Contractual terms imputed from economic substance. (i) Company X is a member of a controlled group that has been in operation in the pharmaceutical sector for many years. In years 1 through 4, Company X undertakes research and development activities. As a result of those activities, Company X developed a compound that may be more effective than existing medications in the treatment of certain conditions. (ii) Company Y is acquired in year 4 by the controlled group that includes Company X. Once Company Y is acquired, Company X makes available to Company Y a large amount of technical data concerning the new compound, which Company Y uses to register patent rights with respect to the compound in several jurisdictions, making Company Y the legal owner of such patents. Company Y then enters into licensing agreements with group members that afford Company Y 100% of the premium return attributable to use of the intangible property by its subsidiaries. (iii) In determining whether an allocation is appropriate in year 4, the Commissioner may consider the economic substance of the arrangements between Company X and Company Y, and the parties’ course of conduct throughout their relationship. Based on this analysis, the Commissioner determines that it is unlikely that an uncontrolled taxpayer operating at arm’s length would make available the results of its research and development or perform services that resulted in transfer of valuable know how to another party unless it received contemporaneous compensation or otherwise had a reasonable anticipation of receiving a future benefit from those activities. In this case, Company X’s undertaking the research and development activities and then providing technical data and know-how to Company Y in year 4 is inconsistent with the registration and subsequent exploitation of the patent by Company Y. Therefore, the Commissioner may impute one or more agreements between Company X and Company Y consistent with the economic substance of their course of conduct, which would afford Company X an appropriate portion of the premium return from the patent rights. For example, the Commissioner may impute a separate services agreement that affords Company X contingent-payment compensation for its services in year 4 for the benefit of Company Y, consisting of making available to Company Y technical data, know-how, and other fruits of research and development conducted in previous years. These services benefited Company Y by giving rise to and contributing to the value of the patent rights that were ultimately registered by Company Y. In the alternative, the Commissioner may impute a transfer of patentable intangible property rights from Company X to Company Y immediately preceding the registration of patent rights by Company Y. The taxpayer may present additional facts that could indicate which of these or other alternative agreements best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions, consistent with the parties’ course of conduct in the particular case ...

Non-arm’s length compensation. (i) The facts are the same as in paragraph (i) of Example 4. As in Example 4, assume that, after adjustments are made to improve the reliability of the comparison for any material differences relating to marketing activities, manufacturing or marketing intangible property, and other comparability factors, the royalties paid by independent licensees would provide the most reliable measure of the arm’s length royalty owed by USSub to FP, apart from the additional facts described in paragraph (ii) of this Example 5. (ii) In years 1 through 4, USSub performs certain incremental marketing activities with respect to the AA trademark athletic gear, in addition to the activities required under the terms of the basic license agreement, that are also incremental as compared with those activities observed in the comparables. At the start of year 1, FP enters into a separate services agreement with USSub, which states that FP will compensate USSub quarterly, in an amount equal to specified costs plus X%, for these incremental marketing functions. Further, these written agreements reflect the intent of the parties that USSub receive such compensation from FP throughout the term of the agreement, without regard to the success or failure of the promotional activities. During years 1 through 4, USSub performs marketing activities pursuant to the separate services agreement and in each year USSub receives the specified compensation from FP on a cost of services plus basis. (iii) In evaluating year 4, the Commissioner performs an analysis of independent parties that perform promotional activities comparable to those performed by USSub and that receive separately-stated compensation on a current basis without contingency. The Commissioner determines that the magnitude of the specified cost plus X% is outside the arm’s length range in each of years 1 through 4. Based on an evaluation of all the facts and circumstances, the Commissioner makes an allocation to require payment of compensation to USSub for the promotional activities performed in year 4, based on the median of the interquartile range of the arm’s length markups charged by the uncontrolled comparables described in paragraph (e)(3) of this section. (iv) Given that based on facts and circumstances, the terms agreed by the controlled parties were that FP would bear all risks associated with the promotional activities performed by USSub to promote the AA trademark product in the United States market, and given that the parties’ conduct during the years examined was consistent with this allocation of risk, the fact that the cost of services plus markup on USSub’s services was outside the arm’s length range does not, without more, support imputation of additional contractual terms based on alternative views of the economic substance of the transaction, such as terms indicating that USSub, rather than FP, bore the risk associated with these activities ...

Contractual terms imputed from economic substance. (i) FP, a foreign producer of athletic gear, is the registered holder of the AA trademark in the United States and in other countries worldwide. In year 1, FP enters into a licensing agreement that affords its newly organized United States subsidiary, USSub, exclusive rights to certain manufacturing and marketing intangible property (including the AA trademark) for purposes of manufacturing and marketing athletic gear in the United States under the AA trademark. The contractual terms of this agreement obligate USSub to pay FP a royalty based on sales, and also obligate both FP and USSub to undertake without separate compensation specified types and levels of marketing activities. Unrelated foreign businesses license independent United States businesses to manufacture and market athletic gear in the United States, using trademarks owned by the unrelated foreign businesses. The contractual terms of these uncontrolled transactions require the licensees to pay royalties based on sales of the merchandise, and obligate the licensors and licensees to undertake without separate compensation specified types and levels of marketing activities. In years 1 through 6, USSub manufactures and sells athletic gear under the AA trademark in the United States. Assume that, after adjustments are made to improve the reliability of the comparison for any material differences relating to marketing activities, manufacturing or marketing intangible property, and other comparability factors, the royalties paid by independent licensees would provide the most reliable measure of the arm’s length royalty owed by USSub to FP, apart from the additional facts in paragraph (ii) of this Example 4. (ii) In years 1 through 6, USSub performs incremental marketing activities with respect to the AA trademark athletic gear, in addition to the activities required under the terms of the license agreement with FP, that are also incremental as compared to those observed in the comparables. FP does not directly or indirectly compensate USSub for performing these incremental activities during years 1 through 6. By year 7, AA trademark athletic gear generates a premium return in the United States, as compared to similar athletic gear marketed by independent licensees. In year 7, USSub and FP enter into a separate services agreement under which FP agrees to compensate USSub on a cost basis for the incremental marketing activities that USSub performed during years 1 through 6, and to compensate USSub on a cost basis for any incremental marketing activities it may perform in year 7 and subsequent years. In addition, the parties revise the license agreement executed in year 1, and increase the royalty to a level that attributes to FP substantially all the premium return from sales of the AA trademark athletic gear in the United States. (iii) In determining whether an allocation of income is appropriate in year 7, the Commissioner may consider the economic substance of the arrangements between USSub and FP and the parties’ course of conduct throughout their relationship. Based on this analysis, the Commissioner determines that it is unlikely that, ex ante, an uncontrolled taxpayer operating at arm’s length would engage in the incremental marketing activities to develop or enhance intangible property owned by another party unless it received contemporaneous compensation or otherwise had a reasonable anticipation of a future benefit. In this case, USSub’s undertaking the incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6 is a course of conduct that is inconsistent with the parties’ adoption in year 7 of contractual terms by which FP compensates USSub on a cost basis for the incremental marketing activities that it performed. Therefore, the Commissioner may impute one or more agreements between USSub and FP, consistent with the economic substance of their course of conduct, which would afford USSub an appropriate portion of the premium return from the AA trademark athletic gear. For example, the Commissioner may impute a separate services agreement that affords USSub contingent-payment compensation for the incremental activities it performed during years 1 through 6, which benefited FP by contributing to the value of the trademark owned by FP. In the alternative, the Commissioner may impute a long-term, exclusive United States license agreement that allows USSub to benefit from the incremental activities. As another alternative, the Commissioner may require FP to compensate USSub for terminating USSub’s imputed long-term United States license agreement, a license that USSub made more valuable at its own expense and risk. The taxpayer may present additional facts that could indicate which of these or other alternative agreements best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions, consistent with the parties’ course of conduct in this particular case ...

