ABD Limited is a South African telecommunications company with subsidiaries worldwide. These subsidiaries are operating companies, with local shareholders, but having ABD as a significant shareholder. ABD licences its intellectual property to these operating companies (referred to as Opcos) in return for which they pay ABD a royalty. The present case involves the royalty payments made by fourteen of the Opcos to ABD during the periods 2009 to 2012. ABD charged all of them the same royalty rate of 1% for the right to use its intellectual property. In 2011 ABD retained the services of a consultancy to advise it on what royalty it should charge its various Opcos.The consultancy procured research on the subject and then, informed by that, came up with the recommendation that a royalty of 1% could be justified. The tax authorities (SARS) found that a 1% royalty rate was not at arms-length and issued an assessment where the royalty rate had instead been determined to be 3%. Judgment of the Court The Court ruled in favour of ABD Limited and set aside the assessment. Excerpt “I conclude that the Cyprus CUP serves as a comparable internal CUP. The royalty in that agreement was 1%. On that basis the royalty of 1% charged by ABD to the other Opcos constitutes a reasonable arm’s length royalty. That being the case there was no factual justification for the Commissioner to have adjusted the royalty in terms of the then section 31 of the Income Tax Act. The appeal succeeds. It is not necessary for this reason to consider the several other administrative law grounds and accounting issues raised by ABD in its appeal. I appreciate that the outcome of this case will be of great disappointment to SARS which put into it extensive resources to create a precedent in this seldom litigated field of tax law. But this not only meant it running contrary to the opinions and approach of its initial expert (which meant effectively dispensing with his views without explanation and engaging a new expert) but fighting a case where there appeared to be no rationale for the taxpayer to have any motive to shortchange the South African fiscus as I mentioned earlier in this decision.” Click here for translation ...

SAS Itron France (a manufacturer and distributor of water, electricity and gas meters) was the subject of a tax audit for the financial years 2012 and 2013, which resulted in an assessment. The tax authorities considered that the transfer pricing applied by the group had resulted in an understatement of taxable income in France and a transfer of profits to a Hong Kong-based distributor of the group. An appeal was filed by SAS Itron France and in a ruling handed down on 2 December 2021, the Administrative Court annulled the assessment. The tax authorities filed an appeal against this ruling. Judgement of the Court The Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and decided in favor of SAS Itron France. Excerpt in English “…In order to calculate the transfer price to be set by SAS Itron France in its relations as a producer with its group distributors, the tax authorities followed the profit-sharing method defined at group level, applicable to relations between its various entities, and, after a functional analysis of the company and taking into account the respective contribution of the producer and distributor to the costs and risks for each of the eight functions defined and for each of the three main product lines (water-gas-electricity), it finally retained a distribution of the margin between producers and distributors of 53% and 47% respectively for the “gas” product line and 51% and 49% for the other two lines. By comparing the respective turnover of SAS Itron France as a producer and that of the group’s foreign distributors relating to sales of SAS Itron France products, it estimated that the respondent’s turnover as a producer, determined by applying a cost-plus method with margin rates differentiated according to product category, ranging from 14% to 35%, showed that SAS Itron France’s profit was insufficient in relation to the overall margin sharing targets (producer and seller) mentioned of 51% or 53%, constituting an advantage within the meaning of Article 57 of the General Tax Code. It also noted that no correction, as provided for by the transfer pricing method at group level, had been implemented. In the absence of any alleged quid pro quo, and despite the adjustments determined on appeal in respect of the benefits granted to SAS Itron France by certain group companies and the neutralisation of benefits granted to distributors in an amount of less than 30,000 euros, the tax authorities consider that they have demonstrated the undervaluation of transfer prices to the detriment of the company as a producer, and the undue reduction in its tax base. 5. However, it appears from the investigation that, in order to reconstitute the transfer prices between SAS Itron France as a producer and its other partners, distributors, in the Itron group, the tax authorities used, on the one hand, the margin of the distributing entities after deducting the sale price of SAS Itron France’s products, without taking into account the distributor’s own operating expenses (cost of discounting ; commissions paid to agents; rebates and discounts; product shipping costs; insurance costs incurred in transporting products; customs duties; product packaging costs), even though these expenses contribute to the distributors’ share of the Group’s net margin to which they should be entitled. On the other hand, it deducted their direct expenses from the margin of the manufacturing entities, including SAS Itron France, to which the gross margin rates mentioned in the previous point apply under the cost plus