A S.A. had transferred a dividend receivable to an indirect shareholder for the purpose of acquiring other companies. The tax authorities considered the transfer to be a loan, for which A S.A should have received arm’s length interest and issued an assessment on that basis. A complaint was filed by A S.A. with the tax Court, which ruled in favour of A S.A. and dismissed the assessmemt in 2021 An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Court The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decission of the tax court and dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities. According to the Court the local transfer pricing in article 58 of the CIRC, in the wording in force at the time of the facts did not allow for a recharacterization of a transaction, only for a re-quantification. A recharacterization of the transaction would at the time of the facts only be possible under the Portuguese general anti-abuse clause, which required the tax authorities to prove that the arrangement had been put in place for securing a tax advantage. Such evidence had not been presented. Excerpt “In other words, the fact that the transfer of credits arising from ancillary benefits to non-shareholders is not common is not enough to destroy the characteristics of the ancillary obligation set out in the articles of association, which, as is well known, can be transferred – see art. Furthermore, the Tax Authority’s reasoning reveals a total disregard for the rest of the applicable legal regime, namely the restitution regime provided for in Article 213 of the CSC, which gives them the unquestionable character of quasi-equity benefits. In fact, since the admissibility of supplementary capital contributions in public limited companies has been debated for a long time, but with the majority of legal scholars being in favor of such contributions, the enshrinement in the articles of association of the figure of accessory obligations following the supplementary contributions regime appeared as a solution to the possibility of internal financing of the public limited company, (See, for example, Paulo Olavo Cunha in Direito das Sociedades Comerciais, 3rd edition, Almedina, 2007, pages 441 and 442 (in a contemporary annotation with the legal framework in force at the time). ) . Furthermore, as pointed out by the Deputy Attorney General, whose reasoning, due to its assertiveness, we do not hesitate to refer to again, “This situation is not unrelated to the fact that, in the corporate structure in question, the company “D… ” has a majority stake in the company “A…”, and there is even doctrine that defends “the possibility of transferring the credits resulting from the supplementary installments autonomously from the status of partner” – in an explicit allusion to the view taken by Rui Pinto Duarte (Author cited, “Escritos sobre Direito das Sociedades”, Coimbra Editora, 2008). In conclusion: if the Tax Administration believed that the evidence it had found, to which we have already referred, strongly indicated that the transaction in question was really about the parties providing financing to the company “D…, S.A. “, it was imperative that it had made use of the anti-abuse clause (although there are legal scholars who also include article 58 of the CIRC in the special anti-abuse rules – see Rui Duarte Morais, “Sobre a Notção de “cláusulas antiabusos”, Direito Fiscal, Estudos Jurídicos e Económicos em Homenagem ao Prof. Dr. António Sousa Franco III 2006, p.879 /894) and use the procedure laid down in Article 63 of the CPPT, as the Appellant claims. What is not legitimate, however, in these circumstances, “in view of the letter of the law and the teleology of the transfer pricing system as enshrined in the IRC Code and developed in Ministerial Order 1446-C/2001, is to use this system to carry out a sort of half-correction and, in the other half, i.e., For cases of this nature, there is a specific legal instrument in the legal system – the CGAA – specially designed and aimed at combating this type of practice (Bruno Santiago & António Queiroz Martins, “Os preços de transferência na compra e venda de participações sociais entre entidades relacionadas”, Cadernos Preços de Transferência, Almedina, 2013, Coordenação João Taborda Gama). …” Click here for English translation. Click here for other translation ...

K.P. is active in retail sale of computers, peripheral equipment and software. In December 2013 it had transfered valuable trademarks to its subsidiary and in the years following the transfer incurred costs in form of licence fees for using the trademarks. According to the tax authorities the arrangement was commercially irrationel and had therfore been recharacterised. Not satisfied with the assessment an appeal was filed. Judgement of the Provincial Administrative Court. The Court decided in favor of K.P.  According to the Court recharacterization of controlled transactions was not possible under the Polish arm’s length provisions in force until the end of 2018. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

GSS Holdings had claimed a loss of USD 22.54 million which the IRS disallowed. In disallowing the loss, the IRS claimed that the loss was not an ordinary business loss, but was incurred as part of a series of transactions that resulted in the sale of capital assets between related parties. The trial court upheld the IRS’s adjustment and GSS Holdings appealed to the Court of Federal Claims. The Court of Federal Claims applied a combination of substance over form and step transaction doctrines to combine two transactions and dismissed GSS Holdings’ claims on that basis. GSS Holdings then appealed to the US Court of Appeals. Opinion of the Court The Court of Appeals found that the Federal Claims Court had misapplied the step transaction doctrine and remanded the case for reconsideration under the correct legal standard. Excerpt “As part of this examination, the Claims Court must determine the outset of the series of transactions, keeping in mind that the series of transactions should be considered as a whole. Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989); see also True, 190 F.3d at 1177; Brown v. United States, 868 F.2d 859, 862 (6th Cir. 1989). The parties dispute the timeframe for the outset, with GSS advocating for the 2006 and 2007 timeframe when the Aaardvark LAPA and First Loss Note agreement were negotiated and entered, and the government advocating for the 2011 timeframe when the Aaardvark LAPA was renewed6 and exercised and when the First Loss Note Account payment was made to BNS. See Appellant’s Br. 33, 44–45; Appellee’s Br. 30–31. Once the outset’s timeframe has been assessed, the Claims Court must determine the intent from the outset, which is an- other disputed issue between the parties. See Falconwood, 422 F.3d at 1349; Appellant’s Br. 46–48; Appellee’s Br. 30–37. If the Claims Court does conclude that the separate transactions were “really component parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result,” then the step transaction doctrine applies. See Falconwood, 422 F.3d at 1349 (citation omitted). The Claims Court should conduct this analysis on remand. We are not suggesting any particular outcome; we are simply instructing the Claims Court to apply the correct legal standard. Even if the Claims Court applied an erroneous legal standard, the government contends that the intent was the same regardless of the timeframe, and that the Claims Court agreed. See Appellee’s Br. 37 (first citing Decision at 489 (“A payment from the First Loss Note [A]ccount was always anticipated to be at least a partial offset of losses resulting from the sale of a distressed asset.”); and then citing Decision at 489 n.22 (“The First Loss Note was always intended to absorb the first loss stemming out of a decline in Liberty[] [Street]’s investments.”)); see also Appellee’s Br. 30–34. In other words, the government con- tends that the same outcome would be reached under the correct legal standard. GSS disagrees, contending that the intent differed at various timeframes. See Appellant’s Br. 46–48; Appellant’s Reply Br. 11–15. Since the Claims Court applied an incorrect legal standard, the Claims Court “should make a new determination under the correct standard in the first instance.” Walther, 485 F.3d at 1152 (declining to reach the merits of a similar argument). To the extent any finding of the Claims Court “is derived from the application of an improper legal standard to the facts, it cannot be allowed to stand.” Id. (citations omitted). “In such a circumstance, this court must remand for new factual findings in light of the correct legal standard.” Id. GSS contends that under the correct legal standard, the step transaction doctrine would not operate to collapse the individual steps into a single integrated transaction for tax purposes. See Appellant’s Br. 44–52. In other words, GSS urges this court to reach a determination under the correct legal standard in the first instance. But just as we will not do so at the government’s request, we will not do so at GSS’s request.” Click here for translation ...