Contractual terms imputed from economic substance. (i) FP, a foreign producer of wristwatches, is the registered holder of the YY trademark in the United States and in other countries worldwide. In year 1, FP enters the United States market by selling YY wristwatches to its newly organized United States subsidiary, USSub, for distribution in the United States market. USSub pays FP a fixed price per wristwatch. USSub and FP undertake, without separate compensation, marketing activities to establish the YY trademark in the United States market. Unrelated foreign producers of trademarked wristwatches and their authorized United States distributors respectively undertake similar marketing activities in independent arrangements involving distribution of trademarked wristwatches in the United States market. In years 1 through 6, USSub markets and sells YY wristwatches in the United States. Further, in years 1 through 6, USSub undertakes incremental marketing activities in addition to the activities similar to those observed in the independent distribution transactions in the United States market. FP does not directly or indirectly compensate USSub for performing these incremental activities during years 1 through 6. Assume that, aside from these incremental activities, and after any adjustments are made to improve the reliability of the comparison, the price paid per wristwatch by the independent, authorized distributors of wristwatches would provide the most reliable measure of the arm’s length price paid per YY wristwatch by USSub. (ii) By year 7, the wristwatches with the YY trademark generate a premium return in the United States market, as compared to wristwatches marketed by the independent distributors. In year 7, substantially all the premium return from the YY trademark in the United States market is attributed to FP, for example through an increase in the price paid per watch by USSub, or by some other means. (iii) In determining whether an allocation of income is appropriate in year 7, the Commissioner may consider the economic substance of the arrangements between USSub and FP, and the parties’ course of conduct throughout their relationship. Based on this analysis, the Commissioner determines that it is unlikely that, ex ante, an uncontrolled taxpayer operating at arm’s length would engage in the incremental marketing activities to develop or enhance intangible property owned by another party unless it received contemporaneous compensation or otherwise had a reasonable anticipation of receiving a future benefit from those activities. In this case, USSub’s undertaking the incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6 is a course of conduct that is inconsistent with the parties’ attribution to FP in year 7 of substantially all the premium return from the enhanced YY trademark in the United States market. Therefore, the Commissioner may impute one or more agreements between USSub and FP, consistent with the economic substance of their course of conduct, which would afford USSub an appropriate portion of the premium return from the YY trademark wristwatches. For example, the Commissioner may impute a separate services agreement that affords USSub contingent-payment compensation for its incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6, which benefited FP by contributing to the value of the trademark owned by FP. In the alternative, the Commissioner may impute a long-term, exclusive agreement to exploit the YY trademark in the United States that allows USSub to benefit from the incremental marketing activities it performed. As another alternative, the Commissioner may require FP to compensate USSub for terminating USSub’s imputed long-term, exclusive agreement to exploit the YY trademark in the United States, an agreement that USSub made more valuable at its own expense and risk. The taxpayer may present additional facts that could indicate which of these or other alternative agreements best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions, consistent with the parties’ course of conduct in the particular case ...

Reliability of adjustment for differences in volume. (i) FS manufactures product XX and sells that product to its parent corporation, P. FS also sells product XX to uncontrolled taxpayers at a price of $100 per unit. Except for the volume of each transaction, the sales to P and to uncontrolled taxpayers take place under substantially the same economic conditions and contractual terms. In uncontrolled transactions, FS offers a 2% discount for quantities of 20 per order, and a 5% discount for quantities of 100 per order. If P purchases product XX in quantities of 60 per order, in the absence of other reliable information, it may reasonably be concluded that the arm’s length price to P would be $100, less a discount of 3.5%. (ii) If P purchases product XX in quantities of 1,000 per order, a reliable estimate of the appropriate volume discount must be based on proper economic or statistical analysis, not necessarily a linear extrapolation from the 2% and 5% catalog discounts applicable to sales of 20 and 100 units, respectively ...

Differences in volume. USP, a United States agricultural exporter, regularly buys transportation services from FSub, its foreign subsidiary, to ship its products from the United States to overseas markets. Although FSub occasionally provides transportation services to URA, an unrelated domestic corporation, URA accounts for only 10% of the gross revenues of FSub, and the remaining 90% of FSub’s gross revenues are attributable to FSub’s transactions with USP. In determining the degree of comparability between FSub’s uncontrolled transaction with URA and its controlled transaction with USP, the difference in volumes involved in the two transactions and the regularity with which these services are provided must be taken into account if such difference would have a material effect on the price charged. Inability to make reliable adjustments for these differences would affect the reliability of the results derived from the uncontrolled transaction as a measure of the arm’s length result ...

The following examples illustrate this paragraph (d)(3)(ii) ...

In the absence of a written agreement, the district director may impute a contractual agreement between the controlled taxpayers consistent with the economic substance of the transaction. In determining the economic substance of the transaction, greatest weight will be given to the actual conduct of the parties and their respective legal rights (see, for example, § 1.482-4(f)(3) (Ownership of intangible property)). For example, if, without a written agreement, a controlled taxpayer operates at full capacity and regularly sells all of its output to another member of its controlled group, the district director may impute a purchasing contract from the course of conduct of the controlled taxpayers, and determine that the producer bears little risk that the buyer will fail to purchase its full output. Further, if an established industry convention or usage of trade assigns a risk or resolves an issue, that convention or usage will be followed if the conduct of the taxpayers is consistent with it. See UCC 1-205. For example, unless otherwise agreed, payment generally is due at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive goods. See UCC 2-310 ...

The contractual terms, including the consequent allocation of risks, that are agreed to in writing before the transactions are entered into will be respected if such terms are consistent with the economic substance of the underlying transactions. In evaluating economic substance, greatest weight will be given to the actual conduct of the parties, and the respective legal rights of the parties (see, for example, § 1.482-4(f)(3) (Ownership of intangible property)). If the contractual terms are inconsistent with the economic substance of the underlying transaction, the district director may disregard such terms and impute terms that are consistent with the economic substance of the transaction ...

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Determining the degree of comparability between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions requires a comparison of the significant contractual terms that could affect the results of the two transactions. These terms include – (1) The form of consideration charged or paid; (2) Sales or purchase volume; (3) The scope and terms of warranties provided; (4) Rights to updates, revisions or modifications; (5) The duration of relevant license, contract or other agreements, and termination or renegotiation rights; (6) Collateral transactions or ongoing business relationships between the buyer and the seller, including arrangements for the provision of ancillary or subsidiary services; and (7) Extension of credit and payment terms. Thus, for example, if the time for payment of the amount charged in a controlled transaction differs from the time for payment of the amount charged in an uncontrolled transaction, an adjustment to reflect the difference in payment terms should be made if such difference would have a material effect on price. Such comparability adjustment is required even if no interest would be allocated or imputed under § 1.482-2(a) or other applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code or regulations ...

