Although countries may have different views on the application of Article 9 to determine the balance of debt and equity funding of an entity within an MNE group, the purpose of this section is to provide guidance for countries that use the accurate delineation under Chapter I to determine whether a purported loan should be regarded as a loan for tax purposes (or should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital) ...

As indicated in paragraph 8.33, the guidance in Chapter VI on hard-to-value intangibles may equally apply in situations involving CCAs. This will be the case if the objective of the CCA is to develop a new intangible that is hard to value at the start of the development project, but also in valuing contributions involving pre-existing intangibles. Where the arrangements viewed in their totality lack commercial rationality in accordance with the criteria in Section D.2 of Chapter I, the CCA may be disregarded ...

It will often be the case that a price for a transaction involving intangibles can be identified that is consistent with the realistically available options of each of the parties. The existence of such prices is consistent with the assumption that MNE groups seek to optimise resource allocations. If situations arise in which the minimum price acceptable to the transferor, based on its realistically available options, exceeds the maximum price acceptable to the transferee, based on its realistically available options, it may be necessary to consider whether the actual transaction should be disregarded under the criterion for non-recognition set out in Section D.2 of Chapter I, or whether the conditions of the transaction should otherwise be adjusted. Similarly, if situations arise in which there are assertions that either the current use of an intangible, or a proposed realistically available option (i.e. an alternative use of the intangible), does not optimise resource allocations, it may be necessary to consider whether such assertions are consistent with the true facts and circumstances of the case. This discussion highlights the importance of taking all relevant facts and circumstances into account in accurately delineating the actual transaction involving intangibles ...

Company S1 conducts research activities to develop intangibles that it uses to create new products that it can produce and sell. It agrees to transfer to an associated company, Company S2, unlimited rights to all future intangibles which may arise from its future work over a period of twenty years for a lump sum payment. The arrangement is commercially irrational for both parties since neither Company S1 nor Company S2 has any reliable means to determine whether the payment reflects an appropriate valuation, both because it is uncertain what range of development activities Company S1 might conduct over the period and also because valuing the potential outcomes would be entirely speculative. Under the guidance in this section, the structure of the arrangement adopted by the taxpayer, including the form of payment, should be modified for the purposes of the transfer pricing analysis. The replacement structure should be guided by the economically relevant characteristics, including the functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed, of the commercial or financial relations of the associated enterprises. Those facts would narrow the range of potential replacement structures to the structure most consistent with the facts of the case (for example, depending on those facts the arrangement could be recast as the provision of financing by Company S2, or as the provision of research services by Company S1, or, if specific intangibles can be identified, as a licence with contingent payments terms for the development of those specific intangibles, taking into account the guidance on hard-to-value intangibles as appropriate) ...

Under the guidance in this section, the transaction should not be recognised. S1 is treated as not purchasing insurance and its profits are not reduced by the payment to S2; S2 is treated as not issuing insurance and therefore not being liable for any claim ...

Company S1 carries on a manufacturing business that involves holding substantial inventory and a significant investment in plant and machinery. It owns commercial property situated in an area prone to increasingly frequent flooding in recent years. Third-party insurers experience significant uncertainty over the exposure to large claims, with the result that there is no active market for the insurance of properties in the area. Company S2, an associated enterprise, provides insurance to Company S1, and an annual premium representing 80% of the value of the inventory, property and contents is paid by Company S1. In this example S1 has entered into a commercially irrational transaction since there is no market for insurance given the likelihood of significant claims, and either relocation or not insuring may be more attractive realistic alternatives. Since the transaction is commercially irrational, there is not a price that is acceptable to both S1 and S2 from their individual perspectives ...

The criterion for non-recognition may be illustrated by the following examples ...

The structure that for transfer pricing purposes, replaces that actually adopted by the taxpayers should comport as closely as possible with the facts of the actual transaction undertaken whilst achieving a commercially rational expected result that would have enabled the parties to come to a price acceptable to both of them at the time the arrangement was entered into ...

The key question in the analysis is whether the actual transaction possesses the commercial rationality of arrangements that would be agreed between unrelated parties under comparable economic circumstances, not whether the same transaction can be observed between independent parties. The non-recognition of a transaction that possesses the commercial rationality of an arm’s length arrangement is not an appropriate application of the arm’s length principle. Restructuring of legitimate business transactions would be a wholly arbitrary exercise the inequity of which could be compounded by double taxation created where the other tax administration does not share the same views as to how the transaction should be structured. It should again be noted that the mere fact that the transaction may not be seen between independent parties does not mean that it does not have characteristics of an arm’s length arrangement ...

