the High Court find that there was evidence that there was a basis for a partial reduction of the withholding tax requirement due to the fact that one of the investors in the company on Y3 island was resident in Y5 country, with which Denmark also had a double taxation treaty. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ØLD Beneficial Owner CHP Airport ...

RRE and EBL Italia, belonged to the Belgian group ELECTRABEL SA (which later became the French group GDF Suez, now the Engie group); RRE, like the other Italian operating companies, benefited from a financing line from the Luxembourg subsidiary ELECTRABEL INVEST LUXEMBOURG SA (“EIL”). In the course of 2006, as part of a financial restructuring project of the entire group, EBL Italia acquired all the participations in the Italian operating companies, assuming the role of sub-holding company, and EIL acquired 45 per cent of the share capital of EBL Italia. At a later date, EBL Italia and EIL signed an agreement whereby EIL assigned to EBL Italia the rights and obligations deriving from the financing contracts entered into with the operating companies; at the same time, in order to proceed with the acquisition of EIL’s receivables from the operating companies, the two companies concluded a second agreement (credit facility agreement) whereby EIL granted EBL Italia a loan for an amount equal to the receivables being acquired. Both the tax commissions of first and of second instance had found the Office’s actions to be legitimate. According to the C.T.R., in particular, the existence of a “symmetrical connection between two financing contracts entered into, both signed on the same date (31/07/2006) and the assignments of such credits to EBL Italia made on 20/12/2006, with identical terms and conditions” and the fact that “EBL Italia accounted for the interest expenses paid to EIL in a manner exactly mirroring the interest income paid by Rosen, so as to channel the same interest, by contractual obligation, punctually to EIL’ showed that EBL Italia ‘had no management autonomy and was obliged to pay all the income flows, that is to say, the interest, obtained by Rosen immediately to the Luxembourg company EIL’, with the result that the actual beneficiary of the interest had to be identified in the Luxembourg company EIL. Judgement of the Court The Supreme Court confirmed the legitimacy of the notices of assessment issued by the Regional Tax Commission, for failure to apply the withholding tax on interest expense paid. According to the Court ‘abuse in the technical sense’ must be kept distinct from the verification of whether or not the company receiving the income flows meets the requirements to benefit from advantages that would otherwise not be due to it. One thing is the abuse of rights, another thing are the requirements to be met in order to be entitled to the benefits recognised by provisions inspired by anti-abuse purposes. “On the subject of the exemption of interest (and other income flows) from taxation pursuant to Article 26, of Presidential Decree No. 600 of 29 September 1973”, the burden of proof it is on the taxpayer company, which claims to be the “beneficial owner”. To this end, it is necessary for it to pass three tests, autonomous and disjointed” the recipient company performs an actual economic activity the recipient company can freely dispose of the interest received and is not required to remit it to a third party the recipient company has a function in the financing transaction and is not a mere conduit company (or société relais), whose interposition is aimed exclusively at a tax saving. The Supreme Court also ruled out the merely ‘domestic’ nature of the transaction as it actually consisted in a cross-border payment of interest. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Italy vs Engie 28 Feb 2023 Supreme Court No 6045-2023 and 6079-2023 ...

The issue in the Danish beneficial ownership cases of NetApp Denmark ApS and TDC A/S was whether the companies were obliged to withhold dividend tax on distributions to foreign parent companies. The first case – NetApp Denmark ApS – concerned two dividend distributions of approximately DKK 566 million and DKK 92 million made in 2005 and 2006 to an intermediate parent company in Cyprus – and then on to NETAPP Bermuda. The second case – TDC A/S – concerned the distribution of dividends of approximately DKK 1.05 billion in 2011 to an intermediate parent company in Luxembourg – and then on to owner companies in the Cayman Islands. In both cases, the tax authorities took the view that the intermediate parent companies were so-called “flow-through companies” which were not the real recipients of the dividends, and that the real recipients (beneficial owners) were resident in countries not covered by the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive (Bermuda and Cayman respectively). Therefore, withholding taxes should have been paid by the Danish companies on the distributions. Judgment of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the tax authorities’ assessment of additional withholding tax of 28 percent on a total amount of DKK 1,616 million plus a very substantial amount of interest on late payment. Only with regard to NetApp’s 2006 dividend payment of DKK 92 million did the court rule in favour of the company. Excerpts: “The Supreme Court agrees that the term “beneficial owner” must be understood in the light of the OECD Model Tax Convention, including the 1977 OECD Commentary on Anti-Abuse. According to these commentaries, the purpose of the term is to ensure that double tax treaties do not encourage tax avoidance or tax evasion through “artifices” and “artful legal constructions” which “enable the benefit to be derived both from the advantages conferred by certain national laws and from the tax concessions afforded by double tax treaties.” The 2003 Revised Commentaries have elaborated and clarified this, stating inter alia that it would not be “consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention for the source State to grant relief or exemption from tax in cases where a person who is resident of a Contracting State, other than as an agent or intermediary, merely acts as a conduit for another person who actually receives the income in question.” “The question is whether it can lead to a different result that NetApp Denmark – if the parent company at the time of the distribution had been NetWork Appliance Inc (NetApp USA) and not NetApp Cyprus – could have distributed the dividend to NetApp USA with the effect that the dividend would have been exempt from tax liability under the Double Taxation Convention between Denmark and the USA. On this issue, the CJEU’s judgment of 26 February 2019 states that it is irrelevant for the purposes of examining the group structure that some of the beneficial owners of the dividends transferred by flow-through companies are resident for tax purposes in a third State with which the source State has concluded a double tax treaty. According to the judgment, the existence of such a convention cannot in itself rule out the existence of an abuse of rights and cannot therefore call into question the existence of abuse of rights if it is duly established by all the facts which show that the traders carried out purely formal or artificial transactions, devoid of any economic or commercial justification, with the principal aim of taking unfair advantage of the exemption from withholding tax provided for in Article 5 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (paragraph 108). It also appears that, having said that, even in a situation where the dividend would have been exempt if it had been distributed directly to the company having its seat in a third State, it cannot be excluded that the objective of the group structure is not an abuse of law. In such a case, the group’s choice of such a structure instead of distributing the dividend directly to that company cannot be challenged (paragraph 110).” “In light of the above, the Supreme Court finds that the dividend of approximately DKK 92 million from NetApp Denmark was included in the dividend of USD 550 million that NetApp Bermuda transferred to NetApp USA on 3 April 2006. The Supreme Court further finds that the sole legal owner of that dividend was NetApp USA, where the dividend was also taxed. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that an amount of approximately DKK 92 million. – corresponding to the dividend – was not transferred to NetApp Cyprus until 2010 and from there to NetApp Bermuda. NetApp Bermuda had thus, as mentioned above, taken out the loan which provided the basis for distributing approximately DKK 92 million to NetApp USA in dividends from NetApp Denmark in 2006. Accordingly, the dividend of approximately DKK 92 million is exempt from taxation under Section 2(1)(c) of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act in conjunction with the Danish-American Double Taxation Convention. NetApp Denmark has therefore not been required to withhold dividend tax under Section 65(1) of the Danish Withholding Tax Act.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Denmark vs Netapp and TDC 9 January 2023 case no 69-70-79-2021 ...

Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS, a subsidiary in the Heerema group, paid dividends to a parent company in Luxembourg which in turn paid the dividends to two group companies in Panama. The tax authorities found that the company in Luxembourg was not the beneficial owner of the dividends and thus the dividends were not covered by the tax exemption rules of the EU Parent/Subsidiary Directive or the Double Taxation Convention between Denmark and Luxembourg. On that basis an assessment was issued regarding payment of withholding tax on the dividends. An appeal was filed by Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS with the High Court. Judgement of the Eastern High Court The court dismissed the appeal of Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS and decided in favor of the tax authorities. The parent company in Luxembourg was a so-called “flow-through” company which was not the beneficial owner of the dividend and thus not covered by the tax exemption rules of the Parent/Subsidiary Directive and the Double Taxation Convention between Denmark and Luxembourg. The Danish subsidiary was held liable for the non-payment of dividend tax. Excerpt “The actual distribution On 23 May 2007, Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS distributed USD 325 million, corresponding to DKK 1,799,298,000, to its parent company Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA. The amount was set off by the Danish company against a claim on the Luxembourg parent company arising from a loan of the same amount taken out by Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA in Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS on 22 January 2007 to pay the purchase price for the company. Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA acquired Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS from the two companies, Heavy Transport Group Inc. and Incomara Holdings SA, both resident in Panama and owners of both the Danish and Luxembourg companies. The purchase price was transferred from Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA to the Panamanian companies on 24 January 2007. The loan from Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS to Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA of USD 325 million is referred to in the loan agreement between the parties of 22 January 2007 as an ‘interim dividend’ and states that the amount will be paid as a ‘short term loan’ until such time as a resolution is passed at a future general meeting of Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS to distribute a dividend to the parent company in the same amount. The loan agreement also provides that the loan is to be repaid on demand or immediately after the dividend payment has been declared by offsetting it. It is undisputed that the company Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA was set up as an intermediate holding company between the Panamanian companies and Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS with the aim of ensuring that no Danish withholding tax was triggered by the dividend distribution. Moreover, as regards the activities of Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA, it appears that the company, which was apparently set up in 2004 to provide the financing for Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS and, after 22 January 2007, as the parent company of the company, did not have (and does not have) any employees, the administration of the company being outsourced to a group company in Luxembourg, Heerema Group Service SA. It is undisputed that the parent company had no other activity when it took over the Danish company. Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA’s annual accounts for 2007 show that its assets as at 31 December 2007 consisted of cash of USD 148 551 and financial assets of USD 1 255 355 in its subsidiary Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA was obliged and, moreover, was only able to repay the loan of USD 325 million to Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS by offsetting the dividend received and thus had no real power of disposal over the dividend. Consequently, and since the purpose of the transactions was undoubtedly to avoid Danish taxation of the dividends in connection with the repatriation of the funds to the shareholders in Panama, Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA cannot be regarded as the beneficial owner of the dividends within the meaning of Article 10(2) of the Double Taxation Convention and, as a general rule, the tax should not be reduced in accordance with the rules of the Convention. Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA is also not entitled to the tax exemption under the Parent/Subsidiary Directive, as it must be considered as a flow-through company with no independent economic and commercial justification, and must therefore be characterised as an artificial arrangement whose sole purpose was to obtain the tax exemption under the Directive, see the judgment of 26 February 2019 in Joined Cases C-116/16 and C-117/16. Significance of the possibility of liquidation under Article 59 of the current law on limited liability companies However, Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS claims that there is no abuse of the Parent/Subsidiary Directive, since the two shareholders in Panama, Heavy Transport Group Inc. and Incomara Holdings SA, instead of contributing the company Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA to receive and distribute the ordinary dividends of Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS to the Panamanian companies, could have chosen to liquidate the Danish company pursuant to Article 59 of the current Anartsselskabslov, whereby any liquidation proceeds distributed by the parent company in Luxembourg would have been tax-free for the two shareholders. In its judgment of 26 February 2019, paragraphs 108-110, the CJEU has ruled on the situation where there is a double taxation convention concluded between the source State and the third State in which the beneficial owners of the dividends transferred by the flow-through company are resident for tax purposes. The Court held that such circumstances cannot in themselves preclude the existence of an abuse of rights. The Court stated that if it is duly established on the basis of all the facts that the traders have carried out purely formal or artificial transactions, devoid of any economic or ...

