Tag: ROTC (Return On Total Cost)

South Africa vs FAST (PTY) LTD, August 2023, Tax Court, Case No IT 14305

FAST (PTY) LTD is in the business of manufacturing, importing, and selling chemical products. It has a catalyst division that is focused on manufacturing and selling catalytic converters (catalysts) which is used in the abatement of harmful exhaust emissions from motor vehicles. To produce the catalysts, FAST requires some metals known as the Precious Group of Metals (PGMs). It purchases the PGMs from a Swiss entity (FAST Zug). The PGMs are liquified and mixed with other chemicals to create coating for substrates, all being part of the manufacturing process. Once the manufacturing is complete, the catalysts are sold to customers in South Africa known as the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). FAST (PTY) LTD and FAST Zug are connected parties as defined in section 1 of the ITA. Following an audit carried out in 2014 the revenue service issued an assessment for FY 2009-2011 by an amount of R114 157 077. According to the revenue service the prices paid for the PGMs had not been at arm’s length. The revenue service set aside the CUP method and instead applied the TNMM method using ROTC as the Profit Level Indicator. The assessment was based on a detailed analysis of the total cost base incurred by FAST (PTY) LTD in acquiring the PGMs and other raw materials, including the manufacturing and distribution costs of the catalysts. The role played by FAST (PTY) LTD in purchasing and manufacturing the catalysts, the assets and the risks involved, which risks FAST had accounted for in its financial statement was also taken into account. FAST (PTY) LTD filed a complaint in which it held that the South African arm’s length provision in section 31(2) of the ITA only permitted tax authorities to adjust the consideration in respect of the transactions between it and the Swiss Entity to reflect an arm’s length price for the purchase and supply of PGMs. It also stated that even if it had been found that it had not paid an arm’s length price for the PGMs, which it denies, the tax authorities was only entitled to adjust the price/consideration paid for the PGMs as between applicant and the Swiss Entity, not the consideration between applicant and third parties. In this regard, the tax authorities’ adjustment of profits pursuant to its application of the TNMM was not a legitimate exercise of transfer pricing power authorized by section 31(2). As a consequence, the additional assessment is legally impermissible. The issue which FAST seeks separated therefore, is whether the conduct of tax authorities fell within the powers set out in section 31(2). FAST (PTY) LTD appeal was dismissed by the Tax Court. The judge referred to three recent international transfer pricing court cases (The Coca Cola Company (TCCC) and Subsidiaries v The Commissioner of Internal Revenue US, Canda v AgraCity Ltd and Denmark v ECCO A/S) and stated that these cases illustrated that regardless of what method has been used to determine the arm’s length consideration, ultimately, adjustments are made to profits of the taxpayer to ensure that tax is levied on the correct amount of taxable income. An appeal was then filed by FAST with the Court of Appeal. However both parties to the case filed complaints over admendments to the statements and subnition of evidence by the other party. Judgement of the Court This judgement concerns statements of the parties in regards of evidence before the Court of Appeal. The first question before the court is: has the Commissioner, by amending his rule 31 statement, novated the whole of the factual or legal basis that underlies his assessment? The court answered no to this question. “The Commissioner, as pointed out, has not abandoned the basis of his assessment. It remains his primary case. The amendment does not detract from this. The Commissioner is not “replacing an old obligation with a new oneâ€,1 he is not novating. He is not changing the facts of the tested transaction. He is simply introducing a different comparator – companies that “specifically document†the use of precious metals in the manufacturing process – to test the transaction. In so doing, the Commissioner may be introducing new “facts†in that he is scrutinising the profits of companies that did not feature in his initial assessment, but that is not the same as changing the facts of the tested transaction. The facts of the tested transaction are the facts upon which he based his conclusion regarding its arms-length nature. He is not changing the facts as to how much FAST paid for the purchase of the XYZs from FAST Zug, or about how much profit FAST made. Those are fixed, both in his assessment and in his amended – as well as in his unamended – rule 31 statement. The amended rule 31 statement does not alter the assessment. [18] Furthermore, for the prohibition set out in sub-rule 31(3) to be applicable there must be “a novation of the whole factual or legal basis of the assessmentâ€. Here he is not “novating the whole†of the facts of his assessment. [19] In these circumstances, the application to amend the rule 31 statement should be allowed.” The second question is: was the amendments made by FAST to its rule 32 statement prohibited? The court also answered no to this question. “A taxpayer is not faced with an absolute bar to raising a new ground. The taxpayer is only barred from raising a ground that is completely novel, one that was not at all raised in the objection filed in terms of rule 7. It is difficult to articulate the legal principle more precisely. The principle can only be clarified on the facts of each case. Such facts would be the only way of testing if the ground of appeal differs so radically from the ground of objection that it would fall foul of the prohibition. Some differences are minor and would therefore be allowed in terms of sub-rules 10(4) and 33(2), thus avoiding the prohibition contained in sub-rules 10(3) and 32(3) ...

