Uber files – confidential documents, leaked to The Guardian newspaper shows that Uber in 2015 sought to deflect attention from its Dutch conduits and Caribbean tax shelters by helping tax authorities collect taxes from its drivers. At that time, Uber’s Dutch subsidiary received payments from customers hiring cars in cities around the world (except US and China), and after paying the drivers, profits were routed on as royalty fees to Bermuda, thus avoiding corporate income tax. In 2019, Uber took the first steps to close its Caribbean tax shelters. To that end, a Dutch subsidiary purchased the IP that was previously held by the Bermudan subsidiary, using a $16 billion loan it had received from Uber’s Singapore holding company. The new setup was also tax driven. Tax depreciations on the IP acquired from Bermuda and interest on the loan from Singapore will significantly reduce Uber’s effective tax rate in years to come. Centre for International Corporate Tax Accountability and Research (CICTAR) has revealed that in 2019 Uber’s Dutch headquarter pulled in more than $US5.8 billion in operating revenue from countries around the world. “The direct transfer of revenue from around the world to the Netherlands leaves little, if any, taxable profits behind,“. “Uber created an $8 billion Dutch tax shelter that, if unchecked, may eliminate tax liability on profits shifted to the Netherlands for decades to come.” According to the groups 10-Q filing for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2022, Uber it is currently facing numerous tax audits. “We may have exposure to materially greater than anticipated tax liabilities. The tax laws applicable to our global business activities are subject to uncertainty and can be interpreted differently by different companies. For example, we may become subject to sales tax rates in certain jurisdictions that are significantly greater than the rates we currently pay in those jurisdictions. Like many other multinational corporations, we are subject to tax in multiple U.S. and foreign jurisdictions and have structured our operations to reduce our effective tax rate. Currently, certain jurisdictions are investigating our compliance with tax rules. If it is determined that we are not compliant with such rules, we could owe additional taxes. Certain jurisdictions, including Australia, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UK and other countries, require that we pay any assessed taxes prior to being allowed to contest or litigate the applicability of tax assessments in those jurisdictions. These amounts could materially adversely impact our liquidity while those matters are being litigated. This prepayment of contested taxes is referred to as “pay-to-play.” Payment of these amounts is not an admission that we believe we are subject to such taxes; even when such payments are made, we continue to defend our positions vigorously. If we prevail in the proceedings for which a pay-to-play payment was made, the jurisdiction collecting the payment will be required to repay such amounts and also may be required to pay interest. Additionally, the taxing authorities of the jurisdictions in which we operate have in the past, and may in the future, examine or challenge our methodologies for valuing developed technology, which could increase our worldwide effective tax rate and harm our financial position and operating results. Furthermore, our future income taxes could be adversely affected by earnings being lower than anticipated in jurisdictions that have lower statutory tax rates and higher than anticipated in jurisdictions that have higher statutory tax rates, changes in the valuation allowance on our U.S. and Netherlands’ deferred tax assets, or changes in tax laws, regulations, or accounting principles. We are subject to regular review and audit by both U.S. federal and state tax authorities, as well as foreign tax authorities, and currently face numerous audits in the United States and abroad. Any adverse outcome of such reviews and audits could have an adverse effect on our financial position and operating results. In addition, the determination of our worldwide provision for income taxes and other tax liabilities requires significant judgment by our management, and we have engaged in many transactions for which the ultimate tax determination remains uncertain. The ultimate tax outcome may differ from the amounts recorded in our financial statements and may materially affect our financial results in the period or periods for which such determination is made. Our tax positions or tax returns are subject to change, and therefore we cannot accurately predict whether we may incur material additional tax liabilities in the future, which could impact our financial position. In addition, in connection with any planned or future acquisitions, we may acquire businesses that have differing licenses and other arrangements that may be challenged by tax authorities for not being at arm’s-length or that are otherwise potentially less tax efficient than our licenses and arrangements. Any subsequent integration or continued operation of such acquired businesses may result in an increased effective tax rate in certain jurisdictions or potential indirect tax costs, which could result in us incurring additional tax liabilities or having to establish a reserve in our consolidated financial statements, and could adversely affect our financial results. Changes in global and U.S. tax legislation may adversely affect our financial condition, operating results, and cash flows. We are a U.S.-based multinational company subject to tax in multiple U.S. and foreign tax jurisdictions. U.S. tax legislation enacted on December 22, 2017, and modified in 2020, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“the Act”), has significantly changed the U.S. federal income taxation of U.S. corporations. The legislation and regulations promulgated in connection therewith remain unclear in many respects and could be subject to potential amendments and technical corrections, as well as interpretations and incremental implementing regulations by the U.S. Treasury and U.S. Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”), any of which could lessen or increase certain adverse impacts of the legislation. In addition, it remains unclear in some instances how these U.S. federal income tax changes will affect state and local taxation, which often uses federal taxable income as a starting point for computing state and local tax liabilities. Furthermore, beginning on ...

Ferragamo France, which was set up in 1992 and is wholly owned by the Dutch company Ferragamo International BV, which in turn is owned by the Italian company Salvatore Ferragamo Spa, carries on the business of retailing shoes, leather goods and luxury accessories and distributes, in shops in France, products under the ‘Salvatore Ferragamo’ brand, which is owned by the Italian parent company. An assessment had been issued to Ferragamo France in which the French tax authorities asserted that the French subsidiary had not been sufficiently remunerated for additional expenses and contributions to the value of the Ferragamo trademark. The French subsidiary had been remunerated on a gross margin basis, but had incurred losses in previous years and had indirect cost exceeding those of the selected comparable companies. In 2017 the Administrative Court decided in favour of Ferragamo and dismissed the assessment issued by the tax authorities. According to the Court the tax administration had not demonstrated the existence of an advantage granted by Ferragamo France to the Italien parent, Salvatore Ferragamo SPA, nor the amount of this advantage. This decision was later upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal. An appel was then filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court (Conseil d’Etat) overturned the decision and remanded the case back to the Administrative Court of Appeal for further considerations. “In ruling that the administration did not establish the existence of an advantage granted to the Italian company on the grounds that the French company’s results for the financial years ending from 2010 to 2015 had been profitable without any change in the company’s transfer pricing policy, whereas it had noted that the exposure of additional charges of wages and rents in comparison with independent companies was intended to increase, in a strategic market in the luxury sector, the value of the Italian brand which did not yet have the same notoriety as its direct competitors, the administrative court of appeal erred in law. Moreover, although it emerged from the documents in the file submitted to the trial judges that the tax authorities had established the existence of a practice falling within the provisions of Article 57 of the General Tax Code, by showing that the remuneration granted by the Italian company was not sufficient to cover the additional expenses which contributed to the value of the Salvatore Ferragamo trade mark incurred by the French subsidiary and by arguing that the latter had been continuously loss-making since at least 1996 until 2009, the court distorted the facts and documents in the file. By dismissing, under these conditions, the existence of an indirect transfer of profits to be reintegrated into its taxable income when the company did not establish, by merely claiming a profitable situation between 2010 and 2015, that it had received a consideration for the advantage in question, the court incorrectly qualified the facts of the case.” Judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal The Administrative Court of Appeal issued a final decision in June 2022 in which the 2017 decision of the Paris Administrative Court was annulled and the tax assessment issued by the tax authorities reinstated. “Firstly, Ferragamo France argued that the companies included in the above-mentioned panel were not comparable, since most of their activities were carried out in the provinces, whereas its activity was concentrated in international tourist areas, mainly in Paris, and their workforce was less than ten employees, whereas it employed 68 people, that they are mere distributors whereas it also manages a network of boutiques and concessions in department stores, and that some of them own their premises whereas it rents its premises for amounts much higher than the rents in the provinces, the relationship between external charges and turnover thus being irrelevant. However, most of the comparables selected by the administration, which operate as multi-brand distributors in the luxury ready-to-wear sector, were proposed by Ferragamo France itself. Moreover, the company does not indicate the adjustments that should be made to the various ratios of salary and external costs used to obtain a result that it considers more satisfactory, even though it has been established that additional costs in the area of salaries and property constitute an advantage granted to Salvatore Ferragamo Spa. Furthermore, apart from the fact that it has not been established that some of the companies on the panel own their premises, Ferragamo France does not allege that excluding the companies in question from the calculation of the ratios would result in a reduction in the amount of the adjustments. Lastly, as regards the insufficient consideration of the management of a network of department stores’ boutiques and concessions, Ferragamo France does not provide any specific information in support of its allegations, whereas the comparison made by the administration is intended to assess the normality of the remuneration of its retail activity.” … It follows from all of the above that the Minister of the Economy, Finance and Recovery is entitled to argue that it was wrong for the Administrative Court of Paris, in the judgment under appeal, to discharge, in terms of duties and increases, the supplementary corporate tax assessment to which Ferragamo France was subject in respect of the financial year ended in 2010, of the withholding tax charged to it for 2009 and 2010 and of the supplementary minimum business tax and business value added contribution charged to it for 2009 and 2010 respectively. This judgment must therefore be annulled and the aforementioned taxes, in duties and increases, must be remitted to Ferragamo France.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

Adidas India Marketing Pvt. Ltd. is engaged in distribution and marketing of a range of Adidas and tailor made branded athletic and lifestyle products. Following an audit for FY 2016-2017, an assessment had been issued by the tax authorities where adjustments had been made to (1) advertising, promotion and marketing activities in Adidas India which was considered to have benefitted related parties in the Adidas group, (2) royalty/license payments to the group which was considered excessive and (3) fees paid by Adidas India to related parties which was considered “fees for technical services” (FTS) subjekt to Indian withholding tax. Following an unfavorable decision on the first complaint, an appeal was filed by Adidas with the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Judgment of the ITAT The Tribunal decided predominantly in favor of Adidas. Issues 1 and 2 was restored back to the tax authorities for a new decision in accordance with the directions given by the Tribunal, and issue 3 was set aside ...

By judgment of 22 May 2020, the Administrative Court set aside a tax assessment in which CBS International Netherlands B.V. had been denied reimbursement of withholding tax in the amount of BGN 156 830,27 related to royalties and license payments. An appeal was filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Administrative Court. In the appeal the tax authorities held that the beneficial owner of the licence and royalty payments was not CBS International Netherlands B.V. but instead CBS CORPORATION, a company incorporated and domiciled in New York, USA. According to the tax authorities the main function of CBS International Netherlands B.V. was that of an intermediary between the end customers and the beneficial owner. This was further supported by the transfer pricing documentation, according to which the US company that bears the risk of the development activity, the market risk is borne equally by the two companies, and the only risks borne by the Dutch company are the currency, operational and credit risks, which in turn are not directly related to the development activity. Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court The court upheld the decision of the court of first instance and decided in favour of CBS International Netherlands B.V. Excerpt “The activity from which the income is derived is that of granting rights under underlying television licence contracts. Corresponding to this activity is the risk identified in the transfer pricing documentation – development risk, market risk, currency risk, operational risk, credit risk. Neither CBS International Netherlands B.V. nor the Administration have alleged that the Dutch company was involved in the creation of the rights from the grant of which the income arose. Nor did the tax authorities deny that company’s right to grant the Bulgarian company the use of the copyright objects in return for consideration constituting the income on which the withholding tax was levied. To the contrary, there would be an assertion that there was no basis for the exchange of property and, accordingly, no object of taxation. “CBS International Netherlands B.V. is not a company for the purpose of channelisation of income under section 136A(2) of the ITA. It has not been shown to be controlled by a person not entitled to the same type or amount of relief on direct receipt of income. Control of CBS International Netherlands B.V. is exercised by another Dutch company which is within the personal scope of the Netherlands DTT. There are no sources of information that control is exercised by the ultimate parent company, CBS Corporation, based in New York, USA. The trial court was correct in finding that C.B.S. International Netherlands B.V. had assets, capital, and its own specialized personnel, and a comparison of the 2016 and 2017 C.B.S. figures showed that the company’s employees, offices, and profits were increasing, and therefore it was not a company that did not have assets, capital, and personnel consistent with its business. The existence of control over the use of the rights from which the income was earned is indicated by the content of the underlying contracts, which provide for penalties for non-performance and Fox Networks’ obligation to submit monthly reports. Insofar as the grounds under Article 136 of the VAT Code for the application of the Netherlands DTT are met, CBS International Netherlands B.V. is also entitled to the relief under Article 12(1) of the Netherlands DTT. 1 of the Royalty Income Tax Treaty in its country of residence. There is therefore also a right to a refund of the withholding tax under Art. 195 para. In concluding that the refusal to refund the tax withheld and paid by the contested APV was unlawful, the first instance court made a correct decision which should be upheld.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

