12 December 2024, the German Federal Ministry of Finance published updated administrative principles on transfer pricing 2024 (VWG VP 2024). The updates mainly concern the chapter on financial transactions, where paragraphs 3d and 3e have recently been added to the AStG. Paragraph 3d concerns the determination of arm’s length interest rates, group or stand-alone rating and whether capital should be treated as a loan or equity, and paragraph 3e concerns the treatment of financing arrangements, i.e. cash pools, hedging, etc. New guidance is also provided on the application of OECD Pillar 1 – Amount B. Click here for an unofficial English Translation ...

14 August 2024, the Federal Ministry of Finance sent revised administrative principles for transfer prices 2023 dated 6 June 2023 regarding the topic of intra-group financing, which, among other things, takes into account new paragraphs 3d and 3e in the German TP provisions. An opportunity to comment on the draft will be available until 6 September 2024. Paragraphs 3d and 3e were recently added to the German Foreign Tax Act (AStG). Paragraph 3d concerns the determination of arm’s length interest rates, group or stand-alone rating and whether capital should be treated as a loan or equity and paragraph 3e concerns the treatment of financing arrangements, i.e. cash pools, hedging, etc. Click here for an unofficial English Translation ...

In 2011, Willink SAS issued two intercompany convertible bonds with a maturity of 10 years and an annual interest rate of 8%. The tax authorities found that the 8% interest rate had not been determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle. Willink appealed, but both the Administrative Court and later the Administrative Court of Appeal sided with the tax authorities. The case was then appealed to the Conseil d’Etat which in December 2022 overturned the decision and ruled predominantly in favour of Willink SAS finding that RiskCalc could be used to determine a company’s credit rating for transfer pricing purposes in a sufficiently reliable manner, notwithstanding its shortcomings and the differences in the business sectors of the comparables. On that basis the case was remanded to the Administrative Court of Appeal. Judgment After re-examination of the case, the Administrative Court of Appeal annulled the tax assessment and ruled in favour of Willink SAS. “12. It follows from the foregoing that SAS Willink provides the evidence incumbent on it that the interest rate applicable to the transactions at issue could not have been lower than that which would have been applicable to borrowing transactions of the same nature entered into by independent undertakings. It is therefore entitled to request the cancellation of the corporation tax adjustments that led to the reduction of its losses carried forward for the 2011, 2012 and 2013 financial years, and the reinstatement of those losses.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

On 27 March 2024, new paragraphs (3d) and (3e) were added to the German Foreign Tax Act (Außensteuergesetz – AStG) regarding intragroup financing. Paragraph (3d) concerns the determination of arm’s length interest rates, group vs. stand-alone rating and whether capital is treated as a loan or equity. Paragraph (3e) concerns the treatment of financing arrangements, i.e. cash pools, hedging, etc ...

On 27 March 2024, new paragraphs (3d) and (3e) were added to the German Foreign Tax Act (Außensteuergesetz – AStG) regarding intragroup financing. Paragraph (3d) concerns the determination of arm’s length interest rates, group vs. stand-alone rating and whether capital is treated as a loan or equity. Paragraph (3e) concerns the treatment of financing arrangements, i.e. cash pools, hedging, etc ...

Singapore Telecom Australia Investments Pty Ltd entered into a loan note issuance agreement (the LNIA) with a company (the subscriber) that was resident in Singapore. Singapore Telecom Australia and the subscriber were ultimately 100% owned by the same company. The total amount of loan notes issued to the Participant was approximately USD 5.2 billion. The terms of the LNIA have been amended on three occasions, the first and second amendments being effective from the date the LNIA was originally entered into. The interest rate under the LNIA as amended by the third amendment was 13.2575%. Following an audit, the tax authorities issued an assessment under the transfer pricing provisions and disallowed interest deductions totalling approximately USD 894 million in respect of four years of income. In the view of the tax authorities, the terms agreed between the parties deviated from the arm’s length principle. Singapore Telecom Australia appealed to the Federal Court, which in a judgment published on 17 December 2021 upheld the assessment and dismissed the appeal. An appeal was then made to the Full Federal Court which, in a judgment published on 8 March 2024, dismissed the appeal and upheld the previous decision. Click here for translation ...

On 29 December 2023, the Office of Chief Counsel of the IRS issued a memorandum (AM 2023-008) on the effect of group membership on financial transactions. The memorandum answers the following question: “May the Service consider group membership in determining the arm’s length rate of interest chargeable for intragroup loans and making a section 482 adjustment?” The answer given in the memorandum is “Yes. Under the section 482 regulations, the arm’s length rate of interest on an intragroup loan to a controlled borrower is generally the rate at which that borrower could realistically obtain alternative financing from an unrelated party. Thus, if an unrelated lender would consider group membership in establishing financing terms available to the borrower, and such third-party financing is realistically available, then the Service may adjust the interest rate in a controlled lending transaction to reflect group membership.” The rationale in the memorandum refers to Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1, 1.482-2, 1.482-9, OECD TPG 7.13 and 10.76-80 and the realistic alternatives/realistically available options principle ...

“Lux Credit B.V.” took out various credit facilities from related parties [company name 2] s.a.r.l. and [company name 3] s.a.r.l. – both resident in Luxembourg. These were financings whereby “Lux Credit facility B.V.” could draw funds (facilities) up to a pre-agreed maximum amount. In doing so, “Lux Credit B.V.” owed both interest and “commitment fees”. The commitment fees were calculated on the maximum amount of the facility. Interest and commitment fees were owed. The interest payable to [company name 2] and [company name 3], respectively, was calculated by deducting the commitment fees from the interest payable on the amount withdrawn, with interest payable on the amount withdrawn, the commitment fees owed after the due date and the interest owed after the due date. In its returns for the current financial years, “Lux Credit B.V.” charged both interest and commitment fees against taxable profit. Following an audit, an assessment of additional taxable income was issued for the financial years 2012/2013 – 2016/2017. According to the tax authorities, the financial arrangement was not at arm’s length. The interest rate and commitment fees were adjusted and part of the loans were classified as equity. A complaint was filed by “Lux Credit B.V.” Judgement of the District Court The Court found mainly in favour of Credit Facility B.V.. It upheld most of the adjustments relating to commitment fees, but overturned the adjustment to the interest rate. According to the Court, Lux Credit B.V. was entitled to an interest deduction for the years under review, calculated at the contractually agreed interest rate on the amounts actually borrowed. Excerpts “51. With regard to the transfer pricing documentation, the court considers the following. Although the documentation referred to in Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Vpb Act was not available at the time the defendant requested it, the claimant has remedied this defect by again preparing records to substantiate the conditions surrounding the facilities. In the court’s opinion, the defendant did not make it plausible with what it argued that the claimant’s administration contains such defects and shortcomings that it cannot serve as a basis for the profit calculation that must lead to the conclusion that the claimant did not file the required return.10 The court also took into account that the parliamentary history of Section 8b of the 1969 Vpb Act noted that the documentation requirement of Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Vpb Act relates to the availability of information necessary to assess whether the prices and conditions(transfer prices) used in affiliated relationships qualify as arm’s length. 11 In the court’s opinion, the defendant has not argued sufficiently to conclude that the transfer-pricing data further collected, prepared and documented by the claimant and the documents that were present at [company name 2] and [company name 3] on the determination of the credit ratings are so deficient that the claimant has not complied with the obligations of Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Income Tax Act. The fact that source documents for the period, in which the transactions were entered into, have not been preserved and the defendant has comments on the data used by the claimant and disagrees with the outcomes of the claimant, do not alter this.” “56. In the court’s view, the defendant was right to make the adjustments in respect of commitment fees on facilities 1 and 3 for the years under review. The defendant was also correct in imposing the 2014/2015, 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 assessments to correct the commitment fees on Facility 7bn. In assessing whether the defendant was justified in making those corrections, the court relied on what [company name 1] and [company name 2] and [company name 3] agreed on civilly. The agreements between [company name 1] and [company name 2] and [company name 3] explicitly distinguish between interest due and commitment fees due. The court therefore rejects the plaintiff’s position that it must be assessed whether the total of the commitment fee and interest costs remained within the margins of Section 8b of the 1969 Vpb Act, and the commitment fee and interest costs should be considered together as an “all-in rate”. That the terms of Facilities 1, 3 and 7bn show similarities with Payment in Kind loans, as claimed by the claimant, does not make it necessary in this case to deviate from what the parties agreed under civil law. Indeed, the defendant has argued, with reasons, that stipulating headroom for the purpose of funding interest that may be credited, if the same facts and circumstances are present, is not usual in the market but it is usual in the market that over interest to be credited, a charge arises only at the time of the maturity of the interest. It is not usual that a charge – in this case in the form of commitment fees – is already due before the due date. This involves a double burden, as interest is also charged on the commitment fee. On the other hand, the plaintiff has not made it plausible that independent third-party parties were willing to agree such terms in similar circumstances, nor has it made its economic reality plausible. The court also took into account that the claimant did not make any calculations, prior to setting the maximum amount and commitment fees. 57. In the court’s view, the defendant was right to make the adjustments in respect of the commitment fees and interest payable thereon in respect of Facility 5. The defendant has made it plausible that such an agreement between independent third parties will not be concluded. The defendant was right to point out the following aspects:” “In the court’s opinion, with what the defendant has put forward and also in view of what the claimant has put forward in response, the defendant has failed to make it plausible that the interest rates agreed by [company name 1] , [company name 2] and [company name 3] regarding facilities 1, 3 and 7bn are not in line with what would have been agreed by independent parties in the ...