The tax authorities issued an assessment of additional taxable income for “D. sp. z o.o.” resulting in additional corporate income tax liability for 2014 in the amount of PLN 2,494,583. The basis for the assessment was the authority’s findings that the company understated its taxable income for 2014 by a total of PLN 49,732,274.05, as a result of the inclusion of deductible expenses interest in the amount of PLN 39,244,375.62, under an intra-group share purchase loan agreements paid to W. S.a.r.l. (Luxembourg) expenses for intra-group services in the amount of USD 2,957,837 (amount of PLN 10,487,898.43) paid to W. Inc. (USA) “D. sp. z o.o.” filed a complaint with the Administrative Court (WSA) requesting annulment of the assessment. In a judgment of 15 September 2020 the Administrative Court dismissed the complaint. In the opinion of the WSA, it was legitimate to adjust the terms of the loan agreement for tax purposes in such a way as to lead to transactions that would correspond to market conditions, thus disregarding the arrangements, cf. the OECD TPG 1995 para. 1.65 and 1.66. Furthermore, according to the court the company did not present credible evidence as to the ‘shareholder’s expenses’ and the fact that significant costs were incurred for analogous services purchased from other entities indicates duplication of expenses. Consequently, it is impossible to verify whether the disputed management services were performed at all. Not satisfied with the decision “D. sp. z o.o.” filed an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The Supreme Administrative Court set aside the decision of the Administrative Court and the tax assessment and refered the case back to the tax authorities for a reexamination. According to the court, there was no legal basis in Poland in 2014 for the non-recognition or recharacterisation of controlled transactions. The Polish arm’s length principle only allowed the tax authorities to price controlled transactions. The provisions (Articles 119a § 1 and § 2 Op) allowing for the substitution of the effects of an artificial legal act, if the main or one of the main purposes of which was to achieve a tax advantage have been in force only since 15 July 2016. And the possibility provided for the tax authority to determine the taxpayer’s income or loss without taking into account the economically irrational transaction undertaken by related parties (Article 11c(4) of the CIT) came into existence even later, as of 1 January 2019. Excerpts “3.2 The tax authorities relied on section 11(1) of the Income Tax Act (as in force in 2014), under which the tax authorities could determine the taxpayer’s income and the tax due without taking into account the conditions established or imposed as a result of the relationship between the contracting entities. However, this income had to be determined by way of estimation, using the methods described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 11 of the Income Tax Act. This is because these are not provisions creating abuse of rights or anti-avoidance clauses. They only allow a different determination of transaction (transfer) prices. The notion of ‘transaction price’ was defined in Article 3(10) of the Op, which, in the wording relevant to the tax period examined in the case, stated that it is the price of the subject of a transaction concluded between related parties. Thus, the essence of the legal institution stipulated in Article 11 of the CIT is not the omission of the legal effects of legal transactions made by the taxpayer or a different legal definition of those transactions, but the determination of their economic effect expressed in the transaction price, disregarding the impact of institutional links between the counterparties (…) It is therefore a legal institution with strictly defined characteristics and can only have the effects provided for in the provisions defining it (as the law stood in 2014). Meanwhile, the application of any provisions allowing the tax authorities to interfere in the legal relations freely formed by taxpayers must be strictly limited and restricted only to the premises defined in those provisions, as they are of a far-reaching interferential nature. Any broadening interpretation of them, as a result of which legal sanction could be obtained by the interference of public administration bodies going further than the grammatical meaning of the words and phrases used in the provisions establishing such powers, is inadmissible.” “3.3 The structure of the DIAS ruling corresponds to the hypothesis of the standard of Article 11c(4) of the 2019 CIT, which was not in force in 2014. Therefore, there was no adequate legal basis for its application with respect to 2014. This legal basis was not provided by Article 11 of the Corporate Income Tax Act in force at that time. This provision regulated the issue of so-called transfer prices, i.e. transaction prices applied between entities related by capital or personality. In this provision, the legislator emphasised the principle of applying the market price (also known as the arm’s length principle), requiring that prices in transactions between related parties be determined in such a way as if the companies were functioning as independent entities, operating on market terms and carrying out comparable transactions in similar market and factual circumstances. When the transaction under review deviates from those between independent parties, in comparable circumstances, then in the event of the occurrence of also other circumstances indicated in Article 11 of the updopdop, the tax authority may require an adjustment of profit. The legislative solutions adopted in Article 11 of the CIT Act (from 1 January 2019 in Article 11a et seq. of the CIT Act) refer to the recommendations contained in the OECD Guidelines on transfer pricing for multinational enterprises and tax administrations. The Guidelines were adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 27 June 1995 and approved for publication by the OECD Council on 13 July 1995 (they have been amended several times, including in 2010 and 2017). While the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not constitute a source of law in the territory ...