BenQ Italy SRL is part of a multinational group headed by the Taiwanese company BenQ Corporation that sells and markets technology products, consumer electronics, computing and communications devices. BenQ Italy’s immediate parent company was a Dutch company, BenQ Europe PV. Following an audit the tax authorities issued a notice of assessment for FY 2003 in which the taxpayer was accused of having procured goods from companies operating in countries with privileged taxation through the fictitious interposition of a Dutch company (BenQ Europe BV), the parent company of the taxpayer, whose intervention in the distribution chain was deemed uneconomic. On the basis of these assumptions, the tax authorities found that the recharge of costs made by the interposed company, were non-deductible. The tax authorities also considered that, through the interposition of BenQ BV, the prices charged by the taxpayer were aimed at transferring most of the taxable income to the manufacturing companies of the BenQ Group located in countries with privileged taxation. Thirdly, the costs recharged by the Dutch company to the taxpayer for the insurance of the solvency risk of its customers was denied. Not agreeing with the assessment BenQ Italy filed a complaint which was rejected first by the provincial court and later by the regional court. The regional court held – in relation to purchases from non-EU countries – that there were no economic reasons for the interposition of the parent company in relation to such purchases. Secondly, the court found that the taxpayer did not allocate the income earned in Italy according to the market values of the goods purchased from the group’s distribution chain, which resulted from the variability of the unit prices and the application by the seller under Dutch law of negative mark-up prices, constituting circumstantial evidence of the transfer of the economic advantage to group companies located in other countries. Finally, it held that the insurance costs were not inherent. BenQ then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court based on ten grounds. In the forth ground of appeal BenQ Italy alleged that the judgment under appeal held that the rules on transfer prices had been infringed. BenQ Italy argues that the burden of proof is on the tax authorities, in order to overcome the documentary (and negotiated) element of the purchase price agreed between the seller and the other companies in the group, to provide evidence that such price constitutes a breach of the arm’s length principle. BenQ also points out that none of the methods advocated on the basis of the OECD Guidelines and the Circular of the tax authorities No 32/9/2267 of 1980 has been applied in the present case, with a consequent breach of the rules governing placement of the burden of proof. Judgment of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court granted the appeal on the fourth ground. The judgment of the regional court was therefore set aside and referred back to the regional court for reconsideration. Excerpts “5 – The fourth ground is well-founded. 5.1 – The judgment appealed against found, on the basis of the contested notice, that “the interposition of the parent company appears to be for the purpose of circumventing the tax rules – which is not economically justifiable – and consequently the mark-up applied to the aforementioned imports loses the requirement of inherence in that it is not necessary or causally/mente connected with the income-producing activity under Article 11O(7) of the TUIR”. While drawing inspiration from the recovery of the non-deductibility of the cost of recharge (based on the different and distorted assumption of the uneconomic nature of the interposition of the company under Dutch law), the CTR hypothesizes the existence of an element of alleged tax avoidance and evaluates in this sense the “inconsistent and unexplained marked variability of the prices charged by the parent company, as well as [. …] the application of the alleged negative margins’, in order to derive the ‘presumption’ that the BenQ Group ‘did not allocate the income earned in Italy according to market values […] but concentrated it in the producers’ countries of residence’. Therefore, despite the fact that the Office did not adopt any method of calculating normal value (by comparing, for example, the prices charged by the taxpayer with the other non-resident companies in the group with respect to transactions concluded by and with independent parties), the CTR found that the normal value pursuant to art. 110, seventh paragraph, TUIR, the excessive variability of unit prices and the application of negative mark-ups by the parent company, as a “symptom of pathological conduct”, inducing evidence of the “transfer of the actual economic advantage to companies with lower production costs”. 5.2 – The CTR arrives, therefore – after deducting the negative mark-up percentage of a 5% flat-rate margin – to consider the burden of proof met by the Office regarding the assessment of a normal value of the prices charged (generically indicated as “both in purchase and sale”), as an exception to the contractual prices charged by the taxpayer, in terms of the indicated provisions of the TUIR (art. 76, paragraphs 2 and 5 of the TUIR, corresponding to Article 110, paragraphs 2 and 7 of the TUIR pro tempore and Article 9 of the TUIR) without having made any reference to the methodologies which, according to the OECD Guidelines, allow the comparison of the margin of the resident intra-group company with that which would be achieved by the same in case of transactions with independent companies (such as, for example, the resale price method and the cost-plus method). 5.3 – It should be noted that this Court has long pointed out that the rule of assessment of the normality of the transaction price, as well as the relative burden of proof, are the responsibility of the Office (Court of Cassation, Section V, 2 March 2020, No. 5645), without the taxpayer’s avoidance purpose being relevant, since the tax authorities do not have to prove the assumption of higher domestic taxation compared to cross-border taxation. What the tax ...

By a notice of December 2020, the Court of Appeal of Brussels referred the following question for a preliminary ruling by the Constitutional Court : “ Does article 207, second paragraph, ITC (1992), as it applies, read together with article 79 ITC (1992), in the interpretation that it also applies to abnormal or gratuitous advantages obtained by a Belgian company from a foreign company, violate articles 10, 11 and 172 of the Constitution? “. The Belgian company “D.W.B.”, of which Y.S. and R.W. were the managers, was set up on 4 October 2006 by the Dutch company “W.”. On 25 October 2006, the latter also set up the Dutch company “D.W.” On 9 November 2006, bv “W.” sold its shareholdings in a number of subsidiaries of the D.W. group to its subsidiary nv ” D.W. “. It was agreed that 20 % of the selling price would be contributed by e.g. “W.” to the capital of the latter and that 80 % would be converted into a five-year interest-bearing loan between e.g. “W.” and “D.W.”. On 16 March 2007 the capital of “D.W.B.” was increased. This increase in capital was achieved by a contribution in kind by “W.”. of its claim against nv “D.W.” by virtue of the aforementioned loan. The contribution of the claim was partly booked in the account “Kapital” and partly on the account “Issuance premiums”, which were not available. On 17 March 2007, “W.” sold all its shares in ” D.W.B. ” to the “D.W.” On 31 August 2009, “D.W.B.” was put into liquidation and the liquidation was completed. Y.S. and R.W. were the liquidators. Pursuant to the loan agreement, the interest from “D.W.” to “D.W.B.” was not to be paid until 8 November 2011. In accordance with the accounting principle of accrual, according to which costs and revenues must be allocated to the period to which they relate, “D.W.B.” added the annual interest, due by the ” D.W. ” on 31 December 2007, 31 December 2008 and 31 August 2009, to its profit and loss account and to its amounts receivable after more than one year in its accounts on 31 December 2007, 31 December 2008 and 31 August 2009. It declared the amounts of interest in its returns for the assessment years 2008, 2009 and 2009 special, in which it then applied the deduction for risk capital (code 103). The tax administration rejected the aforementioned deductions for risk capital with application of Article 207(2) of the Income Tax Code 1992 (hereinafter: CIR 1992), as applicable for the assessment years 2008 and 2009. According to the administration, the capital on which “D.W.B.” wanted to make the deduction for risk capital comes from a transaction obtained under abnormal circumstances and which is not justified by economic objectives, but only by tax objectives. A tax increase of 10 pct. was applied. Y.S. and R.W. lodged an administrative appeal against that decision, but it was rejected by the regional director. Thereupon, Y.S. and R.W. filed a claim with the Dutch-speaking Court of First Instance in Brussels. By judgment of 18 November 2014, the Court dismissed the claim as unfounded. Y.S. and R.W. subsequently lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal of Brussels. The court ruled that the interest on the intra-group loan was at arm’s length and that the contribution in kind to “D.W.B.” constituted a transaction with an actual quid pro quo, but that it was acquired in the context of transactions which cannot be explained by reference to economic objectives, but only by reference to the fiscal purpose of the deduction for risk capital. However, Y.S. and R.W. argue that the application of Article 207(2) (now Article 207(7)) of the CIR 1992 to the benefits obtained from a foreign company is contrary to the constitutional principle of equality. The Court of Appeal of Brussels therefore decided to raise of its own motion the above question. Judgment of the Constitutional Court The Constitutionals Court’s answer to the question is that “Article 207 of the Income Tax Code 1992, read in conjunction with Article 79 of that Code, as applicable for the assessment years 2008 and 2009, does not violate Articles 10, 11 and 172 of the Constitution.” Click Here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

The Spanish tax authorities have published a report on the applicability of their domestic General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR). In the report, a conduit arrangement aimed at benefiting from an exemption at source on the payment of interest to EU residents is described. Click here for English translation ...