...

In 2009-2011 Fortis Petroleum Norway AS (FPN) bought seismic data related to oil exploration in the North Sea from a related party, Petroleum GeoServices AS (PGS), for NKR 95.000.000. FBN paid the amount by way of a convertible intra-group loan from PGS in the same amount. FPN also purchased administrative services from another related party, Consema, and later paid a substantial termination fee when the service contract was terminated. The acquisition costs, interest on the loan, costs for services and termination fees had all been deducted in the taxable income of the company for the years in question. Central to this case is the exploration refund scheme on the Norwegian shelf. This essentially means that exploration companies can demand cash payment of the tax value of exploration costs, cf. the Petroleum Tax Act § 3 letter c) fifth paragraph. If the taxpayer does not have income to cover an exploration cost, the company receives payment / refund of the tax value from the state. On 21 November 2018, the Petroleum Tax Office issued two decisions against FPN. One decision (the “Seismic decision”) which applied to the income years 2010 to 2011, where FPN was denied a deduction for the purchase of seismic services from PGS and interest on the associated seller credit, as well as ordinary and increased additional tax (hereinafter the «seismic decision»), and another decision (the “Consema decision”) which applied to the income years 2011 and 2012 where, FPN’s claim for deduction for the purchase of administrative services from Consema for the income years 2011 and 2012 was reduced at its discretion, and where FPN was also denied a deduction for the costs of the services and a deduction for termination fees. Finally in regards of the “Seismic decision” an increased additional tax of a total of 60 per cent, was added to the additional taxation on the basis of the incorrectly deducted seismic purchases as FPN had provided incorrect and incomplete information to the Oil Tax Office. In the “Seismic decision” the tax office argued that FPN used a exploration reimbursement scheme to run a “tax carousel” In the “Consema decision” the tax office found that the price paid for the intra-group services and the termination fee had not been determined at arm’s length. An appeal was filed by Fortis Petroleum Norway AS with the district court where, in December 2020, the case was decided in favour of the tax authorities. An appeal was then filed with the Court of Appel Judgement of the Court of Appeal The court upheld the decisions of the district court and decided in favour of the tax authorities. The Court concluded that the condition for deduction in the Tax Act § 6-1 on incurred costs on the part of Fortis Petroleum Norway AS was not met, and that there was a basis for imposing ordinary and increased additional tax. The Court of Appeal further found that the administrative services and the termination fee were controlled transactions and had not been priced at arm’s length. Excerpts – Regarding the acquisition of seismic exploration Based on the case’s extensive evidence, and especially the contemporary evidence, the Court of Appeal has found that there was a common subjective understanding between FPN and PGS, both at the planning stage, during the conclusion of the agreement, in carrying out the seismic purchases and in the subsequent process. should take place by conversion to a subscription price that was not market-based. Consequently, seismic would not be settled with real values. This was made possible through the common interest of the parties. The parties also never significantly distanced themselves from this agreement. The Court of Appeal has heard testimonies from the management of PGS and FPN, but can not see that these entail any other view on the question of what was agreed. The loan was never repaid, and in the end it was converted to the pre-agreed exchange rate of NOK 167. In the Court of Appeal’s view, there is no other rational explanation for this course than that it was carefully adapted to the financing through 78 per cent of the exploration refund. The share value at the time of conversion was down to zero. The Court of Appeal agrees with the state that all conversion prices between 167 and 0 kroner would have given a share price that reflected the value in FPN better and which consequently had given PGS a better settlement. On this basis, the Court of Appeal believes that the conversion rate did not cover the 22 percent, and that there was a common perception that this was in line with the purpose of the establishment of FPN, namely not to pay “a penny” of fresh capital. The Court of Appeal has also emphasized that the same thing that happened in 2009 was repeated in 2010 and 2011. For 2009, the Oil Tax Office came to the conclusion that it was a pro forma event and a shift in financial risk. In 2010 and 2011, the same actors used the same structure and procedure to finance all costs from the state. It is thus the Court of Appeal’s view that there was a common understanding between the parties to the agreement that the real relationship within was different from that which was signaled to the tax authorities regarding sacrifice and which provided the basis for the deduction. Furthermore, in the Court of Appeal’s view, the loan transactions were not fiscally neutral. The seismic purchases constituted the only source of liquidity and were covered in their entirety by the state. In light of ESA’s decision from 2018 as an element of interpretation, such a loss of fiscal neutrality would indicate that when the company has thus not borne any risk itself, sacrifice has not taken place either. Even if the debt had been real, assuming a sale without a common interest of the parties, in the Court of Appeal’s view in a tax context it could not be decisive, as long as 22 ...

In general, a financial guarantee provides for the guarantor to meet specified financial obligations in the event of a failure to do so by the guaranteed party. There are various terms in use for different types of credit support from one member of an MNE group to another. At one end of the spectrum is the formal written guarantee and at the other is the implied support attributable solely to membership in the MNE group. In the context of this section, a guarantee is a legally binding commitment on the part of the guarantor to assume a specified obligation of the guaranteed debtor if the debtor defaults on that obligation. The situation likely to be encountered most frequently in a transfer pricing context is that in which an associated enterprise (guarantor) provides a guarantee on a loan taken out by another associated enterprise from an unrelated lender ...

There may be less information asymmetry between entities (that is, better visibility) in the intra- group context than in situations involving unrelated parties. Intra-group lenders may choose not to have covenants on loans to associated enterprises, partly because they are less likely to suffer information asymmetry and because it is less likely that one part of an MNE group would seek to take the same kind of action as an independent lender in the event of a covenant breach, nor would it usually seek to impose the same kind of restrictions. Where there is an absence of covenants in any written agreement between the parties, it will be appropriate to consider under Chapter I guidance whether there is, in practice, the equivalent of a maintenance covenant between the parties and the consequential impact upon the pricing of the loan ...

The terms and conditions of a financial transaction between independent enterprises are usually explicitly stated in a written agreement. However, between associated enterprises the contractual arrangements may not always provide information in sufficient detail or may be inconsistent with the actual conduct of the parties or other facts and circumstances. It is therefore necessary to look to other documents, the actual conduct of the parties – notwithstanding that such consideration may ultimately result in the conclusion that the contractual form and actual conduct are in alignment – and the economic principles that generally govern relationships between independent enterprises in comparable circumstances in order to accurately delineate the actual transaction in accordance with Section D.1.1 of Chapter I ...

As noted at paragraph 1.46, in transactions between independent enterprises, the divergence of interests between the parties ensures that: (i) contractual terms are concluded that reflect the interest of both parties, (ii) the parties will ordinarily seek to hold each other to the terms of the contract, and (iii) that contractual terms will be ignored or modified after the fact generally only if it is in the interests of both parties. However, this same divergence of interest may not exist in the case of associated enterprises or any such divergences may be managed in ways facilitated by the relationship between the associated enterprises and not solely or mainly through contractual agreements. For this reason, when the facts of the case differ from the written terms of the agreement between the parties or when no written terms exist, the absence or existence (and its terms) of an indemnification clause should be deduced from the conduct of the parties. For instance, it may be that, on the basis of the facts of the case and of the actual conduct of the associated enterprises, it is determined that the term of the contract is longer than established in the written contract, which would entitle the terminated party to some indemnification in case of early termination ...