Pandox AB is the parent company of a hotel group active in northern Europe. Pandox AB’s business concept is to acquire hotel property companies with associated external operators running hotel operations. Pandox AB acquires both individual companies and larger portfolios, both in Sweden and abroad. Within the group, the segment is called Property Management. Pandox AB’s main income consists of dividends from the Property Management companies (PM companies), interest income from intra-group loans and compensation for various types of administrative services that Pandox AB provides to the Swedish and foreign PM companies. These services include strategic management, communication, general back-office functions and treasury. The PM companies’ income consists of rental income from the external hotel operators. Following an audit for FY 2013-2017 the Swedish tax authorities found that the affiliated property management entities were only entitled to a risk-free return and that the residual profit should be allocated to the Swedish parent. The tax authorities argued that Pandox AB had conducted all value-creating activities related to the core business, controlled and carried the financial risks, and actively managed the group’s business and operating agreements. The property management entities were merely legal parties in local agreements without any real control of the relevant risks. The property management entities had no employees and the boards consisted of one or two persons, most of whom were part of management at Pandox AB. Since Pandox AB controlled and managed major decisions and risks, the residual result should be allocated from the property management entities to Pandox AB. The property management entities should only be entitled to a risk-free return in line with their contributions to the value chain in accordance with paragraph 1.85 in the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. Paragraph 1.85 deals with the capability to make important business decisions. An appeal was filed by Pandox with the Administrative Court in Stockholm. Judgement of the Court The Court ruled in favor of Pandox AB. Excerpts “The Administrative Court finds that Pandox AB’s description of the operations of Property Management is strongly supported both by the documentary evidence in the cases and by what has emerged in interviews with Ms Liia Nõu. The Court also considers that the Swedish Tax Agency has not challenged the facts described by Pandox AB. Based on what has emerged from the investigation, the Administrative Court considers that Pandox AB must be regarded as having a limited role in the management of the hotel operations and a limited function in the value-creating core business. Nor does the investigation show anything other than that the PM companies independently make and implement decisions within the framework of the hotel property operations. Furthermore, the services that Pandox AB actually provides to the PM companies are priced in accordance with established transfer pricing documents, and there has been no indication that this pricing is not market-based. Even if Pandox AB, in its capacity as legal owner of the PM Companies, has the capacity and ability to renegotiate or enter into new operator agreements and make other crucial decisions for the hotel business, the investigation does not, according to the Administrative Court, show that this has been done to a particularly large extent. On the contrary, the investigation shows that Pandox AB is relatively passive after the shares in a PM company have been acquired. The Swedish Tax Agency has emphasised the management of the so-called Heart portfolio as a sign that Pandox AB actively manages the hotels in the PM companies. The Administrative Court considers, however, that the acquisition and how it was handled constitutes an exception in how Pandox AB otherwise conducts its Property Management business. Thus, the circumstance that the operator agreements were renegotiated in connection with the acquisition does not lend any more far-reaching or general conclusions about the business in general. The Administrative Court does not agree with the Tax Agency’s assessment of where in the Pandox Group the value-creating work is conducted. In this assessment, the Court takes into account in particular that the operations of the acquired PM companies are already established through, inter alia, ownership of hotel properties with associated operator agreements. Nor does the investigation provide support that Pandox AB would otherwise have had such control over the management of the hotels that the PM companies’ contribution to the business is limited in the manner described in the Tax Agency’s decision. Therefore, the Administrative Court finds that the Tax Agency’s investigation does not show that the Pandox group is based on commercial relationships as required by point 1.85 of the Guidelines. In such circumstances, the Tax Agency was not entitled to correct Pandox AB’s results in the manner recommended by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation Sweden vs Pandox 2022 PDF ...

The provisions of Section D.1.1 of Chapter I apply in identifying the specific nature of a transaction involving a transfer of intangibles or rights in intangibles, in identifying the nature of any intangibles transferred, and in identifying any limitations imposed by the terms of the transfer on the use of those intangibles. For example, a written specification that a licence is non-exclusive or of limited duration need not be respected by the tax administration if such specification is not consistent with the conduct of the parties. Example 18 in the Annex I to Chapter VI illustrates the provisions of this paragraph ...

The framework for analysing transactions involving intangibles between associated enterprises requires taking the following steps, consistent with the guidance for identifying the commercial or financial relations provided in Section D. 1 of Chapter I: i) Identify the intangibles used or transferred in the transaction with specificity and the specific, economically significant risks associated with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangibles; ii) Identify the full contractual arrangements, with special emphasis on determining legal ownership of intangibles based on the terms and conditions of legal arrangements, including relevant registrations, licence agreements, other relevant contracts, and other indicia of legal ownership, and the contractual rights and obligations, including contractual assumption of risks in the relations between the associated enterprises; iii) Identify the parties performing functions (including specifically the important functions described in paragraph 6.56), using assets, and managing risks related to developing, enhancing, maintaining, protecting, and exploiting the intangibles by means of the functional analysis, and in particular which parties control any outsourced functions, and control specific, economically significant risks; iv) Confirm the consistency between the terms of the relevant contractual arrangements and the conduct of the parties, and determine whether the party assuming economically significant risks under step 4 (i) of paragraph 1.60, controls the risks and has the financial capacity to assume the risks relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangibles; v) Delineate the actual controlled transactions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles in light of the legal ownership of the intangibles, the other relevant contractual relations under relevant registrations and contracts, and the conduct of the parties, including their relevant contributions of functions, assets and risks, taking into account the framework for analysing and allocating risk under Section D.1.2.1 of Chapter I; vi) Where possible, determine arm’s length prices for these transactions consistent with each party’s contributions of functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed, unless the guidance in Section D.2 of Chapter I applies ...

Company S1 conducts research activities to develop intangibles that it uses to create new products that it can produce and sell. It agrees to transfer to an associated company, Company S2, unlimited rights to all future intangibles which may arise from its future work over a period of twenty years for a lump sum payment. The arrangement is commercially irrational for both parties since neither Company S1 nor Company S2 has any reliable means to determine whether the payment reflects an appropriate valuation, both because it is uncertain what range of development activities Company S1 might conduct over the period and also because valuing the potential outcomes would be entirely speculative. Under the guidance in this section, the structure of the arrangement adopted by the taxpayer, including the form of payment, should be modified for the purposes of the transfer pricing analysis. The replacement structure should be guided by the economically relevant characteristics, including the functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed, of the commercial or financial relations of the associated enterprises. Those facts would narrow the range of potential replacement structures to the structure most consistent with the facts of the case (for example, depending on those facts the arrangement could be recast as the provision of financing by Company S2, or as the provision of research services by Company S1, or, if specific intangibles can be identified, as a licence with contingent payments terms for the development of those specific intangibles, taking into account the guidance on hard-to-value intangibles as appropriate) ...

Under the guidance in this section, the transaction should not be recognised. S1 is treated as not purchasing insurance and its profits are not reduced by the payment to S2; S2 is treated as not issuing insurance and therefore not being liable for any claim ...

Company S1 carries on a manufacturing business that involves holding substantial inventory and a significant investment in plant and machinery. It owns commercial property situated in an area prone to increasingly frequent flooding in recent years. Third-party insurers experience significant uncertainty over the exposure to large claims, with the result that there is no active market for the insurance of properties in the area. Company S2, an associated enterprise, provides insurance to Company S1, and an annual premium representing 80% of the value of the inventory, property and contents is paid by Company S1. In this example S1 has entered into a commercially irrational transaction since there is no market for insurance given the likelihood of significant claims, and either relocation or not insuring may be more attractive realistic alternatives. Since the transaction is commercially irrational, there is not a price that is acceptable to both S1 and S2 from their individual perspectives ...

The criterion for non-recognition may be illustrated by the following examples ...

The structure that for transfer pricing purposes, replaces that actually adopted by the taxpayers should comport as closely as possible with the facts of the actual transaction undertaken whilst achieving a commercially rational expected result that would have enabled the parties to come to a price acceptable to both of them at the time the arrangement was entered into ...

The key question in the analysis is whether the actual transaction possesses the commercial rationality of arrangements that would be agreed between unrelated parties under comparable economic circumstances, not whether the same transaction can be observed between independent parties. The non-recognition of a transaction that possesses the commercial rationality of an arm’s length arrangement is not an appropriate application of the arm’s length principle. Restructuring of legitimate business transactions would be a wholly arbitrary exercise the inequity of which could be compounded by double taxation created where the other tax administration does not share the same views as to how the transaction should be structured. It should again be noted that the mere fact that the transaction may not be seen between independent parties does not mean that it does not have characteristics of an arm’s length arrangement ...

This section sets out circumstances in which the transaction between the parties as accurately delineated can be disregarded for transfer pricing purposes. Because non-recognition can be contentious and a source of double taxation, every effort should be made to determine the actual nature of the transaction and apply arm’s length pricing to the accurately delineated transaction, and to ensure that non-recognition is not used simply because determining an arm’s length price is difficult. Where the same transaction can be seen between independent parties in comparable circumstances (i.e. where all economically relevant characteristics are the same as those under which the tested transaction occurs other than that the parties are associated enterprises) non-recognition would not apply. Importantly, the mere fact that the transaction may not be seen between independent parties does not mean that it should not be recognised. Associated enterprises may have the ability to enter into a much greater variety of arrangements than can independent enterprises, and may conclude transactions of a specific nature that are not encountered, or are only very rarely encountered, between independent parties, and may do so for sound business reasons. The transaction as accurately delineated may be disregarded, and if appropriate, replaced by an alternative transaction, where the arrangements made in relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would have been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner in comparable circumstances, thereby preventing determination of a price that would be acceptable to both of the parties taking into account their respective perspectives and the options realistically available to each of them at the time of entering into the transaction. It is also a relevant pointer to consider whether the MNE group as a whole is left worse off on a pre-tax basis since this may be an indicator that the transaction viewed in its entirety lacks the commercial rationality of arrangements between unrelated parties ...

Every effort should be made to determine pricing for the actual transaction as accurately delineated under the arm’s length principle. The various tools and methods available to tax administrations and taxpayers to do so are set out in the following chapters of these Guidelines. A tax administration should not disregard the actual transaction or substitute other transactions for it unless the exceptional circumstances described in the following paragraphs 1.142-1.145 apply ...

In performing the analysis, the actual transaction between the parties will have been deduced from written contracts and the conduct of the parties. Formal conditions recognised in contracts will have been clarified and supplemented by analysis of the conduct of the parties and the other economically relevant characteristics of the transaction (see Section D.1.1). Where the characteristics of the transaction that are economically significant are inconsistent with the written contract, then the actual transaction will have been delineated in accordance with the characteristics of the transaction reflected in the conduct of the parties. Contractual risk assumption and actual conduct with respect to risk assumption will have been examined taking into account control over the risk (as defined in paragraphs 1.65-1.68) and the financial capacity to assume risk (as defined in paragraph 1.64), and consequently, risks assumed under the contract may have been allocated in accordance with the conduct of the parties and the other facts on the basis of steps 4 and 5 of the process for analysing risk in a controlled transaction as reflected in Sections D.1.2.1.4 and D.1.2.1.5. Therefore, the analysis will have set out the factual substance of the commercial or financial relations between the parties and accurately delineated the actual transaction ...

Following the guidance in the previous section, the transfer pricing analysis will have identified the substance of the commercial or financial relations between the parties, and will have accurately delineated the actual transaction by analysing the economically relevant characteristics ...

If the characteristics of the transaction that are economically relevant are inconsistent with the written contract between the associated enterprises, the actual transaction should generally be delineated for purposes of the transfer pricing analysis in accordance with the characteristics of the transaction reflected in the conduct of the parties ...

