In 2009 the BlackRock Group acquired Barclays Global Investors for a total sum of $13,5bn. The price was paid in part by shares ($6.9bn) and in part by cash ($6.6bn). The cash payment was paid by BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC – a US Delaware Company tax resident in the UK – but funded by the parent company by issuing $4bn loan notes to the LLC. In the years following the acquisition Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC claimed tax deductions in the UK for interest payments on the intra-group loans. The tax authorities (HMRC) denied tax deductions for the interest costs on two grounds: (1) HMRC claimed that no loans would have been made between parties acting at arm’s length, so that relief should be denied under the transfer pricing rules in Part 4 of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010. (2) HMRC also maintained that relief should be denied under the unallowable purpose rule in section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009, on the basis that securing a tax advantage was the only purpose of the relevant loans. An appeal was filed by the BlackRock Group with the First Tier Tribunal, which in a decision issued in November 2020 found that an independent lender acting at arm’s length would have made loans to LLC5 in the same amount and on the same terms as to interest as were actually made by LLC4 (the “Transfer Pricing Issue”). The FTT further found that the Loans had both a commercial purpose and a tax advantage purpose but that it would be just and reasonable to apportion all the debits to the commercial purpose and so they were fully deductible by LLC5 (the “Unallowable Purpose Issue”). An appeal was then filed with the Upper Tribunal by the tax authorities. According to the judgment issued in 2022, the Upper Tribunal found that the First Tier Tribunal had erred in law and therefore allowed HMRC’s appeal on both the transfer pricing issue and the unallowable purpose issue. The First Tier Tribunal’s Decision was set aside and the tax authorities amendments to LLC5’s tax returns were confirmed. An appeal was then filed by BlackRock with the Court of Appeal. Judgment The Court of Appeal found that tax deductions for the interest on the Loans were not restricted under the transfer pricing rules (cf. ground 1 above) but instead disallowed under the unallowable purpose rule in section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009 (cf. ground 2 above). Excerpt regarding application of transfer pricing rules “34. Paragraph 1.6 of both the 1995 and 2010 versions of the OECD guidelines explains that what Article 9 of the model convention seeks to do is to adjust profits by reference to “the conditions which would have obtained between independent enterprises in comparable transactions and comparable circumstances” (a comparable “uncontrolled transaction”, as opposed to the actual “controlled transaction”). The 2010 version adds that this comparability analysis is at the “heart of the application of the arm’s length principle”, while explaining at para. 1.9 that there are cases, for example involving specialised goods or services or unique intangibles, where a comparability analysis is difficult or complicated to apply. 35. In its discussion of comparability analysis, para. 1.15 of the 1995 version states: “Application of the arm’s length principle is generally based on a comparison of the conditions in a controlled transaction with the conditions in transactions between independent enterprises. In order for such comparisons to be useful, the economically relevant characteristics of the situations being compared must be sufficiently comparable. To be comparable means that none of the differences (if any) between the situations being compared could materially affect the condition being examined in the methodology (e.g. price or margin), or that reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the effect of any such differences. In determining the degree of comparability, including what adjustments are necessary to establish it, an understanding of how unrelated companies evaluate potential transactions is required. Independent enterprises, when evaluating the terms of a potential transaction, will compare the transaction to the other options realistically available to them, and they will only enter into the transaction if they see no alternative that is clearly more attractive. For example, one enterprise is unlikely to accept a price offered for its product by an independent enterprise if it knows that other potential customers are willing to pay more under similar conditions. This point is relevant to the question of comparability, since independent enterprises would generally take into account any economically relevant differences between the options realistically available to them (such as differences in the level of risk or other comparability factors discussed below) when valuing those options. Therefore, when making the comparisons entailed by application of the arm’s length principle, tax administrations should also take these differences into account when establishing whether there is comparability between the situations being compared and what adjustments may be necessary to achieve comparability.” Similar text appears at paras. 1.33 and 1.34 of the 2010 version. 36. As can be seen from this, it is essential that the “economically relevant characteristics” are “sufficiently comparable”, in the sense of any differences either not having a material effect on the relevant condition (term) of the transaction, or being capable of being adjusted for with reasonable accuracy so as to eliminate their effect. 37. Paragraph 1.17 of the 1995 version expands on the concept of differences as follows: “… In order to establish the degree of actual comparability and then to make appropriate adjustments to establish arm’s length conditions (or a range thereof), it is necessary to compare attributes of the transactions or enterprises that would affect conditions in arm’s length dealings. Attributes that may be important include the characteristics of the property or services transferred, the functions performed by the parties (taking into account assets used and risks assumed), the contractual terms, the economic circumstances of the parties, and the business strategies pursued by the parties…” Again, this is reflected in the 2010 version, at ...

