Tag: EU

European Commission vs Apple and Ireland, November 2023, European Court of Justice, AG-Opinion, Case No C-465/20 P

In 1991 and 2007, Ireland issued two tax rulings in relation to two companies of the Apple Group (Apple Sales International – ASI and Apple Operations Europe – AOE), incorporated under Irish law but not tax resident in Ireland. The rulings approved the method by which ASI and AOE proposed to determine their chargeable profits in Ireland deriving from the activity of their Irish branches. In 2016, the European Commission considered that the tax rulings, by excluding from the tax base the profits deriving from the use of intellectual property licences held by ASI and AOE, granted those companies, between 1991 and 2014, State aid that was unlawful and incompatible with the internal market and from which the Apple Group as a whole had benefitted, and ordered Ireland to recover that aid. In 2020, on the application of Ireland and ASI and AOE, the General Court of the European Union annulled the Commission’s decision, finding that the Commission had not shown that there was an advantage deriving from the adoption of the tax rulings. The Commission lodged an appeal with the Court of Justice, asking it to set aside the judgment of the General Court. Opinion of the AG In his Opinion, Advocate General Giovanni Pitruzzella proposes that the Court set aside the judgment and refer the case back to the General Court for a new decision on the merits. According to the Advocate General, the General Court committed a series of errors in law when it ruled that the Commission had not shown to the requisite legal standard that the intellectual property licences held by ASI and AOE and related profits, generated by the sales of Apple products outside the USA, had to be attributed for tax purposes to the Irish branches. The Advocate General is also of the view that the General Court failed to assess correctly the substance and consequences of certain methodological errors that, according to the Commission decision, vitiated the tax rulings. In the Advocate General’s opinion, it is therefore necessary for the General Court to carry out a new assessment. EU vs Apple AG Opinion ...

European Commission vs. Belgium, September 2023, The EU General Court, Case No. Case T 131/16 RENV

Since 2005, Belgium has applied a tax regime under which group companies could apply for tax exemptions on excess profits. The exemption could be obtained through a tax ruling from the Belgian tax authorities if the existence of a new situation could be demonstrated, i.e. a reorganisation leading to the relocation of the central entrepreneur to Belgium, the creation of jobs or investments. Profits were considered ‘excessive’ in the sense that they exceeded the profits that would have been made by comparable independent companies operating in similar circumstances and were exempted from corporate income tax. In 2016, the Commission found that the Belgian scheme constituted state aid that was unlawful and incompatible with the single market and ordered the recovery of the aid from 55 companies that had benefited from the practice. On 14 February 2019, the General Court annulled the Commission’s decision. It found, inter alia, that the Commission had wrongly concluded that the excess profits exemption scheme did not require further implementing measures and that the scheme therefore constituted an ‘aid scheme’ within the meaning of Regulation 2015/1589. It also rejected the Commission’s arguments concerning the existence of an alleged ‘systematic approach’ by the Belgian tax authorities. The Commission appealed to the Court of Justice and on 16 September 2002 the Court of Justice overturned the judgement of the General Court and ruled that the Commission had correctly established the existence of an unlawfull state aid scheme. Judgement of the EU General Court In this case, European Commission v Belgium, the General Court upheld the Commission’s 2016 decision, finding that the Belgian excess profits tax scheme constitutes unlawful state aid. Click here for other translations Belgium Excess Profit T 131-16 RENV ...

Joint Statement on Pillar I and II by France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain

France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain have issued a joint statement to reaffirm their commitment to swiftly implement the global minimum effective corporate taxation (Pillar Two). According to the statement the five countries are also fully committed to to complete the work on the better reallocation of taxing rights from huge global multinationals’ profits (Pillar One) with the objective of signing a multilateral convention by mid-2023. g5-statement-global-minimum-effective-taxation ...