G.K. Ktf was a subsidiary of a company registered in the United Kingdom. On 29 December 2010 G.K. Ktf entered into a loan agreement with a Dutch affiliate, G.B. BV, under which G.B. BV, as lender, granted a subordinated unsecured loan of HUF 3 billion to G.K. Ktf. Interest was set at a fixed annual rate of 11.32%, but interest was only payable when G.K. Ktf earned a ‘net income’ from its activities. The maturity date of the loan was 2060. The loan was used by G.K. Ktf to repay a debt under a loan agreement concluded with a Dutch bank in 2006. The bank loan was repaid in 2017/2018. The interest paid by G.K. Ktf under the contract was deducted as an expense of HUF 347,146,667 in 2011 and HUF 345,260,000 in 2012. But, in accordance with Dutch tax law – the so called participation exemption – G.B BV did not include the interest as taxable income in its tax return. The tax authorities carried out an audit for FY 2011-2012 and by decision of 17 January 2018 an assessment was issued. According to the assessment G.K. Ktf had underpaid taxes in an amount of HUF 88,014,000. A penalty of HUF 43,419,000 and a late payment penalty of HUF 5,979,000 had been added. According to the tax authorities, a contract concluded by a member of a group of companies for a term of more than 50 years, with an interest payment condition other than that of a normal loan and without capitalisation of interest in the event of default, does not constitute a loan but a capital contribution for tax purposes. This is indicated by the fact that it is subordinated to all other creditors, that the payment of interest is conditional on the debtor’s business performance and that no security is required. The Dutch tax authorities have confirmed that in the Netherlands the transaction is an informal capital injection and that the interest paid to the lender is tax exempt income under the ‘participation exemption’. Hence the interest paid cannot be deducted from the tax base. The parties intended the transaction to achieve a tax advantage. Not agreeing with the decision G.K. Ktf took the case to court. The Court of first instance upheld the decision of the tax authorities. The case was then appealed to the Court of Appeal which resulted in the case being remanded to the court of first instance for reconsideration. After reconsidering the case, a new decision was issued in 2019 where the disallowed deduction of interest was upheld with reference to TPG 1995 para. 1.64, 1.65 and 1.66. The Court of first instance also found that the interest rate on the loan from BV was several times higher than the arm’s length interest rate. G.K Ktf then filed a new appeal with the Court of appeal. Judgment of the Court of Appeal. The Court held that the contested part of the tax authority’s decision and the final judgment of the court of first instance were unlawful and decided in favor of G.K. Ktf. For the years in question, legislation allowing for recharacterisation had still not been enacted in Hungary, and the conditions for applying the “abuse of rights” provision that was in force, was not established by the tax authorities. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A new huge leak of financial records revealed by ICIJ, once again shows widespread use of offshore accounts, shell companies and trusts to hide wealth and/or avoid taxes. The new leak is known as the Pandora Papers and follows other recent leaks – lux leak, panama papers, paradise papers. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists obtained 11.9 million confidential documents from 14 separate legal and financial services firms, which the group said offered “a sweeping look at an industry that helps the world’s ultrawealthy, powerful government officials and other elites conceal trillions of dollars from tax authorities, prosecutors and others.” “The key players in the system include elite institutions – multinational banks, law firms and accounting practices – headquartered in the U.S. and Europe.” The Consortium said the 2.94 terabytes of financial and legal data shows the “offshore money machine operates in every corner of the planet, including the world’s largest democracies,” and involves some of the world’s most well-known banks and legal firms. “The Pandora Papers provide more than twice as much information about the ownership of offshore companies. In all, the new leak of documents reveals the real owners of more than 29,000 offshore companies. The owners come from more than 200 countries and territories, with the largest contingents from Russia, the U.K., Argentina and China.” “Pandora Papers” leaks: Statement by Bob Hamilton, Chair of the Forum on Tax Administration and Chris Jordan, Chair of the FTA’s Joint International Task Force on Shared Intelligence and Collaboration On October 14, a statement was issued by the OECD The Forum on Tax Administration and its Joint International Task Force on Shared Intelligence and Collaboration (JITSIC) are already working collaboratively in response to the recent “Pandora Papers” leaks. This follows the model successfully adopted for the Panama and Paradise Papers leaks. 14/10/2021 – The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) has recently released information relating to its review of data leaks referred to as the Pandora Papers. As a result of the strong partnerships established through its JITSIC Network, the OECD Forum on Tax Administration (FTA) is well positioned to enable a collaborative approach to identifying and addressing aggressive tax avoidance and tax evasion involving multiple jurisdictions once the data becomes available. The FTA is dedicated to tax transparency and tax co-operation through the delivery of its collaborative work programme, and its members have access to a range of tools and platforms to help tackle offshore tax evasion and avoidance, including: The FTA’s JITSIC network, which provides an effective and well-established platform to its 42 members to cooperate directly on individual cases, as well as sharing their experience, resources and expertise. This direct and immediate collaboration proved to be very effective following the Panama and Paradise Papers leaks. JITSIC, like tax administrations more generally, operates under strict rules designed to protect the confidentiality of information and the confidence of taxpayers. As a consequence much of the work of JITSIC is not always visible to the public. The OECD standard on the exchange of information on request, which provides a powerful framework for tax administrations to receive detailed information on taxpayers’ offshore affairs from 163 jurisdictions. The OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS) under which there is automatic reporting of information between more than 100 jurisdictions on the offshore financial accounts of non-residents, to their jurisdiction of residence. Information on these financial accounts, as well as the requirements envisaged by the transparency and exchange of information on request standard, ensure greater transparency of ownership of companies, trusts, and other similar structures, the importance of which has been illustrated in the Pandora Papers. As has been the case with previous leaks, JITSIC members will continue to work together to pool resources, share information and rapidly develop a more accurate picture of potential wrong doing in order to facilitate further investigations. While the information contained in such leaks can be of value in investigations, the inclusion of information about an individual or entity in a data leak does not automatically mean that there has been non-compliance ...

A new huge leak of financial records revealed by ICIJ, once again shows widespread use of offshore accounts, shell companies and trusts to hide wealth and/or avoid taxes. The new leak is known as the Pandora Papers and follows other recent leaks – lux leak, panama papers, paradise papers. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists obtained 11.9 million confidential documents from 14 separate legal and financial services firms, which the group said offered “a sweeping look at an industry that helps the world’s ultrawealthy, powerful government officials and other elites conceal trillions of dollars from tax authorities, prosecutors and others.” “The key players in the system include elite institutions – multinational banks, law firms and accounting practices – headquartered in the U.S. and Europe.” The Consortium said the 2.94 terabytes of financial and legal data shows the “offshore money machine operates in every corner of the planet, including the world’s largest democracies,” and involves some of the world’s most well-known banks and legal firms. “The Pandora Papers provide more than twice as much information about the ownership of offshore companies. In all, the new leak of documents reveals the real owners of more than 29,000 offshore companies. The owners come from more than 200 countries and territories, with the largest contingents from Russia, the U.K., Argentina and China.” ...

In 2016 the European Commission announced that it had opened an in-depth investigation to examine whether tax rulings (unilateral APA’s) granted by the Netherlands had given Nike an unfair advantage over its competitors, in breach of EU State aid rules. The formal investigation concerned the tax treatment in the Netherlands of two Nike group companies, Nike European Operations Netherlands BV and Converse Netherlands BV. These two operating companies develops, markets and records the sales of Nike and Converse products in Europe, the Middle East and Africa (the EMEA region). Nike European Operations Netherlands BV and Converse Netherlands BV obtained licenses to use intellectual property rights relating to Nike and Converse products in the EMEA region. The two companies obtained the licenses, in return for a tax-deductible royalty payment, from two Nike group entities, which are currently Dutch entities that are “transparent” for tax purposes (i.e., not taxable in the Netherlands). From 2006 to 2015, the Dutch tax authorities issued five tax rulings, two of which are still in force, endorsing a method to calculate the royalty to be paid by Nike European Operations Netherlands and Converse Netherlands for the use of the intellectual property. As a result of these tax rulings, Nike European Operations Netherlands BV and Converse Netherlands BV are only taxed in the Netherlands on a limited operating margin based on sales. The Commission was concerned that the royalty payments endorsed by the rulings may not reflect economic reality. According to the Commission the payments appeared to be higher than what independent companies negotiating on market terms would have agreed. On 26 September 2019 Nike brought the decision to open the investigation to the European General Court claiming the investigation was in breach of fundamental  EU rights, principles of good administration and equal treatment by (1) erring in law in the preliminary assessment of the aid character of the contested measures. (2) not providing sufficient reasons for finding that the contested measures fulfil all elements of State aid, especially why they should be regarded as selective. (3) prematurely opening a formal investigation and providing insufficient reasoning for the existence of State aid where there were no difficulties to continue the preliminary investigation. Judgment of the Court On 14 July 2021 The General Court dismissed the claims brought by Nike. The Court agreed that the intercompany royalties payments as determined in the tax rulings (unilateral APA’s) issued by the Netherlands left the distribution affiliates with less profits than would have occurred at arm’s length ...

At issue in this case was the choice of transfer pricing method for determining the arm’s length price of a intra-group loan. Lender GmbH is held by a Dutch holding company. The holding company is also the sole shareholder of Lender GmbH’s sister company, which is also domiciled in the Netherlands. The Dutch sister company acts as a financing company within the group. It extended various loans to Lender GmbH. The interest rate was determined by application of the CUP method. The tax office disagreed with the transfer price method and the appropriateness of the interest rate determined by the group. The tax office determined the interest rate on the basis of the cost-plus method and qualified the difference as a hidden profit distribution (vGA). In its ruling of 7 December 2016 (13 K 4037/13), the Münster Regional Tax Court held in favour of the tax office, arguing that there was no hierarchy between the transfer pricing methods. Rather, it was up to the tax office to determine the most appropriate method in each case. The cost-plus method was applicable in the present case. Only where there were essentially identical transactions could the CUP method be considered the most appropriate method. Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court The Court referred to price determination on stock markets, which was also not entirely comprehensible. The Court commented on the specific application of the cost-plus method by the tax office and the Münster Regional Court. It was unusual for an appropriate interest rate to be recalculated annually by including variable parameters (here: equity ratio), so that the interest rate changed annually. This was contrary to the fixed interest rate. The Court also pointed out that the group as a whole had to be taken into account. However, neither a group group view nor a “stand-alone view” was to be used. Rather, it required a case-by-case consideration. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The controversy in the case of India vs Concentrix Services Netherlands B.V. & Optum Global Solutions International Netherlands B.V., was the rate of withholding tax to be applied on dividends paid by the Indian subsidiaries (Concentrix Services India Private Limited & Optum Global Solutions India Private Limited) to its participating (more than 10% ownership) shareholders in the Netherlands. The shareholders in the Netherlands held that withholding tax on dividends should be applied by a rate of only 5%, whereas the Indian tax authorities applied a rate of 10%. The difference in opinions relates to interpretation of a protocol to the tax treaty between India and the Netherlands containing an most favoured nation clause (MFN clause). MFN clauses provides that the parties to the treaty (here India and the Netherlands) are obliged to provide each other with a treatment no less favourable than the treatment they provide under other treaties in the areas covered by the MFN clause. The MFN Clause in the relevant protocol to the tax treaty between India and the Netherlands had the following wording “2. If after the signature of this convention under any Convention or Agreement between India and a third State which is a member of the OECD India should limit its taxation at source on dividends, interests, royalties, fees for technical services or payments for the use of equipment to a rate lower or a scope more restricted than the rate or scope provided for in this Convention on the said items of income, then as from the date on which the relevant Indian Convention or Agreement enters into force the same rate or scope as provided for in that Convention or Agreement on the said items of income shall also apply under this Convention.” More favourable tax treaties in regards of withholding tax had later been signed between India and #Slovenia, #Lithuania, and #Columbia. However, none of these countries were OECD members at the time where the Tax Treaties with India were entered. Concentrix Services Netherlands B.V. & Optum Global Solutions International Netherlands B.V. contended that since India had entered into Tax Treaties with other countries which were now members of OECD, the lower rate of 5% withholding tax in these treaties should automatically apply to the Tax Treaty between India and the Netherlands. According to the Tax Authorities since none of the aforementioned countries were members of the OECD, at the date where the tax treaties with India were signed, the MFN clause of the protocol appended to the tax treaty between India and the Netherlands would not apply in regards to these tax treaties. Slovenia, Lithuania, and Columbia only later became members of the OECD. Judgment of the Delhi High Court The High Court decided in favour of Concentrix Services Netherlands B.V. & Optum Global Solutions International Netherlands B.V. Hence, withholding tax on dividends paid by the Indian subsidiaries to its (participating) shareholders in the Netherlands was limited to 5%. Excerpts from the conclusion of the High Court “In our view, the word “is” describes a state of affairs that should exist not necessarily at the time when the subject DTAA was executed but when a request is made by the taxpayer or deductee for issuance of a lower rate withholding tax certificate under Section 197 of the Act. .” “Clearly, the Netherlands has interpreted Clause IV (2) of the protocol appended to the subject DTAA in a manner, indicated hereinabove by us, which is, that the lower rate of tax set forth in the India-Slovenia Convention/DTAA will be applicable on the date when Slovenia became a member of the OECD, i.e., from 21.08.2010, although, the Convention/DTAA between India and Slovenia came into force on 17.02.2005.” “However, the case before us is one where the other contracting State, i.e., the Netherlands has interpreted Clause IV (2) in a particular way and therefore in our opinion, in the fitness of things, the principle of common interpretation should apply on all fours to ensure consistency and equal allocation of tax claims between the contracting States.” ...