K. S.A. had made an in-kind contribution to a subsidiary (a partnership) in the form of previously created or acquired and depreciated trademark protection rights for individual beer brands. The partnership in return granted K. S.A. a licence to use these trademarks (K. S.A. was the only user of the trademarks). The partnership made depreciations on these intangible assets, which – due to the lack of legal personality of the partnership – were recognised as tax deductible costs directly by K. S.A. According to the tax authorities the role of the partnership was limited to the administration of trademark rights, it was not capable of exercising any rights and obligations arising from the licence agreements. Therefore the prerequisites listed in Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. were met, allowing K. S.A.’s income to be determined without regard to the conditions arising from those agreements. The assessment issued by the tax authorities was later set aside by the Provincial Administrative Court. An appeal and cross appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decisions of the Provincial Administrative Court and dismissed both appeals as neither of them had justified grounds. The Provincial Administrative Court had correctly deduced that Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. authorises only adjustment of the amount of licence fees, but not the nature of the controlled transactions by recognising that instead of a licence agreement for the use of the rights to trademarks, an agreement was concluded for the provision of services for the administration of these trademarks. Excerpts “The tax authorities, in finding that the applicant had not in fact made an in-kind contribution of trademark rights to the limited partnership, but had merely entrusted that partnership with the duty to administer the marks, referred to Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. (as expressed in the 2011 consolidated text. ), by virtue of which the tax authorities could determine the taxpayer’s income and the tax due without taking into account the conditions established or imposed as a result of the links between the contracting entities, with the income to be determined by way of an estimate, using the methods described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 11 u.p.d.o.p. However, these are not provisions creating abuse of rights or anti-avoidance clauses, as they only allow for a different determination of transaction (transfer) prices. The notion of ‘transaction price’ is legally defined in Article 3(10) of the I.P.C., which, in the wording relevant to the tax period examined in the case, stipulated that it is the price of the subject of a transaction concluded between related parties. Thus, the essence of the legal institution regulated in Article 11 of the u.p.d.o.p. is not the omission of the legal effects of legal transactions performed by the taxpayer or a different legal definition of those transactions, but the determination of their economic effect expressed in the transaction price, with the omission of the impact of institutional links between counterparties”  “For the same reasons, the parallel plea alleging infringement of Articles 191, 120 and 121(1) of the P.C.P. by annulling the tax authority’s legal rulings on the grounds of a breach of the aforementioned rules of evidence in conjunction with Articles 11(1) and 11(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. and holding that the tax authority did not correct the amount of royalties and the marketability of the transaction, but reclassified the legal relationship on the basis of which the entity incurred the expenditure, is also inappropriate. In fact, the assessment of the Provincial Administrative Court that such a construction of the tax authority’s decision corresponds to the hypothesis of the 2019 standard of Article 11c(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. is correct, but there was no adequate legal basis for applying it to 2012/2013 and based on Article 11(1) and (4) of the u.p.d.o.p. in its then wording. Failure to take into account a transaction undertaken by related parties deemed economically irrational by the tax authority violated, in these circumstances, the provisions constituting the cassation grounds of the plea, as the Provincial Administrative Court reasonably found.” “Contrary to the assumption highlighted in the grounds of the applicant’s cassation appeal, in the individual interpretations issued at its request, the applicant did not obtain confirmation of the legality of the entire optimisation construction, but only of the individual legal and factual actions constituting this construction, presented in isolation from the entire – at that time – planned future event. Such a fragmentation of the description of the future event does not comply with the obligation under Article 14b § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure to provide an exhaustive account of the actual state of affairs or future event, and therefore – as a consequence – the applicant cannot rely on the legal protection provided under Article 14k § 1 or Article 14m § 1, § 2 (1) and § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In 2008 and 2009 the Medtronic group acquired the entire share capital of the Israeli company, Ventor Technologies Ltd, for a sum of $325 million. Subsequent to the acquisition various inter-company agreements were entered into between Ventor Technologies Ltd and Medtronics, but no transfer of intangible assets was recognised by the Group for tax purposes. The tax authorities found that all the intangibles previously owned by Ventor had been transferred to Medtronic and issued an assessment of additional taxable profits. An appeal was filed by Medtronic Ventor Technologies Ltd. Judgement of the District Court The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Click here for English translation ...