European Commission vs. Belgium, September 2021, The European Court of Justice, Case No. C‑337/19 P

Since 2005, Belgium has applied a system of exemptions for the excess profit of Belgian entities which form part of multinational corporate groups. Those entities were able to obtain a tax ruling from the Belgian tax authorities, if they could demonstrate the existence of a new situation, such as a reorganisation leading to the relocation of the central entrepreneur to Belgium, the creation of jobs, or investments. In that context, profits regarded as being ‘excess’, in that they exceeded the profit that would have been made by comparable stand-alone entities operating in similar circumstances, were exempted from corporate income tax. In 2016, the Commission found that that system of excess profit exemptions constituted a State aid scheme that was unlawful and incompatible with the internal market and ordered the recovery of the aid thus granted from 55 beneficiaries, including the company Magnetrol International. Belgium and Magnetrol International brought an action before the General Court of the European Union seeking the annulment of the Commission’s decision. On 14 February 2019, the General Court annulled the Commission’s decision. It found, inter alia, that the Commission had wrongly concluded that the excess profit exemption scheme did not require further implementing measures and that that scheme therefore constituted an ‘aid scheme’ within the meaning of Regulation 2015/1589. It also rejected the Commission’s arguments relating to the existence of an alleged ‘systematic approach’ by the Belgian tax authorities. On 24 April 2019, the Commission brought an appeal before the Court of Justice. According to the Commission, the General Court made errors in the interpretation of the definition of an ‘aid scheme’. The Judgement of the European Court of Justice The Court of Justice overturned the judgement of the General Court and ruled that the Commission correctly found that there was an aid scheme. The Court therefore sets aside the judgment delivered on 14 February 2019 by the General Court and referred the case back to the latter for it to rule on other aspects of the case. In its decision the Court of Justice notes that, for a state measure to be classified as an aid scheme, three cumulative conditions must be satisfied. First, aid may be granted individually to undertakings on the basis of an act. Secondly, no further implementing measure is required for that aid to be granted. Thirdly, undertakings to which individual aid may be granted must be defined ‘in a general and abstract manner’. As regards, first of all, the first condition, the Court clarifies the concept of an ‘act’. It confirms that the term may also refer to a consistent administrative practice by the authorities of a Member State where that practice reveals a ‘systematic approach’. Although the General Court found that the legal basis of the scheme at issue resulted not only from a provision of the Code des impôts sur les revenus 1992 (Income Tax Code 1992; ‘CIR 92’), 3 but also from the application of that provision by the Belgian tax authorities, it did not, however, draw all the appropriate conclusions from that finding. In particular, it did not take account of the fact that the Commission inferred the application of that provision not only from certain acts, 4 but also from a systematic approach on the part of those authorities. The General Court did, however, rely on the incorrect premise that the fact that certain key facts of the scheme at issue were not apparent from those acts, but from the rulings themselves, meant that those acts necessarily had to be the subject of further implementing measures. Consequently, by limiting its analysis to only the abovementioned normative acts, the General Court misapplied the term ‘act’. Next, as regards the second condition for defining an ‘aid scheme’, namely that no ‘further implementing measures’ are required, the Court of Justice notes that that issue is intrinsically linked to the determination of the ‘act’ on which that scheme is based. In the context of that examination, the General Court failed to take account of the fact that one of the essential characteristics of the scheme at issue lay in the fact that the Belgian tax authorities had systematically granted the excess profit exemption when the conditions were satisfied. Contrary to what the General Court held, the identification of such a systematic practice was capable of constituting a relevant factor in order to establish, where applicable, that the tax authorities did not in fact have any discretion. As regards the third condition defining an ‘aid scheme’, namely that the beneficiaries of the excess profit exemption are defined ‘in a general and abstract manner’, the Court of Justice notes that that issue is also intrinsically linked to the first two conditions, relating to the existence of an ‘act’ and the absence of ‘further implementing measures’. Accordingly, the errors of law made by the General Court concerning the first two conditions vitiated its assessment of the definition of the beneficiaries of the excess profit exemption. The Court of Justice therefore concludes that the General Court made several errors of law. Furthermore, as regards proof of the existence of a ‘systematic approach’, the Court of Justice finds that the sample of rulings examined by the Commission (22 selected in a weighted manner from a total of 66) is, by its nature, capable of representing a ‘systematic approach’ taken by the Belgian tax authorities. The Court of Justice therefore sets aside the judgment of the General Court. However, it finds that the state of the proceedings does not permit final judgment to be given as regards the pleas alleging, in essence, the incorrect classification of the excess profit exemption as State aid, in view of, inter alia, the absence of any advantage or selectivity, and as regards the pleas in law alleging, inter alia, infringement of the principles of legality and protection of legitimate expectations, in so far as the recovery of the alleged aid was incorrectly ordered, including from the groups to which the beneficiaries of that aid belong. The Court of Justice ...