Ferragamo France, which was set up in 1992 and is wholly owned by the Dutch company Ferragamo International BV, which in turn is owned by the Italian company Salvatore Ferragamo Spa, carries on the business of retailing shoes, leather goods and luxury accessories and distributes, in shops in France, products under the ‘Salvatore Ferragamo’ brand, which is owned by the Italian parent company. An assessment had been issued to Ferragamo France in which the French tax authorities asserted that the French subsidiary had not been sufficiently remunerated for additional expenses and contributions to the value of the Ferragamo trademark. The French subsidiary had been remunerated on a gross margin basis, but had incurred losses in previous years and had indirect cost exceeding those of the selected comparable companies. The Administrative Court decided in favour of Ferragamo and dismissed the assessment. According to the Court the tax administration has not demonstrated the existence of an advantage granted by Ferragamo France to Salvatore Ferragamo SPA, nor the amount of this advantage. Judgment of the Conseil d’Etat The Conseil d’Etat overturned the decision of the Administrative Court and remanded the case back to the Administrative Court of Appeal for further considerations. “In ruling that the administration did not establish the existence of an advantage granted to the Italian company on the grounds that the French company’s results for the financial years ending from 2010 to 2015 had been profitable without any change in the company’s transfer pricing policy, whereas it had noted that the exposure of additional charges of wages and rents in comparison with independent companies was intended to increase, in a strategic market in the luxury sector, the value of the Italian brand which did not yet have the same notoriety as its direct competitors, the administrative court of appeal erred in law. Moreover, although it emerged from the documents in the file submitted to the trial judges that the tax authorities had established the existence of a practice falling within the provisions of Article 57 of the General Tax Code, by showing that the remuneration granted by the Italian company was not sufficient to cover the additional expenses which contributed to the value of the Salvatore Ferragamo trade mark incurred by the French subsidiary and by arguing that the latter had been continuously loss-making since at least 1996 until 2009, the court distorted the facts and documents in the file. By dismissing, under these conditions, the existence of an indirect transfer of profits to be reintegrated into its taxable income when the company did not establish, by merely claiming a profitable situation between 2010 and 2015, that it had received a consideration for the advantage in question, the court incorrectly qualified the facts of the case.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

By judgment of 22 May 2020, the Administrative Court set aside a tax assessment in which CBS International Netherlands B.V. had been denied reimbursement of withholding tax related to royalties and license payments. An appeal was filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Administrative Court. In the appeal the tax authorities held that the beneficial owner of the licence and royalty payments was not CBS International Netherlands B.V. but instead CBS CORPORATION, a company incorporated and domiciled in New York, USA. According to the tax authorities the main function of CBS International Netherlands B.V. was that of an intermediary between the end customers and the beneficial owner. This was further supported by the transfer pricing documentation, according to which the US company that bears the risk of the development activity, the market risk is borne equally by the two companies, and the only risks borne by the Dutch company are the currency, operational and credit risks, which in turn are not directly related to the development activity. Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court The court canceled the 2019 tax assessment and returns the case to the competent authority to issue decision in accordance with the instructions on the interpretation and application of the law given by this decision. Excerpt “There is no information source for the fact that CBS International Netherlands B.V. has no right to dispose of the income and to assess its use. Conversely, according to article 13 of the company’s articles of association, the decision to distribute the result for the year is to be made by the general meeting of shareholders. This disqualifies the company as the nominee instead of the owner of the income /refer to the Commentary to Article 12 of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Model DTT/. The Dutch company does not have the limited powers of a formal owner – it does not direct the income to another person who actually receives the benefit; it does not act as a fiduciary or administrator on behalf of the stakeholders /see Commentary/. The activity from which the income is derived is that of granting rights under underlying television licence contracts. Corresponding to this activity is the risk identified in the transfer pricing documentation – development risk, market risk, currency risk, operational risk, credit risk. Neither the applicant nor the administration have alleged that the Dutch company was involved in the creation of the rights from the grant of which the income arose. Nor did the tax authorities deny that company’s right to grant the Bulgarian company the use of the copyright objects in return for consideration constituting the income on which the withholding tax was levied. To the contrary, there would be an assertion that there was no basis for the exchange of property and, accordingly, no object of taxation. The appellant is not an income directing company under Section 136A(2) of the Income-tax Act. It has not been shown to be controlled by a person not entitled to the same type or amount of relief on direct receipt of income. The control of CBS International Netherlands B.V. is exercised by another Dutch company which is within the personal scope of the Netherlands DTT. There are no sources of information that control is exercised by the “ultimate parent company” CBS Corporation based in New York, USA. It is unclear what type and amount of assets the Dutch company is expected to own beyond the USD 72,000 in property, plant and equipment listed in the APA and with a staff of 22 employees given the intellectual property rights management activities carried out. The existence of control over the use of the rights from which the income was earned is indicated by the content of the underlying contracts, which provide for penalties for non-performance and Fox Networks’ obligation to submit monthly reports. In so far as the grounds laid down in Article 136 of the VAT Code for the application of the Netherlands DTT are met, the applicant is also entitled to the relief provided for in Article 12(1) of the VAT Code. 1 of the Royalty Income Tax Treaty in the country of residence. There is therefore also a right to a refund of the withholding tax under Article 195(1) of the Treaty. The refusal to refund the tax withheld and deposited as provided for in the APA challenged before the ACCA is unlawful and the dismissal of the challenge to the refusal is incorrect. The first instance decision and the APV must be annulled in accordance with the rule of Article 160 para. 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, the case file should be returned to the competent revenue authority at the Directorate General of the National Revenue Service, GDO, Sofia. Sofia to issue an APV in accordance with the instructions on the interpretation and application of the law given by this decision.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

An assessment was issued where the tax administration denied the application treaty benefits, understanding that the dividends distributed by X S.A. a company with tax residence in Panama, to its shareholder NL Corp in the Netherlands did not qualify for the reduced rate provided for in the DTA because the latter was not the “beneficial owner” of the dividends. Judgment of the Tax Court The court upheld the assessment. “By virtue of the above, we consider that the possibility that the tax administration of the State in which the benefits of the Convention are requested, in this case Panama, also depends on the analysis of the body of evidence, and it is not apparent that the taxpayer has provided, in a timely manner, documentation related to the elements described above, therefore, we do not consider the request to be admissible, as it has not been duly supported by the taxpayer. By virtue of the foregoing considerations, and the fact that access to the benefits provided for in Article 10(a)(iii)(3) of the Panama-Netherlands Convention depends on compliance with all the requirements detailed in the preceding paragraphs, which have only been partially met, revealing significant evidentiary deficiencies, which lead us to conclude that there are insufficient reasons to revoke the contested acts, in light of the regulations, doctrine and case law analysed in this resolution.” Click here for English translation ...

“G Pharma Ltd” is a distributor of generic and specialised pharmaceutical products purchased exclusively from affiliated suppliers. It has no significant intangible assets nor does it assume any significant risks. However for 17 consecutive years it has had losses. Following an audit, the tax authorities issued an assessment, where the income of G Pharma Ltd was determined by application of the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM). According to the tax authorities a limited risk distributor such as G Pharma Ltd would be expected to be compensated with a small, guaranteed, positive profitability. G Pharma Ltd disagreed with the assessment and filed an appeal. Judgment of the Court The court dismissed the appeal of G Pharma Ltd and upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Excerpts “First, the reasons for the rejection of the final comparable sample of two companies were set out in detail and then the reasons for using the net profit margin as an appropriate indicator of profitability for the chosen method of documenting intra-group transactions were documented in a clear and substantiated manner, citing the relevant OECD guidelines, in order to establish whether or not the principle of equidistance was respected. Subsequently, since the claim concerning the inclusion of the company ……………………. in the final sample of comparable companies was accepted, the calculations of the arm’s length thresholds were provided in order to assess whether or not the arm’s length principle was respected. Following the above, the method of calculation of the resulting difference due to the non-respect of the arm’s length principle in the intra-group invoicing of the applicant’s transactions with the related companies of the group was analysed. Consequently, the applicant’s claims in respect of the first plea in law of the application are not upheld and are rejected as unfounded in law and in substance. Because the applicant itself, as documented in detail in the documentation file, arrived at the above method of documentation, which it nevertheless applied on incorrect bases. The choice of the gross profit margin as an appropriate indicator of profitability is incorrect as it is not provided for in the OECD guidelines” “based on the above, it would be expected that it would be compensated with a small, guaranteed, positive profitability. Instead, the picture it presents over time is one of a company with consistently disproportionately high losses from inception to the present day beyond any notion of business sense or contrary to normal commercial transactions, which demonstrates the need to adjust its intragroup pricing given the fact that all of its purchases and a significant portion of its operating expenses are intragroup transactions. Since the applicant’s claim that ‘in calculating the adjustment to its operating profitability, due to non-compliance with the arm’s length principle, account should also be taken of the adjustments to the tax adjustment already made by the accounting differences declared by the company’ cannot be accepted and is rejected, since this is a comparison between dissimilar figures, that is to say, a comparison between the applicant’s tax result and the accounting results of comparable companies in the sample. Because the applicant’s claim that, ‘any adjustment to its operating profitability should be based on the 1st quartile value and not that of the median’, is not accepted and is rejected, as, when assessing the operating profile, the applicant performs additional functions beyond a mere reseller and in particular than the comparable companies in the final sample as it has a disproportionately high cost of operating expenses to gross income compared to the comparable companies. Moreover, none of the comparable undertakings in the final sample is representative of the industry as they all have similar gross revenues to the applicant and therefore similar market share in the pharmaceutical industry. The choice of the median is the most appropriate because it eliminates possible comparability deficits (differences in factors and circumstances) that may exist between the applicant and the undertakings in the sample. Because the tax audit has come to the clear and well-founded conclusion that the pricing policy pursued by the applicant with its related undertakings does not comply with the arm’s length principle and is outside the acceptable limits. Since it follows from the foregoing that the contested income tax assessment measure was lawfully adopted, the applicant’s claims to the contrary must be rejected as unfounded.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In this case, the Gothenburg Court of Appeal reviewed the tax treatment of a 2012 sale of the “L” trademark by E AB, a Swedish company, to its Dutch affiliate SGH BV. The main issues were whether E AB should be taxed on the full sales revenue and whether the sale was conducted at an arm’s length price. E AB argued that it held only a minor economic interest in the trademark and should be taxed accordingly. The company also claimed that the price should not be adjusted for the seller’s tax effects, as this was not an arm’s length consideration. E AB referenced Cost Sharing Agreements (CSAs) to justify its lower taxable income, arguing that these agreements represented contributions from other subsidiaries to the trademark’s value. Judgment The court found that E AB was both the legal and economic owner of the trademark at the time of sale, given its control and investment in the brand, and ruled that E AB should be taxed on the entire sales revenue. The court rejected the CSAs as evidence of shared ownership, noting that they merely allowed subsidiaries to use E AB’s brand assets for a fee and did not support a transfer of ownership rights. Additionally, the court ruled that an arm’s length price should reflect both the buyer’s and seller’s tax effects, following OECD guidelines that advise considering all relevant economic factors in a transaction. The court upheld the Swedish Tax Agency’s adjustment, finding that the sale price did not cover the full market value, including the seller’s tax cost. This undervaluation resulted in a SEK 117 million income adjustment for E AB, which was added to its taxable income. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Fiat Chrysler has reached a settlement with the Italian tax agency over taxable gains related to a transfer of the U.S. Chrysler business from Fiat SpA Italy to Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV (Netherlands). The Italian tax agency claimed that the value of the U.S. Chrysler business had been underestimated and issued a preliminary assessment with an additional taxable gain of 5.1 billion euros. The agency had valued Chrysler at 12.5 billion euros, while Fiat SpA had declared it to be worth less than 7.5 billion. Under the terms of the latter settlement the additional taxable gain has agreed at 2.5 billion euros ...

