At issue was the “royalty-free” use of intangible assets under an agreement whereby PepsiCo’s Singapore affiliate sold concentrate to Schweppes Australia, which then bottled and sold PepsiCo soft drinks for the Australian market. As no royalties were paid under the agreement, no withholding tax was paid in Australia. The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) determined that the payments for “concentrate” from Schweppes to PepsiCo had been misclassified and were in part royalty for the use of PepsiCo’s intangibles (trademarks, branding etc.), and an assessment was issued for FY2018 and FY2019 where withholding tax was determined on that basis. The assessment was issued under the Australian diverted profits tax provisions. The assessment was appealed to the Federal Court, which in November 2023 found in favour of the tax authorities. PepsiCo then appealed to the Full Federal Court. Judgment In a split decision, the Full Federal Court overturned the decision of the Federal Court and found in favour of PepsiCo. Excerpts “In summary, we conclude that the payments made by the Bottler to the Seller were for concentrate alone and did not include any component which was a royalty for the use of PepsiCo/SVC’s intellectual property. The payments were in no part made in ‘consideration for’ the use of that intellectual property and they did not therefore include a ‘royalty’ within the definition of that term in s 6(1) of the ITAA 1936. Further, the payments were received by the Seller on its own account and they cannot be said to have been paid to PepsiCo/SVC. The Commissioner’s attempts to bring PepsiCo/SVC to tax under s 128B(2B) therefore fails for two interrelated reasons: there was no ‘royalty’ as required by s 128B(2B)(b) and the payments made to the Seller by the Bottler cannot constitute ‘income derived’ by PepsiCo/SVC within the meaning of s 128(2B)(a).” “PepsiCo/SVC’s appeals in the royalty withholding tax proceedings should be allowed, the orders made by the trial judge set aside and in lieu thereof there should be orders setting aside the notices of assessment for royalty withholding tax. The Commissioner’s appeals in the Part IVA proceedings should be dismissed. PepsiCo/SVC should have their costs in both sets of appeals as taxed, assessed or otherwise agreed. The parties should bring in a minute of order giving effect to these conclusions within 14 days.” Click here for translation ...

In 2017 the European Commission concluded that Luxembourg had granted undue tax benefits to Amazon of around €250 million. According to the Commission, a tax ruling issued by Luxembourg in 2003 – and prolonged in 2011 – lowered the tax paid by Amazon in Luxembourg without any valid justification. The tax ruling enabled Amazon to shift the vast majority of its profits from an Amazon group company that is subject to tax in Luxembourg (Amazon EU) to a company which is not subject to tax (Amazon Europe Holding Technologies). In particular, the tax ruling endorsed the payment of a royalty from Amazon EU to Amazon Europe Holding Technologies, which significantly reduced Amazon EU’s taxable profits. This decision was brought before the European Courts by Luxembourg and Amazon, and in May 2021 the General Court found that Luxembourg’s tax treatment of Amazon was not illegal under EU State aid rules. An appeal was then filed by the European Commission with the European Court of Justice. Judgement of the Court The European Court of Justice upheld the decision of the General Court and annulled the decision of the European Commission. However, it did so for different reasons. According to the Court of Justice, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines were not part of the legal framework against which a selective advantage should be assessed, since Luxembourg had not implemented these guidelines. Thus, although the General Court relied on an incorrect legal framework, it had reached the correct result. Click here for other translation ...

Prior to the payment of dividends by Husky Energy Inc. to its shareholders in 2003, two of its shareholders (companies resident in Barbados) transferred their shares to companies in Luxembourg under securities lending arrangements, and therefore Husky Energy Inc. only withheld dividend tax at a reduced rate of 5% under the Canada-Luxembourg Income Tax Treaty. Judgment of the Court The Court found Husky Energy liable for failing to withhold dividend tax at the non-Convention rate of 25%. As the dividends were not paid to the Barbados companies, the 15% rate under the Canada – Barbados Income Tax Convention was not available. The Canada-Luxembourg Income Tax Convention rate was also not available as the Luxembourg companies were not the beneficial owners of the dividends as they were required to pay compensation to the Barbados companies equal to the dividends received. Excerpts “Under the securities lending arrangements, companies resident in Luxembourg enjoyed nothing more than temporary custodianship of the funds received in payment of the Dividends. The compensation payments were preordained by the terms of the borrowing requests, and this preordination ensured that at all times, the Barbcos retained their rights to the full economic value of the Dividends.” “For the foregoing reasons, HWEI and LF Luxembourg were not the beneficial owners of the Dividends for the purposes of Article 10(2) because they were legally obligated from the outset of the securities lending arrangements to return the full amount of the Dividends to the Barbcos in the form of the compensation payments. This was to occur no later than approximately seven weeks after the commencement of the securities lending arrangements. Consequently, HWEI and LF Luxembourg were not entitled to the benefit of the reduced rates of Part XIII tax provided under Article 10(2) and, for the purposes of subsections 215(1) and (6), the amount of tax under Part XIII that Husky was required to withhold and remit in respect of the Dividends was 25% of the Dividends.” “The fact that the Barbcos transferred their common shares in Husky to the Luxcos under atypical securities lending arrangements really has no bearing on whether the Transactions abuse Article 10(2). The rationale of Article 10(2) is to provide relief from double taxation by allocating the right to tax dividends between Canada and Luxembourg in accordance with the theory of economic allegiance while retaining the protections against the use of conduit‐type arrangements afforded by the beneficial owner requirement and the voting power requirement. Consistent with the theory of economic allegiance described by the majority in Alta Energy, which recognizes that a recipient of passive income need not have any allegiance to the paying country, the focus of the rationale of Article 10(2) is not how the common shares of Husky came to be owned by the Luxcos, but whether the Luxcos satisfy the residence requirement, the beneficial owner requirement and the voting power requirement. Since the hypothetical being considered assumes these requirements have been satisfied, I see no basis on which to find that the securities lending arrangements abused Article 10(2). VII. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the appeal of Husky is dismissed with costs to the Respondent, and the appeals of HWLH and LFMI are allowed with costs to HWLH and LFMI and the HWLH Assessment and the LFMI Assessment are vacated. While this is an unusual result, it flows from the fact that the Minister assessed the successors of the Barbcos and did not assess the Luxcos.” Click here for translations ...

At issue was the “royalty-free” use of intangible assets under an agreement whereby PepsiCo’s Singapore affiliate sold concentrate to Schweppes Australia, which then bottled and sold PepsiCo soft drinks for the Australian market. As no royalties were paid under the agreement, no withholding tax was paid in Australia. The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) determined that the payments for “concentrate” from Schweppes to PepsiCo had been misclassified and were in part royalty for the use of PepsiCo’s intangibles (trademarks, branding etc.), and an assessment was issued for FY2018 and FY2019 where withholding tax was determined on that basis. The assessment was issued under the Australian diverted profits tax provisions. The assessment was appealed to the Federal Court in February 2022. Judgment of the Court The Federal Court ruled in favor of the tax authorities. Following the decision of the Court, the ATO issued an announcement concerning the case. According to the announcement it welcomes the decision. “This decision confirms PepsiCo, Inc. (Pepsi) is liable for royalty withholding tax and, in the alternative, diverted profits tax would apply. This is the first time a Court has considered the diverted profits tax – a new tool to ensure multinationals pay the right amount of tax. Deputy Commissioner Rebecca Saint said this is a landmark decision as it confirms that the diverted profits tax can be an effective tool in the ATO’s arsenal to tackle multinational tax avoidance. However, the decision may be subject to appeal and therefore, may be subject to further consideration by the Courts in the event of an appeal. The Tax Avoidance Taskforce has for a number of years been targeting arrangements where royalty withholding tax has not been paid because payments have been mischaracterised, particularly payments for the use of intangible assets, such as trademarks. The ATO has issued Taxpayer Alert 2018/2 which outlines and puts multinationals on notice about our concerns. “The Pepsi matter is a lead case for our strategy to target arrangements where royalty withholding tax should have been paid. Whilst there may still be more to play out in this matter, it sends strong signals to other businesses that have similar arrangements to review and consider their tax outcomes.” ...

K.P. is active in retail sale of computers, peripheral equipment and software. In December 2013 it had transfered valuable trademarks to its subsidiary and in the years following the transfer incurred costs in form of licence fees for using the trademarks. According to the tax authorities the arrangement was commercially irrationel and had therfore been recharacterised. Not satisfied with the assessment an appeal was filed. Judgement of the Provincial Administrative Court. The Court decided in favor of K.P.  According to the Court recharacterization of controlled transactions was not possible under the Polish arm’s length provisions in force until the end of 2018. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

K. S.A. had made an in-kind contribution to a subsidiary (a partnership) in the form of previously created or acquired and depreciated trademark protection rights for individual beer brands. The partnership in return granted K. S.A. a licence to use these trademarks (K. S.A. was the only user of the trademarks). The partnership made depreciations on these intangible assets, which – due to the lack of legal personality of the partnership – were recognised as tax deductible costs directly by K. S.A. According to the tax authorities the role of the partnership was limited to the administration of trademark rights, it was not capable of exercising any rights and obligations arising from the licence agreements. Therefore the prerequisites listed in Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. were met, allowing K. S.A.’s income to be determined without regard to the conditions arising from those agreements. The assessment issued by the tax authorities was later set aside by the Provincial Administrative Court. An appeal and cross appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decisions of the Provincial Administrative Court and dismissed both appeals as neither of them had justified grounds. The Provincial Administrative Court had correctly deduced that Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. authorises only adjustment of the amount of licence fees, but not the nature of the controlled transactions by recognising that instead of a licence agreement for the use of the rights to trademarks, an agreement was concluded for the provision of services for the administration of these trademarks. Excerpts “The tax authorities, in finding that the applicant had not in fact made an in-kind contribution of trademark rights to the limited partnership, but had merely entrusted that partnership with the duty to administer the marks, referred to Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. (as expressed in the 2011 consolidated text. ), by virtue of which the tax authorities could determine the taxpayer’s income and the tax due without taking into account the conditions established or imposed as a result of the links between the contracting entities, with the income to be determined by way of an estimate, using the methods described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 11 u.p.d.o.p. However, these are not provisions creating abuse of rights or anti-avoidance clauses, as they only allow for a different determination of transaction (transfer) prices. The notion of ‘transaction price’ is legally defined in Article 3(10) of the I.P.C., which, in the wording relevant to the tax period examined in the case, stipulated that it is the price of the subject of a transaction concluded between related parties. Thus, the essence of the legal institution regulated in Article 11 of the u.p.d.o.p. is not the omission of the legal effects of legal transactions performed by the taxpayer or a different legal definition of those transactions, but the determination of their economic effect expressed in the transaction price, with the omission of the impact of institutional links between counterparties”  “For the same reasons, the parallel plea alleging infringement of Articles 191, 120 and 121(1) of the P.C.P. by annulling the tax authority’s legal rulings on the grounds of a breach of the aforementioned rules of evidence in conjunction with Articles 11(1) and 11(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. and holding that the tax authority did not correct the amount of royalties and the marketability of the transaction, but reclassified the legal relationship on the basis of which the entity incurred the expenditure, is also inappropriate. In fact, the assessment of the Provincial Administrative Court that such a construction of the tax authority’s decision corresponds to the hypothesis of the 2019 standard of Article 11c(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. is correct, but there was no adequate legal basis for applying it to 2012/2013 and based on Article 11(1) and (4) of the u.p.d.o.p. in its then wording. Failure to take into account a transaction undertaken by related parties deemed economically irrational by the tax authority violated, in these circumstances, the provisions constituting the cassation grounds of the plea, as the Provincial Administrative Court reasonably found.” “Contrary to the assumption highlighted in the grounds of the applicant’s cassation appeal, in the individual interpretations issued at its request, the applicant did not obtain confirmation of the legality of the entire optimisation construction, but only of the individual legal and factual actions constituting this construction, presented in isolation from the entire – at that time – planned future event. Such a fragmentation of the description of the future event does not comply with the obligation under Article 14b § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure to provide an exhaustive account of the actual state of affairs or future event, and therefore – as a consequence – the applicant cannot rely on the legal protection provided under Article 14k § 1 or Article 14m § 1, § 2 (1) and § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In 2007, Forbes Medi-Tech Inc. (now Deans Knight Income Corporation) was a British Columbia-based drug research and nutritional food additive business in financial difficulty. It had accumulated approximately $90 million of unclaimed non-capital losses and other tax credits. Non-capital losses are financial losses resulting from carrying on a business that spends more than it makes in a given year. Under the Income Tax Act (the Act), a taxpayer can reduce their income tax by deducting non-capital losses from its taxable income. If the taxpayer does not use all, or a portion, of the loss in the year it incurred it, they may carry the loss back three years, or forward 20 years. However, under section 111(5) of the Act, when another entity acquires control of the company, the new owners may not carry over those non-capital losses and deduct them from its future taxes, unless the company continues to operate the same or a similar business. Deans Knight wanted to use its non-capital losses but did not have sufficient income against which to offset them. In early 2008, it entered into a complex investment agreement with venture capital firm Matco Capital Ltd, to help it become profitable. The agreement was drafted in a way that ensured Matco did not acquire control of Deans Knight by becoming the majority shareholder because that would trigger the restriction on carrying over losses under section 111(5) of the Act. However, in effect, Matco gained considerable influence over Deans Knight’s business affairs. It found a separate mutual fund management company that would use Deans Knight as a corporate vehicle to raise money through an initial public offering. That money would then be used to transform Deans Knight into an investment business. This was attractive to Deans Knight because it could make use of its non-capital losses to shelter most of the new business’ portfolio income and capital gains. When Deans Knight filed its tax returns for 2009 to 2012, it claimed nearly $65 million in non-capital losses and other tax credits, thereby reducing its tax liability. The tax authorities reassessed Deans Knight’s tax returns and denied the deductions. The company appealed that decision to the Tax Court of Canada. The Tax Court found that Deans Knight gained a tax benefit through a series of transactions that it concluded primarily for tax avoidance purposes, but that the transactions did not amount to an abuse of the Act, namely section 111(5). The tax authorities appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal, which held that the transactions were abusive. It applied the “general anti-avoidance rule” (GAAR) under the Act to deny Deans Knight’s tax deductions. The GAAR operates to deny tax benefits flowing from transactions that comply with the literal text of the Act, but that nevertheless constitute abusive tax avoidance. Deans Knight appealed to the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Court dismissed the appeal of Deans Knight and upheld the decision from the Court of Appeal. It found the transactions were abusive and the GAAR applied to deny the tax benefits. Despite complying with the literal text of a provision in the Act, a transaction is abusive if it frustrates its rationale. The rationale behind section 111(5) of the Act is to prevent corporations from being acquired by unrelated parties in order to deduct their unused losses against income from another business for the benefit of new shareholders. Deans Knight was fundamentally transformed through a series of transactions that achieved the outcome that the Act sought to prevent, while narrowly circumventing the restriction in section 111(5). Excerpt “the appellant was gutted of any vestiges from its prior corporate ‘life’ and became an empty vessel with [unused deductions]”.  ...

The cases concerned in particular whether Takeda A/S under voluntary liquidation and NTC Parent S.à.r.l. were obliged to withhold tax on interest on intra-group loans granted by foreign group companies. The cases were to be assessed under Danish tax law, the EU Interest/Royalty Directive and double taxation treaties with the Nordic countries and Luxembourg. In a judgment of 9 January 2023, concerning dividends distributed to foreign parent companies, the Supreme Court has ruled on when a foreign parent company is a “beneficial owner” under double taxation treaties with, inter alia, Luxembourg, and when there is abuse of rights under the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive. In the present cases on the taxation of interest, the Supreme Court referred to the judgement of January 2023 on the general issues and then made a specific assessment of the structure and loan relationships of the two groups. The Supreme Court stated that both groups had undergone a restructuring involving, inter alia, the contribution of companies in Sweden and Luxembourg, respectively, and that this restructuring had to be seen as a comprehensive and pre-organised tax arrangement. The Supreme Court held that the contributed companies had to be regarded as flow-through companies which did not enjoy protection under the Interest/Royalty Directive or under the double taxation conventions. According to the information submitted by the parties, it could not be determined what had finally happened to the interest after it had flowed through the contributed companies, and therefore it could not be determined who was the rightful owner of the interest. The Supreme Court then held that the tax arrangements constituted abuse. Takeda under voluntary liquidation and NTC Parent should therefore have withheld interest tax of approximately DKK 369 million and DKK 817 million respectively. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

According to the Canadian Budget 2023 the government will release for consultation draft legislative proposals to amend the general anti avoidance rule (GAAR) which was added to the Canadian Income Tax Act in section 245 back in 1988. If abusive tax avoidance is established, the GAAR applies to deny the tax benefit that was unfairly created. The GAAR has helped to tackle abusive tax avoidance in Canada but it requires modernizing to ensure its continued effectiveness. The following amendments to the GAAR is proposed: introducing a preamble (containing interpretive rules and statements of purpose); changing the avoidance transaction standard (from a “primary purpose” test to a “one of the main purposes” test); introducing an economic substance rule (indicators for lack in economic substance); introducing a penalty (25% of the amount of the tax benefit); and extending the reassessment period in certain circumstances (three-year extension to the normal reassessment period). The revised GAAR is expected to come into force as of 1 January 2024. See the relevant sections of the Canadian Budget 2023 below ...

A parent company resident in country Y1 was liable to tax on interest and dividends it had received from its Danish subsidiary. There should be no reduction of or exemption from withholding tax under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive or the Interest and Royalties Directive or under the double taxation treaty between Denmark and country Y1, as neither the parent company nor this company’s own Y1-resident parent company could be considered the rightful owner of the dividends and interest within the meaning of the directives and the treaty, and as there was abuse. The High Court thus found that the Y1-domestic companies were flow-through companies for the interest and dividends, which were passed on to underlying companies in the tax havens Y2-ø and Y3-ø. The High Court found that there was no conclusive evidence that the companies in Y2 were also flow-through entities and that the beneficial owner of the interest and dividends was an underlying trust or investors resident in Y4. The double taxation treaty between Denmark and the Y4 country could therefore not provide a basis for a reduction of or exemption from withholding tax on the interest and dividends. Nor did the High Court find that there was evidence that there was a basis for a partial reduction of the withholding tax requirement due to the fact that one of the investors in the company on Y3 island was resident in Y5 country, with which Denmark also had a double taxation treaty. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

I. sp. z o.o. is a Polish tax resident. Its sole shareholder is an Italian tax resident company. The Company plans to pay a dividend to the shareholder in the future, and therefore asked the following question to the Polish Tax Chamber: in order to exercise the right to exempt a dividend paid to a shareholder from corporate income tax (withholding tax) under Article 22(4) of the Corporate Income Tax Act of 15 February 1992 (Journal of Laws of 2019, item 865, hereinafter the CIT), is the Company required to verify whether the entity to which the dividend is paid is the actual owner of the dividend? The Tax Chamber answered that verification of the beneficial ownership is part of the due diligence obligation introduced in Article 26(1) of the Corporate Income Tax Act in 2019. The company challenged this interpretation before the Administrative Court and the Court found the complaint well-founded and overturned the interpretation of the Tax Chamber. An appeal was then filed by the authorities with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court. The Court set aside the judgment of the Administrative Court in its entirety and decided in favor of the authorities. Excerpts “It should be recalled that the Danish judgments point out that the mechanisms of Directive 90/435 (now 2011/96) were ‘introduced to address situations where, without their application, the exercise by Member States of their taxing authority could lead to profits distributed by a subsidiary to its parent company being taxed twice (judgment of 8 March 2017, Wereldhave Belgium and Others, C-448/15, EU:C:2017:180, paragraph 39). On the other hand, such mechanisms cannot apply if the owner of the dividends is a company established for tax purposes outside the Union, since, in such a case, the exemption from withholding tax on the dividends in question in the Member State from which they were paid could lead to those dividends not being effectively taxed in the Union.” (paragraph 113 of the judgment). In paragraph 5 of the operative part of the judgment, it was held that where the Directive’s “withholding tax exemption regime for dividends paid by a company resident in a Member State to a company resident in another Member State is inapplicable because of a finding of fraud or abuse within the meaning of Article 1(2) of that Directive, the application of the freedoms guaranteed by the EU Treaty cannot be relied upon to challenge the first Member State’s regulation of the taxation of those dividends.” The CJEU noted that “a Member State must refuse to avail itself of provisions of Union law if those provisions are relied upon not to pursue their objectives but to obtain an advantage under Union law, when the conditions for obtaining that advantage are only formally fulfilled.” (paragraph 72 of the judgment). In the context of the theses Danish judgments, the reasoning in the CJEU judgment of 7 September 2017, which was extensively cited by the Applicant and the Court of First Instance, must be considered outdated. C-6/16 in the EQIOM case (publ. ZOTSiS.2017/9/I-641). For this reason, the Supreme Administrative Court considered it pointless to refer to it when assessing the correctness of the judgment under appeal. It is clear from the Danish judgments that the mechanisms created by the Directive cannot be applied contrary to its purpose. They certainly cannot be applied in a situation where the recipient of the dividend will not be its actual beneficiary. National legislation which, when levying withholding tax, makes the application of the tax preference conditional on the exercise of due diligence by the payer by carrying out verification that the recipient of the dividend is its actual beneficiary must therefore be regarded as compatible with the provisions of the Directive. At the same time, in the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court in the panel hearing the case, even the absence of an express regulation on the verification of the entity that is the recipient of the dividend would not exempt the payer from verifying that the taxpayer is the actual beneficiary of the dividend. It would be unacceptable to argue that, prior to the introduction of the regulation of Article 26(1) of the A.P.C. in the version in force in 2019, the payer could act without due diligence when applying the withholding tax exemption. It is irrelevant for this assessment that neither Article 22(4) of the A.P.D.O.P. nor the Directive contains this requirement expressis verbis, as the payment of dividends without withholding tax would be treated as an abuse of the right. Contrasting this regulation with the provisions relating to the exemption from withholding tax under Article 21(3) of the A.P.C. and Directive No 2011/96, i.e. the provisions governing the exemption from withholding tax of, inter alia, interest on loans and royalties, does not prejudge the fact that there is no obligation to verify the status of the taxpayer when paying dividends. At this point, it is necessary to stipulate that the tax preference will be admissible in a situation where, although the dividend payment is not made to its actual beneficiary, the look-through approach is applied. This concept allows the application of preferential taxation, or tax exemption, in a situation where, although the payment is made through an intermediary – an entity that is not the actual beneficiary, this actual beneficiary is established in the EU (EEA) and is known. It should be noted that this principle does not seem to be questioned by the interpreting authority (cf. DKIS interpretation of 14 June 2022, No. 0111-KDIB2-1.4010.128.2022.2.AR, available at http://sip.mf.gov.pl.). The use of this example is relevant as it illustrates a situation where an intermediary that is not the actual beneficiary of the dividend, upon receipt, transfers the dividend to another group entity – the actual beneficiary also established in the EU (EEA). As this is not the case in the present case, this issue is not discussed further. In the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court, a taxpayer who applies a tax preference at source ...

