On 1 February 2010, E.K. and its subsidiary, E. S.A, concluded an agreement on the transfer of E.K.’s trade marks to E. S.A. Following the transfer (on the same day), E.K. concluded with E. S.A. an agreement to grant a licence for the use of the marks in return for payment to the licensor (E. S.A.) of a monthly remuneration. In 2011, E.K. recognised as a deductible expense the royalties paid to E. S.A. According to the tax authorities this resulted in E.K. understating its corporate income tax liability for 2011. According to the tax authorities, E. S.A. did not participate in any way in the creation of revenue, with the result that the profits generated by E.K. were ‘passed on’ in the form of royalties to a related company – E. S.A. The remuneration payable to the legal owner of the trademarks did not take into account the very limited functions performed by that entity in creating the value of the trademarks. The only function performed by E. S.A. in 2011 was to manage the legal protection of the trade marks, for which it would be entitled to a limited remuneration appropriate to its function. After receiving the resulting assessment of additional taxable income, a complaint was then filed by E.K. with the Director of the Tax Chamber which was later dismissed. An appeal was then filed by E.K. with the Administrative Court. Judgement of the Administrative Court. The Administrative Court set aside the Decision of the Tax Chamber and referred the case back to the Tax Chamber. Excerpts “… In the Court’s view, the faulty application of Article 11(1) and (4) of the u.p.d.o.p. affected the manner in which the applicant’s income was estimated and the estimation method adopted by the authorities, based on the erroneous assumption that the transaction analysed by the authorities consisted in the provision of trade mark administration services on behalf of the economic owner of those trade marks. In making that assumption, the authorities applied the net transaction margin method in order to determine the market level of the remuneration payable to the company for its trade mark administration functions. Meanwhile, the applicant provided the tax authority with the data that formed the basis for the calculation of the royalties, as well as the licence agreement. In view of the repetitive nature of such transactions on the market, the applicant used the comparable uncontrolled price method as the correct approach. The Court notes that the estimation of income by the methods indicated in Article 11(2) of the u.p.d.o.p. (comparable uncontrolled price method, reasonable margin method, selling price method) should be considered first, and only when it is not possible to apply these methods, the methods indicated in Article 11(3) of that Act (net transaction margin method, profit sharing method) will be applied. Furthermore, the applicant reasonably pointed out that in the comparability analysis the authorities should have taken into account the fact that intangible assets of significant value (trademarks) were involved in the examined transaction, being the only significant asset analysed by the parties to the examined transaction. As a result, the authorities incorrectly conducted the comparability analysis of the transaction involving the licence for the use of trademarks granted to the applicant by the limited partnership, which prejudges the validity of the allegation of a breach of Article 11(1)-(3) of the u.p.d.o.p. in conjunction with § 3, § 7, § 8, § 10 and § 11 of the MF Regulation. In the opinion of the Court, the basis for the decision in this case was not the provision of Article 11c(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. in the 2019 wording, hence the allegation of violation of this provision contained in the complaint does not merit consideration. In the opinion of the Court, the evidence gathered in the case allowed it to be resolved and, in this respect, the authorities did not fail to comply with Article 122 in conjunction with Article 187 § 1 of the Tax Ordinance. On the other hand, the allegation of a breach of Article 191 of the Tax Ordinance, consisting in the authorities’ faulty assessment of the market nature of the examined legal transactions, is justified. In the context of this allegation, however, it should be stipulated that the reclassification of a legal action by the authorities is not so much the result of a defective assessment of the evidence gathered, but results from the interpretation and manner of application of substantive law provisions adopted by the authorities (Article 11(1) and (4) of the u.p.d.o.p.). As aptly pointed out in the case law, in such a situation the state of facts was not so much established, but adopted by the tax authority. This is because the tax authority determines the factual state not on the basis of established circumstances, but reconstructs it, taking as a directional guideline the taxpayer’s intention to achieve the intended fiscal goal (unauthorised tax benefit). Thus, the state of facts adopted by the tax authorities does not so much result from the evidence gathered in the case, but from the assumption that if the taxpayer was guided only by economic and economic rationale and not by the intention to achieve an unauthorised tax benefit, it is precisely in the way the tax authority wants him to arrange his relations (judgment of the NSA of 8 May 2019, II FSK 2711/18). On the other hand, the consequence of the violation of substantive law is the legitimacy of the allegations of violation of Articles 120 and 121 § 1 of the Tax Ordinance by the authorities. On the other hand, due to the voluminous nature of the complaint, the Court referred to the allegations contained therein and their justification to the extent necessary to conduct a review of the appealed decisions (judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 26 May 2017, I FSK 1660/15). When re-examining the case, the authority will take into account the legal assessment presented above as to the interpretation and application, in the ...

According to Refinitiv Limited a Diverted Profit Tax-notices they had been served for FY 2018 by the tax authorities were unlawful because the tax authorities had used another transfer pricing method (Profit Split) than the method previously agreed (TNMM with a cost based PLI) in respect of the same services in an earlier Advance Pricing Agreement (“APA”) covering FY 2008-2014. Judgement of the Upper Tribunal The Court did not find an inconsistency between the Diverted Profit Tax-notices issued by the tax authorities in respect of 2018 and the APA covering FY 2008-2014. The appeal of Refinitiv Limited was dismissed. Excerpt “90. HMRC’s acceptance that the 2018 profits were referable to the provision of services in 2008-2014 does not therefore assist the claimants’ case. The APA had terminated and had no effect in relation to the pricing of services for the purposes of calculating profits in 2018. The referability did not mean the services had to be priced under an APA that did not have  effect.91. In conclusion there is accordingly no inconsistency between the DPT notices that HMRC issued in respect of 2018 and the APA. The DPT notices concerned an accounting period in relation to which the APA had no effect.” ...

K.P. is active in retail sale of computers, peripheral equipment and software. In December 2013 it had transfered valuable trademarks to its subsidiary and in the years following the transfer incurred costs in form of licence fees for using the trademarks. According to the tax authorities the arrangement was commercially irrationel and had therfore been recharacterised. Not satisfied with the assessment an appeal was filed. Judgement of the Provincial Administrative Court. The Court decided in favor of K.P.  According to the Court recharacterization of controlled transactions was not possible under the Polish arm’s length provisions in force until the end of 2018. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

K. S.A. had made an in-kind contribution to a subsidiary (a partnership) in the form of previously created or acquired and depreciated trademark protection rights for individual beer brands. The partnership in return granted K. S.A. a licence to use these trademarks (K. S.A. was the only user of the trademarks). The partnership made depreciations on these intangible assets, which – due to the lack of legal personality of the partnership – were recognised as tax deductible costs directly by K. S.A. According to the tax authorities the role of the partnership was limited to the administration of trademark rights, it was not capable of exercising any rights and obligations arising from the licence agreements. Therefore the prerequisites listed in Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. were met, allowing K. S.A.’s income to be determined without regard to the conditions arising from those agreements. The assessment issued by the tax authorities was later set aside by the Provincial Administrative Court. An appeal and cross appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decisions of the Provincial Administrative Court and dismissed both appeals as neither of them had justified grounds. The Provincial Administrative Court had correctly deduced that Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. authorises only adjustment of the amount of licence fees, but not the nature of the controlled transactions by recognising that instead of a licence agreement for the use of the rights to trademarks, an agreement was concluded for the provision of services for the administration of these trademarks. Excerpts “The tax authorities, in finding that the applicant had not in fact made an in-kind contribution of trademark rights to the limited partnership, but had merely entrusted that partnership with the duty to administer the marks, referred to Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. (as expressed in the 2011 consolidated text. ), by virtue of which the tax authorities could determine the taxpayer’s income and the tax due without taking into account the conditions established or imposed as a result of the links between the contracting entities, with the income to be determined by way of an estimate, using the methods described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 11 u.p.d.o.p. However, these are not provisions creating abuse of rights or anti-avoidance clauses, as they only allow for a different determination of transaction (transfer) prices. The notion of ‘transaction price’ is legally defined in Article 3(10) of the I.P.C., which, in the wording relevant to the tax period examined in the case, stipulated that it is the price of the subject of a transaction concluded between related parties. Thus, the essence of the legal institution regulated in Article 11 of the u.p.d.o.p. is not the omission of the legal effects of legal transactions performed by the taxpayer or a different legal definition of those transactions, but the determination of their economic effect expressed in the transaction price, with the omission of the impact of institutional links between counterparties”  “For the same reasons, the parallel plea alleging infringement of Articles 191, 120 and 121(1) of the P.C.P. by annulling the tax authority’s legal rulings on the grounds of a breach of the aforementioned rules of evidence in conjunction with Articles 11(1) and 11(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. and holding that the tax authority did not correct the amount of royalties and the marketability of the transaction, but reclassified the legal relationship on the basis of which the entity incurred the expenditure, is also inappropriate. In fact, the assessment of the Provincial Administrative Court that such a construction of the tax authority’s decision corresponds to the hypothesis of the 2019 standard of Article 11c(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. is correct, but there was no adequate legal basis for applying it to 2012/2013 and based on Article 11(1) and (4) of the u.p.d.o.p. in its then wording. Failure to take into account a transaction undertaken by related parties deemed economically irrational by the tax authority violated, in these circumstances, the provisions constituting the cassation grounds of the plea, as the Provincial Administrative Court reasonably found.” “Contrary to the assumption highlighted in the grounds of the applicant’s cassation appeal, in the individual interpretations issued at its request, the applicant did not obtain confirmation of the legality of the entire optimisation construction, but only of the individual legal and factual actions constituting this construction, presented in isolation from the entire – at that time – planned future event. Such a fragmentation of the description of the future event does not comply with the obligation under Article 14b § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure to provide an exhaustive account of the actual state of affairs or future event, and therefore – as a consequence – the applicant cannot rely on the legal protection provided under Article 14k § 1 or Article 14m § 1, § 2 (1) and § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In 2010, E S.A. transferred the legal ownership of a trademark to subsidiary S and subsequently entered into an agreement with S for the “licensing of the use of the trademarks”. In 2013, the same trademark was transferred back to E. S.A. As a result of these transactions, E. S.A., between 2010 and 2013, recognised the licence fees paid to S as tax costs, and then, as a result of the re-purchase of those trademarks in 2013 – it again made depreciation write-offs on them, recognising them as tax costs. The tax authority found that E S.A. had reported income lower than what would have been reported had the relationships not existed. E S.A. had  overestimated the tax deductible costs by PLN […] for the depreciation of trademarks, which is a consequence of the overestimation for tax purposes of the initial value of the trademarks repurchased from S – 27 December 2013 – by the amount of PLN […]. The function performed by S between 2010 and 2013 was limited to re-registration of the trademarks with the change of legal ownership. In the tax authority’s view, the expenses incurred by E S.A. for the reverse acquisition of the trademarks did not reflect the transactions that unrelated parties would have entered into, as they do not take into account the functions that E S.A. performed in relation to the trademarks. A tax assessment was issued where – for tax purposes – the transaction had instead been treated as a service contract, where S had provided protection and registration services to E S.A. A complaint was filed by E S.A. Judgement of the Court The Court found that there was no legal basis for re-characterisation in Poland for the years in question and that the issue should instead be resolved by applying the Polish anti-avoidance provision. On that basis, the case was referred back for further consideration. Excerpts “In principle, the tax authorities did not present any argumentation showing from which rules of interpretation they came to the conclusion that such an application of the above-mentioned provisions is legally possible and justified in the present case. It should be noted in this regard that Article 11(1) in fine speaks of the determination of income and tax due without – ‘[…] taking into account the conditions arising from the relationship…’, but does not allow for the substitution of one legal act (a licence agreement) for another act (an agreement for the provision of administration services), and deriving from the latter the legal consequences for the determination of the amount of the tax liability. There should be no doubt in this case that, in fact, the authorities made an unjustified reclassification of the legal act performed in the form of the conclusion of a valid licensing contract, when they concluded (referring to the OECD Guidelines – Annex to Chapter VI – Illustrative Examples of Recommendations on Intangible Assets, example 1, point 4) that the transactions carried out by E. and S. in fact constitute, for the purposes of assessing remuneration, a contract for the provision of trademark administration services and the market price in such a case should be determined for administration services. As the applicant rightly argued, such a possibility exists as of 1 January 2019, since Article 11c(4) uses the expression – “[…] without taking into account the controlled transaction, and where justified, determines the income (loss) of the taxpayer from the transaction appropriate to the controlled transaction”. This is what is meant by the so-called recharacterisation, i.e. the reclassification of the transaction, which is what the tax authorities actually did in the present case. At the same time, the Court does not share the view expressed in the jurisprudence of administrative courts, referring to the content of the justification of the draft amending act, according to which, the solutions introduced in 2019 were of a clarifying rather than normative nature (cf. the judgment of the WSA in Rzeszów of 20 October 2022, I SA/Rz 434/22). The applicant rightly argues in this regard that the new regulation is undoubtedly law-making in nature and that the provisions in force until the end of 2018 did not give the tax authorities such powers. It is necessary to agree with the view expressed in the literature that a linguistic interpretation of Article 11(1) of the A.p.d.o.p. and Article 11c of the A.p.d.o.p. proves that Article 11c of that Act is a normative novelty, as the concepts and premises it regulates cannot be derived in any way from the wording of Art. 11(1) u.p.d.o.p. (cf. H. Litwińczuk, Reclassification (non-recognition) of a transaction made between related parties in the light of transfer pricing regulations before and after 1.01.2019, “Tax Review” of 2019, no. 3).” “It follows from the justification of the contested decisions that, in applying Article 11(1) and (4) of the TAX Act to the facts of this case, the tax authorities referred to the OECD Guidelines, inter alia, to the example provided therein (Anex to Chapter VI – Illustrative Examples of Recommendations on Intangible Assets, example 1, point 4), from which, according to the authorities, it follows that the transactions carried out by E. S.A. and S. for the purposes of assessing remuneration constitute, in fact, a contract for the provision of trademark administration services and, in that case, the market price should be determined for such services. In this context, it should be clarified that the OECD Guidelines (as well as other documents of this organisation), in the light of the provisions of Article 87 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, do not constitute a source of universally binding law. Neither can they determine in a binding manner the basic structural elements of a tax, since the constitutional legislator in Article 217 of the Basic Law has subjected this sphere exclusively to statutory regulations. Since these guidelines do not constitute a source of law, they can therefore neither lead to an extension of the powers of the tax authorities nor of the ...

The tax authorities had issued a notice of assessment which disallowed tax deductions for royalties paid by R…Cash & C…, S.A. to its Polish parent company, O…Mark Sp. Z.o.o. R… Cash & C…, S.A. appealed to the Administrative Court, which later annulled the assessment. The tax authorities then filed an appeal with the Administrative Court of Appeal. Judgement of the Court The Court of Appeal revoked the judgement issued by the administrative court and decided in favour of the tax authorities. Extracts “It is clear from the evidence in the case file that the applicant has succeeded in demonstrating that the agreement to transfer rights is not based on effective competition, in the context of identical operations carried out by independent entities. The studies presented by the challenger do not succeed in overturning this assertion, since, as is clear from the evidence (12), they relate to operations and market segments other than the one at issue in the case. The provision for the payment of royalties for the transfer of the brands, together with the unpaid provision of management and promotion services for the brands in question by the applicant, prove that there has been a situation that deviates from full competition, with the allocation of income in a tax jurisdiction other than the State of source, without any apparent justification. The application of the profit splitting method (Article 9 of Ministerial Order 1446-C/2001 of 21 December 2001) does not deserve censure. Intangible assets are at stake, so invoking the comparability of transactions, in cases such as the present one, does not make it possible to understand the relationships established between the companies involved. It should also be noted that the Polish company receiving the royalties has minimal staff costs, and that brand amortisation costs account for 97.72% of its operating costs. As a result, the obligations arising for the defendant from the licence agreement in question are unjustified. In view of the demonstration of the deviation from the terms of an arm’s length transaction, it can be seen that the taxpayer’s declaratory obligations (articles 13 to 16 of Ministerial Order 1446-C/2001, of 21.12.200) have not been complied with, as there is a lack of elements that would justify the necessary adjustment. Therefore, the correction under examination does not deserve to be repaired and should be confirmed in the legal order. By ruling differently, the judgement under appeal was an error of judgement and should therefore be replaced by a decision dismissing the challenge.” Click here for English translation. Click here for other translation ...

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has released a new draft of Compliance Guidelines on Intangible Arrangements, PCG 2023/D2. When finalised, the guidelines will set out the ATO’s compliance approach to the development, use and transfer of intangible assets. The guidelines focus on tax risks associated with the potential application of the transfer pricing provisions, withholding tax provisions, capital gains tax (CGT), capital allowances, the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) and the diverted profits tax (DPT). Examples of high-risk intangibles arrangements under the draft guidelines include centralisation of intangible assets bifurcation (separation) of intangible assets non-recognition of local intangible assets and DEMPE activities migration of pre-commercialised intangible assets (HTVI) transfer of intangibles assets to a foreign hybrid entity ...

