BHP Group has agreed to pay the state of Western Australia A$250 million to end a dispute over royalties paid on iron ore shipments sold through its Singapore marketing hub. The State government found in January that the world’s biggest miner had underpaid royalties on iron ore shipments sold via Singapore stretching back over more than a decade. BHP reached a deal to pay A$529 million in additional taxes to the Australian government late last year to settle a long-running tax dispute over the miner’s Singapore hub on its income from 2003-2018 ...

The Australian Taxation Office has agreed on a settlement with BHP Mining Group to resolve a transfer pricing dispute relating to transfer pricing treatment of commodities sold to a Singapore marketing hub. BHP had originally been assessed with over AUD 1 billion in additional taxes. According to the settlement BHP will pay additional tax of AUD 529 million to resolve the dispute, covering the years 2003–18. According to the settlement BHP Group will also increase its ownership of BHP Billiton Marketing AG, the company conducting BHP’s Singapore marketing business, from 58 percent to 100 percent. The change in ownership will result in all profits made in Singapore in relation to the Australian assets owned by BHP Group being fully subject to Australian tax. BHP’s Singapore marketing arrangements will continue to be located in Singapore and will also be within the ‘low risk’ segment for offshore marketing hubs ...

The Australian Taxation Office has issued new guidance for multinational groups using offshore marketing- and procurment hubs for tax avoidance purposes. The guidance adresses tax schemes where MNEs uses offshore hubs to shift profits and thereby avoid Australian taxes. Offshore hub arrangements are catagorised by the ATO as white, green, blue, yellow, amber, or red – based on the risk assesment for tax purposes of the transfer pricing setup. The new guidance is a result of recent Australian investigations and hearings into tax avoidance schemes used by Multinational Groups. Tax avoidance in Australia Australian Senate Hearings into Tax Avoidance The overall framework for Australian risk assessment for tax purposes of MNE’s offshore marketing- and procurement hubs is shown below: ...

A transfer pricing dispute between South African Revenue Service and Sishen Iron Ore, a subsidiary of Kumba Iron Ore, has now been resolved in a settlement of ZAR 2.5bn. The case concerned disallowance of sales commissions paid to offshore sales and marketing subsidiaries in Amsterdam, Luxembourg and Hong Kong. Since 2012, Kumba Iron Ore’s international marketing has been integrated with the larger Anglo American group’s Singapore-based marketing hub. The settlement follows a similar investigations into the transfer pricing activities of Evraz Highveld Steel, which resulted in a R685 million tax claim against the now-bankrupt company related to apparent tax evasion using an Austrian shell company between 2007 and 2009 ...

The Handbook on Effective Tax Risk Assessment explores how information contained in CbC reports can be used for risk assessment and which types of tax risk indicators that may be identified using the information contained in CbC Reports. In chapter 4 some of the main tax risk indicators that may be identified using CbC Reports are described: The footprint of a group in a particular jurisdiction A group’s activities in a jurisdiction are limited to those that pose less risk There is a high value or high proportion of related party revenues in a particular jurisdiction The results in a jurisdiction deviate from potential comparable The results in a jurisdiction do not reflect market trends There are jurisdictions with significant profits but little substantial activity There are jurisdictions with significant profits but low levels of tax accrued There are jurisdictions with significant activities but low levels of profit (or losses) A group has activities in jurisdictions which pose a BEPS risk A group has mobile activities located in jurisdictions where the group pays a lower rate or level of tax There have been changes in a group’s structure, including the location of assets Intellectual property (IP) is separated from related activities within a group A group has marketing entities located in jurisdictions outside its key markets A group has procurement entities located in jurisdictions outside its key manufacturing locations Income tax paid is consistently lower than income tax accrued A group includes dual resident entities A group includes entities with no tax residence A group discloses stateless revenues Information in a group’s CbC Report does not correspond with information previously provided by a constituent entity According to the OECD, combiantions of thise 19 indicators can provide a general overview of the main tax risks of a MNE Group. Draft-Handbook-TP-Risk-Assessment-ENG country-by-country-reporting-handbook-on-effective-tax-risk-assessment ...

Canadian mining company, Cameco Corp, has settled a tax dispute and will pay the IRS $122,000 for income years 2009-2012. Cameco’s dispute with tax authorities relates to its offshore marketing structure and transfer pricing. Cameco sells uranium to its marketing subsidiary in Switzerland, which re-sells it to buyers, incurring less tax than the company would through its Canadian office. Cameco says it has a marketing subsidiary in Switzerland because most customers are located outside Canada ...

