Tag: Netherlands Antilles

Netherlands vs Crop Tax Advisors, June 2019, Court of the Northern Netherlands, Case No 200.192.332/01

The question at issue was whether a tax adviser at Crop BV had acted in accordance with the requirements of a reasonably competent and reasonably acting adviser when advising on the so-called royalty routing and its implementation and when giving advice on trading. Click here for translation NL royalty routing1 ...

Sweden vs. Nobel Biocare Holding AB, HFD 2016 ref. 45

In January 2003, a Swedish company, Nobel Biocare Holding AB, entered into three loan agreements with its Swiss parent company. The loans had 15, 25 and 30 maturity respectively, with terms of amortization and with a variable interest rate corresponding to Stibor plus an interest rate margin of 1.75 percent points for one of the loans and 1.5 percent points for the other two loans. The same day the parent company transfered the loans to a sister company domiciled in the Netherlands Antilles. In June 2008 new loan agreements was signed. The new agreements lacked maturity and amortization and interest rates were stated in accordance with the Group’s monthly fixed interest rates. Amortization continued to take place in accordance with the provisions of the 2003 agreement, and the only actual change in relation to those agreements consisted in raising the interest rates by 2.5 percent points. These loans were transferred to a Swiss sister company. The Swedish Tax administration denied tax deductions corresponding to the difference between the interest rates in 2003 and 2008 respectively, with the support of the so-called correction rule (arm’s length rule) in Chapter 14 Section 19 of the Income Tax Act (1999: 1229). The question before the HFD Court was whether the correction rule could be applied when a contract with a certain condition was replaced by an agreement with a worse conditions – Were an audit according to the correction rule limited to referring only to the interest rate terms of the 2008 agreement or were there any reason to take into account the existence and content of the agreements that had previously been concluded between the parties? The Court stated that a prerequisite for applying the correction rule is that the company’s earnings have been lowered as a result of terms being agreed which differ from what would have been agreed between independent parties. It is thus the effect of the earnings that must be assessed and not how a single income or expense item has been affected. According to the Court, it was not only the new interest rate in the 2008 agreement that should be used as the basis for the audit, but all af the terms agreed by the parties. Of particular importance was the fact that the company accepted an increased interest rate without compensation, even though the 2003 agreement did not contain any such obligation for the company. The Court considered that an independent party had not acted in that way. The Court concluded that the correction rule could be applied when a contract with a certain condition was replaced by an agreement with a worse conditions. Such an interpretation of the correction rule was considered compatible with the OECD Guidelines. Click here for translation Sweden-vs-Nobel-Biocare-Holding-AG-HFD-june-2016-ref-45 ...

US vs PepsiCo, September 2012, US Tax Court, 155 T.C. Memo 2012-269

PepsiCo had devised hybrid securities, which were treated as debt in the Netherlands and equity in the United States. Hence, the payments were treated as tax deductible interest expenses in the Netherlands but as tax free dividend income on equity in the US. The IRS held that the payments received from PepsiCo in the Netherlands should also be characterised as taxable interest payments for federal income tax purposes and issued an assessment for FY 1998 to 2002. PepsiCo brought the assessment before the US Tax Court. Based on a 13 factors-analysis the Court concluded that the payments made to PepsiCo were best characterised as nontaxable returns on capital investment and set aside the assessment. Factors considered were: (1) names or labels given to the instruments; (2) presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; (3) source of payments; (4) right to enforce payments; (5) participation in management as a result of the advances; (6) status of the advances in relation to regular corporate creditors; (7) intent of the parties; (8) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (9) “thinness†of capital structure in relation to debt; (10) ability of the corporation to obtain credit from outside sources; (11) use to which advances were put; (12) failure of debtor to repay; and (13) risk involved in making advances. “And, perhaps most convincingly, the “independent creditor test†underscores that a commercial bank or third party lender would not have engaged in transactions of comparable risk.” “However, after consideration of all the facts and circumstances, we believe that the advance agreements exhibited more qualitative and quantitative indicia of equity than debt.” “We hold that the advance agreements are more appropriately characterized as equity for Federal income tax purposes.” US vs PepsiCo Sep 2012 US Tax Court Opinion, T-C-Memo 2012-269 ...