R.B. NV had entered into a loan agreement with a group company in Switzerland. The interest rate on the loan had been determined by applying the method used by the credit agency, Standard & Poor’s. Moreover, it had been concluded that R.B. NV was a “moderately strategic entity”, and a one-notch correction was applied to the “stand-alone credit rating”. Following an audit, the tax administration concluded that the company had not applied the S&P method consistently and that the company’s credit rating should have been the same as that of the group as the company was a “core entity” in the group. On that basis, the interest rate were reduced. Judgement of the Court The court ruled predominantly in favour of the tax authorities. The court found several unjustified deviations in the way R.B. NV had applied the S&P method and on that basis several adjustments were made by the court. According to the court, R.B. NV was not a “core entity” in the group whose credit rating should be the same as that of the group (as held by the tax authorities), but rather a “highly strategic entity” whose credit rating should be one notch lower than that of the group. Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

“Electric Component Manufacturing KtF” is a Hungarian subsidiary of a global group that distributes electronic components in more than 150 countries worldwide. The tax authorities had conducted a comprehensive tax audit of the Hungarian company for the period from 1 October 2016 to 30 September 2017, which resulted in an assessment of additional taxable income. The transfer pricing issues identified by the tax authorities were the remuneration received by the Hungarian company for its manufacturing activities and excessive interest payments to a group company in Luxembourg. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal and ordered the court to conduct new proceedings and issue a new decision. In its decision, the Court of Appeal had relied on an expert opinion, which the Supreme Court found to to be questionable, because there were serious doubt as to its correctness. Therefore, according to the order issued by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal may not undertake a professional assessment of the expert opinion that goes beyond the interpretation of the applicable legislation, nor may it review the expert opinion in the new proceedings in the absence of expertise. Excerpt “[58] In relation to the adjustment of the profit level indicator for manufacturing activities, the expert found that comparable companies do not charge taxes such as the local business tax and the innovation levy as an expense to operating profit, the amount of which distorts comparability, this is a clearly identifiable difference in the cost structure of the company under investigation and the comparable companies, so an adjustment should be made in accordance with the OECD guidelines and the Transfer Pricing Regulation, because the statistical application of the interquartile range restriction cannot be used to increase comparability. However, the Court of First Instance held that it was not disputed that, even if the interquartile range as a statistical method was used, it might be necessary to apply individual adjustments, but that the applicant had not provided the audit with a detailed analysis of the justification for the adjustment and had not provided any documentary evidence in the course of the two administrative proceedings to show how the adjustment applied served to increase comparability. However, the application for review relied on the contradictory nature of the reasoning in this respect, since, while the Court of First Instance criticised the lack of documentation to support the adjustment {Ist judgment, paragraph 34}, it shared the expert’s view that this would indeed require an investment of time and energy which taxpayers could not reasonably be expected to make {Ist judgment, paragraph 35}. [59] On the other hand, the judgment at first instance explained that the applicant had only carried out research in the course of the administrative proceedings into whether the countries of the undertakings used as comparators had a similar type of tax burden to the Hungarian local business tax, and the expert had referred in his expert opinion to the fact that the applicant had only identified this one difference when carrying out the comparative analysis, but, if a detailed analysis is carried out, each difference can be individually identified and quantified and it is for this reason that the OECD guidelines also allow a range of results to be taken into account, because it reduces the differences between the business characteristics of the associated enterprises and the independent companies involved in comparable transactions and also takes account of differences which occur in different commercial and financial circumstances. Thus, the expert did not share the expert’s view that, while the narrowing to the interquartile range includes differences that are not quantifiable or clearly identifiable, individual adjustments should always be applied in the case of clearly identifiable and quantifiable significant differences. Thus, the trial court took a contrary view to the expert on this issue. [60] Nor did the Court of First Instance share the expert’s view in relation to the interest rate on the intercompany loan granted to the applicant by its affiliate and did not accept the expert’s finding that the MNB’s interest rate statistics were an averaging of the credit spreads of the debtor parties involved in the financing transactions, on an aggregated basis and, consequently, the use of the MNB interest rate statistics is not in itself capable of supporting or refuting the arm’s length principle of the interest rate applied in intra-group lending transactions, whether long or short-term. Nor did it accept the method used and described by the applicant in the comparability field, since it did not consider that the applicant should have used an international database to look for comparative data, since comparability was questionable. Furthermore, it considered irrelevant the expert’s reference to the fact that the average loan interest rates in Hungary in 2016 were strongly influenced by the low interest rates on subsidised loans to businesses and criticised the fact that the expert did not consider it necessary to examine the applicant’s current account loans under the cash-pool scheme. [61] It can thus be concluded that the Court of First Instance, in its judgment, did not accept the reasoning of the private expert’s opinion and made professionally different findings from those of the expert on both substantive points. [62] The opinion of the appointed expert is questionable if a) it is incomplete or does not contain the mandatory elements of the opinion required by law, b) it is vague, c) it contradicts itself or the data in the case, or d) there is otherwise a strong doubt as to its correctness [Art. 316 (1) of the Civil Code]. The private expert’s opinion is questionable if a) the case specified in paragraph (1) is present [Art. 316 (2) a) of the Civil Code]. Section 316 of the Private Expert Act specifies and indicates precisely in which cases the expert’s opinion is to be considered as a matter of concern. Thus, the expert’s opinion is of concern if it is incomplete, vague, contradictory or otherwise doubtful. The latter case ...

On 17 April 2015, “Loan Ltd” entered into a bond loan agreement with related parties. The effective interest rate charged to “Loan Ltd” (borrowing costs) in the years under consideration (2016 and 2017) was 8.1%. The interest rate had been determined based on the CUP method and external comparable data. The tax authorities determined the arm’s length interest rate for the loan to be 4,03% and issued an assessment of the additional taxable income resulting from the lower borrowing costs. A complaint was filed by “Loan Ltd” Decision of the Board The Board dismissed the complaint and upheld the assessment of the tax authorities. Excerpt “Because the applicant claims that the audit used inappropriate/non comparable data. Because, however, the audit chose the most reliable internal data in accordance with the OECD Guidelines, namely the interest rate agreed with a third independent bank for the provision of a credit facility (2.03%), which it adjusted by the percentage of the guarantee fee provided by the parent company (2%), resulting in an interest rate in accordance with the principle of equivalence equal to 4.03%. This adjustment is correct, in line with the OECD Guidelines and in the context of good administration. In particular, paragraph 10.177 of the OECD Guidelines states that: “The result of this analysis sets a maximum premium for the guarantee (the maximum amount the guarantee recipient will be willing to pay), i.e. the difference between the interest rate with the guarantee and the interest rate without the guarantee. […] The borrower would not have any incentive to enter into a guarantee agreement if, in total, he pays an amount (to the bank interest and to the guarantor commission) equal to what he would have paid to the bank without the guarantee (interest). Therefore, this maximum commission does not necessarily reflect the result of a negotiation made on a purely commercial basis, but represents the maximum that the borrower would be willing to pay’. The audit, in direct application of the OECD Guidelines, adjusted the lending rate by the maximum commission. Otherwise, the borrower would have paid an aggregate amount (interest to the bank and commission to the guarantor) higher than the amount he would have paid to the bank without the guarantee (interest). Because the audit, to corroborate the audit findings and its reasoning , also sought external comparable data (on an ancillary basis), namely, interest rates of comparable loans from the Bank of Greece and the Bank of Denmark. The Bank of Greece yielded an interest rate of 5.02% and from the Bank of Denmark 3.70% (3% plus 0.70% to reflect the country-Greece risk ). Because the above external comparables confirm the correctness of the audit approach, as they are close to the interest rate determined by the audit (4.03%) and at a significant deviation from the interest rate of the assessed intragroup transaction (8.1%). It should be noted that the reliance on central bank data is in line with a number of decisions of our Office (see, for example, BIT 4560/2021), but also a common methodology in numerous Documentation Files. As therefore, the claim of the applicant is rejected as unfounded.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

17 January 2023 the South African Revenue Service (SARS) released an interpretation note titled “DETERMINATION OF THE TAXABLE INCOME OF CERTAIN PERSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: INTRA-GROUP LOANS” which provides guidance on how SARS will determine arm’s length pricing for intra-group loans. The Note also provides guidance on the consequences for a taxpayer if the amount of debt, the cost of debt or both are not arm’s length. According to the note an intra-group loan would be incorrectly priced if the amount of debt funding, the cost of the debt or both are excessive compared to what is arm’s length ...