European Commission vs. Ireland and Apple, July 2020, General Court of the European Union, Case No. T-778/16 and T-892/16

In a decision of 30 August 2016 the European Commission concluded that Ireland’s tax benefits to Apple were illegal under EU State aid rules, because it allowed Apple to pay substantially less tax than other businesses. The decision of the Commission concerned two tax rulings issued by Ireland to Apple, which determined the taxable profit of two Irish Apple subsidiaries, Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe, between 1991 and 2015. As a result of the rulings, in 2011, for example, Apple’s Irish subsidiary recorded European profits of US$ 22 billion (c.a. €16 billion) but under the terms of the tax ruling only around €50 million were considered taxable in Ireland. Ireland appealed the Commission’s decision to the European Court of Justice. The Judgement of the European Court of Justice The General Court annuls the Commission’s decision that Ireland granted illegal State aid to Apple through selective tax breaks because the Commission did not succeed in showing to the requisite legal standard that there was an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. According to the Court, the Commission was wrong to declare that Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe had been granted a selective economic advantage and, by extension, State aid. The Court considers that the Commission incorrectly concluded, in its primary line of reasoning, that the Irish tax authorities had granted Apple’s Irish subsidiaries an advantage as a result of not having allocated the Apple Group intellectual property licences to their Irish branches. According to the Court, the Commission should have shown that that income represented the value of the activities actually carried out by the Irish branches themselves, in view of the activities and functions actually performed by the Irish branches of the two Irish subsidiaries, on the one hand, and the strategic decisions taken and implemented outside of those branches, on the other. In addition, the Court considers that the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating, in its subsidiary line of reasoning, methodological errors in the contested tax rulings which would have led to a reduction in chargeable profits in Ireland. The defects identified by the Commission in relation to the two tax rulings are not, in themselves, sufficient to prove the existence of an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. Furthermore, the Court considers that the Commission did not prove, in its alternative line of reasoning, that the contested tax rulings were the result of discretion exercised by the Irish tax authorities and that, accordingly, Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe had been granted a selective advantage. Apple-Ireland-vs-EU-Commission-150720 ...

European Commission vs. Luxembourg and Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe, September 2019, General Court of the European Union, Case No. T-755/15