RRE and EBL Italia, belonged to the Belgian group ELECTRABEL SA (which later became the French group GDF Suez, now the Engie group); RRE, like the other Italian operating companies, benefited from a financing line from the Luxembourg subsidiary ELECTRABEL INVEST LUXEMBOURG SA (“EIL”). In the course of 2006, as part of a financial restructuring project of the entire group, EBL Italia acquired all the participations in the Italian operating companies, assuming the role of sub-holding company, and EIL acquired 45 per cent of the share capital of EBL Italia. At a later date, EBL Italia and EIL signed an agreement whereby EIL assigned to EBL Italia the rights and obligations deriving from the financing contracts entered into with the operating companies; at the same time, in order to proceed with the acquisition of EIL’s receivables from the operating companies, the two companies concluded a second agreement (credit facility agreement) whereby EIL granted EBL Italia a loan for an amount equal to the receivables being acquired. Both the tax commissions of first and of second instance had found the Office’s actions to be legitimate. According to the C.T.R., in particular, the existence of a “symmetrical connection between two financing contracts entered into, both signed on the same date (31/07/2006) and the assignments of such credits to EBL Italia made on 20/12/2006, with identical terms and conditions” and the fact that “EBL Italia accounted for the interest expenses paid to EIL in a manner exactly mirroring the interest income paid by Rosen, so as to channel the same interest, by contractual obligation, punctually to EIL’ showed that EBL Italia ‘had no management autonomy and was obliged to pay all the income flows, that is to say, the interest, obtained by Rosen immediately to the Luxembourg company EIL’, with the result that the actual beneficiary of the interest had to be identified in the Luxembourg company EIL. Judgement of the Court The Supreme Court confirmed the legitimacy of the notices of assessment issued by the Regional Tax Commission, for failure to apply the withholding tax on interest expense paid. According to the Court ‘abuse in the technical sense’ must be kept distinct from the verification of whether or not the company receiving the income flows meets the requirements to benefit from advantages that would otherwise not be due to it. One thing is the abuse of rights, another thing are the requirements to be met in order to be entitled to the benefits recognised by provisions inspired by anti-abuse purposes. “On the subject of the exemption of interest (and other income flows) from taxation pursuant to Article 26, of Presidential Decree No. 600 of 29 September 1973”, the burden of proof it is on the taxpayer company, which claims to be the “beneficial owner”. To this end, it is necessary for it to pass three tests, autonomous and disjointed” the recipient company performs an actual economic activity the recipient company can freely dispose of the interest received and is not required to remit it to a third party the recipient company has a function in the financing transaction and is not a mere conduit company (or société relais), whose interposition is aimed exclusively at a tax saving. The Supreme Court also ruled out the merely ‘domestic’ nature of the transaction as it actually consisted in a cross-border payment of interest. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The issue in the Danish beneficial ownership cases of NetApp Denmark ApS and TDC A/S was whether the companies were obliged to withhold dividend tax on distributions to foreign parent companies. The first case – NetApp Denmark ApS – concerned two dividend distributions of approximately DKK 566 million and DKK 92 million made in 2005 and 2006 to an intermediate parent company in Cyprus – and then on to NETAPP Bermuda. The second case – TDC A/S – concerned the distribution of dividends of approximately DKK 1.05 billion in 2011 to an intermediate parent company in Luxembourg – and then on to owner companies in the Cayman Islands. In both cases, the tax authorities took the view that the intermediate parent companies were so-called “flow-through companies” which were not the real recipients of the dividends, and that the real recipients (beneficial owners) were resident in countries not covered by the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive (Bermuda and Cayman respectively). Therefore, withholding taxes should have been paid by the Danish companies on the distributions. Judgment of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the tax authorities’ assessment of additional withholding tax of 28 percent on a total amount of DKK 1,616 million plus a very substantial amount of interest on late payment. Only with regard to NetApp’s 2006 dividend payment of DKK 92 million did the court rule in favour of the company. Excerpts: “The Supreme Court agrees that the term “beneficial owner” must be understood in the light of the OECD Model Tax Convention, including the 1977 OECD Commentary on Anti-Abuse. According to these commentaries, the purpose of the term is to ensure that double tax treaties do not encourage tax avoidance or tax evasion through “artifices” and “artful legal constructions” which “enable the benefit to be derived both from the advantages conferred by certain national laws and from the tax concessions afforded by double tax treaties.” The 2003 Revised Commentaries have elaborated and clarified this, stating inter alia that it would not be “consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention for the source State to grant relief or exemption from tax in cases where a person who is resident of a Contracting State, other than as an agent or intermediary, merely acts as a conduit for another person who actually receives the income in question.” “The question is whether it can lead to a different result that NetApp Denmark – if the parent company at the time of the distribution had been NetWork Appliance Inc (NetApp USA) and not NetApp Cyprus – could have distributed the dividend to NetApp USA with the effect that the dividend would have been exempt from tax liability under the Double Taxation Convention between Denmark and the USA. On this issue, the CJEU’s judgment of 26 February 2019 states that it is irrelevant for the purposes of examining the group structure that some of the beneficial owners of the dividends transferred by flow-through companies are resident for tax purposes in a third State with which the source State has concluded a double tax treaty. According to the judgment, the existence of such a convention cannot in itself rule out the existence of an abuse of rights and cannot therefore call into question the existence of abuse of rights if it is duly established by all the facts which show that the traders carried out purely formal or artificial transactions, devoid of any economic or commercial justification, with the principal aim of taking unfair advantage of the exemption from withholding tax provided for in Article 5 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (paragraph 108). It also appears that, having said that, even in a situation where the dividend would have been exempt if it had been distributed directly to the company having its seat in a third State, it cannot be excluded that the objective of the group structure is not an abuse of law. In such a case, the group’s choice of such a structure instead of distributing the dividend directly to that company cannot be challenged (paragraph 110).” “In light of the above, the Supreme Court finds that the dividend of approximately DKK 92 million from NetApp Denmark was included in the dividend of USD 550 million that NetApp Bermuda transferred to NetApp USA on 3 April 2006. The Supreme Court further finds that the sole legal owner of that dividend was NetApp USA, where the dividend was also taxed. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that an amount of approximately DKK 92 million. – corresponding to the dividend – was not transferred to NetApp Cyprus until 2010 and from there to NetApp Bermuda. NetApp Bermuda had thus, as mentioned above, taken out the loan which provided the basis for distributing approximately DKK 92 million to NetApp USA in dividends from NetApp Denmark in 2006. Accordingly, the dividend of approximately DKK 92 million is exempt from taxation under Section 2(1)(c) of the Danish Corporate Income Tax Act in conjunction with the Danish-American Double Taxation Convention. NetApp Denmark has therefore not been required to withhold dividend tax under Section 65(1) of the Danish Withholding Tax Act.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Frucor Suntory (FHNZ) had deducted purported interest expenses that had arisen in the context of a tax scheme involving, among other steps, its issue of a Convertible Note to Deutsche Bank, New Zealand Branch (DBNZ), and a forward purchase of the shares DBNZ could call for under the Note by FHNZ’s Singapore based parent Danone Asia Pte Ltd (DAP). The Convertible Note had a face value of $204,421,565 and carried interest at a rate of 6.5 per cent per annum. Over its five-year life, FHNZ paid DBNZ approximately $66 million which FHNZ characterised as interest and deducted for income tax purposes. The tax authorities issued an assessment where deductions of interest expenses in the amount of $10,827,606 and $11,665,323 were disallowed in FY 2006 and 2007 under New Zealand´s general anti-avoidance rule in s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 2004. In addition, penalties of $1,786,555 and $1,924,779 for those years were imposed. The tax authorities found that, although such deductions complied with the “black letter” of the Act, $55 million of the $66 million paid was in fact a non- deductible repayment of principal. Hence only interest deduction of $11 million over the life of the Arrangement was allowed. These figures represent the deduction disallowed by the Commissioner, as compared to the deductions claimed by the taxpayer: $13,250,998 in 2006 and $13,323,806 in 2007. Based on an allegedly abusive tax position but mitigated by the taxpayer’s prior compliance history. In so doing, avoiding any exposure to shortfall penalties for the 2008 and 2009 years in the event it is unsuccessful in the present proceedings. The income years 2004 and 2005, in which interest deductions were also claimed under the relevant transaction are time barred. Which I will refer to hereafter as $204 million without derogating from the Commissioner’s argument that the precise amount of the Note is itself evidence of artifice in the transaction. As the parties did in both the evidence and the argument, I use the $55 million figure for illustrative purposes. In fact, as recorded in fn 3 above, the Commissioner is time barred from reassessing two of FHNZ’s relevant income tax returns. The issues The primary issue is whether s BG 1 of the Act applies to the Arrangement. Two further issues arise if s BG 1 is held to apply: (a) whether the Commissioner’s reconstruction of the Arrangement pursuant to s GB 1 of the Act is correct or whether it is, as FHNZ submits, “incorrect and excessive”; and (b) whether the shortfall penalties in ss 141B (unacceptable tax position) or 141D (abusive tax position) of the Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA) have application. In 2018 the High Court decided in favor of Frucor Suntory This decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal, where in 2020 a decision was issued in favor of the tax authorities. The Court of Appeal set aside the decision of the High Court in regards of the tax adjustment, but dismissed the appeal in regards of shortfall penalties. “We have already concluded that the principal driver of the funding arrangement was the availability of tax relief to Frucor in New Zealand through deductions it would claim on the coupon payments. The benefit it obtained under the arrangement was the ability to claim payments totaling $66 million as a fully deductible expense when, as a matter of commercial and economic reality, only $11 million of this sum comprised interest and the balance of $55 million represented the repayment of principal. The tax advantage gained under the arrangement was therefore not the whole of the interest deductions, only those that were effectively principal repayments. We consider the Commissioner was entitled to reconstruct by allowing the base level deductions totaling $11 million but disallowing the balance. The tax benefit Frucor obtained “from or under” the arrangement comprised the deductions claimed for interest on the balance of $149 million which, as a matter of commercial reality, represented the repayment of principal of $55 million.” This decision was then appealed to the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Frucor and ruled in favor of the tax authorities both in regards of the tax adjustment and in regards of shortfall penalties. Excerpt “[80] The picture which emerges from the planning documents which we have reviewed is clear. The whole purpose of the arrangement was to secure tax benefits in New Zealand. References to tax efficiency in those planning documents are entirely focused on the advantage to DHNZ of being able to offset repayments of principal against its revenue. The anticipated financial benefits of this are calculated solely by reference to New Zealand tax rates. The only relevance of the absence of a capital gains liability in Singapore was that this tax efficiency would not be cancelled out by capital gains on the contrived “gain” of DAP under the forward purchase agreement. [81] There were many elements of artificiality about the funding arrangement. Of these, the most significant is in relation to the note itself. [82] Orthodox convertible notes offer the investor the opportunity to receive both interest and the benefit of any increases in the value of the shares over the term of the note. For this reason, the issuer of a convertible note can expect to receive finance at a rate lower than would be the case for an orthodox loan. [83] The purpose of the convertible note issued by DHNZ was not to enable it to receive finance from an outside investor willing to lend at a lower rate because of the opportunity to take advantage of an increase in the value of the shares. The shares were to wind up with DAP which already had complete ownership of DHNZ. As well, Deutsche Bank had no interest in acquiring shares in DHNZ. Instead, it had structured a transaction that generated tax benefits for DHNZ in return for a fee. Leaving aside the purpose of obtaining tax advantages in New Zealand, the convertible note ...

In making allocations under section 482, the district director is not restricted to the case of improper accounting, to the case of a fraudulent, colorable, or sham transaction, or to the case of a device designed to reduce or avoid tax by shifting or distorting income, deductions, credits, or allowances ...

As part of a multinational tax integrity package aimed to address the tax avoidance practices of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and improve transparency through better public reporting of MNEs’ tax information, the Australian Treasury issued a Consultation Paper in August 2022. This paper seeks to consult on the implementation of proposals to: amend Australia’s existing thin capitalisation rules to limit interest deductions for MNEs in line with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s recommended approach under Action 4 of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) program (Part 1); introduce a new rule limiting MNEs’ ability to claim tax deductions for payments relating to intangibles and royalties that lead to insufficient tax paid (Part 2); and ensure enhanced tax transparency by MNEs (Part 3), through measures such as public reporting of certain tax information on a country‑by‑country basis; mandatory reporting of material tax risks to shareholders; and requiring tenderers for Australian government contracts to disclose their country of tax domicile. The changes contemplated seek to target activities deliberately designed to minimise tax, while also considering the need to attract and retain foreign capital and investment in Australia, limit potential additional compliance cost considerations for business, and continue to support genuine commercial activity ...

An intercompany loan in the form of a so-called international debt pushdown had been issued to Universal Music Japan to acquire the shares of another Japanese group company. The tax authority found that the loan transaction had been entered for the principal purpose of reducing the tax burden in Japan and issued an assessment where deductions of the interest payments on the loan had been disallowed for tax purposes. The Tokyo District Court decided in favour of Universal Music Japan and set aside the assessment. The Court held that the loan did not have the principle purpose of reducing taxes because the overall restructuring was conducted for valid business purposes. Therefore, the tax authorities could not invoke the Japanese anti-avoidance provisions to deny the interest deductions. In 2020 the decision of the district court was upheld by the Tokyo High Court. The tax authorities then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court Decision of the Court The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and set aside the assessment of the tax authorities. “The term “economic rationality” is used to refer to the economic rationality of a series of transactions. In examining whether or not the entire series of transactions lacks economic rationality, it is necessary to consider (i) whether the series of transactions is unnatural, such as being based on procedures or methods that are not normally assumed or creating a form that deviates from the actual situation, and (ii) whether there are other rational reasons for such a reorganisation other than a decrease in tax burden. (iii) Whether there are any business objectives or other reasons other than a reduction in the tax burden that would constitute a rational reason for such a reorganisation.” “However, the borrowings in question were made under an agreement to be used solely for the purchase price of the shares of the domestic corporations in question and related costs, and in fact the appellant acquired the shares and brought the domestic corporations under its control, and there is no indication that the amount borrowed was unreasonably high in relation to its intended use. In addition, the interest and repayment period of the loan were determined based on the expected profit of the appellant, and there is no evidence that the appellant is currently experiencing any difficulty in paying the interest on the loan. It is therefore difficult to say that the above points make the borrowing unnatural or unreasonable. (d) Considering the above circumstances as a whole, the borrowing in question cannot be said to be unnatural or unreasonable from an economic and substantive standpoint, i.e. to lack economic rationality. Therefore, the borrowing in question does not fall within the scope of Article 132(1) of the Corporate Tax Act, which states that “the borrowing is deemed to result in an unreasonable decrease in the corporate tax burden if it is permitted”.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS, a subsidiary in the Heerema group, paid dividends to a parent company in Luxembourg which in turn paid the dividends to two group companies in Panama. The tax authorities found that the company in Luxembourg was not the beneficial owner of the dividends and thus the dividends were not covered by the tax exemption rules of the EU Parent/Subsidiary Directive or the Double Taxation Convention between Denmark and Luxembourg. On that basis an assessment was issued regarding payment of withholding tax on the dividends. An appeal was filed by Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS with the High Court. Judgement of the Eastern High Court The court dismissed the appeal of Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS and decided in favor of the tax authorities. The parent company in Luxembourg was a so-called “flow-through” company which was not the beneficial owner of the dividend and thus not covered by the tax exemption rules of the Parent/Subsidiary Directive and the Double Taxation Convention between Denmark and Luxembourg. The Danish subsidiary was held liable for the non-payment of dividend tax. Excerpt “The actual distribution On 23 May 2007, Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS distributed USD 325 million, corresponding to DKK 1,799,298,000, to its parent company Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA. The amount was set off by the Danish company against a claim on the Luxembourg parent company arising from a loan of the same amount taken out by Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA in Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS on 22 January 2007 to pay the purchase price for the company. Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA acquired Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS from the two companies, Heavy Transport Group Inc. and Incomara Holdings SA, both resident in Panama and owners of both the Danish and Luxembourg companies. The purchase price was transferred from Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA to the Panamanian companies on 24 January 2007. The loan from Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS to Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA of USD 325 million is referred to in the loan agreement between the parties of 22 January 2007 as an ‘interim dividend’ and states that the amount will be paid as a ‘short term loan’ until such time as a resolution is passed at a future general meeting of Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS to distribute a dividend to the parent company in the same amount. The loan agreement also provides that the loan is to be repaid on demand or immediately after the dividend payment has been declared by offsetting it. It is undisputed that the company Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA was set up as an intermediate holding company between the Panamanian companies and Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS with the aim of ensuring that no Danish withholding tax was triggered by the dividend distribution. Moreover, as regards the activities of Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA, it appears that the company, which was apparently set up in 2004 to provide the financing for Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS and, after 22 January 2007, as the parent company of the company, did not have (and does not have) any employees, the administration of the company being outsourced to a group company in Luxembourg, Heerema Group Service SA. It is undisputed that the parent company had no other activity when it took over the Danish company. Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA’s annual accounts for 2007 show that its assets as at 31 December 2007 consisted of cash of USD 148 551 and financial assets of USD 1 255 355 in its subsidiary Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA was obliged and, moreover, was only able to repay the loan of USD 325 million to Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS by offsetting the dividend received and thus had no real power of disposal over the dividend. Consequently, and since the purpose of the transactions was undoubtedly to avoid Danish taxation of the dividends in connection with the repatriation of the funds to the shareholders in Panama, Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA cannot be regarded as the beneficial owner of the dividends within the meaning of Article 10(2) of the Double Taxation Convention and, as a general rule, the tax should not be reduced in accordance with the rules of the Convention. Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA is also not entitled to the tax exemption under the Parent/Subsidiary Directive, as it must be considered as a flow-through company with no independent economic and commercial justification, and must therefore be characterised as an artificial arrangement whose sole purpose was to obtain the tax exemption under the Directive, see the judgment of 26 February 2019 in Joined Cases C-116/16 and C-117/16. Significance of the possibility of liquidation under Article 59 of the current law on limited liability companies However, Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS claims that there is no abuse of the Parent/Subsidiary Directive, since the two shareholders in Panama, Heavy Transport Group Inc. and Incomara Holdings SA, instead of contributing the company Heavy Transport Finance (Luxembourg) SA to receive and distribute the ordinary dividends of Heavy Transport Holding Denmark ApS to the Panamanian companies, could have chosen to liquidate the Danish company pursuant to Article 59 of the current Anartsselskabslov, whereby any liquidation proceeds distributed by the parent company in Luxembourg would have been tax-free for the two shareholders. In its judgment of 26 February 2019, paragraphs 108-110, the CJEU has ruled on the situation where there is a double taxation convention concluded between the source State and the third State in which the beneficial owners of the dividends transferred by the flow-through company are resident for tax purposes. The Court held that such circumstances cannot in themselves preclude the existence of an abuse of rights. The Court stated that if it is duly established on the basis of all the facts that the traders have carried out purely formal or artificial transactions, devoid of any economic or ...

Civil monetary penalties for tax understatement are frequently triggered by one or more of the following: an understatement of tax liability exceeding a threshold amount, negligence of the taxpayer, or wilful intent to evade tax (and also fraud, although fraud can trigger much more serious criminal penalties). Many OECD member countries impose civil monetary penalties for negligence or willful intent, while only a few countries penalise “no-fault” understatements of tax liability ...

Even if some countries were willing to accept global formulary apportionment, there would be disagreements because each country may want to emphasize or include different factors in the formula based on the activities or factors that predominate in its jurisdiction. Each country would have a strong incentive to devise formulae or formula weights that would maximise that country’s own revenue. In addition, tax administrations would have to consider jointly how to address the potential for artificially shifting the production factors used in the formula (e.g. sales, capital) to low tax countries. There could be tax avoidance to the extent that the components of the relevant formula can be manipulated, e.g. by entering into unnecessary financial transactions, by the deliberate location of mobile assets, by requiring that particular companies within an MNE group maintain inventory levels in excess of what normally would be encountered in an uncontrolled company of that type, and so on ...