In April 2010 Roche pharmaceutical group acquired the entire share capital of the Israeli company, Medingo Ltd, for USD 160 million. About six months after the acquisition, Medingo was entered into 3 inter-group service agreements: a R&D services agreement, pursuant to which Medingo was to provide R&D services in exchange for cost + 5%. All developments under the agreement would be owned by Roche. a services agreement according to which Medingo was to provided marketing, administration, consultation and support services in exchange for cost + 5%. a manufacturing agreement, under which Medingo was to provide manufacturing and packaging services in exchange for cost + 5. A license agreement was also entered, according to which Roche could now manufacture, use, sell, exploit, continue development and sublicense to related parties the Medingo IP in exchange for 2% of the relevant net revenues. Finally, in 2013, Medingo’s operation in Israel was terminated and its IP sold to Roche for approximately USD 45 million. The tax authorities viewed the transactions as steps in a single arrangement, which – from the outset – had the purpose of transferring all the activities of Medingo to Roche. On that basis an assessment was issued according to which the intangibles had been transferred to Roche in 2010. Based on the acquisition price for the shares, the value was determined to approximately USD 160 millions. An appeal was filed by Medingo claiming that there had been no transfer in 2010. Judgement of the District Court The court decided in favor of Medingo and set aside the 2010 tax assessment – but without passing an opinion in relation to the value of the sale of the intellectual property in 2013. Excerpts “96. The guidelines indicate that in a transaction between related parties, two different issues must be examined using the arm’s length principle: transaction characterization and transaction pricing. The characterization of the transaction must first be examined and it must be examined whether it would also have been made between unrelated parties. If the examination reveals that even unrelated parties would have entered into a transaction in the same situation, then it must be further examined whether the price paid for the assets complies with market conditions. It should be noted that in accordance with the guidelines, the characterization of the transaction should not be interfered with in violation of the agreements, except in exceptional circumstances, in which the agreements are fundamentally unfounded, or in no way allow a price to be determined according to the arm’s length principle. “Tax A tax administration should not disregard part or all of the restructuring or substitute other transactions for it unless the exceptional circumstances described in paragraph 1.142 are met”. out circumstances in which the transaction between the parties as accurately delineated can be disregarded for transfer pricing purposes. Because non-recognition can be contentious and a source of double taxation, every effort should be made to determine the actual nature of the transaction and apply arm’s length pricing to the accurately delineated transaction, and to ensure that non-recognition is not used simply because determining an arm’s length price is difficult. e same transaction can be seen between independent parties in comparable circumstances… non-recognition would not apply… the transaction as accurately delineated may be disregarded, and if appropriate, replaced by an alternative transaction, where the arrangements made in relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would have been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner in comparable circumstances, thereby preventing determination of a price that would be acceptable to both of the parties taking into account their respective perspective and the options realistically available to each of them at the time of entering into the transaction “. 97. Further to this, sections 1.146 – 1.148 of the Guideline, 2022, provide two examples of cases in which the characterization of the transaction must be ignored. The second example deals with a case closer to our case, where a one-time payment is paid for R&D services and their products provided – for 20 years. 98. After examining the characterization of the transaction in our case, I found no defect in it. This is a completely different case from those mentioned in the guidelines, and it has been proven to me that transactions with a similar characterization can be conducted and are also conducted between unrelated parties. Thus, throughout the proceedings, the appellant presented various examples of similar license agreements and R&D agreements signed between unrelated parties: In Phase A, the appellant presented various transactions for comparison (P / 2 (to which the respondent did not even refer), p. 332 of the minutes (and within the appeal Of EY Germany and of Gonen in which additional transactions were presented for comparison, including transactions of similar companies in the relevant market.” “104. I also believe that it makes sense to enter into such agreements, especially in the situation of the appellant at that time. Appellant faced considerable obstacles, and her chances of success were not guaranteed, to say the least….” “105. The inter-group agreements secured the appellant’s future in the near term, and gave her more chances to survive. As the appellant’s experts clarified, small companies find it difficult to survive alone in the medical device market (see for example Section 1 of the Michlin Opinion (hence, a licensing and commercialization agreement is common practice in the field and common with contractors with experience and resources); See also paragraph 41 regarding Broadcom).” “110. In conclusion, as long as the appellant and Roche acted in accordance with the inter-group agreements, which are acceptable in industry and in the circumstances of the case there is logic in concluding them, I did not find any invalidity in the characterization of the agreements (see paragraphs 85 and 87 in the Broadcom case).” “….As stated, I believe that even if there was an intention to transfer the activity, there was no final decision until the date of the announcement. Second, and this is the ...

D. Sp. z oo had deducted interest expenses on intra-group loans and expenses related to intra-group services in its taxable income for FY 2015. The loans and services had been provided by a related party in Delaware, USA. Following a inspection, the tax authority issued an assessment where deductions for these costs had been denied resulting in additional taxable income. In regards to the interest expenses the authority held that the circumstances of the transactions indicated that they were made primarily in order to achieve a tax advantage contrary to the object and purpose of the Tax Act (reduction of the tax base by creating a tax cost in the form of interest on loans to finance the purchase of own assets), and the modus operandi of the participating entities was artificial, since under normal trading conditions economic operators, guided primarily by economic objectives and business risk assessment, do not provide financing (by loans or bonds) for the acquisition of their own assets, especially shares in subsidiaries, if these assets generate revenue for them. In regards to support services (management fee) these had been classified by the group as low value-added services. It appeared from the documentation, that services concerned a very large number of areas and events that occurred in the operations of the foreign company and the entire group of related entities. The US company aggregated these expenses and then, according to a key, allocated the costs to – among others – Sp. z o.o. The Polish subsidiary had no influence on the amount of costs allocated or on the verification of such costs. Hence, according to the authorities, requirements for tax deduction of these costs were not met. An appeal was filed by D. Sp. z oo with the Administrative Court requesting that the tax assessment be annulled in its entirety and that the case be remitted for re-examination or that the proceedings in the case be discontinued. Judgement of the Administrative Court The Court dismissed the complaint of D. Sp. z oo and upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Excerpt in regards of interest on intra-group loans “The authorities substantively, with reference to specific evidence and figures, demonstrated that an independent entity would not have agreed to such interest charges without obtaining significant economic benefits, and that the terms of the economic transactions adopted by the related parties in the case at hand differ from the economic relations that would have been entered into by independent and market-driven entities, rather than the links existing between them. One must agree with the authority that a loan granted to finance its own assets is free from the effects of the borrower’s insolvency, the lender does not bear the risk of loss of capital in relation to the subject matter of the loan agreement, since, in principle, it becomes the beneficiary of the agreement. This in turn demonstrates the non-market nature of the transactions concluded. The lack of market character of the transactions demonstrated by the authorities cannot be justified by the argumentation about leveraged buyout transactions presented in the complaint (page 9). This is because the tax authorities are obliged to apply the provisions of tax law, which in Article 15(1) of the A.l.p. outline the limits within which a given expense constitutes a tax deductible cost. In turn, Article 11 of