method. Without calling into question the parameters used by SAS Itron France to determine its transfer prices as a producer (costs used and margin rates mentioned, determined within an arm’s length interval), it thus carried out a comparison of different margins, gross for the distributing entities and net for the producing entities. If, as stated in point 3 of this judgment, the existence of a shortfall in the net margin accruing to the producer, compared with the net margin target assigned to it under the profit split method defined at group level, is likely to give rise to a presumption of the existence of an advantage granted by the producer to the distributors within the meaning of Article 57 of the General Tax Code; in the present case, as its criticism of the calculation of the net margins of SAS Itron France was unfounded, the administration did not establish the existence of such an advantage. 6. Furthermore, although the tax authorities maintain that SAS Itron France’s documentation setting out the group’s transfer pricing policy requires adjustments to be made in the event of a significant difference between the transfer price resulting from this method and the economic reality, such adjustments, as the respondent points out, are provided for only in exceptional circumstances and under a procedure that derogates from the cost-plus method. According to appendix 5 of the document on the group’s transfer pricing method provided by SAS Itron France, they are lawful only in the presence of an exceptional flow of a regular amount, i.e. over a period of time, and if three conditions are met: existence of new markets or invitations to tender; existence of a turnover exceeding 10% of the distributor’s revenue; existence of a variation in the distributor’s turnover of at least 500,000 euros. In this respect, it is not clear from the investigation that exceptional circumstances of the kind mentioned above arose during the period in dispute, requiring an adjustment to the margin charged by Itron France. Consequently, the tax authorities have not provided any evidence that the adjustments should have been made in order to justify the appropriateness of the method used and the resulting transfer prices. 7. In view of the foregoing, the plea that the pricing method defined at group level was wrongly disregarded in favour of the cost-plus method applied by SAS Itron France has no bearing on the outcome of the present dispute.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A Dutch company “Tobacco B.V.” belonging to an internationally operating tobacco group was subjected to (additional assessment) corporate income tax assessments according to taxable amounts of €2,850,670,712 (2013), €2,849,204,122 (2014), €2,933,077,258 (2015) and €3,067,630,743 (2016), and to penalty fines for the year 2014 of €1,614,709, for the year 2015 of €363,205 and for the year 2016 of €125,175,082. In each case, the dispute focuses on whether the fees charged by various group companies for supplies and services can be regarded as business-related. Also in dispute is whether transfer profit should have been recognised in connection with a cessation of business activities. One of the group companies provided factoring services to “Tobacco B.V.”. The factoring fee charged annually for this includes a risk fee to cover the default risk and an annual fee for other services. The court concluded that the risk was actually significantly lower than the risk assumed in determining the risk fee, that the other services were routine in nature and that the factoring fee as a whole should be qualified as impractical. “Tobacco B.V.” has not rebutted the presumption that the disadvantage caused to it by paying the factoring fees was due to the affiliation between it and the service provider. In 2016, a reorganisation took place within the tobacco group in which several agreements concluded between group companies were terminated. The court concluded that there had been a coherent set of legal acts, whereby a Dutch group company transferred its business activities in the field of exporting tobacco products, including the functions carried out therein, the risks assumed therein and the entire profit potential associated therewith, to a group company in the UK. For the adjustment related to the transfer profit, the court relies on the projected cash flows from the business and information known at the time the decision to transfer was taken. The conclusions regarding factoring and the termination of business activities in the Netherlands lead to a deficiency in the tax return for each of the years 2014 to 2016. For these years, “Tobacco B.V.” filed returns to negative taxable amounts. For the years 2014 and 2016, a substantial amount of tax due arises after correction, even if the corrections established by application of reversal and aggravation are disregarded. For the year 2015, the tax due remains zero even after correction. Had the return been followed, this would have resulted in “Tobacco B.V.” being able to achieve, through loss relief, that substantially less tax would be due than the actual tax due. At the time the returns were filed, “Tobacco B.V.” knew that this would result in a substantial amount of tax due not being levied in each of these years and the court did not find a pleading position in this regard. The burden of proof is therefore reversed and aggravated. For the year 2013, this follows from the court’s decision of 17 October 2022, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2022:8937. To finance their activities, the group companies issued listed bonds under the tobacco group’s so-called EMTN Programme, which were guaranteed by the UK parent company. A subsidiary of “Tobacco