When independent enterprises transact with each other, the conditions of their commercial and financial relations (e.g. the price of goods transferred or services provided and the conditions of the transfer or provision) ordinarily are determined by market forces. When associated enterprises transact with each other, their commercial and financial relations may not be directly affected by external market forces in the same way, although associated enterprises often seek to replicate the dynamics of market forces in their transactions with each other, as discussed in paragraph 1.5 below. Tax administrations should not automatically assume that associated enterprises have sought to manipulate their profits. There may be a genuine difficulty in accurately determining a market price in the absence of market forces or when adopting a particular commercial strategy. It is important to bear in mind that the need to make adjustments to approximate arm’s length conditions arises irrespective of any contractual obligation undertaken by the parties to pay a particular price or of any intention of the parties to minimize tax. Thus, a tax adjustment under the arm’s length principle would not affect the underlying contractual obligations for non-tax purposes between the associated enterprises, and may be appropriate even where there is no intent to minimize or avoid tax. The consideration of transfer pricing should not be confused with the consideration of problems of tax fraud or tax avoidance, even though transfer pricing policies may be used for such purposes ...

Delta Beverages Ltd, a subsidiary of Delta Corporation, had been issued a tax assessment for FY 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 where various fees for service, technology license of trademarks, technology and know-how paid to a group company in the Netherlands (SAB Miller Management BV) had been disallowed by the tax authorities (Zimra) of Zimbabwe resulting in additional taxes of US$42 million which was later reduced to US$30 million. An appeal was filed with the Special Court (for Income Tax Appeals) where, in a judgment dated 11 October 2019, parts of the assessment was set aside. Not satisfied with the result, an appeal (Delta Beverages) and cross-appeal (tax authorities) was filed with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the Special Court (for Income Tax Appeals) and remanded the case for reconsiderations in relation to the issue of tax avoidance. Excerpts from the Supreme Court judgement regarding deductions for royalties paid for trademarks: “I respectfully agree with the reasoning of the court a quo. A product’s standing and marketability is enhanced by its trademark which has acquired a reputation and become desirable on the market. The trademarks in issue are of international repute. They in my view add value to the main appellant’s beverages and make it possible for the appellant to make an income from the trademarked products. It is apparent from the various agreements entered into between the franchisors and the holding company that what was being sought was to benefit from the reputation of the international brands and trademarks.” “In respect of the royalties the issue is whether or not the main appellant was a party to the agreements on the royalties, which were to be paid for or had ratified the agreements entitling it to claim its payments for them as deductions in its tax returns. A reading of the record establishes that the agreements in terms of which royalties were payable were entered into by Delta Corporation or its predecessors in title and there is no specific mention of the appellant. There is however mention of Delta Corporation’s subsidiaries. It is common cause that the main appellant is a subsidiary of Delta Corporation (Private) Limited.” “In any event, evidence on record establishes that the cross appellant’s main challenge cannot prevail because the Exchange Control Authority granted authority for the payment of those royalties. The record proves that on 19 August 2011, the exchange control authority granted authority to the holding company to pay royalties of up to 5 percent to the Dutch Company less withholding tax.” “Once it is established that the main appellant is the one which operated the beverages business and benefited from the contract between the Dutch company and the holding company, it follows that it lawfully deducted the royalties it paid to the Dutch company.” Excerpts from the Supreme Court judgement regarding deductions for technical services (calculated based on turnover) – tax avoidance: In determining this issue the court [Special Court (for Income Tax Appeals)] a quo commented on its perception that there might have been tax avoidance in the manner in which the technical services agreement was concluded between the parties. It commented that if the Commissioner had attacked the deduction of these services from the main appellant’s taxable income it would have been fatal to the main appellant’s claim. “The witness failed to explain why the Dutch company paid the South African entity that supplied the technical services to the appellant on its behalf on a cost plus mark-up basis but charged the local holding company on a percentage of turnover basis. Such a failure may have been fatal to the appellant’s case had the Commissioner disallowed the technical fees in terms of s 98 the Income Tax Act.” “It is apparent from the court a quo’s comments that it perceived that there might have been a case of tax avoidance by the main appellant’s holding company and the Dutch company. It is also apparent that it took no further steps to inquire into that possibility but proceeded to determine the appeal on other factors not connected to tax avoidance as if the appeal before it was an appeal in the strict sense. It thus left the issue of tax avoidance hanging as no further inquiry into it was made, nor did it make a decision on the issue.” “It is clear from the underlined part of the quotation that the issue of avoidance should be determined to enable the Commissioner or as in this case the Special Court to determine how the tax payer should be taxed. The determination of tax issues require clarity and incisiveness in decision making. This is because the law requires that those who should pay tax should do so and those who fall outside that requirement should not be taxed. There should be no room for those within the group which should be taxed escaping through failure by the Commissioner to net them in and if he fails the Special Court in the exercise of its full jurisdiction should net them in. … It is therefore my view that once the court a quo realised that there might be tax avoidance it should have exhaustively inquired into and made a determination on it. It should have sought to determine the correct position of the law instead of identifying a possible error by the Commissioner and allowing it to pass. Taxation is by the law and not official errors or laxity. …where a tax matter has been placed before the Special Court for adjudication a taxpayer should not escape liability simply because the Commissioner failed to invoke the appropriate taxing provision. In casu the omission by the court a quo to determine the issue of tax avoidance will have the effect of allowing the main appellant to get away with tax avoidance, if that can be proved on inquiry. That view is strengthened by the court a quo’s view that the failure by ...

ALTA Energy, a resident of Luxembourg, claimed an exemption from Canadian income tax under Article 13(5) of the Canada-Luxembourg Income Tax Treaty in respect of a large capital gain arising from the sale of shares of ALTA Canada, its wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary. At that time, Alta Canada carried on an unconventional shale oil business in the Duvernay shale oil formation situated in Northern Alberta. Alta Canada was granted the right to explore, drill and extract hydrocarbons from an area of the Duvernay formation designated under licenses granted by the government of Alberta. The Canadian tax authorities denied that the exemption applied and assessed ALTA Energy accordingly. Article 13(5) of the Canada-Luxembourg Tax Treaty is a distributive rule of last application. It applies only in the case where the capital gain is not otherwise taxable under paragraphs (1) to (4) of Article 13 of the Treaty. Article 13(4) is relevant to the outcome of this appeal. Under that provision, Canada has preserved its right to tax capital gains arising from the disposition of shares where the shares derive their value principally from immovable property situated in Canada. However, the application of Article 13(4) is subject to an important exception. Property that would otherwise qualify as Immovable Property is deemed not to be such property in the circumstances where the business of the corporation is carried on in the property (the “Excluded Property” exception). The tax authorities argued that the Shares derived their value principally from Alta Canada’s Working Interest in the Duvernay Formation. The authorities also argued that the capital gain it realized would be taxable under Article 13(4) unless the Court agreed with ALTA’s submission that its full Working Interest is Excluded Property. ALTA Energy appealed the position of the tax authorities and argued the contrary view. According to ALTA, substantially all of ALTA Canada’s Working Interest remained Immovable Property because ALTA Canada drilled in and extracted hydrocarbons from only a small area of the Duvernay Formation that it controlled. In 2018 the Federal Court of Appeal decided in favour of ALTA Energie and the matter was referred back for reconsideration and reassessment. This decision was then appealed by the tax authorities before the Supreme Court The Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities but with dissenting judges. Excerpts: [185] Nevertheless, we agree with Alta Luxembourg that treaty shopping is not inherently abusive. There is nothing necessarily improper about minimizing tax liability by selecting a beneficial tax regime in making an investment in a foreign jurisdiction (Crown Forest, at para. 49). Certain jurisdictions may provide tax incentives to attract businesses and investment; as such, taxpayers are entitled to avail themselves of such benefits to minimize tax. Thus, merely selecting a treaty to minimize tax, on its own, is not abusive. In fact, it may be consonant with one of the main purposes of tax treaties: encouraging trade and investment. [186] However, where taxing rights in a tax treaty are allocated on the basis of economic allegiance and conduit entities claim tax benefits despite the absence of any genuine economic connection with the state of residence, treaty shopping is, in our view, abusive. As Professors N. Bammens and L. De Broe explain, the use of “conduit companies” is disconnected from the objectives of bilateral tax treaties: . . . tax treaties are concluded for reasons of an economic nature: the contracting states want to stimulate reciprocal commercial relations by preventing double taxation. The use of conduit companies and treaty shopping structures has very little to do with this economic objective. Treaty shopping thus upsets the balance and reciprocity of the tax treaty: in order to preserve a tax treaty’s inherent reciprocity, its benefits must not be extended to persons not entitled to them. [Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.] (“Treaty Shopping and Avoidance of Abuse”, in Lang et al., Tax Treaties, 51, at p. 52; see also Li and Avella, at s. 2.1.1.3.) [187] In such cases, as here, the avoidance transaction would be contrary to the objectives of bilateral tax treaties and frustrate the object, spirit or purpose of the specific provisions related to the allocation of taxing rights. Preventing such abuse is the purpose of the GAAR: “. . . most double tax treaties do not contain specific limitations on the ability of third-country residents to treaty shop [and instead] rely on the concept of beneficial ownership or on domestic anti-abuse legislation to safeguard against hollow conduits” (Krishna (2009), at p. 540). Similarly, C. A. Brown and J. Bogle are of the view that the GAAR is “[t]he primary tool to fight treaty shopping in Canada currently” (“Treaty Shopping and the New Multilateral Tax Agreement — Is it Business as Usual in Canada?” (2020), 43 Dal. L.J. 1, at p. 4). [188] In conclusion, not all types of treaty shopping lead to abuse of a tax treaty. Only when an avoidance transaction frustrates the rationale of the relevant treaty provision will treaty shopping be abusive and the tax benefit denied. For instance, where contracting parties allocate taxing rights to the state of residence on the basis of economic allegiance, as in this case, treaty shopping will be abusive if the resident of a third-party state uses a conduit company to claim treaty benefits conferred by provisions requiring a genuine economic connection with the residence state. Therein lies the undermining of these provisions’ rationale clothed in a formalistic adherence to their text. Ignoring this is to render the GAAR empty of meaningful effect. Click here for other translation ...

The issue in these two cases is whether withholding tax was payable on interest paid to foreign group companies considered “beneficial owners” via conduit companies covered by the EU Interest/Royalties Directive and DTA’s exempting the payments from withholding taxes. The first case concerned interest accruals totalling approximately DKK 1,476 million made by a Danish company in the period 2007-2009 in favour of its parent company in Sweden in connection with an intra-group loan. The Danish Tax Authorities (SKAT) subsequently ruled that the recipients of the interest were subject to the tax liability in Section 2(1)(d) of the Corporation Tax Act and that the Danish company was therefore obliged to withhold and pay withholding tax on a total of approximately DKK 369 million. The Danish company brought the case before the courts, claiming principally that it was not obliged to withhold the amount collected by SKAT, as it disputed the tax liability of the recipients of the interest attributions. The second case concerned interest payments/accruals totalling approximately DKK 3,158 million made by a Danish company in the period 2006-2008 in favour of its parent company in Luxembourg in respect of an intra-group loan. SKAT also ruled in this case that the interest payments/write-ups were taxable for the recipients and levied withholding tax on them from the Danish company totalling approximately DKK 817 million. The Danish company appealed to the courts, claiming principally that the interest was not taxable. The Eastern High Court, as first instance, dealt with the two cases together. The European Court of Justice has ruled on a number of preliminary questions in the cases, see Joined Cases C-115/16, C-118/16, C119/16 and C-299/16. In both cases, the Ministry of Taxation argued in general terms that the parent companies in question were so-called “flow-through” companies, which were not the “beneficial owners” of the interest, and that the real “beneficial owners” of the interest were not covered by the rules on tax exemption, i.e. the EU Interest/Royalties Directive and the double taxation conventions applicable between the Nordic countries and between Denmark and Luxembourg respectively. Judgement of the Eastern High Court In both cases, the Court held that the parent companies in question could not be regarded as the “beneficial owners” of the interest, since the companies were interposed between the Danish companies and the holding company/capital funds which had granted the loans, and that the corporate structure had been established as part of a single, pre-organised arrangement without any commercial justification but with the main aim of obtaining tax exemption for the interest. As a result, the two Danish companies could not claim tax exemption under either the Directive or the Double Taxation Conventions and the interest was therefore not exempt. On 3 May 2021, the High Court ruled on two cases in the Danish beneficial owner case complex concerning the issue of taxation of dividends. The judgment of the Regional Court in Denmark vs NETAPP ApS and TDC A/S can be read here. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Ensco Gerudi provided offshore drilling services to the petroleum industry in Malaysia, including leasing drilling rigs, to oil and gas operators in Malaysia. In order to provide these services, the Ensco entered into a Master Charter Agreement dated 21.9.2006 (amended on 17.8.2011) (“Master Charter Agreement”) with Ensco Labuan Limited (“ELL”), a third-party contractor, to lease drilling rigs from ELL. Ensco then rents out the drilling rigs to its own customers. As part of the Master Charter Agreement, Ensco agreed to pay ELL a percentage of the applicable day rate that Ensco earns from its drilling contracts with its customers for the drilling rigs. By way of a letter dated 12.10.2018, the tax authorities initiated its audit for FY 2015 to 2017. The tax authorities issued its first audit findings letter on 23.10.2019 where it took the position that the pricing of the leasing transactions between the Applicant and ELL are not at arm’s length pursuant to s 140A of the Income Tax Act 1967 (“ITA”). The tax authorities proposed that the profit earned by ELL should remain with the Ensco by reducing the cost of the leasing asset by 20% or equivalent to the margin obtained by ELL. Ensco disputed the tax assessment and brought the case to court for an appeals review. Decision of the High Court The High Court granted orders in terms of Ensco’s application allowing an appeal. Excerpts “It has been said that additional assessment is rooted in fairness and that there is a duty on the part of the Respondent [tax authorities] being an important public authority to give its reasons more so, when the issues pertaining to transfer pricing are complex matters and can never be straightforward. As the Applicant [Ensco] has submitted and this Court agrees, that at the very least, the most basic Transfer Pricing Report by the Respondent will be able to shed some light on the Applicant on this issue because without some basis, how would the Applicant be able to adequately defend itself before the Special Commissioners of Income Tax. The Applicant’s [Ensco] basis and justifications for the pricing of the leasing transactions is definitely in stark contrast to the Respondent’s failure to provide its own Transfer Pricing Report to the Applicant. In the present matter, exceptional circumstances of the case have been established at the leave stage which is a starting point in judicial review cases. Illegality, unlawful treatment, error of law and failure to adhere to legal principles established by the Courts tantamount to an excess of jurisdiction and all of which this Court finds have been demonstrated by the Applicant ...

In 2017 the European Commission concluded that Luxembourg granted undue tax benefits to Amazon of around €250 million.  Following an in-depth investigation the Commission concluded that a tax ruling issued by Luxembourg in 2003, and prolonged in 2011, lowered the tax paid by Amazon in Luxembourg without any valid justification. The tax ruling enabled Amazon to shift the vast majority of its profits from an Amazon group company that is subject to tax in Luxembourg (Amazon EU) to a company which is not subject to tax (Amazon Europe Holding Technologies). In particular, the tax ruling endorsed the payment of a royalty from Amazon EU to Amazon Europe Holding Technologies, which significantly reduced Amazon EU’s taxable profits. This decision was brought before the European Court of Justice by Luxembourg and Amazon. Judgement of the EU Court  The European General Court found that Luxembourg’s tax treatment of Amazon was not illegal under EU State aid rules. According to a press release ” The General Court notes, first of all, the settled case-law according to which, in examining tax measures in the light of the EU rules on State aid, the very existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation, with the result that, in order to determine whether there is a tax advantage, the position of the recipient as a result of the application of the measure at issue must be compared with his or her position in the absence of the measure at issue and under the normal rules of taxation. In that respect, the General Court observes that the pricing of intra-group transactions carried out by an integrated company in that group is not determined under market conditions. However, where national tax law does not make a distinction between integrated undertakings and standalone undertakings for the purposes of their liability to corporate income tax, it may be considered that that law is intended to tax the profit arising from the economic activity of such an integrated undertaking as though it had arisen from transactions carried out at market prices. In those circumstances, when examining a fiscal measure granted to such an integrated company, the Commission may compare the tax burden of that undertaking resulting from the application of that fiscal measure with the tax burden resulting from the application of the normal rules of taxation under national law of an undertaking, placed in a comparable factual situation, carrying on its activities under market conditions. In addition, the General Court points out that, in examining the method of calculating an integrated company’s taxable income endorsed by a tax ruling, the Commission can find an advantage only if it demonstrates that the methodological errors which, in its view, affect the transfer pricing do not allow a reliable approximation of an arm’s length outcome to be reached, but rather lead to a reduction in the taxable profit of the company concerned compared with the tax burden resulting from the application of normal taxation rules. In the light of those principles, the General Court then examines the merits of the Commission’s analysis in support of its finding that, by endorsing a transfer pricing method that did not allow a reliable approximation of an arm’s length outcome to be reached, the tax ruling at issue granted an advantage to LuxOpCo.  In that context, the General Court holds, in the first place, that the primary finding of an advantage is based on an analysis which is incorrect in several respects. Thus, first, in so far as the Commission relied on its own functional analysis of LuxSCS in order to assert, in essence, that contrary to what was taken into account in granting the tax ruling at issue, that company was merely a passive holder of the intangible assets in question, the General Court considers that analysis to be incorrect. In particular, according to the General Court, the Commission did not take due account of the functions performed by LuxSCS for the purposes of exploiting the intangible assets in question or the risks borne by that company in that context.  Nor did it demonstrate that it was easier to find undertakings comparable to LuxSCS than undertakings comparable to LuxOpCo, or that choosing LuxSCS as the tested entity would have made it possible to obtain more reliable comparison data. Consequently, contrary to its findings in the contested decision, the Commission did not, according to the General Court, establish that the Luxembourg tax authorities had incorrectly chosen LuxOpCo as the ‘tested party’ in order to determine the amount of the royalty. Secondly, the General Court holds that, even if the ‘arm’s length’ royalty should have been calculated using LuxSCS as the ‘tested party’ in the application of the TNMM, the Commission did not establish the existence of an advantage since it was also unfounded in asserting that LuxSCS’s remuneration could be calculated on the basis of the mere passing on of the development costs of the intangible assets borne in relation to the Buy-In agreements and the cost sharing agreement without in any way taking into account the subsequent increase in value of those intangible assets. Thirdly, the General Court considers that the Commission also erred in evaluating the remuneration that LuxSCS could expect, in the light of the arm’s length principle, for the functions linked to maintaining its ownership of the intangible assets at issue. Contrary to what appears from the contested decision, such functions cannot be treated in the same way as the supply of ‘low value adding’ services, with the result that the Commission’s application of a mark-up most often observed in relation to intra-group supplies of a ‘low value adding’ services is not appropriate in the present case. In view of all the foregoing considerations, the General Court concludes that the elements put forward by the Commission in support of its primary finding are not capable of establishing that LuxOpCo’s tax burden was artificially reduced as a result of an overpricing of the royalty. In the second place, after examining the ...

On 3 May 2021, the Danish High Court ruled in two “beneficial owner” cases concerning the question of whether withholding tax must be paid on dividends distributed by Danish subsidiaries to foreign parent companies. The first case – NETAPP Denmark ApS – concerned two dividend distributions of approx. 566 million DKK and approx. 92 million made in 2005 and 2006 by a Danish company to its parent company in Cyprus. The National Tax Court had upheld the Danish company in that the dividends were exempt from withholding tax pursuant to the Corporation Tax Act, section 2, subsection. 1, letter c, so that the company was not obliged to pay withholding tax. The Ministry of Taxation brought the case before the courts, claiming that the Danish company should include – and thus pay – withholding tax of a total of approx. 184 million kr. The second case – TDC A/S – concerned the National Tax Tribunal’s binding answer to two questions posed by another Danish company regarding tax exemption of an intended – and later implemented – distribution of dividends in 2011 of approx. 1.05 billion DKK to the company’s parent company in Luxembourg. The National Tax Court had ruled in favor of the company in that the distribution was tax-free pursuant to section 2 (1) of the Danish Corporation Tax Act. 1, letter c, 3. pkt. The Ministry of Taxation also brought this case before the courts. The Eastern High Court has, as the first instance, dealt with the two cases together. The European Court of Justice has ruled on a number of questions referred in the main proceedings, see Joined Cases C-116/16 and C-117/16. In both cases, the Ministry of Taxation stated in general that the parent companies in question were so-called “flow-through companies” that were not real recipients of the dividends, and that the real recipients (beneficial owners) were in countries that were not covered by the EU parent / subsidiary directive. in the first case – NETAPP Denmark ApS – the High Court upheld the company’s position that the dividend distribution in 2005 of approx. 566 million did not trigger withholding tax, as the company had proved that the distribution had been redistributed from the Cypriot parent company, which had to be considered a “flow-through company”, to – ultimately – the group’s American parent company. The High Court stated, among other things, that according to the Danish-American double taxation agreement, it would have been possible to distribute the dividend directly from the Danish company to the American company, without this having triggered Danish taxation. As far as the distribution in 2006 of approx. 92 million On the other hand, the High Court found that it had not been proven that the dividend had been transferred to the group’s American parent company. In the second case – TDC A/S – the High Court stated, among other things, that in the specific case there was no further documentation of the financial and business conditions in the group, and the High Court found that it had to be assumed that the dividend was merely channeled through the Luxembourg parent company. on to a number of private equity funds based in countries that were not covered by tax exemption rules, ie. partly the parent / subsidiary directive, partly a double taxation agreement with Denmark. On that basis, the Danish company could not claim tax exemption under the Directive or the double taxation agreement with Luxembourg, and the dividend was therefore not tax-exempt. Click here for English translation ...