This section sets out circumstances in which the transaction between the parties as accurately delineated can be disregarded for transfer pricing purposes. Because non-recognition can be contentious and a source of double taxation, every effort should be made to determine the actual nature of the transaction and apply arm’s length pricing to the accurately delineated transaction, and to ensure that non-recognition is not used simply because determining an arm’s length price is difficult. Where the same transaction can be seen between independent parties in comparable circumstances (i.e. where all economically relevant characteristics are the same as those under which the tested transaction occurs other than that the parties are associated enterprises) non-recognition would not apply. Importantly, the mere fact that the transaction may not be seen between independent parties does not mean that it should not be recognised. Associated enterprises may have the ability to enter into a much greater variety of arrangements than can independent enterprises, and may conclude transactions of a specific nature that are not encountered, or are only very rarely encountered, between independent parties, and may do so for sound business reasons. The transaction as accurately delineated may be disregarded, and if appropriate, replaced by an alternative transaction, where the arrangements made in relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would have been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner in comparable circumstances, thereby preventing determination of a price that would be acceptable to both of the parties taking into account their respective perspectives and the options realistically available to each of them at the time of entering into the transaction. It is also a relevant pointer to consider whether the MNE group as a whole is left worse off on a pre-tax basis since this may be an indicator that the transaction viewed in its entirety lacks the commercial rationality of arrangements between unrelated parties ...

Every effort should be made to determine pricing for the actual transaction as accurately delineated under the arm’s length principle. The various tools and methods available to tax administrations and taxpayers to do so are set out in the following chapters of these Guidelines. A tax administration should not disregard the actual transaction or substitute other transactions for it unless the exceptional circumstances described in the following paragraphs 1.142-1.145 apply ...

The consequences of risk allocation in Example 3 in paragraph 1.85 depend on analysis of functions under step 3. Company A does not have control over the economically significant risks associated with the investment in and exploitation of the asset, and those risks should be aligned with control of those risks by Companies B and C. The functional contribution of Company A is limited to providing financing for an amount equating to the cost of the asset that enables the asset to be created and exploited by Companies B and C. However, the functional analysis also provides evidence that Company A has no capability and authority to control the risk of investing in a financial asset. Company A does not have the capability to make decisions to take on or decline the financing opportunity, or the capability to make decisions on whether and how to respond to the risks associated with the financing opportunity. Company A does not perform functions to evaluate the financing opportunity, does not consider the appropriate risk premium and other issues to determine the appropriate pricing of the financing opportunity, and does not evaluate the appropriate protection of its financial investment. In the circumstances of Example 3, Company A would not be entitled to any more than a risk-free return as an appropriate measure of the profits it is entitled to retain, since it lacks the capability to control the risk associated with investing in a riskier financial asset. The risk will be allocated to the enterprise which has control and the financial capacity to assume the risk associated with the financial asset. In the circumstances of example, this would be Company B. Company A does not control the investment risk that carries a potential risk premium. An assessment may be necessary of the commercial rationality of the transaction based on the guidance in Section D.2 taking into account the full facts and circumstances of the transaction. (Company A could potentially be entitled to less than a risk-free return if, for example, the transaction is disregarded under Section D.2.) ...

Although countries may have different views on the application of Article 9 to determine the balance of debt and equity funding of an entity within an MNE group, the purpose of this section is to provide guidance for countries that use the accurate delineation under Chapter I to determine whether a purported loan should be regarded as a loan for tax purposes (or should be regarded as some other kind of payment, in particular a contribution to equity capital) ...