the A.l.t.d.o.p. specifies premises, the occurrence of which does not allow a given expense to be included in tax deductible costs. This is the situation in the present case. Therefore, questioning the inclusion of the above-mentioned interest as a tax deductible cost, the authorities referred to Article 11(1), (2), (4) and (9) of the A.p.d.o.p. and § 12(1) and (2) of the Ordinance of the Minister of Finance of 10 September 2009 and the findings of the OECD contained in para. 1.65 and 1.66 of the “Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations” (the Guidelines were adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on […] and approved for publication by the OECD Council on […]). According to these guidelines: 1.65. – However, there are two specific situations where, exceptionally, it may be appropriate and justified for a tax administration to consider ignoring the construction adopted by the taxpayer when entering into a transaction between associated enterprises. The first arises when the economic substance of the transaction differs from its form. In this case, the tax administration may reject the parties’ qualification of the transaction and redefine it in a manner consistent with its substance. An example could be an investment in a related company in the form of interest-bearing debt, and according to the principle of the free market and taking into account the economic situation of the borrowing company, such a form of investment would not be expected. In this case, it might be appropriate to define the investment according to its economic substance – the loan could be treated as a subscription to capital. Another situation arises where the substance and form of the transaction are consistent with each other, but the arrangements made in connection with the transaction, taken as a whole, differ from those that would have been adopted by commercially rational independent companies, and the actual structure of the transaction interferes with the tax administration’s ability to determine the appropriate transfer price; 1.66. – In both of the situations described above, the nature of the transaction may derive from the relationship between the parties rather than be determined by normal commercial terms, or it may be so structured by the taxpayer to avoid or minimise tax. In such cases, the terms of the transaction would be unacceptable if the parties were transacting on a free market basis. Article 9 of the OECD Model Convention, allows the terms and conditions to be adjusted in such a way that the transaction is structured in accordance with the economic and commercial realities of the parties operating under the free market principle. Bearing in mind the aforementioned guidelines, in the ...

Pandox AB is the parent company of a hotel group active in northern Europe. Pandox AB’s business concept is to acquire hotel property companies with associated external operators running hotel operations. Pandox AB acquires both individual companies and larger portfolios, both in Sweden and abroad. Within the group, the segment is called Property Management. Pandox AB’s main income consists of dividends from the Property Management companies (PM companies), interest income from intra-group loans and compensation for various types of administrative services that Pandox AB provides to the Swedish and foreign PM companies. These services include strategic management, communication, general back-office functions and treasury. The PM companies’ income consists of rental income from the external hotel operators. Following an audit for FY 2013-2017 the Swedish tax authorities found that the affiliated property management entities were only entitled to a risk-free return and that the residual profit should be allocated to the Swedish parent. The tax authorities argued that Pandox AB had conducted all value-creating activities related to the core business, controlled and carried the financial risks, and actively managed the group’s business and operating agreements. The property management entities were merely legal parties in local agreements without any real control of the relevant risks. The property management entities had no employees and the boards consisted of one or two persons, most of whom were part of management at Pandox AB. Since Pandox AB controlled and managed major decisions and risks, the residual result should be allocated from the property management entities to Pandox AB. The property management entities should only be entitled to a risk-free return in line with their contributions to the value chain in accordance with paragraph 1.85 in the OECD transfer pricing guidelines. Paragraph 1.85 deals with the capability to make important business decisions. An appeal was filed by Pandox with the Administrative Court in Stockholm. Judgement of the Court The Court ruled in favor of Pandox AB. Excerpts “The Administrative Court finds that Pandox AB’s description of the operations of Property Management is strongly supported both by the documentary evidence in the cases and by what has emerged in interviews with Ms Liia Nõu. The Court also considers that the Swedish Tax Agency has not challenged the facts described by Pandox AB. Based on what has emerged from the investigation, the Administrative Court considers that Pandox AB must be regarded as having a limited role in the management of the hotel operations and a limited function in the value-creating core business. Nor does the investigation show anything other than that the PM companies independently make and implement decisions within the framework of the hotel property operations. Furthermore, the services that Pandox AB actually provides to the PM companies are priced in accordance with established transfer pricing documents, and there has been no indication that this pricing is not market-based. Even if Pandox AB, in its capacity as legal owner of the PM Companies, has the capacity and ability to renegotiate or enter into new operator agreements and make other crucial decisions for the hotel business, the investigation does not, according to the Administrative Court, show that this has been done to a particularly large extent. On the contrary, the investigation shows that Pandox AB is relatively passive after the shares in a PM company have been acquired. The Swedish Tax Agency has emphasised the management of the so-called Heart portfolio as a sign that Pandox AB actively manages the hotels in the PM companies. The Administrative Court considers, however, that the acquisition and how it was handled constitutes an exception in how Pandox AB otherwise conducts its Property Management business. Thus, the circumstance that the operator agreements were renegotiated in connection with the acquisition does not lend any more far-reaching or general conclusions about the business in general. The Administrative Court does not agree with the Tax Agency’s assessment of where in the Pandox Group the value-creating work is conducted. In this assessment, the Court takes into account in particular that the operations of the acquired PM companies are already established through, inter alia, ownership of hotel properties with associated operator agreements. Nor does the investigation provide support that Pandox AB would otherwise have had such control over the management of the hotels that the PM companies’ contribution to the business is limited in the manner described in the Tax Agency’s decision. Therefore, the Administrative Court finds that the Tax Agency’s investigation does not show that the Pandox group is based on commercial relationships as required by point 1.85 of the Guidelines. In such circumstances, the Tax Agency was not entitled to correct Pandox AB’s results in the manner recommended by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

A restructuring that followed the acquisition of Timberland by VF Enterprises in 2011 resulted in an intra-group transfer of ownership to valuable intangibles to a Swiss corporation, TBL Investment Holdings. The IRS was of the opinion that gains from the transfer was taxable. Judgement of the US Tax Court The tax court upheld the assessment of the tax authorities. Excerpt: “we have concluded that petitioner’s constructive distribution to VF Enterprises of the TBL GmbH stock that petitioner constructively received in exchange for its intangible property was a “disposition” within the meaning of section 367(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II). We also conclude, for the reasons explained in this part IV, that no provision of the regulations allows petitioner to avoid the recognition of gain under that statutory provision.” “Because we do not “agree[] to reduce the adjustment to income for the trademarks based on a 20-year useful life limitation, pursuant to Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.367(d)-1T,” we determine, in accordance with the parties’ stipulation, that “[p]etitioner’s increase in income for the transfer of the trademarks is $1,274,100,000.” Adding that figure to the agreed value of the foreign workforce and customer relationships that petitioner transferred to TBL GmbH and reducing the sum by the agreed trademark basis, we conclude that petitioner’s income for the taxable year in issue should be increased by $1,452,561,000 ($1,274,100,000 +$23,400,000 + $174,400,000 − $19,339,000), as determined in the notice of deficiency. Because petitioner did not assign error to the other two adjustments reflected in the notice of deficiency, it follows that respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we will grant respondent’s motion for summary judgment and deny petitioner’s corresponding motion.” Click here for translation ...