On 3 September 2012, the Luxembourg tax authorities issued a tax ruling in favour of Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe (‘FFT’), an undertaking in the Fiat group that provided treasury and financing services to the group companies established in Europe. The tax ruling at issue endorsed a method for determining FFT’s remuneration for these services, which enabled FFT to determine its taxable profit on a yearly basis for corporate income tax in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. In 2015, the Commission concluded that the tax ruling constituted State aid under Article 107 TFEU and that it was operating aid that was incompatible with the internal market. It also noted that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg had not notified it of the proposed tax ruling and had not complied with the standstill obligation. The Commission found that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was required to recover the unlawful and incompatible aid from FFT. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and FFT each brought an action before the General Court for annulment of the Commission’s decision. They criticise the Commission in particular for: (1) having adopted an analysis leading to tax harmonisation in disguise; (2) having found that the tax ruling at issue conferred an advantage, notably on the ground that it did not comply with the arm’s length principle, contrary to Article 107 TFEU and to the obligation to state reasons and in breach of the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations; (3) having found that that advantage was selective, contrary to Article 107 TFEU; (4) having found that the measure at issued restricted competition and distorted trade between Member States, contrary to Article 107 TFEU and to the obligation to state reasons; and (5) having breached the principle of legal certainty and infringed the rights of the defence, by ordering that the aid at issue be recovered. In it’s judgment, the General Court dismisses the actions and confirms the validity of the Commission’s decision. In the first place, with regard to the plea relating to tax harmonisation in disguise, the Court notes that, when considering whether the tax ruling at issue complied with the rules on State aid, the commission did not engage in any ‘tax harmonisation’ but exercised the power conferred on it by EU law by verifying whether that tax ruling conferred on its beneficiary an advantage as compared to ‘normal’ taxation, as defined by national tax law. In the second place, as regards the pleas relating to the absence of an advantage, the Court first considered whether, for a finding of an advantage, the Commission was entitled to analyse the tax ruling at issue in the light of the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision. In that regard, the Court notes in particular that, in the case of tax measures, the very existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation and that, in order to determine whether there is a tax advantage, the position of the recipient as a result of the application of the measure at issue must be compared with his position in the absence of the measure at issue and under the normal rules of taxation. The Court goes on to note that the pricing of intra-group transactions is not determined under market conditions. It states that, where national tax law does not make a distinction between integrated undertakings and stand-alone undertakings for the purposes of their liability to corporate income tax, that law is intended to tax the profit arising from the economic activity of such an integrated undertaking as though it had arisen from transactions carried out at market prices. The Court holds that, in those circumstances, when examining, pursuant to the power conferred on it by Article 107(1) TFEU, a fiscal measure granted to such an integrated undertaking, the Commission may compare the fiscal burden of such an integrated undertaking resulting from the application of that fiscal measure with the fiscal burden resulting from the application of the normal rules of taxation under the national law of an undertaking placed in a comparable factual situation, carrying on its activities under market conditions. The Court makes clear that the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision is a tool that allows the Commission to check that intra-group transactions are remunerated as if they had been negotiated between independent companies. Thus, in the light of Luxembourg tax law, that tool falls within the exercise of the Commission’s powers under Article 107 TFEU. The Commission was therefore, in the present case, in a position to verify whether the pricing for intra-group transactions endorsed by the tax ruling at issue corresponds to prices that would have been negotiated under market conditions. The Court further notes that it does not follow from the contested decision that the Commission found that every tax ruling necessarily constitutes State aid. Second, with regard to demonstrating the actual existence of an advantage, the Court examined whether the Commission was right to find that the methodology for calculating FFT’s remuneration, as endorsed by the tax ruling at issue, did not enable an arm’s length remuneration to be obtained and whether this resulted in a reduction of FFT’s taxable profit. In that regard, the Court concludes that the Commission correctly found that the arrangements for the application of the transactional net margin method (TNMM) endorsed by the tax ruling at issue were incorrect and, specifically, that the whole of FFT’s capital should have been taken into account and a single rate should have been applied. In any event, the Commission also correctly considered that the method consisting, on the one hand, in using FFT’s hypothetical regulatory capital and, on the other, in excluding FFT’s shareholdings in Fiat Finance North America (FFNA) and Fiat Finance Canada (FFC) from the amount of the capital to be remunerated could not result in an arm’s length outcome. Consequently, the Court finds that the methodology approved by the tax ruling ...

European Commission vs. The Netherlands and Starbucks, September 2019, General Court of the European Union, Case No. T-760/15 and T-636/16