A Swiss company manufactured and distributed pharmaceutical and chemical products. The Swiss company was held by a Dutch parent that held another company in France. R&D activities were delegated by the Dutch parent to its French subsidiary and compensated with cost plus 15%. On that basis the Swiss company had to pay a royalty to its Dutch parent of 2.5% of its turnover for using the IP developed. Following an audit the Swiss tax authorities concluded that the Dutch parent did not contribute to the development of IP. In 2006 and 2007, no employees were employed, and in 2010 and 2011 there were only three employees. Hence the royalty agreement was disregarded and an assessment issued where the royalty payments were denied. Instead the R&D agreement between the Dutch parent and the French subsidiary was regarded as having been concluded between the Swiss and French companies Judgement of the Supreme Court The Court agreed with the decision of the tax authorities. The Dutch parent was a mere shell company with no substance. Hence, the royalty agreement was disregarded and replaced with the cost plus agreement with the French subsidiary. The Court found that it must have been known to the taxpayer that a company without substance could not be entitled to profits of the R&D activities. On that basis an amount equal to 75% of the evaded tax had therefore rightly been imposed as a penalty. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The issues in this case was: Whether the price of purchase of right to dividends were deductible. Whether the purchase and sale of right to dividends was trading transaction in course of Appellant’s trade. Whether the purchase price expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for purposes of the trade. Whether HMRC were permitted to argue point in relation to section 730 ICTA that was not raised in closure notice and which they stated they were not pursuing Whether the price of sale of right to dividends should be disregarded for the purposes of calculating Appellant’s trading profits under section 730(3) ICTA ...

As indicated in paragraph 8.33, the guidance in Chapter VI on hard-to-value intangibles may equally apply in situations involving CCAs. This will be the case if the objective of the CCA is to develop a new intangible that is hard to value at the start of the development project, but also in valuing contributions involving pre-existing intangibles. Where the arrangements viewed in their totality lack commercial rationality in accordance with the criteria in Section D.2 of Chapter I, the CCA may be disregarded ...

It will often be the case that a price for a transaction involving intangibles can be identified that is consistent with the realistically available options of each of the parties. The existence of such prices is consistent with the assumption that MNE groups seek to optimise resource allocations. If situations arise in which the minimum price acceptable to the transferor, based on its realistically available options, exceeds the maximum price acceptable to the transferee, based on its realistically available options, it may be necessary to consider whether the actual transaction should be disregarded under the criterion for non-recognition set out in Section D.2 of Chapter I, or whether the conditions of the transaction should otherwise be adjusted. Similarly, if situations arise in which there are assertions that either the current use of an intangible, or a proposed realistically available option (i.e. an alternative use of the intangible), does not optimise resource allocations, it may be necessary to consider whether such assertions are consistent with the true facts and circumstances of the case. This discussion highlights the importance of taking all relevant facts and circumstances into account in accurately delineating the actual transaction involving intangibles ...

Company S1 conducts research activities to develop intangibles that it uses to create new products that it can produce and sell. It agrees to transfer to an associated company, Company S2, unlimited rights to all future intangibles which may arise from its future work over a period of twenty years for a lump sum payment. The arrangement is commercially irrational for both parties since neither Company S1 nor Company S2 has any reliable means to determine whether the payment reflects an appropriate valuation, both because it is uncertain what range of development activities Company S1 might conduct over the period and also because valuing the potential outcomes would be entirely speculative. Under the guidance in this section, the structure of the arrangement adopted by the taxpayer, including the form of payment, should be modified for the purposes of the transfer pricing analysis. The replacement structure should be guided by the economically relevant characteristics, including the functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed, of the commercial or financial relations of the associated enterprises. Those facts would narrow the range of potential replacement structures to the structure most consistent with the facts of the case (for example, depending on those facts the arrangement could be recast as the provision of financing by Company S2, or as the provision of research services by Company S1, or, if specific intangibles can be identified, as a licence with contingent payments terms for the development of those specific intangibles, taking into account the guidance on hard-to-value intangibles as appropriate) ...

Under the guidance in this section, the transaction should not be recognised. S1 is treated as not purchasing insurance and its profits are not reduced by the payment to S2; S2 is treated as not issuing insurance and therefore not being liable for any claim ...

Company S1 carries on a manufacturing business that involves holding substantial inventory and a significant investment in plant and machinery. It owns commercial property situated in an area prone to increasingly frequent flooding in recent years. Third-party insurers experience significant uncertainty over the exposure to large claims, with the result that there is no active market for the insurance of properties in the area. Company S2, an associated enterprise, provides insurance to Company S1, and an annual premium representing 80% of the value of the inventory, property and contents is paid by Company S1. In this example S1 has entered into a commercially irrational transaction since there is no market for insurance given the likelihood of significant claims, and either relocation or not insuring may be more attractive realistic alternatives. Since the transaction is commercially irrational, there is not a price that is acceptable to both S1 and S2 from their individual perspectives ...