(i) Facts. The year 1 facts are the same as in Example 3. In year 2, FP and USSub enter into a separate services agreement that obligates FP to perform incremental marketing activities, not specified in the year 1 license, by advertising AA trademarked athletic gear in selected international sporting events, such as the Olympics and the soccer World Cup. FP’s corporate advertising department develops and coordinates these special promotions. The separate services agreement obligates USSub to pay an amount to FP for the benefit to USSub that may reasonably be anticipated as the result of FP’s incremental activities. The separate services agreement is not a qualified cost sharing arrangement under § 1.482-7T. FP begins to perform the incremental activities in year 2 pursuant to the separate services agreement. (ii) Whether an allocation is warranted with respect to the incremental marketing activities performed by FP under the separate services agreement would be evaluated under § 1.482-9. Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to anticipate that FP’s activities would increase the value of USSub’s license as well as the value of FP’s trademark. Accordingly, the incremental activities by FP may constitute in part a controlled services transaction for which USSub must compensate FP. The analysis of whether an allocation is warranted would include a comparison of the compensation provided for the services with the results obtained under a method pursuant to § 1.482-9, selected and applied in accordance with the best method rule of § 1.482-1(c). (iii) Whether an allocation is appropriate with respect to the royalty under the license agreement would be evaluated under §§ 1.482-1 through 1.482-3, this section, and §§ 1.482-5 and 1.482-6. The comparability analysis would include consideration of all relevant factors, such as the term and geographical exclusivity of USSub’s license, the nature of the intangible property subject to the license, and the marketing activities required to be undertaken by both FP and USSub pursuant to the license. This comparability analysis would take into account that the compensation for the incremental activities performed by FP was provided for in the separate services agreement, rather than embedded in the royalty paid for use of the AA trademark. For illustrations of application of the best method rule, see § 1.482-8, Example 10, Example 11, and Example 12 ...

(i) Facts. The year 1 facts are the same as in Example 3. In year 2, FP and USSub enter into a separate services agreement that obligates USSub to perform certain incremental marketing activities to promote AA trademark athletic gear in the United States, above and beyond the activities specified in the license agreement executed in year 1. In year 2, USSub begins to perform these incremental activities, pursuant to the separate services agreement with FP. (ii) Whether an allocation is warranted with respect to USSub’s incremental marketing activities covered by the separate services agreement would be evaluated under §§ 1.482-1 and 1.482-9, including a comparison of the compensation provided for the services with the results obtained under a method pursuant to § 1.482-9, selected and applied in accordance with the best method rule of § 1.482-1(c). (iii) Whether an allocation is warranted with respect to the royalty under the license agreement is determined under § 1.482-1, and this section through § 1.482-6. The comparability analysis would include consideration of all relevant factors, such as the term and geographical exclusivity of the license, the nature of the intangible property subject to the license, and the nature of the marketing activities required to be undertaken pursuant to the license. The comparability analysis would take into account that the compensation for the incremental activities by USSub is provided for in the separate services agreement, rather than embedded in the royalty paid for use of the AA trademark. For illustrations of application of the best method rule, see § 1.482-8 Examples 10, 11, and 12 ...

(i) Facts. The year 1 facts are the same as in Example 3, with the following exceptions. In year 2, USSub undertakes certain incremental marketing activities in addition to those required by the contractual terms of the license for the AA trademark executed in year 1. The parties do not execute a separate agreement with respect to these incremental marketing activities performed by USSub. The license agreement executed in year 1 is of sufficient duration that it is reasonable to anticipate that USSub will obtain the benefit of its incremental activities, in the form of increased sales or revenues of trademarked products in the U.S. market. (ii) To the extent that it was reasonable to anticipate that USSub’s incremental marketing activities would increase the value only of USSub’s intangible property (that is, USSub’s license to use the AA trademark for a specified term), and not the value of the AA trademark owned by FP, USSub’s incremental activities do not constitute a contribution for which an allocation is warranted under paragraph (f)(4)(i) of this section ...

(i) Facts. FP, a foreign producer of athletic gear, is the registered holder of the AA trademark in the United States and in other countries. In year 1, FP licenses to a newly organized U.S. subsidiary, USSub, the exclusive rights to use certain manufacturing and marketing intangible property to manufacture and market athletic gear in the United States under the AA trademark. The license agreement obligates USSub to pay a royalty based on sales of trademarked merchandise. The license agreement also obligates FP and USSub to perform without separate compensation specified types and levels of marketing activities. In year 1, USSub manufactures and sells athletic gear under the AA trademark in the United States. (ii) The consideration for FP’s and USSub’s respective marketing activities is embedded in the contractual terms of the license for the AA trademark. Accordingly, pursuant to paragraph (f)(4)(i) of this section, ordinarily no separate allocation would be appropriate with respect to the embedded contributions in year 1. See § 1.482-9(m)(4). (iii) Whether an allocation is warranted with respect to the royalty under the license agreement would be analyzed under § 1.482-1, and this section through § 1.482-6. The comparability analysis would include consideration of all relevant factors, such as the term and geographical exclusivity of the license, the nature of the intangible property subject to the license, and the nature of the marketing activities required to be undertaken pursuant to the license. Pursuant to paragraph (f)(4)(i) of this section, the analysis would also take into account the fact that the compensation for the marketing services is embedded in the royalty paid for use of the AA trademark, rather than provided for in a separate services agreement. For illustrations of application of the best method rule, see § 1.482-8 Examples 10, 11, and 12 ...

(i) Facts. FP, a foreign producer of wristwatches, is the registered holder of the YY trademark in the United States and in other countries worldwide. FP enters into an exclusive, five-year, renewable agreement with its newly organized U.S. subsidiary, USSub. The contractual terms of the agreement grant USSub the exclusive right to re-sell YY trademark wristwatches in the United States, obligate USSub to pay a fixed price per wristwatch throughout the entire term of the contract, and obligate both FP and USSub to undertake without separate compensation specified types and levels of marketing activities. (ii) The consideration for FP’s and USSub’s marketing activities, as well as the consideration for the exclusive right to re-sell YY trademarked merchandise in the United States, are embedded in the transfer price paid for the wristwatches. Accordingly, pursuant to paragraph (f)(4)(i) of this section, ordinarily no separate allocation would be appropriate with respect to these embedded contributions. (iii) Whether an allocation is warranted with respect to the transfer price for the wristwatches is determined under §§ 1.482-1, 1.482-3, and this section through § 1.482-6. The comparability analysis would include consideration of all relevant factors, including the nature of the intangible property embedded in the wristwatches and the nature of the marketing activities required under the agreement. This analysis would also take into account that the compensation for the activities performed by USSub and FP, as well as the consideration for USSub’s use of the YY trademark, is embedded in the transfer price for the wristwatches, rather than provided for in separate agreements. See §§ 1.482-3(f) and 1.482-9(m)(4) ...

A, a member of a controlled group, allows B, another member of the controlled group, to use tangible property, such as laboratory equipment, in connection with B’s development of an intangible that B owns. By furnishing tangible property, A makes a contribution to the development of intangible property owned by another controlled taxpayer, B. Pursuant to paragraph (f)(4)(i) of this section, the arm’s length charge for A’s furnishing of tangible property will be determined under the rules for use of tangible property in § 1.482-2(c) ...

The principles of this paragraph (f)(4) are illustrated by the following examples: ...

The arm’s length consideration for a contribution by one controlled taxpayer that develops or enhances the value, or may be reasonably anticipated to develop or enhance the value, of intangible property owned by another controlled taxpayer will be determined in accordance with the applicable rules under section 482. If the consideration for such a contribution is embedded within the contractual terms for a controlled transaction that involves such intangible property, then ordinarily no separate allocation will be made with respect to such contribution. In such cases, pursuant to § 1.482-1(d)(3), the contribution must be accounted for in evaluating the comparability of the controlled transaction to uncontrolled comparables, and accordingly in determining the arm’s length consideration in the controlled transaction ...

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On 5 July 2022, the Federal Ministry of Finance in Germany published draft legislation regarding application of the arm’s length principle to cross-border relocation of functions. According to the general provisions A function is a business activity that consists of a grouping of similar operational tasks performed by specific units or departments of an enterprise. It is an organic part of an enterprise, without the need for a sub-operation in the tax sense. A transfer of functions within the meaning of section 1(3b) of the Foreign Tax Act occurs if a function, including the associated opportunities and risks as well as any assets or other benefits that may have been transferred or left along with it, is transferred or left in whole or in part so that the acquiring company can perform this function or expand an existing function. The function transferred as a whole in accordance with sentence 1 constitutes the transfer package. Business transactions that are realised within five business years shall be combined as a single transfer of function at the time when the requirements of sentence 1 are economically fulfilled by their joint realisation. In cases of transfer of functions, intangible assets are essential within the meaning of section 1(3b) sentence 2 of the Foreign Tax Act if they are necessary for the transferred function and their arm’s length price amounts in total to more than 25 per cent of the sum of the individual prices of all assets and other benefits of the transfer package and this is credible, taking into account the effects of the transfer of function, which are evident from the records within the meaning of section 2 sentence 2. If an acquiring enterprise independently provides the services previously provided exclusively to the transferring enterprise, in whole or in part, to other enterprises at prices which are higher than the remuneration according to the cost-plus method or which are to be set higher in accordance with the arm’s length principle, a remuneration in accordance with 2 shall be charged to the other enterprises at the time of the first provision for assets and other advantages previously provided free of charge by the transferring enterprise for the provision of services; the assets or other benefits in question shall be deemed to be a transfer package, provided that the other requirements for this are met. A transfer of functions within the meaning of paragraph 2 shall not be deemed to have taken place if there is no restriction on the exercise of the function in question at the transferring company within five years of the assumption of the function by the acquiring company, although the other requirements of paragraph 2, sentence 1 are met (duplication of functions). If such a restriction occurs within this period, a transfer of functions shall be deemed to have taken place at the time when the restriction occurs, unless the taxpayer proves that this restriction is not directly related to the duplication of functions. The legislation will apply retrospectively to covered transactions after 31 December 2021. Click here for unofficial English translation Click here for other translation ...

Ferragamo France, which was set up in 1992 and is wholly owned by the Dutch company Ferragamo International BV, which in turn is owned by the Italian company Salvatore Ferragamo Spa, carries on the business of retailing shoes, leather goods and luxury accessories and distributes, in shops in France, products under the ‘Salvatore Ferragamo’ brand, which is owned by the Italian parent company. An assessment had been issued to Ferragamo France in which the French tax authorities asserted that the French subsidiary had not been sufficiently remunerated for additional expenses and contributions to the value of the Ferragamo trademark. The French subsidiary had been remunerated on a gross margin basis, but had incurred losses in previous years and had indirect cost exceeding those of the selected comparable companies. In 2017 the Administrative Court decided in favour of Ferragamo and dismissed the assessment issued by the tax authorities. According to the Court the tax administration had not demonstrated the existence of an advantage granted by Ferragamo France to the Italien parent, Salvatore Ferragamo SPA, nor the amount of this advantage. This decision was later upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal. An appel was then filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court (Conseil d’Etat) overturned the decision and remanded the case back to the Administrative Court of Appeal for further considerations. “In ruling that the administration did not establish the existence of an advantage granted to the Italian company on the grounds that the French company’s results for the financial years ending from 2010 to 2015 had been profitable without any change in the company’s transfer pricing policy, whereas it had noted that the exposure of additional charges of wages and rents in comparison with independent companies was intended to increase, in a strategic market in the luxury sector, the value of the Italian brand which did not yet have the same notoriety as its direct competitors, the administrative court of appeal erred in law. Moreover, although it emerged from the documents in the file submitted to the trial judges that the tax authorities had established the existence of a practice falling within the provisions of Article 57 of the General Tax Code, by showing that the remuneration granted by the Italian company was not sufficient to cover the additional expenses which contributed to the value of the Salvatore Ferragamo trade mark incurred by the French subsidiary and by arguing that the latter had been continuously loss-making since at least 1996 until 2009, the court distorted the facts and documents in the file. By dismissing, under these conditions, the existence of an indirect transfer of profits to be reintegrated into its taxable income when the company did not establish, by merely claiming a profitable situation between 2010 and 2015, that it had received a consideration for the advantage in question, the court incorrectly qualified the facts of the case.” Judgement of the Administrative Court of Appeal The Administrative Court of Appeal issued a final decision in June 2022 in which the 2017 decision of the Paris Administrative Court was annulled and the tax assessment issued by the tax authorities reinstated. “Firstly, Ferragamo France argued that the companies included in the above-mentioned panel were not comparable, since most of their activities were carried out in the provinces, whereas its activity was concentrated in international tourist areas, mainly in Paris, and their workforce was less than ten employees, whereas it employed 68 people, that they are mere distributors whereas it also manages a network of boutiques and concessions in department stores, and that some of them own their premises whereas it rents its premises for amounts much higher than the rents in the provinces, the relationship between external charges and turnover thus being irrelevant. However, most of the comparables selected by the administration, which operate as multi-brand distributors in the luxury ready-to-wear sector, were proposed by Ferragamo France itself. Moreover, the company does not indicate the adjustments that should be made to the various ratios of salary and external costs used to obtain a result that it considers more satisfactory, even though it has been established that additional costs in the area of salaries and property constitute an advantage granted to Salvatore Ferragamo Spa. Furthermore, apart from the fact that it has not been established that some of the companies on the panel own their premises, Ferragamo France does not allege that excluding the companies in question from the calculation of the ratios would result in a reduction in the amount of the adjustments. Lastly, as regards the insufficient consideration of the management of a network of department stores’ boutiques and concessions, Ferragamo France does not provide any specific information in support of its allegations, whereas the comparison made by the administration is intended to assess the normality of the remuneration of its retail activity.” … It follows from all of the above that the Minister of the Economy, Finance and Recovery is entitled to argue that it was wrong for the Administrative Court of Paris, in the judgment under appeal, to discharge, in terms of duties and increases, the supplementary corporate tax assessment to which Ferragamo France was subject in respect of the financial year ended in 2010, of the withholding tax charged to it for 2009 and 2010 and of the supplementary minimum business tax and business value added contribution charged to it for 2009 and 2010 respectively. This judgment must therefore be annulled and the aforementioned taxes, in duties and increases, must be remitted to Ferragamo France.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

“Fertilizer Licence SA” (“A”) transferred its trademarks to “B” in 2013, previously financed the transfer through a cash contribution, and then, following the transfer, paid royalties to “A” in exchange for the ability to use the assets. According to the tax authorities, a situation where an entity transfers its assets to another entity, finances the transfer and then pays for access to use those assets does not reflect the conditions that unrelated parties would establish. An unrelated party, in order to obtain such licence fees from another unrelated party, would first have to incur the costs of manufacturing or acquiring the trademarks and to finance these costs itself without the involvement of the licensee. An independent entity which has finances the creation or purchase of an intangible asset, should not incur further costs for the use of that asset. Furthermore, in determining the licence fee to “B” for the use of trademarks, “A” relied on formal legal ownership, granting “B” a share in the revenues generated by “A” despite the fact that “B” did not take any part in the creation of these revenues. As a result, almost all the profits of “A” were transferred as royalties to company “B”. According to the authority, such an approach is inconsistent with the arm’s length principle. The remuneration of “B” (the legal owner of trademarks) did not take into account the functions performed by entities in creating the value of trademarks nor the risks and assets involved in the creation. The authority concluded that “B” was not entitled to share in the profit of “A”, because “B” was only the legal owner of internally created trademarks in the group and performed no significant DEMPE functions, had not used significant assets nor borne significant risks. This role of “B” entitled only to reimbursement of the costs incurred for the registration and legal protection of trademarks added a arm’s length margin for this type of services. As a result of the findings, the authority of first instance concluded that “A” had overstated tax deductible costs in connection with the disclosure of trademark licence fees as costs. “A” had reported income lower than it would have expected if the above-mentioned relationships had not existed. In the opinion of the authority of the second instance, an independent entity would not have entered, on the terms and conditions set by the company and its affiliates, into transactions leading to the divestment of ownership of valuable assets necessary for its operations, additionally financing their acquisition by another company, taking up shares in return with a nominal value significantly lower than the value of the lost assets (subsequently not receiving any dividends therefrom), and additionally being forced to incur additional costs as a result of the need to pay licence fees for the use of the trademarks held earlier. An appeal was filed by “A”. Judgement of the Court Excerpts “What is important in the case, however, is the conclusion of the authorities that in fact the legal relationship justifying the incurrence of expenses recognised as tax deductible costs is a contract for the provision of services consisting only in the administration of trademarks. The Court notes, however, that this conclusion is in conflict with the position of the authorities, which did not question the validity of the legal transactions resulting in the transfer of the rights to the trade marks to company ‘B’ and thus to another entity. As the applicant rightly submits, it cannot be disregarded in this case that the applicant was not the owner of the trade marks but acquired the right to use them on the basis of a licence agreement, for which it should pay remuneration to company ‘B’ (page […] of the application). In principle, the authorities did not present any arguments showing which interpretation rules they applied to reach the conclusion that this manner of applying the abovementioned provisions is legally possible and justified in the present case. It should be pointed out here that Article 11(1) in fine speaks of the determination of income and tax due without – ‘[…] taking into account the conditions resulting from the link …’, but does not permit the substitution of one legal transaction (a licence agreement) for another (an agreement for the provision of administration services) and the derivation of legal effects from the latter in terms of determining the amount of the tax liability. As the applicant rightly argued, such a possibility exists from 1 January 2019, since Article 11c(4) uses the expression- “[…] without taking into account the controlled transaction, and where it is justified, it determines the income (loss) of the taxpayer from the transaction relevant to the controlled transaction”. This is the so-called recharacterisation, i.e. reclassification of transactions, which was actually done by the tax authorities in this case. The company’s claims that the transfer of the trade mark into a separate entity was motivated by a desire to increase the company’s recognition and creditworthiness, which was a normal practice for business entities at the time, are unconvincing. On that point, it should be noted that, operating under the GKO with the same name, the applicant’s recognition and the name under which it operated were already sufficiently well established. As regards the increase in the creditworthiness or market power of the users of the trade mark, the applicant’s contentions on this point too are empty. Moreover, even if it were to be accepted, at least in the context of the activities of ‘A’, that the creditworthiness of ‘A’ had been increased, the advantage which the applicant derives from such an operation would appear to be of little significance. In fact, it obtained this benefit to a significant extent from the formation of relations with “A”, as a result of which the value of its income taxable income, and thus its tax liability in 2015, was significantly reduced. The benefits, mainly tax ones, are also indirectly pointed out by the applicant herself, indicating, inter alia, that there were no grounds ...