A S.A. had transferred a dividend receivable to an indirect shareholder for the purpose of acquiring other companies. The tax authorities considered the transfer to be a loan, for which A S.A should have received arm’s length interest and issued an assessment on that basis. A complaint was filed by A S.A. with the tax Court, which ruled in favour of A S.A. and dismissed the assessmemt in 2021 An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Court The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decission of the tax court and dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities. According to the Court the local transfer pricing in article 58 of the CIRC, in the wording in force at the time of the facts did not allow for a recharacterization of a transaction, only for a re-quantification. A recharacterization of the transaction would at the time of the facts only be possible under the Portuguese general anti-abuse clause, which required the tax authorities to prove that the arrangement had been put in place for securing a tax advantage. Such evidence had not been presented. Excerpt “In other words, the fact that the transfer of credits arising from ancillary benefits to non-shareholders is not common is not enough to destroy the characteristics of the ancillary obligation set out in the articles of association, which, as is well known, can be transferred – see art. Furthermore, the Tax Authority’s reasoning reveals a total disregard for the rest of the applicable legal regime, namely the restitution regime provided for in Article 213 of the CSC, which gives them the unquestionable character of quasi-equity benefits. In fact, since the admissibility of supplementary capital contributions in public limited companies has been debated for a long time, but with the majority of legal scholars being in favor of such contributions, the enshrinement in the articles of association of the figure of accessory obligations following the supplementary contributions regime appeared as a solution to the possibility of internal financing of the public limited company, (See, for example, Paulo Olavo Cunha in Direito das Sociedades Comerciais, 3rd edition, Almedina, 2007, pages 441 and 442 (in a contemporary annotation with the legal framework in force at the time). ) . Furthermore, as pointed out by the Deputy Attorney General, whose reasoning, due to its assertiveness, we do not hesitate to refer to again, “This situation is not unrelated to the fact that, in the corporate structure in question, the company “D… ” has a majority stake in the company “A…”, and there is even doctrine that defends “the possibility of transferring the credits resulting from the supplementary installments autonomously from the status of partner” – in an explicit allusion to the view taken by Rui Pinto Duarte (Author cited, “Escritos sobre Direito das Sociedades”, Coimbra Editora, 2008). In conclusion: if the Tax Administration believed that the evidence it had found, to which we have already referred, strongly indicated that the transaction in question was really about the parties providing financing to the company “D…, S.A. “, it was imperative that it had made use of the anti-abuse clause (although there are legal scholars who also include article 58 of the CIRC in the special anti-abuse rules – see Rui Duarte Morais, “Sobre a Notção de “cláusulas antiabusos”, Direito Fiscal, Estudos Jurídicos e Económicos em Homenagem ao Prof. Dr. António Sousa Franco III 2006, p.879 /894) and use the procedure laid down in Article 63 of the CPPT, as the Appellant claims. What is not legitimate, however, in these circumstances, “in view of the letter of the law and the teleology of the transfer pricing system as enshrined in the IRC Code and developed in Ministerial Order 1446-C/2001, is to use this system to carry out a sort of half-correction and, in the other half, i.e., For cases of this nature, there is a specific legal instrument in the legal system – the CGAA – specially designed and aimed at combating this type of practice (Bruno Santiago & António Queiroz Martins, “Os preços de transferência na compra e venda de participações sociais entre entidades relacionadas”, Cadernos Preços de Transferência, Almedina, 2013, Coordenação João Taborda Gama). …” Click here for English translation. Click here for other translation ...