Canada vs VELCRO CANADA INC., February 2012, Tax Court, Case No 2012 TCC 57

The Dutch company, Velcro Holdings BV (“VHBVâ€), licensed IP from an affiliated company in the Dutch Antilles, Velcro Industries BV (“VIBVâ€), and sublicensed this IP to a Canadian company, Velcro Canada Inc. (VCI). VHBV was obliged to pay 90% of the royalties received from VCI. within 30 days after receipt to VIBV. At issue was whether VHBV qualified as Beneficial Owner of the royalty payments from VCI and consequently would be entitled to a reduced withholding tax – from 25% (the Canadian domestic rate) to 10% (the rate under article 12 of the treaty between Canada and the Netherlands). The tax authorities considered that VHBV did not qualify as Beneficial Owner and denied application of the reduced withholding tax rate. Judgement of the Tax Court The court set aside the decision of the tax authorities and decided in favor of VCI. Excerpts: “VHBV obviously has some discretion based on the facts as noted above regarding the use and application of the royalty funds. It is quite obvious that though there might be limited discretion, VHBV does have discretion. According to Prévost, there must be “absolutely no discretion†– that is not the case on the facts before the Court. It is only when there is “absolutely no discretion†that the Court take the draconian step of piercing the corporate veil.” “The person who is the beneficial owner is the person who enjoys and assumes all the attributes of ownership. Only if the interest in the item in question gives that party the right to control the item without question (e.g. they are not accountable to anyone for how he or she deals with the item) will it meet the threshold set in Prévost. In Matchwood, the Court found that the taxpayer did not have such rights until the deed was registered; likewise, VIBV is not a party to the license agreements (having fully assigned it, along with its rights and obligations, to VHBV). It no longer has such rights and thus does not have an interest that amounts to beneficial ownership.” “For the reasons given above I believe that the beneficial ownership of the royalties rests in VHBV and not in VIBV and as such, the appeal is allowed and the matter is referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment on that basis and further, the 1995 assessment dated October 25, 1996 is referred back to the Minister for reconsideration and recalculation on the basis that VIBV was a resident of the Netherlands in 1995 and therefore entitled to the benefit of that treaty.” Canada vs Velcro 2012tcc57 ...

Netherlands vs “Dutch Low Risk Treasury B.V.”, August 2003, District Court, Case No 01/04083, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2003:AJ6865

This case concerns a Dutch treasury company with a low risk intra-group borrowing and on-lending activity. The interested party was incorporated on 5 August 1995 by a legal person named V Limited, under Canadian law. Its subscribed and paid-up capital amounted to NLG 40,000 in the years under review. The claimant is part of the V group. Its actual activities are described in its “Declaration of data on business start-ups” submitted to the tax authorities as “intra-group financing”. It maintained a bank account with the Bank of Montreal. In the financial years in question, the interested party lent substantial amounts of pounds sterling to its sister company Y Plc, incorporated under the laws of the United Kingdom, in the form of promissory notes and a revolving credit facility with effect from 31 January and 1 February 1996 respectively. The stakeholder obtained the necessary pounds by way of a loan from its sister company Z B.V. The funds borrowed and lent by the stakeholder were transferred to its bank account with the Bank of Montreal. The loan conditions in the relationship between the interested party (lender) and Y (borrower) ran completely parallel to the conditions under which the interested party borrowed the relevant funds from Z. The money flows – such as repayment and interest payments – also ran completely parallel. The interested party did not therefore run any interest or exchange rate risk. It did not carry out any other activities. Before the interested party became active as such – on 31 January 1996 – loans to Y were provided by Z, which borrowed funds for that purpose within the V-group. Z has a very large own capital. For its holding and financing activities, Z concluded a ruling; with regard to the financing activities this ruling implied that there would be fees determined at arm’s length if it would declare a gross margin of at least 1% of the borrowed and on-lent funds as a contribution to its taxable profit. In the current financial years Z has lent out the funds to the interested party at its subsidiary D N.V. established in the Netherlands Antilles. In dispute is the manner in which the profits of the interested party should be determined. – Does the interested party act as a finance company, and if so, should its profit, as the tax inspector primarily argues, be set at 1/8% of the borrowed and on-lent amounts, in accordance with the so-called ruling policy, or should the interest paid by it be excluded from deduction pursuant to Article 9(1)(b) of the Corporation Tax Act 1969 (the Act), as the tax inspector alternatively argues? – If the interested party is not a finance company in the strict sense of the word, can the interested party’s profit be determined in accordance with the tax return, as the interested party primarily maintains, or at least can its profit be determined in accordance with the cost-plus method, as the interested party maintains in the alternative and the Inspector maintains in the further alternative? – If none of the aforementioned profit determination methods is correct, is it then possible, as the interested party argues in the alternative, to use the advice of two trust offices which it obtained to determine its profit? Judgement of the Court According to the court, a cost-plus surcharge of 10% was appropriate in this case. “Based on the facts established – including the circumstance that its risk-bearing capital did not exceed NLG 40,000 – the Court deems it sufficiently plausible that the interested party in fact acted as an intermediary between Z and Y, that it borrowed and lent money and received and passed on interest in this context almost without any risk, and that as such it essentially only fulfilled a cashier’s function for the benefit of Z. The applicant cannot therefore be regarded as a finance company in the proper sense of the term. The primary and subsidiary arguments of the Inspector are therefore rejected by the Court. The reason(s) why the interested party was thus engaged and the question whether the loans and interest are rightly included in its balance sheet or profit and loss account, respectively, can be left open in the context of the present dispute. It is part of the economic function performed by the interested party – see 5.1 – that the interested party passes on its costs to Z with a profit surcharge. Since the interested party’s profit must be determined according to the cost-plus method, the Court agrees with the parties’ arguments – shared in so far as they are not unreasonable – that a mark-up of 10% must be applied, so that the taxable amount for the 1995/1996 financial year is NLG 2,350 and for the 1996/1997 financial year NLG 26,693. The Court will rule accordingly.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ECLI_NL_GHAMS_2003_AJ6865 ...