Following a business restructuring, rights in a trademark developed and used by O.B SA was transferred to a related party “A”. The newly established company A had no employees and all functions in the company was performed by O.B. SA. Anyhow, going forward O.B SA would now pay a license fee to A for using the trademark. The payments from O.B SA were the only source of income for “A” (apart from interest). According to the O.B. group placement of the trademark into a separate entity was motivated by a desire to increase recognition and creditworthiness of the group, which was a normal practice for business entities at the time. In 2014 and 2015 O.B. SA deducted license fees paid to A of PLN 6 647 596.19 and PLN 7 206 578.24. The tax authorities opened an audited of O.B. SA and determined that the license fees paid to A were excessive. To establish an arm’s length remuneration of A the tax authorities applied the TNMM method with ROTC as PLI. The market range of costs to profits for similar activities was between 2.78% and 19.55%. For the estimation of income attributable to “A”, the upper quartile, i.e. 19.55 %, was used. The arm’s length remuneration of A in 2014 and 2015 was determined to be PLN 158,888.53 and PLN 111,609.73. On that basis the tax authorities concluded that O.B. SA had overstated its costs in 2014 and 2015 by a total amount of PLN 13 583 676.17 and an assessment of additional taxable income was issued. A complaint was filed by O.B. SA. Judgement of the Court The Court dismissed the complaint of OB SA and upheld the decision of the tax authorities Excerpts “….the dependence of “A” on the applicant cannot be in any doubt. Nor can it be disputed that the abovementioned dependence – the relationship between ‘A’ and the applicant as described above – influenced the terms agreed between the parties to the licence agreement. Invoices issued by “A” to the company for this purpose amounted to multi-million amounts, and all this took place in conditions in which “A” did not employ any workers, and performed only uncomplicated administrative activities related to monitoring of possible use of the trademark by other, unauthorised entities. All this took place in conditions in which licence fees were, in principle, the main and only source of revenue for “A” (apart from interest), while the trade mark itself in fact originated from the applicant. It was also to it that the mark eventually came in 2017, after the incorporation of “A”. The company’s claims that the hive-off of the trade mark into a separate entity was motivated by a desire to increase the company’s recognition and creditworthiness, which was a normal practice for business entities at the time, are unconvincing. On that point, it should be noted that, operating under the GKO with the same name, the applicant’s recognition and the name under which it operated were already sufficiently well established. As regards the increase in the creditworthiness or market power of the users of the trade mark, the applicant’s contentions on this point too are empty. Moreover, even if it were to be accepted, at least in the context of the activities of ‘A’, that the creditworthiness of ‘A’ had been increased, the advantage which the applicant derives from such an operation would appear to be of little significance. In fact, it obtained this benefit to a significant extent from the formation of relations with “A”, as a result of which the value of its income taxable income, and thus its tax liability in 2015, was significantly reduced. The benefits, mainly tax ones, are also indirectly pointed out by the applicant herself, indicating, inter alia, that there were no grounds for the authorities to question the tax optimisations, prior to 15 July 2016. This only confirms the position of the authority in the discussed scope.” “The authority carefully selected appropriate comparative material, relying on reliable data concerning a similar category of entrepreneurs. Contrary to the applicant’s submissions, the authority analysed the terms and conditions of the cooperation between the applicant and ‘A’ when it embarked on the analysis of the appropriate estimation method in the circumstances of the case. In doing so, it took into account both the specific subject-matter of the cooperation and the overall context of the cooperation between the two entities. As for the method itself, the authority correctly found that “A” carried out simple administrative activities, and therefore took into account the general costs of management performed by this entity. In this respect it should be noted that the Head of the Customs and Tax Office accepted the maximum calculated indicator of transaction margin amounting to 19.55%. The applied method, which should be emphasised, is an estimation method, which allows only for obtaining approximate values by means of it. Moreover, it is based on comparative data obtained independently of the circumstances of the case, therefore it is not possible to adjust the results obtained on the basis of its principles by the costs of depreciation, as suggested by the applicant, alleging, inter alia, that § 18(1) of the Regulation was infringed by the authority. Moreover, the costs of depreciation of the trade mark by ‘A’ related strictly to its business and therefore did not affect its relations with the applicant. The company also unjustifiably alleges that the authority breached Article 23(3) of the Regulation by failing to take account of the economic reasons for the restructuring of its business in the context of the GKO’s general principles of operation. For, as already noted above, there is no rational basis for accepting the legitimacy of carrying out such restructuring, both in 2015 and thereafter. And the fact of the return of the trademark right to the Applicant only supports this kind of conclusion. Nor can there be any doubt as to the availability to the applicant, in 2015, of an adequate range of data relating to aspects ...

73. Första is a consumer goods company organised and operating in country A. Prior to Year 1, Första produces Product Y in country A and sells it through affiliated distribution companies in many countries around the world. Product Y is well recognised and attracts a premium compared to its competitors, to which Första is entitled as the legal owner and developer of the trademark and related goodwill giving rise to that premium. 74. In Year 2, Första organises Company S, a wholly owned subsidiary, in country B. Company S acts as a super distributor and invoicing centre. Första continues to ship Product Y directly to its distribution affiliates, but title to the products passes to Company S, which reinvoices the distribution affiliates for the products. 75. Beginning in Year 2, Company S undertakes to reimburse the distribution affiliates for a portion of their advertising costs. Prices for Product Y from Company S to the distribution affiliates are adjusted upward so that the distribution affiliate operating profit margins remain constant notwithstanding the shift of advertising cost to Company S. Assume that the operating profit margins earned by the distribution affiliates are arm’s length both before and after Year 2 given the concurrent changes in product pricing and the reimbursement of advertising costs. Company S performs no functions with regard to advertising nor does it control any risk related to marketing the products. 76. In Year 3, the prices charged by Första to Company S are reduced. Första and Company S claim such a reduction in price is justified because Company S is now entitled to income related to intangibles. It asserts that such income is attributable to intangibles in respect of Product Y created through the advertising costs it has borne. 77. In substance, Company S has no claim to income derived from the exploitation of intangibles with respect to Product Y. It performs no functions, assumes no risk, and in substance bears no costs related to the development, enhancement, maintenance or protection of intangibles. Transfer pricing adjustments to increase the income of Första in Year 3 and thereafter would be appropriate ...

49. Shuyona is the parent company of an MNE group. Shuyona is organised in and operates exclusively in country X. The Shuyona group is involved in the production and sale of consumer goods. In order to maintain and, if possible, improve its market position, ongoing research is carried out by the Shuyona group to improve existing products and develop new products. The Shuyona group maintains two R&D centres, one operated by Shuyona in country X, and the other operated by Company S, a subsidiary of Shuyona, operating in country Y. 50. The Shuyona group sells two lines of products. All R&D with respect to product line A is conducted by Shuyona. All R&D with respect to product line B is conducted by the R&D centre operated by Company S. Company S also functions as the regional headquarters of the Shuyona group in North America and has global responsibility for the operation of the business relating to product line B. However, all patents developed through Company S research efforts are registered by Shuyona. Shuyona makes no or only a nominal payment to Company S in relation to the patentable inventions developed by the Company S R&D centre. 51. The Shuyona and Company S R&D centres operate autonomously. Each bears its own operating costs. Under the general policy direction of Shuyona senior management, the Company S R&D centre develops its own research programmes, establishes its own budgets, makes determinations as to when R&D projects should be terminated or modified, and hires its own R&D staff. The Company S R&D centre reports to the product line B management team in Company S, and does not report to the Shuyona R&D centre. Joint meetings between the Shuyona and Company S R&D teams are sometimes held to discuss research methods and common issues. 52. The transfer pricing analysis of this fact pattern would begin by recognising that Shuyona is the legal owner/registrant of intangibles developed by Company S. Unlike the situation in Example 14, however, Shuyona neither performs nor exercises control over the research functions carried out by Company S, including the important functions related to management, design, budgeting and funding that research. Accordingly, Shuyona’s legal ownership of the intangibles does not entitle it to retain or be attributed any income related to the product line B intangibles. Tax administrations could arrive at an appropriate transfer pricing outcome by recognising Shuyona’s legal ownership of the intangibles but by noting that, because of the contributions of Company S in the form of functions, assets, and risks, appropriate compensation to Company S for its contributions could be ensured by confirming that Company S should make no royalty or other payment to Shuyona for the right to use any successfully developed Company S intangibles, so that the future income derived from the exploitation of those intangibles by Company S would be allocated to Company S and not to Shuyona. 53. If Shuyona exploits the product line B intangibles by itself, Shuyona should provide appropriate compensation to Company S for its functions performed, assets used and risks assumed related to intangible development. In determining the appropriate level of compensation for Company S, the fact that Company S performs all of the important functions related to intangible development would likely make it inappropriate to treat Company S as the tested party in an R&D service arrangement ...

46. Shuyona is the parent company of an MNE group. Shuyona is organised in and operates in country X. The Shuyona group is involved in the production and sale of consumer goods. In order to maintain and, if possible, improve its market position, ongoing research is carried out by the Shuyona group to improve existing products and develop new products. The Shuyona group maintains two R&D centres, one operated by Shuyona in country X and the other operated by Company S, a subsidiary of Shuyona operating in country Y. The Shuyona R&D centre is responsible for the overall research programme of Shuyona group. The Shuyona R&D centre designs research programmes, develops and controls budgets, makes decisions as to where R&D activities will be conducted, monitors the progress on all R&D projects and, in general, controls the R&D function for the MNE group, operating under strategic direction of Shuyona group senior management. 47. The Company S R&D centre operates on a separate project by project basis to carry out specific projects assigned by the Shuyona R&D centre. Suggestions of Company S R&D personnel for modifications to the research programme are required to be formally approved by the Shuyona R&D centre. The Company S R&D centre reports on its progress on at least a monthly basis to supervisory personnel at the Shuyona R&D centre. If Company S exceeds budgets established by Shuyona for its work, approval of Shuyona R&D management must be sought for further expenditures. Contracts between the Shuyona R&D centre and the Company S R&D centre specify that Shuyona will bear all risks and costs related to R&D undertaken by Company S. All patents, designs and other intangibles developed by Company S research personnel are registered by Shuyona, pursuant to contracts between the two companies. Shuyona pays Company S a service fee for its research and development activities. 48. The transfer pricing analysis of these facts would begin by recognising that Shuyona is the legal owner of the intangibles. Shuyona controls and manages both its own R&D work and that of Company S. It performs the important functions related to that work such as budgeting, establishing research programmes, designing projects and funding and controlling expenditures. Under these circumstances, Shuyona is entitled to returns derived from the exploitation of the intangibles developed through the R&D efforts of Company S. Company S is entitled to compensation for its functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed. In determining the amount of compensation due Company S, the relative skill and efficiency of the Company S R&D personnel, the nature of the research being undertaken, and other factors contributing to value should be considered as comparability factors. To the extent transfer pricing adjustments are required to reflect the amount a comparable R&D service provider would be paid for its services, such adjustments would generally relate to the year the service is provided and would not affect the entitlement of Shuyona to future returns derived from exploiting intangibles derived from the Company S R&D activities ...

30. The facts in this example are the same as in Example 9, except that the market development functions undertaken by Company S in this Example 10 are far more extensive than those undertaken by Company S in Example 9. 31. Where the marketer/distributor actually bears the costs and assumes the risks of its marketing activities, the issue is the extent to which the marketer/distributor can share in the potential benefits from those activities. A thorough comparability analysis identifies several uncontrolled companies engaged in marketing and distribution functions under similar long-term marketing and distribution arrangements. Assume, however, that the level of marketing expense Company S incurred in Years 1 through 5 far exceeds that incurred by the identified comparable independent marketers and distributors. Assume further that the high level of expense incurred by Company S reflects its performance of additional or more intensive functions than those performed by the potential comparables and that Primair and Company S expect those additional functions to generate higher margins or increased sales volume for the products. Given the extent of the market development activities undertaken by Company S, it is evident that Company S has made a larger functional contribution to development of the market and the marketing intangibles and has assumed significantly greater costs and assumed greater risks than the identified potentially comparable independent enterprises (and substantially higher costs and risks than in Example 9). There is also evidence to support the conclusion that the profits realised by Company S are significantly lower than the profit margins of the identified potentially comparable independent marketers and distributors during the corresponding years of similar long-term marketing and distribution agreements. 32. As in Example 9, Company S bears the costs and associated risks of its marketing activities under a long-term contract of exclusive marketing and distribution rights for the R watches, and therefore expects to have an opportunity to benefit (or suffer a loss) from the marketing and distribution activities it undertakes. However, in this case Company S has performed functions and borne marketing expenditures beyond what independent enterprises in potentially comparable transactions with similar rights incur for their own benefit, resulting in significantly lower profit margins for Company S than are made by such enterprises. 33. Based on these facts, it is evident that by performing functions and incurring marketing expenditure substantially in excess of the levels of function and expenditure of independent marketer/distributors in comparable transactions, Company S has not been adequately compensated by the margins it earns on the resale of R watches. Under such circumstances it would be appropriate for the country Y tax administration to propose a transfer pricing adjustment based on compensating Company S for the marketing activities performed (taking account of the risks assumed and the expenditure incurred) on a basis that is consistent with what independent enterprises would have earned in comparable transactions. Depending on the facts and circumstances reflected in a detailed comparability analysis, such an adjustment could be based on: Reducing the price paid by Company S for the R brand watches purchased from Primair. Such an adjustment could be based on applying a resale price method or transactional net margin method using available data about profits made by comparable marketers and distributors with a comparable level of marketing and distribution expenditure if such comparables can be identified. An alternative approach might apply a residual profit split method that would split the relevant profits from sales of R branded watches in country Y by first giving Company S and Primair a basic return for the functions they perform and then splitting the residual profit on a basis that takes into account the relative contributions of both Company S and Primair to the generation of income and the value of the R trademark and trade name. Directly compensating Company S for the excess marketing expenditure it has incurred over and above that incurred by comparable independent enterprises including an appropriate profit element for the functions and risks reflected by those expenditures. 34. In this example, the proposed adjustment is based on Company S’s having performed functions, assumed risks, and incurred costs that contributed to the development of the marketing intangibles for which it was not adequately compensated under its arrangement with Primair. If the arrangements between Company S and Primair were such that Company S could expect to obtain an arm’s length return on its additional investment during the remaining term of the distribution agreement, a different outcome could be appropriate ...

14. In Year 1, a multinational group comprised of Company A (a country A corporation) and Company B (a country B corporation) decides to develop an intangible, which is anticipated to be highly profitable based on Company B’s existing intangibles, its track record and its experienced research and development staff. The intangible is expected to take five years to develop before possible commercial exploitation. If successfully developed, the intangible is anticipated to have value for ten years after initial exploitation. Under the development agreement between Company A and Company B, Company B will perform and control all activities related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangible. Company A will provide all funding associated with the development of the intangible (the development costs are anticipated to be USD 100 million per year for five years), and will become the legal owner of the intangible. Once developed, the intangible is anticipated to result in profits of USD 550 million per year (years 6 to 15). Company B will license the intangible from Company A and make contingent payments to Company A for the right to use the intangible, based on returns of purportedly comparable licensees. After the projected contingent payments, Company B will be left with an anticipated return of USD 200 million per year from selling products based on the intangible. 15. A functional analysis by the country B tax administration of the arrangement assesses the functions performed, assets used and contributed, and risks assumed by Company A and by Company B. The analysis through which the actual transaction is delineated concludes that although Company A is the legal owner of the intangibles, its contribution to the arrangement is solely the provision of funding for the development of an intangible. This analysis shows that Company A contractually assumes the financial risk, has the financial capacity to assume that risk, and exercises control over that risk in accordance with the principles outlined in paragraphs 6.63 and 6.64. Taking into account Company A’s contributions, as well as the realistic alternatives of Company A and Company B, it is determined that Company A’s anticipated remuneration should be a risk-adjusted return on its funding commitment. Assume that this is determined to be USD 110 million per year (for Years 6 to 15), which equates to an 11% risk-adjusted anticipated financial return.1 Company B, accordingly, would be entitled to all remaining anticipated income after accounting for Company A’s anticipated return, or USD 440 million per year (USD 550 million minus USD 110 million), rather than USD 200 million per year as claimed by the taxpayer. (Based on the detailed functional analysis and application of the most appropriate method, the taxpayer incorrectly chose Company B as the tested party rather than Company A) ...