In 2008, the Netherlands tax authorities concluded an advance pricing arrangement (APA) with Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV (Starbucks BV), part of the Starbucks group, which, inter alia, roasts coffees. The objective of that arrangement was to determine Starbucks BV’s remuneration for its production and distribution activities within the group. Thereafter, Starbucks BV’s remuneration served to determine annually its taxable profit on the basis of Netherlands corporate income tax. In addition, the APA endorsed the amount of the royalty paid by Starbucks BV to Alki, another entity of the same group, for the use of Starbucks’ roasting IP. More specifically, the APA provided that the amount of the royalty to be paid to Alki corresponded to Starbucks BV’s residual profit. The amount was determined by deducting Starbucks BV’s remuneration, calculated in accordance with the APA, from Starbucks BV’s operating profit. In 2015, the Commission found that the APA constituted aid incompatible with the internal market and ordered the recovery of that aid. The Netherlands and Starbucks brought an action before the General Court for annulment of the Commission’s decision. They principally dispute the finding that the APA conferred a selective advantage on Starbucks BV. More specifically, they criticise the Commission for (1) having used an erroneous reference system for the examination of the selectivity of the APA; (2) having erroneously examined whether there was an advantage in relation to an arm’s length principle particular to EU law and thereby violated the Member States’ fiscal autonomy; (3) having erroneously considered the choice of the transactional net margin method (TNMM) for determining Starbucks BV’s remuneration to constitute an advantage; and (4) having erroneously considered the detailed rules for the application of that method as validated in the APA to confer an advantage on Starbucks BV. In it’s judgment, the General Court annuls the Commission’s decision. First, the Court examined whether, for a finding of an advantage, the Commission was entitled to analyse the tax ruling at issue in the light of the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision. In that regard, the Court notes in particular that, in the case of tax measures, the very existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation and that, in order to determine whether there is a tax advantage, the position of the recipient as a result of the application of the measure at issue must be compared with his position in the absence of the measure at issue and under the normal rules of taxation. The Court goes on to note that the pricing of intra-group transactions is not determined under market conditions. It states that where national tax law does not make a distinction between integrated undertakings and stand-alone undertakings for the purposes of their liability to corporate income tax, that law is intended to tax the profit arising from the economic activity of such an integrated undertaking as though it had arisen from transactions carried out at market prices. The Court holds that, in those circumstances, when examining, pursuant to the power conferred on it by Article 107(1) TFEU, a fiscal measure granted to such an integrated company, the Commission may compare the fiscal burden of such an integrated undertaking resulting from the application of that fiscal measure with the fiscal burden resulting from the application of the normal rules of taxation under the national law of an undertaking placed in a comparable factual situation, carrying on its activities under market conditions. The Court makes clear that the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision is a tool that allows it to check that intra-group transactions are remunerated as if they had been negotiated between independent companies. Thus, in the light of Netherlands tax law, that tool falls within the exercise of the Commission’s powers under Article 107 TFEU. The Commission was therefore, in the present case, in a position to verify whether the pricing for intragroup transactions accepted by the APA corresponds to prices that would have been negotiated under market conditions. The Court therefore rejects the claim that the Commission erred in identifying an arm’s length principle as a criterion for assessing the existence of State aid. Second, the Court reviewed the merits of the various lines of reasoning set out in the contested decision to demonstrate that, by endorsing a method for determining transfer pricing that did not result in an arm’s length outcome, the APA conferred an advantage on Starbucks BV. The Court began by examining the dispute as to the Commission’s principal reasoning. It notes that, in the context of its principal reasoning, the Commission found that the APA had erroneously endorsed the use of the TNMM. The Commission first stated that the transfer pricing report on the basis of which the APA had been concluded did not contain an analysis of the royalty which Starbucks BV paid to Alki or of the price of coffee beans purchased by Starbucks BV from SCTC, another entity of the group. Next, in examining the arm’s length nature of the royalty, the Commission applied the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP method). As a result of that analysis, the Commission considered that the amount of the royalty should have been zero. Last, the Commission considered, on the basis of SCTC’s financial data, that Starbucks BV had overpaid for the coffee beans in the period between 2011 and 2014. The Court holds that mere non-compliance with methodological requirements does not necessarily lead to a reduction of the tax burden and that the Commission would have had to demonstrate that the methodological errors identified in the APA did not allow a reliable approximation of an arm’s length outcome to be reached and that they led to a reduction of the tax burden. As regards the error identified by the Commission in respect of the choice of the TNMM and not of the CUP method, the Court finds that the Commission did not invoke any element to support as such ...