In 2009 the BlackRock Group acquired Barclays Global Investors for a total sum of $13,5bn. The price was paid in part by shares ($6.9bn) and in part by cash ($6.6bn). The cash payment was paid by BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC – a US Delaware Company tax resident in the UK – but funded by the parent company by issuing $4bn loan notes to the LLC. In the years following the acquisition Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC claimed tax deductions in the UK for interest payments on the intra-group loans. Following an audit in the UK the tax authorities disallowed the interest deductions. The tax authorities held that the transaction would not have happened between independent parties. They also found that the loans were entered into for an unallowable tax avoidance purpose. A UK taxpayer can be denied a deduction for interest where a loan has an unallowable purpose i.e, where a tax advantage is the company’s main purpose for entering into the loan relationship (section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009). If there is such an unallowable purpose, the company may not bring into account for that period ….so much of any debit in respect of that relationship as is attributable to the unallowable purpose. An appeal was filed by the BlackRock Group. In November 2020 the First Tier Tribunal found that an independent lender acting at arm’s length would have made loans to LLC5 in the same amount and on the same terms as to interest as were actually made by LLC4 (the “Transfer Pricing Issue”). The FTT further found that the Loans had both a commercial purpose and a tax advantage purpose but that it would be just and reasonable to apportion all the debits to the commercial purpose and so they were fully deductible by LLC5 (the “Unallowable Purpose Issue”). An appeal was then filed with the Upper Tribunal by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Upper Tribunal The Upper Tribunal found that the First Tier Tribunal had erred in law and therefore allowed HMRC’s appeal on both the transfer pricing issue and the unallowable purpose issue. The First Tier Tribunal’s Decision was set aside and the tax authorities amendments to LLC5’s tax returns were confirmed. Transfer Pricing “The actual provision of the loans from LLC4 to LLC5 differed from any arm’s length provision in that the loans would not have been made as between independent enterprises. The actual provision conferred a potential advantage in relation to United Kingdom taxation. The profits and losses of LLC5, including the allowing of debits for the interest and other expenses payable on the Loans, are to be calculated for tax purposes as if the arm’s length provision had been made or imposed instead of the actual provision. In this case, no arm’s length loan for $4 billion would have been made in the form that LLC4 made to LLC5 and hence HMRC’s amendments to the relevant returns should be upheld and confirmed.” Unallowable Purpose “The FTT did not err in finding that LLC5 had both a commercial purpose and an unallowable tax advantage main purpose in entering into the Loans. However, it was wrong to decide that the just and reasonable apportionment was solely to the commercial purpose. But for the tax advantage purpose there would have been no commercial purpose to the Loans and all the relevant facts and circumstances lead inexorably to the conclusion that the loan relationship debits should be wholly attributed to the unallowable tax purpose and so disallowed.” ...

It is expected that all cash pool participants will be better off than in the absence of the cash pool arrangement. Under prevailing facts and circumstances that could imply, for instance, that all cash pool participants would benefit from enhanced interest rates applicable to debit and credit position within the cash pooling arrangement compared to the rates that they would expect to obtain from borrowing or depositing cash outside of the pool. However, it is important to note that cash pool members might be willing to participate in cash pool arrangements to access benefits from the membership of the cash pool other than an enhanced interest rate like, for instance, access to a permanent source of financing; reduced exposure to external banks; or access to liquidity that may not be available otherwise ...

No member of the pooling arrangement would expect to participate in the transaction if it made them any worse off than their next best option. The analysis of an MNE’s decision to participate in a cash pool arrangement should be done with reference to its options realistically available, taking into account that an MNE can obtain benefits as a member of the cash pool other than an improved interest rate (see paragraph 10.146) ...

There can be group-level business reasons for an MNE group to restructure. However, it is worth re-emphasising that the arm’s length principle treats the members of an MNE group as separate entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified business (see paragraph 1.6). As a consequence, it is not sufficient from a transfer pricing perspective that a restructuring arrangement makes commercial sense for the group as a whole: the arrangement must be arm’s length at the level of each individual taxpayer, taking account of its rights and other assets, expected benefits from the arrangement (i.e. any consideration of the post-restructuring arrangement plus, if applicable, any compensation payments for the restructuring itself), and realistically available options. Where a restructuring makes commercial sense for the group as a whole on a pre-tax basis, it is expected that an appropriate transfer price (that is, any compensation for the post-restructuring arrangement plus, if applicable, any compensation payments for the restructuring itself) would generally be available to provide arm’s length compensation for each accurately delineated transaction comprising the business restructuring for each individual group member participating in it ...