P.T. Sanken Indonesia Ltd. – an Indonesian subsidiary of Sanken Electric Co., Ltd. Japan – paid royalties to its Japanese parent for use of IP. The royalty payment was calculated based on external sales and therefore did not include sales of products to group companies. The royalty payments were deducted for tax purposes. Following an audit, the tax authorities issued an assessment where deductions for the royalty payments were denied. According to the authorities the license agreement had not been registrered in Indonesia. Furthermore, the royalty payment was found not to have been determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle. P.T. Sanken issued a complaint over the decision with the Tax Court, where the assessment later was set aside. This decision was then appealed to the Supreme Court by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities and upheld the decision of the Tax Court. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines states that to test the existence of transactions to royalty payments on intangible between related parties, four tests/considerations must be performed: a) Willing to pay test (Par 6.14); b) Economic benefit test (Par 6.15); c) Product life cycle considerations (Par 1.50); d) Identify contractual and arrangement for transfer of IP (Par 6.16-6.19 ); To obtain a comparison that is reliable the level of comparability between the transactions must be determined. The degree of comparability must be measured accurately and precisely because it would be “the core” in the accuracy of the results of the selected method . Although the characteristics of products and the provision in the contract on the sale to related parties and independent was comparable, it was not sufficient to justify the conditions of the transactions are  sufficiently comparable; Based on the OECD Guidelines there are five factors of comparability, namely : ( i ) the terms and conditions in the contract ; (ii) FAR analysis ( function , asset and risk ); (iii) the product or service being transacted ; (iv) business strategy ; and (v) economic situation ; In the application of the arm’s length principle, the OECD TP Guidenline provide guidance as follows: 6.23 “In establishing arm’s length pricing in the case of a sale or license of intangible property, it is possible to use the CUP method where the same owner has transferred or licensed comparable intangible property under comparable circumstances to independent enterprises. The amount of consideration charged in comparable trnsaction between independent enterprises in the same industry can also be guide, where this information is available, and a range of pricing may be Appropriate. “That the provisions mentioned in the above , the Panel of Judges Court believes that the payment of royalties can be financed due to meet the requirements that have been set out in the OECD TP Guidenline and have a relationship with 3M ( Getting , Charge and Maintain ) income and therefore on the correction compa ( now Applicant Review Back) in the case a quo not be maintained because it is not in accordance with the provisions of regulatory legislation which applies as stipulated in Article 29, the following explanation of Article 29 paragraph (2) Paragraph Third Act Provisions General and Tata How Taxation in conjunction with Article 4 paragraph (1), Article 6 paragraph (1) and Article 9 paragraph (1) and Article 18 paragraph (3) of Law – Income Tax Law in conjunction with Article 69 paragraph (1) letter e and Article 78 of the Tax Court Law ; Click here for translation putusan_5291_b_pk_pjk_2020 Dec 2021 ...

The issue in these two cases is whether withholding tax was payable on interest paid to foreign group companies considered “beneficial owners” via conduit companies covered by the EU Interest/Royalties Directive and DTA’s exempting the payments from withholding taxes. The first case concerned interest accruals totalling approximately DKK 1,476 million made by a Danish company in the period 2007-2009 in favour of its parent company in Sweden in connection with an intra-group loan. The Danish Tax Authorities (SKAT) subsequently ruled that the recipients of the interest were subject to the tax liability in Section 2(1)(d) of the Corporation Tax Act and that the Danish company was therefore obliged to withhold and pay withholding tax on a total of approximately DKK 369 million. The Danish company brought the case before the courts, claiming principally that it was not obliged to withhold the amount collected by SKAT, as it disputed the tax liability of the recipients of the interest attributions. The second case concerned interest payments/accruals totalling approximately DKK 3,158 million made by a Danish company in the period 2006-2008 in favour of its parent company in Luxembourg in respect of an intra-group loan. SKAT also ruled in this case that the interest payments/write-ups were taxable for the recipients and levied withholding tax on them from the Danish company totalling approximately DKK 817 million. The Danish company appealed to the courts, claiming principally that the interest was not taxable. The Eastern High Court, as first instance, dealt with the two cases together. The European Court of Justice has ruled on a number of preliminary questions in the cases, see Joined Cases C-115/16, C-118/16, C119/16 and C-299/16. In both cases, the Ministry of Taxation argued in general terms that the parent companies in question were so-called “flow-through” companies, which were not the “beneficial owners” of the interest, and that the real “beneficial owners” of the interest were not covered by the rules on tax exemption, i.e. the EU Interest/Royalties Directive and the double taxation conventions applicable between the Nordic countries and between Denmark and Luxembourg respectively. Judgement of the Eastern High Court In both cases, the Court held that the parent companies in question could not be regarded as the “beneficial owners” of the interest, since the companies were interposed between the Danish companies and the holding company/capital funds which had granted the loans, and that the corporate structure had been established as part of a single, pre-organised arrangement without any commercial justification but with the main aim of obtaining tax exemption for the interest. As a result, the two Danish companies could not claim tax exemption under either the Directive or the Double Taxation Conventions and the interest was therefore not exempt. On 3 May 2021, the High Court ruled on two cases in the Danish beneficial owner case complex concerning the issue of taxation of dividends. The judgment of the Regional Court in Denmark vs NETAPP ApS and TDC A/S can be read here. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Takeda AS and NTC Parents Sarl Nov 2021 case no b-2942-12 ...

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has issued draft Compliance Guidelines on intangible arrangements, PCG 2021/D4. These Guidelines will (when finalised)  set out the ATO’s compliance approach to international arrangements connected with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangible assets, specifically, the potential application of the transfer pricing, general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) and the diverted profits tax (DPT) provisions. The capital gains tax and capital allowances provisions will also be discussed in this Guideline where these may be considered alongside, or relevant to, the ATO’s transfer pricing, GAAR or DPT risk assessment. The draft Guidelines sets out ATO’s compliance approach to international arrangements connected with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation (DEMPE) of intangible assets and/or involving a migration of intangible assets. The Guidelines applies to Intangibles Arrangements and focuses on tax risks associated with the potential application of the transfer pricing provisions. It also focuses on other tax risks that may be associated with Intangibles Arrangements, specifically the withholding tax provisions, capital gains tax (CGT), capital allowances, the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) and the diverted profits tax (DPT). The Guidelines has been prepared to accompany the release and publication of Taxpayer Alerts TA 2018/2 Mischaracterisation of activities or payments in connection with intangible assets and TA 2020/1 Non-arm’s length arrangements and schemes connected with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangible assets. It is not the intention of the Guidelines to limit, deter or prevent arm’s length dealings involving intangible assets. Rather it is intended that the Guideline will serve as a point of reference and assist in understanding arrangements which is seen as representing a higher risk from a compliance perspective. Examples of high risk arrangements centralisation of intangible assets bifurcation (separation) of intangible assets non-recognition of local intangible assets and DEMPE activities migration of pre-commercialised intangible assets non-arm’s length licence arrangements ATO PCG 2021_D4nw ...

On 3 May 2021, the Danish High Court ruled in two “beneficial owner” cases concerning the question of whether withholding tax must be paid on dividends distributed by Danish subsidiaries to foreign parent companies. The first case – NETAPP Denmark ApS – concerned two dividend distributions of approx. 566 million DKK and approx. 92 million made in 2005 and 2006 by a Danish company to its parent company in Cyprus. The National Tax Court had upheld the Danish company in that the dividends were exempt from withholding tax pursuant to the Corporation Tax Act, section 2, subsection. 1, letter c, so that the company was not obliged to pay withholding tax. The Ministry of Taxation brought the case before the courts, claiming that the Danish company should include – and thus pay – withholding tax of a total of approx. 184 million kr. The second case – TDC A/S – concerned the National Tax Tribunal’s binding answer to two questions posed by another Danish company regarding tax exemption of an intended – and later implemented – distribution of dividends in 2011 of approx. 1.05 billion DKK to the company’s parent company in Luxembourg. The National Tax Court had ruled in favor of the company in that the distribution was tax-free pursuant to section 2 (1) of the Danish Corporation Tax Act. 1, letter c, 3. pkt. The Ministry of Taxation also brought this case before the courts. The Eastern High Court has, as the first instance, dealt with the two cases together. The European Court of Justice has ruled on a number of questions referred in the main proceedings, see Joined Cases C-116/16 and C-117/16. In both cases, the Ministry of Taxation stated in general that the parent companies in question were so-called “flow-through companies” that were not real recipients of the dividends, and that the real recipients (beneficial owners) were in countries that were not covered by the EU parent / subsidiary directive. in the first case – NETAPP Denmark ApS – the High Court upheld the company’s position that the dividend distribution in 2005 of approx. 566 million did not trigger withholding tax, as the company had proved that the distribution had been redistributed from the Cypriot parent company, which had to be considered a “flow-through company”, to – ultimately – the group’s American parent company. The High Court stated, among other things, that according to the Danish-American double taxation agreement, it would have been possible to distribute the dividend directly from the Danish company to the American company, without this having triggered Danish taxation. As far as the distribution in 2006 of approx. 92 million On the other hand, the High Court found that it had not been proven that the dividend had been transferred to the group’s American parent company. In the second case – TDC A/S – the High Court stated, among other things, that in the specific case there was no further documentation of the financial and business conditions in the group, and the High Court found that it had to be assumed that the dividend was merely channeled through the Luxembourg parent company. on to a number of private equity funds based in countries that were not covered by tax exemption rules, ie. partly the parent / subsidiary directive, partly a double taxation agreement with Denmark. On that basis, the Danish company could not claim tax exemption under the Directive or the double taxation agreement with Luxembourg, and the dividend was therefore not tax-exempt. Click here for English translation DK beneficial Owner HC 3 May 2021-b198012-og-b217312 ...

PT Nanindah Mutiara Shipyard Ltd reported losses for FY 2013. The tax authorities issued an assessment where the income of the company was increased by a substantial amount referring to applicable transfer pricing regulations. Nanindah Mutiara Shipyard Ltd filed a complaint with the Tax Court, but the Tax Court upheld the assessment. An application for judicial review was then filed with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Nanindah Mutiara Shipyard Ltd. The Tax Court had erred in assessing facts, data, evidence and application of the law. The decision of the Tax Court was canceled and the petition for judicial review was granted. Losses reported by Nanindah Mutiara Shipyard Ltd were not due to non-arm’s length pricing, but rather exceptional circumstances that occurred at the local company in the years following 2010. Excerpts: ” … a. that the reasons for the Petitioner’s petition for judicial review in the a quo case are positive corrections to Business Circulation amounting to Rp45,920,139,538.00; which the Panel of Judges of the Tax Court maintains can be justified, because after examining and re-examining the arguments put forward in the Memorandum of Review by the Petitioner for Judicial Review in connection with the Counter Memorandum of Review, it can invalidate the facts and weaken the evidence revealed in the trial. as well as legal considerations of the Tax Court Panel of Judges, because in the a quo case in the form of substances that have been examined, decided and tried by the Tax Court Judges there are errors in assessing facts, data, evidence and application of the law as well as real mistakes in it, so that the Supreme Court of Justice canceled the a quo Tax Court decision and tried again with the legal considerations below, because in casu it is related to the evidentiary value that prioritizes the principle of material truth and based on the principle of substance over the form which has fulfilled the Ne Bis Vexari Rule principle as which has required that all administrative actions must be based on applicable laws and regulations. Whereas therefore the object of the dispute is in the form of a positive correction of Business Circulation amounting to Rp.45,920,139,538.00;which have been considered based on facts, evidence and application of the law and decided with the conclusion that the Panel of Judges maintains that there are factual errors and legal errors, so that the Supreme Court of Justice overturned the a quo decision and retrial with the consideration that due to in casu, the relationship with a special relationship, there are indications that the indicator of the current level of profit of the Appellant for the Review Applicant for the 2013 Fiscal Year which is below the normal profit range of similar companies, is not due to the existence of transfer pricing or pricing for transactions between parties that have a special relationship, but due to the impact of riots, causing extraordinary costs and companies not operating at full capacity. Thus, the Transfer Pricing Documentation of the present Appellant for the Review of the Appellant for the 2013 Fiscal Year, thus causing the loss suffered by the current Appellant of the Appeal for the Review of the 2013 Fiscal Year is the effect of extraordinary events in 2010 namely riots. at the shipyard in one of the companies belonging to the business group which is located adjacent to the shipyard of the present Appellant of the Applicant for Judicial Review. Besides that, The Panel of Supreme Court Justices is of the opinion that the decrease in income received by the Appellant now, the Petitioner for Review for the Fiscal Year after the riots, is due to the decline in new shipbuilding projects and the cancellation of orders that have caused ongoing shipbuilding projects to be neglected. decisive factors include the decline in new shipbuilding projects. Whereas on the basis of a state of chaos, it is considered as an extraordinary situation (force majeure) or a state of coercion (overmacht) which will directly result in the assessment of legal obligations on the fulfillment of tax obligations not being in the expected level of position, b. whereas therefore, the reasons for the Petitioner’s application for judicial review can be justified and sufficiently based on law because the arguments submitted are decisive opinions and therefore deserve to be granted and because there is a decision of the Tax Court which clearly contradicts the prevailing laws and regulations. applies as stipulated in Article 91 letter e of Law Number 14 of 2002 concerning the Tax Court and related laws, so that the accrued tax is recalculated into overpayment of Rp3,818,166,381.00; with the following details: …based on the above considerations, according to the Supreme Court, there are sufficient reasons to grant the petition for review;” Click here for translation putusan_4446_b_pk_pjk_2020_20210918 ...