Panama vs Banana S.A., June 2023, Administrative Tribunal, Case No TAT-RF-048

Banana S.A. sold bananas to related parties abroad. These transactions were priced using the TNMM method and the result of the benchmark analysis was an interquartile range of ROTC from 0.71% to 11.09%. However, Banana S.A. had continuous losses and for 2016 its return on total costs (ROTC) was -1.83%. To this end, an “adjustment” was made by adding “unearned income” related to storm damage to the actual results, which increased the company’s ROTC from -1.83% to 3.57%. The tax authorities disagreed with both the transfer pricing method used and the “adjustment” made to the results. An assessment of additional taxable income in an amount of B/.20,646,930,51. was issued, where the CUP method (based on quoted commodity prices for bananas) had been applied. Judgement of the Court The Court agreed with the tax authorities that the “adjustment” for “unearned income” was not allowed. “….In this sense, we agree with the Tax Administration when questioning the adjustment made by the taxpayer, attending to the reality exposed by the itself in the appeal , explaining that —————– produces different types of bananas according to their characteristics which are direct consequence of the position of the banana in the bunch, so that in the scenario of having lost an approximate of 700,000 boxes due to climatic events, it is impossible to claim that the total of boxes lost would have had a cost of USD 8.30, already that this would represent that the lost bunches, only had bananas extra quality, so that of according to the taxpayer’s own explanations is impossible. …. Based on the above, we can conclude that the taxpayer did not disclose the weather event that affected its plantations in the audited income statement for the period 2016, nor in its audited financial statements, since at the information financial that is uses to make the adjustments of comparability,such events were not reported since there is no financial information that validates their existence and therefore they are rejected.” However, as regards the transfer pricing method, the Court agreed with the taxpayer that although the product was the same, other comparability factors were not. On this basis, the assessment of the additional taxable income was changed by the court to the result previously determined by the tax authorities using the TNMM, without taking into account the adjustment for unearned profits. “….Tax Administration undermined the conclusions and results presented in the Transfer Pricing Study of ———————- for the year 2016, which were established using the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM), by not accepting that the taxpayer’s income and margin, which would have been higher had the weather events that caused losses not occurred, notwithstanding, the taxpayer emphasises that the Tax Administration accepted all the comparables used in the Transfer Pricing Study. In this regard, the taxpayer adds that had the weather events that caused the loss of 719,531 boxes of bananas not occurred, the company’s margins would have been within the inter-quartile ranges of the comparables selected for the Transfer Pricing Study, and secondly, being weather events of an exceptional nature. In this regard, the appellant adds that by using the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM), it is possible to adjust the company’s revenues and costs in order to show what the margin would have been………………………. .The operating margin of —————— was -1.83% in 2016, due to the damages caused by the weather events, which, had they not occurred, the adjusted margin would have been 3.57%. Since the Directorate General Revenue did not accept this argument, it concluded that since the appellant’s margin is not within the inter-quartile range, which is 0.71%, up to 11.09%, it then proceeded to adjust the operating profit margin of ——————, to the value of the —————- of the operating margins of the comparable companies selected for the Transfer Pricing Study, which is 4.83% and in order to achieve this profit margin, it proceeded to increase the appellant’s revenues in the amount of B/.6,747,901.75.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation Panama resoluciones_2023_08_08_Exp-068-2020 ...