5. The facts related to the development and control of patentable inventions are the same as in Example 1. However, instead of granting a perpetual and exclusive licence of its patents back to Premiere, Company S, acting under the direction and control of Premiere, grants licences of its patents to associated and independent enterprises throughout the world in exchange for periodic royalties. For purposes of this example, it is assumed that the royalties paid to Company S by associated enterprises are all arm’s length. 6. Company S is the legal owner of the patents. However, its contributions to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the patents are limited to the activities of its three employees in registering the patents and maintaining the patent registrations. The Company S employees do not control or participate in the licensing transactions involving the patents. Under these circumstances, Company S is only entitled to compensation for the functions it performs. Based on an analysis of the respective functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed by Premiere and Company S in developing, enhancing, maintaining, protecting, and exploiting the intangibles, Company S should not be entitled ultimately to retain or be attributed income from its licensing arrangements over and above the arm’s length compensation for its patent registration functions. 7. As in Example 1 the true nature of the arrangement is a patent administration service contract. The appropriate transfer pricing outcome can be achieved by ensuring that the amount paid by Company S in exchange for the assignments of patent rights appropriately reflects the respective functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed by Premiere and by Company S. Under such an approach, the compensation due to Premiere for the patentable inventions is equal to the licensing revenue of Company S less an appropriate return to the functions Company S performs ...

1. Premiere is the parent company of an MNE group. Company S is a wholly owned subsidiary of Premiere and a member of the Premiere group. Premiere funds R&D and performs ongoing R&D functions in support of its business operations. When its R&D functions result in patentable inventions, it is the practice of the Premiere group that all rights in such inventions be assigned to Company S in order to centralise and simplify global patent administration. All patent registrations are held and maintained in the name of Company S. 2. Company S employs three lawyers to perform its patent administration work and has no other employees. Company S does not conduct or control any of the R&D activities of the Premiere group. Company S has no technical R&D personnel, nor does it incur any of the Premiere group’s R&D expense. Key decisions related to defending the patents are made by Premiere management, after taking advice from employees of Company S. Premiere’s management, and not the employees of Company S, controls all decisions regarding licensing of the group’s patents to both independent and associated enterprises. 3. At the time of each assignment of rights from Premiere to Company S, Company S makes a nominal EUR 100 payment to Premiere in consideration of the assignment of rights to a patentable invention and, as a specific condition of the assignment, simultaneously grants to Premiere an exclusive, royalty free, patent licence, with full rights to sub-licence, for the full life of the patent to be registered. The nominal payments of Company S to Premiere are made purely to satisfy technical contract law requirements related to the assignments and, for purposes of this example, it is assumed that they do not reflect arm’s length compensation for the assigned rights to patentable inventions. Premiere uses the patented inventions in manufacturing and selling its products throughout the world and from time to time sublicenses patent rights to others. Company S makes no commercial use of the patents nor is it entitled to do so under the terms of the licence agreement with Premiere. 4. Under the agreement, Premiere performs all functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangibles except for patent administration services. Premiere contributes and uses all assets associated with the development and exploitation of the intangible, and assumes all or substantially all of the risks associated with the intangibles. Premiere should be entitled to the bulk of the returns derived from exploitation of the intangibles. Tax administrations could arrive at an appropriate transfer pricing solution by delineating the actual transaction undertaken between Premiere and Company S. Depending on the facts, it might be determined that taken together the nominal assignment of rights to Company S and the simultaneous grant of full exploitation rights back to Premiere reflect in substance a patent administration service arrangement between Premiere and Company S. An arm’s length price would be determined for the patent administration services and Premiere would retain or be allocated the balance of the returns derived by the MNE group from the exploitation of the patents ...

10. Company A and Company B are members of an MNE group that sells electronic appliances. For the launch of a new line of products, Company A will be responsible for its design, development and manufacturing whereas Company B will undertake the marketing functions and the global distribution of the goods. 11. In particular, Company A performs the research and development functions and decides on the lines of research and the timelines. For the manufacturing of the new line of products, Company A decides on the levels of production and performs the quality controls. In doing so, Company A uses its valuable know-how and expertise regarding the manufacturing of electronic appliances. 12. Once the products are manufactured, they are sold to Company B, which develops and executes cutting-edge global marketing activities relating to the new line of products. In particular, Company B is responsible for designing the marketing strategy, deciding on the level of marketing expenditure in each country where the products will be released, and validating the impact of the marketing campaigns on a monthly basis. The marketing activities performed by Company B result in a valuable trademark and associated goodwill by which the new line of products is favourably differentiated from competitors’ alternatives in the market. 13. Company B is also responsible for the global distribution of the products. The distribution activities performed by Company B are a key source of economic advantage over competitors. Company B has performed the R&D activities and assumed the risks associated with the development of a sophisticated proprietary algorithm to get feedback from customers on the performance of the products. This information is highly valuable in accurately forecasting demand and managing inventory and distribution logistics so that customers are assured of receiving their orders within 48 hours. 14. The accurate delineation of the transaction indicates that the contributions of Company A and Company B are unique and valuable to the potential success of the new line of products. 15. Under these circumstances, the transactional profit split method is likely to be the most appropriate method for determining the compensation for the products sold by Company A to Company B as both parties make unique and valuable contributions to the transaction ...

5. A Co, a member of T Group, is a company incorporated in Country A whose principal activity is the growing and processing of tea. A Co identifies, acquires and cultivates land with extremely good soil for growing tea. A Co has developed extensive know- how in respect of tea-growing, including maximising the desirable qualities of the tea it grows through its cultivation methods. The properties of the soil together with the cultivation methods give A Co’s tea a highly sought after flavour. 6. A Co processes tea by undertaking the following activities: sorting leaf, grading, full or partial fermenting, and blending and packaging for export as per customer order specifications. Blending entails using extensive proprietary know-how to mix the various teas in order to get blends with the unique tastes appreciated by customers of T Group. Tea produced by A Co has won international acclaim for its unique taste and aroma. 7. A Co sells its tea to B Co, its parent company located in Country B. B Co then repackages and brands the teas for sale in the target markets. 8. B Co owns and has, by its own efforts, developed the tradename and trademark which are both unique and valuable. However, the branding features the origin of the tea and the unique blend developed by A Co. B Co has carried out extensive advertising campaigns through electronic media, internet, trade fairs and publications in industry magazines resulting in the product range becoming market leader in a number of geographic markets. Tea sold by T Group commands a premium price. 9. The accurate delineation of the transaction in this particular case determines that both A Co and B Co are making a unique and valuable contribution and the most appropriate transfer pricing method is likely to be the transactional profit split method ...

1. Company A is the parent company of an MNE group in the pharmaceutical sector. Company A owns a patent for a new pharmaceutical formulation. Company A designed the clinical trials and performed the research and development functions during the early stages of the development of the product, leading to the granting of the patent. 2. Company A enters into a contract with Company S, a subsidiary of Company A, according to which Company A licenses the patent rights relating to the potential pharmaceutical product to Company S. In accordance with the contract, Company S conducts the subsequent development of the product and performs important enhancement functions. Company S obtains the authorisation from the relevant regulatory body. The development of the product is successful and it is sold in various markets around the world. 3. The accurate delineation of the transaction indicates that the contributions made by both Company A and Company S are unique and valuable to the development of the pharmaceutical product. 4. Under these circumstances, the transactional profit split method is likely to be the most appropriate method for determining the compensation for the patent rights licensed by Company A to Company S ...

Based on these findings, it can be concluded that Company A continues to perform the same functions and assume the same risks as before the restructuring took place. In particular, Company A continues to have the capability and actually performs control functions in relation to the risk of exploitation of the intangibles. It also carries on the functions related to the development, maintenance and execution of the worldwide marketing strategy. Company Z has no capability to perform control functions, and does not in fact perform the control functions needed to assume the intangible related risks. Accordingly, the accurate delineation of the transaction after the restructuring may lead to the conclusion that this is in substance a funding arrangement between Company A and Company Z, rather than a restructuring for the centralisation of intangible management. An assessment may be necessary of the commercial rationality of the transaction based on the guidance in Section D.2 of Chapter I taking into account the full facts and circumstances of the transaction ...

Then a restructuring takes place. Legal ownership of the trademarks, trade names and other intangibles represented by the brand is transferred by Company A to a newly set up affiliate, Company Z in Country Z in exchange for a lump sum payment. After the restructuring, Company A is remunerated on a cost plus basis for the services it performs for Company Z and the rest of the group. The remuneration of the affiliated contract manufacturers and distributors remains the same. The remaining profits after remuneration of the contract manufacturers, distributors, and Company A head office services are paid to Company Z. The accurate delineation of the transactions before and after the restructuring determines that: Company Z is managed by a local trust company. It does not have people (employees or directors) who have the capability to perform, and who in fact do not perform control functions in relation to the risks associated with the ownership or the strategic development of the trademarks, trade names or other intangibles represented by the brand. It also does not have the financial capacity to assume these risks. High ranking officials from Company A’s head office fly to Country Z once a year to formally validate the strategic decisions necessary to operate the company. These decisions are prepared by Company A’s head office in Country A before the meetings take place in Country Z. The MNE considers that these activities are service activities performed by Company A’s head office for Z. These strategic decision-making activities are remunerated at cost plus in the same way as the central services are remunerated (e.g. human resource management, legal, tax). The development, maintenance and execution of the worldwide marketing strategy are still performed by the same employees of Company A’s head office and remunerated on a cost plus basis ...

In particular, in the case of the conversion of a full-fledged distributor into, for example, a limited risk distributor or commissionnaire, it may be important to examine whether the distributor has developed local marketing intangibles over the years prior to its being restructured and if so, what the nature and the value of these intangibles are, and whether they were transferred to an associated enterprise. Where such local intangibles are found to be in existence and to be transferred to a foreign associated enterprise, the arm’s length principle should apply to determine whether and if so how to compensate such a transfer, based on what would be agreed between independent parties in comparable circumstances. In this regard it is relevant to note that the transferor should receive arm’s length compensation (in addition to the arm’s length compensation for the transferred intangibles) when after the restructuring it continues to perform functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of the local intangible transferred (see Section B.2. 1 of Chapter VI). On the other hand, where such local intangibles are found to be in existence and to remain in the restructured entity, they should be taken into account in the functional analysis of the post-restructuring activities. They may accordingly influence the selection and application of the most appropriate transfer pricing method for the post-restructuring controlled transactions, in order that appropriate compensation can be determined ...

Also in the case where a local operation disposes of the legal ownership of its intangibles to a foreign associated enterprise and continues to use the intangibles further to the disposal, but does so in a different legal capacity (e.g. as a licensee), the conditions of the transfer should be assessed from both the transferor’s and the transferee’s perspectives. The determination of an arm’s length remuneration for the subsequent ownership, control and exploitation of the transferred intangible should take account of the extent of the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by the parties in relation to the intangible transferred, and in particular analysing control of risks and control of functions performed relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of the intangibles ...

MNE groups may have sound business reasons to centralise ownership of intangibles or rights in intangibles. An example in the context of business restructuring is a transfer of legal ownership of intangibles that accompanies the specialisation of manufacturing sites within an MNE group. In a pre-restructuring environment, each manufacturing entity may be the owner and manager of a series of patents – for instance if the manufacturing sites were historically acquired from third parties with their intangibles. In a global business model, each manufacturing site can be specialised by type of manufacturing process or by geographical area rather than by patent. As a consequence of such a restructuring the MNE group might proceed with the transfer of all the locally owned patents to a central location which will in turn give contractual rights (through licences or manufacturing agreements) to all the group’s manufacturing sites to manufacture the products falling in their new areas of competence, using patents that were initially owned either by the same or by another entity within the group. In such a scenario it will be important to delineate the actual transaction and to understand whether the transfer of legal ownership is for administrative simplicity (as in Example 1 of Annex I to Chapter VI), or whether the restructuring changes the identity of the parties performing or controlling functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles ...

Business restructurings sometimes involve the transfer of the legal ownership of intangibles or rights in intangibles that were previously owned by one or more local operation(s) to a central location situated in another tax jurisdiction (e.g. a foreign associated enterprise that operates as a principal or as a so-called “IP company”). In some cases the transferor continues to use the intangible transferred, but does so in another legal capacity (e.g. as a licensee of the transferee, or through a contract that includes limited rights to the intangible such as a contract manufacturing arrangement using patents that were transferred; or a limited risk distribution arrangement using a trademark that was transferred). In accordance with the guidance in Chapter VI, it is important to remember that the legal ownership of an intangible by itself does not confer any right ultimately to retain returns derived by the MNE group from exploiting that intangible (see 6.42). Instead, the compensation required to be paid to associated enterprises performing or controlling functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles may comprise any share of the total return anticipated to be derived from the intangibles (see 6.54). Therefore, the change in legal ownership of an intangible in a business restructuring may not affect which party is entitled to returns from that intangible ...

The following information would be relevant and useful concerning the initial terms of the CCA: a) a list of participants b) a list of any other associated enterprises that will be involved with the CCA activity or that are expected to exploit or use the results of the subject activity c) the scope of the activities and specific projects covered by the CCA, and how the CCA activities are managed and controlled d) the duration of the arrangement e) the manner in which participants’ proportionate shares of expected benefits are measured, and any projections used in this determination f) the manner in which any future benefits (such as intangibles) are expected to be exploited g) the form and value of each participant’s initial contributions, and a detailed description of how the value of initial and ongoing contributions is determined (including any budgeted vs actual adjustments) and how accounting principles are applied consistently to all participants in determining expenditures and the value of contributions h) the anticipated allocation of responsibilities and tasks, and the mechanisms for managing and controlling those responsibilities and tasks, in particular, those relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of intangibles or tangible assets used in the CCA activity i) the procedures for and consequences of a participant entering or withdrawing from the CCA and the termination of the CCA j) any provisions for balancing payments or for adjusting the terms of the arrangement to reflect changes in economic circumstances ...

As described in the previous paragraphs, it is not necessary for the CCA participants to perform all of the CCA activities through their own personnel. In some cases, the participants in a CCA may decide to outsource certain functions related to the subject activity to a separate entity that is not a participant under the standard of paragraph 8.14 above. In such situations, the participants to the CCA should individually meet the requirements on exercising control over the specific risks they assume under the CCA. Such requirements include exercising control over the outsourced functions by at least one of the participants to the CCA. In circumstances in which the objective of the CCA is to develop an intangible, at least one of the participants to the CCA should also exercise control over the important development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation functions that are outsourced. When the contribution of a participant to the CCA consists of activities other than controlling the outsourced functions, the guidance in paragraph 8.15 is relevant for assessing whether this party has the functional capability to exercise control over the specific risks it assumes under the CCA, in particular if these risks are closely linked to the outsourced functions ...

In some circumstances where reliable uncontrolled transactions cannot be identified, transactional profit split methods may be utilised to determine an arm’s length allocation of profits for the sale of goods or the provision of services involving the use of intangibles. One circumstance in which the use of transactional profit split methods may be appropriate is where both parties to the transaction make unique and valuable contributions to the transaction ...

This chapter makes it clear that in matters involving the transfer of intangibles or rights in intangibles it is important not to simply assume that all residual profit, after a limited return to those providing functions, should necessarily be allocated to the owner of intangibles. The selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method should be based on a functional analysis that provides a clear understanding of the MNE’s global business processes and how the transferred intangibles interact with other functions, assets and risks that comprise the global business. The functional analysis should identify all factors that contribute to value creation, which may include risks borne, specific market characteristics, location, business strategies, and MNE group synergies among others. The transfer pricing method selected, and any adjustments incorporated in that method based on the comparability analysis, should take into account all of the relevant factors materially contributing to the creation of value, not only intangibles and routine functions ...

The principles set out in this Section B must be applied in a variety of situations involving the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles. A key consideration in each case is that associated enterprises that contribute to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles legally owned by another member of the group must receive arm’s length compensation for the functions they perform, the risks they assume, and the assets they use. In evaluating whether associated enterprises that perform functions or assume risks related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles have been compensated on an arm’s length basis, it is necessary to consider (i) the level and nature of the activity undertaken; and (ii) the amount and form of compensation paid. In assessing whether the compensation provided in the controlled transaction is consistent with the arm’s length principle, reference should be made to the level and nature of activity of comparable uncontrolled entities performing similar functions, the compensation received by comparable uncontrolled entities performing similar functions, and the anticipated creation of intangible value by comparable uncontrolled entities performing similar functions. This section describes the application of these principles in commonly occurring fact patterns ...

The entitlement of any member of the MNE group to profit or loss relating to differences between actual (ex post) and a proper estimation of anticipated (ex ante) profitability will depend on which entity or entities in the MNE group in fact assumes the risks as identified when delineating the actual transaction (see Section D. 1 of Chapter I). It will also depend on the entity or entities which are performing the important functions as reflected in paragraph 6.56 or contributing to the control over the economically significant risks as established in paragraph 1.105, and for which it is determined that an arm’s length remuneration of these functions would include a profit sharing element ...