The criterion for non-recognition may be illustrated by the following examples ...

The structure that for transfer pricing purposes, replaces that actually adopted by the taxpayers should comport as closely as possible with the facts of the actual transaction undertaken whilst achieving a commercially rational expected result that would have enabled the parties to come to a price acceptable to both of them at the time the arrangement was entered into ...

The key question in the analysis is whether the actual transaction possesses the commercial rationality of arrangements that would be agreed between unrelated parties under comparable economic circumstances, not whether the same transaction can be observed between independent parties. The non-recognition of a transaction that possesses the commercial rationality of an arm’s length arrangement is not an appropriate application of the arm’s length principle. Restructuring of legitimate business transactions would be a wholly arbitrary exercise the inequity of which could be compounded by double taxation created where the other tax administration does not share the same views as to how the transaction should be structured. It should again be noted that the mere fact that the transaction may not be seen between independent parties does not mean that it does not have characteristics of an arm’s length arrangement ...

This section sets out circumstances in which the transaction between the parties as accurately delineated can be disregarded for transfer pricing purposes. Because non-recognition can be contentious and a source of double taxation, every effort should be made to determine the actual nature of the transaction and apply arm’s length pricing to the accurately delineated transaction, and to ensure that non-recognition is not used simply because determining an arm’s length price is difficult. Where the same transaction can be seen between independent parties in comparable circumstances (i.e. where all economically relevant characteristics are the same as those under which the tested transaction occurs other than that the parties are associated enterprises) non-recognition would not apply. Importantly, the mere fact that the transaction may not be seen between independent parties does not mean that it should not be recognised. Associated enterprises may have the ability to enter into a much greater variety of arrangements than can independent enterprises, and may conclude transactions of a specific nature that are not encountered, or are only very rarely encountered, between independent parties, and may do so for sound business reasons. The transaction as accurately delineated may be disregarded, and if appropriate, replaced by an alternative transaction, where the arrangements made in relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would have been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner in comparable circumstances, thereby preventing determination of a price that would be acceptable to both of the parties taking into account their respective perspectives and the options realistically available to each of them at the time of entering into the transaction. It is also a relevant pointer to consider whether the MNE group as a whole is left worse off on a pre-tax basis since this may be an indicator that the transaction viewed in its entirety lacks the commercial rationality of arrangements between unrelated parties ...

Every effort should be made to determine pricing for the actual transaction as accurately delineated under the arm’s length principle. The various tools and methods available to tax administrations and taxpayers to do so are set out in the following chapters of these Guidelines. A tax administration should not disregard the actual transaction or substitute other transactions for it unless the exceptional circumstances described in the following paragraphs 1.122-1.125 apply ...

The consequences of risk allocation in Example 3 in paragraph 1.85 depend on analysis of functions under step 3. Company A does not have control over the economically significant risks associated with the investment in and exploitation of the asset, and those risks should be aligned with control of those risks by Companies B and C. The functional contribution of Company A is limited to providing financing for an amount equating to the cost of the asset that enables the asset to be created and exploited by Companies B and C. However, the functional analysis also provides evidence that Company A has no capability and authority to control the risk of investing in a financial asset. Company A does not have the capability to make decisions to take on or decline the financing opportunity, or the capability to make decisions on whether and how to respond to the risks associated with the financing opportunity. Company A does not perform functions to evaluate the financing opportunity, does not consider the appropriate risk premium and other issues to determine the appropriate pricing of the financing opportunity, and does not evaluate the appropriate protection of its financial investment. In the circumstances of Example 3, Company A would not be entitled to any more than a risk-free return as an appropriate measure of the profits it is entitled to retain, since it lacks the capability to control the risk associated with investing in a riskier financial asset. The risk will be allocated to the enterprise which has control and the financial capacity to assume the risk associated with the financial asset. In the circumstances of example, this would be Company B. Company A does not control the investment risk that carries a potential risk premium. An assessment may be necessary of the commercial rationality of the transaction based on the guidance in Section D.2 taking into account the full facts and circumstances of the transaction. (Company A could potentially be entitled to less than a risk-free return if, for example, the transaction is disregarded under Section D.2.) ...