In 2008, the Netherlands tax authorities concluded an advance pricing arrangement (APA) with Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV (Starbucks BV), part of the Starbucks group, which, inter alia, roasts coffees. The objective of that arrangement was to determine Starbucks BV’s remuneration for its production and distribution activities within the group. Thereafter, Starbucks BV’s remuneration served to determine annually its taxable profit on the basis of Netherlands corporate income tax. In addition, the APA endorsed the amount of the royalty paid by Starbucks BV to Alki, another entity of the same group, for the use of Starbucks’ roasting IP. More specifically, the APA provided that the amount of the royalty to be paid to Alki corresponded to Starbucks BV’s residual profit. The amount was determined by deducting Starbucks BV’s remuneration, calculated in accordance with the APA, from Starbucks BV’s operating profit. In 2015, the Commission found that the APA constituted aid incompatible with the internal market and ordered the recovery of that aid. The Netherlands and Starbucks brought an action before the General Court for annulment of the Commission’s decision. They principally dispute the finding that the APA conferred a selective advantage on Starbucks BV. More specifically, they criticise the Commission for (1) having used an erroneous reference system for the examination of the selectivity of the APA; (2) having erroneously examined whether there was an advantage in relation to an arm’s length principle particular to EU law and thereby violated the Member States’ fiscal autonomy; (3) having erroneously considered the choice of the transactional net margin method (TNMM) for determining Starbucks BV’s remuneration to constitute an advantage; and (4) having erroneously considered the detailed rules for the application of that method as validated in the APA to confer an advantage on Starbucks BV. In it’s judgment, the General Court annuls the Commission’s decision. First, the Court examined whether, for a finding of an advantage, the Commission was entitled to analyse the tax ruling at issue in the light of the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision. In that regard, the Court notes in particular that, in the case of tax measures, the very existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation and that, in order to determine whether there is a tax advantage, the position of the recipient as a result of the application of the measure at issue must be compared with his position in the absence of the measure at issue and under the normal rules of taxation. The Court goes on to note that the pricing of intra-group transactions is not determined under market conditions. It states that where national tax law does not make a distinction between integrated undertakings and stand-alone undertakings for the purposes of their liability to corporate income tax, that law is intended to tax the profit arising from the economic activity of such an integrated undertaking as though it had arisen from transactions carried out at market prices. The Court holds that, in those circumstances, when examining, pursuant to the power conferred on it by Article 107(1) TFEU, a fiscal measure granted to such an integrated company, the Commission may compare the fiscal burden of such an integrated undertaking resulting from the application of that fiscal measure with the fiscal burden resulting from the application of the normal rules of taxation under the national law of an undertaking placed in a comparable factual situation, carrying on its activities under market conditions. The Court makes clear that the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision is a tool that allows it to check that intra-group transactions are remunerated as if they had been negotiated between independent companies. Thus, in the light of Netherlands tax law, that tool falls within the exercise of the Commission’s powers under Article 107 TFEU. The Commission was therefore, in the present case, in a position to verify whether the pricing for intragroup transactions accepted by the APA corresponds to prices that would have been negotiated under market conditions. The Court therefore rejects the claim that the Commission erred in identifying an arm’s length principle as a criterion for assessing the existence of State aid. Second, the Court reviewed the merits of the various lines of reasoning set out in the contested decision to demonstrate that, by endorsing a method for determining transfer pricing that did not result in an arm’s length outcome, the APA conferred an advantage on Starbucks BV. The Court began by examining the dispute as to the Commission’s principal reasoning. It notes that, in the context of its principal reasoning, the Commission found that the APA had erroneously endorsed the use of the TNMM. The Commission first stated that the transfer pricing report on the basis of which the APA had been concluded did not contain an analysis of the royalty which Starbucks BV paid to Alki or of the price of coffee beans purchased by Starbucks BV from SCTC, another entity of the group. Next, in examining the arm’s length nature of the royalty, the Commission applied the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP method). As a result of that analysis, the Commission considered that the amount of the royalty should have been zero. Last, the Commission considered, on the basis of SCTC’s financial data, that Starbucks BV had overpaid for the coffee beans in the period between 2011 and 2014. The Court holds that mere non-compliance with methodological requirements does not necessarily lead to a reduction of the tax burden and that the Commission would have had to demonstrate that the methodological errors identified in the APA did not allow a reliable approximation of an arm’s length outcome to be reached and that they led to a reduction of the tax burden. As regards the error identified by the Commission in respect of the choice of the TNMM and not of the CUP method, the Court finds that the Commission did not invoke any element to support as such ...

A Dutch company, Agusta Holding BV, submitted a request regarding the reimbursement of withholding tax paid in Italy by its Italian subsidiary on dividends distributed for the fiscal year 2001. The request was initially accepted and the withholding tax paid back. But after an audit, the reimbursement was then challenged. The tax authorities found that Agusta Holding BV had been incorporated in the Netherlands only to benefit from the favourable fiscal dividend regime provided by the Italian-Netherland double tax treaty and from the Dutch tax regime concerning the exemption of dividends from taxable income. Agusta Holding BV appealed the decision of the tax office before the Provincial Tax Court which ruled in favor of Augusta Holding BV as the deadline to ask for the reimbursement of the withholding tax back had expired at the time of the audit conducted by local tax office. The local tax office appealed this decision before the Regional Tax Court. The Regional Tax Court overturned the decision and affirmed that: (i) the terms to challenge the reimbursement initially granted after automated controls had not expired, (ii) Agusta Holding BV was not tax resident in the Netherlands since its directors resided in Italy and in the UK and (iii) Agusta Holding BV did not perform any economic activity in the Netherlands. This decision was then appealed by Augusta Holding to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court rejected the decision of the Regional Tax Court and held that the place of effective management of Agusta Holding BV was located in the Netherlands, where meetings of the board of directors physically took place and where the company had dedicated premises where management activities were conducted. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In March 2018 a special EU committee on financial crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance (TAX3) was established. Now, one year later, The EU Parliament has approved a controversial report from the committee. According to the report close to 40 % of MNEs’ profits are shifted to tax havens globally each year with some European Union countries appearing to be the prime losers of profit shifting, as 35 % of shifted profits come from EU countries. About 80 % of the profits shifted from EU Member States are channelled to or through a few other EU Member States. The latest estimates of tax evasion within the EU point to a figure of approximately EUR 825 billion per year. Tax avoidance via six EU Member States results in a loss of EUR 42,8 billion in tax revenue in the other 22 Member States, which means that the net payment position of these countries can be offset against the losses they inflict on the tax base of other Member States. For instance, the Netherlands imposes a net cost on the Union as a whole of EUR 11,2 billion, which means the country is depriving other Member States of tax income to the benefit of multinationals and their shareholders. The Commission has criticised seven Member States – Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands – for shortcomings in their tax systems that facilitate aggressive tax planning, arguing that they undermine the integrity of the European single market. Member States now calls on the Commission to currently regard at least these five Member States as EU tax havens until substantial tax reforms are implemented ...

The European Commission has opened an in-depth investigation to examine whether tax rulings granted by the Netherlands to Nike may have given the company an unfair advantage over its competitors, in breach of EU State aid rules. Margrethe Vestager, Commissioner in charge of competition policy, said: “Member States should not allow companies to set up complex structures that unduly reduce their taxable profits and give them an unfair advantage over competitors. The Commission will investigate carefully the tax treatment of Nike in the Netherlands, to assess whether it is in line with EU State aid rules. At the same time, I welcome the actions taken by the Netherlands to reform their corporate taxation rules and to help ensure that companies will operate on a level playing field in the EU.” Nike is a US based company involved worldwide in the design, marketing and manufacturing of footwear, clothing, equipment and accessories, in particular in the sports area. The formal investigation concerns the tax treatment in the Netherlands of two Nike group companies based in the Netherlands, Nike European Operations Netherlands BV and Converse Netherlands BV. These two operating companies develop, market and record the sales of Nike and Converse products in Europe, the Middle East and Africa (the EMEA region). Nike European Operations Netherlands BV and Converse Netherlands BV obtained licenses to use intellectual property rights relating to, respectively, Nike and Converse products in the EMEA region. The two companies obtained the licenses, in return for a tax-deductible royalty payment, from two Nike group entities, which are currently Dutch entities that are “transparent” for tax purposes (i.e., not taxable in the Netherlands).The Nike group’s corporate structure itself is outside the remit of EU State aid rules. From 2006 to 2015, the Dutch tax authorities issued five tax rulings, two of which are still in force, endorsing a method to calculate the royalty to be paid by Nike European Operations Netherlands and Converse Netherlands for the use of the intellectual property. As a result of the rulings, Nike European Operations Netherlands BV and Converse Netherlands BV are only taxed in the Netherlands on a limited operating margin based on sales. At this stage, the Commission is concerned that the royalty payments endorsed by the rulings may not reflect economic reality. They appear to be higher than what independent companies negotiating on market terms would have agreed between themselves in accordance with the arm’s length principle. In particular, a preliminary analysis of the companies’ activities found that: Nike European Operations Netherlands BV and Converse Netherlands BV have more than 1,000 employees and are involved in the development, management and exploitation of the intellectual property. For example, Nike European Operations Netherlands BV actively advertises and promotes Nike products in the EMEA region, and bears its own costs for the associated marketing and sales activities. In contrast, the recipients of the royalty are Nike group entities that have no employees and do not carry out any economic activity. The Commission investigation will focus on whether the Netherlands’ tax rulings endorsing these royalty payments may have unduly reduced the taxable base in the Netherlands of Nike European Operations Netherlands BV and Converse Netherlands BV since 2006. As a result, the Netherlands may have granted a selective advantage to the Nike group by allowing it to pay less tax than other stand-alone or group companies whose transactions are priced in accordance with market terms. If confirmed, this would amount to illegal State aid ...

A Swiss company manufactured and distributed pharmaceutical and chemical products. The Swiss company was held by a Dutch parent that held another company in France. R&D activities were delegated by the Dutch parent to its French subsidiary and compensated with cost plus 15%. On that basis the Swiss company had to pay a royalty to its Dutch parent of 2.5% of its turnover for using the IP developed. Following an audit the Swiss tax authorities concluded that the Dutch parent did not contribute to the development of IP. In 2006 and 2007, no employees were employed, and in 2010 and 2011 there were only three employees. Hence the royalty agreement was disregarded and an assessment issued where the royalty payments were denied. Instead the R&D agreement between the Dutch parent and the French subsidiary was regarded as having been concluded between the Swiss and French companies Judgment of the Supreme Court The Court agreed with the decision of the tax authorities. The Dutch parent was a mere shell company with no substance. Hence, the royalty agreement was disregarded and replaced with the cost plus agreement with the French subsidiary. The Court found that it must have been known to the taxpayer that a company without substance could not be entitled to profits of the R&D activities. On that basis an amount equal to 75% of the evaded tax had therefore rightly been imposed as a penalty. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In 2011, a Korean company, CJ E&M Co., Ltd concluded a license agreement relating to the domestic distribution of Paramount films, etc. with Hungary-based entity Viacom International Hungary Kft (hereinafter “VIH”), which is affiliated with the global entertainment content group Viacom that owns the film producing company Paramount and music channel MTV. From around that time to December 2013, the Plaintiff paid VIH royalties amounting to roughly KRW 13.5 billion (hereinafter “pertinent royalty income”). CJ E&M Co., Ltd did not withhold the corporate tax regarding the pertinent royalty income according to Article 12(1) of the Convention between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (hereinafter “Korea-Hungary Tax Treaty”). The Hungarian company was interposed between the Korean entertainment company and a Dutch company which previously licensed the rights to the Korean entertainment company. The Korean Tax Authorities (a) deemed that VIH was merely a conduit company established for the purpose of tax avoidance and that the de facto beneficial owner of the pertinent royalty income was Viacom Global Netherlands BV (hereinafter “VGN”), the parent company of VIH based in the Netherlands; (b) applied the Convention between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (hereinafter “Korea- Netherlands Tax Treaty”), rather than the Korea-Hungary Tax Treaty; and (c) imposed the corporate tax withheld totaling KRW 2,391 million (including penalty tax) against the Plaintiff on May 2, 2014 and July 1, 2014, respectively (hereinafter “instant disposition”). The High Court ruled in favor of the tax authorities and held that the Hungarian company was a mere conduit used for treaty shopping purposes. The Korean Supreme Court reversed the High Court’s decision on the grounds that beneficial ownership should not be denied by the mere fact that tax benefits were derived from the relevant tax treaty if the foreign entity was otherwise engaged in genuine business activities in line with the entity’s business purpose. The Supreme Court decided that the Hungarian entity should be entitled to the treaty benefits because it did not bear any legal or contractual obligation to transfer the royalty income and thus should be regarded as the beneficial owner; and it had the ability to manage and control the license rights that gave rise to the royalty income, and therefore the GAAR should not apply. Click here for English Translation ...

New Oxfam research shows that four pharmaceutical corporations — Abbott, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, and Pfizer — systematically allocate super profits in overseas tax havens. In eight advanced economies, pharmaceutical profits averaged 7 percent, while in seven developing countries they averaged 5 percent. In comparison, profits margins averaged 31 percent in countries with low or no corporate tax rates – Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands and Singapore. The report exposes how pharmaceutical corporations uses sophisticated tax planning to avoid taxes ...