In 2011, Willink SAS issued two intercompany convertible bonds with a maturity of 10 years and an annual interest rate of 8%. The tax authorities found that the 8% interest rate had not been determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle. Willink appealed, but both the Administrative Court and later the Administrative Court of Appeal sided with the tax authorities. Judgment of the Supreme Court The Conseil d’Etat overturned the decision and ruled in favour of Willink SAS. The court found that RiskCalc could be used to determine a company’s credit rating for transfer pricing purposes in a sufficiently reliable manner, notwithstanding its shortcomings and the differences in the business sectors of the comparables. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

“Gas-Trader KtF” – a subsidiary in the E.ON group – had entered into loan agreements with other group companies and the related parties had determined the interest rate by application of the CUP method using the Thomson Reuters LoanConnector database. Comparable transactions was extracted from the database by searching for credit rating, type of debtor party, date of loan, maturity, transactions with completed status, and spread/provision fee. An audit was conducted by the tax authorities for FY 2012-2013 and the interest rate determined by the group was found to be incompliant with the arm’s length principle. The tax authorities applied the same method as Gas-Trader but added further search criteria in the selection of comparable transactions – credit purpose and insurance coverage. This resulted in a different range and an assessment of additional taxable income was issued. An appeal was filed by Gas-Trader KtF with the National Tax and Customs Board of Appeal where a judgement in favor of the tax authorities was issued. Then an appeal was then filed with the courts where the decision was annulled and the Board of Appeal ordered to initiate new proceedings. During these proceedings, an expert opinion was obtained which was in favor of Gas-Trader. However following objections from the tax authorities, the Board of Appeal dismissed the expert opinion and decided predominantly in favor of the tax authorities. An appeal was then filed with Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Court The Supreme Administrative Court set aside the decision and issued a judgement in favor of Gas-Trader. In its judgment, the Court states “[26] A large amount of data is needed to determine the transfer price. However, the available information may be incomplete, difficult to interpret, difficult to obtain for reasons of confidentiality, or may not exist at all, or the relevant independent enterprise itself may be missing. In the practical application of the arm’s length principle, the objective is always to determine an acceptable estimate of arm’s length profit based on reliable data. The ‘estimated’ nature of the transfer price means that it is never an exact tax act, but requires both the taxpayer and the tax authorities to subsequently take evidence that is clearly identifiable and realistic. The Curia has stated in its judgment Kfv.I.35.550/2018/12 that the question of transfer pricing can be a technical question or a purely legal question depending on the underlying facts. In the case at hand, the defendant transformed the decision into a question of law by basing its decision not on an examination of the transfer pricing method, but on a different classification of the underlying legal relationship from that of the plaintiff in that case. In the present case, the Curia adds that, in the event of a substantive examination of the transfer pricing method by the tax authorities, the applicant may also submit a request for evidence on a technical point in the course of the judicial review. [27] Among the methods of transfer pricing, both the Directives and the Tao [Corporate Tax and Dividend Tax] Law recognise the method of comparative independent prices. Pursuant to Section 18(2)(a) of the Tao Law, the arm’s length price is to be determined by one of the following methods: the arm’s length price method, whereby the arm’s length price is the price that independent parties would apply for the sale of a comparable asset or service in an economically comparable market. The problem in applying this method is the identification of the ‘economically comparable market’, which is ultimately achieved by applying the correction/constraint criteria within the scope of the method. Indeed, an independent transaction can only be compared with a controlled transaction using the method of comparable independent prices if one of the following two conditions is met: (a) none of the differences, if any, between the transactions to be compared or between the undertakings entering into those transactions can materially affect the free market price, or (b) relatively accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the distortive effect of such differences. Therefore, where distorting differences exist between controlled and unrelated transactions, adjustments should be made to at least broadly eliminate price influencing factors and enhance comparability. Each of the narrowing methods should be assessed for their relative accuracy and only those adjustments should be made that are likely to improve comparability. [28] In the case at bar, it is a fact that the defendant did not make a finding with respect to the plaintiff’s records that the plaintiff had developed what it considered to be an appropriate transfer price, that the defendant agreed to the use of the comparative independent pricing method. The court’s remedy resulted from a difference in the criteria considered by the parties to eliminate the distorting effect of the differences. It may also be noted that in the decision of the Court of Appeal ordering a new trial in the main proceedings, the defendant excluded the application of the interquartile range correction criterion of narrowing the range around the midpoint. [29] Defendant used the data extracted by the plaintiff from the LoanConnector database to verify the transfer pricing. In its procedure, it considered the relevant aspects of the Directives to be relevant, according to the review request: in the expected audit practice, tax auditors should be flexible in their approach, take into account the business considerations of taxpayers and start their analysis from the perspective of the pricing method chosen by the taxpayer. If the taxpayer’s screening strategy is reproducible and the screening steps are suitable to produce a suitable sample for the transaction under consideration, the tax administration will use the taxpayer’s database screening as a basis. If, for any reason, the tax administration disputes the screening steps, it will attempt to make the necessary adjustments based on the taxpayer’s research to ensure that the results calculated from the improved sample are consistent with the market price principle. As a starting point, the tax administration does not therefore seek to determine the price or range of prices applicable to ...

On 1 July 2013, HCL Maître Pierre issued a ten-year bond which were convertible into shares and bore interest at a rate of 12%, the accrued amount of which was capitalised annually until the date of redemption or conversion, together with a non-conversion premium at a rate of 3%, if applicable. This loan was subscribed by its sole partner, (SAS) HGFI Saint-Martin. Following an tax audit of HCL Maître Pierre’s for the financial years ended 31 March 2012, 2013 and 2014, the tax authorities considered that the interest at the rate of 12% could only be deducted at a rate set at 2.82%. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Court dismissed the appeal of HCL Maître Pierre and upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Excerpts “3. It follows from the combination of these provisions that interest relating to sums left or made available to a company by a company which directly or through an intermediary holds the majority of the share capital or in fact exercises decision-making power, or which is placed under the control of the same third party as the first company, are deductible within the limit of those calculated at a rate equal to the annual average of the average effective rates charged by credit institutions for variable-rate loans to enterprises with an initial term of more than two years or, if higher, at the rate which the borrowing enterprise could have obtained from independent financial institutions or organisations under similar conditions. The rate which the borrowing undertaking could have obtained from independent financial institutions or organisations under similar conditions shall mean, for the purposes of these provisions, the rate which such institutions or organisations would have been likely, in view of its own characteristics, in particular its risk profile, to grant it for a loan of the same characteristics under arm’s length conditions. The borrowing undertaking, which has the burden of proving the rate it could have obtained from independent financial institutions or bodies for a loan granted under similar conditions, may provide such proof by any means. In order to evaluate this rate, it may, where appropriate, take account of the yield on bonds issued by undertakings in comparable economic circumstances where such bonds constitute, in the circumstances under consideration, a realistic alternative to intra-group financing. Where the sums left or made available to the company by its members consist of the nominal amount of bonds convertible into shares subscribed to by the latter, the reference rate thus assessed should be adjusted to take account of the value of the conversion option associated with the convertible bonds issued. In order to establish that the 12% rate of the convertible bonds in question corresponded to the remuneration of an arm’s length financing, HCL Maître Pierre relied on ten bond issues by Western European companies with comparable risk, selected from a study by PwC, which showed a median rate of 11.91%. The court noted that these companies had ratings of less than BB- on the scale of the Standard and Poor’s rating agency, whereas the rating assigned by the same study to HCL Maître Pierre was BB+. It concluded that, since the comparables cited related to companies with worse credit ratings than its own, HCL Maître Pierre did not justify the arm’s length nature of the 12 % rate by presenting such a sample.” (10) It follows from the foregoing that HCL Maître Pierre does not provide evidence that the 12% rate at which it issued bonds convertible into shares on 1 July 2013 would be the rate it could have obtained from independent financial institutions or organisations under similar conditions, and that the tax authorities were right to limit the deduction of interest to the rate provided for by the provisions of Article 39(1)(3) of the aforementioned General Tax Code. The company is therefore not entitled to seek the annulment of the judgment by which the Strasbourg Administrative Court rejected its claim.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The price of a comparable uncontrolled services transaction may be derived based on indirect measures of the price charged in comparable uncontrolled services transactions, but only if – (A) The data are widely and routinely used in the ordinary course of business in the particular industry or market segment for purposes of determining prices actually charged in comparable uncontrolled services transactions; (B) The data are used to set prices in the controlled services transaction in the same way they are used to set prices in uncontrolled services transactions of the controlled taxpayer, or in the same way they are used by uncontrolled taxpayers to set prices in uncontrolled services transactions; and (C) The amount charged in the controlled services transaction may be reliably adjusted to reflect differences in quality of the services, contractual terms, market conditions, risks borne (including contingent-payment terms), duration or quantitative measure of services rendered, and other factors that may affect the price to which uncontrolled taxpayers would agree ...