European Commission vs. Belgium and Magnetrol International, February 2019, General Court of the European Union, Case No. T 131/16 and T 263/16

In January 2016 the European Commission concluded that Belgium’s excess profits tax exemption scheme was incompatible with the internal market and unlawful and ordering recovery of the aid granted . Belgium’s excess profits tax exemption In the first step, the arm’s length prices charged in transactions between the Belgian entity of a group and the companies with which it is associated were fixed based on a transfer pricing report provided by the taxpayer. Those transfer prices were determined by applying the transactional net margin method (TNMM). A residual or arm’s length profit was thus established, which corresponded to the profit actually recorded by the Belgian entity. In the second step the Belgian entity’s adjusted arm’s length profit was established by determining the profit that a comparable standalone company would have made in comparable circumstances. The difference between the profit arrived at following the first and second steps (namely the residual profit minus the adjusted arm’s length profit) constituted the amount of excess profit which the Belgian tax authorities regarded as being the result of synergies or economies of scale arising from membership of a corporate group and which, accordingly, could not be attributed to the Belgian entity. Under the scheme at issue, that excess profit was not taxed. According to the Commission, that non-taxation granted the beneficiaries of the scheme a selective advantage, particularly since the methodology for determining the excess profit departed from a methodology that leads to a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome and thus from the arm’s length principle. The Commission considered that the measure in question constituted an aid scheme, based on Article 185(2)(b) of the CIR 92, as applied by the Belgian tax administration. According to the Commission, those acts constitute the basis on which the exemptions in question were granted. In addition, the Commission considered that those exemptions were granted without further implementing measures being required, since the advance rulings were merely technical applications of the scheme at issue. Furthermore, the Commission stated that the beneficiaries of the exemptions were defined in a general and abstract manner by the acts on which the scheme was based. Those acts referred to entities that form part of a multinational group of companies. Belgium appealed the decision to the European General Court. The Judgement of the General Court The General Court annulled the Commission’s decision. “Conclusion on the classification of the measures in question as an aid scheme 135   It follows from the foregoing considerations that the Commission erroneously considered that the Belgian excess profit system at issue, as presented in the contested decision, constituted an aid scheme. 136    Accordingly, it is necessary to uphold the pleas raised by the Kingdom of Belgium and Magnetrol International, alleging the infringement of Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589, as regards the conclusion set out in the contested decision regarding the existence of an aid scheme. Consequently, without it being necessary to examine the other pleas raised against the contested decision, that decision must be annulled in its entirety, inasmuch as it is based on the erroneous conclusion concerning the existence of such a scheme.” JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT ...

EU Transparency on Income Allocation and Tax Arrangements – DAC 1 to 6

Tax authorities in the EU have agreed to cooperate more closely and exchange information so as to be able to apply their taxes correctly and combat tax fraud and tax evasion. Exchange of Information within the EU is based on Council Directive 2011/16/EU. The Directive and the later amendments in DAC 2 – 6 provides for exchange of information in three forms: spontaneous, automatic and on request. Spontaneous exchange of information takes place if a country discovers information on possible tax evasion relevant to another country, which is either the country of the income source or the country of residence. Exchange of information on request is used when additional information for tax purposes is needed from another country. Automatic exchange of information (AEOI) is activated in a cross-border situation, where a taxpayer is active in another country than the country of residence. In such cases tax administrations provide automatically tax information to the residence country of the taxpayer, in electronic form on a periodic basis. The Directive provides for mandatory exchange of five categories of income and assets: employment income, pension income, directors fees, income and ownership of immovable property and life insurance products. The scope has later been extended to financial account information, cross-border tax rulings and advance pricing arrangements, country by country reporting and tax planning schemes. These amendments which extend the application of the original Directive are loosely based on the common global standards agreed by tax administrations at international level, notably at the OECD. However, they sometimes go further and importantly they are legislative rather than being based on political agreement without legislative force. The table below shows the main content of the  Directives (DAC 1-6) and when exchanges started or will start to take place. An unofficial consolidated version of the original Directive and the five amendments (DAC 1-6) DAC 1 to 6 ...

European Commission vs. The Netherlands and Starbucks, March 2017 and October 2015, State Aid Investigation

The European Commission’s investigation on granting of selective tax advantages to Starbucks BV, cf. EU state aid rules. EU-vs-Starbucks-March-2017-State-Aid-investigation-2 EU-Starbucks-2015 ...