B.V.” joined in a tax group paid an annual guarantee fee to the UK parent company for this purpose. The court ruled that: – the guarantee fees are not expenses originating from the subsidiary’s acceptance of liability for debts of an affiliated company; – the EMTN Programme is not a credit arrangement within the meaning of the Umbrella Credit Judgment(ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BW6520); – “Tobacco B.V.” has made it clear that a not-for-profit fee can be determined at which an independent third party would have been willing to accept the same liability on otherwise the same terms and conditions; – “Tobacco B.V.” failed to show that in the years in which the guarantee fees were provided, credit assessments did not have to take implied guarantee into account; – “Tobacco B.V.” failed to show that its subsidiary was not of such strategic importance to the group that its derivative rating did not match the group rating, so that the guarantee fees paid are not at arm’s length due to the effect of implied guarantee in their entirety; – “Tobacco B.V.” did not put forward any contentions that could rebut the objectified presumption of awareness that follows from the size of the adjustments (the entire guarantee fee), that the disadvantage suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the payment of the guarantee fees is due to its affiliation with its parent company. A group company charges the claimant, inter alia, a fee corresponding to a percentage of “Tobacco B.V.”‘s profits (profit split) for activities on behalf of the tobacco group that result in cost savings for “Tobacco B.V.”. The court ruled that “Tobacco B.V.” failed to prove that the group company made a unique contribution to the tobacco group that could justify the agreed profit split. The group company also charges “Tobacco B.V.” a fee equivalent to a 12% mark-up on costs for services relating to the manufacture of cigarettes. The court ruled that, in the context of the reversal and aggravation of the burden of proof, it was not sufficient for “Tobacco B.V.” to refer to the functional analysis, as it was based on the incorrect premise that the group company could be compared to a manufacturer. Finally, since April 2012, “Tobacco B.V.” has been paying the group company a 10% fee on the costs excluding raw materials for the production of cigarettes as toll manufacturer, where previously the basis of this fee also included the costs of raw materials. The court noted that the flow of goods remained the same and that “Tobacco B.V.” remained operationally responsible for the production process. The court ruled that it was up to “Tobacco B.V.” to establish and prove facts from which it follows that it was businesslike to change the basis of remuneration, which it did not do sufficiently. Regarding an adjustment made by the tax authorities in relation to reorganisation costs, the court finds that the adjustment was made in error ...

In 2017 the European Commission concluded that Luxembourg had granted undue tax benefits to Amazon of around €250 million. According to the Commission, a tax ruling issued by Luxembourg in 2003 – and prolonged in 2011 – lowered the tax paid by Amazon in Luxembourg without any valid justification. The tax ruling enabled Amazon to shift the vast majority of its profits from an Amazon group company that is subject to tax in Luxembourg (Amazon EU) to a company which is not subject to tax (Amazon Europe Holding Technologies). In particular, the tax ruling endorsed the payment of a royalty from Amazon EU to Amazon Europe Holding Technologies, which significantly reduced Amazon EU’s taxable profits. This decision was brought before the European Courts by Luxembourg and Amazon, and in May 2021 the General Court found that Luxembourg’s tax treatment of Amazon was not illegal under EU State aid rules. An appeal was then filed by the European Commission with the European Court of Justice. Judgement of the Court The European Court of Justice upheld the decision of the General Court and annulled the decision of the European Commission. However, it did so for different reasons. According to the Court of Justice, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines were not part of the legal framework against which a selective advantage should be assessed, since Luxembourg had not implemented these guidelines. Thus, although the General Court relied on an incorrect legal framework, it had reached the correct result. Click here for other translation ...

According to Refinitiv Limited a Diverted Profit Tax-notices they had been served for FY 2018 by the tax authorities were unlawful because the tax authorities had used another transfer pricing method (Profit Split) than the method previously agreed (TNMM with a cost based PLI) in respect of the same services in an earlier Advance Pricing Agreement (“APA”) covering FY 2008-2014. Judgement of the Upper Tribunal The Court did not find an inconsistency between the Diverted Profit Tax-notices issued by the tax authorities in respect of 2018 and the APA covering FY 2008-2014. The appeal of Refinitiv Limited was dismissed. Excerpt “90. HMRC’s acceptance that the 2018 profits were referable to the provision of services in 2008-2014 does not therefore assist the claimants’ case. The APA had terminated and had no effect in relation to the pricing of services for the purposes of calculating profits in 2018. The referability did not mean the services had to be priced under an APA that did not have  effect.91. In conclusion there is accordingly no inconsistency between the DPT notices that HMRC issued in respect of 2018 and the APA. The DPT notices concerned an accounting period in relation to which the APA had no effect.” ...