Unicomer (St. Vincent) Ltd. is engaged in the business of selling household furniture and appliances. In FY 2013 and 2014 Unicomer entered into an “insurance arrangement” involving an unrelated party, United insurance, and a related party, Canterbury. According to the tax authorities United Insurance had been used as an intermediate/conduit to funnel money from the Unicomer to Canterbury, thereby avoiding taxes in St. Vincent. In 2017 the Inland Revenue Department issued an assessments of additional tax in the sum of $12,666,798.23 inclusive of interest and penalties. The basis of the assessment centered on Unicomer’s treatment of (1) credit protection premiums (hereinafter referred to as “CPI”) under the insurance arrangement, (2) tax deferral of hire-purchase profits and (3) deductions for royalty payments. Unicomer appealed the assessment to the Appeal Commission where a decision was rendered in 2018. The Appeal Commission held that the CPI payments were rightfully disallowed by the tax authorities and that withholding tax was chargeable on these payments; the deferral of hire purchase profits was also disallowed; but royalty expenses were allowed. This decision was appealed by Unicomer to the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court predominantly ruled in favor of the tax authorities. The court upheld the decision of the Appeal Commission to disallow deductions for CPI’s and confirmed that withholding tax on these payments was chargeable. The deferral of taxation of hire-purchase profits was also disallowed by the court. However, although the additional taxes should of course be collected by the tax authorities, the procedure that had been followed after receiving the decision of the Appeal Commission – contacting the bank of Unicomer and having them pay the additional taxes owed by the company – was considered wholly unacceptable and amounted to an abuse of the power. The taxes owed should be collected following correct procedures. Click here for translation ...

The shareholder of “BO zoo” is a German company. The German parent held 100% of the shares of “BO zoo” continuously for more than 2 years. The German parent’s ownership of the shares was based on title. “BO zoo” asked the Tax Chamber whether, in order to apply the exemption provided for in Article 22(4) of the CIT Act, it is obliged to verify whether the German parent meets the definition of a beneficial owner of dividends within the meaning of Article 4a(29a) of the CIT Act. “BO zoo” took the position that no provision of the CIT Act makes the application of the exemption from CIT under Article 22(4) of the CIT Act conditional on the company receiving the dividend being the beneficial owner of the dividend. The Tax Chamber disagreed, arguing that the verification of the beneficial owner is part of the due diligence obligation introduced in Article 26(1) of the Corporate Income Tax Act in 2019. The company challenged this interpretation before the Administrative Court. The Court found the complaint of “BO zoo” well-founded and overturned the interpretation of the Tax Chamber. According to the Court, the obligation to verify the identity of the beneficial owner referred to in Article 28b of the CIT Act concerns a completely separate procedure, i.e. the procedure for the refund of withholding tax. It does not specify the conditions for claiming the exemption, but only the procedure for proving that tax has been withheld in spite of the exemption. The authorities appealed the decision to the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the position of the Administrative Court was correct and that, in the case of dividends, it is not necessary that the recipient of the dividend be the beneficial owner. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

DIGITEX INFORMATICA S.L. had entered into a substantial service contract with an unrelated party in Latin America, Telefonica, according to which the DIGITEX group would provide certain services for Telefonica. The contract originally entered by DIGITEX INFORMATICA S.L. was later transferred to DIGITEX’s Latin American subsidiaries. But after the transfer, cost and amortizations related to the contract were still paid – and deducted for tax purposes – by DIGITEX in Spain. The tax authorities found that costs (amortizations, interest payments etc.) related to the Telefonica contract – after the contract had been transferred to the subsidiaries – should have been reinvoiced to the subsidiaries, and an assessment was issued to DIGITEX for FY 2010 and 2011 where these deductions had been disallowed. DIGITEX on its side argued that by not re-invoicing the costs to the subsidiaries the income received from the subsidiaries increased. According to the intercompany contract, DIGITEX would invoice related entities 1% of the turnover of its own customers for branding and 2% of the turnover of its own or referred customers for know-how. However, no invoicing could be made if the operating income of the subsidiaries did not exceed 2.5% of turnover, excluding the result obtained from operations carried out with local clients. Judgement of the Court The Audiencia Nacional dismissed the appeal of DIGITEX and decided in favour of the tax authorities. Excerpt “1.- The income derived from the local contracts for customer analysis and migration services corresponds to the appellant Group entities and designated as PSACs, i.e. to the same affiliates. Therefore, the taxpayer should have re-invoiced the costs of the project to these subsidiaries, according to the revenue generated in each of them. And this by application of the principle of correlation between income and expenditure set out in RD 1514/2007. The plaintiff should not be surprised by this consideration insofar as this was done, at least partially, in the financial year 2010, in which it already re-invoiced EUR 339 978.55. Consequently, it cannot be said that the defendant administration went against its own actions when it took the view that the plaintiff in 2009 should have recorded in its accounts an intangible asset of EUR 50 million, in view of what happened later, in 2010, when the contracts with the subsidiaries were concluded and the PSACs became PSACs. Therefore, it was the plaintiff itself that went against its own actions, acting differently between 2010 and 2011 when it came to allocating the costs derived from the intangible amortisation and the financial expenses of the loan contracted. 2.- Even if we were to admit that the services provided by the plaintiff have added value by incorporating both a trademark licence and know-how, this does not mean that such re-invoicing does not have to be carried out, when, as has been said, in 2009 DIGITEX INFORMATICA S.L was acting as PSAC under the mediation contract, but as a result of the new contracts entered into with the Latin American subsidiaries in 2010, this position as PSAC was assumed by the said subsidiaries present in the seven Latin American countries. As regards the method of determining the profit, it is appropriate to refer to the operating margin expressly contained in the contracts concluded by the plaintiff with the subsidiaries and not to the general margin determined by the plaintiff in accordance with folio 32 et seq. of the application (according to the final result of the profit and loss account), despite the reports provided by the appellant. And so it is that the latter cannot contradict itself by going against its own acts to the point of altering the literal nature of the contracts, even if it indicates that the will of the parties in the other to the contrary, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1281 of the CC.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

A Colombian taxpayer had filed an unconstitutionality complaint against Article 70 (partial) of Law 1819 of 2016, “Whereby a structural tax reform is adopted, mechanisms for the fight against tax evasion and avoidance are strengthened, and other provisions are enacted.” The Constitutional Court ruled that the Colombian GAAR legislation was not unconstitutional. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

This case concerns application of the New Zealand´s general anti-avoidance rule in s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 2004. The tax authorities issued an assessment to Frucor Suntory NZ Ltd where deductions of interest expenses in the amount of $10,827,606 and $11,665,323 were disallowed in FY 2006 and 2007. In addition, penalties of $1,786,555 and $1,924,779 for those years were imposed. The claimed deductions arose in the context of an arrangement entered into by Frucor Holdings Ltd (FHNZ) involving, among other steps, its issue of a Convertible Note to Deutsche Bank, New Zealand Branch (DBNZ) and a forward purchase of the shares DBNZ could call for under the Note by FHNZ’s Singapore based parent Danone Asia Pte Ltd (DAP). The Note had a face value of $204,421,5654 and carried interest at a rate of 6.5 per cent per annum. Over its five-year life, FHNZ paid DBNZ approximately $66 million which FHNZ characterised as interest and deducted for income tax purposes. The tax authorities found that, although such deductions complied with the “black letter” of the Act, $55 million of the $66 million paid was in fact a non- deductible repayment of principal. Hence only interest deduction of $11 million over the life of the Arrangement was allowed. These figures represent the deduction disallowed by the Commissioner, as compared to the deductions claimed by the taxpayer: $13,250,998 in 2006 and $13,323,806 in 2007. Based on an allegedly abusive tax position but mitigated by the taxpayer’s prior compliance history. In so doing, avoiding any exposure to shortfall penalties for the 2008 and 2009 years in the event it is unsuccessful in the present proceedings. The income years 2004 and 2005, in which interest deductions were also claimed under the relevant transaction are time barred. Which I will refer to hereafter as $204 million without derogating from the Commissioner’s argument that the precise amount of the Note is itself evidence of artifice in the transaction. As the parties did in both the evidence and the argument, I use the $55 million figure for illustrative purposes. In fact, as recorded in fn 3 above, the Commissioner is time barred from reassessing two of FHNZ’s relevant income tax returns. The issues The primary issue in the proceedings is whether s BG 1 of the Act applies to the Arrangement. Two further issues arise if s BG 1 is held to apply: (a) whether the Commissioner’s reconstruction of the Arrangement pursuant to s GB 1 of the Act is correct or whether it is, as FHNZ submits, “incorrect and excessive”; and (b) whether the shortfall penalties in ss 141B (unacceptable tax position) or 141D (abusive tax position) of the Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA) have application. The key parties The High Court decided in favor of Frucor Suntory The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal, where a decision in favor of the tax authorities has now been issued. The Court of Appeal set aside the decision of the High Court in regards of the tax adjustment, but dismissed the appeal in regards of shortfall penalties. “We have already concluded that the principal driver of the funding arrangement was the availability of tax relief to Frucor in New Zealand through deductions it would claim on the coupon payments. The benefit it obtained under the arrangement was the ability to claim payments totalling $66 million as a fully deductible expense when, as a matter of commercial and economic reality, only $11 million of this sum comprised interest and the balance of $55 million represented the repayment of principal. The tax advantage gained under the arrangement was therefore not the whole of the interest deductions, only those that were effectively principal repayments. We consider the Commissioner was entitled to reconstruct by allowing the base level deductions totalling $11 million but disallowing the balance. The tax benefit Frucor obtained “from or under” the arrangement comprised the deductions claimed for interest on the balance of $149 million which, as a matter of commercial reality, represented the repayment of principal of $55 million.” ...

AFRICAN BARRICK GOLD PLC (now Acacia Mining Plc), the largest mining company operating in Tanzania, was issued a tax bill for unpaid taxes, interest and penalties for alleged under-declared export revenues. As a tax resident in Tanzania, AFRICAN BARRICK GOLD was asked to remit withholding taxes on dividend payments amounting to USD 81,843,127 which the company allegedly made for the years 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 (this sum was subsequently reduced to USD 41,250,426). AFRICAN BARRICK GOLD was also required to remit withholding taxes on payments which the mining entities in Tanzania had paid to the parent, together with payments which was made to other non-resident persons (its shareholders) for the service rendered between 2010 up to September 2013. AFRICAN BARRICK GOLD argued that, being a holding company incorporated in the United Kingdom, it was neither a resident company in Tanzania, nor did it conduct any business in Tanzania to attract the income tax demanded according to the tax assessment issued by the tax authorities. In 2016, the Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities. AFRICAN BARRICK GOLD then filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The Court dismissed the appeal of AFRICAN BARRICK GOLD and upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Excerpts “In light of our earlier finding that the appellant is a resident company with sources of mining income from its mining entities in Tanzania, this ground need not detain us long. We shall dismiss this ground because assignment of TIN and VRN registration numbers are legal consequences of the appellant’s tax residence in Tanzania. From the premise of our conclusion that the appellant became a resident company from 11th March 2010 when it was issued with a Certificate of Compliance for purposes of registering its place of business in Tanzania, the appellant had statutory obligation to apply to the respondent for a tax identification number within 15 days of beginning to carry on the business.” “We shall not trouble ourselves with the way the Board and the Tribunal interchangeably discussed “tax avoidance” and “tax evasion” while these courts were determining the salient question as to whether the dividend the appellant received from its Tanzanian entities and which was paid out to the appellant’s shareholders abroad was subject to withholding tax. As we pointed earlier, neither the Board nor the Tribunal made any actionable criminal finding against the appellant in respect of tax evasion. Otherwise, we agree with Mr. Tito in his submission that since the dividend which the appellant paid to its foreign shareholders had a source in the United Republic in terms of section 69(a) of the ITA 2004, the appellant had a statutory duty under section 54(1)(a) of the ITA 2004 to withhold tax from such dividends. Because the appellant failed to withhold that tax, the appellant is liable to pay that withholding tax in terms of sections 82(l)(a)(b) and 84(3) of the ITA 2004.” Click here for translation ...

Coffee Machine Ltd. was founded in Ireland and responsible for the trademark and patent administration as well as the management of the research and development activities of the A group, the world’s largest manufacturer of coffee machines. A Swiss subsidiary of the A group reported payments of dividend to the the Irish company and the group claimed that the payments were exempt from withholding tax under the DTA and issued a claim for a refund. Tax authorities found that the Irish company was not the beneficial owner of the dividend and on that basis denied the companies claim for refund. The lower Swiss court upheld the decision of the tax authorities. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court and supplemented its findings with the argument, that the arrangement was also abusive because of the connection between the share transfer in 2006 and the distribution of pre-acquisition reserves in 2007 and the total lack of substance in the Irish company. “…the circumstantial evidence suggests with a probability bordering on certainty that the complainant and the other companies involved wanted to secure a tax saving for themselves with the transfer of the shareholding in the subsidiary and the subsequent distribution of a dividend to the complainant, which they would not have been entitled to under the previous group structure. The economic objective asserted by the complainant – locating the research and development function, including the shareholding in the subsidiary, under the Irish grandparent company responsible for overseeing the licensing agreements – does not explain why the complainant went heavily into debt in order to ultimately use this borrowed capital to buy the subsidiary’s liquid funds, which were subject to latent withholding tax. It would have been much simpler for all parties involved and would have led to the same economic result if the subsidiary had instead distributed these funds to the sister company immediately before the transfer of the shareholding and the sister company had thus recorded an inflow of liquidity in the form of a dividend instead of a purchase price payment. Against this background, the chosen procedure appears to be outlandish and the legal arrangement artificial. Since the arrangement chosen by the complainant mainly served to obtain advantages from the DTA CH-IE and the AEOI-A CH-EU and the three characteristics of tax avoidance are met, the complainant must be accused of abuse of law both from the perspective of international law and from the perspective of internal law. “ “A person who, like the complainant, fulfils the criteria of abuse of the agreement and tax avoidance as defined by the practice cannot invoke the advantage pursuant to Art. 15 para. 1 aAIA-A CH-EU. As a result, the lower court did not violate either federal or international law by completely refusing to refund the withholding tax to the complainant on the basis of Art. 15 para. 1 aAIA-A CH-EU.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In 2008, the A Group had reorganized its internal financing function so that the Group’s parent company, A Oyj, had established A Finance NV in Belgium. Thereafter, A Oyj had transferred to intra-group long-term loan receivables of approximately EUR 223,500,000 to A Finance NV. In return, A Oyj had received shares in A Finance NV. The intra-group loan receivables transferred in kind had been unsecured and the interest income on the loan receivables had been transferred to A Finance NV on the same day. A Finance NV had entered the receivables in its balance sheet as assets. In addition, A Oyj and A Finance NV had agreed that target limits would be set for the return on investment achieved by A Finance NV through its operations. A Finance NV has reimbursed A Oyj for income that has exceeded the target limit or, alternatively, invoiced A Oyj for income that falls below the target limit. Based on the functional analysis prepared in the tax audit submitted to A Oyj, the Group Tax Center had considered that A Oyj had in fact performed all significant functions related to intra-group financing, assumed significant risks and used significant funds and that A Finance NV had not actually acted as a group finance company. The Group Tax Center had also considered that A Finance NV had received market-based compensation based on operating costs. In the tax adjustments for the tax years 2011 and 2012 submitted by the Group Tax Center to the detriment of the taxpayer, A Oyj had added as a transfer pricing adjustment: n the difference between the income deemed to be taxable and the income declared by the company and, in addition, imposed tax increases on the company. In the explanatory memorandum to its transfer pricing adjustment decisions, the Group Tax Center had stated that the transactions had not been re-characterized because the characterization or structuring of the transaction or arrangement between the parties had not been adjusted but taxed on the basis of actual transactions between the parties. The Supreme Administrative Court found that the Group Tax Center had ignored the legal actions taken by A Oyj and A Finance NV and in particular the fact that A Finance NV had become a creditor of the Group companies. It had identified the post-investment transactions between A Oyj and A Finance NV and considered that A Oyj had in fact performed all significant intra-group financing activities and that A Finance NV had not in fact acted as a group finance company. Thus, when submitting the tax adjustments to the detriment of the taxpayer, the Group Tax Center had re-characterized the legal transactions between A Oyj and A Finance NV on the basis of section 31 of the Act on Tax Procedure. As the said provision did not entitle the Group Tax Center to re-characterize the legal transactions made by the taxpayer and since it had not been alleged that A Oyj and A Finance NV had reorganized the Group’s financial activities for tax avoidance purposes, the Group Tax Center could not correct A Oyj taxes to the detriment of the taxpayer and does not impose tax increases on the company. Tax years 2011 and 2012. that A Oyj and A Finance NV had undertaken to reorganize the Group’s financial operations for the purpose of tax avoidance, the Group Tax Center could not, on the grounds presented, correct A Oyj’s taxation in 2011 and 2012 to the detriment of the taxpayer or impose tax increases on the company. Tax years 2011 and 2012. that A Oyj and A Finance NV had undertaken to reorganize the Group’s financial operations for the purpose of tax avoidance, the Group Tax Center could not, on the grounds presented, correct A Oyj’s taxation in 2011 and 2012 to the detriment of the taxpayer or impose tax increases on the company. Tax years 2011 and 2012. Click here for translation ...

In the case of HMRC v Smith & Nephew Overseas Ltd, consideration was given to the “fairly represent” requirement in the loan relationship code. The dispute concerns each of the Smith & Nephew’s entitlement to set off foreign exchange losses against their liability to corporation tax. The exchanges loss arose as a result of Smith & Nephews changing their functional accounting currencies from sterling to US dollars on 23 December 2008 at a time when the only asset on their balance sheets was a very substantial inter-company debt owed to them by their parent company. The debts were denominated in sterling but then had to be converted into dollars when the companies’ accounts were restated in dollars. The next day, the debts were disposed of as part of a group restructuring. The exchange losses arose from Smith & Nephew’s ‘loan relationships’ as that term is used in Chapter 2 of Part IV of the Finance Act 1996 (‘Chapter 2’). Section 80 provides that all profits and gains arising to a company from its loan relationships should be chargeable to tax as income in accordance with Chapter 2. It provides also that the Chapter has effect for the purpose of determining how any deficit on a company’s loan relationships is to be brought into account. Section 81 defines ‘loan relationship’ for the purposes of the Corporation Tax Acts. A loan relationship exists whenever a company stands in the position of a creditor or debtor as respects any money debt and that debt is one arising from a transaction for lending money. Section 82 sets out the method for bringing into account any gains or deficits arising from the company’s loan relationships and provides that those gains and deficits shall be computed in accordance with section 82, using the credits and debits given for the accounting period in question by the provisions of Chapter 2. Section 84 then provides for what debits and credits are to be brought into account in respect of the company’s loan relationships. It provides that the credits and debits to be brought into account shall be the sums which when taken together ‘fairly represent’ all profits, gains and losses of the company arising from its loan relationships. As originally enacted, section 84 did not cover gains and losses arising from fluctuations in currency exchange rates as they affected a company’s loan relationships. The Finance Act 2002 introduced section 84A to deal with exchange gains and losses arising from loan relationships. Section 84A provides, broadly, that exchange gains and losses are included in the references in section 84 to profits, gains and losses arising from its loan relationships. The term ‘exchange gains and losses’ is defined by section 103(1A), which was also introduced by the Finance Act 2002. Section 84A(3), however, excepted certain exchange gains and losses so that they were not included in the credits and debits covered by section 84. The category of exchange gains or losses to which section 84A does not apply because of section 84A(3) include those which fall within either section 84A(3)(a) or (b) and which are recognised in the company’s statement of total recognised gains and losses (‘STRGL’), rather than in its profit and loss account. Section 84A conferred on HM Treasury a regulation-making power to bring into account in prescribed circumstances amounts which are taken out of the regime by section 84A(3). HM Treasury exercised that power in 2002 making regulations which covered, amongst other things, the disposal of loan relationships in respect of which exchange gains and losses have been recognised in the company’s STRGL. The question was whether, if applicable to exchange losses, the losses satisfied the ‘fairly represent-test’ On that issue the court refered to the GDF Suez judgement where the following reasoning was provided: “I agree with HMRC’s submission that the presence or absence of a tax avoidance purpose should not be determinative. Although the Court in GDF Suez explained how the amendments to the loan relationships regime in 2004 and 2006 were prompted by the desire to close loopholes and prevent tax avoidance, the wording of the statute does not refer to tax avoidance as a yardstick. It is not correct to give the ‘fairly represent’ test a limited meaning by regarding tax avoidance as the paradigm situation where the test would not be met. The test may well be failed in a case where there is an avoidance motive but where the more specific provisions directed at preventing avoidance do not, for whatever reason, apply. However, the override is not limited to that situation since it is intended to operate in favour of the taxpayer as well as in favour of HMRC. It may lead, for example, to profits being left out of account for tax purposes even though they are included in the company’s accounts in accordance with GAAP. I also agree that the presence or absence of an ‘asymmetry’ of the tax treatment of a transaction when looked at from the perspective of the counterparties is not a factor that need be present in every case where the override is triggered. It so happens that asymmetry was a factor both in GDF Suez and in the earlier case of DCC Holdings (UK) Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2010] UKSC 58, [2011] 1 WLR 44. That does not mean, in my view, that the absence of an asymmetry in any subsequent case militates against the override being triggered. Finally, I agree with Mr Gibbon [counsel for HMRC] that the hurdle of ‘manifest absurdity’ which the Upper Tribunal appears to have applied before triggering the ‘fairly represent’ override is too stringent test. The true analysis is that section 84(1) is engaged wherever fair representation would not otherwise be achieved.” HMRC’s  appeal was dismissed by the Court ...