G.K. Ktf was a subsidiary of a company registered in the United Kingdom. On 29 December 2010 G.K. Ktf entered into a loan agreement with a Dutch affiliate, G.B. BV, under which G.B. BV, as lender, granted a subordinated unsecured loan of HUF 3 billion to G.K. Ktf. Interest was set at a fixed annual rate of 11.32%, but interest was only payable when G.K. Ktf earned a ‘net income’ from its activities. The maturity date of the loan was 2060. The loan was used by G.K. Ktf to repay a debt under a loan agreement concluded with a Dutch bank in 2006. The bank loan was repaid in 2017/2018. The interest paid by G.K. Ktf under the contract was deducted as an expense of HUF 347,146,667 in 2011 and HUF 345,260,000 in 2012. But, in accordance with Dutch tax law – the so called participation exemption – G.B BV did not include the interest as taxable income in its tax return. The tax authorities carried out an audit for FY 2011-2012 and by decision of 17 January 2018 an assessment was issued. According to the assessment G.K. Ktf had underpaid taxes in an amount of HUF 88,014,000. A penalty of HUF 43,419,000 and a late payment penalty of HUF 5,979,000 had been added. According to the tax authorities, a contract concluded by a member of a group of companies for a term of more than 50 years, with an interest payment condition other than that of a normal loan and without capitalisation of interest in the event of default, does not constitute a loan but a capital contribution for tax purposes. This is indicated by the fact that it is subordinated to all other creditors, that the payment of interest is conditional on the debtor’s business performance and that no security is required. The Dutch tax authorities have confirmed that in the Netherlands the transaction is an informal capital injection and that the interest paid to the lender is tax exempt income under the ‘participation exemption’. Hence the interest paid cannot be deducted from the tax base. The parties intended the transaction to achieve a tax advantage. Not agreeing with the decision G.K. Ktf took the case to court. The Court of first instance upheld the decision of the tax authorities. The case was then appealed to the Court of Appeal which resulted in the case being remanded to the court of first instance for reconsideration. After reconsidering the case, a new decision was issued in 2019 where the disallowed deduction of interest was upheld with reference to TPG 1995 para. 1.64, 1.65 and 1.66. The Court of first instance also found that the interest rate on the loan from BV was several times higher than the arm’s length interest rate. G.K Ktf then filed a new appeal with the Court of appeal. Judgement of the Court of Appeal. The Court held that the contested part of the tax authority’s decision and the final judgment of the court of first instance were unlawful and decided in favor of G.K. Ktf. For the years in question, legislation allowing for recharacterisation had still not been enacted in Hungary, and the conditions for applying the “abuse of rights” provision that was in force, was not established by the tax authorities. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In 2019, the Danish parent company of the group, EAC Invest A/S, had been granted a ruling by the tax tribunal that, in the period 2008-2011, due to, inter alia, quite exceptional circumstances involving currency restrictions in Venezuela, the parent company should not be taxed on interest on a claim for unpaid royalties relating to trademarks covered by licensing agreements between the parent company and its then Venezuelan subsidiary, Plumrose Latinoamericana C.A. The Tax tribunal had also found that neither a payment of extraordinary dividends by the Venezuelan subsidiary to the Danish parent company in 2012 nor a restructuring of the group in 2013 could trigger a deferred taxation of royalties. The tax authorities appealed against the decisions to the High Court. Judgement of the High Court The High Court upheld the decisions of the tax tribunal with amended grounds and dismissed the claims of the tax authorities. Excerpts: Interest on unpaid royalty claim “The High Court agrees that, as a starting point, between group-related parties such as H1 and the G2 company, questions may be raised regarding the interest on a receivable arising from a failure to pay royalties, as defined in section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act. The question is whether, when calculating H1’s taxable income for the income years in question, there is a basis for fixing interest income to H1 on the unpaid royalty claim by G2, within the meaning of Paragraph 2 of the Tax Assessment Act. Such a fixing of interest must, where appropriate, be made on terms which could have been obtained if the claim had arisen between independent parties. The right to an adjustment is thus based, inter alia, on the assumptions that the failure to pay interest on the royalty claim has no commercial justification and that there is in fact a basis for comparison in the form of contractual terms between a debtor for a claim in bolivar in Venezuela and a creditor in another country independent of the debtor.” … “In the light of the very special circumstances set out above, and following an overall assessment, the Court considers that there are no grounds for finding that the failure to recover H1’s royalty claim from G2 was not commercially justified. The High Court also notes that the Ministry of Taxation has not demonstrated the existence of a genuine basis for comparison in the form of contractual terms for a claim in bolivar between a debtor in Venezuela and a creditor in a third country independent of the debtor. The High Court therefore finds that there is no basis under Section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act, cf. Section 3B(5) of the Tax Control Act, cf. Para 8 cf. Section 5(3), there is a basis for increasing G3-A/S’s income in the income years in question by a fixed rate of interest on the unpaid royalty claim with G2 company.” Dividend distribution in 2012 reclassified as royalty “…the Court of Appeal, after an overall assessment, accepts that the fact that the G2 company did not waive outstanding royalty receivables was solely a consequence of the very specific currency restrictions in Venezuela, that the payment of dividends was commercially motivated and was not due to a common interest between H1 and the G2 company, and that therefore, under Article 2(2) of the Tax Code, there is no need to pay dividends to the G2 company. 1(3), there are grounds for reclassifying the dividend distribution as a taxable deduction from the royalty claim, as independent parties could not have acted as claimed by the Tax Ministry.” Claim in respect of purchase price for shares in 2013 set-off against dividend reclassified as royalty “… For the reasons given by the Tax Court and, moreover, in the light of the very special circumstances of Venezuela set out above, the Court finds that there is no basis under section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act for reclassifying the claim of the G2 company against H2, in respect of the share purchase price for the G9 company, from a set-off against dividends due to an instalment of royalties due.