Olympus Medical Systems India is a subsidiary of Olympus Corp and engaged in the import, sale and maintenance of medical equipment in India. For FY 2012 and 2013 the company reported losses. An transfer pricing audit was initiated by the tax authorities and later an assessment was issued. Since Olympus India had failed to provide audited financials of its associated enterprises to determine the overall profits of the group, it adopted the Resale Price Method using the Bright Line Test approach. An appeal was then filed by Olympus with the Tax Appellate Tribunal. Olympus India argued that the tax authorities was erroneous in adopting the Residual Profit Split Method in determining the arm’s length price of the AMP expenses and furthermore that the tax authorities could not make an adjustment without having information on the total profits of the group. Judgement of the Tax Appellate Tribunal The tribunal held that Olympus India should not benefit for non-cooperation in providing audited financials of associated enterprises. Olympus was obligated to submit the audited financials of the associated enterprises. Failure to do so could justify an assessment by applying the Residual Profit Split Method in the determination of the arm’s length price of the AMP expenses. Excerpts “The TPO has benchmarked using the Residual Profit Split Method. For applying the Residual Profits Split Method, it is incumbent upon the TPO first to combine profit from the international transaction of incurring AMP expenses and then split the combined profit in proportion to the relative contribution made by both the entities. In order to work out the combined profit in the transaction the financials/profitability of the AE’s is very much essential. In the instant case, the Assessee has refused to submit the profitability of the AE’s, therefore the TPO has adopted the RPSM.” “In our opinion, the Assessee who is entering into the International transaction is duty bound to maintain and produce the same before the Department when it is asked to produce as per Section 92D of Income Tax Act R/w. Rule 10D and 92D of Income Tax Rules, 1962. If the assessee doesn’t provide the financials of its AE’s, the TPO/AO/DRP can very well invoke the provisions of Income tax Provisions of Income-Tax Act and the Rules framed there under to call for such records not only from the country of residence but also from any other country in cases of AE’s and decide the issue.” “In our opinion the TPO/Assessing Officer cannot apply wrong method in the absence of material ie: audited financials of AE. On the other hand, TPO/AO cannot even give the benefit as well to the Assessee for non cooperation for providing the audited financials of AE.” “By following the above said binding decision in Assessee’s own case and also for the reasons mentioned above, we hold that the international transaction of AMP functions exists in the case of the Assessee and restore the issue to the TPO for following the direction of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Sony Ericsson (supra) for benchmarking under TNMM in aggregated manner along with the purchase of goods from the AE’s or in the segregated manner, after taking into account appropriate comparables or applying of Resale price method or Cost Plus Method or Profit Split Method keeping in view the findings of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court. Needles to say that, the Assessee shall be given opportunity of being heard. Further Assessee is directed to provide all the relevant documents including the financials of its AE’s if required, failing to which the Authorities can act in accordance with law by invoking the relevant provisions.” ...

The tax authority found that P.sp. z o.o. had understated its income from sales to related parties in the P. Group. The tax authority selected three comparable independent wholesalers and established a range of profit margins between 4.02% and 6.24%. As P. sp. z o.o. had a profit margin of only 2.84% on its wholesale activities, an adjustment was made to the taxable income. A complaint was filed by “P. sp. z o.o.” with the Administrative Court, which was dismissed, and an appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court. The the Supreme Administrative Court, annulled the appealed decision in its entirety and ordered – when re-examining the case – the tax authority to follow the interpretation of the law made by the Supreme Administrative Court. In a very comprehensive judgment, the Court ruled on a wide range of issues, including Whether and how to take into account income received for other activities (marketing services) when determining the arm’s length income. The choice and application of transfer pricing methods The objectives and standards of a compability analysis and benchmarking study conducted by the tax authority The use of statistical methods (IQR) when the number of comparables in a benchmark is limited. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Ukrainian company “PJSP Gals-K” had been involved in various controlled transactions – complex technological drilling services; sale of crude oil; transfer of fixed assets etc. The tax authority found, that prices had not been determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle and issued a tax assessment. Gals-K disagreed and filed a complaint. The Administrative Court dismissed the tax assessment and this decision was later upheld by the Administrative Court of Appeal. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The Supreme Court set aside the decisions of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case to the court of first instance for a new hearing. The court considered that breaches of procedural and substantive law by both the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance have been committed, and the case should therefore be referred to the Court of First Instance for a new hearing. Excerpts “Thus, in order to properly resolve the dispute in this part, the courts must determine, on the basis of the relevant and admissible evidence, whether the oil sales by the plaintiff to the non-resident GFF AG (Swiss Confederation) are controlled transactions within the meaning of paragraph 39. 