P.T. Sanken Indonesia Ltd. – an Indonesian subsidiary of Sanken Electric Co., Ltd. Japan – paid royalties to its Japanese parent for use of IP. The royalty payment was calculated based on external sales and therefore did not include sales of products to group companies. The royalty payments were deducted for tax purposes. Following an audit, the tax authorities issued an assessment where deductions for the royalty payments were denied. According to the authorities the license agreement had not been registrered in Indonesia. Furthermore, the royalty payment was found not to have been determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle. P.T. Sanken issued a complaint over the decision with the Tax Court, where the assessment later was set aside. This decision was then appealed to the Supreme Court by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities and upheld the decision of the Tax Court. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines states that to test the existence of transactions to royalty payments on intangible between related parties, four tests/considerations must be performed: a) Willing to pay test (Par 6.14); b) Economic benefit test (Par 6.15); c) Product life cycle considerations (Par 1.50); d) Identify contractual and arrangement for transfer of IP (Par 6.16-6.19 ); To obtain a comparison that is reliable the level of comparability between the transactions must be determined. The degree of comparability must be measured accurately and precisely because it would be “the core” in the accuracy of the results of the selected method . Although the characteristics of products and the provision in the contract on the sale to related parties and independent was comparable, it was not sufficient to justify the conditions of the transactions are  sufficiently comparable; Based on the OECD Guidelines there are five factors of comparability, namely : ( i ) the terms and conditions in the contract ; (ii) FAR analysis ( function , asset and risk ); (iii) the product or service being transacted ; (iv) business strategy ; and (v) economic situation ; In the application of the arm’s length principle, the OECD TP Guidenline provide guidance as follows: 6.23 “In establishing arm’s length pricing in the case of a sale or license of intangible property, it is possible to use the CUP method where the same owner has transferred or licensed comparable intangible property under comparable circumstances to independent enterprises. The amount of consideration charged in comparable trnsaction between independent enterprises in the same industry can also be guide, where this information is available, and a range of pricing may be Appropriate. “That the provisions mentioned in the above , the Panel of Judges Court believes that the payment of royalties can be financed due to meet the requirements that have been set out in the OECD TP Guidenline and have a relationship with 3M ( Getting , Charge and Maintain ) income and therefore on the correction compa ( now Applicant Review Back) in the case a quo not be maintained because it is not in accordance with the provisions of regulatory legislation which applies as stipulated in Article 29, the following explanation of Article 29 paragraph (2) Paragraph Third Act Provisions General and Tata How Taxation in conjunction with Article 4 paragraph (1), Article 6 paragraph (1) and Article 9 paragraph (1) and Article 18 paragraph (3) of Law – Income Tax Law in conjunction with Article 69 paragraph (1) letter e and Article 78 of the Tax Court Law ; Click here for translation putusan_5291_b_pk_pjk_2020_20210918 ...

East African Breweries International Ltd (applicant) is a wholly owned subsidiary of East African Breweries Limited, and is incorporated in Kenya. East African Breweries International Ltd was involved in developing the markets of the companies in countries that did not have manufacturing operations. The company did not carry out marketing services in Uganda but was marketing Ugandan products outside Uganda. After sourcing customers, they pay to the applicant. A portion is remitted to Uganda Breweries Limited and East African Breweries International Ltd then adds a markup on the products obtained from Uganda Breweries Limited sold to customers in other countries. East African Breweries International Ltd would pay a markup of 7.5 % to Uganda Breweries and then sell the items at a markup of 70 to 90%. In July 2015 the tax authorities (respondent) audited Uganda Breweries Limited, also a subsidiary of East African Breweries Limited, and found information relating to transactions with the East African Breweries International Ltd for the period May 2008 to June 2015. The tax authorities issued an assessment of income tax of Shs. 9,780,243,983 for the period June 2009 to June 2015 on the ground that East African Breweries International Ltd was resident in Uganda for tax purposes. An appeal was filed by East African Breweries International Ltd where the agreed issues were: 1. Whether the applicant is a taxable person in Uganda under the Income Tax Act? 2. Whether the applicant obtained income from Uganda for the period in issue? 3. What remedies are available to the parties? Judgement of the Tax Appeals Tribunal The tribunal dismissed the appeal of East African Breweries International Ltd and upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Excerpt “From the invoices and dispatch notes tendered in as exhibits, it was not clear who the exporter of the goods was. There was no explanation why the names of the parties were crossed out and replaced with others in some of the invoices and dispatch notes. While the applicant did not have an office or presence in Uganda it was exporting goods. In the absence of satisfactory explanations, the Tribunal would not fault the Commissioner’s powers to re-characterize transactions where there is a tax avoidance scheme. The arrangement may not only be a tax avoidance scheme but also one where the form does not reflect the substance. The markup the applicant was paying Uganda Breweries was extraordinarily low compared to what the applicant was obtaining from its sale to third partied. Once again in the absence of good reasons, the form does not reflect the substance. If the Commissioner re-characterized such transactions, the Tribunal will not fault him or her. The Commissioner cannot be said to have acted grossly irrationally for the Tribunal to set aside the decision. The Tribunal notes that the activities of the group companies were overlapping. It is not clear whether they were actually sharing TIN, premises and staff. The witness who came to testify on behalf of the applicant was from East African Breweries Limited. Despite the applicant selling goods to many countries it does not have an employee or officer to testify on its behalf. The markup of the sale of the goods by Uganda Breweries Limited to the applicant was far lower than that between the applicant and the final consumers in Sudan, Congo and Rwanda. While Uganda Breweries Limited was charging the applicant a markup of 7.5% the applicant was charging its customers 70 to 90%. This is part of a transfer pricing arrangement where the companies are dealing with each other not at arm’s length. The arm’s length principle requires inter-company transactions to conform to a level that would have applied had the transactions taking place between unrelated parties, all other factors remaining the same. Under. S. 90 of the Income Tax Act, in any transaction between associates, the commissioner may distribute, apportion or allocate income, deductions between the associates as is necessary to reflect the income realized by the taxpayer in an arm’s length transaction. An associate is defined in S. 3 of the Income Tax Act. In making any adjustments the commissioner may determine the source of income and the nature of any payment or loss. The transfer pricing arrangement originated in Uganda. The Commissioner apportion taxes according to the income received by the applicant. In Unilever Kenya Limited v CIT Income Tax Appeal No. 753/2003 (High Court of Kenya) Unilever Kenya Limited (UKL) and Unilever Uganda Limited (UUL) were both subsidiaries of Unilever PLC, a UK multinational group. Pursuant to a contract, UKL manufactured goods on behalf of and supplied them to UUL, at a price lower than UKL charged to unrelated parties in its domestic and export sales for identical goods. The Commissioner raised an assessment against UKL in respect of sales made by UKL to UUL on the basis that UKL’s sale to UUL were not at arm’s length prices. In that matter it was held that in the absence of guidelines under Kenya law, the taxpayer was entitled to apply OECD transfer pricing guidelines. In this application, the issue is not about which rules to apply. What the Tribunal can note is that the Commissioner has powers to apportion income on an intergroup company and issue an assessment. In this case the Commissioner chose the applicant over Uganda Breweries Limited. The Tribunal feels that the Commissioner was acting within his discretion and was justified to do so. Taking all the above into consideration, the Tribunal finds that the applicant did not discharge the burden placed on it to prove the respondent ought to have made the decision differently. Click here for other translation 10178_EABLi_Vs_URA (1) ...

Two Swiss investors had established a structure for the management of a private equity fund in the form of a Swiss “Investment Advisor” AG and a Jersey “Investment Mananger” Ltd. They each held 50% of the shares in the Swiss AG and 50% of the shares in the Jersey Ltd. Swiss AG and Jersey Ltd then entered an investment advisory agreement whereby the Swiss AG carried out all advisory activities on behalf of Jersey Ltd and Jersey Ltd assumed all the risk of the investments. Both investors were employed by Swiss AG and Jersey Ltd had no employees execpt two directors who each received a yearly payment of CFH 15,000. According to the investment advisory agreement Jersey Ltd would remunerate the Swiss AG with 66% of the gross fee income. The Swiss AG would carry out all relevant functions related to investment advisory and recommend to Jersey Ltd acquisition targets which the latter would then evaluate and subsequently decides on and assume the risk of. For provision of the advisory functions two-thirds of the total fees (of 2.25% on Assets under Management) would go to the Swiss AG, and the remaining one-third would go to the Jersey Ltd. The Swiss AG had prepared a benchmarking analysis confirming that independent private equity fund of funds (Dachfonds) earned management fees of between 0.75% and 1% on Assets under Management, which was in line with the 0.75% attributed to the Jersey Ltd. The Swiss Tax Authorities regarded the two Swiss investors employed by the Swiss AG as the only two entrepreneurs in the structure that could have possibly taken any significant decisions. On that basis the tax authorities claimed that the 66/34 profit sharing was artificial and inconsistent with the substance of the arrangements. They argued that the Jersey Ltd should only be remunerated with a cost plus 10%. This assessment was brought to the first instance of the tax appelant court and then to the administrative court. Both courts ruled that the set-up was artificial and not in line with OECD standards, after applying a substance-over-form approach. Click here for translation Verwaltungsgericht ...

In moving to the United Kingdom, a New Zealand citizen, Mr. Eric Watson, restructured a significant shareholding into debt owed by a New Zealand company, Cullen Group Ltd, to two Cayman Island conduit companies, all of which he still controlled to a high degree. This allowed Cullen Group Ltd to pay an Approved Issuer Levy (AIL) totalling $8 million, rather than Non-Resident Withholding Tax of $59.5 million. The steps in the arrangement were as follows: (a) Mr Watson sold his shares in Cullen Investments Ltd to Cullen Group, at a (rounded) value of $193 million, being $291 million less his previous $98 million shareholder advances. The sale was conditional on Cullen Investments Ltd selling its shares in Medical Holdings Ltd to Mr Watson and on Cullen Investments Ltd selling its shares in Vonelle Holdings Ltd to Maintenance Ltd which was owned by Mr Watson. (b) Cullen Group’s purchase of the Cullen Investments Ltd shares from Mr Watson was funded by a vendor loan from Mr Watson of $193 million (Loan A). Mr Watson also lent Cullen Group $98 million (Loan B) which Cullen Group on-lent to Cullen Investments Ltd so that Cullen Investments Ltd could repay Mr Watson’s shareholder advance of that amount. (c) Mr Watson assigned his rights under Loans A and B to the two conduit companies, Modena and Mayfair, respectively. Mr Watson made back-to-back loans of $193 million (Modena Loan) and $98 million (Mayfair Loan) to each of them to fund their payment to him of consideration for those respective assignments in return for security over all property owned by Modena and Mayfair respectively. The result was therefore that Cullen Investments Ltd was owned by Cullen Group which owed money to Modena/Mayfair which owed money to Mr Watson. Effectively, instead of Mr Watson owning the shares in Cullen Investments Ltd, he held loans for the same value to Cullen Investments Ltd’s owner, Cullen Group, through Modena and Mayfair. He had exchanged equity for debt. The tax authorities held that Cullen Group had avoided $59.5 million of NRWT (withholding tax) while it paid $8 million in Approved Issuer Levy. An assessment in the amount of the difference, $51.5 million, was issued. There are three requirements for there to be tax avoidance in New Zealand: There is an arrangement which uses, and falls within, specific tax provisions. Viewed in light of the arrangement as a whole, the taxpayer has used the specific provisions in a way which cannot have been within the contemplation and purpose of Parliament when it enacted the provisions. The arrangement has a purpose or effect, that is more than merely incidental, of directly or indirectly altering the incidence of income tax. The High Court found there was a tax avoidance arrangement because it was not within Parliament’s contemplation and purpose in enacting the Approved Issuer Levy regime. Cullen Group Ltd was found liable for the $51.5 million difference plus interest and penalties. 1Cuo ...