Philips France SAS provides contract R&D to it’s Dutch parent. Compensation for the service was calculated as cost plus 10%. In the years 2003 to 2007 Philips France received government subsidies for performing R&D. These subsidies had been deducted by the company from the cost base before calculating of the cost plus remuneration. The French tax authorities issued a tax assessment where the deduction was denied and the remuneration calculated on the full cost base. The Supreme Administrative Court ruled that a deduction of subsidies from the cost base does not constitute a “transfer of profits abroad” and allowed the reduced cost base for calculation of the arm’s length remuneration. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Samsung Electronics Baltic Ltd, is a subsidiary of Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd, which was established at the end of 2007. On 1 January 2008, Samsung Electronics Baltic and Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd entered into Distribution Agreement, under which Samsung Electronics Baltic was appointed as the distributor in the Baltic States of the products manufactured by Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd and its subsidiaries (‘the Distribution Agreement’). In 2008 and 2009, Samsung Electronics Baltic carried out business activities in the territory of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia distributing the goods received from Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd under the Distribution Agreement. Samsung Electronics Baltic also provided warranty services for the goods sold by engaging service providers for that purpose, namely merchants who carried out repairs of the goods (‘Repair Services’). On 2 January 2008, Samsung Electronics Baltic concluded a Warranty Assumption Agreement (‘the Warranty Assumption Agreement’) with its sister company, Samsung Electronics Overseas B.V. (‘Dutch Samsung’), which was the distributor of Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd’s products in the Baltic States before the Applicant. Under the agreement, Samsung Electronics Baltic undertook to provide product warranty services for products sold by Dutch Samsung in the Baltic markets in 2005, 2006 and 2007, and Dutch Samsung undertook to pay Samsung Electronics Baltic a lump sum of USD 4 369 550 to fulfil the assumed warranty obligations. In order to fulfil its obligations under this contract, Samsung Electronics Baltic engaged the services of Repair Service Providers. Pursuant to the Distribution Agreement and the Marketing Fund Agreement (‘the Marketing Fund Agreement’) concluded on 1 January 2008 between Samsung Electronics Baltic and Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd, Samsung Electronics Baltic also performed marketing functions for the Samsung Group in 2008. In particular, Samsung Electronics Baltic engaged marketing agencies as marketing service providers in accordance with the marketing strategy set out by Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. Samsung Electronics Baltic paid the service fees indicated in the invoices issued by these agencies and subsequently invoiced Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd (or other related companies) for the same amount. The State Revenue Service (hereinafter – the Service) audited Samsung Electronics Baltic for value added tax for the period from January 2008 to October 2009 and for corporate income tax for 2008. The administrative procedure before the authority was concluded by the decision of the Revenue Service of 15 February 2011 (hereinafter – the appealed decision), by which the value added tax, the related penalty and late payment fines were calculated for additional payment to the budget, the value added tax to be refunded from the budget and the related penalty were reduced, and the corporate income tax and the related late payment fines and penalties were calculated for additional payment to the budget by the applicant. As regards value added tax, the contested decision states that in 2008 and 2009 Samsung Electronics Baltic deducted as input tax in its value added tax returns the amounts of tax indicated in the invoices issued to Samsung Electronics Baltic by the Repair Service. According to the Authority, Samsung Electronics Baltic was not entitled to do so, since the transactions in question were not aimed at the pursuit of Samsung Electronics Baltic’s economic activity (transactions subject to value added tax). The Revenue Service considers that Samsung Electronics Baltic used the transactions in question to secure its warranty service obligations towards Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd and Samsung Netherlands, whereas, in the Revenue Service’s view, these relationships are not to be regarded as transactions subject to value added tax but as cost compensation transactions which are not subject to value added tax. As regards corporation tax, the contested decision states that Samsung Electronics Baltic, in performing the group’s marketing functions, has acted as an intermediary which undertakes to provide the related companies with the services of subcontractors (marketing agencies). The Authority found that since Samsung Electronics Baltic passed on the services received from the unrelated parties – the marketing agencies – to Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd and other related undertakings without a mark-up, it follows that Samsung Electronics Baltic provided services to the related undertakings below the market price, since an unrelated undertaking would have added a mark-up to such intermediation services in order to make a profit. Consequently, there are grounds for adjusting Samsung Electronics Baltic’s corporation taxable income by the difference between the value of the services reported by Samsung Electronics Baltic and the market value of the services as calculated by the Revenue Service. The method of adding up costs should be used to determine the market value of the services provided. Taking into account the information available in the Amadeus database, it is estimated that the operating cost or profit margin for unrelated undertakings ranges between 1,7 % and 4,05 %. Consequently, the market value of the services provided by Samsung Electronics Baltic to its affiliates was determined by applying the profit margin of 1,7 % to the sum of the value of the services received from the marketing agencies and Samsung Electronics Baltic’s agency costs as determined in the audit. In follows from the judgment that – If the arm’s length price is not applied and the goods or services are sold at a price below the arm’s length price, the taxable income for corporation tax purposes must be revised upwards by that part of the difference. The legislator has accepted that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, which summarise the best practices in transfer pricing of OECD Member States, complement the explanation of the market price methods in the legislation and provide guidance to help calculate the market price as accurately as possible. Consequently, the application of market price methodologies should take into account and use, to the extent possible, the guidance provided in those guidelines. Determining the nature of the service provided is a prerequisite for application of the cost markup method. The essence of the cost markup method is the application of a mark-up to the costs incurred by the service provider in providing the service which is ...

The 2018 Vodafone case from India – whether termination of option rights under an agreement can be treated as a “deemed international transaction” under section 92B(2) of the Income Tax Act. Vodafone India Services had a call option to buy shares in SMMS Investment Pvt Ltd — which held 5.11% equity capital of the Vodafone India through a web of holdings for 2.78 crore if the fair market value of these shares was less than 1,500 crore. If the fair market value was higher, it had to pay a little more. Under the same agreement, if Vodafone India Services terminated its right to acquire the share, the company would have to pay Rs 21.25 crore. Instead of exercising the call option and acquiring the valuable shares at a very low price, Vodafone India Service terminated the option and paid 21.25 crore. The tax administration held that the Vodafone India Service should have received a substantial consideration for not exercising the option. Vodafone India Services held that termination of an option was not a transaction. It also argued that it was not an international transaction, but a deal between domestic companies. The tribunal held in favor of the tax administration. The deal was deemed an international transaction. The consideration value was to be based on the price of the shares that was later sold in the market. Se also India vs Vodafone 2012 ...

The European Commission has opened an in-depth investigation into the Netherlands’ tax treatment of Inter IKEA, one of the two groups operating the IKEA business. The Commission has concerns that two Dutch tax rulings may have allowed Inter IKEA to pay less tax and given them an unfair advantage over other companies, in breach of EU State aid rules. Commissioner Margrethe Vestager in charge of competition policy said: “All companies, big or small, multinational or not, should pay their fair share of tax. Member States cannot let selected companies pay less tax by allowing them to artificially shift their profits elsewhere. We will now carefully investigate the Netherlands’ tax treatment of Inter IKEA.” In the early 1980s, the IKEA business model changed into a franchising model. Since then, it has been the Inter IKEA group that operates the franchise business of IKEA, using the “IKEA franchise concept”. What this means more concretely is that Inter IKEA does not own the IKEA shops. All IKEA shops worldwide pay a franchise fee of 3% of their turnover to Inter IKEA Systems, a subsidiary of Inter IKEA group in the Netherlands. In return, the IKEA shops are entitled to use inter alia the IKEA trademark, and receive know-how to operate andexploit the IKEA franchise concept. Thus, Inter IKEA Systems in the Netherlands records all revenue from IKEA franchise fees worldwide collected from the IKEA shops. The Commission’s investigation concerns the tax treatment of Inter IKEA Systems in the Netherlands since 2006. Our preliminary inquiries indicate that two tax rulings, granted by the Dutch tax authorities in 2006 and 2011, have significantly reduced Inter IKEA Systems’ taxable profits in the Netherlands. The Commission has concerns that the two tax rulings may have given Inter IKEA Systems an unfair advantage compared to other companies subject to the same national taxation rules in the Netherlands. This would breach EU State aid rules. Between 2006-2011 (the 2006 tax ruling) The 2006 tax ruling endorsed a method to calculate an annual licence fee to be paid by Inter IKEA Systems in the Netherlands to another company of the Inter IKEA group called I.I. Holding, based in Luxembourg. At that time, I.I. Holding held certain intellectual property rights required for the IKEA franchise concept. These were licensed exclusively to Inter IKEA Systems. Inter IKEA Systems used these intellectual property rights to create and develop the IKEA franchise concept. In other words, it developed, enhanced and maintained the intellectual property rights. Inter IKEA Systems also managed the franchise contracts and collected the franchise fees from IKEA shops worldwide. The annual licence fee paid by Inter IKEA Systems to I.I. Holding, as endorsed by the 2006 tax ruling, made up a significant part of Inter IKEA Systems’ revenue. As a result, a significant part of Inter IKEA Systems’ franchise profits were shifted from Inter IKEA Systems to I.I. Holding in Luxembourg, where they remained untaxed. This is because I.I. Holding was part of a special tax scheme, as a result of which it was exempt from corporate taxation in Luxembourg. After 2011 (the 2011 tax ruling) In July 2006, the Commission concluded that the Luxembourg special tax scheme was illegal under EU State aid rules, and required the scheme to be fully repealed by 31 December 2010. No illegal aid needed to be recovered from I.I. Holding because the scheme was granted under a Luxembourg law from 1929, predating the EC Treaty. This is a historical element of the case and not part of the investigation opened today. However, as a result of the Commission decision I.I. Holding would have had to start paying corporate taxes in Luxembourg from 2011. In 2011, Inter IKEA changed the way it was structured. As a result, the 2006 tax ruling was no longer applicable: Inter IKEA Systems bought the intellectual property rights formerly held by I.I. Holding. To finance this acquisition, Inter IKEA Systems received an intercompany loan from its parent company in Liechtenstein. The Dutch authorities then issued a second tax ruling in 2011, which endorsed the price paid by Inter IKEA Systems for the acquisition of the intellectual property. It also endorsed the interest to be paid under the intercompany loan to the parent company in Liechtenstein, and the deduction of these interest payments from Inter IKEA Systems’ taxable profits in the Netherlands. As a result of the interest payments, a significant part of Inter IKEA Systems’ franchise profits after 2011 was shifted to its parent in Liechtenstein. The Commission’s investigation The Commission considers at this stage that the treatment endorsed in the two tax rulings may have resulted in tax benefits in favour of Inter IKEA Systems, which are not available to other companies subject to the same national taxation rules in the Netherlands. The role of EU State aid control is to ensure that Member States do not give selected companies a better tax treatment than others, via tax rulings or otherwise. More specifically, transactions between companies in a corporate group must be priced in a way that reflects economic reality. This means that the payments between two companies in the same group should be in line with arrangements that take place under comparable conditions between independent companies (so-called “arm’s length principle”). The Commission will now investigate Inter IKEA Systems’ tax treatment under both tax rulings: The Commission will assess whether the annual licence fee paid by Inter IKEA Systems to I.I. Holding, endorsed in the 2006 tax ruling, reflects economic reality. In particular, it will assess if the level of the annual licence fee reflects Inter IKEA Systems’ contribution to the franchise business; The Commission will also assess whether the price Inter IKEA Systems agreed for the acquisition of the intellectual property rights and consequently the interest paid for the intercompany loan, endorsed in the 2011 tax ruling, reflect economic reality. In particular, the Commission will assess if the acquisition price adequately reflects the contribution made by Inter IKEA Systems to the value of the franchise business, and the ...