2.1 of Article 39.2 of Article 39 of the Code of Ukraine. In this case, when establishing the validity of the position on the extension of the provisions of Article 39 of the CP of Ukraine to other legal relationships, the courts should also assess the validity of the opinion of the State Traffic Department regarding the improper valuation by the caller of a controlled operation when using the method of “comparative uncontrolled price”. For example, in the SO No. 35/4, the price that was set at the auction (auction certificate No. A185-186 of 23 January 2014 for the sale of oil on the domestic market) was reversed as the price of the export of oil from GFF AG to Orlen Lietuva.” “According to the appellant’s position, the transfer of the tangible fixed assets by the managing directorate of SD No 35/4 in the name of all the parties to the contract to one of the parties (PJSC “Ukrnafta”) in the person of its structural division (NGVU “Chernihivnaftogaz”) cannot be considered a sale, since the goods were actually transferred to the entire legal entity of PJSC “Ukrnafta”. In connection with the above-mentioned circumstances, during the cassation examination of the case, the plaintiff also pointed to the absence of legislative grounds for considering such a transaction as controlled, and the mention of the latter in the Report on Controlled Transactions constitutes a mistake made by the relevant administrative department. In accordance with this position, the courts of the previous instances have found that the use of the “resale price” method was unjustified. The College of Judges considers that, in resolving the dispute between the parties in this part, the courts of the previous instances did not fully appreciate the parties’ arguments on the dispute, which resulted in an incorrect assessment of the circumstances of the case. It should be noted that the sub-clauses of clause 14.1.139 of Article 14.1 and clause 153.14.5 of Article 153.14 of the Ukrainian Civil Code provide that for the purposes of the disclosure the obligations of the parties to the joint venture under the Joint Venture Agreement are specific civil law contracts. At the same time, the accounting treatment of transactions involving the transfer/sale of tangible goods has been subject to respect and legal scrutiny by the courts. In order to properly resolve the dispute in this part, the following should have been addressed: who and for what money the goods were delivered; to whom (PJSC “Ukrznafta” as a separate legal entity or PJSC “Ukrznafta” as a member of the Agreement No. 35/4) and on what legal basis the goods were exchanged/sold; how the relevant transaction was recorded in the accounting records and whether such recording corresponds to the primary documents that were created in connection with the transfer/sale of the goods.” “The Collegium of Judges notes that, in addition to the above-mentioned deficiencies in the absence of primary documents and accounting documents, which were created for the results of the business transactions, the documentation from the transfer pricing, which was provided to the audit, is also absent (volume 1, page 30). The above makes it impossible to establish officially the conditions of the case as to the method used by the caller, the arguments of the latter in the absence of the conditions for the inclusion of the joint operation in the controlled order with the self-inclusion of the operations of PJSC “Ukrnafta” in the Report for 2014 with the inclusion of the methods 303 “costs plus” and 305 “revenue allocation”, whereas in the letter No 1855/10 dated 22 March 2017 the caller informed the State Tax Administration about the use of only the 303 “cost plus” method.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

TMC Italy SpA is a parent company which provides services and support to the commercial production activities of its affiliated companies based in foreign countries (Spain, Czech Republic, Germany, France, Israel, Brazil, United Kingdom). The costs of providing these intra-group services had been allocated between the related parties based on the number and salary of employees in FY 2008 and 2009. The tax administration issued an assessment where the allocation was instead be based on turnover – due to data supporting better correlation. The Court of first instance held in favour of the tax authorities. This decision was appealed by TMC to the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Court The Court dismissed the appeal of TMC in its entirety and decided in favour of the tax authorities. Excerpts: “CTR considered legitimate and correct the use of the method of allocation of the profits of the transactions adopted by the Office, as provided for by the OECD Guidelines 2010, since the allocation key chosen (turnover), although not being able to prevail in abstract terms over the other indicated by the taxpayer company (number of administrative employees), was more appropriate to the concrete case (see judgment p. 8, where it is stated that the method of allocation of the profits of the transactions used by the Office was more appropriate to the specific case). Judgment p. 8, where the inadequacy of the key indicated by the taxpayer is reported) and therefore compliant in terms of reliability of the results (OECD Guidelines, 2010, § 2.116).” “With regard to the application of the transfer pricing rules for IRAP purposes, the Appeals Committee, after having reconstructed the succession of relevant laws (from the repeal of Law No. 244 of 2007, to the rules set forth in Article. 1, Paragraph 281 and Paragraph 282 of the 2014 Finance Act), correctly affirmed that Paragraph 281, Article 1, Law 147/2013 (2014 Stability Law), extended the application of transfer pricing also to tax periods subsequent to the one in progress as at 31 December 2007, without any break in continuity with respect to the previous rules.” “The Court observes that art. 1, paragraph 281, I. n. 147 of 2013, is a rule of authentic interpretation, so that, as such, is intended to produce effects also for the past, allowing the application of the discipline of art. 110, paragraph 7, T.U.I.R. for tax periods from 2008 onwards.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

This case concerns Società Italiana per l’Oleodotto Transalpino Spa (S.I.O.T.) – , which operates the transalpine oil pipeline that crosses Italy, Austria and Germany, with the Austrian subsidiary T.O.O. GmbH and with the German subsidiary D.T.O. GmbH, belonging to the same group of companies. The Italian tax authorities had issued four notices of assessment for FY 2003-2006, related to undeclared revenues, determined in application of the transfer pricing regulations, according to which revenues deriving from transactions with foreign companies must be determined according to the “normal value” of the goods sold or services provided, cf, the arm’s length principle. S.I.O.T. had allocated profit from the activity between the Italien, Austrian and German pipelines using the profit split method – where kilometers of pipeline was the splitting factor. However, the cost of maintenance borne of S.I.O.T. was almost three times higher than that of the other two companies managing the pipeline due to the geography. The tax authorities therefore adjusted the profit allocation by referring to two other significant parameters (in addition to those already considered by the company), i.e. that of the electricity used and that of the maintenance costs borne by the individual companies, except then, in practice, to choose and use only one (that of maintenance costs). Click here for Translation ...