The taxpayer is registered and incorporated in the Republic of South Africa and carries on business in the petrochemical industry. It has some of its subsidiaries in foreign jurisdictions. Business activities include the importation and refinement of crude oil. This matter concerns the analysis of supply agreements entered into between the XYZ Corp and some of its foreign subsidiaries. It thus brings to fore, inter alia the application of the South African developing fiscal legal principles, namely, residence based taxation, section 9D of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and other established principles of tax law, such as anti-tax avoidance provisions and substance over form. Tax avoidance is the use of legal methods to modify taxpayer’s financial situation to reduce the amount of tax that is payable SARS’s ground of assessment is that the XYZ Group structure constituted a transaction, operation or scheme as contemplated in section 103(1) of the Act. The structure had the effect of avoiding liability for the payment of tax imposed under the Act. The case is based on the principle of substance over form, in which event the provisions of section 9D will be applicable. Alternatively the respondent’s case is based on the application of section 103 of the Act. XYZ Group denies that the substance of the relevant agreements differed from their form. It contends that both in form and substance the relevant amounts were received by or accrued to XYZIL from sale of crude oil by XYZIL to SISIL. XYZ Group states that in order to treat a transaction as simulated or a sham, it is necessary to find that there was dishonesty. The parties did not intend the transaction to have effect in accordance with its terms but intended to disguise the transaction. The transaction should be intended to deceive by concealing what the real agreement or transaction between the parties is. Substance over form: If the transaction is genuine then it is not simulated, and if it is simulated then it is a dishonest transaction, whatever the motives of those who concluded the transaction. The true position is that „the court examines the transaction as a whole, including all surrounding circumstances, any unusual features of the transaction and the manner in which the parties intend to implement it, before determining in any particular case whether a transaction is simulated. Among those features will be the income tax consequences of the transaction. Tax evasion is of course impermissible and therefore, if a transaction is simulated, it may amount to tax evasion. But there is nothing impermissible about arranging one’s affairs XYZ as to minimise one’s tax liability, in other words, in tax avoidance. If the revenue authorities regard any particular form of tax avoidance as undesirable they arefree to amend the Act, as occurs annually, to close anything they regard as a loophole. That is what occurred when s 8C was introduced. Once that is appreciated the argument based on simulation must fail. For it to succeed, it required the participants in the scheme to have intended, when exercising their options to enter into agreements of purchase and sale of shares, to do XYZ on terms other than those set out in the scheme. Before a transaction is in fraudem legis in the above sense, it must be satisfied that there is some unexpressed agreement or tacit understanding between the parties. The Court rules as follows: The question is whether the substance of the relevant agreements differs from form. The interposition of XIXL and the separate reading of “back-to-back” agreements take XIXL out of the equation. Regrettably no matter how the appellant’s witnesses try to dress the contracts and their implementation, the surrounding circumstances; implementation of the uncharacteristic features of the transaction point to none other than disguised contracts. The court can only read one thing not expressed as it is; tax avoidance. Based on the evidence the court concludes that the purpose of relevant supply agreements was to avoid the anticipated tax which would accrue to XYZIL, a CFC if it sold the crude oil directly to XYZ. The court has concluded that the whole scheme and or the implementation of supply agreements is a sham. The court, therefore cannot consider the facsimile argument in isolation to support the averment that the contracts were concluded in IOM. Furthermore there is nothing before court to the effect that XYZIL has an FBE with a truly active business with connections to South Africa being used for bona fide non- tax business purposes. There is not even a shred of evidence alluding to the existence of an FBE. Section 76 (2) empowers SARS with a discretion to remit a portion or all of the additional tax assessment in terms of section 76 (1). Additional tax prescribed in Section 76(1) is 200% of the relevant tax amount. The appeal is dismissed. The assessments by the South African Revenue Services for 2005, 2006 and 2007 tax years as well as interest and penalties, are confirmed. LAPD-DRJ-TC-2017-06 - TCIT 13065 JHB 30 June 2017 ...