This issue in this case is qualification of an investment as debt or equity. HP bought preferred stock in Foppingadreef Investments, a Dutch company. Foppingadreef Investments bought contingent interest notes, from which FOP’s preferred stock received dividends that HP claimed as foreign tax credits. HP claimed millions in foreign tax credits between 1997 and 2003, then exercised its option to sell its preferred shares for a capital loss of more than $16 million. The IRS characterized the transaction as debt, and denied the tax credits claimed by Hewlett Packard. First the Tax Court and later the Court of Appeal agreed with the tax authorities. The eleven factors considered by the Court when qualifying an investment as debt/equity the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; the presence or absence of a maturity date; the source of the payments; the right to enforce the payment of principal and interest; participation and management; a status equal to or inferior to that of regular corporate creditors; the intent of the parties; ‘thin’ or adequate capitalization; identity of interest between creditor and stock holder; payment of interest only out of ‘dividend’ money; the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending  institutions. “The parties expend considerable effort arguing over whether “most” of the relevant factors point one way or the other. But our test isn’t a bean-counting exercise. Instead, it’s best understood as a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that are often helpful in guiding a court’s factual determination. And, while such a free-floating inquiry is hardly a paragon of judicial predictability, it’s the necessary evil of a tax code that mistakes a messy spectrum for a simple binary, and has repeatedly failed to offer the courts statutory or regulatory guidance” “With this background in place, we have no difficulty concluding that the Tax Court didn’t err in finding that HP’s investment in FOP is best characterized as debt. While the factors point in different directions, the Tax Court committed no clear error in considering or weighing them. It appropriately found that the formal labels attached to the documents didn’t settle the inquiry. Instead, of particular importance to the Tax Court was the de facto presence of a fixed maturity date, and HP’s de facto creditor’s rights. The Tax Court concluded that the deal had a de facto maturity date because HP had an overwhelming economic incentive to divest itself of FOP after 2003: After that year, FOP would have negative earnings, thereby preventing HP from claiming foreign tax credits. HP knew this, and never expected to stay in the transaction after 2003. HP’s income was also highly predictable: It was entitled to semiannual payments equal to 97% of the after-tax base interest on the notes, and had a contractual remedy against ABN and, if ABN failed to pay interest on the notes, FOP as well. While payment of the dividends was contingent on FOP’s earnings, the transaction was arranged such that FOP’s earnings were all but predetermined. In short, HP’s investment earned it a limited return for a fixed period, and the Tax Court made no error in concluding that the investment was debt.” The Court of Appeal also upheld the determination that a purported capital loss was really a fee paid for a tax shelter, which cannot be deducted ...

A transfer pricing dispute between South African Revenue Service and Sishen Iron Ore, a subsidiary of Kumba Iron Ore, has now been resolved in a settlement of ZAR 2.5bn. The case concerned disallowance of sales commissions paid to offshore sales and marketing subsidiaries in Amsterdam, Luxembourg and Hong Kong. Since 2012, Kumba Iron Ore’s international marketing has been integrated with the larger Anglo American group’s Singapore-based marketing hub. The settlement follows a similar investigations into the transfer pricing activities of Evraz Highveld Steel, which resulted in a R685 million tax claim against the now-bankrupt company related to apparent tax evasion using an Austrian shell company between 2007 and 2009 ...

In a public hearing held 22 August 2017 in Sydney Australia by the Economics References Committee, tech companies IBM, Microsoft, and Apple were called to the witnesses stand to explain about tax avoidance schemes – use of “regional headquarters” in low tax jurisdictions (Singapore, Ireland and the Netherlands) to avoid or reduce taxes. Follow the ongoing Australian hearings into corporate tax avoidance on this site: http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Corporatetax45th Transcript from the hearing: ...

By Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Jan Fichtner, Frank W. Takes, & Eelke M. Heemskerk Multinational corporations use highly complex structures of parents and subsidiaries to organize their operations and ownership. Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs) facilitate these structures through low taxation and lenient regulation, but are increasingly under scrutiny, for instance for enabling tax avoidance. Therefore, the identifcation of OFC jurisdictions has become a politicized and contested issue. We introduce a novel data-driven approach for identifying OFCs based on the global corporate ownership network, in which over 98 million firms (nodes) are connected through 71 million ownership relations. This granular firm-level network data uniquely allows identifying both sink-OFCs and conduit-OFCs. Sink-OFCs attract and retain foreign capital while conduit-OFCs are attractive intermediate destinations in the routing of international investments and enable the transfer of capital without taxation. We identify 24 sink-OFCs. In addition, a small set of countries – the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Singapore and Switzerland – canalize the majority of corporate offshore investment as conduit-OFCs. Each conduit jurisdiction is specialized in a geographical area and there is signifcant specialization based on industrial sectors. Against the idea of OFCs as exotic small islands that cannot be regulated, we show that many sink and conduit-OFCs are highly developed countries. Conduits-and-Sinks-in-the-Global-Corporate-Ownership-Network.pdf ...

A Investment GmbH, acquired all shares of B in May 2012. To finance the acquisition, A Investment GmbH took up a bank loan with a interest rate of 4.78%, a vendor loan with an interest rate of 10% and a shareholder loan with an interest rate 8% from its parent company, Capital B.V. The 8 % interest rate on the shareholder loan was determined by A Investment GmbH by applying the CUP method based on external comparables. The German tax authority, found that the interest rate of 8 % did not comply with the arm’s length principle. An assessment was issued where the interest rate was set to 5% based on the interest rate on the bank loan (internal CUP). A Investment GmbH filed an appeal to Cologne Fiscal Court. The court ruled that the interest rate of the bank loan, 4.78%, was a reliable CUP for setting the arm’s length interest rate of the controlled loan. The vendor loan was considered irrelevant as the 10 % interests could have been influenced by other factors. With regard to the subordination of claims on the loan from Capital B.V., pursuant to Section 39 (1) (5) of the German Insolvency Act, neither the non-provision of collateral nor the subordination of the loans could justify a risk premium in the determination of the arm’s length interest. Implicit support within the group – at least for the loans from Capital B.V – was considered by the Court in this respect. The appeal of A Investment GmbH was dismissed by the Court. This decision is now appealed by A Investment GmbH to the Supreme Tax Court under file I R 62/17 and is pending. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The European Commission’s investigation on granting of selective tax advantages to Starbucks BV, cf. EU state aid rules ...

The European Commission’s investigation on granting of selective tax advantages to Starbucks BV, cf. EU state aid rules ...

The Spanish Tax administration made an income adjustment of Citresa (a Spanish subsidiary of the Schweeps Group) Corporate Income Tax for FY 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, resulting in a tax liability of €38.6 millon. Citresa entered into a franchise agreement and a contract manufacturing agreement with Schweppes International Limited (a related party resident in the Netherlands). The transactions between the related parties were not found to be in accordance with the arm’s length principle. In the parent company, CITRESA, the taxable income declared for the years 2003 to 2005 was increased as a result of an adjustment of market prices relating to the supply of certain fruit and other components by Citresa to Schweppes International Limited. In the subsidiary, SCHWEPPES, S.A. (SSA), the taxable income declared for the years 2003 to 2006 was increased as a result of adjustment of market prices relating to the supply of concentrates and extracts by the entity Schweppes International Limited, resident in Holland, to SSA. The taxpayer had used the CUP method to verify the arm’s length nature of the transaction while the Spanish Tax administration – due to lack of comparable transactions – found it more appropriate to use the transactional net margin method (TNMM). Prior to 1 December 2006, the Spanish Corporate Income Tax Act (CIT) established three methods of pricing related transactions (the “Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method”, the “Cost Plus Method” and the “Resale Price Method”) and if none were applicable it established the application of the “Transactional Profit Split Method”. Thus, the “Transactional Net Margin Method” was not included at the time the market value of related transactions was established. However, as the Tax Treaty between Spain and the Netherlands was applicable, the Spanish Tax Authorities considered that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines could be directly applicable. Consequently, as the “Transactional Net Margin Method” was envisaged in the above-mentioned Guidelines, the Spanish Tax Authorities understood that this method could be used as a valid pricing method. The case ended up in Court where Citresa argued that the assessment was in breach of EU rules on freedom of establishment and that the TNM method had been applied by the authorities without any legal basis in Spain for the years in question. Judgment of the Court In regards to the claimed violation of the principle of freedom of establishment cf. TFEU article 49, the Court stated: “….the mere purposes of argument, that there can be no doubt as to the conformity with European Union Law of the regime of related-party transactions in Spain, in the terms in which this infringement is proposed to us, which is what is strictly speaking being postulated in cassation for the first time, it being sufficient to support this assertion to record some elementary considerations, such as that the censure is projected indiscriminately on the whole of the law (that is to say, on the legal regime of related-party transactions), which is to say, on the legal regime of related-party transactions, on the legal regime of related-party transactions regulated by Article 16 of Law 43/1995, of 27 December 1995, on Corporate Income Tax, and then Article 16 of Royal Legislative Decree 4/2004, of 5 March 2004, which approves the revised text of the Law on Corporate Income Tax – TRLIS), while, at the same time and in open contradiction, it advocates the application of the precept to resolve the case, thus starting from its compliance with European Union Law.” In regards to application of the transactional net margin method, the Court stated: “…tax years cover the period from January 2003 to February 2006. Article 16.3 of Law 43/1995, in the wording applicable to the case, and the same provision of the TRLIS, in its original version, established the following: “In order to determine the normal market value, the tax authorities shall apply the following methods: Market price of the good or service in question or of others of similar characteristics, making, in this case, the necessary corrections to obtain equivalence, as well as to consider the particularities of the transaction. The following shall be applicable on a supplementary basis: The sale price of goods and services calculated by increasing the acquisition value or production cost of the goods and services by the margin normally obtained by the taxable person in comparable transactions entered into with independent persons or entities or by the margin normally obtained by companies operating in the same sector in comparable transactions entered into with independent persons or entities. Resale price of goods and services established by the purchaser, reduced by the margin normally obtained by the aforementioned purchaser in comparable transactions arranged with independent persons or entities or by the margin normally obtained by companies operating in the same sector in comparable transactions arranged with independent persons or entities, considering, where applicable, the costs incurred by the aforementioned purchaser in order to transform the aforementioned goods and services. Where none of the above methods are applicable, the price derived from the distribution of the joint result of the transaction in question shall be applied, taking into account the risks assumed, the assets involved and the functions performed by the related parties”. This hierarchical list exhausts the possible methods available to the administration for establishing the market value of the transactions to which it has been applied. It consists of four methods: one of them, which we can call direct or primary, that of the market price of the good or service in question (art. 16.3.a) LIS); two others that the law itself declares to be supplementary, that of the increase in acquisition value and that of the resale price (art. 16.3.b) of the legal text itself); and finally, as a residual or supplementary second degree method, that of the distribution of the joint result of the operation in question (art. 16.3.c) LIS). These obviously do not include the valuation method used by the tax inspectorate in this case, that of the net margin of all transactions, introduced ex novo by Law 36/2006, of 29 November, on measures for the ...

Oxfam’s list of Tax Havens, in order of significance are: (1) Bermuda (2) the Cayman Islands (3) the Netherlands (4) Switzerland (5) Singapore (6) Ireland (7) Luxembourg (8) Curaçao (9) Hong Kong (10) Cyprus (11) Bahamas (12) Jersey (13) Barbados, (14) Mauritius and (15) the British Virgin Islands. Most notably is The Netherlands placement as no. 3 on the list. Oxfam researchers compiled the list by assessing the extent to which countries employ the most damaging tax policies, such as zero corporate tax rates, the provision of unfair and unproductive tax incentives, and a lack of cooperation with international processes against tax avoidance (including measures to increase financial transparency). Many of the countries on the list have been implicated in tax scandals. For example Ireland hit the headlines over a tax deal with Apple that enabled the global tech giant to pay a 0.005 percent corporate tax rate in the country. And the British Virgin Islands is home to more than half of the 200,000 offshore companies set up by Mossack Fonseca – the law firm at the heart of the Panama Papers scandal. The United Kingdom does not feature on the list, but four territories that the United Kingdom is ultimately responsible for do appear: the Cayman Islands, Jersey, Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands ...