Toyota Kirloskar Auto Parts Private Limited manufactures auto parts and sold them to Toyota Kirloskar Motors Limited, another Indian corporation in the Toyota Group. In FY 2013-14 Toyota Kirloskar Auto Parts Private Limited paid a 5% royalty to the Japanese parent Toyota Motor Corporation for use of know-how. The royalty rate had been determined by application of the TNMM method. The Indian tax authorities did not agree with the choice of method and argued that the most appropriate method was the Profit Split Method (PSM). Judgement of the Tax Appellate Tribunal The Tribunal decided in favor of Toyota Kirloskar Auto Parts and set aside the assessment. Excerpt “17. It is clear from the above OECD guidelines that in ‘order to determine the profits to be split, the crux is to understand the functional profile of the entities under consideration. Although the comparability analysis is at the “heart of the application of the arm’s length principle”, likewise, a functional analysis has always been a cornerstone of the comparability analysis. In the present case the Assessee leverages on the use of technology from the AE and does not contribute any unique intangibles to the transaction. It may be true that the Assessee aggregated payment of royalty with the transaction of manufacturing as it was closely IT(TP)A Nos.1915/Bang/2017 & 3377/Bang/2018 linked and adopted TNMM but that does not mean that the transactions are so interrelated that they cannot be evaluated separately for applying PSM. Further, the Assessee does not make any unique contribution to the transaction, hence PSM in this case cannot be applied. 18. Therefore, we are of the view that TNMM is the Most Appropriate Method in the case of assessee. The decision of the Tribunal in the earlier AY 2008-09 has also been upheld by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in ITA No.104/2015, judgment dated 16.7.2018, which was an appeal of the revenue against the order of Tribunal for AY 2008-09. The Tribunal has upheld TNMM as MAM from AY 2007-08 to 2011-12. In those AYs the dispute was whether TNMM or CUP was the MAM. It is for the first time in AY 2013-14 that the revenue has sought to apply PSM as MAM. In the given facts and circumstances, we are of the view that TNM Method is the Most Appropriate Method and the AO is directed to apply the said method in determining the ALP, after affording opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The grounds of appeal of the assessee are treated as allowed. 19. The facts in AY 2014-15 are identical and the reasoning given in AY 2013-14 will equally apply to the AY 2014-15 also and the TPO is directed to compute the ALP for AY 2014-15 by applying TNMM as the MAM , after affording due opportunity to the assessee. 20 The other issues with regard to the objections regarding the manner in which ALP was determined by applying PSM as the MAM does not require any adjudication because of the conclusion that TNMM is the MAM.” Click here for other translation ...

Two Swiss investors had established a structure for the management of a private equity fund in the form of a Swiss “Investment Advisor” AG and a Jersey “Investment Mananger” Ltd. They each held 50% of the shares in the Swiss AG and 50% of the shares in the Jersey Ltd. Swiss AG and Jersey Ltd then entered an investment advisory agreement whereby the Swiss AG carried out all advisory activities on behalf of Jersey Ltd and Jersey Ltd assumed all the risk of the investments. Both investors were employed by Swiss AG and Jersey Ltd had no employees execpt two directors who each received a yearly payment of CFH 15,000. According to the investment advisory agreement Jersey Ltd would remunerate the Swiss AG with 66% of the gross fee income. The Swiss AG would carry out all relevant functions related to investment advisory and recommend to Jersey Ltd acquisition targets which the latter would then evaluate and subsequently decides on and assume the risk of. For provision of the advisory functions two-thirds of the total fees (of 2.25% on Assets under Management) would go to the Swiss AG, and the remaining one-third would go to the Jersey Ltd. The Swiss AG had prepared a benchmarking analysis confirming that independent private equity fund of funds (Dachfonds) earned management fees of between 0.75% and 1% on Assets under Management, which was in line with the 0.75% attributed to the Jersey Ltd. The Swiss Tax Authorities regarded the two Swiss investors employed by the Swiss AG as the only two entrepreneurs in the structure that could have possibly taken any significant decisions. On that basis the tax authorities claimed that the 66/34 profit sharing was artificial and inconsistent with the substance of the arrangements. They argued that the Jersey Ltd should only be remunerated with a cost plus 10%. This assessment was brought to the first instance of the tax appelant court and then to the administrative court. Both courts ruled that the set-up was artificial and not in line with OECD standards, after applying a substance-over-form approach. Click here for translation ...