Hungary vs “Electronic components Manufacturing KtF”, June 2023, Supreme Court, Case No Kfv.V.35.415/2022/7

“Electric Component Manufacturing KtF” is a Hungarian subsidiary of a global group that distributes electronic components in more than 150 countries worldwide. The tax authorities had conducted a comprehensive tax audit of the Hungarian company for the period from 1 October 2016 to 30 September 2017, which resulted in an assessment of additional taxable income. The transfer pricing issues identified by the tax authorities were the remuneration received by the Hungarian company for its manufacturing activities and excessive interest payments to a group company in Luxembourg. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal and ordered the court to conduct new proceedings and issue a new decision. In its decision, the Court of Appeal had relied on an expert opinion, which the Supreme Court found to to be questionable, because there were serious doubt as to its correctness. Therefore, according to the order issued by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal may not undertake a professional assessment of the expert opinion that goes beyond the interpretation of the applicable legislation, nor may it review the expert opinion in the new proceedings in the absence of expertise. Excerpt “[58] In relation to the adjustment of the profit level indicator for manufacturing activities, the expert found that comparable companies do not charge taxes such as the local business tax and the innovation levy as an expense to operating profit, the amount of which distorts comparability, this is a clearly identifiable difference in the cost structure of the company under investigation and the comparable companies, so an adjustment should be made in accordance with the OECD guidelines and the Transfer Pricing Regulation, because the statistical application of the interquartile range restriction cannot be used to increase comparability. However, the Court of First Instance held that it was not disputed that, even if the interquartile range as a statistical method was used, it might be necessary to apply individual adjustments, but that the applicant had not provided the audit with a detailed analysis of the justification for the adjustment and had not provided any documentary evidence in the course of the two administrative proceedings to show how the adjustment applied served to increase comparability. However, the application for review relied on the contradictory nature of the reasoning in this respect, since, while the Court of First Instance criticised the lack of documentation to support the adjustment {Ist judgment, paragraph 34}, it shared the expert’s view that this would indeed require an investment of time and energy which taxpayers could not reasonably be expected to make {Ist judgment, paragraph 35}. [59] On the other hand, the judgment at first instance explained that the applicant had only carried out research in the course of the administrative proceedings into whether the countries of the undertakings used as comparators had a similar type of tax burden to the Hungarian local business tax, and the expert had referred in his expert opinion to the fact that the applicant had only identified this one difference when carrying out the comparative analysis, but, if a detailed analysis is carried out, each difference can be individually identified and quantified and it is for this reason that the OECD guidelines also allow a range of results to be taken into account, because it reduces the differences between the business characteristics of the associated enterprises and the independent companies involved in comparable transactions and also takes account of differences which occur in different commercial and financial circumstances. Thus, the expert did not share the expert’s view that, while the narrowing to the interquartile range includes differences that are not quantifiable or clearly identifiable, individual adjustments should always be applied in the case of clearly identifiable and quantifiable significant differences. Thus, the trial court took a contrary view to the expert on this issue. [60] Nor did the Court of First Instance share the expert’s view in relation to the interest rate on the intercompany loan granted to the applicant by its affiliate and did not accept the expert’s finding that the MNB’s interest rate statistics were an averaging of the credit spreads of the debtor parties involved in the financing transactions, on an aggregated basis and, consequently, the use of the MNB interest rate statistics is not in itself capable of supporting or refuting the arm’s length principle of the interest rate applied in intra-group lending transactions, whether long or short-term. Nor did it accept the method used and described by the applicant in the comparability field, since it did not consider that the applicant should have used an international database to look for comparative data, since comparability was questionable. Furthermore, it considered irrelevant the expert’s reference to the fact that the average loan interest rates in Hungary in 2016 were strongly influenced by the low interest rates on subsidised loans to businesses and criticised the fact that the expert did not consider it necessary to examine the applicant’s current account loans under the cash-pool scheme. [61] It can thus be concluded that the Court of First Instance, in its judgment, did not accept the reasoning of the private expert’s opinion and made professionally different findings from those of the expert on both substantive points. [62] The opinion of the appointed expert is questionable if a) it is incomplete or does not contain the mandatory elements of the opinion required by law, b) it is vague, c) it contradicts itself or the data in the case, or d) there is otherwise a strong doubt as to its correctness [Art. 316 (1) of the Civil Code]. The private expert’s opinion is questionable if a) the case specified in paragraph (1) is present [Art. 316 (2) a) of the Civil Code]. Section 316 of the Private Expert Act specifies and indicates precisely in which cases the expert’s opinion is to be considered as a matter of concern. Thus, the expert’s opinion is of concern if it is incomplete, vague, contradictory or otherwise doubtful. The latter case ...