If the legal owner of an intangible in substance: performs and controls all of the functions (including the important functions described in paragraph 6.56) related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangible; provides all assets, including funding, necessary to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangibles; and assumes all of the risks related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangible, then it will be entitled to all of the anticipated, ex ante, returns derived from the MNE group’s exploitation of the intangible. To the extent that one or more members of the MNE group other than the legal owner performs functions, uses assets, or assumes risks related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangible, such associated enterprises must be compensated on an arm’s length basis for their contributions. This compensation may, depending on the facts and circumstances, constitute all or a substantial part of the return anticipated to be derived from the exploitation of the intangible ...

Resolution of this question requires a careful analysis of which entity or entities in the MNE group in fact assume the economically significant risks as identified when delineating the actual transaction (see Section D. 1 of Chapter I). As this analytical framework indicates, the party actually assuming the economically significant risks may or may not be the associated enterprise contractually assuming these risks, such as the legal owner of the intangible, or may or may not be the funder of the investment. A party which is not allocated the risks that give rise to the deviation between the anticipated and actual outcomes under the principles of Sections D. 1.2.1.4 to D. 1.2.1.6 of Chapter I will not be entitled to the differences between actual and anticipated profits or required to bear losses that are caused by these differences if such risk materialises, unless these parties are performing the important functions as reflected in paragraph 6.56 or contributing to the control over the economically significant risks as established in paragraph 1.105, and it is determined that arm’s length remuneration of these functions would include a profit sharing element. In addition, consideration must be given to whether the ex ante remuneration paid to members of the MNE group for their functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed is, in fact, consistent with the arm’s length principle. Care should be taken to ascertain, for example, whether the group in fact underestimated or overestimated anticipated profits, thereby giving rise to underpayments or overpayments (determined on an ex ante basis) to some group members for their contributions. Transactions for which valuation is highly uncertain at the time of the transaction are particularly susceptible to such under or overestimations of value. This is further discussed in Section D.4 ...

It is quite common that actual (ex post) profitability is different than anticipated (ex ante) profitability. This may result from risks materialising in a different way to what was anticipated through the occurrence of unforeseeable developments. For example, it may happen that a competitive product is removed from the market, a natural disaster takes place in a key market, a key asset malfunctions for unforeseeable reasons, or that a breakthrough technological development by a competitor will have the effect of making products based on the intangible in question obsolete or less desirable. It may also happen that the financial projections, on which calculations of ex ante returns and compensation arrangements are based, properly took into account risks and the probability of reasonably foreseeable events occurring and that the differences between actual and anticipated profitability reflects the playing out of those risks. Finally, it may happen that financial projections, on which calculations of ex ante returns and compensation arrangements are based, did not adequately take into account the risks of different outcomes occurring and therefore led to an overestimation or an underestimation of the anticipated profits. The question arises in such circumstances whether, and if so, how the profits or losses should be shared among members of an MNE group that have contributed to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangible in question ...

It is especially important to ensure that the group member(s) asserting entitlement to returns from assuming risk actually bear responsibility for the actions that need to be taken and the costs that may be incurred if the relevant risk materialises. If costs are borne or actions are undertaken by an associated enterprise other than the associated enterprise assuming the risk as determined under the framework for analysing risk reflected in paragraph 1.60 of these guidelines, then a transfer pricing adjustment should be made so that the costs are allocated to the party assuming the risk and the other associated enterprise is appropriately remunerated for any activities undertaken in connection with the materialisation of the risk. Example 7 in the Annex I to Chapter VI illustrates this principle ...

In determining which member or members of the group assume risks related to intangibles, the principles of Section D. 1.2 of Chapter I apply. In particular, steps 1 to 5 of the process to analyse risk in a controlled transaction as laid out in paragraph 1.60 should be followed in determining which party assumes risks related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles ...

The identity of the member or members of the group assuming risks related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles is an important consideration in determining prices for controlled transactions. The assumption of risk will determine which entity or entities will be responsible for the consequences if the risk materialises. The accurate delineation of the controlled transaction, based on the guidance in Section D. 1 of Chapter I, may determine that the legal owner assumes risks or that, instead, other members of the group are assuming risks, and such members must be compensated for their contributions in that regard ...

Group members that use assets in the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of an intangible should receive appropriate compensation for doing so. Such assets may include, without limitation, intangibles used in research, development or marketing (e.g. know-how, customer relationships, etc.), physical assets, or funding. One member of an MNE group may fund some or all of the development, enhancement, maintenance, and protection of an intangible, while one or more other members perform all of the relevant functions. When assessing the appropriate anticipated return to funding in such circumstances, it should be recognised that in arm’s length transactions, a party that provides funding, but does not control the risks or perform other functions associated with the funded activity or asset, generally does not receive anticipated returns equivalent to those received by an otherwise similarly-situated investor who also performs and controls important functions and controls important risks associated with the funded activity. The nature and amount of compensation attributable to an entity that bears intangible-related costs, without more, must be determined on the basis of all the relevant facts, and should be consistent with similar funding arrangements among independent entities where such arrangements can be identified. See the guidance in Section D.1.2.1.6 of Chapter I, and in particular Example 3 in paragraphs 1.85 and 1.103, which illustrate a situation where the party providing funding does not control the financial risk associated with the funding ...

Because the important functions described in paragraph 6.56 are often instrumental in managing the different functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed that are key to the successful development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles, and are therefore essential to the creation of intangible value, it is necessary to carefully evaluate transactions between parties performing these important functions and other associated enterprises. In particular, the reliability of a one-sided transfer pricing method will be substantially reduced if the party or parties performing significant portions of the important functions are treated as the tested party or parties. See Example 6 ...

Because it may be difficult to find comparable transactions involving the outsourcing of such important functions, it may be necessary to utilise transfer pricing methods not directly based on comparables, including transactional profit split methods and ex ante valuation techniques, to appropriately reward the performance of those important functions. Where the legal owner outsources most or all of such important functions to other group members, attribution to the legal owner of any material portion of the return derived from the exploitation of the intangibles after compensating other group members for their functions should be carefully considered taking into account the functions it actually performs, the assets it actually uses and the risks it actually assumes under the guidance in Section D. 1.2 of Chapter I. Examples 16 and 17 in the Annex I to Chapter VI illustrate the principles contained in this paragraph ...

In considering the arm’s length compensation for functional contributions of various members of the MNE group, certain important functions will have special significance. The nature of these important functions in any specific case will depend on the facts and circumstances. For self-developed intangibles, or for self-developed or acquired intangibles that serve as a platform for further development activities, these more important functions may include, among others, design and control of research and marketing programmes, direction of and establishing priorities for creative undertakings including determining the course of “blue-sky” research, control over strategic decisions regarding intangible development programmes, and management and control of budgets. For any intangible (i.e. for either self-developed or acquired intangibles) other important functions may also include important decisions regarding defence and protection of intangibles, and ongoing quality control over functions performed by independent or associated enterprises that may have a material effect on the value of the intangible. Those important functions usually make a significant contribution to intangible value and, if those important functions are outsourced by the legal owner in transactions between associated enterprises, the performance of those functions should be compensated with an appropriate share of the returns derived by the MNE group from the exploitation of intangibles ...

The relative value of contributions to development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles varies depending on the particular facts of the case. The MNE group member(s) making the more significant contributions in a particular case should receive relatively greater remuneration. For example, a company that merely funds research and development should have a lower anticipated return than if it both funds and controls research and development. Other things being equal, a still higher anticipated return should be provided if the entity funds, controls, and physically performs the research and development. See also the discussion of funding in Section B.2.2 ...

If the legal owner neither controls nor performs the functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of the intangible, the legal owner would not be entitled to any ongoing benefit attributable to the outsourced functions. Depending on the facts, the arm’s length compensation required to be provided by the legal owner to other associated enterprises performing or controlling functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles may comprise any share of the total return derived from exploitation of the intangibles. A legal owner not performing any relevant function relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of the intangible will therefore not be entitled to any portion of such returns related to the performance or control of functions relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of the intangible. It is entitled to an arm’s length compensation for any functions it actually performs, any assets it actually uses and risks it actually assumes. See Sections B.2.2 to B.2.3. In determining the functions it actually performs, assets it actually uses and the risks it actually assumes the guidance in Section D.1.2 of Chapter I is especially relevant ...

In outsourcing transactions between independent enterprises, it is usually the case that an entity performing functions on behalf of the legal owner of the intangible that relate to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangible will operate under the control of such legal owner (as discussed in paragraph 1.65). Because of the nature of the relationships between associated enterprises that are members of an MNE group, however, it may be the case that outsourced functions performed by associated enterprises will be controlled by an entity other than the legal owner of the intangibles. In such cases, the legal owner of the intangible should also compensate the entity performing control functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles on an arm’s length basis. In assessing what member of the MNE group in fact controls the performance of the relevant functions, principles apply analogous to those for determining control over risk in Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I. Assessing the capacity of a particular entity to exert control and the actual performance of such control functions will be an important part of the analysis ...

Where associated enterprises other than the legal owner perform relevant functions that are anticipated to contribute to the value of the intangibles, they should be compensated on an arm’s length basis for the functions they perform under the principles set out in Chapters I – III. The determination of arm’s length compensation for functional contributions should consider the availability of comparable uncontrolled transactions, the importance of the functions performed to the creation of intangible value, and the realistically available options of the parties. The specific considerations described in paragraphs 6.53 to 6.58 should also be taken into account ...

The need to ensure that all members of the MNE group are appropriately compensated for the functions they perform, the assets they contribute and the risks they assume implies that if the legal owner of intangibles is to be entitled ultimately to retain all of the returns derived from exploitation of the intangibles it must perform all of the functions, contribute all assets used and assume all risks related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangible. This does not imply, however, that the associated enterprises constituting an MNE group must structure their operations regarding the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of intangibles in any particular way. It is not essential that the legal owner physically performs all of the functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of an intangible through its own personnel in order to be entitled ultimately to retain or be attributed a portion of the return derived by the MNE group from exploitation of the intangibles. In transactions between independent enterprises, certain functions are sometimes outsourced to other entities. A member of an MNE group that is the legal owner of intangibles could similarly outsource functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of intangibles to either independent enterprises or associated enterprises ...

Under the principles of Chapters I – III, each member of the MNE group should receive arm’s length compensation for the functions it performs. In cases involving intangibles, this includes functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles. The identity of the member or members of the group performing functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles, therefore, is one of the key considerations in determining arm’s length conditions for controlled transactions ...

The relative importance of contributions to the creation of intangible value by members of the group in the form of functions performed, assets used and risks assumed will vary depending on the circumstances. For example, assume that a fully developed and currently exploitable intangible is purchased from a third party by a member of a group and exploited through manufacturing and distribution functions performed by other group members while being actively managed and controlled by the entity purchasing the intangible. It is assumed that this intangible would require no development, may require little or no maintenance or protection, and may have limited usefulness outside the area of exploitation intended at the time of the acquisition. There would be no development risk associated with the intangible, although there are risks associated with acquiring and exploiting the intangible. The key functions performed by the purchaser are those necessary to select the most appropriate intangible on the market, to analyse its potential benefits if used by the MNE group, and the decision to take on the risk-bearing opportunity through purchasing the intangible. The key asset used is the funding required to purchase the intangible. If the purchaser has the capacity and actually performs all the key functions described, including control of the risks associated with acquiring and exploiting the intangible, it may be reasonable to conclude that, after making arm’s length payment for the manufacturing and distribution functions of other associated enterprises, the owner would be entitled to retain or have attributed to it any income or loss derived from the post-acquisition exploitation of the intangible. While the application of Chapters I – III may be fairly straightforward in such a simple fact pattern, the analysis may be more difficult in situations in which: i) Intangibles are self-developed by a multinational group, especially when such intangibles are transferred between associated enterprises while still under development; ii) Acquired or self-developed intangibles serve as a platform for further development; or iii) Other aspects, such as marketing or manufacturing are particularly important to value creation. The generally applicable guidance below is particularly relevant for, and is primarily concerned with, these more difficult cases ...

In identifying arm’s length prices for transactions among associated enterprises, the contributions of members of the group related to the creation of intangible value should be considered and appropriately rewarded. The arm’s length principle and the principles of Chapters I – III require that all members of the group receive appropriate compensation for any functions they perform, assets they use, and risks they assume in connection with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles. It is therefore necessary to determine, by means of a functional analysis, which member(s) perform and exercise control over development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation functions, which member(s) provide funding and other assets, and which member(s) assume the various risks associated with the intangible. Of course, in each of these areas, this may or may not be the legal owner of the intangible. As noted in paragraph 6.133, it is also important in determining arm’s length compensation for functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed to consider comparability factors that may contribute to the creation of value or the generation of returns derived by the MNE group from the exploitation of intangibles in determining prices for relevant transactions ...

The terms of the compensation that must be paid to members of the MNE group that contribute to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles is generally determined on an ex ante basis. That is, it is determined at the time transactions are entered into and before risks associated with the intangible play out. The form of such compensation may be fixed or contingent. The actual (ex post) profit or loss of the business after compensating other members of the MNE group may differ from these anticipated profits depending on how the risks associated with the intangible or the other relevant risks related to the transaction or arrangement actually play out. The accurately delineated transaction, as determined under Section D. 1 of Chapter I, will determine which associated entity assumes such risks and accordingly will bear the consequences (costs or additional returns) when the risks materialise in a different manner to what was anticipated (see Section B.2.4) ...

Where no written terms exist, or where the facts of the case, including the conduct of the parties, differ from the written terms of any agreement between them or supplement these written terms, the actual transaction must be deduced from the facts as established, including the conduct of the parties (see Section D. 1.1 of Chapter I). It is, therefore, good practice for associated enterprises to document their decisions and intentions regarding the allocation of significant rights in intangibles. Documentation of such decisions and intentions, including written agreements, should generally be in place at or before the time that associated enterprises enter into transactions leading to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles ...

Legal rights and contractual arrangements form the starting point for any transfer pricing analysis of transactions involving intangibles. The terms of a transaction may be found in written contracts, public records such as patent or trademark registrations, or in correspondence and/or other communications among the parties. Contracts may describe the roles, responsibilities and rights of associated enterprises with respect to intangibles. They may describe which entity or entities provide funding, undertake research and development, maintain and protect intangibles, and perform functions necessary to exploit the intangibles, such as manufacturing, marketing and distribution. They may describe how receipts and expenses of the MNE associated with intangibles are to be allocated and may specify the form and amount of payment to all members of the group for their contributions. The prices and other conditions contained in such contracts may or may not be consistent with the arm’s length principle ...

The framework for analysing transactions involving intangibles between associated enterprises requires taking the following steps, consistent with the guidance for identifying the commercial or financial relations provided in Section D. 1 of Chapter I: i) Identify the intangibles used or transferred in the transaction with specificity and the specific, economically significant risks associated with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangibles; ii) Identify the full contractual arrangements, with special emphasis on determining legal ownership of intangibles based on the terms and conditions of legal arrangements, including relevant registrations, licence agreements, other relevant contracts, and other indicia of legal ownership, and the contractual rights and obligations, including contractual assumption of risks in the relations between the associated enterprises; iii) Identify the parties performing functions (including specifically the important functions described in paragraph 6.56), using assets, and managing risks related to developing, enhancing, maintaining, protecting, and exploiting the intangibles by means of the functional analysis, and in particular which parties control any outsourced functions, and control specific, economically significant risks; iv) Confirm the consistency between the terms of the relevant contractual arrangements and the conduct of the parties, and determine whether the party assuming economically significant risks under step 4 (i) of paragraph 1.60, controls the risks and has the financial capacity to assume the risks relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangibles; v) Delineate the actual controlled transactions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles in light of the legal ownership of the intangibles, the other relevant contractual relations under relevant registrations and contracts, and the conduct of the parties, including their relevant contributions of functions, assets and risks, taking into account the framework for analysing and allocating risk under Section D.1.2.1 of Chapter I; vi) Where possible, determine arm’s length prices for these transactions consistent with each party’s contributions of functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed, unless the guidance in Section D.2 of Chapter I applies ...

Applying the provisions of Chapters I – III to address these questions can be highly challenging for a number of reasons. Depending on the facts of any given case involving intangibles the following factors, among others, can create challenges: i) A lack of comparability between the intangible related transactions undertaken between associated enterprises and those transactions that can be identified between independent enterprises; ii) A lack of comparability between the intangibles in question; iii) The ownership and/or use of different intangibles by different associated enterprises within the MNE group; iv) The difficulty of isolating the impact of any particular intangible on the MNE group’s income; v) The fact that various members of an MNE group may perform activities relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of an intangible, often in a way and with a level of integration that is not observed between independent enterprises; vi) The fact that contributions of various members of the MNE group to intangible value may take place in years different than the years in which any associated returns are realised; and vii) The fact that taxpayer structures may be based on contractual terms between associated enterprises that separate ownership, the assumption of risk, and/or funding of investments in intangibles from performance of important functions, control over risk, and decisions related to investment in ways that are not observed in transactions between independent enterprises and that may contribute to base erosion and profit shifting. Notwithstanding these potential challenges, applying the arm’s length principle and the provisions of Chapters I – III within an established framework can, in most cases, yield an appropriate allocation of the returns derived by the MNE group from the exploitation of intangibles ...