The accurate delineation of the transaction will identify whether an indemnification clause or arrangement is in place upon termination, non-renewal or re-negotiation of the arrangements. In order to do so, the starting point should be a review of whether an indemnification clause or similar provision for termination, non-renewal or renegotiation is provided for, and of whether the conditions for termination, non-renewal or renegotiation of the contract were respected (e.g. with regard to any required notice period). However, the examination of the terms of the contract between the associated enterprises may not suffice from a transfer pricing perspective as the mere fact that a given terminated, non-renewed or renegotiated contract did not provide an indemnification or similar provision does not necessarily mean that this is arm’s length, as discussed below ...

Where the conditions of a business restructuring have been formalised by the MNE group in writing (e.g. written contractual agreements, correspondence and/or other communications), those agreements provide the starting point for delineating the transactions comprising the business restructuring between the MNEs involved. The contractual terms may describe the roles, responsibilities and rights of the restructured entity under the pre-restructuring arrangement (including in relevant circumstances those existing under contract and commercial law) and of the manner and extent to which those rights and obligations change as a result of the restructuring. However, where no written terms exist, or where the facts of the case, including the conduct of the parties, differ materially from the written terms of any agreement between them or supplement these written terms, the actual transactions comprising the business restructuring must be deduced from the facts as established, including the conduct of the parties (see Section D. 1.1 of Chapter I) ...

It should be recognised that the process of identifying all of the intangibles transferred in a particular transaction is an exercise of identifying, by reference to written agreements and the actual conduct of the parties, the actual transactions that have been undertaken, applying the principles of Section D. 1 of Chapter I ...

The provisions of Section D.1.1 of Chapter I apply in identifying the specific nature of a transaction involving a transfer of intangibles or rights in intangibles, in identifying the nature of any intangibles transferred, and in identifying any limitations imposed by the terms of the transfer on the use of those intangibles. For example, a written specification that a licence is non-exclusive or of limited duration need not be respected by the tax administration if such specification is not consistent with the conduct of the parties. Example 18 in the Annex I to Chapter VI illustrates the provisions of this paragraph ...

In any application of a transactional profit split, care should be exercised to ensure that the method is applied without hindsight. See paragraph 3.74. That is, irrespective of whether a transactional profit split of anticipated or actual profits is used, unless there are major unforeseen developments which would have resulted in a renegotiation of the agreement had it occurred between independent parties, the basis upon which those profits are to be split between the associated enterprises, including the profit splitting factors, the way in which relevant profits are calculated, and any adjustments or contingencies, must be determined on the basis of information known or reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time the transactions were entered into. This is so notwithstanding the fact that in many cases, the actual calculations can necessarily only be performed some time afterwards, where, for example they apply profit splitting factors determined at the outset to the actual profits. Additionally, it should be remembered that the starting point in the accurate delineation of any transaction will generally be the written contracts which may reflect the intention of the parties at the time the contract was concluded. See paragraph 1.42 ...

In performing the analysis, the actual transaction between the parties will have been deduced from written contracts and the conduct of the parties. Formal conditions recognised in contracts will have been clarified and supplemented by analysis of the conduct of the parties and the other economically relevant characteristics of the transaction (see Section D.1.1). Where the characteristics of the transaction that are economically significant are inconsistent with the written contract, then the actual transaction will have been delineated in accordance with the characteristics of the transaction reflected in the conduct of the parties. Contractual risk assumption and actual conduct with respect to risk assumption will have been examined taking into account control over the risk (as defined in paragraphs 1.65-1.68) and the financial capacity to assume risk (as defined in paragraph 1.64), and consequently, risks assumed under the contract may have been allocated in accordance with the conduct of the parties and the other facts on the basis of steps 4 and 5 of the process for analysing risk in a controlled transaction as reflected in Sections D.1.2.1.4 and D.1.2.1.5. Therefore, the analysis will have set out the factual substance of the commercial or financial relations between the parties and accurately delineated the actual transaction ...

Consider for example, a manufacturer, whose functional currency is US dollars, that sells goods to an associated distributor in another country, whose functional currency is euros, and the written contract states that the distributor assumes all exchange rate risks in relation to this controlled transaction. If, however, the price for the goods is charged by the manufacturer to the distributor over an extended period of time in euros, the currency of the distributor, then aspects of the written contractual terms do not reflect the actual commercial or financial relations between the parties. The assumption of risk in the transaction should be determined by the actual conduct of the parties in the context of the contractual terms, rather than by aspects of written contractual terms which are not in practice applied. The principle can be further illustrated by Example 7 in the Annex to Chapter VI, where there is an inconsistency between the contractual assumption of risk and the conduct of the parties as evidenced by the bearing of costs relating to the downside outcome of that risk ...

In line with the discussion in relation to contractual terms (see Section D.1.1), it should be considered under step 4(i) whether the parties’ conduct conforms to the assumption of risk contained in written contracts, or whether the contractual terms have not been followed or are incomplete. Where differences exist between contractual terms related to risk and the conduct of the parties which are economically significant and would be taken into account by third parties in pricing the transaction between them, the parties’ conduct in the context of the consistent contractual terms should generally be taken as the best evidence concerning the intention of the parties in relation to the assumption of risk ...

Where no written terms exist, the actual transaction would need to be deduced from the evidence of actual conduct provided by identifying the economically relevant characteristics of the transaction. In some circumstances the actual outcome of commercial or financial relations may not have been identified as a transaction by the MNE, but nevertheless may result in a transfer of material value, the terms of which would need to be deduced from the conduct of the parties. For example, technical assistance may have been granted, synergies may have been created through deliberate concerted action (as discussed in Section D.8), or know-how may have been provided through seconded employees or otherwise. These relations may not have been recognised by the MNE, may not be reflected in the pricing of other connected transactions, may not have been formalised in written contracts, and may not appear as entries in the accounting systems. Where the transaction has not been formalised, all aspects would need to be deduced from available evidence of the conduct of the parties, including what functions are actually performed, what assets are actually used, and what risks are actually assumed by each of the parties ...

The following example illustrates the concept of differences between written contractual terms and conduct of the parties, with the result that the actual conduct of the parties delineates the transaction. Company S is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Company P. The parties have entered into a written contract pursuant to which Company P licenses intellectual property to Company S for use in Company S’s business; Company S agrees to compensate Company P for the licence with a royalty. Evidence provided by other economically relevant characteristics, and in particular the functions performed, establishes that Company P performs negotiations with third-party customers to achieve sales for Company S, provides regular technical services support to Company S so that Company S can deliver contracted sales to its customers, and regularly provides staff to enable Company S to fulfil customer contracts. A majority of customers insist on including Company P as joint contracting party along with Company S, although fee income under the contract is payable to Company S. The analysis of the commercial or financial relations indicates that Company S is not capable of providing the contracted services to customers without significant support from Company P, and is not developing its own capability. Under the contract, Company P has given a licence to Company S, but in fact controls the business risk and output of Company S such that it has not transferred risk and function consistent with a licensing arrangement, and acts not as the licensor but the principal. The identification of the actual transaction between Company P and Company S should not be defined solely by the terms of the written contract. Instead, the actual transaction should be determined from the conduct of the parties, leading to the conclusion that the actual functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed by the parties are not consistent with the written licence agreement ...

