In light of the potential complexity that may arise in some circumstances when determining whether an associated enterprise assuming a risk controls that risk, the test of control should be regarded as being met where comparable risk assumptions can be identified in a comparable uncontrolled transaction. To be comparable those risk assumptions require that the economically relevant characteristics of the transactions are comparable. If such a comparison is made, it is particularly relevant to establish that the enterprise assuming comparable risk in the uncontrolled transaction performs comparable risk management functions relating to control of that risk to those performed by the associated enterprise assuming risk in the controlled transaction. The purpose of the comparison is to establish that an independent party assuming a comparable risk to that assumed by the associated enterprise also performs comparable risk management functions to those performed by the associated enterprise ...

If it is established that the associated enterprise assuming the risk as analysed under step 4(i) either does not control the risk or does not have the financial capacity to assume the risk, then the analysis described under step 5 needs to be performed ...

Where two or more parties to the transaction assume a specific risk (as analysed under step 4(i)), and in addition they together control the specific risk and each has the financial capacity to assume their share of the risk, then that assumption of risk should be respected. Examples may include the contractual assumption of development risk under a transaction in which the enterprises agree jointly to bear the costs of creating a new product ...

Furthermore, in some cases, there may be more than one party to the transaction exercising control over a specific risk. Where the associated enterprise assuming risk (as analysed under step 4(i)) controls that risk in accordance with the requirements set out in paragraphs 1.65 – 1.66, all that remains under step 4(ii) is to consider whether the enterprise has the financial capacity to assume the risk. If so, the fact that other associated enterprises also exercise control over the same risk does not affect the assumption of that risk by the first-mentioned enterprise, and step 5 need not be considered ...

In some cases, the analysis under step 3 may indicate that there is more than one MNE that is capable of exercising control over a risk. However, control requires both capability and functional performance in order to exercise control over a risk. Therefore, if more than one party is capable of exercising control, but the entity contractually assuming risk (as analysed under step 4(i)) is the only party that actually exercises control through capability and functional performance, then the party contractually assuming the risk also controls the risk ...

In the circumstances of Example 3, analysis under step 4(i) shows that the assumption of utilisation risk by Company A is consistent with its contractual arrangements with Company C, but under step 4(ii) it is determined that Company A does not control risks that it assumes associated with the investment in and exploitation of the asset. Company A has no decision-making function which allows it to control its risks by taking decisions that affect the outcomes of the risks. Under step 4(ii) the party assuming risk does not control that risk, and further consideration is required under step 5 ...

If the circumstances of Example 2 remain the same except for the fact that, while the contract specifies that Company A assumes supply chain risks, Company B is not reimbursed by Company A when there was a failure to secure key components on time, the analysis under step 4(i) would show that contractual assumption of risk has not been followed in practice in regard to that supply chain risk, such that Company B in fact assumes the downside consequences of that risk. Based on the information provided in Example 2, Company B does not have any control over the supply chain risk, whereas Company A does exercise control. Therefore, the party assuming risk as analysed under step 4(i), does not under step 4(ii) exercise control over that risk, and further consideration is required under step 5 ...

Under step 4(ii) it should be determined whether the party assuming the risk under the contract, taking into account whether the contractual terms have been applied in the conduct of the parties under step 4(i), controls the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk. If all the circumstances set out in Example 1 remain the same except for the fact that the contract between Company A and Company B allocates development risk to Company B, and if there is no evidence from the conduct of the parties under step 4(i) to suggest that the contractual allocation of risk is not being followed, then Company B contractually assumes development risk but the facts remain that Company B has no capability to evaluate the development risk and does not make decisions about Company A’s activities. Company B has no decision-making function which allows it to control the development risk by taking decisions that affect the outcomes of that risk. Based on the information provided in Example 1, the development risk is controlled by Company A. The determination that the party assuming a risk is not the party controlling that risk means that further consideration is required under step 5 ...

Consider for example, a manufacturer, whose functional currency is US dollars, that sells goods to an associated distributor in another country, whose functional currency is euros, and the written contract states that the distributor assumes all exchange rate risks in relation to this controlled transaction. If, however, the price for the goods is charged by the manufacturer to the distributor over an extended period of time in euros, the currency of the distributor, then aspects of the written contractual terms do not reflect the actual commercial or financial relations between the parties. The assumption of risk in the transaction should be determined by the actual conduct of the parties in the context of the contractual terms, rather than by aspects of written contractual terms which are not in practice applied. The principle can be further illustrated by Example 7 in the Annex to Chapter VI, where there is an inconsistency between the contractual assumption of risk and the conduct of the parties as evidenced by the bearing of costs relating to the downside outcome of that risk ...