Denmark vs. “C-Advisory Business ApS”, November 2022, Supreme Court, Case No BS-22176/2021-HJR

A was the sole owner of “C-Advisory Business ApS” established in Denmark in 2003. The company advised and represented taxpayers in cases related to tax deductions for land improvements to immovable property. A was also the sole owner of a company established in Dubai in 2006. The Dubai company provided services for “C-Advisory Business ApS” in Denmark and a total of DKK 78,785,549 was expensed in FY 2006-2010 relating to the purchase of these services. The Danish tax authorities considered that the payments had not been at arm’s length and reduced the service fees to the Dubai company to DKK 20 million for the income years in question. This resulted in additional taxable income of “C-Advisory Business ApS” in a total amount of DKK 58,5 million. Following an unsuccessful complaint to the Tax Tribunal, “C-Advisory Business ApS” filed an appeal with the regional court where a judgement was issued in June 2021. The Regional Court found, that the tax authorities had been entitled to exercise discretion over the pricing of the controlled transactions as the transactions had not been priced at arm’s length and the transfer pricing documentation did not provide the tax authorities with a sufficient basis for assessing whether the arm’s length principle had been complied with. An appeal was then filed by “C-Advisory Business ApS” with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Regional Court and found in favour of the tax authorities. The Court considered that the tax authorities had been entitled to exercise discretion in relation to pricing of the controlled transactions at issue and that there were no grounds for setting aside the tax assessment “(…) Whether the tax authorities were entitled to exercise a discretion in respect of the controlled transactions It is accepted, for the reasons given by the Court, that the tax authorities have established that the transfer pricing documentation is so deficient that it did not provide the tax authorities with a sufficient basis for assessing whether the arm’s length principle was complied with. As stated by the Regional Court, in assessing whether the pricing between C and the Dubai company was at arm’s length, it must be borne in mind, inter alia, that it followed from the Service Agreement concluded and the allonge thereto that in 2006-07 the Dubai company received a management fee consisting of a fixed base fee of DKK 800,000 and a profit-based fee of 50-70% of C’s profits, and that in 2008-10 the Dubai company received a base fee with full cost recovery plus the same profit-based fee. The Supreme Court finds, as did the Regional Court, that it has been established that C would not have entered into an agreement on those terms with an independent company. The Supreme Court therefore holds that the tax authorities were entitled to set aside C’s pricing and instead exercise discretion in relation to the controlled transactions in order to determine what C would have paid to the Dubai company for the purchase of the services if they had been independent contracting parties. Whether there is a basis to set aside the estimate SKAT’s estimate of C’s payments for the services provided by the Dubai company is based on the TNM method as a pricing method. In applying the TNM method, SKAT calculated the Dubai company’s transfer prices for the provision of services to C by carrying out a benchmark analysis of 25 law firms and audit firms, using return on total cost (RoTC) as a profit level indicator. RoTC is calculated by dividing the firms’ profits (earnings before interest and tax) by their costs (total costs). The benchmark analysis showed a market RoTC with a median of 6.72% and on this basis the tax authorities have estimated that the Dubai company is entitled to a profit of 6.72% of the Dubai company’s expenses. C’s expenditure on the Dubai company was then estimated for tax purposes to be approximately DKK 20 million for the period 2006-10. For the reasons stated by the Regional Court, the Supreme Court finds that C and B have not demonstrated that the TNM method was not applicable as a pricing method. C and B submit that SKAT’s calculation does not take account of the fact that a partner in a law firm – as described, inter alia, in the Competition Council’s analysis report of 14 January 2021 on ‘Competition in the legal profession’ – receives both payment for his work and remuneration for ownership in the form of a share of the law firm’s profits. The Ministry of Taxation has submitted to the Supreme Court a calculation which, according to the Ministry, shows that a discretionary tax assessment based on the conclusions of the said report would not have resulted in a lower tax assessment than the tax assessment calculated by SKAT based on the application of the TNM method and RoTC as described above. The Supreme Court considers that, with regard to this calculation, C and B have not provided any evidence that the tax authorities’ estimate rests on an incorrect or inadequate basis or is manifestly unreasonable. There are therefore no grounds for setting aside the tax authorities’ assessment and referring the case back to the Court.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation DK vs Advisor 7 NOV 22 HRD bs-22176-2021 ...