In transfer pricing cases involving intangibles, the determination of the entity or entities within an MNE group which are ultimately entitled to share in the returns derived by the group from exploiting intangibles is crucial. A related issue is which entity or entities within the group should ultimately bear the costs, investments and other burdens associated with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles. Although the legal owner of an intangible may receive the proceeds from exploitation of the intangible, other members of the legal owner’s MNE group may have performed functions, used assets, or assumed risks that are expected to contribute to the value of the intangible. Members of the MNE group performing such functions, using such assets, and assuming such risks must be compensated for their contributions under the arm’s length principle. This Section B confirms that the ultimate allocation of the returns derived by the MNE group from the exploitation of intangibles, and the ultimate allocation of costs and other burdens related to intangibles among members of the MNE group, is accomplished by compensating members of the MNE group for functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed in the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles according to the principles described in Chapters I – III ...

In a transfer pricing analysis of a matter involving intangibles, it is important to identify the relevant intangibles with specificity. The functional analysis should identify the relevant intangibles at issue, the manner in which they contribute to the creation of value in the transactions under review, the important functions performed and specific risks assumed in connection with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangibles and the manner in which they interact with other intangibles, with tangible assets and with business operations to create value. While it may be appropriate to aggregate intangibles for the purpose of determining arm’s length conditions for the use or transfer of the intangibles in certain cases, it is not sufficient to suggest that vaguely specified or undifferentiated intangibles have an effect on arm’s length prices or other conditions. A thorough functional analysis, including an analysis of the importance of identified relevant intangibles in the MNE’s global business, should support the determination of arm’s length conditions ...

Care should be taken in determining whether or when an intangible exists and whether an intangible has been used or transferred. For example, not all research and development expenditures produce or enhance an intangible, and not all marketing activities result in the creation or enhancement of an intangible ...

German legislation on transfer pricing has been updated to align the rules with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2017. The new amendments are effective as of fiscal year 2022. The rules includes revised content on Substance over form Risk analysis Best method rule Use of interquartile range Aggregation of transactions Determination of actual ownership vs legal ownership DEMPE functions Valuation of Hard to value intangibles Unofficial translation of the new amendments to the German TP legislation Article 5 Amendment of the Foreign Tax Act The Foreign Tax Act of 8 September 1972 (BGBl. I p. 1713), as last amended by Article 4 of the Act of 25 March 2019 (BGBl. I p. 357), shall be amended as follows: section 1 shall be amended as follows: (a) Paragraph 1 shall be amended as follows: aa) In sentence 1, the words “related” shall be replaced by the word “related”. bb) In sentence 2, the words “and within the meaning of § 1a” shall be inserted after the word “provision”. (b) Paragraph 3 shall be replaced by the following paragraphs 3 to 3c: “(3) For the determination of the transfer prices (arm’s length prices) corresponding to the arm’s length principle for a business relationship within the meaning of paragraph 1 sentence 1, the actual circumstances underlying the respective business transaction shall be decisive. In particular, it shall be taken into account which functions are performed by which person involved in the business transaction in relation to the respective business transaction, which risks are assumed in this respect and which assets are used for this purpose (function and risk analysis). The relationships within the meaning of sentences 1 and 2 shall form the standard for determining the comparability of the business transaction to be examined with business transactions between unrelated third parties (comparability analysis); the relationships on which these business transactions are based shall be decisive in the corresponding application of sentences 1 and 2, insofar as this is possible. The circumstances at the time of the agreement of the business transaction shall be taken into account. The arm’s length price shall in principle be determined according to the most appropriate transfer pricing method with regard to the comparability analysis and the availability of values for comparable transactions of independent third parties. Differences between the ratios of the arm’s length transactions used for comparison and the ratios underlying the transaction under review that may affect the application of the transfer pricing method shall be eliminated by appropriate adjustments, if possible; this shall only apply if comparability is thereby enhanced. If no comparative values can be determined, a hypothetical arm’s length comparison shall be carried out for the determination of the arm’s length price in compliance with paragraph 1 sentence 3 from the perspective of the supplier and the respective service recipient using economically recognised valuation methods. (3a) The application of the arm’s length principle regularly leads to a range of values. This range shall be narrowed if differences in comparability remain after application of paragraph 3 sentence 6. If these values themselves do not offer any indications for a certain narrowing, the quarter of the smallest and the quarter of the largest values shall be disregarded from this range. If the value used by the taxpayer to determine his income lies outside the range pursuant to sentence 1 or the narrowed range, the median shall be decisive if the taxpayer does not credibly demonstrate that another value complies with the arm’s length principle. When applying the hypothetical arm’s length principle according to paragraph 3, sentence 7, a range of agreement regularly results from the minimum price of the supplier and the maximum price of the service recipient. In the cases of sentence 5, the mean value of the agreement range shall be used as a basis if the taxable person does not credibly demonstrate that another value within the agreement range complies with the arm’s length principle. (3b) If a function, including the associated opportunities and risks as well as the assets or other benefits transferred along with the function, is transferred and paragraph 3 sentence 7 is to be applied to the transferred function because no comparative data can be determined for the transfer of the function as a whole (transfer package), the agreement range shall be determined on the basis of the transfer package. This may be waived if the taxpayer can credibly demonstrate that neither significant intangible assets nor other benefits were the subject of the transfer of function. This applies if the receiving company performs the transferred function exclusively vis-à-vis the transferring company and the consideration to be recognised for the performance of the function and the provision of the corresponding services is to be determined according to the cost-plus method. (3c. A transfer or assignment for use of an intangible asset shall be remunerated if it is made on the basis of a business relationship as defined in paragraph 4 and it has a financial effect on the transferee, the user, the transferor or the assignor. Intangible assets are assets that are neither tangible assets nor equity interests nor financial assets which may be the subject of a transaction without being individually transferable; and which can give a person an actual or legal position over that asset. The identification of the ownership or holder of an intangible asset, including rights derived from such an asset, is the starting point for determining which party to the transaction is entitled to the revenue arising from any disposition of that intangible asset. To the extent that a related party of the owner or holder of the intangible asset performs functions, uses assets or assumes risks in connection with the development or creation, enhancement, maintenance, protection or any form of exploitation of the intangible asset, those functions shall be appropriately compensated by the owner or holder of the related party. The financing of the development or creation, maintenance or protection of an intangible asset shall be appropriately remunerated and shall not give rise ...

“Uniclick B.V.” had performed all the important DEMPE functions with regard to intangible assets as well as managing all risks related to development activities without being remunerated for this. Royalty-income related to the activities had instead been received by a foreign group company incorporated in Ireland and with its place of management in Luxembourg. In 2012, the administration sent notices of amendment to the tax return to the respondent for assessment years 2006 and 2010. The tax administration stated that “Uniclick B.V.”, through its director B.T. and employees M.C. and S.M., invented and developed the Uniclic technology in 1996 and continued to exploit it, and that the subsequent transfer of rights to the Uniclic invention to U.B. BV was simulated. The administration added the profits foregone annually by the “Uniclick B.V.”, i.e. the royalties received by F. from third party licensees less the costs borne by F., to “Uniclick B.V’s” taxable base. “Uniclick B.V.” disagreed with this and argued, among other things, that the tax administration had failed in demonstrating that the transfer of the Uniclic invention and the right to patent had been recognised by various third parties and was not fiscally motivated. “Uniclick B.V.” further disputed the existence of tax evasion and raised a number of breaches of procedural rules – including retrospective application of the DEMPE concept introduced in the 2017 Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The tax administration maintained its position and sent the notices of assessment. The assessment was appealed by “Uniclick B.V.” and the court of first instance found the appeal admissible and dismissed the assessment. This decision was then appealed by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The Court of Appeal concluded that the administration failed in its burden of proof that the transfer prices applied between F. and Uniclick B.V for assessment year 2010 were not in accordance with the arm’s length principle. The administration did not show that Uniclick B.V. granted an abnormal or gratuitous advantage to F. in income year 2009, which should be added to its own profit by virtue of Article 26 WIB92. Since the existence of the abnormal or gratuitous advantage was not proven, it was not necessary to discuss the claim of the tax administration, put forward in secondary order, to determine what an arm’s length remuneration would be in respect of the functions performed, assets owned and risk born by “Uniclick B.V.” Excerpt “The discussion between the parties regarding the applicability of the OECD TPG 2017 is legally relevant notwithstanding the question whether it is decisive in the factual assessment (see factual assessment in section 4.3.3 below). The OECD guidelines are intended to provide insight into how the at arm’s length principle can be applied in practice and contain recommendations for determining transfer pricing policy. The OECD guidelines as such have no direct effect in Belgium but are used as a starting point in the area of transfer pricing. From the conclusion of the Belgian State supporting the filed subsidiary assessment, it is clear that the administration bases the valuation of the abnormal or gratuitous benefit at least partially on the 2017 version of the OECD TPG. However, the 1995, 2010 and 2017 versions of the OECD TPG differ in a number of respects and to varying degrees. These differences range from mere clarifications that do not impact on the content of previous versions to completely newly developed parts, namely recommendations that were not included, even implicitly, in previous versions. One of these completely newly developed parts that have only been included in the 2017 OECD TPG concerns the DEMPE functional analysis method as well as the method of ex post outcomes of hard-to-value intangibles, on which the Belgian State bases the subsidiary assessment at issue at least in part. The subsidiary assessment relates to the 2010 tax year/the 2009 income year in which the economic context and the regulatory framework applicable in 2009 had to be taken into account. The only OECD TPG available at the time were the 1995 OECD TPG. In the light of this, the administration is permitted to base the valuation on the 1995 OECD TPG (which, moreover, as stated above, are merely a non-binding instrument). The administration is also permitted to base the valuation on later versions of the OECD TPG (such as those of 2010), but only to the extent that these contain useful clarifications, without further elaboration, of the 1995 OECD TPG. The 2017 OECD TPG were published after 2009 and to the extent that the recommendations contained therein have evolved significantly since the 1995 OECD TPG, they cannot be applied in the current dispute. In particular, the DEMPE functional analysis method and the method of a posteriori results of intangibles that are difficult to value cannot be usefully applied in the present dispute from a temporal point of view, as these are tools that are only set out in the 2017 OECD TPG. Moreover, this position is also confirmed in Circular 2020/C/35 of 25 February 2020, which summarises and further interprets the 2017 OECD TPG, in which the administration explicitly states in para. 284 that the provisions of the Circular are in principle only applicable to transactions between related companies taking place as of 1 January 2018 (see also EU General Court judgment, 12 May 2021, cases T-816/17 and T-318/18, Luxembourg-lreland-Amazon v. Commission, para. 146- 155).” Click Here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has issued draft Compliance Guidelines on intangible arrangements, PCG 2021/D4. These Guidelines will (when finalised)  set out the ATO’s compliance approach to international arrangements connected with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangible assets, specifically, the potential application of the transfer pricing, general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) and the diverted profits tax (DPT) provisions. The capital gains tax and capital allowances provisions will also be discussed in this Guideline where these may be considered alongside, or relevant to, the ATO’s transfer pricing, GAAR or DPT risk assessment. The draft Guidelines sets out ATO’s compliance approach to international arrangements connected with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation (DEMPE) of intangible assets and/or involving a migration of intangible assets. The Guidelines applies to Intangibles Arrangements and focuses on tax risks associated with the potential application of the transfer pricing provisions. It also focuses on other tax risks that may be associated with Intangibles Arrangements, specifically the withholding tax provisions, capital gains tax (CGT), capital allowances, the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) and the diverted profits tax (DPT). The Guidelines has been prepared to accompany the release and publication of Taxpayer Alerts TA 2018/2 Mischaracterisation of activities or payments in connection with intangible assets and TA 2020/1 Non-arm’s length arrangements and schemes connected with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangible assets. It is not the intention of the Guidelines to limit, deter or prevent arm’s length dealings involving intangible assets. Rather it is intended that the Guideline will serve as a point of reference and assist in understanding arrangements which is seen as representing a higher risk from a compliance perspective. Examples of high risk arrangements centralisation of intangible assets bifurcation (separation) of intangible assets non-recognition of local intangible assets and DEMPE activities migration of pre-commercialised intangible assets non-arm’s length licence arrangements ...

S GmbH was an Austrian trading company of a group. In the course of business restructuring, the real estate division of the Austrian-based company was initially separated from the “trading operations/brands” division on the demerger date of 31 March 2007. The trademark rights remained with the previous trading company, which was the parent company of the group, now M GmbH. On 25 September 2007, M GmbH transferred all trademark rights to a permanent establishment in Malta, which was set up in the same year, to which it also moved its place of management on 15 January 2008. Licence agreements were concluded between S GmbH and M GmbH, which entitle S GmbH to use the trademarks of M GmbH for advertising and marketing measures in connection with its business operations in return for a (turnover-dependent) licence fee. The tax authorities (re)assessed the corporate income tax for the years 2008 and 2009. The audit had shown that the licence fees were to be attributed in their entirety to S GmbH as the beneficial owner of the trade marks, which meant that the licence payments to M GmbH were also not to be recognised for tax purposes. S GmbH had created the trademark rights, which had been valued at a total value of €383.5 million in the course of its spin-off; the decisions regarding the use, creation, advertising and licensing of the trademark rights continued to lie with the decision-makers of the operational company advertising the revisions at the Austrian group location. The Maltese management was present at meetings with advertising agencies in Austria, but its activities did not actually go beyond support and administration. The aim of the chosen structure had been a tax-saving effect, whereby the actual taxation of the licence income in Malta had been 5%. A complaint filed by S GmbH was dismissed by the Bundesfinanzgericht. S GmbH then filed an appeal with the Verwaltungsgerichtshof. Judgement of the Court The Court dismissed the appeal of S GmbH and upheld the decision of the tax authorities Excerpts: “In the appeal case, the BFG found that the trademark rights had been created before the separation of the companies. No new trademarks had been registered during the audit period. The advertising line was determined by a two-year briefing of the group and was based on the requirements of the licensees. The brand managers of M GmbH participated in the process, but the decisions were made by the organs of the appellant, which spent over €56 million in 2008 and almost €68 million in 2009 on advertising and marketing.. In contrast, M GmbH had hardly incurred any advertising expenses, and its salary expenses were also disproportionate to the tasks of a company that was supposed to manage corporate assets of almost €400 million in trademark rights and to act as the (also economic) owner of these assets. The minimal salary expenditure, which amounted to a total of € 91,791.0 in 2008 and € 77,008.10 in 2009 and was distributed among eight persons (most of whom were part-time employees), could only be explained by the fact that all relevant trademark administration, maintenance and management tasks were, as in the past, handled either by group companies (by way of group-internal marketing activities) or by specialists commissioned by the group (trademark lawyer, advertising agency) and that M GmbH only acted in a supporting capacity. If, against this background, the BFG assumes, despite the formal retention of the legal ownership of the trademark rights, that the economic ownership of the trademark rights, which had already been created at that time, was also transferred to the appellant at the time of the spin-off, this cannot be seen as an unlawful act which the Administrative Court should take up. If, in the case at hand, the appellant nevertheless concluded licence agreements with M GmbH, the reason for this cannot have been the acquisition of the right of use to which it was entitled from the outset as the beneficial owner. The BFG was therefore correct in denying that the amounts paid by the appellant under the heading of “licence payments” were business expenses. …” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The ATO is currently reviewing international arrangements that mischaracterise Australian activities connected with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation (DEMPE) of intangible assets. Such arrangements may be non-arm’s length or structured to avoid tax obligations, resulting in inappropriate outcomes for Australian tax purposes. One of the issues is whether functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by Australian entities in connection with the DEMPE of intangible assets are properly recognised and remunerated in accordance with the arm’s length requirements of the transfer pricing provisions in the taxation law. These arrangements are particularly in focus where intangible assets and/or associated rights are migrated to international related parties as part of non-arm’s length arrangements and/or in a manner intended to avoid Australian tax. In circumstances where these arrangements lack evidence of commercial rationale and/or substance, the ATO will apply of the exceptions in the transfer pricing provisions (non-recognition) and anti-avoidance rules.  The general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) or diverted profits tax (DPT) provisions may apply where a tax benefit or DPT tax benefit is obtained in connection with these arrangements. Arrangements of particular concern include, but are not limited to, those described in the Alert ...

73. Första is a consumer goods company organised and operating in country A. Prior to Year 1, Första produces Product Y in country A and sells it through affiliated distribution companies in many countries around the world. Product Y is well recognised and attracts a premium compared to its competitors, to which Första is entitled as the legal owner and developer of the trademark and related goodwill giving rise to that premium. 74. In Year 2, Första organises Company S, a wholly owned subsidiary, in country B. Company S acts as a super distributor and invoicing centre. Första continues to ship Product Y directly to its distribution affiliates, but title to the products passes to Company S, which reinvoices the distribution affiliates for the products. 75. Beginning in Year 2, Company S undertakes to reimburse the distribution affiliates for a portion of their advertising costs. Prices for Product Y from Company S to the distribution affiliates are adjusted upward so that the distribution affiliate operating profit margins remain constant notwithstanding the shift of advertising cost to Company S. Assume that the operating profit margins earned by the distribution affiliates are arm’s length both before and after Year 2 given the concurrent changes in product pricing and the reimbursement of advertising costs. Company S performs no functions with regard to advertising nor does it control any risk related to marketing the products. 76. In Year 3, the prices charged by Första to Company S are reduced. Första and Company S claim such a reduction in price is justified because Company S is now entitled to income related to intangibles. It asserts that such income is attributable to intangibles in respect of Product Y created through the advertising costs it has borne. 77. In substance, Company S has no claim to income derived from the exploitation of intangibles with respect to Product Y. It performs no functions, assumes no risk, and in substance bears no costs related to the development, enhancement, maintenance or protection of intangibles. Transfer pricing adjustments to increase the income of Första in Year 3 and thereafter would be appropriate ...