[See Chapter II, Part III, Section C of these Guidelines for general guidance on the application of the transactional profit split method. The assumptions about arm’s length arrangements in the following examples are intended for illustrative purposes only and should not be taken as prescribing adjustments and arm’s length arrangements in actual cases of particular industries. While they seek to demonstrate the principles of the sections of the Guidelines to which they refer, those principles must be applied in each case according to the specific facts and circumstances of that case. Furthermore, the comments below relate to the application of a transactional profit split method in the situations where, given the facts and circumstances of the case and in particular the comparability (including functional) analysis of the transaction and the review of the information available on uncontrolled comparables, such a method is found to be the most appropriate method to be used.] Below are some illustrations of the effect of choosing a measure of profits to determine the combined profits to be split when applying a transactional profit split method. 2. Assume A and B are two associated enterprises situated in two different tax jurisdictions. Both manufacture the same widgets and incur expenditure that results in the creation of an intangible asset which they can mutually use. For the purpose of this example, it is assumed that the nature of this particular asset is such that the value of the asset contribution attributable to each of A and B in the year in question is proportional to A and B’s relative expenditure on the asset in that (It should be noted that this assumption will not always be true in practice. This is because there may be cases where the relative values of asset contributions attributable to each party would be based on accumulated expenditure from the prior, as well as current years.) Assume A and B exclusively sell products to third parties. Assume that it is determined that the most appropriate method to be used is a residual profit split method, that the manufacturing activities of A and B are simple, non-unique transactions that should be allocated an initial return of 10% of the Cost of Goods Sold and that the residual profit should be split in proportion to A’s and B’s intangible asset expenditure. The following figures are for illustration only: A B Combined A + B Sales 100 300 400 Cost Of Goods Sold 60 170 230 Gross Profit 40 130 170 Overhead expenses 3 6 9 Other operating expenses 2 4 6 Intangible asset expenditure 30 40 70 Operating Profit 5 80 85 Step one: determining the initial return for the non-unique manufacturing transactions (Cost of Goods Sold + 10% in this example) A 60 + (60 * 10 %) = 66 ➔ Initial return for the manufacturing transactions of A =  6 B 170 + (170 * 10 %) = 187 ➔ Initial return for the manufacturing transactions of B =     17 Total profit allocated through initial returns (6+17) =       23 Step two: determining the residual profit to be split a) In case it is determined as the operating profit:  Combined Operating Profit 85 Profit already allocated (initial returns for manufacturing transactions) 23 Residual profit to be split in proportion to A’s and B’s intangible asset expenditure 62   Residual profit allocated to A: 62 * 30/70 26.57 Residual profit allocated to B: 62 * 40/70 35.43 Total profits allocated to A: 6 (initial return) + 26.57 (residual) 32.57 Total profits allocated to B: 17 (initial return) + 35.43 (residual) 52.43 Total 85 b) In case it is determined as the operating profit before overhead expenses (assuming it is determined that the overhead expenses of A and B do not relate to the transaction examined and should be excluded from the determination of the combined profits to be split):   A B Combined A + B Sales 100 300 400 Cost Of Goods Sold 60 170 230 Gross Profit 40 130 170 Other operating expenses 2 4 6 Intangible asset expenditure 30 40 70 Operating Profit before overhead expenses 8 86 94 Overhead expenses 3 6 9 Operating Profit 5 80 85   Combined Operating Profit before overhead expenses 94 Profit already allocated (initial returns for manufacturing transactions) 23 Residual profit before overhead expenses to be split in proportion to A’s and B’s intangible asset expenditure 71   Residual profit allocated to A: 71 * 30/70 30.43 Residual profit allocated to B: 71 * 40/70 40.57 Total profits allocated to A: 6 (initial return) + 30.43 (residual) – 3 (overhead expenses) 33.43 Total profits allocated to B: 17 (initial return) + 40.57 (residual) – 6 (overhead expenses) 51.57 Total 85 5. s shown in the above example, excluding some specific items from the determination of the combined profits to be split implies that each party remains responsible for its own expenses in relation to it. As a consequence, the decision whether or not to exclude some specific items must be consistent with the comparability (including functional) analysis of the transaction. 6. As another example, in some cases it may be appropriate to back out a category of expenses to the extent that the allocation key used in the residual profit split analysis relies on those For example, in cases where relative expenditure contributing to the development of an intangible asset is determined to be the most appropriate profit split factor, residual profits can be based on operating profits before that expenditure. After determining the split of residual profits, each associated enterprise then subtracts its own expenditure. This can be illustrated as follows. Assume the facts are the same as in the example at paragraph 2 above and assume the overhead expenses are not excluded from the determination of the residual profit to be split. Step one: determining the basic return for the manufacturing activities (Cost of Goods Sold + 10% in this example) Same as at paragraph 3. Step two: determining the residual profit to ...