The cases of T Danmark (C-116/16) and Y Denmark Aps (C-117/16) adresses questions related to interpretation of the EU-Parent-Subsidary-Directive. The issue is withholding taxes levied by the Danish tax authorities in situations where dividend payments are made to conduit companies located in treaty countries but were the beneficial owners of these payments are located in non-treaty countries. During the proceedings in the Danish court system the European Court of Justice was asked a number of questions related to the conditions under which exemption from withholding tax can be denied on dividend payments to related parties. The European Court of Justice has now answered these questions in favor of the Danish Tax Ministry; Benefits granted under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive can be denied where fraudulent or abusive tax avoidance is involved. Quotations from cases C-116/16 and C-117/16: “The general principle of EU law that EU law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends must be interpreted as meaning that, where there is a fraudulent or abusive practice, the national authorities and courts are to refuse a taxpayer the exemption from withholding tax on profits distributed by a subsidiary to its parent company, provided for in Article 5 of Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, as amended by Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003, even if there are no domestic or agreement-based provisions providing for such a refusal.” “Proof of an abusive practice requires, first, a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the EU rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved and, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the EU rules by artificially creating the conditions laid down for obtaining it. The presence of a certain number of indications may demonstrate that there is an abuse of rights, in so far as those indications are objective and consistent. Such indications can include, in particular, the existence of conduit companies which are without economic justification and the purely formal nature of the structure of the group of companies, the financial arrangements and the loans.” “In order to refuse to accord a company the status of beneficial owner of dividends, or to establish the existence of an abuse of rights, a national authority is not required to identify the entity or entities which it regards as being the beneficial owner(s) of those dividends.” “In a situation where the system, laid down by Directive 90/435, as amended by Directive 2003/123, of exemption from withholding tax on dividends paid by a company resident in a Member State to a company resident in another Member State is not applicable because there is found to be fraud or abuse, within the meaning of Article 1(2) of that directive, application of the freedoms enshrined in the FEU Treaty cannot be relied on in order to call into question the legislation of the first Member State governing the taxation of those dividends.” Several cases have been awaiting the decision from the EU Court of Justice and will now be resumed in Danish courts. eur-lex.europa.eu_ ...

The cases of N Luxembourg 1 (C-115/16), X Denmark A/S (C-118/16), C Danmark I (C-119/16) and Z Denmark ApS (C-299/16), adresses questions related to the interpretation of the EU Interest and Royalty Directive. The issue in these cases is withholding taxes levied by the Danish tax authorities in situations where interest payments are made to conduit companies located in treaty countries but were the beneficial owners of these payments are located in non-treaty countries. During the proceedings in the Danish court system the European Court of Justice was asked a number of questions related to the conditions under which exemption from withholding tax can be denied on interest payments to related parties. The European Court of Justice has now answered these questions in favor of the Danish Tax Ministry; Benefits granted under the Interest and Royalty Directive can be denied where fraudulent or abusive tax avoidance is involved. Quotations from cases C-115/16, C-118/16, C-119/16 and C-299/16: “The concept of ‘beneficial owner of the interest’, within the meaning of Directive 2003/49, must therefore be interpreted as designating an entity which actually benefits from the interest that is paid to it. Article 1(4) of the directive confirms that reference to economic reality by stating that a company of a Member State is to be treated as the beneficial owner of interest or royalties only if it receives those payments for its own benefit and not as an intermediary, such as an agent, trustee or authorised signatory, for some other person.” “ It is clear from the development — as set out in paragraphs 4 to 6 above — of the OECD Model Tax Convention and the commentaries relating thereto that the concept of ‘beneficial owner’ excludes conduit companies and must be understood not in a narrow technical sense but as having a meaning that enables double taxation to be avoided and tax evasion and avoidance to be prevented.” “Whilst the pursuit by a taxpayer of the tax regime most favourable for him cannot, as such, set up a general presumption of fraud or abuse (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 September 2006, Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, C‑196/04, EU:C:2006:544, paragraph 50; of 29 November 2011, National Grid Indus, C‑371/10, EU:C:2011:785, paragraph 84; and of 24 November 2016, SECIL, C‑464/14, EU:C:2016:896, paragraph 60), the fact remains that such a taxpayer cannot enjoy a right or advantage arising from EU law where the transaction at issue is purely artificial economically and is designed to circumvent the application of the legislation of the Member State concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 September 2006, Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, C‑196/04, EU:C:2006:544, paragraph 51; of 7 November 2013, K, C‑322/11, EU:C:2013:716, paragraph 61; and of 25 October 2017, Polbud — Wykonawstwo, C‑106/16, EU:C:2017:804, paragraphs 61 to 63)….It is apparent from these factors that it is incumbent upon the national authorities and courts to refuse to grant entitlement to rights provided for by Directive 2003/49 where they are invoked for fraudulent or abusive ends.” “In a situation where the system, laid down by Directive 2003/49, of exemption from withholding tax on interest paid by a company resident in a Member State to a company resident in another Member State is not applicable because there is found to be fraud or abuse, within the meaning of Article 5 of that directive, application of the freedoms enshrined in the FEU Treaty cannot be relied on in order to call into question the legislation of the first Member State governing the taxation of that interest. Outside such a situation, Article 63 TFEU must be interpreted as: –not precluding, in principle, national legislation under which a resident company which pays interest to a non-resident company is required to withhold tax on that interest at source whilst such an obligation is not owed by that resident company when the company which receives the interest is also a resident company, but as precluding national legislation that prescribes such withholding of tax at source if interest is paid by a resident company to a non-resident company whilst a resident company that receives interest from another resident company is not subject to the obligation to make an advance payment of corporation tax during the first two tax years and is therefore not required to pay corporation tax relating to that interest until a date appreciably later than the date for payment of the tax withheld at source; –precluding national legislation under which the resident company that owes the obligation to withhold tax at source on interest paid by it to a non-resident company is obliged, if the tax withheld is paid late, to pay default interest at a higher rate than the rate which is applicable in the event of late payment of corporation tax that is charged, inter alia, on interest received by a resident company from another resident company; –precluding national legislation providing that, where a resident company is subject to an obligation to withhold tax at source on the interest which it pays to a non-resident company, account is not taken of the expenditure in the form of interest, directly related to the lending at issue, which the latter company has incurred whereas, under that national legislation, such expenditure may be deducted by a resident company which receives interest from another resident company for the purpose of establishing its taxable income.” Several cases have been awaiting the decision from the EU Court of Justice and will now be resumed in Danish courts. EU-NXCZ ...

The provisions of Section D.1.1 of Chapter I apply in identifying the specific nature of a transaction involving a transfer of intangibles or rights in intangibles, in identifying the nature of any intangibles transferred, and in identifying any limitations imposed by the terms of the transfer on the use of those intangibles. For example, a written specification that a licence is non-exclusive or of limited duration need not be respected by the tax administration if such specification is not consistent with the conduct of the parties. Example 18 in the Annex to Chapter VI illustrates the provisions of this paragraph ...

The framework for analysing transactions involving intangibles between associated enterprises requires taking the following steps, consistent with the guidance for identifying the commercial or financial relations provided in Section D. 1 of Chapter I: i) Identify the intangibles used or transferred in the transaction with specificity and the specific, economically significant risks associated with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangibles; ii) Identify the full contractual arrangements, with special emphasis on determining legal ownership of intangibles based on the terms and conditions of legal arrangements, including relevant registrations, licence agreements, other relevant contracts, and other indicia of legal ownership, and the contractual rights and obligations, including contractual assumption of risks in the relations between the associated enterprises; iii) Identify the parties performing functions (including specifically the important functions described in paragraph 6.56), using assets, and managing risks related to developing, enhancing, maintaining, protecting, and exploiting the intangibles by means of the functional analysis, and in particular which parties control any outsourced functions, and control specific, economically significant risks; iv) Confirm the consistency between the terms of the relevant contractual arrangements and the conduct of the parties, and determine whether the party assuming economically significant risks under step 4 (i) of paragraph 1.60, controls the risks and has the financial capacity to assume the risks relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangibles; v) Delineate the actual controlled transactions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles in light of the legal ownership of the intangibles, the other relevant contractual relations under relevant registrations and contracts, and the conduct of the parties, including their relevant contributions of functions, assets and risks, taking into account the framework for analysing and allocating risk under Section D.1.2.1 of Chapter I; vi) Where possible, determine arm’s length prices for these transactions consistent with each party’s contributions of functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed, unless the guidance in Section D.2 of Chapter I applies ...

Company S1 conducts research activities to develop intangibles that it uses to create new products that it can produce and sell. It agrees to transfer to an associated company, Company S2, unlimited rights to all future intangibles which may arise from its future work over a period of twenty years for a lump sum payment. The arrangement is commercially irrational for both parties since neither Company S1 nor Company S2 has any reliable means to determine whether the payment reflects an appropriate valuation, both because it is uncertain what range of development activities Company S1 might conduct over the period and also because valuing the potential outcomes would be entirely speculative. Under the guidance in this section, the structure of the arrangement adopted by the taxpayer, including the form of payment, should be modified for the purposes of the transfer pricing analysis. The replacement structure should be guided by the economically relevant characteristics, including the functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed, of the commercial or financial relations of the associated enterprises. Those facts would narrow the range of potential replacement structures to the structure most consistent with the facts of the case (for example, depending on those facts the arrangement could be recast as the provision of financing by Company S2, or as the provision of research services by Company S1, or, if specific intangibles can be identified, as a licence with contingent payments terms for the development of those specific intangibles, taking into account the guidance on hard-to-value intangibles as appropriate) ...

Under the guidance in this section, the transaction should not be recognised. S1 is treated as not purchasing insurance and its profits are not reduced by the payment to S2; S2 is treated as not issuing insurance and therefore not being liable for any claim ...

Company S1 carries on a manufacturing business that involves holding substantial inventory and a significant investment in plant and machinery. It owns commercial property situated in an area prone to increasingly frequent flooding in recent years. Third-party insurers experience significant uncertainty over the exposure to large claims, with the result that there is no active market for the insurance of properties in the area. Company S2, an associated enterprise, provides insurance to Company S1, and an annual premium representing 80% of the value of the inventory, property and contents is paid by Company S1. In this example S1 has entered into a commercially irrational transaction since there is no market for insurance given the likelihood of significant claims, and either relocation or not insuring may be more attractive realistic alternatives. Since the transaction is commercially irrational, there is not a price that is acceptable to both S1 and S2 from their individual perspectives ...

The criterion for non-recognition may be illustrated by the following examples ...

The structure that for transfer pricing purposes, replaces that actually adopted by the taxpayers should comport as closely as possible with the facts of the actual transaction undertaken whilst achieving a commercially rational expected result that would have enabled the parties to come to a price acceptable to both of them at the time the arrangement was entered into ...