Costa Rica vs GlaxoSmithKline Costa Rica S.A., February 2022, Supreme Court, Case No 4-001638-1027-CA

GlaxoSmithKline Costa Rica S.A. manufactures pharma products which is sold to both independent customers in the region and to group companies abroad. For FY 2004 and 2005 pricing of the controlled transactions had been determined based on the TNMM method using return on total costs (ROTC) as PLI. GSK said the range of return on total costs “for the comparable independent companies ranges from 4.7 per cent to 14.5 per cent, with a median of 9.6 per cent. GSK CR obtained an average ROTC of 50.6 percent during fiscal years 2004 and 2005, which was not below the range identified for comparable independent companies. Accordingly, the transfer prices used by GSK CR in its controlled transactions did not distort GSK CR’s profitability and satisfied the arm’s length principle set out in the OECD Guidelines. In 2009 the tax authorities issued an assessment for FY 2004 and 2005 based on the internal CUP method. “…between the transactions under study, namely sales to related and unrelated customers, there is complete similarity in terms of the characteristics of the product that is addressed to both types of customers, it is the same product, i.e. with identical characteristics…” “the taxpayer GSK sells at different prices with its related companies, taking into account the following branded products: Andrews, SB Analgesics, Oxy, Panadol Concept (RT) and Phillips Mom. It found that some products were sold at 34% of the price to an independent. Thus during the period 2004 it found that products such as Sal Andrews Cja X 50’s, code 200041010 was sold to independents at ¢1,366.57 and to affiliated companies at ¢468.68. The average profit margin over standard cost for products sold to independent customers was 285.33% and for affiliates it was 28.22%.” Applying the internal CUP method resulted in an adjustment of taxable profits in an amount of ¢394,638,821.00. Not content with the tax assessment an appeal was filed by GlaxoSmithKline with the tax court. The appeal was dismissed in 2013 and later in 2019 by the Court of appeal. An appeal was then filed with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Court dismissed the appeal of GlaxoSmithKline and upheld the assessment of the tax authorities. Excerpts from the Judgement “The principle of economic reality, provided for in precepts 8 and 12 of the CNPT, essentially allows the Tax Administration to depart from the forms adopted by the taxpayer to unravel the true tax scope of the contract, in order to avoid tax evasion and thus determine what the business between the parties really consisted of. In the case under study, several aspects can be extracted from the evidence in the case file and referred to above. Firstly, the application of the CUP method is not outside the scope of administrative discretion based on due technical discretion, in proper compliance with paragraphs 15 and 16 of the LGAP. Discretion allows the Administration to determine the best technical criterion to be used. It is a detailed study in which the comparison of the same products is reflected. Secondly, the PwC reports show the possibility of using other methods to determine the actual transfer pricing situation. Indeed, PwC’s work is very comprehensive and justified on each of the points it raises. It is clear to this House that these documents were prepared by experts with extensive knowledge of the subject. Thirdly, the expert opinion is not a study that helps to solve the conflict, as it is basically dedicated to indicate whether the system used by the TA complies or not with the Guidelines, in order to deduce that the best work was that of PwC. However, as has been seen, as explained throughout this judgment, it is not in dispute whether the TA had to apply the Guidelines as they are established; with the obligation to follow each of the guidelines set out therein. The shortcomings that this Chamber detects in the evidence provided by GSK, lies in the fact that the study carried out by the expert PwC, takes into account variables, which do not appear in the file and which the TA did not have, specifically those private reports adduce preponderant factors that influence and directly affect the sale price and analyse elements such as: sales volumes, brands, economic conditions of each country, price controls established in some regions, names under which the products are sold, specifications of the respective packaging, geographic issues, development and market size; which from their point of view make the products incomparable. However, as the auditor indicates, when he carried out his study and asked GSK directly for information on the elements that could influence the prices of related companies with respect to independent companies, in which a clear difference was noted, the taxpayer’s response was that the only factor that affected prices was advertising. This response was given even though the taxpayer was aware that a transfer pricing study was being carried out on the company. PwC’s work goes beyond this statement made by the taxpayer during the audit process, and that is why, even if they are complete and technical studies, they are elaborated with completely different parameters than those available to the TA, as expressly indicated by the plaintiff. None of the elements referred to were arguments made by the taxpayer when the study was carried out. Likewise, it is unacceptable the position used by the plaintiff that when GSK responded to the auditor that “other” elements were also part of the aspects that varied the transfer prices with the related parties, it was the TA’s obligation to find out what those “other” elements consisted of; it is up to the taxpayer to provide all the required information. Thus, it is not possible to affirm that the work carried out by the TA was deficient, unreliable or incomplete; since, all things being equal, it has not been possible to disprove that this study is erroneous or unreliable, in such a way that, in the present case, it is not evident that the ...