14. In Year 1, a multinational group comprised of Company A (a country A corporation) and Company B (a country B corporation) decides to develop an intangible, which is anticipated to be highly profitable based on Company B’s existing intangibles, its track record and its experienced research and development staff. The intangible is expected to take five years to develop before possible commercial exploitation. If successfully developed, the intangible is anticipated to have value for ten years after initial exploitation. Under the development agreement between Company A and Company B, Company B will perform and control all activities related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangible. Company A will provide all funding associated with the development of the intangible (the development costs are anticipated to be USD 100 million per year for five years), and will become the legal owner of the intangible. Once developed, the intangible is anticipated to result in profits of USD 550 million per year (years 6 to 15). Company B will license the intangible from Company A and make contingent payments to Company A for the right to use the intangible, based on returns of purportedly comparable licensees. After the projected contingent payments, Company B will be left with an anticipated return of USD 200 million per year from selling products based on the intangible. 15. A functional analysis by the country B tax administration of the arrangement assesses the functions performed, assets used and contributed, and risks assumed by Company A and by Company B. The analysis through which the actual transaction is delineated concludes that although Company A is the legal owner of the intangibles, its contribution to the arrangement is solely the provision of funding for the development of an intangible. This analysis shows that Company A contractually assumes the financial risk, has the financial capacity to assume that risk, and exercises control over that risk in accordance with the principles outlined in paragraphs 6.63 and 6.64. Taking into account Company A’s contributions, as well as the realistic alternatives of Company A and Company B, it is determined that Company A’s anticipated remuneration should be a risk-adjusted return on its funding commitment. Assume that this is determined to be USD 110 million per year (for Years 6 to 15), which equates to an 11% risk-adjusted anticipated financial return.1 Company B, accordingly, would be entitled to all remaining anticipated income after accounting for Company A’s anticipated return, or USD 440 million per year (USD 550 million minus USD 110 million), rather than USD 200 million per year as claimed by the taxpayer. (Based on the detailed functional analysis and application of the most appropriate method, the taxpayer incorrectly chose Company B as the tested party rather than Company A) ...

5. The facts related to the development and control of patentable inventions are the same as in Example 1. However, instead of granting a perpetual and exclusive licence of its patents back to Premiere, Company S, acting under the direction and control of Premiere, grants licences of its patents to associated and independent enterprises throughout the world in exchange for periodic royalties. For purposes of this example, it is assumed that the royalties paid to Company S by associated enterprises are all arm’s length. 6. Company S is the legal owner of the patents. However, its contributions to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the patents are limited to the activities of its three employees in registering the patents and maintaining the patent registrations. The Company S employees do not control or participate in the licensing transactions involving the patents. Under these circumstances, Company S is only entitled to compensation for the functions it performs. Based on an analysis of the respective functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed by Premiere and Company S in developing, enhancing, maintaining, protecting, and exploiting the intangibles, Company S should not be entitled ultimately to retain or be attributed income from its licensing arrangements over and above the arm’s length compensation for its patent registration functions. 7. As in Example 1 the true nature of the arrangement is a patent administration service contract. The appropriate transfer pricing outcome can be achieved by ensuring that the amount paid by Company S in exchange for the assignments of patent rights appropriately reflects the respective functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed by Premiere and by Company S. Under such an approach, the compensation due to Premiere for the patentable inventions is equal to the licensing revenue of Company S less an appropriate return to the functions Company S performs ...

1. Premiere is the parent company of an MNE group. Company S is a wholly owned subsidiary of Premiere and a member of the Premiere group. Premiere funds R&D and performs ongoing R&D functions in support of its business operations. When its R&D functions result in patentable inventions, it is the practice of the Premiere group that all rights in such inventions be assigned to Company S in order to centralise and simplify global patent administration. All patent registrations are held and maintained in the name of Company S. 2. Company S employs three lawyers to perform its patent administration work and has no other employees. Company S does not conduct or control any of the R&D activities of the Premiere group. Company S has no technical R&D personnel, nor does it incur any of the Premiere group’s R&D expense. Key decisions related to defending the patents are made by Premiere management, after taking advice from employees of Company S. Premiere’s management, and not the employees of Company S, controls all decisions regarding licensing of the group’s patents to both independent and associated enterprises. 3. At the time of each assignment of rights from Premiere to Company S, Company S makes a nominal EUR 100 payment to Premiere in consideration of the assignment of rights to a patentable invention and, as a specific condition of the assignment, simultaneously grants to Premiere an exclusive, royalty free, patent licence, with full rights to sub-licence, for the full life of the patent to be registered. The nominal payments of Company S to Premiere are made purely to satisfy technical contract law requirements related to the assignments and, for purposes of this example, it is assumed that they do not reflect arm’s length compensation for the assigned rights to patentable inventions. Premiere uses the patented inventions in manufacturing and selling its products throughout the world and from time to time sublicenses patent rights to others. Company S makes no commercial use of the patents nor is it entitled to do so under the terms of the licence agreement with Premiere. 4. Under the agreement, Premiere performs all functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangibles except for patent administration services. Premiere contributes and uses all assets associated with the development and exploitation of the intangible, and assumes all or substantially all of the risks associated with the intangibles. Premiere should be entitled to the bulk of the returns derived from exploitation of the intangibles. Tax administrations could arrive at an appropriate transfer pricing solution by delineating the actual transaction undertaken between Premiere and Company S. Depending on the facts, it might be determined that taken together the nominal assignment of rights to Company S and the simultaneous grant of full exploitation rights back to Premiere reflect in substance a patent administration service arrangement between Premiere and Company S. An arm’s length price would be determined for the patent administration services and Premiere would retain or be allocated the balance of the returns derived by the MNE group from the exploitation of the patents ...

Based on these findings, it can be concluded that Company A continues to perform the same functions and assume the same risks as before the restructuring took place. In particular, Company A continues to have the capability and actually performs control functions in relation to the risk of exploitation of the intangibles. It also carries on the functions related to the development, maintenance and execution of the worldwide marketing strategy. Company Z has no capability to perform control functions, and does not in fact perform the control functions needed to assume the intangible related risks. Accordingly, the accurate delineation of the transaction after the restructuring may lead to the conclusion that this is in substance a funding arrangement between Company A and Company Z, rather than a restructuring for the centralisation of intangible management. An assessment may be necessary of the commercial rationality of the transaction based on the guidance in Section D.2 of Chapter I taking into account the full facts and circumstances of the transaction ...

Then a restructuring takes place. Legal ownership of the trademarks, trade names and other intangibles represented by the brand is transferred by Company A to a newly set up affiliate, Company Z in Country Z in exchange for a lump sum payment. After the restructuring, Company A is remunerated on a cost plus basis for the services it performs for Company Z and the rest of the group. The remuneration of the affiliated contract manufacturers and distributors remains the same. The remaining profits after remuneration of the contract manufacturers, distributors, and Company A head office services are paid to Company Z. The accurate delineation of the transactions before and after the restructuring determines that: Company Z is managed by a local trust company. It does not have people (employees or directors) who have the capability to perform, and who in fact do not perform control functions in relation to the risks associated with the ownership or the strategic development of the trademarks, trade names or other intangibles represented by the brand. It also does not have the financial capacity to assume these risks. High ranking officials from Company A’s head office fly to Country Z once a year to formally validate the strategic decisions necessary to operate the company. These decisions are prepared by Company A’s head office in Country A before the meetings take place in Country Z. The MNE considers that these activities are service activities performed by Company A’s head office for Z. These strategic decision-making activities are remunerated at cost plus in the same way as the central services are remunerated (e.g. human resource management, legal, tax). The development, maintenance and execution of the worldwide marketing strategy are still performed by the same employees of Company A’s head office and remunerated on a cost plus basis ...

In particular, in the case of the conversion of a full-fledged distributor into, for example, a limited risk distributor or commissionnaire, it may be important to examine whether the distributor has developed local marketing intangibles over the years prior to its being restructured and if so, what the nature and the value of these intangibles are, and whether they were transferred to an associated enterprise. Where such local intangibles are found to be in existence and to be transferred to a foreign associated enterprise, the arm’s length principle should apply to determine whether and if so how to compensate such a transfer, based on what would be agreed between independent parties in comparable circumstances. In this regard it is relevant to note that the transferor should receive arm’s length compensation (in addition to the arm’s length compensation for the transferred intangibles) when after the restructuring it continues to perform functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of the local intangible transferred (see Section B.2. 1 of Chapter VI). On the other hand, where such local intangibles are found to be in existence and to remain in the restructured entity, they should be taken into account in the functional analysis of the post-restructuring activities. They may accordingly influence the selection and application of the most appropriate transfer pricing method for the post-restructuring controlled transactions, in order that appropriate compensation can be determined ...

Also in the case where a local operation disposes of the legal ownership of its intangibles to a foreign associated enterprise and continues to use the intangibles further to the disposal, but does so in a different legal capacity (e.g. as a licensee), the conditions of the transfer should be assessed from both the transferor’s and the transferee’s perspectives. The determination of an arm’s length remuneration for the subsequent ownership, control and exploitation of the transferred intangible should take account of the extent of the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by the parties in relation to the intangible transferred, and in particular analysing control of risks and control of functions performed relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of the intangibles ...

MNE groups may have sound business reasons to centralise ownership of intangibles or rights in intangibles. An example in the context of business restructuring is a transfer of legal ownership of intangibles that accompanies the specialisation of manufacturing sites within an MNE group. In a pre-restructuring environment, each manufacturing entity may be the owner and manager of a series of patents – for instance if the manufacturing sites were historically acquired from third parties with their intangibles. In a global business model, each manufacturing site can be specialised by type of manufacturing process or by geographical area rather than by patent. As a consequence of such a restructuring the MNE group might proceed with the transfer of all the locally owned patents to a central location which will in turn give contractual rights (through licences or manufacturing agreements) to all the group’s manufacturing sites to manufacture the products falling in their new areas of competence, using patents that were initially owned either by the same or by another entity within the group. In such a scenario it will be important to delineate the actual transaction and to understand whether the transfer of legal ownership is for administrative simplicity (as in Example 1 of the Annex to Chapter VI), or whether the restructuring changes the identity of the parties performing or controlling functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles ...

Business restructurings sometimes involve the transfer of the legal ownership of intangibles or rights in intangibles that were previously owned by one or more local operation(s) to a central location situated in another tax jurisdiction (e.g. a foreign associated enterprise that operates as a principal or as a so-called “IP company”). In some cases the transferor continues to use the intangible transferred, but does so in another legal capacity (e.g. as a licensee of the transferee, or through a contract that includes limited rights to the intangible such as a contract manufacturing arrangement using patents that were transferred; or a limited risk distribution arrangement using a trademark that was transferred). In accordance with the guidance in Chapter VI, it is important to remember that the legal ownership of an intangible by itself does not confer any right ultimately to retain returns derived by the MNE group from exploiting that intangible (see 6.42). Instead, the compensation required to be paid to associated enterprises performing or controlling functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles may comprise any share of the total return anticipated to be derived from the intangibles (see 6.54). Therefore, the change in legal ownership of an intangible in a business restructuring may not affect which party is entitled to returns from that intangible ...

The following information would be relevant and useful concerning the initial terms of the CCA: a) a list of participants b) a list of any other associated enterprises that will be involved with the CCA activity or that are expected to exploit or use the results of the subject activity c) the scope of the activities and specific projects covered by the CCA, and how the CCA activities are managed and controlled d) the duration of the arrangement e) the manner in which participants’ proportionate shares of expected benefits are measured, and any projections used in this determination f) the manner in which any future benefits (such as intangibles) are expected to be exploited g) the form and value of each participant’s initial contributions, and a detailed description of how the value of initial and ongoing contributions is determined (including any budgeted vs actual adjustments) and how accounting principles are applied consistently to all participants in determining expenditures and the value of contributions h) the anticipated allocation of responsibilities and tasks, and the mechanisms for managing and controlling those responsibilities and tasks, in particular, those relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of intangibles or tangible assets used in the CCA activity i) the procedures for and consequences of a participant entering or withdrawing from the CCA and the termination of the CCA j) any provisions for balancing payments or for adjusting the terms of the arrangement to reflect changes in economic circumstances ...

As described in the previous paragraphs, it is not necessary for the CCA participants to perform all of the CCA activities through their own personnel. In some cases, the participants in a CCA may decide to outsource certain functions related to the subject activity to a separate entity that is not a participant under the standard of paragraph 8.14 above. In such situations, the participants to the CCA should individually meet the requirements on exercising control over the specific risks they assume under the CCA. Such requirements include exercising control over the outsourced functions by at least one of the participants to the CCA. In circumstances in which the objective of the CCA is to develop an intangible, at least one of the participants to the CCA should also exercise control over the important development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation functions that are outsourced. When the contribution of a participant to the CCA consists of activities other than controlling the outsourced functions, the guidance in paragraph 8.15 is relevant for assessing whether this party has the functional capability to exercise control over the specific risks it assumes under the CCA, in particular if these risks are closely linked to the outsourced functions ...

In some circumstances where reliable uncontrolled transactions cannot be identified, transactional profit split methods may be utilised to determine an arm’s length allocation of profits for the sale of goods or the provision of services involving the use of intangibles. One circumstance in which the use of transactional profit split methods may be appropriate is where both parties to the transaction make unique and valuable contributions to the transaction ...

The principles set out in this Section B must be applied in a variety of situations involving the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles. A key consideration in each case is that associated enterprises that contribute to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles legally owned by another member of the group must receive arm’s length compensation for the functions they perform, the risks they assume, and the assets they use. In evaluating whether associated enterprises that perform functions or assume risks related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles have been compensated on an arm’s length basis, it is necessary to consider (i) the level and nature of the activity undertaken; and (ii) the amount and form of compensation paid. In assessing whether the compensation provided in the controlled transaction is consistent with the arm’s length principle, reference should be made to the level and nature of activity of comparable uncontrolled entities performing similar functions, the compensation received by comparable uncontrolled entities performing similar functions, and the anticipated creation of intangible value by comparable uncontrolled entities performing similar functions. This section describes the application of these principles in commonly occurring fact patterns ...

The entitlement of any member of the MNE group to profit or loss relating to differences between actual (ex post) and a proper estimation of anticipated (ex ante) profitability will depend on which entity or entities in the MNE group in fact assumes the risks as identified when delineating the actual transaction (see Section D. 1 of Chapter I). It will also depend on the entity or entities which are performing the important functions as reflected in paragraph 6.56 or contributing to the control over the economically significant risks as established in paragraph 1.105, and for which it is determined that an arm’s length remuneration of these functions would include a profit sharing element ...

If the legal owner of an intangible in substance: performs and controls all of the functions (including the important functions described in paragraph 6.56) related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangible; provides all assets, including funding, necessary to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangibles; and assumes all of the risks related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangible, then it will be entitled to all of the anticipated, ex ante, returns derived from the MNE group’s exploitation of the intangible. To the extent that one or more members of the MNE group other than the legal owner performs functions, uses assets, or assumes risks related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangible, such associated enterprises must be compensated on an arm’s length basis for their contributions. This compensation may, depending on the facts and circumstances, constitute all or a substantial part of the return anticipated to be derived from the exploitation of the intangible ...

Resolution of this question requires a careful analysis of which entity or entities in the MNE group in fact assume the economically significant risks as identified when delineating the actual transaction (see Section D. 1 of Chapter I). As this analytical framework indicates, the party actually assuming the economically significant risks may or may not be the associated enterprise contractually assuming these risks, such as the legal owner of the intangible, or may or may not be the funder of the investment. A party which is not allocated the risks that give rise to the deviation between the anticipated and actual outcomes under the principles of Sections D. 1.2.1.4 to D. 1.2.1.6 of Chapter I will not be entitled to the differences between actual and anticipated profits or required to bear losses that are caused by these differences if such risk materialises, unless these parties are performing the important functions as reflected in paragraph 6.56 or contributing to the control over the economically significant risks as established in paragraph 1.105, and it is determined that arm’s length remuneration of these functions would include a profit sharing element. In addition, consideration must be given to whether the ex ante remuneration paid to members of the MNE group for their functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed is, in fact, consistent with the arm’s length principle. Care should be taken to ascertain, for example, whether the group in fact underestimated or overestimated anticipated profits, thereby giving rise to underpayments or overpayments (determined on an ex ante basis) to some group members for their contributions. Transactions for which valuation is highly uncertain at the time of the transaction are particularly susceptible to such under or overestimations of value. This is further discussed in Section D.4 ...