The arm’s length principle requires an evaluation of the conditions made or imposed between associated enterprises, at the level of each of them. The fact that a business restructuring may be motivated by sound commercial reasons at the level of the MNE group, e.g. in order to try to derive synergies at a group level, does not answer the question whether it is arm’s length from the perspectives of each of the restructured entities ...

The authoritative statement of the arm’s length principle is found in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, which forms the basis of bilateral tax treaties involving OECD member countries and an increasing number of non-member countries. Article 9 provides: [Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two [associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. By seeking to adjust profits by reference to the conditions which would have obtained between independent enterprises in comparable transactions and comparable circumstances (i.e. in “comparable uncontrolled transactions”), the arm’s length principle follows the approach of treating the members of an MNE group as operating as separate entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified business. Because the separate entity approach treats the members of an MNE group as if they were independent entities, attention is focused on the nature of the transactions between those members and on whether the conditions thereof differ from the conditions that would be obtained in comparable uncontrolled transactions. Such an analysis of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, which is referred to as a “comparability analysis”, is at the heart of the application of the arm’s length principle. Guidance on the comparability analysis is found in Section D below and in Chapter III ...

In order to apply the separate entity approach to intra-group transactions, individual group members must be taxed on the basis that they act at arm’s length in their transactions with each other. However, the relationship among members of an MNE group may permit the group members to establish special conditions in their intra-group relations that differ from those that would have been established had the group members been acting as independent enterprises operating in open markets. To ensure the correct application of the separate entity approach, OECD member countries have adopted the arm’s length principle, under which the effect of special conditions on the levels of profits should be eliminated ...