Company M, the parent entity of an MNE group, maintains an AAA credit rating based on the strength of the MNE group’s consolidated balance sheet. Company D, a member of the same MNE group, has a credit rating of only BBB on a stand-alone basis, and needs to borrow EUR 10 million from an independent lender ...

The benefit of implicit support will be the difference between the borrowing terms attainable by the borrowing entity based on its credit rating as a member of the MNE group and those attainable on the basis of the stand-alone credit rating it would have had if it were an entirely unaffiliated enterprise. If the borrower has its own independent credit rating from an unrelated credit rating agency, this will usually reflect its membership of the MNE group and so ordinarily no adjustment would be needed to this credit rating to reflect implicit support ...

A lender would benefit from the stronger credit rating of the guarantor (compared to the borrower’s credit rating) and/or the guarantor’s asset pool (in addition to the borrower’s asset pool), and the borrower accordingly may expect a benefit in the form of a lower interest rate. Thus, based on facts and circumstances, a guarantee may provide a benefit to the borrower that has the same or higher credit rating as the guarantor, if the guarantee effectively allows the lender to access wider recourse and, therefore, reduces the interest rate despite the guarantor not having a higher credit rating. In determining the credit rating of the guarantor and the borrower, the effect of implicit support must be considered as explained in Section C.1.1 ...

A guarantee from another party may be used to support the borrower’s credit. A lender placing reliance on a guarantee or guarantees would need to evaluate the guarantor(s) in a similar way to that in which it evaluates the original borrower. For the lender to take a guarantee into account in setting or adjusting the terms and conditions of a loan, it would need to be reasonably satisfied that the guarantor(s) would be able to meet any shortfall resulting from the borrower being unable to meet its obligations in full in the event of a default. Guarantees are discussed in more detail in Section D ...

Maintenance covenants refer typically to financial indicators which have to be met at regular, predetermined intervals during the life of a covenanted loan. Maintenance covenants can act as an early warning system so that in the event of financial underperformance by the borrower, the borrower and/or lender can move to take remedial action at an early stage. This can help to protect unrelated lenders against information asymmetry ...

Incurrence covenants require or prohibit certain actions by the borrower without the consent of the lender. Incurrence covenants may, for example, prohibit the borrower from taking on additional debt, creating any charge on the assets of the entity or disposing of particular assets of the entity, thus giving some degree of certainty over the balance sheet of the borrower ...

The purpose of covenants in a loan agreement is generally to provide a degree of protection to the lender and so limit its risk. That protection may be in the form of incurrence covenants or maintenance covenants ...

Where this is the case, the credit rating of the MNE group may also be used for the purpose of pricing the accurately delineated loan where the facts so indicate, particularly in situations such as where the MNE is important to the group as described in paragraphs 10.78 and 10.79 and where the MNE’s indicators of creditworthiness do not differ significantly from those of the group. An MNE group credit rating is unaffected by controlled transactions and reflects the actual basis on which the group seeks external funding from independent lenders. In situations where an MNE group does not have an external credit rating, consideration may be given to conducting the credit rating analysis at the MNE group level for assessing the controlled transaction. In all cases, the MNE group credit rating, like any other credit rating, will be appropriate only if it is determined to be the most reliable indicator of the MNE credit rating in light of all the facts and circumstances ...

It is also important to note that although there are established approaches to estimate a credit rating for a particular group member or debt issuance, the considerations detailed above mean that a pricing approach based on the separate entity credit ratings that are derived from publicly available financial tools (see paragraph 10.72), the implicit support analysis, the difficulties of accounting for controlled transactions reliably and the presence of information asymmetry may pose challenges that, if not resolved, may result in outcomes that are not reliable ...

The impact of an assessment of implicit support is a matter of judgement. The kind of information on which the MNE group would base a decision of whether or not to provide support to a borrower in particular circumstances may not be available to a tax administration, as is frequently the case in transfer pricing examinations, and the existence of information asymmetry may affect the ability of tax administrations to establish the likelihood of support (see section B.2 in Chapter IV). Furthermore, changing facts and circumstances affecting the willingness or ability of the MNE group to provide support may mean that there is no decision by the MNE group itself until the eventuality for such support arises. This contrasts, for example, where the MNE receives a formal guarantee from another group member. The past behaviour of an MNE group as regards providing support may be a useful indicator of likely future behaviour but an appropriate analysis should be undertaken to identify whether different conditions apply ...

Another key consideration would be the likely consequences for other parts of the MNE group of supporting or not supporting the borrower. The criteria used to determine the status of an entity in this regard may include such considerations as legal obligations (e.g. regulatory requirements), strategic importance, operational integration and significance, shared name, potential reputational impacts, negative effects on the overall MNE group, general statement of policy or intent, and any history of support and common behaviour of the MNE group with respect to third parties. The relative relevance of those factors may vary from one industry to another ...

In the context of intra-group loans, this incidental benefit that the MNE is assumed to receive solely by virtue of group affiliation, is referred to as implicit support. The effect of potential group support on the credit rating of an entity and any effect on that entity’s ability to borrow or the interest rate paid on those borrowings would not require any payment or comparability adjustment. See Example 1 at paragraphs 1.184 – 1.186 of Chapter I and Section D.3 ...

The effect of group membership is relevant for informing the conditions under which an MNE would have borrowed from an independent lender at arm’s length in two ways in particular. Firstly, the external funding policies and practices of group management will assist in informing the form and terms and conditions of the debt the MNE would have entered into with an independent lender, including the pricing (i.e. interest rate paid), and all economically relevant characteristics such as the type of loan, its term, currency, security, covenants, business strategies, and so forth. Secondly, the MNE may receive support from the group to meet its financial obligations in the event of the borrower getting into financial difficulty. Paragraph 1.178 of Chapter I of these Guidelines is relevant to analyse the effect of group membership on the terms and conditions of a borrowing when the borrowing MNE obtains an incidental benefit arising solely by virtue of group affiliation, i.e. passive association ...

In conducting a credit rating analysis, it is important to note that the financial metrics may be influenced by current and past controlled transactions (such as sales, or interest expenses). If it appears that such controlled transactions are not in accordance with the arm’s length principle, the credit rating derived in light of such intra-group transactions may not be reliable. (See also guidance in section B). These considerations apply both to controlled transactions that may affect the current earnings of the MNE and to previous funding and other intra-group transactions that may have had an impact on the measures of income and capital of the MNE that are the subject of quantitative analysis ...

The credit rating methodology used in publicly available financial tools may differ significantly in certain respects from the credit rating methodologies applied by independent credit rating agencies to determine official credit ratings and the impact of any such differences should be carefully considered. For instance, publicly available tools generally use only a limited sample of quantitative data to determine a credit rating. Official credit ratings published by independent credit rating agencies are derived as a result of far more rigorous analysis that includes quantitative analysis of historic and forecast entity performance as well as detailed qualitative analysis of, for instance, management’s ability to manage the entity, industry specific features and the entity’s market share in its industry ...