Portugal vs “Tobacco S.A”, May 2021, Supreme Administrative Court, Case No 0507/17

“Tobacco S.A.” is the parent company of a group active in the tobacco industry. C. SA is a subsidiary of the group and operates as a toll manufacturer (Toller) on behalf of another subsidiary, B S.A. For the manufacturing services provided C S.A receives a “toll fee” from B S.A. According to the manufacturing service agreement the toll fee is calculated, based on Toller’s production costs plus and the capital invested by Toller in the production. Following an audit the tax authorities issued an additional assessment of corporate income tax and compensatory interest, relating to FY 2009, in the amount of EUR 1,395,039.79. The tax authorities considered that i) to correct the value of the production costs of the year 2009, in the amount corresponding to the deduction of the income with the “Write Off” of several credit balances of third parties over the company, since these deductions were not provided for in the contract; ii) to correct the value of the return on invested capital [which in the contract and also in the sentence is designated by the acronym ROCE] because the rules of the contract for its determination were not respected, which resulted in a lower remuneration by C. S.A. and in a cost saving by its contractual counterpart, leading to a result that is not compatible with the arm’s length principle. An appeal was filed against the assessment, but the tax tribunal of Lisbon dismissed the appeal and upheld the assessment. An appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. Tobacco S.A. claimed that it did not in any way breach the contract for the provision of production services as it applied the POC rules when calculating the toll fee. Thus, it must be concluded that the correction made by the Tax Authority and confirmed by the Court of Appeal and which is claimed to be exclusively based on the incorrect interpretation of the contract by the Appellant is illegal due to the violation of the law. Moreover, according to Tobacco S.A, the tax authorities made an error on the assumptions, since it corrected the calculation of the value of the return on invested capital based on different rules from those which, in its interpretation, result from the contract. The appellant had made the calculations according to the statutory accounts (POC accounts), in compliance with the provisions of Annex B to the contract, and the Tax Authorities decided to correct those values by applying the values contained in Annexes C and D (US GAAP accounting classifications), which, according to the appellant, have the sole function of “allowing uniform intra-group reporting, essentially of a management nature”. “(…) as to the corrections to the ROCE, in the amount of €2,965,761.08, the appellant claims that, by disregarding the POC accounts and considering the US GAAP accounts, the Tax Authorities followed an understanding that does not prove to be correct and is distant from that provided for in the agreements entered into. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the case, as it considered to lack jurisdiction in regards to a judgment on the factual matter. The case was therefore officially transferred to the South Administrative Central Court. Excerpt “… Therefore, the Supreme Administrative Court is reserved the role of a review court, with intervention only in cases where the matter of fact in dispute in the case is stabilised and only the law remains under discussion. In order to assess the competence of the Supreme Administrative Court on the grounds of hierarchy, it is necessary to consider, in principle, only the content of the conclusions of the appeal statements (since these define the object and delimit the scope of the appeal – cf. It is necessary, in principle, to look only at the content of the conclusions of the appeal statement (since the object and scope of the appeal are defined by those conclusions – see Article 635 of the CPC) and check whether, in the light of those conclusions, the questions in dispute are resolved exclusively by applying and interpreting legal norms or whether, on the contrary, consideration of them implies the need to settle questions of fact (either because the appellant maintains that the facts presented as proved in the judgment have not been proved, or because he disagrees with the conclusions of fact to be drawn from them, or, still, because he invokes facts which have not been presented as proved and which are not, in the abstract, irrelevant for the judgment of the case). But not only this, it may also be necessary to compare the conclusions with the very substance of the allegations in the appeal, in particular to check whether they expressly contradict the facts on which the decision is based. And if the appellant raises any issue of fact, the appeal will no longer be based exclusively on points of law, and the competence of the Central Administrative Court will be defined from the outset, regardless of the possibility that this Court may eventually conclude that the disagreement on the factual issue is irrelevant for the decision of the appeal. However, the problem, in this case, of the correct interpretation of the contractual clauses on the basis of which the accounts (the accounting system) that are to serve as the basis for the calculation of the taxable amount are defined, is still a matter of fact. Although it is accepted that it may be qualified as a mixed matter (of fact and law), as it involves, on the one hand, the interpretation of the will of the contractual parties in determining the accounts that they intended to use in the calculation of the taxable amount for the purposes of taxation in Portugal of C……… (factual judgment) and, on the other hand, the normative interpretation of the contractual and legal clauses that define the arm’s length principle in the scope of legal transactions between persons that are in a special relationship with each other (transfer pricing), the truth is ...