In line with the discussion in relation to contractual terms (see Section D.1.1), it should be considered under step 4(i) whether the parties’ conduct conforms to the assumption of risk contained in written contracts, or whether the contractual terms have not been followed or are incomplete. Where differences exist between contractual terms related to risk and the conduct of the parties which are economically significant and would be taken into account by third parties in pricing the transaction between them, the parties’ conduct in the context of the consistent contractual terms should generally be taken as the best evidence concerning the intention of the parties in relation to the assumption of risk ...

The significance of step 4 will depend on the findings. In the circumstances of Examples 1 and above, the step may be straightforward. Where a party contractually assuming a risk applies that contractual assumption of risk in its conduct, and also both exercises control over the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk, then there is no further analysis required beyond step 4(i) and (ii) to determine risk assumption. Companies A and B in both examples fulfil the obligations reflected in the contracts and exercise control over the risks that they assume in the transaction, supported by financial capacity. As a result step 4(ii) is satisfied, there is no need to consider step 5, and the next step to consider is step 6 ...

Carrying out steps 1-3 involves the gathering of information relating to the assumption and management of risks in the controlled transaction. The next step is to interpret the information resulting from steps 1-3 and to determine whether the contractual assumption of risk is consistent with the conduct of the parties and the other facts of the case by analysing (i) whether the associated enterprises follow the contractual terms under the principles of Section D.1.1; and (ii) whether the party assuming risk, as analysed under (i), exercises control over the risk and has the financial capacity to assume risk ...

The Intevac group initially focused on designing and producing thin-film production systems for the manufacturing of hard disk drives (“HDD”). However, sometime in or around the mid-2000s, Intevac Asia Pte Ltd received a purchase order for a tool designed for the manufacturing of solar cells. Intevac Asia Pte Ltd did not possess the relevant R&D capabilities to develop such a tool and therefore entered into a Research and Development Services Agreement with Intevac US dated 1 October 2008 (“the RDSA”). The RDSA provided that Intevac US would undertake R&D activities in the US for the benefit of Intevac Asia Pte Ltd. In 2009, the management of the Intevac group decided to plan for the possibility that Intevac Asia Pte Ltd would expand its R&D capabilities in relation to non-HDD products. Accordingly, Intevac Asia Pte Ltd and Intevac US entered into a Cost-Sharing Agreement dated 1 November 2009 (“the CSA”), which superseded the RDSA. The purpose of the CSA was to allow Intevac Asia Pte Ltd and Intevac US to combine their R&D efforts and to share the costs and risks of their R&D activities. It differed from the RDSA in the following respects. (a) Under the RDSA, the Appellant was to acquire all beneficial and economic rights to the Intellectual Property (“IP”) developed in the performance of the RDSA. However, under the CSA, the Appellant and Intevac US would each acquire the right to exploit any IP and intangible property generated in the performance of the CSA within their respective sales territories. (b) The Appellant was the only party that would benefit from the outcome of the R&D activities carried out under the RDSA. However, under the CSA, both the Appellant and Intevac US had a direct stake in any R&D developed for the joint benefit of the parties. Under the new cost-sharing agreement, Intevac Asia Pte Ltd made payments to the U.S. company during FY 2009 and 2010 and claimed tax deductions for payments. Following an audit, the tax authority concluded that deductions for R&D expenses incurred under the cost-sharing agreement was governed exclusively by Section 19C until FY 2012, and that the payments made by the taxpayer under the cost-sharing agreement were not deductible under Section 14D. Hence an assessment was issued where the additional deductions was added back to the taxable income of Intevac Asia Pte Ltd. Judgement of the High Court The court decided in favour of the tax authorities. The R&D payments made to the U.S. parent did not qualify as deductible costs under Section 14D(1)(d). Click here for translation ...