Publicly available financial tools are designed to calculate credit ratings. Broadly, these tools depend on approaches such as calculating the probability of default and of the likely loss should default occur to arrive at an implied rating for the borrowing. This can then be compared to a market database in a search for comparables to arrive at a price or price range for the borrowing. In considering whether the application of these tools results in a reliable assessment of the credit rating of controlled transactions, potential issues that need to be borne in mind include that the results are not based on a direct comparison with transactions between independent parties but are subject to the accuracy of the input parameters, a tendency to rely more on quantitative inputs at the expense of qualitative factors, and a lack of clarity in the processes (i.e. the workings of the underlying algorithms and processes may not be transparent) ...

Particular considerations should be borne in mind when determining a credit rating for a specific MNE within an MNE group for the purpose of assessing controlled transactions. Where an MNE has a publicly available credit rating published by an independent credit rating agency, that rating may be informative for an arm’s length analysis of the MNE’s controlled financing transactions. However, in most cases, publicly available credit ratings are only available for the MNE group. An approach often used for a specific MNE is to apply quantitative and qualitative analyses of the individual characteristics of the MNE using publicly available financial tools or independent credit rating agencies’ methodologies to seek to replicate the process used to determine the credit rating of the MNE group. This approach also involves taking into account improvements in creditworthiness that the specific MNE would be assumed to receive as a result of being part of the MNE group ...

The credit rating of an MNE or MNE group may differ from an issue rating due to the fact that the credit risk of a financial instrument is linked to its specific features and not only to the risk profile of the borrowing MNE. On prevailing facts and circumstances, and provided there is comparability between the third party debt issuance and the controlled transaction, when both an issuer and issue ratings are available, the issue rating of the particular debt issuance would be more appropriate to use to price the controlled financial transaction ...

The credit rating of a particular debt issuance (“issue rating”) is an opinion about the creditworthiness of the issuer with respect to a specific financial instrument. The issue rating considers specific features of the financial instrument, for instance, guarantees, securities and level of seniority ...

It is important that the MNE group appropriately documents the reasons and selection of the credit rating used for a particular MNE when pricing intra-group loans and other controlled financial transactions ...

There may be special circumstances, such as in the case of start-up entities, or those that have recently been part of a merger, that may have an impact on the credit rating of a group entity. These special situations should be taken into consideration ...

The credit rating of an MNE or MNE group (usually referred to as the “issuer credit rating”) is an opinion about its general creditworthiness. Such an opinion is usually premised on the MNE or MNE group’s capacity and willingness to meet its financial obligations in accordance with the terms of those obligations. The credit rating of an MNE or MNE group is effectively a form of relative ranking of the creditworthiness in comparison to other borrowers. In general, a lower credit rating will indicate a greater risk of default and be expected to result in a higher rate of return for lenders ...

Credit ratings can be determined for the overall creditworthiness of an MNE or MNE group4 or for a specific issuance of debt. As detailed in the following paragraphs, determining credit ratings requires consideration of quantitative – e.g. financial information – and qualitative factors – e.g. industry and country in which the MNE or MNE group operates ...

The creditworthiness of the borrower is one of the main factors that independent investors take into account in determining an interest rate to charge. Credit ratings can serve as a useful measure of creditworthiness and therefore help to identify potential comparables or to apply economic models in the context of related party transactions. Furthermore, in the case of intra-group loans and other financial instruments that are the subject of controlled transactions, the effect of group membership may be an economically relevant factor that affects the pricing of these instruments. Accordingly, this subsection elaborates on the use of credit ratings and the effect of group membership in the context of pricing intra- group loans. Where appropriate, reference to this subsection will be made in other parts of this guidance ...

Similarly, an associated enterprise should not be considered to receive an intra-group service when it obtains incidental benefits attributable solely to its being part of a larger concern, and not to any specific activity being performed. For example, no service would be received where an associated enterprise by reason of its affiliation alone has a credit-rating higher than it would if it were unaffiliated, but an intra-group service would usually exist where the higher credit rating were due to a guarantee by another group member, or where the enterprise benefitted from deliberate concerted action involving global marketing and public relations campaigns. In this respect, passive association should be distinguished from active promotion of the MNE group’s attributes that positively enhances the profit-making potential of particular members of the group. Each case must be determined according to its own facts and circumstances. See Section D.8 of Chapter I on MNE group synergies ...

Assume that S borrows EUR 50 million from an independent lender at the market rate of interest for borrowers with an A credit rating. Assume further that S simultaneously borrows EUR 50 million from T, another subsidiary of P, with similar characteristics as the independent lender, on the same terms and conditions and at the same interest rate charged by the independent lender (i.e. an interest rate premised on the existence of an A credit rating). Assume further that the independent lender, in setting its terms and conditions, was aware of S’s other borrowings including the simultaneous loan to S from T ...

P is the parent company of an MNE group engaging in a financial services business. The strength of the group’s consolidated balance sheet makes it possible for P to maintain an AAA credit rating on a consistent basis. S is a member of the MNE group engaged in providing the same type of financial services as other group members and does so on a large scale in an important market. On a stand-alone basis, however, the strength of S’s balance sheet would support a credit rating of only Baa. Nevertheless, because of S’s membership in the P group, large independent lenders are willing to lend to it at interest rates that would be charged to independent borrowers with an A rating, i.e. a lower interest rate than would be charged if S were an independent entity with its same balance sheet, but a higher interest rate than would be available to the parent company of the MNE group ...

Apex Tool Holding France acquired all the shares of Cooper Industrie France, which has since become Apex Tool France. This transaction was financed by a ten-year vendor loan at a rate of 6%. This claim on Apex Tool Holding France was transferred on the same day by the seller to the parent company of this company, which is the head of a global group specialising in tool manufacturing and thus, from that date, the creditor of its subsidiary. Apex Tool Holding France reintegrated the fraction of interest relating to this intra-group loan exceeding the average annual effective rate charged by credit institutions for variable-rate loans granted to companies into its income for the years 2011 to 2013. Apex considered that an interest rate of 6 % was in line with that which it could have obtained from independent financial institutions or organisations under similar conditions. The analysis was set aside by the tax authorities and an assessment was issued where the deduction of interest had been reduced. Apex filed an appeal with the Administrative Court of Appeal. The Court found in favor of the tax authorities in a decision issued in March 2020. An appeal was then filed by Apex with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Court The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal and issued a decision in favor of Apex Tool Group. Excerpts (Unofficial English translation) “3. It is clear from the documents in the file submitted to the trial judges that in order to establish that the rate of 6% at which ATFH1 had paid the loan granted to it by its parent company, which was higher than the rate provided for in the first paragraph of 3° of 1 of Article 39 of the General Tax Code, was not higher than the rate that this company would have obtained from an independent financial institution, the applicant company relied on an initial study drawn up by its counsel. In the absence of previous loans obtained by ATFH1 in 2010, this study first determined the credit rating of the intra-group loan in dispute according to the methodology published by the rating agency Moody’s for the analysis of industrial companies, which took into account the company’s profile, in particular with regard to market data, its size, its profitability, the leverage effect and its financial policy. The rating was set at “BB+”. The study then compared ATHF’s interest rate of 6% with the rates of bond issues over the same period with comparable credit ratings, using data available in the Bloomberg database. The company also relied on an additional study that analysed the arm’s length rate in a sample of bank loans to companies in the non-financial sector with credit ratings ranging from ‘BBB-‘ to ‘BB’. 4. Firstly, in holding that the credit rating assigned to the intra-group loan granted to ATFH1 by the first study in accordance with the methodology set out in point 3 did not reflect the intrinsic situation of that company on the grounds that it had been determined by taking into account the aggregate financial statements of the group that ATHF1 formed with its subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries whereas, as stated in point 2, for the application of the provisions of Articles 39 and 212 of the General Tax Code, the profile of the borrowing company must in principle be assessed in the light of the financial and economic situation of the group that this company forms with its subsidiaries, the Court erred in law. 5. Secondly, it is clear from the documents in the file submitted to the court that the sample of comparable companies used in the supplementary study, the relevance of which had not been contested by the administration, concerned companies in the non-financial sector such as ATFH1 and which had obtained credit ratings ranging from “BBB-” to “BB”, i.e. one notch above and below the “BB+” credit rating determined for the loan in question in the first study. In dismissing this additional study on the sole ground that the companies in the sample belonged to heterogeneous sectors of activity and that, consequently, it was not established that, for a banker, they would have presented the same level of risk as that of ATFH1, whereas the credit rating systems developed by the rating agencies aim to compare the credit risks of the rated companies after taking into account, in particular, their sector of activity, the Court erred in law. “ Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Singapore Telecom Australia Investments Pty Ltd entered into a loan note issuance agreement (the LNIA) with a company (the subscriber) that was resident in Singapore. Singapore Telecom Australia and the subscriber were ultimately 100% owned by the same company. The loan notes issued totalled approximately $5.2 billion to the subscriber. The terms of the LNIA was amendet on three occasions – the first amendment and the second amendment were expressed to have effect as from the date when the LNIA was originally entered into. The interest rate under the LNIA as amended by the third amendment was 13.2575% Following an audit the tax authorities issued an amended assessment under the transfer pricing provisions and denied interest deductions totalling approximately $894 million in respect of four years of income. According to the tax authorities the conditions agreed between the parties differed from the arm’s length principle. Singapore Telecom Australia appealed the assessment to the Federal Court. Judgement of the Federal Court The court upheld the the assessment issued by the tax authorities and dismissed the appeal of Singapore Telecom Australia. Click here for translation ...