X Sub GmbH is a German subsidiary of a multinational group. The parent company Y Par B.V. and the financial hub of the group Z Fin B.V. – a sister company to the German subsidiary – are both located in the Netherlands. In its function as a financial hub, Z Fin B.V granted several loans to X Sub GmbH. As part of a tax audit, the German tax authority considered that the interest on the inter-company loans paid by X Sub GmbH to Z Fin B.V. was too high. In order to determine the arm’s length interest rate, X Sub GmbH had applied the CUP method. The tax authority instead applied the cost plus method and issued an assessment. X Sub GmbH filed an appeal to Münster Fiscal Court. The Court found that the cost plus method had been correctly chosen by the tax authority, as the external CUPs could not be used because of differences in conditions between the uncontrolled transactions and the controlled transactions. Hence, the Court dismissed the appeal of X Sub GmbH. The decision has been appealed by X Sub GmbH to the German Federal Fiscal Court, ref. I R 4/17, where it is still pending. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In this case ZERAIM IBÉRICA SA argues that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines has not been applied propperly, as secret comparables have been used in determining the arm’s length price of controlled transactions between the Spanish company and its Dutch parent company. The court concludes that the “..Guidelines are considered to be merely recommendations to States, which are given an interpretative value.” The appeal filed by the company is dismissed by the court. Click here for other translation ...

A russian subsidiary of British American Tobacco was found by the russian tax administration to have overpaid interest on loans from an affiliate in the Netherlands. The Court ruled in favor of the tax administration ...

Follow the work of the UK Parliament, House of Commons Committee of Public Account, on corporate tax avoidance schemes. http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/taxation/ Statements from Amazon, Google and Starbucks, November 2012 Statement from Google June 2013 ...

In the Cambrix case the issue was whether the interest rate on an shareholder loan had been at arm’s length. The court concluded that the burden of proof was on the Swedish tax authorities and that sufficient evidence had not been provided to support the claim that the interest rate had not been at arm’s length. Click here for translation ...

Spedition Gmbh entered a written agreement – at year-end – to pay management fees to its Dutch parent for services received during the year. The legal question was the relationship between arm’s-length principle as included in double tax treaties and the norms for income assessments in German tax law. The assessment of the tax office claiming a hidden distribution of profits because of the “retrospective” effect of the written agreement, was rejected by the Court. According to the Court the double tax treaty provisions bases the arm’s length standard on amount, rather than on the reason for, or documentation, of a transaction. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

PepsiCo had devised hybrid securities, which were treated as debt in the Netherlands and equity in the United States. Hence, the payments were treated as tax deductible interest expenses in the Netherlands but as tax free dividend income on equity in the US. The IRS held that the payments received from PepsiCo in the Netherlands should also be characterised as taxable interest payments for federal income tax purposes and issued an assessment for FY 1998 to 2002. PepsiCo brought the assessment before the US Tax Court. Based on a 13 factors-analysis the Court concluded that the payments made to PepsiCo were best characterised as nontaxable returns on capital investment and set aside the assessment. Factors considered were: (1) names or labels given to the instruments; (2) presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; (3) source of payments; (4) right to enforce payments; (5) participation in management as a result of the advances; (6) status of the advances in relation to regular corporate creditors; (7) intent of the parties; (8) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (9) “thinness” of capital structure in relation to debt; (10) ability of the corporation to obtain credit from outside sources; (11) use to which advances were put; (12) failure of debtor to repay; and (13) risk involved in making advances. “And, perhaps most convincingly, the “independent creditor test” underscores that a commercial bank or third party lender would not have engaged in transactions of comparable risk.” “However, after consideration of all the facts and circumstances, we believe that the advance agreements exhibited more qualitative and quantitative indicia of equity than debt.” “We hold that the advance agreements are more appropriately characterized as equity for Federal income tax purposes.” ...

The Dutch company, Velcro Holdings BV (“VHBV”), licensed IP from an affiliated company in the Dutch Antilles, Velcro Industries BV (“VIBV”), and sublicensed this IP to a Canadian company, Velcro Canada Inc. (VCI). VHBV was obliged to pay 90% of the royalties received from VCI. within 30 days after receipt to VIBV. At issue was whether VHBV qualified as Beneficial Owner of the royalty payments from VCI and consequently would be entitled to a reduced withholding tax – from 25% (the Canadian domestic rate) to 10% (the rate under article 12 of the treaty between Canada and the Netherlands). The tax authorities considered that VHBV did not qualify as Beneficial Owner and denied application of the reduced withholding tax rate. Judgment of the Tax Court The court set aside the decision of the tax authorities and decided in favor of VCI. Excerpts: “VHBV obviously has some discretion based on the facts as noted above regarding the use and application of the royalty funds. It is quite obvious that though there might be limited discretion, VHBV does have discretion. According to Prévost, there must be “absolutely no discretion” – that is not the case on the facts before the Court. It is only when there is “absolutely no discretion” that the Court take the draconian step of piercing the corporate veil.” “The person who is the beneficial owner is the person who enjoys and assumes all the attributes of ownership. Only if the interest in the item in question gives that party the right to control the item without question (e.g. they are not accountable to anyone for how he or she deals with the item) will it meet the threshold set in Prévost. In Matchwood, the Court found that the taxpayer did not have such rights until the deed was registered; likewise, VIBV is not a party to the license agreements (having fully assigned it, along with its rights and obligations, to VHBV). It no longer has such rights and thus does not have an interest that amounts to beneficial ownership.” “For the reasons given above I believe that the beneficial ownership of the royalties rests in VHBV and not in VIBV and as such, the appeal is allowed and the matter is referred back to the Minister of National Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment on that basis and further, the 1995 assessment dated October 25, 1996 is referred back to the Minister for reconsideration and recalculation on the basis that VIBV was a resident of the Netherlands in 1995 and therefore entitled to the benefit of that treaty.” ...

In the Vodafone case, the Supreme Court of India found that tax planning within the law will be valid as long as it does not amount to a colourable device ...

Adobe Systems Co., a Japanese subsidiary of Adobe Systems Inc., received remuneration from Dutch and Irish group companies for promotion and marketing of Adobe software sold in Japan The remuneration of Adobe Systems Co. was determined as general administrative expenses plus 1.5% of net sales in Japan. A transfer pricing assessment was issued by the Japanese tax authorities where transfer prices were instead based profit margins derived in comparable transactions. Adobe Systems filed an appeal seeking revokal of the assessment. Tokyo High Court held that the tax assessment should be revoked. The burden of proof in relation to the legitimacy of the transfer pricing method applied was on the tax administration. The transfer pricing method used by the tax authority was not consistent with the resale price method. The method applied by the tax authorities “…cannot be said to be “a method equivalent to the resale price standard method” prescribed in Article 66-4, Paragraph 2, Item 2, b of the Special Taxation Measures Law. Therefore, in this case, there is illegality in the process of calculating the inter-company price using this calculation method...” Click here for English translation ...

Prévost is a resident Canadian corporation who declared and paid dividends to its shareholder Prévost Holding B.V. (“PHB.V.”), a corporation resident in the Netherlands. When Prévost paid the dividends it withheld five percent in tax. The tax authorities issued an assessments against Prévost in respect of the aforementioned dividends. The tax authorities found that the beneficial owners of the dividends were the corporate shareholders of PHB.V., a resident of the United Kingdom and a resident of Sweden, and not PHB.V. itself. An appeal was filed by Prévost with the tax court. “… one does not pierce the corporate veil unless the corporation is a conduit for another person and has absolutely no discretion as to the use or application of funds put through it as conduit, or has agreed to act on someone else’s behalf pursuant to that person’s instructions without any right to do other than what that person instructs it, for example, a stockbroker who is the registered owner of the share it holds for clients.” Judgment of the Court The tax court rejected the tax authority’s arguments for beneficial ownership, and allowed the appeal. “Volvo and Henlys were not the beneficial owners of the dividends paid by Prévost. I have not heard any evidence satisfying me that PHB.V. was a conduit for Volvo and Henlys. The appeals are allowed, with costs…” ...

“Guarantee Co. Ltd.” owned all the shares of G, a company located in the Netherlands, and had provided financial guarantees for loans – in the form of so called “keep well agreements” and guarantee agreements. The main issue in this case is whether or not it was possible to calculate an arm’s length price for the consideration for the guarantee issued. Judgment of the National Tax Tribunal The Tax Tribunal came to the conclusion that the price for the guarantees could be determined based on the CUP method and set at 0,10% of the guaranteed amounts. Excerpt “Therefore, a comparative study of the conclusion of each of the Keep Well Agreements, etc. in question and the Bank Guarantee Transactions in question shows that, as stated in (a) of (b) above, the conclusion of each of the Keep Well Agreements, etc. in question is found to have a function substantially equivalent to a guarantee, although there are differences in the contract form from the Bank Guarantee Transactions in question, and therefore, the Bank Guarantee Transactions in question are considered to be “at arm’s length”. The bank guarantee transactions are considered to have the same function as the guarantee transactions, although the contractual form differs from that of the bank guarantee transactions, and therefore, the arm’s length price of each of the Keep Well Agreements is considered to be calculated using the “method equivalent to the arm’s length price method”. And since each of the Bank Guarantee Transactions in question, which took place at the same time as the Conclusion of each of the Keep Well Agreements in question, etc., carried out between April 1990 and November 1990, are under the same circumstances as B in (C) in (C) above, the guarantee fee rate (0.1%) for them, even without adjusting for differences for the same reasons as C in (C) above, is ) as the guarantee fee rate to be used for the calculation of the arm’s length price for the conclusion of each of the Keep Well Agreements in question, etc. is reasonable. On the other hand, according to the results of the Tribunal’s investigation, the guarantee fee rates for the bank guarantee transactions carried out at the same time as the conclusion of the Keep Well Agreements in question from 1991 onwards are as shown in Annex 6-2, and the level of those guarantee fee rates has increased dramatically compared to before 1990. The reasons for this sharp increase in guarantee fees are, according to the Tribunal’s investigations, generally said to be due to the impact of the BIS regulations on banks or changes in risk management and cost awareness of guarantees in banks, although this is not certain. In addition, the Tribunal was unable to obtain sufficient data on any of the bank guarantee transactions to determine whether or not an adjustment for differences was necessary when they were used as comparator transactions, and to quantify the differences. Therefore, it must be said that it is impossible to calculate the arm’s length price for the conclusion of each of the Keep Well Agreements after 1991, using the bank guarantee transactions as comparator transactions. C. As stated above, with regard to the conclusion, etc. of the Keep Well Agreements up to 1990, it is deemed possible to calculate the arm’s length price by applying a method equivalent to the arm’s length price comparison method using the Bank Guarantee Transactions as the comparable transactions, but with regard to the conclusion, etc. of the Keep Well Agreements in 1991 and later, it is not possible to calculate the arm’s length price by using the arm’s length price comparison method. etc., it is not possible to adopt a method equivalent to the method equivalent to the arm’s length price comparison method, and there is no room for adopting any other method prescribed by government order.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A German group company’s payment for use of the group name was not found to be deductible under German transfer pricing regulations. Guidance on payments for use of the group name has been provided in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 6.81 – 6.85 and 7.12. As a general rule, no payment should be recognised for transfer pricing purposes for simple recognition of group membership or the use of the group name merely to reflect the fact of group membership. However, where one member of the group is the owner of a trademark or other intangible for the group name, and where use of the name provides a financial benefit to members of the group other than the member legally owning such intangible, it is reasonable to conclude that a payment for use would have been made in arm’s length transactions. In determining the amount of payment with respect to a group name, it is important to consider the amount of the financial benefit to the user of the name attributable to use of that name, the costs and benefits associated with other alternatives, and the relative contributions to the value of the name made by the legal owner, and the entity using the name in the form of functions performed, assets used and risks assumed. Where an existing successful business is acquired by another successful business and the acquired business begins to use a name, trademark or other branding indicative of the acquiring business, there should be no automatic assumption that a payment should be made in respect of such use. If there is a reasonable expectation of financial benefit to the acquired company from using the acquiring company’s branding, then the amount of any payment should be informed by the level of that anticipated benefit. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...