If the characteristics of the transaction that are economically relevant are inconsistent with the written contract between the associated enterprises, the actual transaction should generally be delineated for purposes of the transfer pricing analysis in accordance with the characteristics of the transaction reflected in the conduct of the parties ...

However, the written contracts alone are unlikely to provide all the information necessary to perform a transfer pricing analysis, or to provide information regarding the relevant contractual terms in sufficient detail. Further information will be required by taking into consideration evidence of the commercial or financial relations provided by the economically relevant characteristics in the other four categories (see paragraph 1.36): the functions performed by each of the parties to the transaction, taking into account assets used and risks assumed, together with the characteristics of property transferred or services provided, the economic circumstances of the parties and of the market in which the parties operate, and the business strategies pursued by the parties. Taken together, the analysis of economically relevant characteristics in all five categories provides evidence of the actual conduct of the associated enterprises. The evidence may clarify aspects of the written contractual arrangements by providing useful and consistent information. If the contract neither explicitly nor implicitly (taking into account applicable principles of contract interpretation) addresses characteristics of the transaction that are economically relevant, then any information provided by the contract should be supplemented for purposes of the transfer pricing analysis by the evidence provided by identifying those characteristics ...

A transaction is the consequence or expression of the commercial or financial relations between the parties. The controlled transactions may have been formalised in written contracts which may reflect the intention of the parties at the time the contract was concluded in relation to aspects of the transaction covered by the contract, including in typical cases the division of responsibilities, obligations and rights, assumption of identified risks, and pricing arrangements. Where a transaction has been formalised by the associated enterprises through written contractual agreements, those agreements provide the starting point for delineating the transaction between them and how the responsibilities, risks, and anticipated outcomes arising from their interaction were intended to be divided at the time of entering into the contract. The terms of a transaction may also be found in communications between the parties other than a written contract ...

In a November 2020 opinion the US Tax Court agreed with the IRS that Coca-Cola’s US-based income should be increased by $9 billion in a dispute over royalties from its foreign-based licensees. Coca-Cola filed a Motion to Reconsider June 2, 2021 – 196 days after the Tax Court had served its opinion. Judgement of the tax court The Tax Court denied the motion to reconsider. There is a 30-day deadline to move for reconsideration and the court concluded that Coca-Cola was without a valid excuse for the late filing and that the motion would have failed on the merits in any event ...

C. SA provides “services, in particular in the areas of communication, management, accounting, management and budget control, sales development monitoring and employee training for the group to which it belongs, active in particular in the field of “F”. C. SA is part of an international group of companies, G. group, whose ultimate owner is A. The G group includes H. Ltd, based in the British Virgin Islands, I. Ltd, based in Guernsey and J. Ltd, also based in Guernsey. In 2005, K. was a director of C. SA. On December 21 and December 31, 2004, an exclusive agreement for distribution of “F” was entered into between L. Ltd, on the one hand, and C. SA , H. Ltd and J. Ltd, on the other hand. Under the terms of this distribution agreement, L. Ltd. undertook to supply “F” to the three companies as of January 1, 2005 and for a period of at least ten years, in return for payment. Under a supply agreement C. SA agreed to sell clearly defined quantities of “F” to M for the period from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2014. In the course of 2005, 56 invoices relating to sales transactions of “F” to M. were drawn up and sent to the latter, on the letterhead of C. SA. According to these documents, M. had to pay the sale price directly into two accounts – one held by H. Ltd and the other by J. Ltd. Part of this money was then reallocated to the supply of “F”, while the balance was transferred to an account in Guernsey held by J. Ltd. The result was, that income from C. SA’s sale of “F” to M was not recognized in C. SA but instead in the two off-shore companies H. Ltd and J. Ltd. Following an audit, the Swiss tax authorities issued an assessment where C. SA and A were held liable for withholding taxes on a hidden distribution of profits. A and C. SA brought this assessment to Court. Decision of the Court The Court decided – in accordance with the 2020 judgment of the Federal Administrative Court – in favor of the tax authorities and the appeal of C. SA and A was dismissed. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Coca Cola, a U.S. corporation, was the legal owner of the intellectual property (IP) necessary to manufacture, distribute, and sell some of the best-known beverage brands in the world. This IP included trade- marks, product names, logos, patents, secret formulas, and proprietary manufacturing processes. Coca Cola licensed foreign manufacturing affiliates, called “supply points,” to use this IP to produce concentrate that they sold to unrelated bottlers, who produced finished beverages for sale  to distributors and retailers throughout the world. Coca Cola’s contracts with its supply points gave them limited rights to use the IP in performing their manufacturing and distribution functions but gave the supply points no ownership interest in that IP. During 2007-2009 the supply points compensated Coca Cola for use of its IP under a formulary apportionment method to which Coca Cola and IRS had agreed in 1996 when settling Coca Cola’s tax liabilities for 1987-1995. Under that method the supply points were permitted to satisfy their royalty obligations by paying actual royalties or by remitting dividends. During 2007-2009 the supply points remitted to Coca Cola dividends of about $1.8 billion in satisfaction of their royalty obligations. The 1996 agreement did not address the transfer pricing methodology to be used for years after 1995. Upon examination of Coca Cola’s 2007-2009 returns IRS determined that Coca Cola’s methodology did not reflect arm’s-length norms because it over-compensated the supply points and undercompensated Coca Cola for the use of its IP. IRS reallocated income between Coca Cola and the supply points employing a comparable profits method (CPM) that used Coca Cola’s unrelated bottlers as comparable parties. These adjustments increased Coca Cola’s aggregate taxable income for 2007- 2009 by more than $9 billion. The US Tax Court ruled on November 18 that Coca-Cola’s US-based income should be increased by about $9 billion in a dispute over the appropriate royalties owned by its foreign-based licensees for the years from 2007 to 2009. The court reduced the IRS’s adjustment by $1.8 billion because the taxpayer made a valid and timely choice to use an offset treatment when it came to dividends paid by foreign manufacturing affiliates to satisfy royalty obligations ...