Singapore marketing hubs are being used by large multinational companies — and billions of dollars in related-party transactions that are being funnelled through the hubs each year. The Australian Tax Office has issued claims of substantial unpaid taxes to mining giants Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton. BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto have revealed through the Senate inquiry they have been issued amended assessments for tax, interest and penalties of $522 million and $107 million respectively. These claims will be challenged in court. The cases centres on the use of commodity trading/marketing hubs established in Singapore colloquially known as the Singapore Sling. The Australian taxation commissioner alleges Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton is using subsidiaries in Singapore to reduce the taxes in Australia. It has been revealed that from 2006 to 2014, BHP Billiton sold $US210 billion worth of resources to its Singapore subsidiary. That was then on-sold to customers for $US235 billion — a $US25 billion mark-up over eight years. After expenses, the Singapore marketing hub was left with a $US5.7 billion profit over those eight years. The key is to sell commodities to a related entity in Singapore at say $50 tonne. The company in Singapore can then sell the ore to clients at say the market price of $70 tonne. Profit gets registered in Singapore, not in Australia, and the company tax rate in Singapore is a lot lower, around 15 per cent. So companies can effectively transfer the profit to those lower taxing destinations. While the ATO accepts there are legitimate business activities being conducted in Singapore (shipping, insurance, and so-called marketing), the question is whether the profits attributable to the Singapore hubs are reasonable. BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto have revealed through the Senate inquiry they have been issued amended assessments for tax, interest and penalties of $522 million and $107 million respectively. In BHP’s case, its Singapore hub is owned 58 per cent by BHP Australia, and 42 per cent by BHP UK. Under Australian laws, profits on the 58 per cent are attributed back to Australia, and subject to company tax at 30 per cent. That has resulted in BHP paying $945 million of Australian tax on the Singapore profits from 2006 to 2014. But profits on the 42 per cent of the Singapore marketing hub that are owned by BHP UK escape the Australian tax net, so the more profits apportioned to Singapore, the less tax paid in Australia. The reason why BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto get an Australian tax advantage from the Singapore hubs is because of their dual listing on the London and Australian stock exchanges. That allows them to put ownership of the Singapore hub partly in the hands of their UK related companies ...

The Practical Compliance Guideline (Guideline) sets out the Australian Taxation Office’s (ATO’s) compliance approach to transfer pricing issues related to the location and relocation of certain business activities and operating risks into a centralised operating model. The type of activities commonly centralised include marketing, sales and distribution functions although centralised operating models are not necessarily limited to these functions. For the purposes of this Guideline, these centralised operating models are referred to as ‘hubs’. The ATO understands that the overall structure of hubs, the transactions that flow in and out and the diversity and sophistication of a hub’s dealings contribute to increased complexity and higher costs for tax compliance. The Guideline is designed to help manage the compliance risk and therefore the compliance costs associated with your hub. The framework set out in the Guideline can be used to: (a) assess the compliance risk of the transfer pricing outcomes of hubs in accordance with the ATO’s risk framework (b) understand the compliance approach that the ATO will likely adopt having regard to the risk profile of hubs (c) mitigate the transfer pricing risk in relation to hubs , and (d) understand the type of analysis and evidence the ATO would require when testing the outcomes of hubs. the ATO’s  engagement will be tailored having regard to the specific hub’s risk rating. If a hub is assessed as being in the low risk zone it can be expected that the ATO will not generally apply compliance resources to test and assess the transfer pricing outcomes. If a hub falls outside the low risk zone, It can be expected that the ATO will monitor, test and/or verify the transfer pricing outcomes. Hubs with a high risk rating will be reviewed as a matter of priority. There is no presumption that because a hub is outside the low risk zone that the transfer pricing outcomes are incorrect, rather it means that the ATO considers a risk and therefore the ATO may conduct further compliance activity to test the outcomes of the hub. The transfer pricing methods used in the risk framework in the Guideline are for risk assessment purposes only. Consistent with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2010 (OECD guidelines), when pricing an arrangements the transfer pricing methodology (or combination of methodologies) that is most appropriate and reliable for your circumstances should be used. The Guideline is structured as follows: (a) Part A sets out the general indicators and principles of the hub risk framework. These principles are relevant to all types of offshore hubs and apply to both outbound and inbound goods and commodity flows (b) Part B provides guidance to assist you when preparing your transfer pricing analysis if you are outside the green zone, and (c) Schedules attached to this Guideline set out specific indicators relevant to particular types of hubs. ATO compliance approach to transfer pricing issues related to centralised operating models ...

The intercompany transactions at issue involved fees paid to the company’s wholly-owned Barbados based subsidiary during taxation years 2000 and 2001 for sales, marketing and support services. The Tax Court of Canada had determined that it was appropriate to apply the CUP method rather than the TNMM, which was advocated by the company’s expert. Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision by the Tax Court of Canada, which in 2014 ruled that the Canada Revenue Agency had largely been correct in reassessing the taxable income of Marzen Artistic Aluminum Ltd. Canada vs Marzen-v-the-Queen ...