The key question in the analysis is whether the actual transaction possesses the commercial rationality of arrangements that would be agreed between unrelated parties under comparable economic circumstances, not whether the same transaction can be observed between independent parties. The non-recognition of a transaction that possesses the commercial rationality of an arm’s length arrangement is not an appropriate application of the arm’s length principle. Restructuring of legitimate business transactions would be a wholly arbitrary exercise the inequity of which could be compounded by double taxation created where the other tax administration does not share the same views as to how the transaction should be structured. It should again be noted that the mere fact that the transaction may not be seen between independent parties does not mean that it does not have characteristics of an arm’s length arrangement ...

This section sets out circumstances in which the transaction between the parties as accurately delineated can be disregarded for transfer pricing purposes. Because non-recognition can be contentious and a source of double taxation, every effort should be made to determine the actual nature of the transaction and apply arm’s length pricing to the accurately delineated transaction, and to ensure that non-recognition is not used simply because determining an arm’s length price is difficult. Where the same transaction can be seen between independent parties in comparable circumstances (i.e. where all economically relevant characteristics are the same as those under which the tested transaction occurs other than that the parties are associated enterprises) non-recognition would not apply. Importantly, the mere fact that the transaction may not be seen between independent parties does not mean that it should not be recognised. Associated enterprises may have the ability to enter into a much greater variety of arrangements than can independent enterprises, and may conclude transactions of a specific nature that are not encountered, or are only very rarely encountered, between independent parties, and may do so for sound business reasons. The transaction as accurately delineated may be disregarded, and if appropriate, replaced by an alternative transaction, where the arrangements made in relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would have been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner in comparable circumstances, thereby preventing determination of a price that would be acceptable to both of the parties taking into account their respective perspectives and the options realistically available to each of them at the time of entering into the transaction. It is also a relevant pointer to consider whether the MNE group as a whole is left worse off on a pre-tax basis since this may be an indicator that the transaction viewed in its entirety lacks the commercial rationality of arrangements between unrelated parties ...

Every effort should be made to determine pricing for the actual transaction as accurately delineated under the arm’s length principle. The various tools and methods available to tax administrations and taxpayers to do so are set out in the following chapters of these Guidelines. A tax administration should not disregard the actual transaction or substitute other transactions for it unless the exceptional circumstances described in the following paragraphs 1.122-1.125 apply ...

In performing the analysis, the actual transaction between the parties will have been deduced from written contracts and the conduct of the parties. Formal conditions recognised in contracts will have been clarified and supplemented by analysis of the conduct of the parties and the other economically relevant characteristics of the transaction (see Section D.1.1). Where the characteristics of the transaction that are economically significant are inconsistent with the written contract, then the actual transaction will have been delineated in accordance with the characteristics of the transaction reflected in the conduct of the parties. Contractual risk assumption and actual conduct with respect to risk assumption will have been examined taking into account control over the risk (as defined in paragraphs 1.65-1.68) and the financial capacity to assume risk (as defined in paragraph 1.64), and consequently, risks assumed under the contract may have been allocated in accordance with the conduct of the parties and the other facts on the basis of steps 4 and 5 of the process for analysing risk in a controlled transaction as reflected in Sections D.1.2.1.4 and D.1.2.1.5. Therefore, the analysis will have set out the factual substance of the commercial or financial relations between the parties and accurately delineated the actual transaction ...

Following the guidance in the previous section, the transfer pricing analysis will have identified the substance of the commercial or financial relations between the parties, and will have accurately delineated the actual transaction by analysing the economically relevant characteristics ...

If the characteristics of the transaction that are economically relevant are inconsistent with the written contract between the associated enterprises, the actual transaction should generally be delineated for purposes of the transfer pricing analysis in accordance with the characteristics of the transaction reflected in the conduct of the parties ...

The taxpayer is registered and incorporated in the Republic of South Africa and carries on business in the petrochemical industry. It has some of its subsidiaries in foreign jurisdictions. Business activities include the importation and refinement of crude oil. This matter concerns the analysis of supply agreements entered into between the XYZ Corp and some of its foreign subsidiaries. It thus brings to fore, inter alia the application of the South African developing fiscal legal principles, namely, residence based taxation, section 9D of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and other established principles of tax law, such as anti-tax avoidance provisions and substance over form. Tax avoidance is the use of legal methods to modify taxpayer’s financial situation to reduce the amount of tax that is payable SARS’s ground of assessment is that the XYZ Group structure constituted a transaction, operation or scheme as contemplated in section 103(1) of the Act. The structure had the effect of avoiding liability for the payment of tax imposed under the Act. The case is based on the principle of substance over form, in which event the provisions of section 9D will be applicable. Alternatively the respondent’s case is based on the application of section 103 of the Act. XYZ Group denies that the substance of the relevant agreements differed from their form. It contends that both in form and substance the relevant amounts were received by or accrued to XYZIL from sale of crude oil by XYZIL to SISIL. XYZ Group states that in order to treat a transaction as simulated or a sham, it is necessary to find that there was dishonesty. The parties did not intend the transaction to have effect in accordance with its terms but intended to disguise the transaction. The transaction should be intended to deceive by concealing what the real agreement or transaction between the parties is. Substance over form: If the transaction is genuine then it is not simulated, and if it is simulated then it is a dishonest transaction, whatever the motives of those who concluded the transaction. The true position is that „the court examines the transaction as a whole, including all surrounding circumstances, any unusual features of the transaction and the manner in which the parties intend to implement it, before determining in any particular case whether a transaction is simulated. Among those features will be the income tax consequences of the transaction. Tax evasion is of course impermissible and therefore, if a transaction is simulated, it may amount to tax evasion. But there is nothing impermissible about arranging one’s affairs XYZ as to minimise one’s tax liability, in other words, in tax avoidance. If the revenue authorities regard any particular form of tax avoidance as undesirable they arefree to amend the Act, as occurs annually, to close anything they regard as a loophole. That is what occurred when s 8C was introduced. Once that is appreciated the argument based on simulation must fail. For it to succeed, it required the participants in the scheme to have intended, when exercising their options to enter into agreements of purchase and sale of shares, to do XYZ on terms other than those set out in the scheme. Before a transaction is in fraudem legis in the above sense, it must be satisfied that there is some unexpressed agreement or tacit understanding between the parties. The Court rules as follows: The question is whether the substance of the relevant agreements differs from form. The interposition of XIXL and the separate reading of “back-to-back” agreements take XIXL out of the equation. Regrettably no matter how the appellant’s witnesses try to dress the contracts and their implementation, the surrounding circumstances; implementation of the uncharacteristic features of the transaction point to none other than disguised contracts. The court can only read one thing not expressed as it is; tax avoidance. Based on the evidence the court concludes that the purpose of relevant supply agreements was to avoid the anticipated tax which would accrue to XYZIL, a CFC if it sold the crude oil directly to XYZ. The court has concluded that the whole scheme and or the implementation of supply agreements is a sham. The court, therefore cannot consider the facsimile argument in isolation to support the averment that the contracts were concluded in IOM. Furthermore there is nothing before court to the effect that XYZIL has an FBE with a truly active business with connections to South Africa being used for bona fide non- tax business purposes. There is not even a shred of evidence alluding to the existence of an FBE. Section 76 (2) empowers SARS with a discretion to remit a portion or all of the additional tax assessment in terms of section 76 (1). Additional tax prescribed in Section 76(1) is 200% of the relevant tax amount. The appeal is dismissed. The assessments by the South African Revenue Services for 2005, 2006 and 2007 tax years as well as interest and penalties, are confirmed. LAPD-DRJ-TC-2017-06 - TCIT 13065 JHB 30 June 2017 ...

The case was about a sale and lease back arrangement characterizised as a loan by the US tax authorities referring to “substance over form”. The Court agreed with the tax authorities. “We have held that all of the test transactions failed the substance over form inquiry because petitioner did not acquire the benefits and burdens of ownership in the assets involved in the test transactions. We have also concluded that the test transactions are more similar to loans made by petitioner to CPS and MEAG because petitioner’s return on its investment was predetermined at the time petitioner entered into the test transactions. Accordingly, in 1999 petitioner exchanged the Powerton and Collins power plants for an interest in financial instruments. Such an exchange fails to meet the “like kind” requirement outlined in the Code and the regulations. Thus, petitioner must recognize the gain it received in 1999 on the sale of the Powerton and Collins plants under section 1001.” US-vs-Exelon-Corp-September-2016-US-Tax-Court ...

The Swedish Supreme Administrative Court makes it clear that OECD guidelines can be used for interpreting Swedish domestic legislation in cases where the domestic legislation is based on OECD guidance and principles. It is also concluded, that the fact that an agreement is given a certain legal term does not mean that the Court is bound by that classification. It is the substance of the agreement – based on the facts and circumstances – that matters. Click here for translation Sweden-vs-Corp-HFD-2016-ref.-23 ...

P.T. Sanken Electric Indonesia Ltd. – an Indonesian subsidiary of Sanken Electric Co., Ltd. Japan – paid royalties to its Japanese parent for use of IP. The royalty payment was calculated based on external sales and therefore did not include sales of products to group companies. The royalty payments were deducted for tax purposes. The tax authorities denied the deduction as the license agreement had not been registrered in Indonesia. Furthermore, the royalty payment was not found to have been determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle. P.T. Sanken Electric Indonesia Ltd appealed the decision of the Tax Court. Judgement of the Tax Court The tax court set aside the assessment and decided in favor of taxpayer. Click here for translation Indonesia PUT 68357-PP-MIA-15-2016 ...

A Ab had in 2009 from its majority shareholder B, based in Luxembourg, received a EUR 15 million inter-company loan. A Ab had in 2009 deducted 1,337,500 euros in interest on the loan. The loan had been granted on the basis that the banks financing A’s operations had demanded that the company acquire additional financing, which in the payment scheme would be a subordinated claim in relation to bank loans, and by its nature a so-called IFRS hybrid, which the IFRS financial statements were treated as equity. The loan was guaranteed. The fixed annual interest rate on the loan was 30 percent. The loan could be paid only on demand by A Ab. The Finnish tax authorities argued that the legal form of the inter-company loan agreed between related parties should be disregarded, and the loan reclassified as equity. Interest on the loan would therefore not be deductible for A Ab. According to the Supreme Administrative Court interest on the loan was tax deductible. The Supreme Administrative Court stated that a reclassification of the loan into equity was not possible under the domestic transfer pricing provision alone. Further, the Supreme Administrative Court noted that it had not been demonstrated or even alleged by the tax authorities that the case was to regarded as tax avoidance. The fact that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Sections 1.65, 1.66 and 1.68) could in theory have allowed a reclassification of the legal form of the loan into equity was not relevant because a tax treaty cannot broaden the tax base from that determined under the domestic tax provisions. Consequently, the arm’s length principle included in Article 9 of the tax treaty between Finland and Luxembourg only regarded the arm’s length pricing of the instrument, not the classification of the instrument. Click here for other translation Finland-2014-July-Supreme-Administrative-Court-HFD-2014-119 ...