[See Chapter II, Part III, Section C of these Guidelines for general guidance on the application of the profit split method. The adjustments and assumptions about arm’s length arrangements in the examples that follow are intended for illustrative purposes only and should not be taken as prescribing adjustments and arm’s length arrangements in actual cases or particular industries. While they seek to demonstrate the principles of the Sections of the Guidelines to which they refer, those principles must be applied in each case according to the specific facts and circumstances of that case.] 1. The success of an electronics product is linked to the innovative technological design both of its electronic processes and of its major component. That component is designed and manufactured by associated company A, is transferred to associated company B which designs and manufactures the rest of the product, and is distributed by associated company C. Information exists to verify by means of a resale price method that the distribution functions and risks of Company C are being appropriately rewarded by the transfer price of the finished product from B to C. 2. The most appropriate method to price the component transferred from A to B may be a CUP, if a sufficiently similar comparable could be found. See paragraph 2.15 of the Guidelines. However, since the component transferred from A to B reflects the innovative technological advance enjoyed by company A in this market, in this example it proves impossible (after the appropriate functional and comparability analyses have been carried out) to find a reliable CUP to estimate the correct price that A could command at arm’s length for its product. Calculating a return on A’s manufacturing costs could however provide an estimate of the profit element which would reward A’s manufacturing functions, ignoring the profit element attributable to the intangible used therein. A similar calculation could be performed on company B’s manufacturing costs, to give an estimate of B’s profit derived from its manufacturing functions, ignoring the profit element attributable to its intangible. Since B’s selling price to C is known and is accepted as an arm’s length price, the amount of the residual profit accrued by A and B together from the exploitation of their respective intangible property can be determined. See paragraphs 2.114 and 2.127 of the Guidelines. At this stage the proportion of this residual profit properly attributable to each enterprise remains undetermined. 3. The residual profit may be split based on an analysis of the facts and circumstances that might indicate how the additional reward would have been allocated at arm’s length. Paragraph 2.127 of the The R&D activity of each company is directed towards technological design relating to the same class of item, and it is established for the purposes of this example that the relative amounts of R&D expenditure reliably measure the relative value of the companies’ contributions. See paragraph 2.126 of the Guidelines. This means that each company’s contribution to the product’s technological innovation may reliably be measured by their relative expenditure on research and development, so that, if A’s R&D expenditure is 15 and B’s 10, the residual could be split 3/5 for A and 2/5 for B. 4. Some figures may assist in following the example: a) Profit & Loss of A and B   A B Sales 50 100 Less: Purchases (10) (50) Manufacturing costs (15) (20) Gross profits 25 30 Less: R&D 15 10 Operating expenses 10 (25) 10 (20) Net profit 0 10 b) Determine routine profit on manufacturing by A and B, and calculate total residual profit 5. It is established, for both jurisdictions, that third-party comparable manufacturers without innovative intangible property earn a return on manufacturing costs (excluding purchases) of 10% (ratio of net profit to the direct and indirect costs of manufacturing).1 See paragraph 2.127 of the A’s manufacturing costs are 15, and so the return on costs would attribute to A a manufacturing profit of 1.5. B’s equivalent costs are 20, and so the return on costs would attribute to B a manufacturing profit of 2.0. The residual profit is therefore 6.5, arrived at by deducting from the combined net profit of 10 the combined manufacturing profit of 3.5. c)  Allocate residual profit 6. The initial allocation of profit (1.5 to A and 2.0 to B) rewards the manufacturing functions of A and B, but does not recognise the value of their respective R&D that has resulted in a technologically advanced product. That residual can, therefore, be split between A and B based on their share of total R&D costs, since, for the purposes of this example2, it can reliably be assumed that the companies’ relative expenditure on R&D accurately reflects their relative contributions to the value of the product’s technological innovation. A’s R&D expenditure is 15 and B’s 10, giving combined R&D expenditure of 25. The residual is 6.5 which may be allocated 15/25 to A and 10/25 to B, resulting in a share of 3.9 and 2.6 respectively, as below: A’s share 6.5 x 15/25= 3.9 B’s share 6.5 x 10/25= 2.6. d)  Recalculate Profits 7. A’s net profits would thus become 5 + 3.9 = 5.4. B’s net profits would thus become 2.0 + 2.6 = 4.6. The revised P & L for tax purposes would appear as: A B Sales 55.4 100 Less: Purchases (10) (55.4) Manufacturing costs (15) (20) Gross profit 30.4 24.6 Less: R& D 15 10 Operating expenses 10 (25) 10 (20) Net profit 5.4 4.6 Note 8. The example is intended to exemplify in a simple manner the mechanisms of a residual profit split and should not be interpreted as providing general guidance as to how the arm’s length principle should apply in identifying arm’s length comparables and determining an appropriate split. It is important that the principles that it seeks to illustrate are applied in each case taking into account the specific facts and circumstances of the case. In particular, it should be noted that the allocation of the residual split ...