Wells Fargo, an American multinational financial services company, had claimed foreign tax credits in the amount of $350 based on a “Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged Securities” (STARS) scheme. The STARS foreign tax credit scheme has two components — a trust structure which produces the foreign tax credits and a loan structure which generates interest deductions. Wells Fargo was of the opinion that the STARS arrangement was a single, integrated transaction that resulted in low-cost funding. In 2016, a jury found that the trust and loan structure were two independent transactions and that the trust transaction failed both the objective and subjective test of the “economic substance” analysis. With respect to the loan transaction the jury found that the transaction passed the objective test by providing a reasonable possibility of a pre-tax profit, but failed the subjective test as the transaction had been entered into “solely for tax-related reasons.” The federal court ruled that Wells Fargo had not been entitled to foreign tax credits. The transaction lacked both economic substance and a non-tax business purpose. (The economic substance doctrine in the US had an objective and a subjective prong . The objective prong of the analysis considered whether a transaction had a real potential to produce an economic profit after consideration of transaction costs and without consideration of potential tax benefits. The subjective prong of the analysis considered whether the taxpayer had a non-tax business purpose for the transaction. The relationship between the two prongs had long been debated.  Some argued for application of the prongs disjunctively and others argued for application of the prongs conjunctively. When the US Congress codified the economic substance doctrine in 2010, it adopted a conjunctive formulation—denying tax benefits to a transaction if it failed to satisfy either prong.) ...

The company had deducted impairment losses recognised on an investment in an Argentinean company (recently acquired from a related entity) arising from the conversion into capital of loans granted to the entity by other group companies, loans which had been acquired by the Spanish taxpayer. The tax administration argued that acquisition of such loans would not have taken place between independent parties due to the economic situation in Argentina at that time. The Supreme Court considered this conclusion to be wrong for two reasons: From a technical point of view, it was unacceptable to consider that the loans had no market value, since economic reality shows that even in situations of apparent insolvency there is an active market to purchase loans that are apparently uncollectible. If the loans acquired could have a market value, it was not possible to deny that they had such value without proving it; and From a legal point of view, it was not possible to disregard transactions actually carried out between related parties which could be attributed a market value by simply referring to the direct application of Article 9 of the International Convention on the avoidance of double taxation between Spain and France or between Spain and Argentina. It would have been necessary in this case to apply a general internal anti-abuse clause to carry out this reclassification. Click here for translation And Click here for translation ...