A Oyj was the parent company of the A-group, and responsible for the group’s centralised financial activities. It owned the entire share capital of D Oy and B Oy. D Oy in turn owned the entire share capital of ZAO C, a Russian company. A Oyj had raised funds from outside the group and lent these funds to its Finnish subsidiary B Oy, which in turn had provided a loan to ZAO C. The interest charged by B Oy on the loans to ZAO C was based on the cost of A Oyj’s external financing. The interest rate also included a margin of 0,55 % in tax year 2009, 0,58 % in tax year 2010 and 0,54 % in tax year 2011. The margins had been based on the average margin of A Oyj’s external financing plus 10 %. The Tax Administration had considered that the level of interest to be charged to ZAO C should have been determined taking into account the separate entity principle and ZAO C’s credit rating. In order to calculate the arm’s length interest rate, the synthetic credit rating of ZAO C had been determined and a search of comparable loans in the Thomson Reuters DealScan database had been carried out. On the basis of this approach, the Tax Administration had considered the market interest margin to be 2 % for the tax year 2009 and 3,75 % for the tax years 2010 and 2011. In the tax adjustments the difference between the interest calculated based on the adjusted rates and the interest actually charged to ZAO C had been added to A Oyj’s taxable income. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The court overturned an earlier decision handed down by the Administrative Court of Helsinki and ruled in favour of A Oyj. The Supreme Administrative Court held that ZAO C had received an intra-group service in the form of financing provided by A Oyj through B Oy. The Court also considered that the cost-plus pricing method referred to in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines was the most appropriate method for assessing the pricing of intra-group services. Thus, the amount of interest to be charged to ZAO C could have been determined on the basis of the costs incurred by the Finnish companies of the group in obtaining the financing, i.e. the cost of external financing plus a mark-up on costs, and ZAO C could have benefited from the better creditworthiness of the parent company of the group. Consequently the Supreme Administrative Court annulled the previous decisions of the Administrative Court and set aside the tax adjustments. Excerpts “B Oy has been responsible for financing ZAO C and certain other group companies with funds received from the parent company. The company is a so-called ‘shell company’ which has had no other activity since 2009 than to act as a company through which intra-group financing formally flows.” “The question is whether the tax assessments of A Oyj for the tax years 2009 to 2011 could be adjusted to the detriment of the taxpayer and the taxable income of the company increased pursuant to Article 31 of the Tax Procedure Act, because the level of the interest margin paid by ZAO C to the Finnish group companies was below the level which ZAO C would have had to pay if it had obtained financing from an independent party. The Supreme Administrative Court’s decision KHO 2010:73 concerns a situation where a new owner had refinanced a Finnish OY after a takeover. The interest rate paid by the Finnish Oy on the new intra-group debt was substantially higher than the interest rate previously paid by the company to an external party, which the Supreme Administrative Court did not consider to be at arm’s length. The present case does not concern such a situation, but whether ZAO C was able to benefit financially from the financing obtained through the Finnish companies of the group. In its previous case law, the Supreme Administrative Court has stated that the methods for assessing market conformity under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are to be regarded as an important source of interpretation when examining the market conformity of the terms of a transaction (KHO 2013:36, KHO 2014:119, KHO 2017:146, KHO 2018:173, KHO 2020:34 and KHO 2020:35). As explained above, the transfer pricing guidelines published by the OECD in 1995 and 2010 are essentially the same in substance for the present case. It is therefore not necessary to assess whether the company’s tax assessment for the tax year 2009 could have been adjusted to the detriment of the taxpayer on the basis of the 2010 OECD transfer pricing guidelines. According to the OECD transfer pricing guidelines described above, when examining the arm’s length nature of intra-group charges, a functional analysis must first be carried out, in particular to determine the legal capacity in which the taxpayer carries out its activities. The guidelines further state that almost all multinational groups need to organise specifically financial services for their members. Such services generally include cash flow and solvency management, capital injections, loan agreements, interest rate and currency risk management and refinancing. In assessing whether a group company has provided financial services, the relevant factor is whether the activity provides economic or commercial value to another group member which enhances the commercial position of that member. In contrast, a parent company is not considered to receive an internal service when it receives an incidental benefit that is merely the result of the parent company being part of a larger group and is not the result of any particular activity. For example, no service is received when the interest-earning enterprise has a better credit rating than it would have had independently, simply because it is part of a group. The financial activities of the A group are centralised in A Oyj. The group’s external and internal loan agreements have prohibited A Oyj subsidiaries from obtaining external financing in their own name. Where necessary, the subsidiaries have provided collateral for ...