It is quite common that actual (ex post) profitability is different than anticipated (ex ante) profitability. This may result from risks materialising in a different way to what was anticipated through the occurrence of unforeseeable developments. For example, it may happen that a competitive product is removed from the market, a natural disaster takes place in a key market, a key asset malfunctions for unforeseeable reasons, or that a breakthrough technological development by a competitor will have the effect of making products based on the intangible in question obsolete or less desirable. It may also happen that the financial projections, on which calculations of ex ante returns and compensation arrangements are based, properly took into account risks and the probability of reasonably foreseeable events occurring and that the differences between actual and anticipated profitability reflects the playing out of those risks. Finally, it may happen that financial projections, on which calculations of ex ante returns and compensation arrangements are based, did not adequately take into account the risks of different outcomes occurring and therefore led to an overestimation or an underestimation of the anticipated profits. The question arises in such circumstances whether, and if so, how the profits or losses should be shared among members of an MNE group that have contributed to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangible in question ...

It is especially important to ensure that the group member(s) asserting entitlement to returns from assuming risk actually bear responsibility for the actions that need to be taken and the costs that may be incurred if the relevant risk materialises. If costs are borne or actions are undertaken by an associated enterprise other than the associated enterprise assuming the risk as determined under the framework for analysing risk reflected in paragraph 1.60 of these guidelines, then a transfer pricing adjustment should be made so that the costs are allocated to the party assuming the risk and the other associated enterprise is appropriately remunerated for any activities undertaken in connection with the materialisation of the risk. Example 7 in the Annex to Chapter VI illustrates this principle ...

In determining which member or members of the group assume risks related to intangibles, the principles of Section D. 1.2 of Chapter I apply. In particular, steps 1 to 5 of the process to analyse risk in a controlled transaction as laid out in paragraph 1.60 should be followed in determining which party assumes risks related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles ...

The identity of the member or members of the group assuming risks related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles is an important consideration in determining prices for controlled transactions. The assumption of risk will determine which entity or entities will be responsible for the consequences if the risk materialises. The accurate delineation of the controlled transaction, based on the guidance in Section D. 1 of Chapter I, may determine that the legal owner assumes risks or that, instead, other members of the group are assuming risks, and such members must be compensated for their contributions in that regard ...

Group members that use assets in the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of an intangible should receive appropriate compensation for doing so. Such assets may include, without limitation, intangibles used in research, development or marketing (e.g. know-how, customer relationships, etc.), physical assets, or funding. One member of an MNE group may fund some or all of the development, enhancement, maintenance, and protection of an intangible, while one or more other members perform all of the relevant functions. When assessing the appropriate anticipated return to funding in such circumstances, it should be recognised that in arm’s length transactions, a party that provides funding, but does not control the risks or perform other functions associated with the funded activity or asset, generally does not receive anticipated returns equivalent to those received by an otherwise similarly-situated investor who also performs and controls important functions and controls important risks associated with the funded activity. The nature and amount of compensation attributable to an entity that bears intangible-related costs, without more, must be determined on the basis of all the relevant facts, and should be consistent with similar funding arrangements among independent entities where such arrangements can be identified. See the guidance in Section D.1.2.1.6 of Chapter I, and in particular Example 3 in paragraphs 1.85 and 1.103, which illustrate a situation where the party providing funding does not control the financial risk associated with the funding ...

Because the important functions described in paragraph 6.56 are often instrumental in managing the different functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed that are key to the successful development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles, and are therefore essential to the creation of intangible value, it is necessary to carefully evaluate transactions between parties performing these important functions and other associated enterprises. In particular, the reliability of a one-sided transfer pricing method will be substantially reduced if the party or parties performing significant portions of the important functions are treated as the tested party or parties. See Example 6 ...

Because it may be difficult to find comparable transactions involving the outsourcing of such important functions, it may be necessary to utilise transfer pricing methods not directly based on comparables, including transactional profit split methods and ex ante valuation techniques, to appropriately reward the performance of those important functions. Where the legal owner outsources most or all of such important functions to other group members, attribution to the legal owner of any material portion of the return derived from the exploitation of the intangibles after compensating other group members for their functions should be carefully considered taking into account the functions it actually performs, the assets it actually uses and the risks it actually assumes under the guidance in Section D. 1.2 of Chapter I. Examples 16 and 17 in the Annex to Chapter VI illustrate the principles contained in this paragraph ...

In considering the arm’s length compensation for functional contributions of various members of the MNE group, certain important functions will have special significance. The nature of these important functions in any specific case will depend on the facts and circumstances. For self-developed intangibles, or for self-developed or acquired intangibles that serve as a platform for further development activities, these more important functions may include, among others, design and control of research and marketing programmes, direction of and establishing priorities for creative undertakings including determining the course of “blue-sky” research, control over strategic decisions regarding intangible development programmes, and management and control of budgets. For any intangible (i.e. for either self-developed or acquired intangibles) other important functions may also include important decisions regarding defence and protection of intangibles, and ongoing quality control over functions performed by independent or associated enterprises that may have a material effect on the value of the intangible. Those important functions usually make a significant contribution to intangible value and, if those important functions are outsourced by the legal owner in transactions between associated enterprises, the performance of those functions should be compensated with an appropriate share of the returns derived by the MNE group from the exploitation of intangibles ...

The relative value of contributions to development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles varies depending on the particular facts of the case. The MNE group member(s) making the more significant contributions in a particular case should receive relatively greater remuneration. For example, a company that merely funds research and development should have a lower anticipated return than if it both funds and controls research and development. Other things being equal, a still higher anticipated return should be provided if the entity funds, controls, and physically performs the research and development. See also the discussion of funding in Section B.2.2 ...

If the legal owner neither controls nor performs the functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of the intangible, the legal owner would not be entitled to any ongoing benefit attributable to the outsourced functions. Depending on the facts, the arm’s length compensation required to be provided by the legal owner to other associated enterprises performing or controlling functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles may comprise any share of the total return derived from exploitation of the intangibles. A legal owner not performing any relevant function relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of the intangible will therefore not be entitled to any portion of such returns related to the performance or control of functions relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of the intangible. It is entitled to an arm’s length compensation for any functions it actually performs, any assets it actually uses and risks it actually assumes. See Sections B.2.2 to B.2.3. In determining the functions it actually performs, assets it actually uses and the risks it actually assumes the guidance in Section D.1.2 of Chapter I is especially relevant ...

In outsourcing transactions between independent enterprises, it is usually the case that an entity performing functions on behalf of the legal owner of the intangible that relate to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangible will operate under the control of such legal owner (as discussed in paragraph 1.65). Because of the nature of the relationships between associated enterprises that are members of an MNE group, however, it may be the case that outsourced functions performed by associated enterprises will be controlled by an entity other than the legal owner of the intangibles. In such cases, the legal owner of the intangible should also compensate the entity performing control functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles on an arm’s length basis. In assessing what member of the MNE group in fact controls the performance of the relevant functions, principles apply analogous to those for determining control over risk in Section D. 1.2.1 of Chapter I. Assessing the capacity of a particular entity to exert control and the actual performance of such control functions will be an important part of the analysis ...

Where associated enterprises other than the legal owner perform relevant functions that are anticipated to contribute to the value of the intangibles, they should be compensated on an arm’s length basis for the functions they perform under the principles set out in Chapters I – III. The determination of arm’s length compensation for functional contributions should consider the availability of comparable uncontrolled transactions, the importance of the functions performed to the creation of intangible value, and the realistically available options of the parties. The specific considerations described in paragraphs 6.53 to 6.58 should also be taken into account ...

The need to ensure that all members of the MNE group are appropriately compensated for the functions they perform, the assets they contribute and the risks they assume implies that if the legal owner of intangibles is to be entitled ultimately to retain all of the returns derived from exploitation of the intangibles it must perform all of the functions, contribute all assets used and assume all risks related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangible. This does not imply, however, that the associated enterprises constituting an MNE group must structure their operations regarding the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of intangibles in any particular way. It is not essential that the legal owner physically performs all of the functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of an intangible through its own personnel in order to be entitled ultimately to retain or be attributed a portion of the return derived by the MNE group from exploitation of the intangibles. In transactions between independent enterprises, certain functions are sometimes outsourced to other entities. A member of an MNE group that is the legal owner of intangibles could similarly outsource functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection or exploitation of intangibles to either independent enterprises or associated enterprises ...

Under the principles of Chapters I – III, each member of the MNE group should receive arm’s length compensation for the functions it performs. In cases involving intangibles, this includes functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles. The identity of the member or members of the group performing functions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles, therefore, is one of the key considerations in determining arm’s length conditions for controlled transactions ...

The relative importance of contributions to the creation of intangible value by members of the group in the form of functions performed, assets used and risks assumed will vary depending on the circumstances. For example, assume that a fully developed and currently exploitable intangible is purchased from a third party by a member of a group and exploited through manufacturing and distribution functions performed by other group members while being actively managed and controlled by the entity purchasing the intangible. It is assumed that this intangible would require no development, may require little or no maintenance or protection, and may have limited usefulness outside the area of exploitation intended at the time of the acquisition. There would be no development risk associated with the intangible, although there are risks associated with acquiring and exploiting the intangible. The key functions performed by the purchaser are those necessary to select the most appropriate intangible on the market, to analyse its potential benefits if used by the MNE group, and the decision to take on the risk-bearing opportunity through purchasing the intangible. The key asset used is the funding required to purchase the intangible. If the purchaser has the capacity and actually performs all the key functions described, including control of the risks associated with acquiring and exploiting the intangible, it may be reasonable to conclude that, after making arm’s length payment for the manufacturing and distribution functions of other associated enterprises, the owner would be entitled to retain or have attributed to it any income or loss derived from the post-acquisition exploitation of the intangible. While the application of Chapters I – III may be fairly straightforward in such a simple fact pattern, the analysis may be more difficult in situations in which: i) Intangibles are self-developed by a multinational group, especially when such intangibles are transferred between associated enterprises while still under development; ii) Acquired or self-developed intangibles serve as a platform for further development; or iii) Other aspects, such as marketing or manufacturing are particularly important to value creation. The generally applicable guidance below is particularly relevant for, and is primarily concerned with, these more difficult cases ...

In identifying arm’s length prices for transactions among associated enterprises, the contributions of members of the group related to the creation of intangible value should be considered and appropriately rewarded. The arm’s length principle and the principles of Chapters I – III require that all members of the group receive appropriate compensation for any functions they perform, assets they use, and risks they assume in connection with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles. It is therefore necessary to determine, by means of a functional analysis, which member(s) perform and exercise control over development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation functions, which member(s) provide funding and other assets, and which member(s) assume the various risks associated with the intangible. Of course, in each of these areas, this may or may not be the legal owner of the intangible. As noted in paragraph 6.133, it is also important in determining arm’s length compensation for functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed to consider comparability factors that may contribute to the creation of value or the generation of returns derived by the MNE group from the exploitation of intangibles in determining prices for relevant transactions ...

The terms of the compensation that must be paid to members of the MNE group that contribute to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles is generally determined on an ex ante basis. That is, it is determined at the time transactions are entered into and before risks associated with the intangible play out. The form of such compensation may be fixed or contingent. The actual (ex post) profit or loss of the business after compensating other members of the MNE group may differ from these anticipated profits depending on how the risks associated with the intangible or the other relevant risks related to the transaction or arrangement actually play out. The accurately delineated transaction, as determined under Section D. 1 of Chapter I, will determine which associated entity assumes such risks and accordingly will bear the consequences (costs or additional returns) when the risks materialise in a different manner to what was anticipated (see Section B.2.4) ...

Where no written terms exist, or where the facts of the case, including the conduct of the parties, differ from the written terms of any agreement between them or supplement these written terms, the actual transaction must be deduced from the facts as established, including the conduct of the parties (see Section D. 1.1 of Chapter I). It is, therefore, good practice for associated enterprises to document their decisions and intentions regarding the allocation of significant rights in intangibles. Documentation of such decisions and intentions, including written agreements, should generally be in place at or before the time that associated enterprises enter into transactions leading to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, or exploitation of intangibles ...

Legal rights and contractual arrangements form the starting point for any transfer pricing analysis of transactions involving intangibles. The terms of a transaction may be found in written contracts, public records such as patent or trademark registrations, or in correspondence and/or other communications among the parties. Contracts may describe the roles, responsibilities and rights of associated enterprises with respect to intangibles. They may describe which entity or entities provide funding, undertake research and development, maintain and protect intangibles, and perform functions necessary to exploit the intangibles, such as manufacturing, marketing and distribution. They may describe how receipts and expenses of the MNE associated with intangibles are to be allocated and may specify the form and amount of payment to all members of the group for their contributions. The prices and other conditions contained in such contracts may or may not be consistent with the arm’s length principle ...

The framework for analysing transactions involving intangibles between associated enterprises requires taking the following steps, consistent with the guidance for identifying the commercial or financial relations provided in Section D. 1 of Chapter I: i) Identify the intangibles used or transferred in the transaction with specificity and the specific, economically significant risks associated with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangibles; ii) Identify the full contractual arrangements, with special emphasis on determining legal ownership of intangibles based on the terms and conditions of legal arrangements, including relevant registrations, licence agreements, other relevant contracts, and other indicia of legal ownership, and the contractual rights and obligations, including contractual assumption of risks in the relations between the associated enterprises; iii) Identify the parties performing functions (including specifically the important functions described in paragraph 6.56), using assets, and managing risks related to developing, enhancing, maintaining, protecting, and exploiting the intangibles by means of the functional analysis, and in particular which parties control any outsourced functions, and control specific, economically significant risks; iv) Confirm the consistency between the terms of the relevant contractual arrangements and the conduct of the parties, and determine whether the party assuming economically significant risks under step 4 (i) of paragraph 1.60, controls the risks and has the financial capacity to assume the risks relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of the intangibles; v) Delineate the actual controlled transactions related to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles in light of the legal ownership of the intangibles, the other relevant contractual relations under relevant registrations and contracts, and the conduct of the parties, including their relevant contributions of functions, assets and risks, taking into account the framework for analysing and allocating risk under Section D.1.2.1 of Chapter I; vi) Where possible, determine arm’s length prices for these transactions consistent with each party’s contributions of functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed, unless the guidance in Section D.2 of Chapter I applies ...

Applying the provisions of Chapters I – III to address these questions can be highly challenging for a number of reasons. Depending on the facts of any given case involving intangibles the following factors, among others, can create challenges: i) A lack of comparability between the intangible related transactions undertaken between associated enterprises and those transactions that can be identified between independent enterprises; ii) A lack of comparability between the intangibles in question; iii) The ownership and/or use of different intangibles by different associated enterprises within the MNE group; iv) The difficulty of isolating the impact of any particular intangible on the MNE group’s income; v) The fact that various members of an MNE group may perform activities relating to the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of an intangible, often in a way and with a level of integration that is not observed between independent enterprises; vi) The fact that contributions of various members of the MNE group to intangible value may take place in years different than the years in which any associated returns are realised; and vii) The fact that taxpayer structures may be based on contractual terms between associated enterprises that separate ownership, the assumption of risk, and/or funding of investments in intangibles from performance of important functions, control over risk, and decisions related to investment in ways that are not observed in transactions between independent enterprises and that may contribute to base erosion and profit shifting. Notwithstanding these potential challenges, applying the arm’s length principle and the provisions of Chapters I – III within an established framework can, in most cases, yield an appropriate allocation of the returns derived by the MNE group from the exploitation of intangibles ...

In transfer pricing cases involving intangibles, the determination of the entity or entities within an MNE group which are ultimately entitled to share in the returns derived by the group from exploiting intangibles is crucial. A related issue is which entity or entities within the group should ultimately bear the costs, investments and other burdens associated with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles. Although the legal owner of an intangible may receive the proceeds from exploitation of the intangible, other members of the legal owner’s MNE group may have performed functions, used assets, or assumed risks that are expected to contribute to the value of the intangible. Members of the MNE group performing such functions, using such assets, and assuming such risks must be compensated for their contributions under the arm’s length principle. This Section B confirms that the ultimate allocation of the returns derived by the MNE group from the exploitation of intangibles, and the ultimate allocation of costs and other burdens related to intangibles among members of the MNE group, is accomplished by compensating members of the MNE group for functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed in the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles according to the principles described in Chapters I – III ...

In a transfer pricing analysis of a matter involving intangibles, it is important to identify the relevant intangibles with specificity. The functional analysis should identify the relevant intangibles at issue, the manner in which they contribute to the creation of value in the transactions under review, the important functions performed and specific risks assumed in connection with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of the intangibles and the manner in which they interact with other intangibles, with tangible assets and with business operations to create value. While it may be appropriate to aggregate intangibles for the purpose of determining arm’s length conditions for the use or transfer of the intangibles in certain cases, it is not sufficient to suggest that vaguely specified or undifferentiated intangibles have an effect on arm’s length prices or other conditions. A thorough functional analysis, including an analysis of the importance of identified relevant intangibles in the MNE’s global business, should support the determination of arm’s length conditions ...

Care should be taken in determining whether or when an intangible exists and whether an intangible has been used or transferred. For example, not all research and development expenditures produce or enhance an intangible, and not all marketing activities result in the creation or enhancement of an intangible ...