South Africa vs ABC (PTY) LTD, January 2021, Tax Court of Johannesburg, Case No IT 14305

ABC Ltd is in the business of manufacturing, importing, and selling chemical products. It has a catalyst division that is focused on manufacturing and selling catalytic converters (catalysts). Catalysts are used in the abatement of harmful exhaust emissions from motor vehicles. To produce the catalysts, applicant requires, inter alia, some metals known as the Precious Group of Metals (PGMs). It purchases the PGMs from a Swiss entity (“the Swiss Entityâ€). The PGMs are liquified and mixed with other chemicals to create coating for substrates, all being part of the manufacturing process. Once the manufacturing is complete, the catalysts are sold to customers in South Africa known as the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). ABC Ltd and the Swiss Entity are connected parties as defined in section 1 of the ITA. Following an audit carried out in 2014 the revenue service issued an assessment for FY 2011 by an amount of R114 157 077. According to the revenue service the prices paid for the PGMs had not been at arm’s length. The assessment set aside the CUP method and instead applied the TNMM method using ROTC as the Profit Level Indicator. The assessment was based on a detailed analysis of the total cost base incurred by ABC Ltd in acquiring the PGMs and other raw materials, including the manufacturing and distribution costs of the catalysts. The role played by ABC Ltd in purchasing and manufacturing the catalysts, the assets and the risks involved, which risks applicant had accounted for in its financial statement was also taken into account. ABC Ltd held that the South African arm’s length provision in section 31(2) of the ITA only permitted tax authorities to adjust the consideration in respect of the transactions between it and the Swiss Entity to reflect an arm’s length price for the purchase and supply of PGMs; in the event the ‘jurisdictional facts’ called for by section 31 were established as a matter of fact. It also stated that even if it had been found that it had not paid an arm’s length price for the PGMs, which it denies, the tax authorities was only entitled to adjust the price/consideration paid for the PGMs as between applicant and the Swiss Entity, not the consideration between applicant and third parties. In this regard, the tax authorities’ adjustment of ABC Ltd’s profits pursuant to its application of the TNMM was not a legitimate exercise of transfer pricing power authorized by section 31(2). As a consequence, ABC Ltd argues, the additional assessment is legally impermissible. The issue which ABC seeks separated therefore, is whether the conduct of tax authorities fell within the powers set out in section 31(2). Decision of the Tax Court ABC Ltd’s application for separation was dismissed by the Tax Court. “Applicant [ABC Ltd] refers to the process of establishment of the arm’s length nature of a transaction between connected persons as jurisdictional facts. Plain from its own advocation of the CUP method is that it accepts that there are various methods that can be employed in establishing the arm’s length nature of a transaction. The appropriateness of a method to test the arm’s length nature of a transaction however, is determined by the circumstances of a case. See in this regard PN 7 and the TPGs. It cannot merely be artificially assumed as applicant argued during the hearing of this matter. In this regard, and for the purpose of advancing the separation application, applicant submitted that the court may accept (artificially so) that the price it paid for the PGMs to the Swiss Entity was not an arm’s length price, even though this is denied. But this cannot be done and applicant knows this. For example, in furtherance of its preferred CUP method, applicant went further and stated that there would have been no need for adjustment had respondent [COMMISSIONER FOR SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE] adopted the CUP method. From the preceding statement, it must be accepted that applicant is aware that the establishment as a fact whether a consideration is or is not at arm’s length precedes the question of adjustment, regardless of what method is employed. The establishment of the arm’s length nature of a transaction is the first step in transfer pricing matters and it involves a factual inquiry which culminates in a decision being made as to which of the methods endorsed by PN 7 is to be employed. Applicant is also wrong in its submission that the question of respondent’s powers – in terms of section 31(2) – can be determined without reference to the merits or to the question of whether the PGM transactions were or were not at arm’s length. As respondent puts it, the question of adjustment does not even arise prior to determining the arm’s length nature of a transaction. The inquiry into the arm’s length nature of a transaction is an overriding principle in transfer pricing matters and cannot be receded to the back. I agree. Respondent at one point likened applicant’s approach with the separation application to determining quantum in a damages claim prior to determining the question of liability. I agree. On the conspectus of evidence before this court, ordering a separation will not achieve any practical benefit. On the contrary, it would result in piecemeal litigation, increase costs, and delay finalisation of the matter. At first, one may be allured by the points raised by applicant. However, on close interrogation there is neither a cogent point worthy of testing nor will the objects set out in Blair Atholl be served with the separation.” Click here for translation SARS vs ABC (PTY) LTD January 2021 Case No IT 14305 ...