“X Beverages S.A.” had entered into an agreement with the ABCDE Group for the use of concentrate and trademarks for the production and sale of beverages in Spain, but according to the agreement, “X Beverages S.A.” only paid for the concentrate. Following an audit for the financial years 2005-2007, the tax authorities issued an assessment which considered part of the payment to be royalties on which withholding tax should have been paid. Court’s Judgement The Court agreed that part of the payment could be qualified as royalties, but the assessment made by the tax authorities had been based on secret comparables – leaving the taxpayer defenceless – and on this basis the Court annulled the assessment. Excerpts “The taxpayer itself seems to recognize that the so-called “Contract of …” contains both a distribution contract and a trademark assignment contract when it says on page 127 of its statement of allegations “Indeed, this authorization of use is necessary to be able to carry out the activity of packaging and distribution that is the object of the contract, and it would not be possible for X to carry out its obligations under the contract if it did not have this authorization to use the trademark. If X did not have the right to use the trademark, it would not be able to package and label the product as required by its principal (Z), nor would it be able to distribute it under said trademark, in accordance with the terms of the contract.” And although the “authorization of use” of the trademark recognized by the taxpayer is qualified by the latter as an obligation and not as a right of the same, seeming to want to reach the conclusion that only if it were a right it would generate a royalty, in the opinion of this Court both aspects (obligation and right) are not mutually exclusive but complementary: X acquires the right to use the trademark and the obligation to use the same with respect to the products (the beverages) made by it with the “concentrates” acquired from the ABCD Group. And without the existence of limits and/or conditions. Limits and/or conditions which, on the other hand, are inherent to any assignment of rights contract, which is never absolute. In the present case, such limits would be that X may not use the trademark to identify other products not made with the “concentrates” purchased from the ABCD Group and that it may not identify the products made with such “concentrates” under another trademark. Both things are logical since the trademark owner remains the owner of the trademark (he only assigns its use in a certain temporal and territorial scope) and must protect its prestige by means of the indicated precautions (previously called limits and/or conditions). Por otro lado, y en contra de lo alegado (pág. 129 of the pleadings), the right to use the trademark is not something merely “instrumental” but something “substantial” to the contracts entered into between the parties in the sense that it is in the interest of the supplier to sell its concentrates and of X to market the products it manufactures with such concentrates under certain trademarks (ABCD or M8), of special diffusion and prestige in the market and whose use implies a volume of sales notably higher than that which it would obtain if it marketed the products under X ‘s own denomination without such diffusion and prestige in the market. The importance of the trademark is such (and more so the ones we are now dealing with) that it would be difficult to understand in the opinion of the Inspectorate a purely “instrumental” transfer of use of the same, and much less free of charge, as the claimant defends. This circumstance is supported by the Inspection in the Valuation Report, which grants to the assignment of the trademark, as an example, percentages of 61.17% of the price of the concentrate in the case of ABCD-1 and 46.18% in the case of ABCD-2.” “Thus, it is clear that the promotion of the ABCD trademark in Spain (not of the products themselves, which is what is made with the “concentrates” acquired by X) generates expenses for the holder of the trademark[2] ( ABCD Group and, specifically,ABCD C…), the inspection revealed that “it does not seem reasonable to think that the ABCD trademarks in Spain only generate expenses and no income” (….) “From a strictly economic perspective, the actions of the ABCD group, assuming such an amount of expenses to make the brand known to the consumer without this action generating any income for the brand in Spain, lacks all rationality”. This is an additional fact taken into account by the Inspectorate for the purpose of confirming the rationality of the fact that the assignment of use of the trademark is not free of charge but that the ABCD Group obtains income from it.” “In the case at hand, we cannot properly speak of “lack of evidence” but more properly of “lack of externalized evidence” since, even if such evidence exists (which this Court, in principle, has no doubt about), it cannot be incorporated into the file that is made available to the interested party, Therefore, the latter is defenseless when it comes to being able to oppose the suitability of the comparables used, so that, as stated in the previously transcribed SAN, we are faced with an “inadequate assessment method” in terms of generating defenselessness in the taxpayer. This Central Court has recently pronounced in the same sense as above in its RG of 05-09-2013 (RG 3780/11). Having said the above with respect to the “subjective motivation”, it should be noted that the objections raised by the taxpayer with respect to the “technical motivation” refer basically to the fact that the data used by the Inspection to assess are not in any case comparable with those of ABCD because ABCD is unique and neither by its product characteristics, nor by the characteristics of the product …. . In ...

“Paper Trading B.V.” was active in the business of buying and selling paper. The paper was purchased (mostly) in Finland, and sold in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Germany. The purchasing and selling activities were carried out by the director of Paper Trading B.V. “Mr. O” who was also the owner of all shares in the company. In 1994, Mr. O set up a company in Switzerland “Paper Trader A.G”. The appointed director of “Paper Trader A.G” was a certified tax advisor, accountant, and trustee, who also acted as director of various other companies registered at the same address. The Swiss director took care of administration, correspondence, invoicing and corporate tax compliance. A couple of years later, part of the purchasing and selling of the paper was now carried out through “Paper Trader A.G”. However, Mr. O proved to be highly involved in activities on behalf of “Paper Trader A.G”, and the purchase and sale of its paper. Mr. O was not employed by “Paper Trader A.G”, nor did he receive any instructions from the company. From witness statements quoted by the Court in the context of a criminal investigation, it followed that Mr. O de facto ran “Paper Trader A.G” like Paper Trading B.V. Mr. O decided on a case-by-case basis whether a specific transaction was carried out by either one of the companies. Moreover, both companies had the same suppliers of paper, paper products, logistics providers and buyers. The only difference was the method of invoicing and payment. The tax authorities issued additional corporate income tax assessments for fiscal years 1996, 1997 and 1998. For fiscal year 1999, the tax authorities issued a corporate income tax assessment that deviated from the corporate income tax return filed by Paper Trading B.V. These decisions were appealed at the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam (the Court). Ruling The Court considered it plausible that the attribution of profit was not based on commercial consideration, but motivated by the interest of the Mr O. The aim was to siphon a (large) part of the revenue achieved from trading activities from the tax base in the Netherlands. The Court of Appeal ruled that the income generated by Paper Trader A.G had to be accounted for at the level of the Paper Trading B.V. For administrative services, Paper Trader A.G was entitled to a cost plus remuneration of 15%. Certain expenses could not be included in the cost basis, such as factoring and insurance fees. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court confirmed the ruling. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ECLI_NL_PHR_2011_BT8777 ...

In this case a US subsidiary, Container Corp, had paid guaranty fees to its foreign parent company Vitro in Mexico. In the US tax return, the fee had been considered analogous to payments for services, and the income was sourced outside the United States and not subject to withholding tax. The IRS held that the guaranty fees were more closely analogized to interest and thus subject to withholding taxes of 30 %. The Tax Court issued an opinion siding with Container Corp. The Commissioner brought the opinion before the US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals also found in favor of Container Corp. “To determine what class of income guaranty fees fall within or may be analogized to, the court must look to the “substance of the transaction”. The Commissioner contends the guaranty fees are more closely analogized to interest, while Container Corporation argues that the fees are more closely analogous to payment for services.” “The source of payments for services is where the services are performed, not where the benefit is inured. The Tax Court held that the parent company’s promise to pay in the event of default produced the guaranty fees. The parent company guaranty was the service. Thus, the services were performed in Mexico, and International did not have to withhold thirty percent of the guaranty fees paid.” “Under these factual circumstances, the guaranty fees are more analogous to payments for services, and the income was properly sourced outside the United States. As we find no reversible error of fact or law, the judgment of the Tax Court is AFFIRMED.” The decision from the Court of Appeal US vs Container Corp10-60515.0.wpd The opinion from the Tax Court US vs Container Corp Opinion ...

This case concerns the tax treatment of a sophisticated financing transaction, known as a “weak currency financing scheme”, undertaken by Shell Canada. In 1988, Shell Canada required about $100 million in United States currency (“US$”) for general corporate purposes. The market rate for a direct borrowing of US$ was 9.1 percent. Instead of borrowing US$ directly, however, Shell Canada entered into two agreements. The first agreement (the “Borrowing Contract”), involved the appellant borrowing $150 million in New Zealand currency (“NZ$”) at an interest rate of 15.4 percent per annum (which was found to be the market rate for borrowing NZ$). The second agreement (the “Purchasing Contract”), involved the appellant using the New Zealand funds to purchase US$100 million at the market price. In order to fulfill Shell Canada’s requirement for New Zealand dollars, the Purchasing Contract provided for the appellant to purchase enough New Zealand dollars to satisfy the interest payments under the Borrowing Contract and for the appellant to purchase NZ$150 million for US$79 million on the date when the principal came due under the Borrowing Contract. The difference in the cost of the NZ$150 million at the time the Borrowing Contract was entered (US$100 million) and at the time the principal was to be repaid (US$79 million) resulted in a US$21 million “gain” to Shell Canada. In computing its tax liability, Shell Canada deducted the 15.4 percent interest it had paid under the Borrowing Contract and characterized the US$21 million gain as a capital gain. The tax authorities reassessed the tax liability by allowing only the cost of directly borrowing US$ (9.1 percent) as an interest expense and characterized the “gain” as income. Shell Canada appealed to the Tax Court where the court found in favour of Shell Canada and allowed the full 15.4 percent to be deducted as an expense. The Tax Court also characterized the gain as a capital gain: An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities with the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal reversed the Tax Court’s finding with respect to the interest deduction applying an “economic substance over form” doctrine which essentially dictated that the Borrowing Contract and Purchasing Contract be considered together: [1998] 3 F.C. 64. This in turn led the Court of Appeal to a determination that the 15.4 percent interest rate expense claimed failed to comply with three of the requirements that must be satisfied for a claimed expense to qualify as “interest” under the Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.): it was not interest, it was not used for the purpose of earning income and it was not reasonable. Therefore, the Court of Appeal disallowed any interest expense claimed above 9.1 percent – the direct cost of borrowing US$. Shell Canada then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court on that issue. Judgement of the Court Excerpt “10 The respondent’s argument on the capital gain issue would not, if accepted, uphold the judgment of the Court of Appeal. According to that judgment, the appellant may claim an interest expense of 9.1 percent per annum on the principal amount borrowed under the Borrowing Contract in the computation of its taxable income. The respondent says that if the appeal against that ruling succeeds, the respondent ought to be free to argue that the tax burden thus reduced should nevertheless be restored in whole or in part by recharacterizing the gain on the Borrowing Contract as income rather than capital. 11 In my view, the respondent would be required to obtain leave to cross-appeal before raising this issue at the hearing of the appeal. 12 In the first place the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal dated February 18, 1998 refers the matter back to the Minister “to be reassessed in accordance with the Reasons for Judgment herein”. The Minister’s authority is thus closely circumscribed by the reasons as well as the outcome of the appeal to that court. 13 Secondly, there is no reason to believe (and the respondent has not offered any proof) that the net effect of reclassifying the US$21 million gain as income would be the same as the net effect on the appellant’s tax burden of the reasons for judgment of the Court of Appeal. If the tax burden calculated under the respondent’s alternative argument differs from the tax burden calculated under the Court of Appeal’s judgment, then recharacterizing the gain as income rather than capital would not uphold even the outcome, much less the reasons for judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal. 14 Accordingly, if the respondent wishes to keep the capital gain issue alive in this Court, she cannot do so without leave. The proper procedure would be to now serve and provide the Court with the proposed leave application with respect to the cross appeal, accompanied by an application for an extension of time within which to file same, as set out in the Notice to the Profession dated January 1996. The leave panel may then determine whether it is appropriate to have all aspects of the “weak currency financing scheme” before the Court on the main appeal. Click here for translation 1999scr3_616 ...

In this case a pharmaceutical company in the US, Eli Lilly & Co, transferred valuable pharmaceutical patents and manufacturing know-how to its subsidiary in Puerto Rico. The IRS argued that the transaction should be disregarded (substance over form) and claimed that all of the income from the transferred intangibles should be allocated to the U.S. parent. The Judgment from the Tax Court: “Respondent’s argument, that petitioner, having originally developed the patents and know-how, is forever required to report the income from those intangibles, is without merit. Respondent ignores the fact that petitioner, as developer and owner of the intangible property, was free to and did transfer the property to the Puerto Ricanaffiliate in 1966.” The Court of Appeals altered the judgement from the Tax Court. According to the Court of Appeals, the parent company had received an arm’s length consideration for the transfer of intangibles in the form of stock in the subsidiary. Hence, the Court disallowed the allocation of the intangibles’ income to the U.S. parent. US vs Eli Lilly ...