A non-interest-bearing loan had been granted by GI Group S.p.A., to a related company – Goldfinger Limited – in Hong Kong, in order to acquire a 56% shareholding in the Chinese company Ningbo Gi Human Resources Co. Limited. The Italien tax authorities had issued an assessment, where an interest rate on the loan had been determined and an amount equal to the interest calculated on that basis had been added to the taxable income of GI Group S.p.A. GI Group brought this assessment to the Regional Tax Commission where a decision was rendered setting aside the assessment. This decision was appealed to the Supreme Court by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme court upheld the appeal of the tax authorities and referred the case back to the Regional Tax Commission. According to the Supreme Court, the decision of the Tax Commission dit not comply with the principles of law concerning the subject matter of evidence and the burden of proof on tax authorities and the taxpayer. Excerpts: “…In conclusion, according to the Court, “such discipline, being aimed at repressing the economic phenomenon of transfer pricing, i.e. the shifting of taxable income as a result of transactions between companies belonging to the same group and subject to different national laws, does not require the administration to prove the avoidance function, but only the existence of “transactions” between related companies at a price apparently lower than the normal one” “according to the application practice of the Italian Revenue Agency (Circular No. 6/E of 30 March 2016 on leveraged buy-outs), the reclassification of debt (or part of it) as a capital contribution should represent an “exceptional measure”. Moreover, it is not excluded that free intra-group financing may have a place in the legal system where it can be demonstrated that the deviation from the arm’s length principle is due to “commercial reasons” within the group, related to the role that the parent company assumes in supporting the other companies of the group; “ “…the Regional Commission did not comply with the (aforementioned) principles of law concerning the subject-matter of the evidence and the criterion for sharing the burden of proof, between the tax authorities and the taxpayer, on the subject of international transfer pricing. In essence, the examination of the trial judge had to be oriented along two lines: first, it had to verify whether or not the tax office had provided the evidence, to which it was entitled, that the Italian parent company had carried out a financing transaction in favour of the foreign subsidiary, as a legitimate condition for the recovery of the taxation of the interest income on the loan, on the basis of the market rate observable in relation to loans with sufficiently “comparable” characteristics and provided to entities with the same credit rating as the associated debtor company (see the OECD Report 2020), the determination of which is quaestio facti referred to the judge of merit; secondly, once this preliminary profile had been established, also on the basis of the principle of non-contestation, it had to be verified whether, for its part, the company had demonstrated that the non-interest-bearing loan was due to commercial reasons within the group, or in any event was consistent with normal market conditions or whether, on the contrary, it appeared that that type of transaction (i.e. the loan of money) between independent companies operating in the free market would have taken place under different conditions. Instead, as stated above (see p. 2 of the “Findings”), the C.T.R. required the Office to demonstrate facts and circumstances extraneous to the onus pro bandi of the Administration, such as the existence of an interest of Goldfinger Ltd in obtaining and remunerating the loan and, again, that there had been other similar onerous intra-group loans; Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In 2011, Willink SAS issued two intercompany convertible bonds with a maturity of 10 years and an annual interest rate of 8%. The tax authorities found that the 8% interest rate had not been determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle. Willink appealed, but in a decision issued in 2019 the Administrative Court sided with the tax authorities. An appeal was then filed with the Court of Appeal. Judgment of the Supreme Court The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of Willink and upheld the decision of the Administrative Court. Excerpt “7. It is common ground that the funds Apax France VIII-A, Apax France VIII-B and the companies MidInvest and Telecom Online are linked to the company Willink, of which they are all partners, and that the rate of 8% exceeds the rate provided for in the first paragraph of 3° of 1 of Article 39 of the General Tax Code. To justify that this rate was not higher than the one it could have obtained from independent financial institutions or organisations under similar conditions, SAS Willink produced before the Court a comparative rate study carried out in 2020 using the Riskcalc software developed by Moody’s Analytics, a subsidiary of the rating agency Moody’s. This study is based on a model calculating the probability of default in the short term (one year) and the long term (five years) and then associates an implicit scoring. In order to select the most reliable and consistent scoring possible, this was determined on the basis of the applicant’s financial statements for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013. A search for comparable transactions on the open market was then carried out using the SetP Capital IQ database. Transactions were selected for which the issuing companies had a score comparable to Willink, issued by public or private companies across a range of industries during the relevant period. The sample was then refined, including transactions with a maturity close to each of the bonds to be compared. An interquartile range of arm’s length interest rates was then constructed on the basis of the bonds identified as comparables and used to identify median rates. 8. Although it is possible to assess the arm’s length rates by taking into account the yield on bonds, it is only on condition that, even if the loan is a realistic alternative to an intra-group loan, the reference companies are in comparable economic conditions. In the present case, this condition cannot be considered to be met for the companies selected in the sample of the report mentioned above. The level of risk used as a basis for comparison is based on a statistical model derived from historical quantitative data for companies that are not representative of the market, since defaulting companies are over-represented, and was determined on the basis of some ten financial data provided by the company itself. There is nothing to establish that this risk rating adequately takes into account all the factors recognised as forward-looking, and in particular the characteristics specific to the sector of activity concerned, even though this sector of activity is provided for the implementation of the model. Nor is it established that the so-called comparable companies in the study sample, which belonged to heterogeneous sectors of activity, would have presented the same level of risk for a banker as that with which the interested party was confronted at the same time. It follows that SAS Willink, which cannot usefully argue in these circumstances that the service cannot require a rating from a rating agency for each of the intra-group financing operations, cannot be regarded as providing the proof, which is incumbent on it, that it could have obtained a rate of 8 % from independent financial institutions or organisations under similar conditions. 9. It follows from all the foregoing that SAS Willink is not entitled to maintain that it was wrongly dismissed by the contested judgment of the Paris Administrative Court. Consequently, its claims for the application of Article L 761-1 of the Code of Administrative Justice can only be rejected.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A intercompany loan had been granted within the Apex Tool group at an interest rate of 6 percent and to demonstrate the arm’s length nature of the interest rate the borrowing company provided a comparability analyses. The analysis was set aside by the tax authorities and an assessment was issued where the deduction of interest had been reduced. Apex then filed an appeal with the Administrative Court of Appeal. Judgement of the Court The Court dismissed the analyses provided by Apex and upheld the assessment of the tax authorities. Excerpts (Unofficial English translation) “9. The investigation shows that the credit rating assigned to the loan in question by Baker and McKenzie, after several adjustments, was not based on the intrinsic situation of ATHF1, particularly with regard to its lending activity and its development prospects. On the contrary, it was allocated on the basis of the aggregate financial statements of the sub-group it formed with four of its subsidiaries and sub-subsidiaries, only one of which, in any event, carried out the industrial activity that Apex Tool Group claims was the only relevant basis for comparison, in the absence of a basis for holding companies other than investment companies and conglomerates. Furthermore, although it is not excluded that the arm’s length rates can be evaluated by taking into account the yield of bond loans, this is only on condition, even supposing that the loan taken out constitutes a realistic alternative to an intra-group loan, that the companies serving as references are in comparable economic conditions. In the case in point, this condition cannot be considered to have been met for the companies in the Baker and McKenzie sample, for which it is only argued, firstly, that they have credit ratings close to that attributed to the ATHF1 loan and, secondly, that they had recourse to the bond market for transactions of the same duration and maturity. Lastly, although the additional study produced by Apex Tool Group shows arm’s length rates close to those obtained by ATHF1 from its parent company, it has not been established that the so-called comparable companies in the study sample, belonging to heterogeneous sectors of activity, would have presented the same level of risk for a banker as that which ATHF1 faced at the same time. Under these conditions, Apex Tool Group, which did not submit to the judge any offer of a loan from a banking establishment, does not provide the proof that ATHF1 was entitled to deduct the interest on the disputed loan up to the rate of 6% that it had actually paid.” “10. Under the terms of 1. of II of Article 212 of the General Tax Code: “When the amount of interest paid by a company to all directly or indirectly related companies within the meaning of Article 39(12) and deductible in accordance with I simultaneously exceeds the following three limits in respect of the same financial year: / a) The product corresponding to the amount of the said interest multiplied by the ratio existing between one and a half times the amount of the equity capital, assessed at the choice of the company at the opening or at the closing of the financial year and the average amount of the sums left or made available by all of the companies directly or indirectly linked within the meaning of Article 12 of Article 39 during the course of the financial year, b) 25% of the current result before tax previously increased by the said interest, the depreciation taken into account for the determination of this same result and the share of leasing rentals taken into account for the determination of the sale price of the asset at the end of the contract, /c) The amount of interest paid to this company by companies directly or indirectly linked within the meaning of Article 12 of Article 39, / the fraction of interest exceeding the highest of these limits cannot be deducted in respect of this financial year, unless this fraction is less than 150,000 . / However, this fraction of interest which is not immediately deductible may be deducted in respect of the following financial year up to the amount of the difference calculated in respect of that financial year between the limit mentioned in b and the amount of interest allowed for deduction under I. The balance not deducted at the end of this financial year is deductible in respect of subsequent financial years under the same conditions, subject to a discount of 5% applied at the beginning of each of these financial years. 11. Since ATHF1 was unable to benefit from the deductibility of the financial expenses arising from the loan taken out on 4 July 2010 beyond the rates of 3.91% and 3.39% set for the financial years ending in 2011 and 2012 respectively, it was not eligible for the extension of the deductibility limits set by II of Article 212 of the General Tax Code. Consequently, Apex Tool Group’s request that the calculation of ATHF1’s thin capitalisation interest be adjusted so that the balance of its interest subsequently carried forward at 31 December 2013 is increased from EUR 1,435,512 to EUR 2,401,651 can only be rejected. 12. It follows from all the foregoing that Apex Tool Group SAS is not entitled to argue that the Administrative Court of Melun wrongly rejected the remainder of its claim. Consequently, its claims for the application of Article L 761-1 of the Code of Administrative Justice can only be rejected.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

“HDP Lux SA acquired a building in France and financed the acquisition with a shareholder loan at an interest rate of 12%. The tax authorities issued a tax assessment for FY 2011 and 2012 in which the market interest rate was set at 3.57% and 2.52% respectively and the excess payments were considered as hidden distribution of profit on which withholding tax was applied. Decision of the Administrative Court The court upheld the tax authorities adjustment of the interest paid on the loan and the qualification of the excess payment as a hidden distribution of profits subject to a withholding tax of 15%. In addition, the court held that the OECD Guidelines could not influence the interpretation of the provision on hidden profit distributions, as the domestic provision had been adopted long before the OECD Guidelines, while at the same time recognising that the OECD Guidelines could be used as an “element of appreciation”. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Similarly, an associated enterprise should not be considered to receive an intra-group service when it obtains incidental benefits attributable solely to its being part of a larger concern, and not to any specific activity being performed. For example, no service would be received where an associated enterprise by reason of its affiliation alone has a credit-rating higher than it would if it were unaffiliated, but an intra-group service would usually exist where the higher credit rating were due to a guarantee by another group member, or where the enterprise benefitted from deliberate concerted action involving global marketing and public relations campaigns. In this respect, passive association should be distinguished from active promotion of the MNE group’s attributes that positively enhances the profit-making potential of particular members of the group. Each case must be determined according to its own facts and circumstances. See Section D.8 of Chapter I on MNE group synergies ...