SAS Microchip Technology Rousset (former SAS Atmel Rousset) is a French subsidiary of the American Atmel group, which designs, manufactures, develops and sells a wide range of semiconductor integrated circuits. It was subject to an audit covering the FY 2010 and 2011 and as a result of this audit, the tax authorities imposed additional corporate income tax and an additional assessments for VAT. The administration also subjected SAS Atmel Rousset to withholding tax due to income deemed to be distributed to one of the Atmel group companies. The authorities invoked the provisions of Article 57 of the General Tax Code as the new legal basis for the additional corporate tax contributions and the social contribution on corporate tax, resulting from the reintegration of the capital loss arising from the sale of SAS Fabco shares and the assumption of responsibility for SAS Fabco’s social plan, instead of the provisions of Article 38(1) and Article 39(1) of the same code. The tax administration, which relies on the guidelines recommended in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Public Administrations, argued that the transfer of the production activity, materialised by the sale of the Rousset plant, is part of a global strategy. The parent company of the group will benefit from the gains made through the outsourcing of the production activity, and moreover initiated and conducted the negotiations, as demonstrated by the letter of intent to purchase dated 12 May 2009 from LFoundry GmbH, addressed to the group’s parent company. Similarly, the administration notes that the “Stock Purchase Agreement” and “Wafer Purchase Agreement” relating respectively to the transfer of shares in SAS Fabco, and to the terms of purchase of semiconductors sold by this same company, were signed by Mr A…, Atmel Corporation’s Director of Operations. It follows from all of these elements that the tax authorities must be considered as providing evidence of a practice falling within the scope of Article 57 of the General Tax Code, which establishes a presumption of indirect profit transfer. SAS Microchip Technology Rousset applied to the Marseille administrative court for a discharge of duties and penalties for the taxes to which it was thus subject for the years 2010 and 2011, and in a judgment of 21 June 2019, the administrative court decided in favor of SAS Microchip Technology Rousset and set aside the assessment. The Authorities filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The court dismissed the appeal of the authorities and upheld the decision of the administrative court in favor of SAS Microchip Technology Rousset. Excerpts “…although the administration argues that this operation was entirely led by the group’s parent company’s operations manager, this circumstance, particularly because of the international scope of the project, is not such as to demonstrate that the interests of SAS Microchip Technology Rousset were not taken into account and that the transaction in question was concluded to the exclusive benefit of the American company. It follows from the above that the court was right to consider that the sum in dispute could not be considered as an indirect transfer of profits to the American company Atmel Corporation within the meaning of Article 57 of the General Tax Code. As a result, the tax authorities were not justified in increasing the profit subject to corporate income tax for the financial year ending in 2010 by EUR 72,062,567. “…Furthermore, it is also clear from the information provided by the respondent company that the cost of the additional costs generated by the Manufacturing Services Agreement was much lower than the costs that SAS Microchip Technology Rousset would have had to bear in the event of the restructuring of the Rousset manufacturing unit or its closure. It is clear from the documents in the file that the Flichy firm estimated that the redundancy costs alone would have amounted to EUR 176 800 000, while the community of the Pays d’Aix estimated at EUR 60 million the amount of business tax that would have had to be paid in the event of cessation of the activity. Finally, the fact that the director of operations of the parent company Atmel Corporation took the decisions relating to the transfer of the manufacturing activity of SAS Microchip Technology Rousset is not sufficient to establish that, by accepting the terms of the Manufacturing Services Agreement and by bearing the resulting additional costs, the respondent company did not act in the interest of the company. Consequently, the latter provided proof that the costs in dispute, which it had borne, had been justified by obtaining favourable considerations for its own operations and did not constitute an indirect transfer of profits. The administration was therefore not justified, as the administrative court ruled, in reintegrating the corresponding sum into the taxable profits of SAS Microchip Technology Rousset for the financial year ending in 2011.” Unless it establishes the existence of an abnormal act of management, the tax administration does not have to interfere in the management of companies. Under the combined provisions of Articles 38 and 209 of the General Tax Code, the profit subject to corporation tax is that which derives from operations of any kind carried out by the company, with the exception of those which, because of their purpose or their methods, are alien to normal commercial management. The assumption by an enterprise of costs for which it has no direct consideration or which are not directly incumbent on it is only normal commercial management if it appears that, in granting such advantages, the enterprise has acted in its own interest. It follows from the reasons set out in points 10 and 12, recalling the interest of SAS Microchip Technology Rousset in bearing the additional costs linked to the invoicing conditions provided for in the “Manufacturing Services Agreement” and “Wafer Purchase Agreement” relating to the purchase of wafers from LFoundry, that the administration does not establish an abnormal management act. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A Oyj was the parent company of the A-group, and responsible for the group’s centralised financial activities. It owned the entire share capital of D Oy and B Oy. D Oy in turn owned the entire share capital of ZAO C, a Russian company. A Oyj had raised funds from outside the group and lent these funds to its Finnish subsidiary B Oy, which in turn had provided a loan to ZAO C. The interest charged by B Oy on the loans to ZAO C was based on the cost of A Oyj’s external financing. The interest rate also included a margin of 0,55 % in tax year 2009, 0,58 % in tax year 2010 and 0,54 % in tax year 2011. The margins had been based on the average margin of A Oyj’s external financing plus 10 %. The Tax Administration had considered that the level of interest to be charged to ZAO C should have been determined taking into account the separate entity principle and ZAO C’s credit rating. In order to calculate the arm’s length interest rate, the synthetic credit rating of ZAO C had been determined and a search of comparable loans in the Thomson Reuters DealScan database had been carried out. On the basis of this approach, the Tax Administration had considered the market interest margin to be 2 % for the tax year 2009 and 3,75 % for the tax years 2010 and 2011. In the tax adjustments the difference between the interest calculated based on the adjusted rates and the interest actually charged to ZAO C had been added to A Oyj’s taxable income. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The court overturned an earlier decision handed down by the Administrative Court of Helsinki and ruled in favour of A Oyj. The Supreme Administrative Court held that ZAO C had received an intra-group service in the form of financing provided by A Oyj through B Oy. The Court also considered that the cost-plus pricing method referred to in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines was the most appropriate method for assessing the pricing of intra-group services. Thus, the amount of interest to be charged to ZAO C could have been determined on the basis of the costs incurred by the Finnish companies of the group in obtaining the financing, i.e. the cost of external financing plus a mark-up on costs, and ZAO C could have benefited from the better creditworthiness of the parent company of the group. Consequently the Supreme Administrative Court annulled the previous decisions of the Administrative Court and set aside the tax adjustments. Excerpts “B Oy has been responsible for financing ZAO C and certain other group companies with funds received from the parent company. The company is a so-called ‘shell company’ which has had no other activity since 2009 than to act as a company through which intra-group financing formally flows.” “The question is whether the tax assessments of A Oyj for the tax years 2009 to 2011 could be adjusted to the detriment of the taxpayer and the taxable income of the company increased pursuant to Article 31 of the Tax Procedure Act, because the level of the interest margin paid by ZAO C to the Finnish group companies was below the level which ZAO C would have had to pay if it had obtained financing from an independent party. The Supreme Administrative Court’s decision KHO 2010:73 concerns a situation where a new owner had refinanced a Finnish OY after a takeover. The interest rate paid by the Finnish Oy on the new intra-group debt was substantially higher than the interest rate previously paid by the company to an external party, which the Supreme Administrative Court did not consider to be at arm’s length. The present case does not concern such a situation, but whether ZAO C was able to benefit financially from the financing obtained through the Finnish companies of the group. In its previous case law, the Supreme Administrative Court has stated that the methods for assessing market conformity under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are to be regarded as an important source of interpretation when examining the market conformity of the terms of a transaction (KHO 2013:36, KHO 2014:119, KHO 2017:146, KHO 2018:173, KHO 2020:34 and KHO 2020:35). As explained above, the transfer pricing guidelines published by the OECD in 1995 and 2010 are essentially the same in substance for the present case. It is therefore not necessary to assess whether the company’s tax assessment for the tax year 2009 could have been adjusted to the detriment of the taxpayer on the basis of the 2010 OECD transfer pricing guidelines. According to the OECD transfer pricing guidelines described above, when examining the arm’s length nature of intra-group charges, a functional analysis must first be carried out, in particular to determine the legal capacity in which the taxpayer carries out its activities. The guidelines further state that almost all multinational groups need to organise specifically financial services for their members. Such services generally include cash flow and solvency management, capital injections, loan agreements, interest rate and currency risk management and refinancing. In assessing whether a group company has provided financial services, the relevant factor is whether the activity provides economic or commercial value to another group member which enhances the commercial position of that member. In contrast, a parent company is not considered to receive an internal service when it receives an incidental benefit that is merely the result of the parent company being part of a larger group and is not the result of any particular activity. For example, no service is received when the interest-earning enterprise has a better credit rating than it would have had independently, simply because it is part of a group. The financial activities of the A group are centralised in A Oyj. The group’s external and internal loan agreements have prohibited A Oyj subsidiaries from obtaining external financing in their own name. Where necessary, the subsidiaries have provided collateral for ...