Denmark vs. ECCO A/S , October 2020, High Court, Case No SKM2020.397.VLR

ECCO A/S is the parent company of a multinational group, whose main activity is the design, development, production and sale of shoes. The group was founded in 1963, and has since gone from being a small Danish shoe manufacturer to being a global player with about 20,000 employees and with sales and production subsidiaries in a large number of countries. ECCO purchased goods from both internal and external producers, and at issue was whether transactions with it’s foreign subsidiaries had been conducted at arm’s length terms. ECCO had prepared two sets of two transfer pricing documentation, both of which were available when the tax authorities issued its assessment. The transfer pricing documentation contained a review of the parent company’s pricing and terms in relation to both internal and external production companies, and a comparability analyzes. The High Court issued a decision in favor of the ECCO A/S. The Court found that the transfer pricing documentation was not deficient to such an extent that it could be equated with missing documentation, and that the tax authorities did not prove that the pricing of the controlled transactions had not been at arm’s length. Hence, there was no justification for the assessment of additional income. Click here for translation Denmark vs Shoe Group AS ...

Chile vs Monsanto Chile S.A, December 2018, Tax Court, Case N° RUC N° 14-9-0000002-3

Monsanto Chile – since 2018 a subsidiary of Bayer – is engaged in production of vegetable seeds and Row Crop seeds. The company uses its own local farmers and contractors, employs some 250 people and hires a maximum of 2,000 temporary workers in the summer months. It receives parental seed from global planners in the US and other countries and then multiplies these seeds in Chile on its own or third-party farms. The seeds are then harvested, processed and shipped to locations specified by global planners. Following an audit of FY 2009-2010 an adjustment was issued related to the profitability obtained in the operations of the “Production” segment (sale of semi-finished products to related parties) and “Research and Development” carried out on behalf of related parties abroad. The adjustment was determined by the tax authorities using the a Net Margin method. The tax authorities found that the income obtained under the production segment and in the research and development business line, did not provide a reasonable return to the local company, since in the production segment the operating margin over costs and expenses (ROTC) obtained by Monsanto Chile amounting to -5.87% was lower than the ROTC obtained by comparable companies which were in a range between 4.573% and 12.648%, with a median of 11.216%; and in the research and development segment the ROTC obtained by Monsanto Chile was -6.54%, whereas the arm’s length ROTC determined by the tax authorities was in a range between 7.93% and 12.48%, with a median of 10.21%. An assessment was issued in 2013 where an adjustment of $2,422,378,384 had been determined in regards to the production segment, and an adjustment of $38,637,909 had been determined in regards to the Research and Development segment, in total resulting in additional taxes of $862,958,963. Monsanto was of the opinion that the assessment was bared due to statues of limitations, and that the transfer pricing analysis conducted by the tax authorities in regards to both the production segment and the research and development segment was erroneous. Monsanto also held that the added fine was unfounded. Decision of the Tax court The decision of the Tax Court was largely in favour of the tax authorities. “That the claim filed in the main part of page 1 by Mr. Manuel Jiménez Pfingsthorn, RUT N°7.021.291-9, on behalf of MONSANTO CHILE S.A., is partially accepted, RUT N°83.693.800-3, against the Assessment N° 38, carried out on 28 August 2013, by the Large Taxpayers Directorate of the Internal Revenue Service, only insofar as the fine established in article 97 N°11 of the Tax Code is left without effect, as stated in recital 35°), being rejected for the rest. III. That the Director of the Large Taxpayers’ Directorate of the Internal Revenue Service shall arrange for administrative compliance with the above decision, for which purpose he must carry out a tax re-calculation.“ Following the decision of the tax court, an appeal has been filed by Monsanto Chile to the Court of Appeal where the appeal is still pending. Click here for English translation CH vs M14-9-0000002-3 ...