In a public statement the French General Directorate of Public Finance clarified that tax treatment of interest deductions taken by a French company on interest payments to a related Belgian company that benefits from the Belgian notional interest rate scheme. According to French Law, interest paid to foreign group companies is only deductible if a minimum rate of tax applies to the relevant income abroad. Click here for translation ...

An intercompany loan in the form of a so-called international debt pushdown had been issued to Universal Music Japan to acquire the shares of another Japanese group company. The tax authority found that the loan transaction had been entered for the principal purpose of reducing the tax burden in Japan and issued an assessment where deductions of the interest payments on the loan had been disallowed for tax purposes. Decision of the Court The Tokyo District Court decided in favour of Universal Music Japan and set aside the assessment. The Court held that the loan did not have the principle purpose of reducing taxes because the overall restructuring was conducted for valid business purposes. Therefore, the tax authorities could not invoke the Japanese anti-avoidance provisions to deny the interest deductions. The case is now pending at the Tokyo High Court awaiting a final decision. Click here for English Translation ...

In moving to the United Kingdom, a New Zealand citizen, Mr. Eric Watson, restructured a significant shareholding into debt owed by a New Zealand company, Cullen Group Ltd, to two Cayman Island conduit companies, all of which he still controlled to a high degree. This allowed Cullen Group Ltd to pay an Approved Issuer Levy (AIL) totalling $8 million, rather than Non-Resident Withholding Tax of $59.5 million. The steps in the arrangement were as follows: (a) Mr Watson sold his shares in Cullen Investments Ltd to Cullen Group, at a (rounded) value of $193 million, being $291 million less his previous $98 million shareholder advances. The sale was conditional on Cullen Investments Ltd selling its shares in Medical Holdings Ltd to Mr Watson and on Cullen Investments Ltd selling its shares in Vonelle Holdings Ltd to Maintenance Ltd which was owned by Mr Watson. (b) Cullen Group’s purchase of the Cullen Investments Ltd shares from Mr Watson was funded by a vendor loan from Mr Watson of $193 million (Loan A). Mr Watson also lent Cullen Group $98 million (Loan B) which Cullen Group on-lent to Cullen Investments Ltd so that Cullen Investments Ltd could repay Mr Watson’s shareholder advance of that amount. (c) Mr Watson assigned his rights under Loans A and B to the two conduit companies, Modena and Mayfair, respectively. Mr Watson made back-to-back loans of $193 million (Modena Loan) and $98 million (Mayfair Loan) to each of them to fund their payment to him of consideration for those respective assignments in return for security over all property owned by Modena and Mayfair respectively. The result was therefore that Cullen Investments Ltd was owned by Cullen Group which owed money to Modena/Mayfair which owed money to Mr Watson. Effectively, instead of Mr Watson owning the shares in Cullen Investments Ltd, he held loans for the same value to Cullen Investments Ltd’s owner, Cullen Group, through Modena and Mayfair. He had exchanged equity for debt. The tax authorities held that Cullen Group had avoided $59.5 million of NRWT (withholding tax) while it paid $8 million in Approved Issuer Levy. An assessment in the amount of the difference, $51.5 million, was issued. There are three requirements for there to be tax avoidance in New Zealand: There is an arrangement which uses, and falls within, specific tax provisions. Viewed in light of the arrangement as a whole, the taxpayer has used the specific provisions in a way which cannot have been within the contemplation and purpose of Parliament when it enacted the provisions. The arrangement has a purpose or effect, that is more than merely incidental, of directly or indirectly altering the incidence of income tax. The High Court found there was a tax avoidance arrangement because it was not within Parliament’s contemplation and purpose in enacting the Approved Issuer Levy regime. Cullen Group Ltd was found liable for the $51.5 million difference plus interest and penalties ...

The cases of T Danmark (C-116/16) and Y Denmark Aps (C-117/16) adresses questions related to interpretation of the EU-Parent-Subsidary-Directive. The issue is withholding taxes levied by the Danish tax authorities in situations where dividend payments are made to conduit companies located in treaty countries but were the beneficial owners of these payments are located in non-treaty countries. During the proceedings in the Danish court system the European Court of Justice was asked a number of questions related to the conditions under which exemption from withholding tax can be denied on dividend payments to related parties. The European Court of Justice has now answered these questions in favor of the Danish Tax Ministry; Benefits granted under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive can be denied where fraudulent or abusive tax avoidance is involved. Quotations from cases C-116/16 and C-117/16: “The general principle of EU law that EU law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends must be interpreted as meaning that, where there is a fraudulent or abusive practice, the national authorities and courts are to refuse a taxpayer the exemption from withholding tax on profits distributed by a subsidiary to its parent company, provided for in Article 5 of Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, as amended by Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003, even if there are no domestic or agreement-based provisions providing for such a refusal.” “Proof of an abusive practice requires, first, a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the EU rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved and, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the EU rules by artificially creating the conditions laid down for obtaining it. The presence of a certain number of indications may demonstrate that there is an abuse of rights, in so far as those indications are objective and consistent. Such indications can include, in particular, the existence of conduit companies which are without economic justification and the purely formal nature of the structure of the group of companies, the financial arrangements and the loans.” “In order to refuse to accord a company the status of beneficial owner of dividends, or to establish the existence of an abuse of rights, a national authority is not required to identify the entity or entities which it regards as being the beneficial owner(s) of those dividends.” “In a situation where the system, laid down by Directive 90/435, as amended by Directive 2003/123, of exemption from withholding tax on dividends paid by a company resident in a Member State to a company resident in another Member State is not applicable because there is found to be fraud or abuse, within the meaning of Article 1(2) of that directive, application of the freedoms enshrined in the FEU Treaty cannot be relied on in order to call into question the legislation of the first Member State governing the taxation of those dividends.” Several cases have been awaiting the decision from the EU Court of Justice and will now be resumed in Danish courts ...

The cases of N Luxembourg 1 (C-115/16), X Denmark A/S (C-118/16), C Danmark I (C-119/16) and Z Denmark ApS (C-299/16), adresses questions related to the interpretation of the EU Interest and Royalty Directive. The issue in these cases is withholding taxes levied by the Danish tax authorities in situations where interest payments are made to conduit companies located in treaty countries but were the beneficial owners of these payments are located in non-treaty countries. During the proceedings in the Danish court system the European Court of Justice was asked a number of questions related to the conditions under which exemption from withholding tax can be denied on interest payments to related parties. The European Court of Justice has now answered these questions in favor of the Danish Tax Ministry; Benefits granted under the Interest and Royalty Directive can be denied where fraudulent or abusive tax avoidance is involved. Quotations from cases C-115/16, C-118/16, C-119/16 and C-299/16: “The concept of ‘beneficial owner of the interest’, within the meaning of Directive 2003/49, must therefore be interpreted as designating an entity which actually benefits from the interest that is paid to it. Article 1(4) of the directive confirms that reference to economic reality by stating that a company of a Member State is to be treated as the beneficial owner of interest or royalties only if it receives those payments for its own benefit and not as an intermediary, such as an agent, trustee or authorised signatory, for some other person.” “ It is clear from the development — as set out in paragraphs 4 to 6 above — of the OECD Model Tax Convention and the commentaries relating thereto that the concept of ‘beneficial owner’ excludes conduit companies and must be understood not in a narrow technical sense but as having a meaning that enables double taxation to be avoided and tax evasion and avoidance to be prevented.” “Whilst the pursuit by a taxpayer of the tax regime most favourable for him cannot, as such, set up a general presumption of fraud or abuse (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 September 2006, Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, C‑196/04, EU:C:2006:544, paragraph 50; of 29 November 2011, National Grid Indus, C‑371/10, EU:C:2011:785, paragraph 84; and of 24 November 2016, SECIL, C‑464/14, EU:C:2016:896, paragraph 60), the fact remains that such a taxpayer cannot enjoy a right or advantage arising from EU law where the transaction at issue is purely artificial economically and is designed to circumvent the application of the legislation of the Member State concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 12 September 2006, Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, C‑196/04, EU:C:2006:544, paragraph 51; of 7 November 2013, K, C‑322/11, EU:C:2013:716, paragraph 61; and of 25 October 2017, Polbud — Wykonawstwo, C‑106/16, EU:C:2017:804, paragraphs 61 to 63)….It is apparent from these factors that it is incumbent upon the national authorities and courts to refuse to grant entitlement to rights provided for by Directive 2003/49 where they are invoked for fraudulent or abusive ends.” “In a situation where the system, laid down by Directive 2003/49, of exemption from withholding tax on interest paid by a company resident in a Member State to a company resident in another Member State is not applicable because there is found to be fraud or abuse, within the meaning of Article 5 of that directive, application of the freedoms enshrined in the FEU Treaty cannot be relied on in order to call into question the legislation of the first Member State governing the taxation of that interest. Outside such a situation, Article 63 TFEU must be interpreted as: –not precluding, in principle, national legislation under which a resident company which pays interest to a non-resident company is required to withhold tax on that interest at source whilst such an obligation is not owed by that resident company when the company which receives the interest is also a resident company, but as precluding national legislation that prescribes such withholding of tax at source if interest is paid by a resident company to a non-resident company whilst a resident company that receives interest from another resident company is not subject to the obligation to make an advance payment of corporation tax during the first two tax years and is therefore not required to pay corporation tax relating to that interest until a date appreciably later than the date for payment of the tax withheld at source; –precluding national legislation under which the resident company that owes the obligation to withhold tax at source on interest paid by it to a non-resident company is obliged, if the tax withheld is paid late, to pay default interest at a higher rate than the rate which is applicable in the event of late payment of corporation tax that is charged, inter alia, on interest received by a resident company from another resident company; –precluding national legislation providing that, where a resident company is subject to an obligation to withhold tax at source on the interest which it pays to a non-resident company, account is not taken of the expenditure in the form of interest, directly related to the lending at issue, which the latter company has incurred whereas, under that national legislation, such expenditure may be deducted by a resident company which receives interest from another resident company for the purpose of establishing its taxable income.” Several cases have been awaiting the decision from the EU Court of Justice and will now be resumed in Danish courts ...

Italien fashion group, Dolce & Gabbana, had moved ownership of valuable intangibles to a subsidiary established for that purpose in Luxembourg. The Italian Revenue Agency found the arrangement to be wholly artificial and set up only to avoid Italien taxes and to benefit from the privileged tax treatment in Luxembourg. The Revenue Agency argued that all decision related to the intangibles was in fact taken at the Italian headquarters of Dolce & Gabbana in Milan, and not in Luxembourg, where there were no administrative structure and only one employee with mere secretarial duties. Dolce & Gabbana disagreed with these findings and brought the case to court. In the first and second instance the courts ruled in favor of the Italian Revenue Agency, but the Italian Supreme Court ruled in favor of Dolce & Gabbana. According to the Supreme Court, the fact that a company is established in another EU Member State to benefit from more advantageous tax legislation does not as such constitute an abuse of the freedom of establishment. The relevant criteria in this regard is if the arrangement is a wholly artificial and as such does not reflect economic reality. Determination of a company’s place of business requires multible factors to be taken into consideration. The fact, that the Luxembourg company strictly followed directives issued by its Italian parent company is not sufficient to consider the structure as abusive and thus to relocate its place of effective management to Italy. A more thorough analysis of the activity carried out in Luxembourg should have been performed. According to the Supreme Court something was actually done in Luxembourg. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

This case concerns application of the general anti-avoidance rule in s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 2004. The tax authorities issued an assessment where deductions of $10,827,606 and $11,665,323 were disallowed in the 2006 and 2007 income tax years respectively. In addition, penalties of $1,786,555 and $1,924,779 for those years were imposed. The claimed deductions arose in the context of an arrangement entered into by Frucor Holdings Ltd (FHNZ) involving, among other steps, its issue of a Convertible Note to Deutsche Bank, New Zealand Branch (DBNZ) and a forward purchase of the shares DBNZ could call for under the Note by FHNZ’s Singapore based parent Danone Asia Pte Ltd (DAP). The Note had a face value of $204,421,5654 and carried interest at a rate of 6.5 per cent per annum. Over its five-year life, FHNZ paid DBNZ approximately $66 million which FHNZ characterised as interest and deducted for income tax purposes. The tax authorities said that, although such deduction complied with the “black letter” of the Act, $55 million of the $66 million paid was in fact a non- deductible repayment of principal. Hence only interest deduction of $11 million only over the life of the Arrangement was allowed. These figures represent the deduction disallowed by the Commissioner, as compared to the deductions claimed by the taxpayer: $13,250,998 in 2006 and $13,323,806 in 2007. Based on an allegedly abusive tax position but mitigated by the taxpayer’s prior compliance history. In so doing, avoiding any exposure to shortfall penalties for the 2008 and 2009 years in the event it is unsuccessful in the present proceedings. The income years 2004 and 2005, in which interest deductions were also claimed under the relevant transaction are time barred. Which I will refer to hereafter as $204 million without derogating from the Commissioner’s argument that the precise amount of the Note is itself evidence of artifice in the transaction. As the parties did in both the evidence and the argument, I use the $55 million figure for illustrative purposes. In fact, as recorded in fn 3 above, the Commissioner is time barred from reassessing two of FHNZ’s relevant income tax returns. The issues The primary issue in the proceedings is whether s BG 1 of the Act applies to the Arrangement. Two further issues arise if s BG 1 is held to apply: (a) whether the Commissioner’s reconstruction of the Arrangement pursuant to s GB 1 of the Act is correct or whether it is, as FHNZ submits, “incorrect and excessive”; and (b) whether the shortfall penalties in ss 141B (unacceptable tax position) or 141D (abusive tax position) of the Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA) have application. The key parties The Court found in favor of Frucor Suntory ...

New Oxfam research shows that four pharmaceutical corporations — Abbott, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, and Pfizer — systematically allocate super profits in overseas tax havens. In eight advanced economies, pharmaceutical profits averaged 7 percent, while in seven developing countries they averaged 5 percent. In comparison, profits margins averaged 31 percent in countries with low or no corporate tax rates – Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands and Singapore. The report exposes how pharmaceutical corporations uses sophisticated tax planning to avoid taxes ...

The Canada Revenue Agency had issued a reassessments related to Loblaw’s Barbadian banking subsidiary, Glenhuron, for tax years 2001 – 2010. The tax authorities had determined that Glenhuron did not meet the requirements to be considered a foreign bank under Canadian law, and therefore was not exempt from paying Canadian taxes. “Loblaw took steps to make Glenhuron look like a bank in order to avoid paying tax. Government lawyers said Glenhuron did not qualify because, among other things, it largely invested the grocery giant’s own funds and was “playing with its own money.“ Tax Court found the transactions entered into by Loblaw regarding Glenhuron did result in a tax benefit but “were entered primarily for purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit and consequently were not avoidance transactions.” The Tax Court concludes as follows: “I do not see any extending the scope of paragraph 95(2)(l) of the Act. No, had there been any avoidance transactions the Appellant would not be saved by the fact it is not caught by a specific anti-avoidance provision.“ “The FAPI rules are complicated, or convoluted as counsel on both sides reminded me, though I needed no reminding. GAAR can be complicated. Taken together they weave a web of intricacy worthy of the 400 pages of written argument presented to me by the Parties. It has not been necessary for me to cover in exhaustive detail every strand of the web. Once I determined how to interpret the financial institution exemption, the complexity disappeared and the case could be readily resolved on the simple basis that Loblaw Financial’s foreign affiliate, a regulated foreign bank with more than the equivalent of five full time employees was conducting business principally with Loblaw and therefore could not avail itself of the financial institution exemption from investment business.“ “With respect to the calculation of the FAPI that arises from my determination, I agree with Loblaw Financial that the financial exchange gains/losses should not be treated on capital account but on income account. It does not matter whether the management fees from the Disputed Entities fall within paragraph 95(2)(b) of the Act as they would be part of GBL’s investment business caught by FAPI in any event.“ ...

In May 2018 the final report on corporate tax avoidance in Australia was published by the Australian Senate. The report contains the findings, conclusions and recommendations based on 4 years of hearings and investigations into tax avoidance practices by multinationals in Australia ...

The issue in this case was whether tax administration could tax a “non-existent income” through the “deeming provisions” of s 98 of Zimbabwe’s Income Tax Act. A lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement had been entered by CRS Ltd and a related South African company, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers and tankers for a fixed rental. The tax payer contended that the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable. The tax administration contended that they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and tax avoidance. The court ruled in favor of the tax administration. Excerps from the Judgement: “Where any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such liability, and which in the opinion of the Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out- (a) was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or (b) has created rights or obligations which would not nonnally be created between persons dealing at arm’s length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and the Commissioner is of the opinion that the avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or reduction.” “Accordingly, I agree with Mr Bhebhe that the agreements had the stipulated effect of avoiding or reducing the appellant’s liability for income tax. The circumstances prevailing at the time the agreement was entered into or carried out In the hyperinflationary era, the appellant averred that it could not secure local contracts that would enable it to fully utilize all its assets. The local currency Jost value at an alarming rate. The pricing of transport services became a nightmare. The income derived from transport services could not sustain the local operations. It was faced with the spectre of liquidation and staff retrenchments. The effect of which was that its loyal and skilled manpower mainly consisting of approximately 110 drivers would lose their only source of livelihood for themselves and their families while the company mechanical horses and trailers would deteriorate through disuse. The appellant could not access the foreign currency required to purchase spare parts and fuel necessary to keep the local operations running.” “It is a notorious fact of commercial life that related parties enter into contractual amngements. I did not discern any abnormalities in the nature of the agreements nor in the identities of the signatories. There was however an admixture of the normal and abnormal in the manner in which the agreements were carried out. For starters, the appellant overemphasized the indisputable uniqueness of the manner in which the agreements were carried out. In the letter of 24 October 2013 at p 50.1 para 11 the external accountants for the appellant wrote that “the appellant’s position is unique in the transport regime of Zimbabwe and there is no other haulier which provides a similar service.” The same point was repeated in the letter of 6 December 2013 at p 45.1 in para 1.2 where the same accountants indicated that they “were unaware of any Zimbabwean company which operates in the same unique situation as the appellant.” “In assessing the information availed to the Commissioner by the appellant and to this Court by both the appellant and the Commissioner, I am satisfied the agreements were carried out in a manner which would not normally be employed in such transactions. In the light of the formulation of Trollip JA in Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue, supra, it appears to me that the two parties were not acting at arm’s length.” “It was clear that each party derived tangible benefits from the agreements. The related party had the right to lease the equipment and the obligation to pay rentals and maintain the equipment. The appellant received a fixed rental. The obligation to meet the maintenance and running expenses was unique and abnonnal. The fixed rentals which negated the cost plus mark-up principle was abnormal and would not have been concluded by parties dealing at arm’s length.” “It seems trite to me that the purpose of a private company is to make a profit. The appellant is not a non-profit making organisation. The appellant was content with the untenable situation in which it made and continues to make losses without any prospects of ever making a profit. It seems to me that the fixed rental was deliberately designed to ensure that the appellant would remain viable enough to survive liquidation and costly retrenchments and at the same avoid or reduce its income tax liability.” “I am satisfied that the avoidance or reduction of income tax liability was one of the main purposes of the agreement (s).” “In my view, the transactions undertaken by the appellant fell into the all-embracing provisions of s 98. The respondent correctly invoked this provision in assessing the appellant to income tax in each of the four tax years in question.” “The appellant strongly argued against the alteration of the contract of lease concluded between the related parties by the respondent. While Mr Bhebhe conceded that the respondent did not have the legal authority to alter the contract of the related parties ...

In the case of Univar Holdco the Canadian tax authorities had applied Canadian Anti-Avoidance Rules to a serie of transactions undertaken by the Univar Group following the acquisition of the group’s Dutch parent. The (only) purpose of these transactions was to increase the amount of retained earnings that could be taken out of Canada without incurring withholding tax. The Federal Court of Appeal overturned the prior decision of the Tax Court and came to the conclusion that it had not been proved that the transactions were abusive tax avoidance – abuse of the Act. The Court also noted that subsequent amendments and commentary to the Act do not confirm that transactions caught by the subsequent amendments are abusive before the amendments are enacted. The 2017 decision of the Federal Court of Appeal The 2016 decision of the Tax Court ...