“X Beheer B.V.” was founded in 1992 and has been part of the A-group as a holding company ever since. The shares of “X Beheer B.V.” were transferred against the issue of depositary receipts to a trust office foundation. The depository receipt holders of “X Beheer B.V.” were also holders of the depository receipts of shares of F B.V. (hereinafter: F), formerly the holding company of the A-group. In 1995, a reorganisation took place as a result of the wish of a number of depositary receipt holders to dispose of their interests in F and “X Beheer B.V.”. However, the remaining group of depositary receipt holders did not have the financial means to buy out those depositary receipt holders, after which it was decided to establish the (take-over) holding company G Holding B.V. (hereinafter: Holding). The intention was that G Holding B.V. would gradually buy up packages of depositary receipts from depositary receipt holders who wished to sell. After four transactions, at the end of 1997 G Holding B.V. held 278 depositary receipts for shares in “X Beheer B.V.” (23.16%) and 38 depositary receipts for shares in F B.V. (7.3%). The purchases of these depositary receipts involved a total amount of Fl. 10,235,760. The purchase price was fully financed by a loan from “X Beheer B.V.” to G Holding B.V. It was intended that G Holding B.V., which had no other assets or financing, would repay the loan from “X Beheer B.V.” from a dividend stream to be generated from “X Beheer B.V.” and F B.V. The loan from “X Beheer B.V.” to G Holding B.V. was classified by “X Beheer B.V.” as a current account, to which the interest due was credited annually. The interest rate was 4.7% in 1996, 4.96% in 1997, 5.25% in 1998 and 5.63% in 2000. The balance of this loan rose from Fl. 4,526,692 at the end of 1995, through Fl. 10,717,470 at the end of 1997 and Fl. 12,509,550 at the end of 1999 to Fl. 13,213,837 at the end of 2000. During the term, a total amount of NLG 115,030 (in three different tranches) was repaid on the loan, which amount came from dividends paid by F B.V. A written loan agreement was never drawn up and a repayment schedule for the loan was never established. Collateral for the loan was neither requested nor provided. A Group’s results had been under pressure since the loan was taken out, partly due to changed market conditions, different production techniques and increasing competition. Losses were incurred in all financial years from 1996 to 2000. The total loss in these five years (commercial) amounted to Fl. 24,619,216. “X Beheer B.V.”‘s equity was negative since 1997. Partly as a result of these losses and this equity position, no dividend was ever paid from the A-group to G Holding B.V. In February 2001 “X Beheer B.V.” transferred its claim on G Holding B.V., with a nominal value of NLG 13,198,000, to F for the fair value of NLG 6,205,400. The G Holding B.V. shares were also sold for Fl. In “X Beheer B.V.”s corporation tax return for 2000, an additional provision of NLG 2,000,000 was made in respect of the loan to G Holding B.V., after a provision of NLG 5,000,000 had already been made in 1999. The tax authorities did not accept the 2,000,000 write off on the loan and disallowed the deduction. A complaint was filed by “X Beheer B.V.” which was later dismissed by the Court of Appeal. An appeal was then filed with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal and dismissed the appeal filed by “X Beheer B.V.”. Excerpt “3.5. The Court’s opinion that an independent third party would not have taken out the money loan under the circumstances outlined by the Court is of a factual nature, and not incomprehensible in the light of the circumstances taken into account by the Court – in particular the fact that no security was requested and provided – and in view of the circumstance that Holding, which did not have any other assets or any other financing, would have had to repay the loan from the interested party from a dividend flow to be generated from the interested party, among others. It follows from the Court’s judgment that – barring special circumstances – it must be assumed that the interested party accepted the full debtor risk with the intention of serving the interest of Holding in its capacity as shareholder. The mere fact that Holding was not a majority shareholder of the interested party does not alter this. Neither the Court’s ruling nor the documents in the case reveal that any facts or circumstances have been established or put forward to justify the conclusion that special circumstances as referred to above apply in this case. 3.6. It follows from the above that the Court of Appeal has correctly concluded that the interested party may not charge the Dfl 2,000,000 write-down on its loan to Holding to its result in the year under review. The complaints directed against the opinion of the Court of Appeal mentioned above in 3.3 and its conclusion cannot therefore lead to cassation. 3.7. It follows from the above that the remaining complaints directed against the opinion of the Court of Appeal – and the further grounds given – that the provision of money by the interested party to Holding should not be regarded as a business loan, fail for lack of interest.” Click here for English translation Click here for translation ...

This case is about a IP sale-and-license-back arrangement. The taxpayer acquired the shares in BV Z (holding). BV Z owns the shares in BV A and BV B (the three BVs form a fiscal unity under the CITA). BV A produces and sells shoes. In 1993, under a self-proclaimed protection clause, BV A sells the trademark of the shoes to BV C, which is also part of the fiscal unity. The protection clause was supposedly intended to protect the trademark in case of default of BV A. Taxpayer had created BV C prior to the sale of the trademark. In 1994, the taxpayer entered into a licensing agreement with BV C: the taxpayer pays NLG 2 to BV C per pair of shoes sold. Next, BV C is then moved to the Netherlands Antilles, which results in the end of the fiscal unity as of January 1, 1994. The roundtrip arrangement, the sale of an intangible and the subsequent payment of licensing fees, is now complete. In 1999 the royalty for use of the trademark was increased from fl. 2 per pair of shoes to fl. 2.50 per pair, resulting in annual royalty payments of fl. 300.000 from A BV to B BV. The Court disallowed tax deductions for the royalty payments. The payments were not proven to be at arm’s length. B BV had no employees to manage the trademarks. There were no business reasons for the transactions, only a tax motive. Hence the sale-and-license back arrangement was disregarded for tax purposes. Also, the licensing agreement were not found to produce effective protection of the brand and was therefore also considered part of a tax planning plan. Taxpayers often seek to maximise differences in tax rates through selling intangibles to a low- tax country and subsequently paying royalties to this country for the use of these intangibles, thereby decreasing the tax-base in the high-tax country. The arm’s length principle requires taxpayers to have valid business purposes for such transactions and requires them to make sure that the royalties are justified – why would an independent company pay royalties to a foreign company for an intangible it previously owned?’ To adress such situations a decree was issued in the Netherlands on August 11, 2004. The decree provided additional rules for transfers of intangibles when the value is uncertain at the time of the transaction (HTVI). It refers to situations in which an intangible is being transferred to a foreign group company and where this company furthermore licenses the intangible back to the transferor and/or related Dutch companies of this company. In these situations a price adjustment clause is deemed to have been entered. The deemed price adjustment clause prevents a sale at a very low price with a consequent high royalty fee to drain the Dutch tax base. Through the price adjustment clause the Dutch tax authorities are guaranteed a fair price for the sale of the intangible. Click here for translation ...