A shared service center in Poland both provided intra-group services to the group and in doing so also received and paid for services from other group companies. At issue was payments for the services that the Shared Service Center in Poland received. Under some circumstances intra-group service costs are non-deductible in Poland according to local anti-avoidance provisions aimed at base eroding payments, and according to the tax authorities the payments for intra group services received by the Shared Service Center were non-deductible according to these anti-avoidance provisions. The tax authorities had considered that the payments for the received services were non-deductible according to these provisions. Court decision Service costs that are directly connected with provision of services that generate income, and are included in the base for remuneration of the services provided are deductable and thus not covered by the non-deduction provisions. The Company’s revenues in connection with the support provided to related entities (domestic and foreign) was calculated based on the net transaction margin method or cost plus. This means that the cmpany determines the cost base (operating costs and in the case of the net transaction margin method general administrative costs) allocated appropriately to each recipient of the service to define revenues from services provided to related entities, and it is the cost base that is key to determine the Company’s remuneration for a given service. According to the Company, it operates a shared services center, and therefore provides support services. Therefore, the company bears a number of costs that are oriented towards the provision of the service for the person ordering the service. Although the costs incurred by the Company may have the nature of indirect costs (in accounting terms), in a business sense, individual cost elements affect the quality and nature of the service provided for the party ordering the service. This is the activity of shared service centers, which are cost centers that, through the skilful use of synergies, are able to create value (including value at the level of costs) for the service provider. The condition for excluding expenditure from cost limitation is that the expenditure as a tax deductible cost is directly related to the act of producing or purchasing a good or providing a service. In this case, a language interpretation outlines the boundaries of other interpretations, including functional ones. The interpretation of the provision of art. 15e paragraph 11 point 1, made by the authority in an unacceptable manner, inconsistent with the content of the norm contained therein, excludes service providers from the right to exclude from cost limitation referred to in art. 15e paragraph 1, despite meeting the conditions of this exclusion. The service expenditures were not artificial or economically unjustified, which should be counteracted by limiting costs (and thus limiting the right to classify expenditure as tax deductible costs). Therefore, it should be emphasized that functional (including teleological) interpretation of the limitation of being classified as tax deductible costs (Article 15e (1), which has a clear connection with the exclusion of this limitation (Article 15e (11) updop), leads to the conclusion, that the purpose of the restriction was to counteract aggressive optimization, the lack of economic justification for the expenditure incurred. This means that the exclusion of a restriction must be caused by the lack of such features of the expenditure incurred when considering the functional and systemic interpretation Click here for translation ...

Corrugados del Guarco S.A. had declared losses on controlled transactions for FY 2003, 2004 and 2005 as export prices for these transactions had been set below cost and without profit margin, and also different from the price charged for that product to other independent or unrelated companies, in favour of its related company Envases Nicaragüenses S.A. According to the Corrugados del Guarco S.A. the reason why the prices of these controlled transactions had been set low was that unfair competition had made it necessary to use a commercial strategy of selling at preferential prices to the group company in Nicaragua. The tax authorities issued an assessment whereby the prices of the controlled transactions were adjusted in accordance with the arm’s length principle. Furthermore a fine was issued to the company for gross negligence. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Court dismissed the appeal of Corrugados del Guarco S.A. Excerpts from the Judgement “…Finally, and in relation to transfer pricing, on which the plaintiff argues reservation of law, it is necessary to indicate that guideline 20-03, called “Fiscal Treatment of Transfer Pricing, according to Normal Market Value”, issued by the Director General of Taxation on June 10, 2003, refers to the rules of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter OECD), for the setting of prices between related companies. This international organisation is dedicated to contributing to the peaceful and harmonious development of relations between peoples, with an emphasis on collaboration in the global economy. In this regard, the Constitutional Chamber explained the content of the aforementioned body of norms as follows: “The guideline in question is based on the assumption that if these operations have some kind of artificial manipulation, and this is detrimental to the tax authorities, it allows the application of articles 8 and 12 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures to establish that certain transactions correspond to a market value as if they had been established between independent persons or entities that compete freely. Although there are different methodologies, to conclude that a price corresponds to a certain reality or not, the problem before the Chamber is an issue closely linked to one that arises for any operator of law that must apply rules that seek to compensate forms of abuse of law or that do not correspond to an economic reality to avoid tax liabilities” (Ruling 2012-4940 of 15 hours 37 minutes of 18 April 2012). The aforementioned court also added, on the constitutionality of the rule “our country does not need to be a member of that body to make use of certain rules or practices that contain a high degree of consensus, especially if, as in the case at hand, articles 15 and 16 of the General Law on Public Administration establish the limits to discretion, even in the absence of a law, which is precisely what is happening in the present case. This Court agrees with the Attorney General’s Office and the Minister of Finance that these are rules with a high degree of subjection to science and technique, as in the case of the general principles of accounting, where a law would not be necessary to reach a technical consensus. In this sense, those methods or techniques make it possible to arrive at a result that is as close to reality as possible, without it being necessary for them to be formally incorporated into the legal system” (ibidem). The above shows that the principle of legal reservation is not violated in the application of OECD transfer pricing methods, such as those analysed here. V.- As a second allegation, it was argued that the financial penalty was imposed without previously following a sanctioning procedure, since it only faced a determinative one.“ ” In the opinion of this Court, the arguments of the appellant also fail to break this aspect of the judgement. The court took for granted that with intent, the plaintiff sold at prices below cost and that she used an agreement with another private individual to defraud the tax authorities, therefore it cannot be indicated in this court that she did not qualify the conduct, establishing that even article 71 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, allows the sanction when it has acted with intent or mere negligence, that is to say, by negligence. The law seeks to ensure that the self-assessments, on which the country’s entire tax system is based, are made seriously and carefully, and therefore penalises fraud and negligence in the self-assessment with 25 percent of what has not been paid to the Treasury. This procedure is necessarily linked to the assessment procedure, where it is defined whether what was declared and paid by the taxpayer is in accordance with the legal system and this is clearly stated by the sentencing body, which also refers that the sanctioning procedure was carried out in the terms established by the said numeral 150 CNPT and that the right of defence was guaranteed by giving the taxpayer a hearing and resolving his appeals.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In light of the potential complexity that may arise in some circumstances when determining whether an associated enterprise assuming a risk controls that risk, the test of control should be regarded as being met where comparable risk assumptions can be identified in a comparable uncontrolled transaction. To be comparable those risk assumptions require that the economically relevant characteristics of the transactions are comparable. If such a comparison is made, it is particularly relevant to establish that the enterprise assuming comparable risk in the uncontrolled transaction performs comparable risk management functions relating to control of that risk to those performed by the associated enterprise assuming risk in the controlled transaction. The purpose of the comparison is to establish that an independent party assuming a comparable risk to that assumed by the associated enterprise also performs comparable risk management functions to those performed by the associated enterprise ...