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The business activity of A S.A. was wholesale of pharmaceutical products to external pharmacies, hospitals, wholesalers (including: to affiliated wholesalers). The tax authority had noted that the company’s name had been changed in FY 2013, and a loss in the amount of PLN […] had been reported in the company’s tax return. An audit revealed that the Company had transferred significant assets (real estate) to a related entity on non-arm’s length terms. The same real estate was then going forward made available to the company on a fee basis under lease and tenancy agreements. The tax authority issued an assessment where a “restructuring fee” in the amount of PLN […] was added to the taxable income, reflecting the amount which would have been achieved if the transaction had been agreed between independent parties. According to the company the tax authority was not entitled at all to examine the compliance of the terms of these transactions with the terms that would have been agreed between hypothetical independent entities, as the transactions in question were in fact concluded precisely between independent entities. (SKA companies were not CIT taxpayers in 2012, so they did not meet the definition of a “domestic entity” referred to in the aforementioned provision, and therefore a transaction between “related entities” cannot be said to have taken place). Moreover, the institution of “re-characterisation” of a controlled transaction into a proper transaction (according to the authority),could only be applied to transactions taking place after 1 January 2019, pursuant to Article 11e, Section 4 of the A.l.t.p. introduced (from that date). Judgement of the Court The Court decided predominantly in favor of A S.A. and remanded the case back to the tax authorities. Excerpts “The applicant in the course of the case referred to the judgment of the WSA in Warsaw of 18 December 2017, III SA/Wa 3661/16 (approved by the NSA in its judgment of 26 November 2020, II FSK 1919/18). The individual interpretation analysed there by the Court assessed a transaction (from 2012) concluded between a limited liability company and a general partnership. According to the WSA in Warsaw, the provisions of Article 11(4) in conjunction with Article 11(1) of the A.l.t.d.o.p. in the wording in force until 31 December 2014 may only be applied to transactions concluded between related parties – ‘domestic entities’ within the meaning of Article 11 of the A.l.t.d.o.p., and the tax authorities may only assess the income of related parties. The wording of Art. 11 of the A.l.t.p. indicates that it is intended to allow the tax authorities to estimate the income of related parties, if these parties, in transactions concluded between themselves, establish or impose terms and conditions that differ from those that would be established between independent parties, leading to an understatement of income. However, there are no grounds for this provision to be applied to transactions concluded by unrelated entities (a limited liability company and a general partnership) solely for the reason that tax on revenue from participation in a partnership is paid by its partners who are also members of the applicant’s management board. Indeed, it was only the provisions introduced by the Act of 29 August 2014 amending the Corporate Income Tax Act, the Personal Income Tax Act and certain other acts, which entered into force on 1 January 2015, that defined an “affiliated entity” as a natural person, a legal person or an organisational unit without legal personality that meets the conditions set out in the Act. If a contrary position were to be adopted Contrary to the authority’s assertions, these rulings do not concern a different factual situation. Although the audited interpretation concerned the necessity to prepare documentation pursuant to Art. 9a of the A.l.t.c., the applicant also directly inquired about classifying the applicant as an entity related to the general partnership. The courts of both instances were firmly in favour of the absence of such a link (dependence) between a capital company and a partnership, in terms of entering into mutual transactions, within the meaning of Article 11 of the A.l.t.p. in the wording in force until 31 December 2014. Thus, as shown above, the application of Article 11 of the A.l.t.d.o.p. in the present case was un-authorised, which makes it timely to consider the application in the analysed factual state of the general principles arising from Article 14 of the A.l.t.d.o.p. and Chapter 3 of this Act (tax deductible costs), which the authorities, for obvious reasons, have not undertaken so far.” “When reconsidering the case, the authority, taking into account the comments presented above, will issue an appropriate decision, containing in the justification of the decision all the elements referred to in Article 210 § 1 of the Polish Civil Code, including those arising from the cited resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

“P Services! provided services to a Peruvian consortium. In 2014, the parties entered into an interest-free loan agreement. According to the loan agreement, payment for the services performed in 2013 was going to be offset against the funds received under the agreement. The tax authorities found that the “loan arrangement”, in reality constituted advances for the services provided by “P Services”- According to the authorities the arrangement had been established for the purpose of avoiding VAT on the advances received for the services. Decision of the Tax Court The tax court issued a decision in favour of the tax authorities. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In July, 1956, the appellants (Berkowitz and Kolbert) formed the taxpayer (K B Trail Properties, Inc.). Each of the appellants paid $2500 cash for one-half of the taxpayer’s authorized stock. They advanced the taxpayer $83,000 to begin business because the taxpayer was unable to borrow funds elsewhere. The taxpayer purchased a 99-year lease on business property utilizing these funds and assumed a mortgage of $57,829.20 as part of the purchase price of the lease. Each appellant took notes from the taxpayer totalling $41,500, payable in four installments of $2,500 commencing July 10, 1957, with the unpaid balance due July 10, 1961, with interest at the rate of 6 percent. In October, 1956, to finance the construction of an additional building on a property, the taxpayer borrowed $40,000 at 6 percent interest from a Savings and Loan Association, secured by a mortgage. In December, 1958, the taxpayer purchased the ground under the leasehold for $50,000. This transaction was partially financed by advances from the appellants in the amount of $5,000 each, evidenced by 15 percent notes due in December, 1959. The taxpayer borrowed $30,000 from a New York mortgage company, evidenced by an 8 percent note secured by a second mortgage on the premises. In 1960 the appellants each advanced the taxpayer $4,000. In 1963 they each advanced the