C. SA provides “services, in particular in the areas of communication, management, accounting, management and budget control, sales development monitoring and employee training for the group to which it belongs, active in particular in the field of “F”. C. SA is part of an international group of companies, G. group, whose ultimate owner is A. The G group includes H. Ltd, based in the British Virgin Islands, I. Ltd, based in Guernsey and J. Ltd, also based in Guernsey. In 2005, K. was a director of C. SA. On December 21 and December 31, 2004, an exclusive agreement for distribution of “F” was entered into between L. Ltd, on the one hand, and C. SA , H. Ltd and J. Ltd, on the other hand. Under the terms of this distribution agreement, L. Ltd. undertook to supply “F” to the three companies as of January 1, 2005 and for a period of at least ten years, in return for payment. Under a supply agreement C. SA agreed to sell clearly defined quantities of “F” to M for the period from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2014. In the course of 2005, 56 invoices relating to sales transactions of “F” to M. were drawn up and sent to the latter, on the letterhead of C. SA. According to these documents, M. had to pay the sale price directly into two accounts – one held by H. Ltd and the other by J. Ltd. Part of this money was then reallocated to the supply of “F”, while the balance was transferred to an account in Guernsey held by J. Ltd. The result was, that income from C. SA’s sale of “F” to M was not recognized in C. SA but instead in the two off-shore companies H. Ltd and J. Ltd. Following an audit, the Swiss tax authorities issued an assessment where C. SA and A were held liable for withholding taxes on a hidden distribution of profits. A and C. SA brought this assessment to Court. Decision of the Court The Court decided in favor of the tax authorities. “The above elements relied on by the appellants in no way provide proof that the appellant carried out the said transactions on behalf of the other companies in the [G]B group. Moreover, they do not in themselves allow the conclusion that the appellant acted through the other companies in its group, as the appellants maintain. Insofar as, as has been seen (see recital 5.1 above), the contract for the sale of *** was concluded and the relevant invoices issued in the name of the appellant, which is moreover designated as the seller in the sales contract (see heading and point 9. 2(a) of that contract), and that the other companies in the group are never mentioned in the context of the transactions at issue, it is much more appropriate to hold that they were carried out, admittedly for the benefit of the appellant, but through the appellant acting in its name and on its behalf. Therefore, by renouncing the resulting proceeds to the appellant, the appellant did indeed make concealed distributions of profits, i.e. appreciable cash benefits subject to withholding tax” “In these circumstances and insofar as the proceeds from the sale of *** were paid directly by [C. SA.] O. to the companies [H Ltd and J Ltd.] Y. and X.     – which must undoubtedly be regarded as persons closely related to the appellant within the meaning of the case-law (cf. recital 3.2.1 above) -, without any equivalent consideration in favour of the appellant, and that part of those proceeds was reallocated to the supply of *** (cf. d above), the lower authority was right to find that there was a taxable supply of money (see recitals 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 above) and to calculate this on the basis of an estimate of the profit resulting from the purchase and resale of *** (see decision under point 4.3, pp. 10 et seq.)” “In the absence of any document attesting to an assignment to the appellant of the claims arising from the purchase contract with [L] M. and the supply agreements of November 2004 with [M] O.     In addition, there is no reason to consider that the allocation of the profit resulting from the purchase and resale of *** to the companies of the group based abroad constitutes the remuneration granted to the latter for the takeover of the two contracts (purchase and sale), nor is there any justification for deducting the value of those contracts from the amount retained by the lower authority. The appellant’s submissions to this effect (see the memorandum of 12 May 2015, pp. 22 et seq. [under para. 6]) must therefore be rejected. Accordingly, the court of appeal refrains from carrying out the expert assessment requested by the appellant in order to estimate that value (see the memorandum of 12 May 2015, p. 25 [under section V]; see also section 2.2.1 above).” “… it should be noted that, in view of the foregoing and the size of the amounts waived by the appellant, the taxable cash benefit was easily recognisable as such by all the participants. Consequently, and insofar as the appellant did not declare or pay the relevant withholding tax spontaneously, the probable existence of tax evasion must be accepted, without it being necessary to determine whether or not it was committed intentionally (see recitals 4.1 and 4.2 above). Accordingly, there can be no criticism of the lower authority’s application of the provisions of the DPA and, since a contribution was wrongly not collected, of Article 12 paras. 1 and 2 of that Act in particular.” “The contested decision must therefore also be confirmed in this respect. Finally, as the case file is complete, the facts sufficiently established and the court is convinced, the court may also dispense with further investigative measures (see section 2.2.1 above). It is therefore also appropriate to reject the appellant’s subsidiary claim that he should be required, by all legal means, to provide ...

In general, a financial guarantee provides for the guarantor to meet specified financial obligations in the event of a failure to do so by the guaranteed party. There are various terms in use for different types of credit support from one member of an MNE group to another. At one end of the spectrum is the formal written guarantee and at the other is the implied support attributable solely to membership in the MNE group. In the context of this section, a guarantee is a legally binding commitment on the part of the guarantor to assume a specified obligation of the guaranteed debtor if the debtor defaults on that obligation. The situation likely to be encountered most frequently in a transfer pricing context is that in which an associated enterprise (guarantor) provides a guarantee on a loan taken out by another associated enterprise from an unrelated lender ...

The terms and conditions of a financial transaction between independent enterprises are usually explicitly stated in a written agreement. However, between associated enterprises the contractual arrangements may not always provide information in sufficient detail or may be inconsistent with the actual conduct of the parties or other facts and circumstances. It is therefore necessary to look to other documents, the actual conduct of the parties – notwithstanding that such consideration may ultimately result in the conclusion that the contractual form and actual conduct are in alignment – and the economic principles that generally govern relationships between independent enterprises in comparable circumstances in order to accurately delineate the actual transaction in accordance with Section D.1.1 of Chapter I ...

The tax authorities of the Czech Republic issued an assessment of additional income taxes and penalties for FY 2010 and 2011, because AZETKO s.r.o. according to the tax authorities did not receive an arm’s length remuneration for administration and operation of a website and e-shop on behalf on a related party, Quantus Consulting s.r.o. AZETKO disagreed with the assessment and brought the case to court. The regional court ruled in favor of AZETKO, but the tax administration appealed the decision to the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court found the tax administrations change in pricing method under the appeal of the case unsubstantiated. The tax administration had originally applied the CUP method, but in the appeal proceedings instead used the net margin transaction method (TNMM). On that basis, the appeal was dismissed by the Court. The conditions for application of the transfer pricing provisions in Section 23(7) of the Czech Income Tax Act was summarised by the Court as follows If it is proved that the parties are related persons within the meaning of Section 23(7) of the Income Tax Act, it is for the tax administrator to prove that the prices agreed between these persons differ from the prices that would have been agreed between independent persons in normal business relations under the same or similar conditions. Therefore, the principle that in tax proceedings it is the tax subject who bears the burden of allegations in relation to its tax liability and the burden of proof in relation to these allegations does not apply (cf. The tax administrator must therefore carry out a comparison in which it must establish both the price agreed between the related parties and the normal price (compared with the average price, the so-called reference price) at which independent persons trade in a comparable commodity. A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the adjustment of the tax base under Section 23(7) of the Income Tax Act is the existence of a price difference. In order to establish the ‘normal’ nature of the price, the administrator must be able to bear the burden of proof in relation to all relevant aspects. The tax authorities can, and usually will, determine the normal price by comparing the prices actually obtained for the same or similar commodity between genuine independent operators. However, it may determine it, in particular because of the absence or unavailability of data on such prices, only as a hypothetical estimate based on logical and rational reasoning and economic experience. On the issue of business strategy the court provided the following insights “According to the above-mentioned guidelines, a business strategy is understood as an attempt to penetrate a new market, where prices can be significantly distorted by higher costs of introducing a product to the market while applying a lower final selling price of this product, but it can also be different circumstances. In assessing this factor, the SAC agrees with the regional court that the administrative authorities assessed the business strategy only for the applicant, namely that it is an established company with an established business program. However, for the companies being compared, they did not assess this factor, and the influence of this question on the assessment of the present case cannot be ruled out without further ado.” Click here for translation ...