The Swedish group TELE2, one of Europe’s largest telecommunications operators, had invested in an entity in Kazakhstan, MTS, that was owned via a joint venture together with an external party. Tele2 owned 51% of the Joint venture and MTS was financed by Tele2’s financing entity, Tele2 Treasury AB, which, during 2011-2015, had issued multiple loans to MTS. In September 2015, the currency on the existing internal loans to MTS was changed from dollars to KZT. At the same time a ‘Form of Selection Note’ was signed according to which Tele2 Treasury AB could recall the currency denomination within six months. A new loan agreement denominated in KZT, replacing the existing agreements, was then signed between Tele2 Treasury AB and MTS. In the new agreement the interest rate was also changed from LIBOR + 4.6% to a fixed rate of 11.5%. As a result of these contractual changes to the loan agreements with MTS, Tele2 Treasury AB in its tax filing deducted a total currency loss of SEK 1 840 960 000 million for FY 2015. Following an audit, the Swedish tax authorities issued an assessment where the tax deduction for the full amount had been disallowed. However, during the proceedings at Court the authorities acknowledged deductions for part of the currency loss – SEK 745 196 000 – related to the period between 22 October to 31 December 2015. Hence, at issue before the Court was disallowed deductions of the remaining amount of SEK 1 095 794 000. Decision of the Court The Administrative Court ruled in favor of the tax authorities. Tele2 Treasury AB could not deduct exchange rate losses resulting from the loan arrangements with MTS related to the period between 1 September and 21 October 2015. “…there have been no reasons to assume that MTS has risked bankruptcy, and that the company’s right to interest and repayments would thus have been in jeopardy. Thus, MTS’s financial position cannot be a reason to believe that the currency conversion would have been commercially justified. With regard to commerciality, the court considers it strange that an independent lender would take great risks to secure the financing when the borrower and another external player are to carry out a merger. That the company assumed responsibility for getting MTS financing in place speak instead of that it was the financial interests of the common interests that prompted the decision to conduct currency conversion. The court thus considers that the company cannot be considered to have any significant interest in securing MTS financing. In this context, the company has stated that other companies within the Tele2 Group’s financial interests must be taken into account when assessing the current issue. However, as stated by the Administrative Court above, the relationship with any other companies in a partnership with the trader shall not be taken into account. In this context, the company has referred to the Court of Appeal in Gothenburg’s judgment of 30 September 2011 in case no. 5854-10. However, the Administrative Court cannot, based on the circumstances and reasoning in the judgment, read out any general conclusions that could provide support for the company’s view in the current cases. The Administrative Court therefore considers that the company’s reasons for the conversion cannot be considered to be any other than reasons attributable to the common interest with MTS.” According to a press release from TELE2 the decision will be appealed. Click here for translation ...