Luxembourg gave illegal tax benefits to Amazon worth around €250 million The European Commission has concluded that Luxembourg granted undue tax benefits to Amazon of around €250 million.  Following an in-depth investigation launched in October 2014, the Commission has concluded that a tax ruling issued by Luxembourg in 2003, and prolonged in 2011, lowered the tax paid by Amazon in Luxembourg without any valid justification. The tax ruling enabled Amazon to shift the vast majority of its profits from an Amazon group company that is subject to tax in Luxembourg (Amazon EU) to a company which is not subject to tax (Amazon Europe Holding Technologies). In particular, the tax ruling endorsed the payment of a royalty from Amazon EU to Amazon Europe Holding Technologies, which significantly reduced Amazon EU’s taxable profits. The Commission’s investigation showed that the level of the royalty payments, endorsed by the tax ruling, was inflated and did not reflect economic reality. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the tax ruling granted a selective economic advantage to Amazon by allowing the group to pay less tax than other companies subject to the same national tax rules. In fact, the ruling enabled Amazon to avoid taxation on three quarters of the profits it made from all Amazon sales in the EU. Amazon’s structure in Europe The Commission decision concerns Luxembourg’s tax treatment of two companies in the Amazon group – Amazon EU and Amazon Europe Holding Technologies. Both are Luxembourg-incorporated companies that are fully-owned by the Amazon group and ultimately controlled by the US parent, Amazon.com, Inc. Amazon EU (the “operating company”) operates Amazon’s retail business throughout Europe. In 2014, it had over 500 employees, who selected the goods for sale on Amazon’s websites in Europe, bought them from manufacturers, and managed the online sale and the delivery of products to the customer.Amazon set up their sales operations in Europe in such a way that customers buying products on any of Amazon’s websites in Europe were contractually buying products from the operating company in Luxembourg. This way, Amazon recorded all European sales, and the profits stemming from these sales, in Luxembourg. Amazon Europe Holding Technologies (the “holding company”) is a limited partnership with no employees, no offices and no business activities. The holding company acts as an intermediary between the operating company and Amazon in the US. It holds certain intellectual property rights for Europe under a so-called “cost-sharing agreement” with Amazon in the US. The holding company itself makes no active use of this intellectual property. It merely grants an exclusive license to this intellectual property to the operating company, which uses it to run Amazon’s European retail business. Under the cost-sharing agreement the holding company makes annual payments to Amazon in the US to contribute to the costs of developing the intellectual property. The appropriate level of these payments has recently been determined by a US tax court. Under Luxembourg’s general tax laws, the operating company is subject to corporate taxation in Luxembourg, whilst the holding company is not because of its legal form, a limited partnership.Profits recorded by the holding company are only taxed at the level of the partners and not at the level of the holding company itself. The holding company’s partners were located in the US and have so far deferred their tax liability. Amazon implemented this structure, endorsed by the tax ruling under investigation, between May 2006 and June 2014. In June 2014, Amazon changed the way it operates in Europe. This new structure is outside the scope of the Commission State aid investigation. The scope of the Commission investigation The role of EU State aid control is to ensure Member States do not give selected companies a better tax treatment than others, via tax rulings or otherwise. More specifically, transactions between companies in a corporate group must be priced in a way that reflects economic reality. This means that the payments between two companies in the same group should be in line with arrangements that take place under commercial conditions between independent businesses (so-called “arm’s length principle”). The Commission’s State aid investigation concerned a tax ruling issued by Luxembourgto Amazon in 2003 and prolonged in 2011. This ruling endorsed a method to calculate the taxable base of the operating company. Indirectly, it also endorsed a method to calculate annual payments from the operating company to the holding company for the rights to the Amazon intellectual property, which were used only by the operating company. These payments exceeded, on average, 90% of the operating company’s operating profits. They were significantly (1.5 times) higher than what the holding company needed to pay to Amazon in the US under the cost-sharing agreement. To be clear, the Commission investigation did not question that the holding company owned the intellectual property rights that it licensed to the operating company, nor the regular payments the holding company made to Amazon in the US to develop this intellectual property. It also did not question Luxembourg’s general tax system as such. Commission assessment The Commission’s State aid investigation concluded that the Luxembourg tax ruling endorsed an unjustified method to calculate Amazon’s taxable profits in Luxembourg. In particular, the level of the royalty payment from the operating company to the holding company was inflated and did not reflect economic reality. The operating company was the only entity actively taking decisions and carrying out activities related to Amazon’s European retail business. As mentioned, its staff selected the goods for sale, bought them from manufacturers, and managed the online sale and the delivery of products to the customer. The operating company also adapted the technology and software behind the Amazon e-commerce platform in Europe, and invested in marketing and gathered customer data. This means that it managed and added value to the intellectual property rights licensed to it. The holding company was an empty shell that simply passed on the intellectual property rights to the operating company for its exclusive use. The holding company was not itself in any way ...

In a public hearing held 22 August 2017 in Sydney Australia by the Economics References Committee, tech companies IBM, Microsoft, and Apple were called to the witnesses stand to explain about tax avoidance schemes – use of “regional headquarters” in low tax jurisdictions (Singapore, Ireland and the Netherlands) to avoid or reduce taxes. Follow the ongoing Australian hearings into corporate tax avoidance on this site: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Corporatetax45th Transcript from the hearing: ...

A Russian company, Uralkaliy PAO, sold potassium chloride to a related trading company in Switzerland , Uralkali Trading SA. Following an audit, the Russian tax authority concluded that Uralkaliy PAO had set the prices at an artificially low level. A decision was therefore issued, ordering the taxpayer to pay an additional tax of 980 million roubles and a penalty of 3 million roubles. Uralkaly PAO had used the transactional net margin method (TNMM). The reasons given for not using the CUP method was that no publicly accessible sources of information on comparable transactions between independent parties existed. The range of return on sales for 2012 under the TNMM was 1.83% – 5.59%, while Uralkali Trading SA’s actual profit margin was 1.81%. The court supported the taxpayer’s choice of pricing method (TNMM), and since the Swiss trader’s actual profit margin did not exceed the upper limit of the range, it was concluded that the controlled transactions were priced at arm’s length.  The court rejected the tax authority’s position that Uralkali Trading SA had purchased products at an artificially low price from Uralkaliy PAO and resold them at a large mark-up. The court also identified significant flaws in the tax authority’s application of the CUP method. Had the Swiss trader, Uralkali Trading SA, used the prices sugested by the tax authorities it would not have been able to cover even “direct business costs” and thus been loss-making. The tax authority had wrongfully compared the taxpayer’s prices in transactions with Uralkali Trading SA with that same taxpayer’s prices after the addition of another trader’s margin. The data published by the Argus price reporting agency had been used without properly analysing the transactions on which the price quotations were based and without adjusting for significant differences in comparability factors – volumes, period , and payment terms. For these reasons, the tax authority’s decision was ruled invalid. Click here for translation ...

Civil monetary penalties for tax understatement are frequently triggered by one or more of the following: an understatement of tax liability exceeding a threshold amount, negligence of the taxpayer, or wilful intent to evade tax (and also fraud, although fraud can trigger much more serious criminal penalties). Many OECD member countries impose civil monetary penalties for negligence or willful intent, while only a few countries penalise “no-fault” understatements of tax liability ...

Even if some countries were willing to accept global formulary apportionment, there would be disagreements because each country may want to emphasize or include different factors in the formula based on the activities or factors that predominate in its jurisdiction. Each country would have a strong incentive to devise formulae or formula weights that would maximise that country’s own revenue. In addition, tax administrations would have to consider jointly how to address the potential for artificially shifting the production factors used in the formula (e.g. sales, capital) to low tax countries. There could be tax avoidance to the extent that the components of the relevant formula can be manipulated, e.g. by entering into unnecessary financial transactions, by the deliberate location of mobile assets, by requiring that particular companies within an MNE group maintain inventory levels in excess of what normally would be encountered in an uncontrolled company of that type, and so on ...

When independent enterprises transact with each other, the conditions of their commercial and financial relations (e.g. the price of goods transferred or services provided and the conditions of the transfer or provision) ordinarily are determined by market forces. When associated enterprises transact with each other, their commercial and financial relations may not be directly affected by external market forces in the same way, although associated enterprises often seek to replicate the dynamics of market forces in their transactions with each other, as discussed in paragraph 1.5 below. Tax administrations should not automatically assume that associated enterprises have sought to manipulate their profits. There may be a genuine difficulty in accurately determining a market price in the absence of market forces or when adopting a particular commercial strategy. It is important to bear in mind that the need to make adjustments to approximate arm’s length conditions arises irrespective of any contractual obligation undertaken by the parties to pay a particular price or of any intention of the parties to minimize tax. Thus, a tax adjustment under the arm’s length principle would not affect the underlying contractual obligations for non-tax purposes between the associated enterprises, and may be appropriate even where there is no intent to minimize or avoid tax. The consideration of transfer pricing should not be confused with the consideration of problems of tax fraud or tax avoidance, even though transfer pricing policies may be used for such purposes ...

The taxpayer is registered and incorporated in the Republic of South Africa and carries on business in the petrochemical industry. It has some of its subsidiaries in foreign jurisdictions. Business activities include the importation and refinement of crude oil. This matter concerns the analysis of supply agreements entered into between the XYZ Corp and some of its foreign subsidiaries. It thus brings to fore, inter alia the application of the South African developing fiscal legal principles, namely, residence based taxation, section 9D of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and other established principles of tax law, such as anti-tax avoidance provisions and substance over form. Tax avoidance is the use of legal methods to modify taxpayer’s financial situation to reduce the amount of tax that is payable SARS’s ground of assessment is that the XYZ Group structure constituted a transaction, operation or scheme as contemplated in section 103(1) of the Act. The structure had the effect of avoiding liability for the payment of tax imposed under the Act. The case is based on the principle of substance over form, in which event the provisions of section 9D will be applicable. Alternatively the respondent’s case is based on the application of section 103 of the Act. XYZ Group denies that the substance of the relevant agreements differed from their form. It contends that both in form and substance the relevant amounts were received by or accrued to XYZIL from sale of crude oil by XYZIL to SISIL. XYZ Group states that in order to treat a transaction as simulated or a sham, it is necessary to find that there was dishonesty. The parties did not intend the transaction to have effect in accordance with its terms but intended to disguise the transaction. The transaction should be intended to deceive by concealing what the real agreement or transaction between the parties is. Substance over form: If the transaction is genuine then it is not simulated, and if it is simulated then it is a dishonest transaction, whatever the motives of those who concluded the transaction. The true position is that „the court examines the transaction as a whole, including all surrounding circumstances, any unusual features of the transaction and the manner in which the parties intend to implement it, before determining in any particular case whether a transaction is simulated. Among those features will be the income tax consequences of the transaction. Tax evasion is of course impermissible and therefore, if a transaction is simulated, it may amount to tax evasion. But there is nothing impermissible about arranging one’s affairs XYZ as to minimise one’s tax liability, in other words, in tax avoidance. If the revenue authorities regard any particular form of tax avoidance as undesirable they arefree to amend the Act, as occurs annually, to close anything they regard as a loophole. That is what occurred when s 8C was introduced. Once that is appreciated the argument based on simulation must fail. For it to succeed, it required the participants in the scheme to have intended, when exercising their options to enter into agreements of purchase and sale of shares, to do XYZ on terms other than those set out in the scheme. Before a transaction is in fraudem legis in the above sense, it must be satisfied that there is some unexpressed agreement or tacit understanding between the parties. The Court rules as follows: The question is whether the substance of the relevant agreements differs from form. The interposition of XIXL and the separate reading of “back-to-back” agreements take XIXL out of the equation. Regrettably no matter how the appellant’s witnesses try to dress the contracts and their implementation, the surrounding circumstances; implementation of the uncharacteristic features of the transaction point to none other than disguised contracts. The court can only read one thing not expressed as it is; tax avoidance. Based on the evidence the court concludes that the purpose of relevant supply agreements was to avoid the anticipated tax which would accrue to XYZIL, a CFC if it sold the crude oil directly to XYZ. The court has concluded that the whole scheme and or the implementation of supply agreements is a sham. The court, therefore cannot consider the facsimile argument in isolation to support the averment that the contracts were concluded in IOM. Furthermore there is nothing before court to the effect that XYZIL has an FBE with a truly active business with connections to South Africa being used for bona fide non- tax business purposes. There is not even a shred of evidence alluding to the existence of an FBE. Section 76 (2) empowers SARS with a discretion to remit a portion or all of the additional tax assessment in terms of section 76 (1). Additional tax prescribed in Section 76(1) is 200% of the relevant tax amount. The appeal is dismissed. The assessments by the South African Revenue Services for 2005, 2006 and 2007 tax years as well as interest and penalties, are confirmed ...

Wells Fargo, an American multinational financial services company, had claimed foreign tax credits in the amount of $350 based on a “Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged Securities” (STARS) scheme. The STARS foreign tax credit scheme has two components — a trust structure which produces the foreign tax credits and a loan structure which generates interest deductions. Wells Fargo was of the opinion that the STARS arrangement was a single, integrated transaction that resulted in low-cost funding. In 2016, a jury found that the trust and loan structure were two independent transactions and that the trust transaction failed both the objective and subjective test of the “economic substance” analysis. With respect to the loan transaction the jury found that the transaction passed the objective test by providing a reasonable possibility of a pre-tax profit, but failed the subjective test as the transaction had been entered into “solely for tax-related reasons.” The federal court ruled that Wells Fargo had not been entitled to foreign tax credits. The transaction lacked both economic substance and a non-tax business purpose. (The economic substance doctrine in the US had an objective and a subjective prong . The objective prong of the analysis considered whether a transaction had a real potential to produce an economic profit after consideration of transaction costs and without consideration of potential tax benefits. The subjective prong of the analysis considered whether the taxpayer had a non-tax business purpose for the transaction. The relationship between the two prongs had long been debated.  Some argued for application of the prongs disjunctively and others argued for application of the prongs conjunctively. When the US Congress codified the economic substance doctrine in 2010, it adopted a conjunctive formulation—denying tax benefits to a transaction if it failed to satisfy either prong.) ...

Tax avoidance scheme. Use of total return swap over shares in subsidiary to create a deemed creditor relationship. Value of shares depressed by novating liability for large loans to subsidiary. The scheme used by Ladbroke UK involved a total return swap and a novation of loans to extract reserves. Used to achieve a “synthetic transfer” of the JBB business to LB&G. In essence, this involved extracting the surplus which had accumulated in LGI and transferring it to LB&G prior to an actual sale of the JBB business to LB&G. The normal way to extract such reserves would be by a dividend payment. The Court ruled, that it is sufficient for the application of paragraph 13 (UK GAAR) that the relevant person has an unallowable purpose. Where the unallowable purpose is to secure a tax advantage for another person, HMRC do not have to show that the other person has in fact obtained a tax advantage, if the other person has been prevented from obtaining a tax advantage by the operation of paragraph 13. It would be impossible to construe paragraph 13 in that way where the relevant person intended to obtain a tax advantage for 40 itself, and there is nothing in the wording to indicate a different result where it intends to obtain a tax advantage for another ...

Oxfam’s list of Tax Havens, in order of significance are: (1) Bermuda (2) the Cayman Islands (3) the Netherlands (4) Switzerland (5) Singapore (6) Ireland (7) Luxembourg (8) Curaçao (9) Hong Kong (10) Cyprus (11) Bahamas (12) Jersey (13) Barbados, (14) Mauritius and (15) the British Virgin Islands. Most notably is The Netherlands placement as no. 3 on the list. Oxfam researchers compiled the list by assessing the extent to which countries employ the most damaging tax policies, such as zero corporate tax rates, the provision of unfair and unproductive tax incentives, and a lack of cooperation with international processes against tax avoidance (including measures to increase financial transparency). Many of the countries on the list have been implicated in tax scandals. For example Ireland hit the headlines over a tax deal with Apple that enabled the global tech giant to pay a 0.005 percent corporate tax rate in the country. And the British Virgin Islands is home to more than half of the 200,000 offshore companies set up by Mossack Fonseca – the law firm at the heart of the Panama Papers scandal. The United Kingdom does not feature on the list, but four territories that the United Kingdom is ultimately responsible for do appear: the Cayman Islands, Jersey, Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands ...

Ensco Gerudi provided offshore drilling services to the petroleum industry in Malaysia. The company did not own any drilling rigs, but entered into leasing agreements with a rig owner within the Ensco Group. One of the rig owners in the group incorporated a Labuan company to facilitate easier business dealings for the taxpayer. Ensco Gerudi entered into a leasing agreement with the Labuan company for the rigs. Unlike previous transactions, the leasing payments made to the Labuan company did not attract withholding tax. The tax authorities found the Labuan company had no economic or commercial substance and that the purpose of the transaction had only been to benefit from the tax reduction. The High Court decided in favour of the taxpayer. The Court held that there was nothing artificial about the payments and that the transactions were within the meaning and scope of the arrangements contemplated by the government in openly offering incentives. The High Court ruled that taxpayers have the freedom to structure transactions to their best tax advantage in so far as the arrangement viewed in a commercially and economically realistic way makes use of the specific provision in a manner that was consistent with Parliament’s intention ...

AFRICAN BARRICK GOLD PLC (now Acacia Mining Plc), the largest mining company operating in Tanzania, was issued a tax bill for unpaid taxes, interest and penalties for alleged under-declared export revenues from the Bulyanhulu and Buzwagi mines. Acacia Mining was accused of operating illegally in the country and for tax evasion. Decision of the Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal The Tribunal decided in favour of the tax authorities. “The conclusion that can be drawn from the above definitions is that the explanation offered by ABG as the source of dividends, i.e., distributable reserves and IPO proceeds are far from being plausible. In the circumstances, it is fair to conclude that the respondent’s argument that the transactions were simply a design created by the appellant aimed at tax evasion was justified. One also wonders as to how could part of IPO proceeds, a one-off event, even if those proceeds were distributable as dividends (which in law they are not), could explain the payment of four-years, back-to-back dividends to the appellant’s shareholders. Since ABG’s only entities that carry on business anywhere in the world are the three Tanzanian gold-mining companies, ABG’s only source of revenue that could create net profits or retained earnings would be the three Tanzanian companies (or one or more of them). While none of them was allegedly making any profits, and since the appellant has no other subsidiary anywhere in the world engaged in business, one is compelled to further conclude that at least one, if not more or all, of the appellant’s three gold producing subsidiaries in Tanzania was making profit. We see no other plausible explanation. Ultimately, the fact that none of ABG’s subsidiaries is declaring any profit that could provide its holding company with such huge net profits sufficient to distribute to its shareholders four years in a row is what in our respectful opinion constitutes the evidence of a sophisticated scheme of tax evasion. To borrow the words of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, this Tribunal cannot accept to be relegated to a mere spectator, mesmerized by the moves of the appellant’s game, oblivious of the end result. The circumstances remind one of the wise words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo in Re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782 at 785, who stated: “Consequences cannot alter statutes but may help to fix their meaning.” We are thus of the respectful view that the Board was entitled to go beyond the mere plain meaning of the provisions of section 66 (4) (a) of the Income Tax Act. The circumstances fully justified the application of the purposive approach rule in construction of tax statutes, as promulgated by Lord Wilberforce in W. T. Ramsay and more elaborately explained by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in McGuckian. Hence, by recognizing the scheme behind the facade that ultimately enabled it to uncover the true source of the dividends that ABG was able to pay to its shareholders for four consecutive years, the Board took the correct view of the law. With these findings we see no merit in the first and second grounds of appeal, and we would dismiss both of them. This conclusion would allow us to now determine the third ground of the appeal to the effect that the Commissioner General was justified in invoking his powers under section 133 (2) of the Income Tax Act , 2004 and section 19 (4) of the Value Added Tax Act to register the appellant under the two Acts and issue it with TIN and VRN Certificates. In the ultimate result, we find no merit in this appeal. We dismiss it with costs.” Click here for translation ...

In the Yahoo case, the Japanese Supreme Court applied the anti-avoidance provisions “…those deemed to result in an unreasonable reduction of the corporate tax burden…” as defined in Article 132-2 of the Corporate Tax Act (denial of acts or calculations related to reorganisation), where the meaning of “unreasonable” is “abusing the tax provisions related to reorganisation…as a means of tax avoidance” and serves as the criteria for determining the provisions applicability. Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

The Federal Supreme Court denied the refund of withholding taxes claimed by a Danish bank on the basis of the double tax treaty between Denmark and Switzerland due to the lack of beneficial ownership. The Danish bank entered into total return swap agreements with different clients. For hedging purposes, the Danish bank purchased a certain amount of the underlying assets (companies listed in the Swiss stock exchange) and received dividend distributions from these Swiss companies. The Federal Supreme Court was of the opinion that the Danish bank lost the right for refund of the withholding taxes on the dividends received based on the DTT-DK/CH. According to the Federal Supreme Court, the Danish Bank could not be qualified as the beneficial owner of these shares. The Federal Supreme Court denied the beneficial ownership on the grounds that the Danish bank was, in fact, obliged to transfer the dividends to the respective parties of the total return swap agreements. Click here for translation ...

An intermediate Japanese holding company in the IBM group acquired from its US parent all of the shares of a Japanese operating company. The Japanese holdings company then sold a portions of shares in the operating company back to the issuing company for the purpose of repatriation of earned profits. These sales resulted in losses in an amount of JPY 400 billion which for tax purposes were offset against the operating company’s taxable income in FY 2002 – 2005. The Japanese tax authorities did not allow deduction of the losses resulted from the sales referring to article 132 of the Corporation Tax Act of Japan (general anti avoidance regulation). The tax authorities found that the reduction of corporation tax due to the tax losses should be disregarded because there were no legitimate reason or business purpose for the transactions. According to the authorities the transactions would not have taken place between independent parties and the primary purpose of the transactions had been tax avoidance. Decision of the Tokyo High Court The Court decided in favour of IBM and annulled the tax assessment. The Court held that the establishment of the intermediate holding company and the following share transfers should not be viewed as one integrated transaction but rather as separate transactions, and that each of these transactions could not be considered lacking economic reality. In 2016 the Supreme Court rejected the tax authorities’ petition for a final appeal. (The Corporation Tax Act of Japan was amended in 2010 and similar tax losses resulting from share repurchases between a Japanese parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary can no longer be claimed.) Click here for English Translation of the Tokyo High Court decision ...