In any application of a transactional profit split, care should be exercised to ensure that the method is applied without hindsight. See paragraph 3.74. That is, irrespective of whether a transactional profit split of anticipated or actual profits is used, unless there are major unforeseen developments which would have resulted in a renegotiation of the agreement had it occurred between independent parties, the basis upon which those profits are to be split between the associated enterprises, including the profit splitting factors, the way in which relevant profits are calculated, and any adjustments or contingencies, must be determined on the basis of information known or reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time the transactions were entered into. This is so notwithstanding the fact that in many cases, the actual calculations can necessarily only be performed some time afterwards, where, for example they apply profit splitting factors determined at the outset to the actual profits. Additionally, it should be remembered that the starting point in the accurate delineation of any transaction will generally be the written contracts which may reflect the intention of the parties at the time the contract was concluded. See paragraph 1.42 ...

Recordati Industria Chimica e Farmaceutica S.p.A had been issued an assessment by the tax authorities for FY 2003 on various issues related to transfer pricing. Recordati Industria Chimica e Farmaceutica S.p.A. disagreed with the assessment and brought the case to court. The Regional Tax Commission of Lombardy (Ctr) issued a decision where it partially annulled the assessment. This decision was challenged both by the tax authorities and Recordati Industria Chimica e Farmaceutica S.p.A. Judgement of the Supreme Court Before the Supreme Court there were 29 issues to be resolved. The Supreme Court predominantly ruled in favour of the tax authorities. The court confirms that transfer pricing adjustments are applicable even in the absence of proof by the administration of a concrete tax advantage by the taxpayer. The shift of taxable income following transactions between companies belonging to the same group and subject to different national regulations, does not require the administration to prove the elusive function, but only the existence of “transactions” between companies linked at an apparently lower than normal price. The court also states that it cannot be excluded that overall business strategy can induce companies to carry out uneconomic operations in view of and in function of other benefits “(…) the essential aspect of transfer pricing does not concern the justification of the lower price from an economic point of view, but whether the discounts can be considered justified from a fiscal point of view, that is, whether they respond to the principle of free competition, in accordance with the teachings of the Supreme Court.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

An agreement between a Swedish company, VSM Group AB, and an American distributor, VSM Sewing Inc, stated that the distributor would receive compensation corresponding to an operating margin of three percent. Benchmark studies showed that the agreed compensation was arm’s length. Each year, the company made a year end adjustment to ensure that the pricing was arm’s length. In cases where the outcome was outside the interquartile range, additional invoicing took place so that the operating margin was adjusted to the agreed level. But no additional invoicing took place where the operating margin deviated from what was agreed but was within the interquartile range. The company argued that the pricing was correct as long as the operating margin was within the interquartile range. The company also argued that the agreement between the parties had a different content than the written agreement because the parties consistently applied an understanding of the arrangement that deviated from the written content. The Court of Appeal considered that the wording of the agreement was clearly formulated and lacked room for interpretation. The agreement had also been followed and the compensation had been adjusted to the agreed level in cases where additional invoicing had taken place. The mere fact that the parties deviated from the terms of the written agreement in cases where the level of compensation proved to be within the interquartile range, cannot mean that the agreement is given a different meaning, even if it has been done consistently. The Court of Appeal found that such a deviation would not have been accepted by an independent party and that it was clear that an incorrect pricing had taken place which had a negative effect on the Swedish company’s results. Click here for translation ...

As noted at paragraph 1.46, in transactions between independent enterprises, the divergence of interests between the parties ensures that: (i) contractual terms are concluded that reflect the interest of both parties, (ii) the parties will ordinarily seek to hold each other to the terms of the contract, and (iii) that contractual terms will be ignored or modified after the fact generally only if it is in the interests of both parties. However, this same divergence of interest may not exist in the case of associated enterprises or any such divergences may be managed in ways facilitated by the relationship between the associated enterprises and not solely or mainly through contractual agreements. For this reason, when the facts of the case differ from the written terms of the agreement between the parties or when no written terms exist, the absence or existence (and its terms) of an indemnification clause should be deduced from the conduct of the parties. For instance, it may be that, on the basis of the facts of the case and of the actual conduct of the associated enterprises, it is determined that the term of the contract is longer than established in the written contract, which would entitle the terminated party to some indemnification in case of early termination ...

The accurate delineation of the transaction will identify whether an indemnification clause or arrangement is in place upon termination, non-renewal or re-negotiation of the arrangements. In order to do so, the starting point should be a review of whether an indemnification clause or similar provision for termination, non-renewal or renegotiation is provided for, and of whether the conditions for termination, non-renewal or renegotiation of the contract were respected (e.g. with regard to any required notice period). However, the examination of the terms of the contract between the associated enterprises may not suffice from a transfer pricing perspective as the mere fact that a given terminated, non-renewed or renegotiated contract did not provide an indemnification or similar provision does not necessarily mean that this is arm’s length, as discussed below ...

Where the conditions of a business restructuring have been formalised by the MNE group in writing (e.g. written contractual agreements, correspondence and/or other communications), those agreements provide the starting point for delineating the transactions comprising the business restructuring between the MNEs involved. The contractual terms may describe the roles, responsibilities and rights of the restructured entity under the pre-restructuring arrangement (including in relevant circumstances those existing under contract and commercial law) and of the manner and extent to which those rights and obligations change as a result of the restructuring. However, where no written terms exist, or where the facts of the case, including the conduct of the parties, differ materially from the written terms of any agreement between them or supplement these written terms, the actual transactions comprising the business restructuring must be deduced from the facts as established, including the conduct of the parties (see Section D. 1.1 of Chapter I) ...

It should be recognised that the process of identifying all of the intangibles transferred in a particular transaction is an exercise of identifying, by reference to written agreements and the actual conduct of the parties, the actual transactions that have been undertaken, applying the principles of Section D. 1 of Chapter I ...

The provisions of Section D.1.1 of Chapter I apply in identifying the specific nature of a transaction involving a transfer of intangibles or rights in intangibles, in identifying the nature of any intangibles transferred, and in identifying any limitations imposed by the terms of the transfer on the use of those intangibles. For example, a written specification that a licence is non-exclusive or of limited duration need not be respected by the tax administration if such specification is not consistent with the conduct of the parties. Example 18 in the Annex to Chapter VI illustrates the provisions of this paragraph ...

In performing the analysis, the actual transaction between the parties will have been deduced from written contracts and the conduct of the parties. Formal conditions recognised in contracts will have been clarified and supplemented by analysis of the conduct of the parties and the other economically relevant characteristics of the transaction (see Section D.1.1). Where the characteristics of the transaction that are economically significant are inconsistent with the written contract, then the actual transaction will have been delineated in accordance with the characteristics of the transaction reflected in the conduct of the parties. Contractual risk assumption and actual conduct with respect to risk assumption will have been examined taking into account control over the risk (as defined in paragraphs 1.65-1.68) and the financial capacity to assume risk (as defined in paragraph 1.64), and consequently, risks assumed under the contract may have been allocated in accordance with the conduct of the parties and the other facts on the basis of steps 4 and 5 of the process for analysing risk in a controlled transaction as reflected in Sections D.1.2.1.4 and D.1.2.1.5. Therefore, the analysis will have set out the factual substance of the commercial or financial relations between the parties and accurately delineated the actual transaction ...