Given the current economic environment, it is possible that independent parties may not strictly hold another party to their contractual obligations, particularly if it is in the interest of both parties to renegotiate the contract or to amend certain aspects of their For example, unrelated enterprises may opt to renegotiate a contract to support the financial survival of any of the transactional counterparties given the potential costs or business disruptions of enforcing the contractual obligations, or in view of anticipated increased future business with the counterparty. This behaviour should be considered when determining whether or not associated parties would agree to revise their intercompany agreements in response to COVID-19 ...

There can be group-level business reasons for an MNE group to restructure. However, it is worth re-emphasising that the arm’s length principle treats the members of an MNE group as separate entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified business (see paragraph 1.6). As a consequence, it is not sufficient from a transfer pricing perspective that a restructuring arrangement makes commercial sense for the group as a whole: the arrangement must be arm’s length at the level of each individual taxpayer, taking account of its rights and other assets, expected benefits from the arrangement (i.e. any consideration of the post-restructuring arrangement plus, if applicable, any compensation payments for the restructuring itself), and realistically available options. Where a restructuring makes commercial sense for the group as a whole on a pre-tax basis, it is expected that an appropriate transfer price (that is, any compensation for the post-restructuring arrangement plus, if applicable, any compensation payments for the restructuring itself) would generally be available to provide arm’s length compensation for each accurately delineated transaction comprising the business restructuring for each individual group member participating in it ...

The arm’s length principle requires an evaluation of the conditions made or imposed between associated enterprises, at the level of each of them. The fact that a business restructuring may be motivated by sound commercial reasons at the level of the MNE group, e.g. in order to try to derive synergies at a group level, does not answer the question whether it is arm’s length from the perspectives of each of the restructured entities ...

The authoritative statement of the arm’s length principle is found in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, which forms the basis of bilateral tax treaties involving OECD member countries and an increasing number of non-member countries. Article 9 provides: [Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two [associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly. By seeking to adjust profits by reference to the conditions which would have obtained between independent enterprises in comparable transactions and comparable circumstances (i.e. in “comparable uncontrolled transactions”), the arm’s length principle follows the approach of treating the members of an MNE group as operating as separate entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified business. Because the separate entity approach treats the members of an MNE group as if they were independent entities, attention is focused on the nature of the transactions between those members and on whether the conditions thereof differ from the conditions that would be obtained in comparable uncontrolled transactions. Such an analysis of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, which is referred to as a “comparability analysis”, is at the heart of the application of the arm’s length principle. Guidance on the comparability analysis is found in Section D below and in Chapter III ...

In order to apply the separate entity approach to intra-group transactions, individual group members must be taxed on the basis that they act at arm’s length in their transactions with each other. However, the relationship among members of an MNE group may permit the group members to establish special conditions in their intra-group relations that differ from those that would have been established had the group members been acting as independent enterprises operating in open markets. To ensure the correct application of the separate entity approach, OECD member countries have adopted the arm’s length principle, under which the effect of special conditions on the levels of profits should be eliminated ...