Following the Tax Courts decision in 2013 (2013 TCC 404), Judge Boyle J. in an order from September 2014 recused himself from completing the McKesson Canada proceeding in the Tax Court. This extended to the consideration and disposition of the costs submissions of the parties, as well as to confidential information order of Justice Hogan in this case and its proper final implementation by the Tax Court and its Registry. Postscript An appeal was filed by McKesson with the Federal Court, but the appeal was later withdrawn and a settlement agreed with the tax authorities. In May 2015 McKesson filed a 10-K with the following information regarding the settlement “…Income tax expense included net discrete tax benefits of $33 million in 2015, net discrete tax expenses of $94 million in 2014 and net discrete tax benefits of $29 million in 2013. Discrete tax expense for 2014 primarily related to a $122 million charge regarding an unfavorable decision from the Tax Court of Canada with respect to transfer pricing issues. We have received reassessments from the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) related to a transfer pricing matter impacting years 2003 through 2010, and have filed Notices of Appeal to the Tax Court of Canada for all of these years. On December 13, 2013, the Tax Court of Canada dismissed our appeal of the 2003 reassessment and we have filed a Notice of Appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal regarding this tax year. After the close of 2015, we reached an agreement in principle with the CRA to settle the transfer pricing matter for years 2003 through 2010. Since the agreement in principle did not occur within 2015, we have not reflected this potential settlement in our 2015 financial statements. We will record the final settlement amount in a subsequent quarter and do not expect it to have a material impact to income tax expense.” Further information on the settlement was found in McKesson’s 10-Q filing from July 2015 “…We received reassessments from the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) related to a transfer pricing matter impacting years 2003 through 2010, and filed Notices of Appeal to the Tax Court of Canada for all of these years. On December 13, 2013, the Tax Court of Canada dismissed our appeal of the 2003 reassessment and we filed a Notice of Appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal. During the first quarter of 2016, we reached an agreement to settle the transfer pricing matter for years 2003 through 2010 and recorded a discrete income tax benefit of $12 million for a previously unrecognized tax benefit.” ...

The case involved export transactions carried out by a company domiciled in Brazil, Marcopolo, manufacturing bus bodies (shells) which were sold to subsidiary trading companies domiciled in low tax jurisdictions (Jurisdição com Tributação Favorecida). The trading companies would then resell the bus bodies (shells) to unrelated companies in different countries. The tax authorities argued that the sale of the bus bodies to the intermediary trading companies carried out prior to the sale to the final customers lacked business purpose and economic substance and were therefore a form of abusive tax planning. The Court reached the decision that the transactions had a business purpose and were therefore legally acceptable. Click here for translation ...

McKesson is a multinational group engaged in the wholesale distribution of pharmaceuticals. Its Canadian subsidiary, McKesson Canada, entered into a factoring agreement in 2002 with its ultimate parent, McKesson International Holdings III Sarl in Luxembourg. Under the terms of the agreement, McKesson International Holdings III Sarl agreed to purchase the receivables for approximately C$460 million and committed to purchase all eligible receivables as they arise for the next five years. The receivables were priced at a discount of 2.206% to face value. The funds to purchase the accounts receivable were borrowed in Canadian dollars from an indirect parent company of McKesson International Holdings III Sarl in Ireland and guaranteed by another indirect parent company in Luxembourg. At the time the factoring agreement was entered into, McKesson Canada had sales of $3 billion and profits of $40 million, credit facilities with major financial institutions in the hundreds of millions of dollars, a large credit department that collected receivables within 30 days (on average) and a bad debt experience of only 0.043%. There was no indication of any imminent or future change in the composition, nature or quality of McKesson Canada’s accounts receivable or customers. Following an audit, the tax authorities applied a discount rate of 1.013%, resulting in a transfer pricing adjustment for the year in question of USD 26.6 million. In addition, a notice of additional withholding tax was issued on the resulting “hidden” distribution of profits to McKesson International Holdings III Sarl. McKesson Canada was not satisfied with the assessment and filed an appeal with the Tax Court. Judgement of the Tax Court The Tax Court dismissed McKesson Canada’s appeal and ruled in favour of the tax authorities. The Court found that an “other method” than that set out in the OECD Guidelines was the most appropriate method to use, resulting in a highly technical economic analysis of the appropriate pricing of risk. The Court noted that the OECD Guidelines were not only written by persons who are not legislators, but are in fact the tax collecting authorities of the world. The statutory provisions of the Act govern and do not prescribe the tests or approaches set out in the Guidelines. According to the Court, the transaction at issue was a tax avoidance scheme rather than a structured finance product ...

This case is about the importance of proving that the transaction has a real economic purpose, and that it does not artificially seek to achieve tax benefits. The courts also consider the spirit of the law, for example, the purpose of the tax exemptions relating to parent-subsidiary distributions is to involve the parent company in the business of the subsidiary. Click here for translation ...

In 2003 Alesco New Zealand Ltd (Alesco NZ) bought two other New Zealand companies. Its Australian owner, Alesco Corporation (Alesco), funded the acquisitions by advancing the purchase monies of $78 million. In consideration Alesco NZ issued a series of optional convertible notes (OCNs or notes). The notes were non-interest bearing for a fixed term and on maturity the holder was entitled to exercise an option to convert the notes into shares. Between 2003 and 2008 Alesco NZ claimed deductions for amounts treated as interest liabilities on the notes in accordance with relevant accounting standards and a determination issued by the Commissioner against its liability to taxation in New Zealand. In the High Court Heath J upheld1 the Commissioner’s treatment of the OCN funding structure as a tax avoidance arrangement under s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 1994 and the Income Tax Act 2004 (the ITA). Alesco NZ appeals that finding and two consequential findings. The amount at issue is about $8.6 million. Included within that figure are revised assessable income tax, shortfall penalties and use of money interest. However, Alesco NZ’s appeal has wider fiscal consequences. The Commissioner has treated similar funding structures used by other entities as tax avoidance arrangements. Decisions on those disputed assessments await the result of this litigation. The Commissioner estimates that over $300 million is at issue including core tax and penalties plus accruing use of money interest. Two other features of this appeal require emphasis. First, in contrast to a number of recent cases on tax avoidance, the Commissioner does not impugn the underlying commercial transactions. She accepts that Alesco NZ’s acquisitions were not made for the purpose or effect of avoiding tax and that the company had to raise funds to enable completion. Her challenge is to the permissibility of the OCN funding mechanism actually deployed or what is called an intermediate step in implementing the underlying transactions. Second, the Commissioner accepts that when viewed in isolation from the statutory anti-avoidance provisions the OCN structure complied technically with the relevant financial arrangements rules, the deductibility provisions relating to expenditure and interest then in force, together with the spreading formula provided by the Commissioner’s determination known as G228 (an instrument issued by the Commissioner to provide a method for assessing income and costs on debt instruments under the financial arrangements rules, to which we shall return in more detail). The meaning, purpose and effect of the financial arrangements rules, and the regime they introduced in 1985 for the purpose of assessing the income returns and deductibility of costs on particular debt instruments, are at the heart of this appeal. Relevant facts In January 2003 Alesco agreed to purchase for $46 million the shares in a New Zealand company, Biolab Ltd, a distributor of medical laboratory equipment. This sum was later increased to $55 million by a supplementary payment. Alesco nominated its New Zealand subsidiary, Alesco NZ, as the purchaser. While the purchase monies were to be raised in Australia, Alesco’s board had not then decided on the appropriate funding structure. Judgement from the Court of Appeal: A Alesco NZ’s appeal is dismissed. B Alesco NZ must pay costs to the Commissioner for a complex appeal on a band B basis and usual disbursements. We certify for two counsel. Judgement from the Supreme Court: A Leave to appeal is granted. B The approved grounds of appeal are whether, in light of the principles laid down by this Court in Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue and other cases on tax avoidance: (i) the structure used by the applicants for funding the transactions is a tax avoidance arrangement; (ii) the Commissioner’s application of shortfall penalties was a proper exercise of the relevant statutory powers; (iii) the Commissioner’s reassessments were a proper exercise of the relevant statutory powers ...

Follow the work of the UK Parliament, House of Commons Committee of Public Account, on corporate tax avoidance schemes. http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/taxation/ Statements from Amazon, Google and Starbucks, November 2012 Statement from Google June 2013 ...

On 13 June 2013, a Statement was released by New Zealand’s Inland Revenue Service on the interpretation of Tax Avoidance provisions. This statement outlines the Commissioner’s view of the law on tax avoidance in New Zealand and sets out the approach the Commissioner will take to application of the general anti-avoidance provision, based on the three-stage test for assessing whether an arrangement is tax avoidance as provided by the Supreme Court Judgment in the Ben Nevis case. In Ben Nevis case the Supreme Court indicated it intended to settle the approach regarding the relationship between s BG 1 and the rest of the Income Tax Act. This has been acknowledged in all relevant judicial decisions released since Ben Nevis. Accordingly, the Commissioner considers that the statement is based upon and reflects the view of the court in Ben Nevis ...

The 2013 Draft Handbook on Transfer Pricing Risk Assessment is a detailed, practical resource that countries can follow in developing their own risk assessment approaches. The handbook supplements useful materials already available with respect to transfer pricing risk assessment. The OECD Forum on Tax Administration published a report entitled “Dealing Effectively with the Challenges of Transfer Pricing” in January 2012. One chapter of that report also addresses transfer pricing risk assessment ...

A company of a Swiss based group maintained a permanent establishment in the Cayman Islands for financing the domestic group companies. Whereas the group companies were able to deduct the interest payments from the taxable profit to their full extent, the interest income, for Swiss tax purposes, was allocated to the permanent establishment in the Cayman Islands, and therefore led to non-taxation of this interest income. By interpreting the legal term “foreign permanent establishment” the Federal Supreme Court concluded that the finance company in the Cayman Islands had only four employees and that such a lean structures was in contrast to the figures in the annual accounts. Therefore, it denied the allocation of interest income to the Cayman Islands for Swiss tax purposes. Click here for English translation ...

In May 1997, BICC CABLES ENERGÍA COMUNICACIONES, S.A. acquired 177 class B shares in BICC USA Inc. (BUSA) for USD 175 million. The par value of each share was one dollar. The acquisition price of the shares was set on the basis of an Arthur Andersen Report which stated that the fair market value of BUSA was USD 423 million. BUSA was the holding company of four investee companies, so the valuation was made in relation to each of the groups of investee companies. The shares acquired by BICC CABLES were Class B shares, with a fixed annual dividend of 4.5% of the total investment. This dividend was paid, at BUSA’s discretion and in accordance with the agreements entered into between the parties, either in cash or by delivery of shares in the Class B company. The acquisition was financed by (1) Ptas. 3,450,000,000,000 charged to the unrestricted reserves account of BICC CABLES and (2) 22,000,000,000 pesetas through a loan granted by an English bank at an interest rate of 6.03%. As a result of the acquisition, BICC CABLES received a shareholding percentage of 15%, which was much lower than what would correspond to the cost of the shares (175 million US dollars) in relation to the value estimated by the auditing company (423 million US dollars). In 1998, BUSA delivered 32 Class A shares to BICC CABLES as a dividend, valued at 1,321,546,634 pesetas. In 1999, no dividend was paid to the company. In June 1999, BICC CABLES repaid part of the loan early (Ptas. 3,600,000,000). Furthermore, in November 1999, BICC OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS Ltd. (BOIL) acquired the BUSA shares owned by BICC CABLES and, at the same time, subrogates itself to the part of the loan which had not been repaid. The shareholding structure of BICC CABLES was as follows: (1) BICC OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS Ltd. (BOIL), a <>, holds 615,000 shares (43.69% of the capital), 2) BICC CEAT CAVI SRL (BICC Plc.), the parent company of the group, holds 226,451 shares (19.05%), and (3) BANCO SANTANDER holds 500,000 non-voting shares (35.5%). In February 2000 SANTANDER sold its shares to BICC Plc. In 1997, BICC CABLES considered Ptas. 899,129,800 as tax deductible financial expenses arising from the loan. In 1998, the expenses linked to the loan Ptas. 1,326,600,000 were deducted from the taxable income. Dividend received this year (the 32 BUSA class A shares valued at Ptas. 1,321,546,634), was not included in the profit and loss account. The company claimed that income corresponding to the dividend would be accounted for when the shares were sold. In 1999, financial expenses related to the loan Ptas. 489,099,461 were considered deductible. In 2000, the partial repayment of the loan and the loss on the transfer of the shares to BOIL were accounted for, despite the fact that they corresponded to two transactions carried out in 1999″. On this bagground a tax assessment was issued by the tax authorities, in which the tax effects (deductions and losses) of the above transactions were disregarded. This assessment was appealed to the Court by BICC. The court of first instance dismissed the appeal and decided in favour of the tax authorities. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court likewise found that the transaction would not have been agreed by independent parties and thus not had been in accordance with the arm’s length principle. Excerpts from the case “The application to the case of the provision in question does not appear to be conditional, contrary to what is claimed in the application, on the classification of the transaction in question as <> or <>. If the absence of free will on the part of the taxpayer is established, if it can be stated that the activity in question was exclusively determined by the link between the companies and if it is clearly inferred – from the evidence – that the same transaction would not have been carried out by independent companies, the competent tax authorities may make the appropriate adjustments, including, in this case, the annulment of any tax effect that might derive from the transaction in question.” “it can be concluded, in agreement with the contested decisions, that the transaction resulted in BICC USA Inc. (BUSA) obtained substantial financial resources without the incorporation of shareholders from outside the group; furthermore, it gave rise to costs for the Spanish entity, which obtained no advantage or profit whatsoever, but only losses. It can easily be concluded that the operation was decided and imposed by the group’s parent company in order to increase the resources of its American subsidiary and that, in any event, in view of the above data, such an operation would not have been carried out by an independent company.” “In any case, it is clear that the Administration has made use of the anti-avoidance rules contained in article nine of the Double Taxation Convention, which constitutes our domestic law.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In this case the Italien company, T. S.r.l. is entirely controlled by H. S.A., registered in Switzerland, and is part of the American multinational group T., being its only branch in Italy for the exclusive marketing of its software products (games for personal computers, play station, etc.). T. S.r.l. imports these products through T. Ltd (which is also part of the same multinational group and controlled by the same parent company), which is registered in the United Kingdom and is the sole supplier of the products that are marketed by the Italian branch. On 31st October 2004 (the last day of the financial year), T. S.r.l. posted an invoice that the British company T. Ltd had issued on that date for £ 947,456. This accounts document referred to “Price adjustment to product sold during FY 2003/2004”, and charges the Italian company with adjustment increases to previously applied prices relative to certain software products the company had purchased during the aforesaid financial year. The Inland Revenue challenged the operation claiming it was evasive, and addressed to reducing the taxable profit of the Italian company by the abusive use of transfer pricing. To back up these claims the Inland Revenue emphasised that: • the operation was carried out on the last day of the financial year; • it involved posting an invoice for the adjustment increases to previously applied prices by the English supplier company; • the prices differ from the average purchase price for the same products by T. S.r.l.. Supreme Court established that: “(…)the application of transfer pricing regulations does not fight the concealment of the price, which is a form of evasion, but the manoeuvres that affect an evident price, allowing the surreptitious transfer of profits from one country to another, which has a tangible effect on the applicable tax regime. Therefore, given these essential requirements it must be considered that this regulation constitutes – according to the more widespread interpretation in case law in this court – an anti-avoidance provision (…)”. The infringement of an anti-avoidance provision means that the burden of proof for recourse to this premise of fact, in principle is the responsibility of the Inland Revenue office that intends carrying out the controls. Therefore, the Supreme Court felt that: “(…) when determining company income, or rather, the problem of sharing the intra-group costs, the question of pertinence must be considered as well as the existence of the declared costs further to charging for a service or asset transfer to the subsidiary from the holding, or another company that is controlled by the same company (…). The burden for demonstrating the existence and pertinence of these negative income items, and, as in the case in question, it concerns costs derived from services or assets loaned or transferred by a foreign holding to an Italian subsidiary, each element that enables the inland revenue to verify the arm’s length value of the relative costs – further to the so-called principle of sphere of influence– can only be the responsibility of the taxpayer”. Transfer pricing legislation is included among the anti-avoidance dispositions, as it is addressed to fight the transfer of income from one country to another by “manipulating” the intra-group costs. Consequently, the burden of proof that there are the premises of fact of evasion lies, mainly, with the Inland Revenue, which should prove the grounds for the adjustment, or the deviation from the applied cost with respect to the arm’s length value. However, as the sharing of intra-group costs also involves the matter of whether the costs exist and are pertinent, the burden of proof of the costs to the company’s business lies with the taxpayer according to the Supreme Court. The Italien Supreme Court have drawn a distinction between cases regarding income and cases regarding expenses. In cases regarding income the burden of proof lies with the tax authorities. In cases regarding costs, the burden of proof lies with the taxpayer. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The Dutch company, Velcro Holdings BV (“VHBV”), licensed IP from an affiliated company in the Dutch Antilles, Velcro Industries BV (“VIBV”), and sublicensed this IP to a Canadian company, Velcro Canada Inc. (VCI). VHBV was obliged to pay 90% of the royalties received from VCI. within 30 days after receipt to VIBV. At issue was whether VHBV qualified as Beneficial Owner of the royalty payments from VCI and consequently would be entitled to a reduced withholding tax – from 25% (the Canadian domestic rate) to 10% (the rate under article 12 of the treaty between Canada and the Netherlands). The tax authorities considered that VHBV did not qualify as Beneficial Owner and denied application of the reduced withholding tax rate. Judgement of the Tax Court The court set aside the decision of the tax authorities and decided in favor of VCI. Excerpts: “VHBV obviously has some discretion based on the facts as noted above regarding the use and application of the royalty funds. It is quite obvious that though there might be limited discretion, VHBV does have discretion. According to Prévost, there must be “absolutely no discretion” – that is not the case on the facts before the Court. It is only when there is “absolutely no discretion” that the Court take the draconian step of piercing the corporate veil.” “The person who is the beneficial owner is the person who enjoys and assumes all the attributes of ownership. Only if the interest in the item in question gives that party the right to control the item without question (e.g. they are not accountable to anyone for how he or she deals with the item) will it meet the threshold set in Prévost. In Matchwood, the Court found that the taxpayer did not have such rights until the deed was registered; likewise, VIBV is not a party to the license agreements (having fully assigned it, along with its rights and obligations, to VHBV). It no longer has such rights and thus does not have an interest that amounts to beneficial ownership.” “For the reasons given above I believe that the beneficial ownership of the royalties rests in VHBV and not in VIBV and as such, the appeal is allowed and the matter is referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment on that basis and further, the 1995 assessment dated October 25, 1996 is referred back to the Minister for reconsideration and recalculation on the basis that VIBV was a resident of the Netherlands in 1995 and therefore entitled to the benefit of that treaty.” ...

The tax scheme in the Ben Nevis-case involved land owned by the subsidiary of a charitable foundation being licensed to a group of single purpose investor loss attributing qualifying companies (LAQC’s). The licensees were responsible for planting, maintaining and harvesting the forest through a forestry management company. The investors paid $1,350 per hectare for the establishment of the forest and $1,946 for an option to buy the land in 50 years for half its then market value. There were also other payments, including a $50 annual license fee. The land had been bought for around $580 per hectare. This meant that the the investors, if it wished to acquire the land after harvesting the forest, had to pay half its then value, even though they had already paid over three times the value at the inception of the scheme. In addition to the above payments, the investors agreed to pay a license premium of some $2 million per hectare, payable in 50 years time, by which time the trees would be harvested and sold. The investors purported to discharge its liability for the license premium immediately by the issuing of a promissory note redeemable in 50 years time. The premium had been calculated on the basis of the after tax amount that the mature forest was expected to yield. Finally the investors had agreed to pay an insurance premium of $1,307 per hectare and a further premium of $32,000 per hectare payable in 50 years time. The “insurance company” was a shell company established in a low tax jurisdiction by one of the promoters of the scheme. The insurance company did not in reality carry any risk due to arrangements with the land-owning subsidiary and the promissory notes from the group of investors. There was also a “letter of comfort” from the charitable foundation that it would make up any shortfall the insurance company was obliged to pay out. 90 per cent of the initial premiums received by the insurance company were paid to a company under the control of one of the promoters as commission and introduction fees tunneled back as loans to the promoters’ family trusts. Secure loans over the assets and undertakings secured the money payable under the promissory notes for the license premium and the insurance premium. The investors claimed an immediate tax deduction for the insurance premium and depreciated the deduction for the license premium over the 50 years of the license. The Inland Revenue disallowed these deductions by reference to the generel anti avoidance provision in New Zealand. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and ruled in favor of the Inland revenue. The majority of the SC judges rejected the notion that the potential conflict between the general anti-avoidance rule and specific tax provisions requires identifying which of the provisions, in any situation, is overriding. Rather, the majority viewed the specific provisions and the general anti-avoidance provision as working “in tandem”. Each provides a context that assists in determining the meaning and, in particular, the scope of the other. The focus of each is different. The purpose of the general anti-avoidance provision is to address tax avoidance. Tax avoidance may be found in individual steps or in a combination of steps. The purpose of the specific provisions is more targeted and their meaning should be determined primarily by their ordinary meaning, as established through their text in the light of their specific purpose. The function of the anti-avoidance provision is “to prevent uses of the specific provisions which fall outside their intended scope in the overall scheme of the Act.” The process of statutory construction should focus objectively on the features of the arrangements involved “without being distracted by intuitive subjective impressions of the morality of what taxation advisers have set up.” A three-stage test for assessing whether an arrangement is tax avoidance was applied by the Court. The first step in any case is for the taxpayer to satisfy the court that the use made of any specific provision comes within the scope of that provision. In this test it is the true legal character of the transaction rather than its label which will determine the tax treatment. Courts must construe the relevant documents as if they were resolving a dispute between the parties as to the meaning and effect of contractual arrangements. They must also respect the fact that frequently in commerce there are different means of producing the same economic outcome which have different taxation effects. The second stage of the test requires the court to look at the use of the specific provisions in light of arrangement as a whole. If a taxpayer has used specific provisions “and thereby altered the incidence of income tax, in a way which cannot have been within the contemplation and purpose of Parliament when it enacted the provision, the arrangement will be a tax avoidance arrangement.” The economic and commercial effect of documents and transactions may be significant, as well as the duration of the arrangement and the nature and extent of the financial consequences that it will have for the taxpayer. A combination of those factors may be important. If the specific provisions of the Act are used in any artificial or contrived way that will be significant, as it cannot be “within Parliament’s purpose for specific provisions to be used in that manner.” The courts are not limited to purely legal considerations at this second stage of the analysis. They must consider the use of the specific provisions in light of commercial reality and the economic effect of that use. The “ultimate question is whether the impugned arrangement, viewed in a commercially and economically realistic way, makes use of the specific provisions in a manner that is consistent with Parliament’s purpose.” If the arrangement does make use of the specific provisions in a manner consistent with Parliament’s purpose, it will not be tax avoidance. The third stage is to consider whether tax avoidance ...