Conclusion of the Tax Court: “The substance of the transactions is revealed in the lack of arm’s-length dealing between LIIBV and petitioners, the circular flow of funds, and the conduct of the parties by changing the terms of the agreements when needed to avoid deadlines. The Laidlaw entities’ core management group designed and implemented this elaborate system to create the appearance that petitioners were paying interest, while in substance they were not. We conclude that, for Federal income tax purposes, the advances from LIIBV to petitioners for which petitioners claim to have paid the interest at issue are equity and not debt. Thus, petitioners may not deduct the interest at issue for 1986, 1987, and 1988.” NOTE: 13 October 2016 section 385 of the Internal Revenue Code was issued containing regulations for re-characterisation of Debt/Equity for US Inbound Multinationals. Further, US documentation rules in Treasury Regulation § 1.385-2 facilitate analysis of related-party debt instruments by establishing documentation and maintenance requirements, operating rules, presumptions, and factors that impact treatment of a debt instrument as debt or equity. US vs Laidlaw Transportation Inc June 1998 US Tax Court ...

In the case of Ramsay a substance over form-doctrine was endorsed by the House of Lords (predecessor of the “UK Supreme Court” established in 2009). The “Ramsay principle” has since been applied in other cases involving tax avoidance schemes in the UK, where transactions have been constructed purely for tax purposes. Statutes referring to “commercial” concepts have also been applied in tax cases where transactions have lacked economic substance. UK vs RAMSAY LIMITED 1981 ...

In July, 1956, the appellants (Berkowitz and Kolbert) formed the taxpayer (K B Trail Properties, Inc.). Each of the appellants paid $2500 cash for one-half of the taxpayer’s authorized stock. They advanced the taxpayer $83,000 to begin business because the taxpayer was unable to borrow funds elsewhere. The taxpayer purchased a 99-year lease on business property utilizing these funds and assumed a mortgage of $57,829.20 as part of the purchase price of the lease. Each appellant took notes from the taxpayer totalling $41,500, payable in four installments of $2,500 commencing July 10, 1957, with the unpaid balance due July 10, 1961, with interest at the rate of 6 percent. In October, 1956, to finance the construction of an additional building on a property, the taxpayer borrowed $40,000 at 6 percent interest from a Savings and Loan Association, secured by a mortgage. In December, 1958, the taxpayer purchased the ground under the leasehold for $50,000. This transaction was partially financed by advances from the appellants in the amount of $5,000 each, evidenced by 15 percent notes due in December, 1959. The taxpayer borrowed $30,000 from a New York mortgage company, evidenced by an 8 percent note secured by a second mortgage on the premises. In 1960 the appellants each advanced the taxpayer $4,000. In 1963 they each advanced the taxpayer $3,600. There were no maturity dates for, or written evidence of these advances. Thus through 1963 the appellants had made unsecured advances to the taxpayer of $108,200, and two lending institutions had loaned the taxpayer $70,000 secured by mortgages. Obviously, the taxpayer was thin to the point of being transparent. Although the taxpayer was timely in its payments to the banking institutions, from 1956 through 1963 the taxpayer had paid only $1,980 toward the principal of the advances made by the appellants. There was no plan to reduce the principal further. In 1963 the taxpayer realized $60,000 from the sale of property, but instead of paying off the long overdue “loans” to the appellants, the taxpayer placed the money in a bank account where it drew a maximum of four and one-half percent, while, at the same time, the taxpayer was paying ten to fifteen percent on the principal of the advances made by the appellants. While the appellants, as directors of the taxpayer, made no effort to reduce the principal amount of their “loans” to the taxpayer, they did meet at the end of each year and decide what interest rate to pay. The taxpayer paid interest to the appellant as follows: 1957 — 4%, 1958 — 8%, 1959 — 15%, 1960 — 14%, 1961 — 10%, 1962 — 10%, and 1963 — 13%. On its income tax returns for the years in issue the taxpayer deducted the “interest” it had paid to the appellants during each fiscal year pursuant to section 163(a) of the Code. The Commissioner disallowed these deductions. Section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that there shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness. The tax authorities disallowed these deductions and increased the taxpayer’s income taxes. An appeal was filed by the taxpayer. Judgment of the Court The US Court of Appeal upheld the assessment of the tax authorities. The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that intent was the controlling factor. Instead, the court noted that the parties had objectively manifested their intent, so subjective intent was not determinative. Excerpts “The appellants had the burden to prove that the advances represented indebtedness rather than equity, and the fact that they intended to make loans and not capital contributions to the taxpayer is not determinative of the equity-capital tax issue. Nor is it decisive that the notes were executed in accordance with state law and described by the appellants and the taxpayer as “loans”. Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 3 Cir. 1968, 398 F.2d 694; Tomlinson v. 1661 Corporation, supra. These are just several of the numerous factors to be considered in determining whether the funds advanced to the taxpayer represented capital contributions rather than loans. We have expatiated on the criteria with some specificity as follows: There are at least eleven separate determining factors generally used by the courts in determining whether amounts advanced to a corporation constitute equity capital or indebtedness. They are (1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a maturity date; (3) the source of the payments; (4) the right to enforce the payment of principal and interest; (5) participation in management; (6) a status equal to or inferior to that of regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) `thin’ or adequate capitalization; (9) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (10) payment of interest only out of `dividend’ money; (11) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending institutions. … Applying these criteria to the case sub judice, there can be no doubt that the advances were nothing more than capital transfers as opposed to bona fide indebtedness. Obviously the taxpayer was inadequately capitalized. Considering only the advances made by the appellants, which the taxpayer designated as indebtedness, the ratio of debt to equity would have been about 21 to 1. Adding the institutional indebtedness to the advances made by the appellants would have made the ratio more lopsided.” “The problem is not one of ascertaining “intent” since the parties have objectively manifested their intent. It is a problem of whether the intent and acts of these parties should be disregarded in characterizing the transaction for federal tax purposes. It is not the jury’s function to determine whether the undisputed operative facts add up to debt or equity. This is a question of law. It was correctly decided by the District Court in favor of the government.” Click here for other translation Berkowitz v. United States, 411 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1969) ...

The Duke of Westminster’s gardener was paid weekly, but to reduce tax, his solicitors drew up a deed in which it was said that the earnings were not really wages, but were an annual payment payable by weekly instalments. The tax authorities held that for tax purposes the true relationship and the true nature of these payments were decisive – substance over form. Judgment of the House of Lords The House of Lords decided in favor of the Duke of Westminster and set aside the assessment. LORD TOMLIN. “… Apart, however, from the question of contract with which I have dealt, it is said that in revenue cases there is a doctrine that the Court may ignore the legal position and regard what is called “the substance of the matter,” and that here the substance of the matter is that the annuitant was serving the Duke for something equal to his former salary or wages, and that therefore, while he is so serving, the annuity must be treated as salary or wages. This supposed doctrine (upon which the Commissioners apparently acted) seems to rest for its support upon a misunderstanding of language used in some earlier cases. The sooner this misunderstanding is dispelled, and the supposed doctrine given its quietus, the better it will be for all concerned, for the doctrine seems to involve substituting “the incertain and crooked cord of discretion” for “the golden and streight metwand of the law.” 4 Inst 41 Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax. This so-called doctrine of “the substance” seems to me to be nothing more than an attempt to make a man pay notwithstanding that he has so ordered his affairs that the amount of tax sought from him is not legally claimable. The principal passages relied upon are from opinions of Lord Herschell and Lord Halsbury in your Lordships’ House. Lord Herschell L.C. in Helby v. Matthews [1895] AC 471, 475 observed: “It is said that the substance of the transaction evidenced by the agreement must be looked at, and not its mere words. I quite agree;” but he went on to explain that the substance must be ascertained by a consideration of the rights and obligations of the parties to be derived from a consideration of the whole of the agreement. In short Lord Herschell was saying that the substance of a transaction embodied in a written instrument is to be found by construing the document as a whole. Support has also been sought by the appellants from the language of Lord Halsbury L.C. in Secretary of State in Council of India v. Scoble. [1903] AC 299, 302 There Lord Halsbury said: “Still, looking at the whole nature and substance of the transaction (and it is agreed on all sides that we must look at the nature of the transaction and not be bound by the mere use of the words), this is not the case of a purchase of an annuity.” Here again Lord Halsbury is only giving utterance to the indisputable rule that the surrounding circumstances must be regarded in construing a document. Neither of these passages in my opinion affords the appellants any support or has any application to the present case. The matter was put accurately by my noble and learned friend Lord Warrington of Clyffe when as Warrington L.J. in In re Hinckes, Dashwood v. Hinckes [1921] 1 Ch 475, 489 he used these words: “It is said we must go behind the form and look at the substance …. but, in order to ascertain the substance, I must look at the legal effect of the bargain which the parties have entered into.” So here the substance is that which results from the legal rights and obligations of the parties ascertained upon ordinary legal principles, and, having regard to what I have already said, the conclusion must be that each annuitant is entitled to an annuity which as between himself and the payer is liable to deduction of income tax by the payer and which the payer is entitled to treat as a deduction from his total income for surtax purposes. There may, of course, be cases where documents are not bona fide nor intended to be acted upon, but are only used as a cloak to conceal a different transaction. No such case is made or even suggested here. The deeds of covenant are admittedly bona fide and have been given their proper legal operation. They cannot be ignored or treated as operating in some different way because as a result less duty is payable than would have been the case if some other arrangement (called for the purpose of the appellants’ argument “the substance”) had been made. I find myself, therefore, in regard to the annuities other than that of Blow, unable to take the same view as the noble and learned Lord upon the Woolsack. In my opinion in regard to all the annuities the appeal fails and ought to be dismissed with costs.” This “Duke of Westminster-doctrine” was later set aside in the Ramsay case where a substance over form-doctrine was endorsed by the House of Lords. The “Ramsay principle” has since been applied in other cases involving tax avoidance schemes in the UK, where transactions have been constructed purely for tax purposes. UK vs DUKE OF WESTMINSTER 1935 TC_19_490 ...

The first rulings where the IRS proposed recharacterizing transactions that could be considered abusive through use of transfer pricing provisions. Judgement of the Supreme Court The court instead applied the general anti-abuse doctrine. “It is earnestly contended on behalf of the taxpayer that, since every element required by the foregoing subdivision (B) is to be found in what was done, a statutory reorganization was effected, and that the motive of the taxpayer thereby to escape payment of a tax will not alter the result or make unlawful what the statute allows. It is quite true that, if a reorganization in reality was effected within the meaning of subdivision (B), the ulterior purpose mentioned will be disregarded. The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted. United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 84 U. S. 506; Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390, 280 U. S. 395-396; Jones v. Helvering, 63 App.D.C. 204, 71 F.2d 214, 217. But the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended. The reasoning of the court below in justification of a negative answer leaves little to be said. When subdivision (B) speaks of a transfer of assets by one corporation to another, it means a transfer made “in pursuance of a plan of reorganization” [§ 112(g)] of corporate business, and not a transfer of assets by one corporation to another in pursuance of a plan having no relation to the business of either, as plainly is the case here. Putting aside, then, the question of motive in respect of taxation altogether, and fixing the character of the proceeding by what actually occurred, what do we find? Simply an operation having no business or corporate purpose — a mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the petitioner. No doubt, a new and valid corporation was created. But that corporation was nothing more than a contrivance to the end last described. It was brought into existence for no other purpose; it performed, as it was intended from the beginning it should perform, no other function. When that limited function had been exercised, it immediately was put to death. In these circumstances, the facts speak for themselves, and are susceptible of but one interpretation. The whole undertaking, though conducted according to the terms of subdivision (B), was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else. The rule which excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, because the transaction, upon its face, lies outside the plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.” Click here for translation US Supreme Court Gregory v Helvering 293 U.S. 465 (1935) ...