The applicant, ARROW International CR, a.s., seeks a judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court annulling the judgment of the Regional Court, and referring the case back to that court for further proceedings. The question of whether the applicant carried out business transactions in the tax year 2005/2006 with a related party (Arrow International, Inc., hereinafter referred to as ‘Arrow US’) in a manner which did not comply with the principles of normal business relations and whether, as a result, the applicant’s basis for calculating the corporate income tax rebate was unjustifiably increased and the special condition for applying the tax rebate under Article 35a(2)(d) of Act No 586/1992 Coll. was breached is decisive for the assessment of the merits of the present case, on income taxes, as in force until 31 December 2006 (‘the Income Tax Act’). Pursuant to Section 35(6) of the same Act, such an act has the effect that the entitlement to the discount ceases and the taxpayer is obliged to file additional returns for all tax periods in which the discount was claimed. The applicant was therefore also under that obligation in respect of the tax year 2002, for which it was additionally assessed by the decisions of the administrative authorities in the amount of CZK 7 505 031 (‘the tax’). According to the contents of the administrative file, the Financial Directorate concluded that the part of the applicant’s activities which consisted in the distribution of medical devices from the Arrow group to customers in the Czech Republic, whereby the goods distributed by the applicant were purchased from Arrow US, did not comply with the principles of normal business relations. On this distribution, the applicant achieved a gross profit margin of 171,45 % in the tax year 2005/2006, whereas other distributors of similar goods found by the tax authority achieved average gross profit margins ranging from 28,40 % to 80,60 %. In each case, the tax authorities found that the goods which the applicant had purchased for redistribution in the Czech Republic from Arrow US at a certain price had previously been sold by the applicant itself – as goods manufactured by it – to Arrow US at a higher price than the price at which it then bought them from Arrow US. Furthermore, the tax authorities found that the applicant’s gross profit margin in 2005/2006, the last period of the investment incentive, had increased significantly compared to the previous and subsequent tax periods, roughly three to four times. The Financial Directorate found that the distribution of Arrow medical devices in the Czech Republic was an activity separable from the applicant’s other activities (production of medical devices for the Arrow group or central purchasing of medical devices for the Arrow group from other manufacturers in the Czech Republic) from an economic point of view. The conclusion that the distribution of Arrow medical devices in the Czech Republic is separable from the applicant’s other activities was also reached by the Financial Directorate taking into account the fact that this activity is significantly less important for the applicant from an economic point of view than the other activities (the two types of distribution activities together accounted for only 6 % of the applicant’s total turnover, while the rest of the turnover was accounted for by the production of medical devices for the Arrow group). Thus, the Directorate of Finance treated the distribution of medical devices of the Arrow group in the Czech Republic as a separate activity for the applicant and as such assessed it separately in terms of the prices negotiated between the applicant and Arrow US in the context of that activity, which differed from the prices (and the gross profit margins based thereon) of other distributors of medical devices in the Czech Republic according to the criterion of the gross profit margins achieved therein. Thus, in considering whether the applicant had breached the special conditions for the application of the tax rebate pursuant to Article 35a(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act, the Financial Directorate considered only the prices (and the markups based thereon) achieved in the context of that one of the applicant’s activities, since it considered that it should be regarded as an economically relatively separate activity, not sufficiently linked to the applicant’s other activities and, on the contrary, separable from them in those respects. It therefore did not accept that the applicant’s activities should be considered as a whole (the sum of all their activities taken together) in the sense that, for the purposes of examining whether there has been a breach of the conditions of that provision, it is possible for significant profits from one activity to be offset by smaller profits from other activities, so that the overall profitability of the applicant’s business remains within the limits of what is normal for other comparable operators. The Regional Court agreed with those conclusions of the tax authorities and therefore dismissed the action brought by ARROW International CR, a.s. as unfounded. An appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court Judgement of the Court The Court dismissed the appeal and decided in favour of the tax authorities. “In the present case, the tax authority bore its burden of proof to establish that the complainant’s business operations involved transactions with the persons referred to in section 23(7) of the Income Tax Act which, by their specific objectively identifiable features, appeared outwardly, on the basis of rational consideration, not to correspond to the economic principles of normal business relations. First of all, it established that the three types of activity of the applicant, which could be regarded as relatively independent of each other in terms of the conditions of their technical implementation (independent in the sense that, in principle, each of them could be carried out independently in such a way that – in the abstract – it could make economic sense in itself, and that none of them necessarily required, in itself, either for production or commercial reasons, legal or otherwise, to operate ...