Consider for example, a manufacturer, whose functional currency is US dollars, that sells goods to an associated distributor in another country, whose functional currency is euros, and the written contract states that the distributor assumes all exchange rate risks in relation to this controlled transaction. If, however, the price for the goods is charged by the manufacturer to the distributor over an extended period of time in euros, the currency of the distributor, then aspects of the written contractual terms do not reflect the actual commercial or financial relations between the parties. The assumption of risk in the transaction should be determined by the actual conduct of the parties in the context of the contractual terms, rather than by aspects of written contractual terms which are not in practice applied. The principle can be further illustrated by Example 7 in the Annex to Chapter VI, where there is an inconsistency between the contractual assumption of risk and the conduct of the parties as evidenced by the bearing of costs relating to the downside outcome of that risk ...

In line with the discussion in relation to contractual terms (see Section D.1.1), it should be considered under step 4(i) whether the parties’ conduct conforms to the assumption of risk contained in written contracts, or whether the contractual terms have not been followed or are incomplete. Where differences exist between contractual terms related to risk and the conduct of the parties which are economically significant and would be taken into account by third parties in pricing the transaction between them, the parties’ conduct in the context of the consistent contractual terms should generally be taken as the best evidence concerning the intention of the parties in relation to the assumption of risk ...

If the characteristics of the transaction that are economically relevant are inconsistent with the written contract between the associated enterprises, the actual transaction should generally be delineated for purposes of the transfer pricing analysis in accordance with the characteristics of the transaction reflected in the conduct of the parties ...

However, the written contracts alone are unlikely to provide all the information necessary to perform a transfer pricing analysis, or to provide information regarding the relevant contractual terms in sufficient detail. Further information will be required by taking into consideration evidence of the commercial or financial relations provided by the economically relevant characteristics in the other four categories (see paragraph 1.36): the functions performed by each of the parties to the transaction, taking into account assets used and risks assumed, together with the characteristics of property transferred or services provided, the economic circumstances of the parties and of the market in which the parties operate, and the business strategies pursued by the parties. Taken together, the analysis of economically relevant characteristics in all five categories provides evidence of the actual conduct of the associated enterprises. The evidence may clarify aspects of the written contractual arrangements by providing useful and consistent information. If the contract neither explicitly nor implicitly (taking into account applicable principles of contract interpretation) addresses characteristics of the transaction that are economically relevant, then any information provided by the contract should be supplemented for purposes of the transfer pricing analysis by the evidence provided by identifying those characteristics ...

A transaction is the consequence or expression of the commercial or financial relations between the parties. The controlled transactions may have been formalised in written contracts which may reflect the intention of the parties at the time the contract was concluded in relation to aspects of the transaction covered by the contract, including in typical cases the division of responsibilities, obligations and rights, assumption of identified risks, and pricing arrangements. Where a transaction has been formalised by the associated enterprises through written contractual agreements, those agreements provide the starting point for delineating the transaction between them and how the responsibilities, risks, and anticipated outcomes arising from their interaction were intended to be divided at the time of entering into the contract. The terms of a transaction may also be found in communications between the parties other than a written contract ...

The Tax Court of Canada upheld the right of Avotus Corporation to deduct from its Canadian income losses incurred by its subsidiary in Puerto Rico. The Tax Court found that the Puerto Rican subsidiary was Avotus’s agent under a validly executed agency agreement, rejecting the CRA’s claim that the written agreement was unacceptable because the subsidiary’s conduct was inconsistent with that of an agent ...

The Duke of Westminster’s gardener was paid weekly, but to reduce tax, his solicitors drew up a deed in which it was said that the earnings were not really wages, but were an annual payment payable by weekly instalments. The tax authorities held that for tax purposes the true relationship and the true nature of these payments were decisive – substance over form. Judgment of the House of Lords The House of Lords decided in favor of the Duke of Westminster and set aside the assessment. LORD TOMLIN. “… Apart, however, from the question of contract with which I have dealt, it is said that in revenue cases there is a doctrine that the Court may ignore the legal position and regard what is called “the substance of the matter,” and that here the substance of the matter is that the annuitant was serving the Duke for something equal to his former salary or wages, and that therefore, while he is so serving, the annuity must be treated as salary or wages. This supposed doctrine (upon which the Commissioners apparently acted) seems to rest for its support upon a misunderstanding of language used in some earlier cases. The sooner this misunderstanding is dispelled, and the supposed doctrine given its quietus, the better it will be for all concerned, for the doctrine seems to involve substituting “the incertain and crooked cord of discretion” for “the golden and streight metwand of the law.” 4 Inst 41 Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax. This so-called doctrine of “the substance” seems to me to be nothing more than an attempt to make a man pay notwithstanding that he has so ordered his affairs that the amount of tax sought from him is not legally claimable. The principal passages relied upon are from opinions of Lord Herschell and Lord Halsbury in your Lordships’ House. Lord Herschell L.C. in Helby v. Matthews [1895] AC 471, 475 observed: “It is said that the substance of the transaction evidenced by the agreement must be looked at, and not its mere words. I quite agree;” but he went on to explain that the substance must be ascertained by a consideration of the rights and obligations of the parties to be derived from a consideration of the whole of the agreement. In short Lord Herschell was saying that the substance of a transaction embodied in a written instrument is to be found by construing the document as a whole. Support has also been sought by the appellants from the language of Lord Halsbury L.C. in Secretary of State in Council of India v. Scoble. [1903] AC 299, 302 There Lord Halsbury said: “Still, looking at the whole nature and substance of the transaction (and it is agreed on all sides that we must look at the nature of the transaction and not be bound by the mere use of the words), this is not the case of a purchase of an annuity.” Here again Lord Halsbury is only giving utterance to the indisputable rule that the surrounding circumstances must be regarded in construing a document. Neither of these passages in my opinion affords the appellants any support or has any application to the present case. The matter was put accurately by my noble and learned friend Lord Warrington of Clyffe when as Warrington L.J. in In re Hinckes, Dashwood v. Hinckes [1921] 1 Ch 475, 489 he used these words: “It is said we must go behind the form and look at the substance …. but, in order to ascertain the substance, I must look at the legal effect of the bargain which the parties have entered into.” So here the substance is that which results from the legal rights and obligations of the parties ascertained upon ordinary legal principles, and, having regard to what I have already said, the conclusion must be that each annuitant is entitled to an annuity which as between himself and the payer is liable to deduction of income tax by the payer and which the payer is entitled to treat as a deduction from his total income for surtax purposes. There may, of course, be cases where documents are not bona fide nor intended to be acted upon, but are only used as a cloak to conceal a different transaction. No such case is made or even suggested here. The deeds of covenant are admittedly bona fide and have been given their proper legal operation. They cannot be ignored or treated as operating in some different way because as a result less duty is payable than would have been the case if some other arrangement (called for the purpose of the appellants’ argument “the substance”) had been made. I find myself, therefore, in regard to the annuities other than that of Blow, unable to take the same view as the noble and learned Lord upon the Woolsack. In my opinion in regard to all the annuities the appeal fails and ought to be dismissed with costs.” This “Duke of Westminster-doctrine” was later set aside in the Ramsay case where a substance over form-doctrine was endorsed by the House of Lords. The “Ramsay principle” has since been applied in other cases involving tax avoidance schemes in the UK, where transactions have been constructed purely for tax purposes. UK vs DUKE OF WESTMINSTER 1935 ...