The Brazilian group Marcopolo assembles bus bodies in Brazil for export. It used two related offshore companies, Marcopolo International Corporation, domiciled in the British Virgin Islands, and Ilmot International Corporation, domiciled in Uruguay, in a re-invoicing arrangement whereby the product was shipped from Marcopolo to the final customers but the final invoice to the customers was issued by the offshore companies. The tax authorities found that the arrangement lacked business purpose and economic substance and, on this basis, disregarded the transactions. Decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal The Court ruled in favour of Marcopolo. According to the Court, the transactions with the offshore companies had a business purpose and were therefore legitimate tax planning. Excerpts “6. The absence of an operational structure of the companies controlled by the Appellant, capable of supporting the transactions performed, even if, in isolation, it could be admitted within the scope of a “rational organization of the economic activity”, in the case at hand, gains greater significance because a) it constituted only one of the elements within a broad set of evidence presented by the tax authority; b) considering the size of the business undertaken (voluminous export), such absence cannot be such that one can even speculate on the very factual existence of such companies; and c) there is no effective evidence in the case records of the performance of the transactions of purchase and resale of products by such companies; 7. even if it can be admitted that the results earned abroad by the companies MIC and ILMOT were, by equity equivalence, reflected in its accounting, the Appellant does not prove having paid Income Tax and Social Contribution on Net Profits on those same results, thus not contradicting the arguments presented by the tax authority authorizing such conclusion; 8. There is no dispute in this case that a Brazilian transnational company cannot see, in addition to tax benefits, other reasons for conducting its operations through offshore financial centres. What is actually at issue is that, when asked to prove (with proper and suitable documentation) that its controlled companies effectively acquired and resold its products, the Appellant does not submit even a single document capable of effectively revealing a commercial relation between its controlled companies and the end recipients of said products; 9. it is also not disputed that the Brazilian economic environment, especially in the year submitted to the tax audit, is likely to lead to higher costs for national companies operating abroad, both in relation to competitors from developed countries, and in relation to competitors from other emerging countries. What is being questioned is that, specifically in the situation being examined herein, at no time did the Appellant at all materialize such costs, demonstrating on documents, by way of example, that in a given export transaction, if the transaction were effected directly, the cost would be X, the profit would be Y, and the tax paid would be Z, whereas, due to the form adopted, the cost would be X – n, the profit would be Y + m, and the tax paid represented Z + p. No, what the Appellant sought to demonstrate is that, considering a historical series of its exports, there was a significant increase in its revenues and, consequently, in the taxes paid. As already stated, if a significant capitalization of funds through evasive methods is admitted, no other result could be expected. (…) Thus, considering everything in the case records, I cast my vote in the sense of: a) dismissing the ex-officio appeal; b) partially granting the voluntary appeal in order to fully exempt the tax credit related to the withholding income tax, fully upholding the other assessments.” “I verify that, when doing business with companies or individuals located in Countries with Favorable Tax Treatment, the legislation adopted minimum parameters of values to be considered in exports; and maximum parameters in values to be considered in payments made abroad, under the same criteria adopted for transfer pricing. Here, it is important to highlight that the legislation did not equalize the concepts of business carried out with people located in Countries with Favorable Tax Regime and transfer pricing. What the law did was to equalize the criteria to control both, but for conceptually distinct operations. Thus, based on the assumption that Brazilian law specifically deals in its legislation, by means of a specific anti-avoidance rule, with transactions carried out with companies in countries with a favored tax regime, I cannot see how one can intend to disregard the transactions carried out by a Brazilian company with its foreign subsidiaries, since these are deemed to be offshore companies in the respective countries where they are incorporated. In fact, every country with a Favorable Tax Regime has, as a presupposition, the existence of offshore companies, in which the activities are limited to foreign business. In the case at hand, there are two wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Appellant, namely, MIC – Marcopolo International Corporation, located in the British Virgin Islands, and ILMOT International Corporation S.A., incorporated as an investment finance corporation – SAFI, in Uruguay. From what can be extracted from the case records, the deals carried out by the Appellant with the final purchasers of the products were intermediated by both companies, and the tax assessment charged, as income of the Appellant, the final values of the deals carried out by those intermediary companies with the purchasers abroad. However, this was not the legal treatment given by Brazilian law to business deals made with offshore companies established in Countries with a Favorable Tax Regime. Law 9430/96 is limited to checking whether the price charged is supported by the criteria set out in articles 18 to 22 thereof; once such minimum parameters are met, the business plan made by the taxpayer must be respected. Therefore, in this case, I believe that the Tax Authorities could not disregard the business carried out by the Appellant with its wholly-owned subsidiaries beyond what Law 9430/96 provides for the hypothesis of companies located in Countries ...

The CRA had issued a six assessments for fiscal years 1995-1999 based on the principle purpose of Univar's acquisition of shares of Van Waters & Rogers (Barbadosco) Ltd. being to permit Univar to avoid, reduce or defer the payment of tax that would otherwise be payable under the Act within the meaning of paragraph 95(6), and thus deemed not to have been acquired . "ITA 95(6) Where rights or shares issued, acquired or disposed of to avoid tax – For the purposes of this subdivision (other than section 90), (b) where a person or partnership acquires or disposes of shares of the capital stock of a corporation, either directly or indirectly, and it can reasonably be considered that the principal purpose for the acquisition or disposition of the shares is to permit a person to avoid, reduce or defer the payment of tax or any other amount that would otherwise be payable under this Act, those shares shall be deemed not to have been acquired or disposed of, as the case may be, and where the shares were unissued by the corporation immediately prior to the acquisition, those shares shall be deemed not to have been issued." The Amended Judgement from the Court The appeal from the six reassessments made under Part I of  the Income Tax Act with respect to the following taxation years is allowed and the reassessments are referred back to the Minister  of National Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment in accordance with the attached Reasons for Judgment: With respect to the six reassessments, it cannot, under paragraph 95(6)reasonably be considered that the principal purpose for the acquisition of the shares of Barbadosco was to permit the Appellant to avoid, reduce or defer the payment of tax or any other amount that would otherwise be payable under the Act ...

A Holding ApS is the owner of all shares in F. AG, domiciled in G. (Canton of Schaffhausen), which it acquired in December 1999 for a total price of Fr. 1. F. AG produces consumer goods. In accordance with the resolution of the general meeting of F. AG on 30 November 2000, a dividend of Fr. 5,500,000 was distributed. Of this amount, F. Ltd paid Fr. 1,925,000 as withholding tax to the Swiss Federal Tax Administration and the remaining amount of Fr. 3,575,000 to Holding ApS. On 15 December 2000, the latter in turn decided to distribute a dividend of 26,882,350 Danish kroner to C. Ltd. On 19 December 2000, A Holding ApS submitted an application to the competent Danish authority for a refund of the withholding tax in the amount of Fr. 1,925,000. The Danish authority confirmed the application and forwarded it to the Federal Tax Administration. By decision of 3 April 2003, the Federal Tax Administration rejected the application for a refund of the withholding tax. The reason given was that A Holding ApS was not engaged in any real economic activity in Denmark; it had been established solely for the purpose of availing itself of the benefits of the Agreement of 23 November 1973 between the Swiss Confederation and the Kingdom of Denmark for the Avoidance of Double Taxation in respect of Taxes on Income and on Capital. The appeals filed by A Holding ApS against this decision were dismissed by the Federal Tax Administration in its objection decision of 4 September 2003 and subsequently by the Federal Tax Appeals Commission in its decision of 3 March 2005. The A Holding ApS filed an administrative appeal with the Federal Administrative Court on 18 April 2005. It requested that the decision of the Federal Tax Appeals Commission be annulled and that the Federal Tax Administration be ordered to pay it the amount of CHF 1,925,000 plus 5% interest thereon since 29 January 2001. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The Court found that the Appeals Commission was correct in refusing to refund the withholding tax claimed by A Holding ApS on the grounds of abuse of the agreement. The appeal therefore proves to be unfounded and must be dismissed. Exceerpt “3.6.4 The complainant does not meet any of the conditions just mentioned. As the lower court found binding for the Federal Supreme Court (cf. Art. 105 para. 2 OG), it has neither its own office premises nor its own staff in Denmark. Accordingly, it did not record any fixed assets or any rental or personnel expenses. The “director” of the complainant, E. who apparently controls the entire group and is resident in Bermuda, performs all management functions according to the complainant’s own statement of facts and does not receive any compensation for this. Thus, the complainant itself does not carry out any effective business activity in Denmark; administration, management of current business and corporate management are not carried out there. It only has a formal seat in Denmark. Significantly, the complainant also immediately forwarded the dividends to its parent company. The complainant’s arguments that it also intends to hold other European shareholdings of the entire group are irrelevant. What is decisive is that, according to the above, the complainant ultimately proves to be a letterbox company and that, apart from tax considerations, no economically significant reasons for its presence in Denmark are apparent. The complainant’s objection that, in view of its detailed statements in the proceedings before the court, it is untenable for the Appeals Commission to claim that it [the complainant] “undisputedly” has no facilities and activities at all, does not lead to a different conclusion. The statements in question before the Appeals Commission do not contradict the above findings. The complainant has failed to show what significant activities it carries out in Denmark itself. If, on the one hand, it is established that the person resident in Bermuda carries out all management activities for the holding company and that there are no other staff, it is not sufficient for the complainant to merely allege, in an unsubstantiated manner, that it works with external resources as far as necessary and that the Danish company H. (as the complainant’s auditors) carries out such outsourced functions in a professional manner. 3.6.5 Other reasons that would justify the granting of the advantages of the agreement (cf. n. 19 and 21 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 1 OECD-MA 2003 and 1995 respectively) are also not given here. Even if the aforementioned circular letter 1999 of the Swiss Federal Tax Administration is used for comparison, no contradiction can be ascertained with regard to point 3 (critical with regard to the decision challenged here: Markus Reich/Michael Beusch, Entwicklungen im Steuerrecht, SJZ 101/2005 p. 266). According to that point 3, holding companies that exclusively or almost exclusively manage and finance participations may use more than 50 per cent of the income eligible for treaty relief to meet the claims of persons not entitled to treaty relief, provided that these expenses are justified on business grounds and can be substantiated; holding companies that engage in other activities in addition to managing and financing participations may not use more than 50 per cent of the income eligible for treaty relief (critically: Silvia Zimmermann, Kreisschreiben vom 17. 12.1998 on the abuse decision, StR 54/1999 p. 157 f.). The regulation in the circular presupposes that the company domiciled in Switzerland actually manages and finances the participations from here. From a mirror image perspective – insofar as such a mirror image may be possible at all – this requirement would not be met by the complainant, which is domiciled in Denmark and is a letterbox company, as explained above (E. 3.6.4). 3.6.6 Finally, the model clause listed in point 21.4 of the OECD Commentary on the OECD-MA 2003 would not lead to any other conclusion. According to this clause, the provisions of Art. 10 DTA (dividends) “shall not apply” if “the principal intention or one of the principal ...

At issue in this case was whether Belgian arm’s length provision in article 344 infringed Article 170 of the Belgian constitution, according to which a tax in favor of the State may only be introduced by law. “Does Article 344(1) of the Income Tax Code 1992, in the version applicable to the assessment years 1996, 1997 and 1998, infringe Article 170 of the Constitution, in particular Article 1 of that article, which provides that a tax for the benefit of the State may be introduced only by a law, in that Article 344(1) gives the executive authority the task of determining the taxable circumstances or at least makes it possible to determine taxable circumstances either by means of a standard to be laid down by the State itself or by means of a blank form to be filled in?» The Decision of the CourtIn accordance with the principle of legality in tax matters, as set out in Article 170(1) of the Constitution, a person may be subject to a tax only if it has been decided by a democratically elected consultative assembly which alone has the power to introduce that tax. The legislature itself has laid down the strict conditions, set out in B.3.2 to B.3.5, under which the measure referred to in Article 344(1) of the 1992 Income Tax Code may be applied in order to achieve a legitimate objective, namely to combat tax avoidance, without however affecting the principle that the least taxed option may be chosen (B.3.1). The measure cannot be regarded as a general enabling provision which would allow the administration to determine the taxable object itself by means of a general measure, but as a means of evidence to assess specific situations individually in specific cases, if necessary, under the control of the judge. In this case, the constitutional principle of legality in tax matters does not require the legislature to specify in greater detail the substantive conditions for the application of the measure, since this is impossible by the very nature of the phenomenon it is intended to combat. For these reasons the court finds that article 344(1) of the Income Tax Code 1992 does not infringe Article 170 § Section 1 of the Constitution. Click here for translation ...

In July, 1956, the appellants (Berkowitz and Kolbert) formed the taxpayer (K B Trail Properties, Inc.). Each of the appellants paid $2500 cash for one-half of the taxpayer’s authorized stock. They advanced the taxpayer $83,000 to begin business because the taxpayer was unable to borrow funds elsewhere. The taxpayer purchased a 99-year lease on business property utilizing these funds and assumed a mortgage of $57,829.20 as part of the purchase price of the lease. Each appellant took notes from the taxpayer totalling $41,500, payable in four installments of $2,500 commencing July 10, 1957, with the unpaid balance due July 10, 1961, with interest at the rate of 6 percent. In October, 1956, to finance the construction of an additional building on a property, the taxpayer borrowed $40,000 at 6 percent interest from a Savings and Loan Association, secured by a mortgage. In December, 1958, the taxpayer purchased the ground under the leasehold for $50,000. This transaction was partially financed by advances from the appellants in the amount of $5,000 each, evidenced by 15 percent notes due in December, 1959. The taxpayer borrowed $30,000 from a New York mortgage company, evidenced by an 8 percent note secured by a second mortgage on the premises. In 1960 the appellants each advanced the taxpayer $4,000. In 1963 they each advanced the taxpayer $3,600. There were no maturity dates for, or written evidence of these advances. Thus through 1963 the appellants had made unsecured advances to the taxpayer of $108,200, and two lending institutions had loaned the taxpayer $70,000 secured by mortgages. Obviously, the taxpayer was thin to the point of being transparent. Although the taxpayer was timely in its payments to the banking institutions, from 1956 through 1963 the taxpayer had paid only $1,980 toward the principal of the advances made by the appellants. There was no plan to reduce the principal further. In 1963 the taxpayer realized $60,000 from the sale of property, but instead of paying off the long overdue “loans” to the appellants, the taxpayer placed the money in a bank account where it drew a maximum of four and one-half percent, while, at the same time, the taxpayer was paying ten to fifteen percent on the principal of the advances made by the appellants. While the appellants, as directors of the taxpayer, made no effort to reduce the principal amount of their “loans” to the taxpayer, they did meet at the end of each year and decide what interest rate to pay. The taxpayer paid interest to the appellant as follows: 1957 — 4%, 1958 — 8%, 1959 — 15%, 1960 — 14%, 1961 — 10%, 1962 — 10%, and 1963 — 13%. On its income tax returns for the years in issue the taxpayer deducted the “interest” it had paid to the appellants during each fiscal year pursuant to section 163(a) of the Code. The Commissioner disallowed these deductions. Section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that there shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness. The tax authorities disallowed these deductions and increased the taxpayer’s income taxes. An appeal was filed by the taxpayer. Judgment of the Court The US Court of Appeal upheld the assessment of the tax authorities. The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that intent was the controlling factor. Instead, the court noted that the parties had objectively manifested their intent, so subjective intent was not determinative. Excerpts “The appellants had the burden to prove that the advances represented indebtedness rather than equity, and the fact that they intended to make loans and not capital contributions to the taxpayer is not determinative of the equity-capital tax issue. Nor is it decisive that the notes were executed in accordance with state law and described by the appellants and the taxpayer as “loans”. Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 3 Cir. 1968, 398 F.2d 694; Tomlinson v. 1661 Corporation, supra. These are just several of the numerous factors to be considered in determining whether the funds advanced to the taxpayer represented capital contributions rather than loans. We have expatiated on the criteria with some specificity as follows: There are at least eleven separate determining factors generally used by the courts in determining whether amounts advanced to a corporation constitute equity capital or indebtedness. They are (1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a maturity date; (3) the source of the payments; (4) the right to enforce the payment of principal and interest; (5) participation in management; (6) a status equal to or inferior to that of regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) `thin’ or adequate capitalization; (9) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (10) payment of interest only out of `dividend’ money; (11) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending institutions. … Applying these criteria to the case sub judice, there can be no doubt that the advances were nothing more than capital transfers as opposed to bona fide indebtedness. Obviously the taxpayer was inadequately capitalized. Considering only the advances made by the appellants, which the taxpayer designated as indebtedness, the ratio of debt to equity would have been about 21 to 1. Adding the institutional indebtedness to the advances made by the appellants would have made the ratio more lopsided.” “The problem is not one of ascertaining “intent” since the parties have objectively manifested their intent. It is a problem of whether the intent and acts of these parties should be disregarded in characterizing the transaction for federal tax purposes. It is not the jury’s function to determine whether the undisputed operative facts add up to debt or equity. This is a question of law. It was correctly decided by the District Court in favor of the government.” Click here for other translation ...

SA Etablissements Brepols, which had a profitable commercial activity in Belgium, transferred its entire activity to an new company, the SA Usines Brepols. At the same time, a loan was granted to the new company. The interest charge on that loan was so high that almost all of the profits of SA Usines Brepols were used to finance the loan and therefore no taxes were paid. However, S.A. Etablissements Brepols was taxed on the interest received, which at the time was at a reduced rate in Belgium. The tax administration considered that the taxpayer had only entered into the transactions for the main purpose of reducing the tax burden and disallowed the reduced taxation. The Court of Appeal agreed and held that the agreements concluded between the parties constituted evasion of the law. The Belgian Supreme court overturned the decision in its judgment of 6 June 1961 and stated the following: “There is no simulation prohibited in the field of taxation, nor does it prohibit fraudulent tax practices, when, in order to benefit from a more favorable tax regime, the parties, using the freedom of conventions, without violating any legal obligation, establish acts of which they accept all the consequences, even if the form they give them is not the most normal”. Click here for Translation ...

The first rulings where the IRS proposed recharacterizing transactions that could be considered abusive through use of transfer pricing provisions. Judgement of the Supreme Court The court instead applied the general anti-abuse doctrine. “It is earnestly contended on behalf of the taxpayer that, since every element required by the foregoing subdivision (B) is to be found in what was done, a statutory reorganization was effected, and that the motive of the taxpayer thereby to escape payment of a tax will not alter the result or make unlawful what the statute allows. It is quite true that, if a reorganization in reality was effected within the meaning of subdivision (B), the ulterior purpose mentioned will be disregarded. The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted. United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 84 U. S. 506; Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390, 280 U. S. 395-396; Jones v. Helvering, 63 App.D.C. 204, 71 F.2d 214, 217. But the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended. The reasoning of the court below in justification of a negative answer leaves little to be said. When subdivision (B) speaks of a transfer of assets by one corporation to another, it means a transfer made “in pursuance of a plan of reorganization” [§ 112(g)] of corporate business, and not a transfer of assets by one corporation to another in pursuance of a plan having no relation to the business of either, as plainly is the case here. Putting aside, then, the question of motive in respect of taxation altogether, and fixing the character of the proceeding by what actually occurred, what do we find? Simply an operation having no business or corporate purpose — a mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the petitioner. No doubt, a new and valid corporation was created. But that corporation was nothing more than a contrivance to the end last described. It was brought into existence for no other purpose; it performed, as it was intended from the beginning it should perform, no other function. When that limited function had been exercised, it immediately was put to death. In these circumstances, the facts speak for themselves, and are susceptible of but one interpretation. The whole undertaking, though conducted according to the terms of subdivision (B), was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else. The rule which excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, because the transaction, upon its face, lies outside the plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.” Click here for translation ...