On 17 February 2003, the President of the Polish Supreme Administrative Court and the Ombudsman requested the Constitutional Court to declare that Article 24b par. 1 of the Tax Ordinance of 29 August 1997 – by giving the tax authorities and fiscal control bodies, while resolving a tax case, the right to disregard the effects of legal transactions which may give the taxpayer an advantage in the form of reduction of tax liability, increase of overpayment or refund of tax – violates the principle of citizens’ trust in the state and the created law resulting from Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and violates the principle of freedom of economic activity expressed in the freedom to arrange one’s civil law relations, i.e. Article 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Article 24b of the Tax Ordinance had the following wording: “Art. 24b par. 1. Tax authorities and tax inspection bodies, when settling tax cases, shall disregard the tax consequences of legal actions, if they prove that from the performance of these actions one could not expect any significant benefits other than those arising from a reduction in the amount of tax liability, increase in loss, increase in overpayment or refund of tax. Par. 2. If the parties, by performing a legal transaction referred to in par. 1, have achieved an intended economic result for which another legal transaction or transactions is appropriate, the tax consequences are derived from that other legal transaction or transactions”. Judgement of the Constitutional Court In a split decision, the Court declared the provision in Article 24b § 1 of the Tax Ordinance inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Excerpts “The infringement of the Constitution consists in enacting unclear and ambiguous provisions, which do not allow a citizen to foresee the legal consequences of his actions” /Judgement of 22 May 2002, K 6/02 – OTK ZU 2002 nr 3/A poz. 33 p. 448/. It follows from the principle of determinacy that “every legal regulation should be constructed correctly from the linguistic and logical point of view – it is only when this basic condition is met that it can be assessed in terms of the remaining criteria”.” “Phrases such as: “could not have been expected”, “other significant benefits”, “benefits resulting from the reduction of the amount of the liability” definitely do not allow to assume that “their jurisprudential interpretation will indeed be uniform and strict” and that “from their wording it will not be possible to derive a law-making power of the applying bodies”. It is worth noting here, that the aforementioned reservation, that a provision using indefinite phrases should not become the object of law-making activity of organs applying the law, has been formulated by the Constitutional Tribunal first and foremost in relation to the normative provisions applied by the courts” “In the opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal, such a statutory solution does not withstand criticism in the light of art. 93 clause 2 of the Constitution. On the one hand, it leads to a dangerous and undesirable blurring of the distinction between lawmaking and its interpretation, which results from giving the value of extended validity to the official interpretation, which is supposed to perform exclusively the function of subjectively limited ordering and unification of the jurisprudential activity. On the other hand, it makes acts addressed formally only to the internal structure of the state apparatus a means of influencing the sphere of taxpayers’ rights and freedoms, i.e. the sphere which may be regulated only by acts included in the closed category of sources of universally binding law. This kind of impact is not permissible either through sources of law of an internal character, or even less so through acts, which only seemingly have the value of purely interpretative actions, but in practice assume features similar to those displayed by normative acts. Therefore, apart from the inconsistency with art. 93 sec. 2 sentence 2 of the Constitution, the solution adopted in art. 14 par. 2 of the Tax ordinance may lead to “disruption” of the whole concept of the system of sources of law adopted by the legislator.” NB. A new Polish anti-avoidance clause was introduced by the Act of 13 May 2016 amending the Tax Ordinance and has been in force since 15 July 2016. Pursuant to the amended anti-avoidance provision in Article 119a § 1 o.p. – an act performed primarily for the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit, contradictory in given circumstances to the object and purpose of the provision of the tax act, does not result in obtaining a tax benefit if the manner of action was artificial (tax avoidance). Click here for English translation. Click here for other translation ...