Assume that S borrows EUR 50 million from an independent lender at the market rate of interest for borrowers with an A credit rating. Assume further that S simultaneously borrows EUR 50 million from T, another subsidiary of P, with similar characteristics as the independent lender, on the same terms and conditions and at the same interest rate charged by the independent lender (i.e. an interest rate premised on the existence of an A credit rating). Assume further that the independent lender, in setting its terms and conditions, was aware of S’s other borrowings including the simultaneous loan to S from T ...

P is the parent company of an MNE group engaging in a financial services business. The strength of the group’s consolidated balance sheet makes it possible for P to maintain an AAA credit rating on a consistent basis. S is a member of the MNE group engaged in providing the same type of financial services as other group members and does so on a large scale in an important market. On a stand-alone basis, however, the strength of S’s balance sheet would support a credit rating of only Baa. Nevertheless, because of S’s membership in the P group, large independent lenders are willing to lend to it at interest rates that would be charged to independent borrowers with an A rating, i.e. a lower interest rate than would be charged if S were an independent entity with its same balance sheet, but a higher interest rate than would be available to the parent company of the MNE group ...

X Sub GmbH is a German subsidiary of a multinational group. The parent company Y Par B.V. and the financial hub of the group Z Fin B.V. – a sister company to the German subsidiary – are both located in the Netherlands. In its function as a financial hub, Z Fin B.V granted several loans to X Sub GmbH. As part of a tax audit, the German tax authority considered that the interest on the inter-company loans paid by X Sub GmbH to Z Fin B.V. was too high. In order to determine the arm’s length interest rate, X Sub GmbH had applied the CUP method. The tax authority instead applied the cost plus method and issued an assessment. X Sub GmbH filed an appeal to Münster Fiscal Court. The Court found that the cost plus method had been correctly chosen by the tax authority, as the external CUPs could not be used because of differences in conditions between the uncontrolled transactions and the controlled transactions. Hence, the Court dismissed the appeal of X Sub GmbH. The decision has been appealed by X Sub GmbH to the German Federal Fiscal Court, ref. I R 4/17, where it is still pending. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Loan agreements were entered into between Cotton Naturals (I) Pvt. and a US subsidiary on 13th April, 2002, 7th May, 2003 and then on 8th September, 2003. The rate of interest had been fixed at 4% per annum on the principal sum. The CUP method had been applied to determine the rate. The tax authorities held that the arm’s length interest rate should instead be set at 14% p.a. Following an objection to the assessment, at partial relief was granted in the form of a reduction of the rate to 12,20%. An appeal was filed by Cotton Naturals with the Tax Appellate Tribunal Cotton Naturals (I) Pvt. Ltd. where in February 2013 the assessment was set aside. An appeal was then filed with the High Court by the tax authorities. Decision of the High Court The High Court decided in favor of Cotton Naturals (I) Pvt. Ltd. and set aside the tax assessment. Excerpts “Transfer pricing determination is not primarily undertaken to re-write the character and nature of the transaction, though this is permissible under two exceptions. Chapter X and Transfer Pricing rules do not permit the Revenue authorities to step into the shoes of the assessee and decide whether or not a transaction should have been entered. It is for the assessed to take  commercial decisions and decide how to conduct and carry on its business. Actual business transactions that are legitimate cannot be restructured.” “Transfer pricing is a mechanism to undo an attempt to shift profits and correct any under or over payment in a controlled transaction by ascertaining the fair purpose is to ascertain whether the transfer price is the same price which would have been agreed and paid for by unrelated enterprises transacting with each other, if the price is determined by market forces. The first step in this exercise is to ascertain the international transaction, which in the present case is payment of interest on the money lent. The next step is to ascertain the functions performed under the international transaction by the respective AEs. Thereafter, the comparables have to be selected by undertaking a comparability analysis. The comparability analysis should ensure that the functions performed by the comparables match with the functions being performed by the AE to whom payment is made for the services rendered. These aspects have been elucidated in detail in Sony India Ltd. (supra) by referring to the OECD Guidelines as well as United Nations Practical Manual of Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries.” “The finding of the TPO that for this reason the interest rate should be computed at 14% per annum i.e. the average yield on unrated bonds for Financial Years (FY, for short) 2006-07, has to be rejected.” “We have no hesitation in holding that the interest rate should be the market determined interest rate applicable to the currency concerned in which the loan has to be repaid. Interest rates should not be computed on the basis of interest payable on the currency or legal tender of the place or the country of residence of either party. Interest rates applicable to loans and deposits in the national currency of the borrower or the lender would vary and are dependent upon the fiscal policy of the Central bank, mandate of the Government and several other parameters. Interest rates payable on currency specific loans/ deposits are significantly universal and globally applicable. The currency in which the loan is to be re-paid normally determines the rate of return on the money lent, i.e. the rate of interest.” “In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the substantial question of law mentioned above has to be answered against the appellant i.e. the Revenue and in favour of the respondent-assessee. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.” ...

The application of the WEV (waarde in het economische verkeer) rule is particularly relevant if the non-corporate loan is interest-free or the agreed interest is owed. The interest to be taken into account for tax purposes is then determined on the market value of each interest period at the time it falls due. The assessment of the business nature of the money supply can take place both at the time of supply and during the term. This test must be carried out on both sides, from the perspective of the lending and borrowing company. Referring to what has been said above with regard to the perspective of the entities involved, a situation of an affiliated lender granting a loan to the borrowing group entity that subsequently is insufficiently creditworthy may also constitute a ‘non-business loan’ in the approach of the aforementioned judgment. In my opinion, the same applies to the borrower who, as a result of the linked intra-group loan, sees his creditworthiness drop to a level below BBB-. The Supreme Court considered that the level of interest on a ‘non-bankrupt loan’, a loan with a non-bankrupt default risk, should be determined by reference to the creditworthiness of the lending entity. The Supreme Court did not explain in its judgment how to deal with the creditworthiness of the lending group entity compared to the creditworthiness of the borrowing entity. In case of a higher creditworthiness of the lender compared to the creditworthiness of the borrowing entity, the interest rate that would be charged by the lending group entity itself will be considered as the appropriate interest rate to be taken into account for tax purposes. If the lending group entity does not have a better credit rating than the borrowing group entity, i.e. if it is not itself investment grade, the notional guarantee does not, in principle, add anything. In that case, no more than the risk-free interest rate on the loan can be taken into account. English translation of the opinion issued by the Attorney General – I recommend that the appeal in cassation is declared to be unfounded Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme court decided against the opinion of the Attorney General and concluded that the appeal of X B.V was well founded. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In the case of General Electric Capital, Canada, the issue was if a 1% guarantee fee  paid by General Electric Capital Canada Inc. to its AAA-rated US parent company satisfied the arm’s length test. The Canadian tax administration argued  that implicit support resulted in General Electric Canada having a AAA credit rating, so that the guarantee provided by the US parent had no value. Taxpayer argued that the 1% guarantee fee did not exceed arm’s length pricing and that implicit support from the US parent should be ignored since it stemmed from the non-arm’s length relationship. The Tax Court agreed with the tax administration that implicit support should be taken into account and applied a “yield approach,” comparing the interest rate the Canadian company would have paid with and without the guarantee. The Tax Court found that credit rating of the Canadian company – with implicit support but without the guarantee – was at most BBB-/BB+ and the 1% guarantee was arm’s length. The Federal Court of Appeal approved of both the Tax Court’s yield approach and its conclusion that the guarantee fee did not exceed an arm’s length price. On the issue of implicit support the Court concluded that under the arm´s length principle implicit support had to be taken into account . Determining arm’s length pricing “involves taking into account all the circumstances which bear on the price whether they arise from the relationship or otherwise.” Hence, Circumstances that are themselves inherently non-arm’s length in nature must also be considered. The relevant question is what an arm’s length guarantor would charge to provide a guarantee to a comparable subsidiary of a comparable AAA-rated US parent Company. Comparing prices of loans without regard to implicit support from the US parent, fails to recognize all of the relevant economic circumstances of the controlled transaction ...