taxpayer $3,600. There were no maturity dates for, or written evidence of these advances. Thus through 1963 the appellants had made unsecured advances to the taxpayer of $108,200, and two lending institutions had loaned the taxpayer $70,000 secured by mortgages. Obviously, the taxpayer was thin to the point of being transparent. Although the taxpayer was timely in its payments to the banking institutions, from 1956 through 1963 the taxpayer had paid only $1,980 toward the principal of the advances made by the appellants. There was no plan to reduce the principal further. In 1963 the taxpayer realized $60,000 from the sale of property, but instead of paying off the long overdue “loans” to the appellants, the taxpayer placed the money in a bank account where it drew a maximum of four and one-half percent, while, at the same time, the taxpayer was paying ten to fifteen percent on the principal of the advances made by the appellants. While the appellants, as directors of the taxpayer, made no effort to reduce the principal amount of their “loans” to the taxpayer, they did meet at the end of each year and decide what interest rate to pay. The taxpayer paid interest to the appellant as follows: 1957 — 4%, 1958 — 8%, 1959 — 15%, 1960 — 14%, 1961 — 10%, 1962 — 10%, and 1963 — 13%. On its income tax returns for the years in issue the taxpayer deducted the “interest” it had paid to the appellants during each fiscal year pursuant to section 163(a) of the Code. The Commissioner disallowed these deductions. Section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that there shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness. The tax authorities disallowed these deductions and increased the taxpayer’s income taxes. An appeal was filed by the taxpayer. Judgment of the Court The US Court of Appeal upheld the assessment of the tax authorities. The Court rejected the appellants’ argument that intent was the controlling factor. Instead, the court noted that the parties had objectively manifested their intent, so subjective intent was not determinative. Excerpts “The appellants had the burden to prove that the advances represented indebtedness rather than equity, and the fact that they intended to make loans and not capital contributions to the taxpayer is not determinative of the equity-capital tax issue. Nor is it decisive that the notes were executed in accordance with state law and described by the appellants and the taxpayer as “loans”. Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 3 Cir. 1968, 398 F.2d 694; Tomlinson v. 1661 Corporation, supra. These are just several of the numerous factors to be considered in determining whether the funds advanced to the taxpayer represented capital contributions rather than loans. We have expatiated on the criteria with some specificity as follows: There are at least eleven separate determining factors generally used by the courts in determining whether amounts advanced to a corporation constitute equity capital or indebtedness. They are (1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a maturity date; (3) the source of the payments; (4) the right to enforce the payment of principal and interest; (5) participation in management; (6) a status equal to or inferior to that of regular corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) `thin’ or adequate capitalization; (9) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder; (10) payment of interest only out of `dividend’ money; (11) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending institutions. … Applying these criteria to the case sub judice, there can be no doubt that the advances were nothing more than capital transfers as opposed to bona fide indebtedness. Obviously the taxpayer was inadequately capitalized. Considering only the advances made by the appellants, which the taxpayer designated as indebtedness, the ratio of debt to equity would have been about 21 to 1. Adding the institutional indebtedness to the advances made by the appellants would have made the ratio more lopsided.” “The problem is not one of ascertaining “intent” since the parties have objectively manifested their intent. It is a problem of whether the intent and acts of these parties should be disregarded in characterizing the transaction for federal tax purposes. It is not the jury’s function to determine whether the undisputed operative facts add up to debt or equity. This is a question of law. It was correctly decided by the District Court in favor of the government.” Click here for other translation ...

The first rulings where the IRS proposed recharacterizing transactions that could be considered abusive through use of transfer pricing provisions. Judgement of the Supreme Court The court instead applied the general anti-abuse doctrine. “It is earnestly contended on behalf of the taxpayer that, since every element required by the foregoing subdivision (B) is to be found in what was done, a statutory reorganization was effected, and that the motive of the taxpayer thereby to escape payment of a tax will not alter the result or make unlawful what the statute allows. It is quite true that, if a reorganization in reality was effected within the meaning of subdivision (B), the ulterior purpose mentioned will be disregarded. The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted. United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 84 U. S. 506; Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390, 280 U. S. 395-396; Jones v. Helvering, 63 App.D.C. 204, 71 F.2d 214, 217. But the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended. The reasoning of the court below in justification of a negative answer leaves little to be said. When subdivision (B) speaks of a transfer of assets by one corporation to another, it means a transfer made “in pursuance of a plan of reorganization” [§ 112(g)] of corporate business, and not a transfer of assets by one corporation to another in pursuance of a plan having no relation to the business of either, as plainly is the case here. Putting aside, then, the question of motive in respect of taxation altogether, and fixing the character of the proceeding by what actually occurred, what do we find? Simply an operation having no business or corporate purpose — a mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the petitioner. No doubt, a new and valid corporation was created. But that corporation was nothing more than a contrivance to the end last described. It was brought into existence for no other purpose; it performed, as it was intended from the beginning it should perform, no other function. When that limited function had been exercised, it immediately was put to death. In these circumstances, the facts speak for themselves, and are susceptible of but one interpretation. The whole undertaking, though conducted according to the terms of subdivision (B), was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else. The rule which excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, because the transaction, upon its face, lies outside the plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.” Click here for translation ...