If it is established that the associated enterprise assuming the risk as analysed under step 4(i) either does not control the risk or does not have the financial capacity to assume the risk, then the analysis described under step 5 needs to be performed ...

Where two or more parties to the transaction assume a specific risk (as analysed under step 4(i)), and in addition they together control the specific risk and each has the financial capacity to assume their share of the risk, then that assumption of risk should be respected. Examples may include the contractual assumption of development risk under a transaction in which the enterprises agree jointly to bear the costs of creating a new product ...

Furthermore, in some cases, there may be more than one party to the transaction exercising control over a specific risk. Where the associated enterprise assuming risk (as analysed under step 4(i)) controls that risk in accordance with the requirements set out in paragraphs 1.65 – 1.66, all that remains under step 4(ii) is to consider whether the enterprise has the financial capacity to assume the risk. If so, the fact that other associated enterprises also exercise control over the same risk does not affect the assumption of that risk by the first-mentioned enterprise, and step 5 need not be considered ...

In some cases, the analysis under step 3 may indicate that there is more than one MNE that is capable of exercising control over a risk. However, control requires both capability and functional performance in order to exercise control over a risk. Therefore, if more than one party is capable of exercising control, but the entity contractually assuming risk (as analysed under step 4(i)) is the only party that actually exercises control through capability and functional performance, then the party contractually assuming the risk also controls the risk ...

In the circumstances of Example 3, analysis under step 4(i) shows that the assumption of utilisation risk by Company A is consistent with its contractual arrangements with Company C, but under step 4(ii) it is determined that Company A does not control risks that it assumes associated with the investment in and exploitation of the asset. Company A has no decision-making function which allows it to control its risks by taking decisions that affect the outcomes of the risks. Under step 4(ii) the party assuming risk does not control that risk, and further consideration is required under step 5 ...

If the circumstances of Example 2 remain the same except for the fact that, while the contract specifies that Company A assumes supply chain risks, Company B is not reimbursed by Company A when there was a failure to secure key components on time, the analysis under step 4(i) would show that contractual assumption of risk has not been followed in practice in regard to that supply chain risk, such that Company B in fact assumes the downside consequences of that risk. Based on the information provided in Example 2, Company B does not have any control over the supply chain risk, whereas Company A does exercise control. Therefore, the party assuming risk as analysed under step 4(i), does not under step 4(ii) exercise control over that risk, and further consideration is required under step 5 ...

Under step 4(ii) it should be determined whether the party assuming the risk under the contract, taking into account whether the contractual terms have been applied in the conduct of the parties under step 4(i), controls the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk. If all the circumstances set out in Example 1 remain the same except for the fact that the contract between Company A and Company B allocates development risk to Company B, and if there is no evidence from the conduct of the parties under step 4(i) to suggest that the contractual allocation of risk is not being followed, then Company B contractually assumes development risk but the facts remain that Company B has no capability to evaluate the development risk and does not make decisions about Company A’s activities. Company B has no decision-making function which allows it to control the development risk by taking decisions that affect the outcomes of that risk. Based on the information provided in Example 1, the development risk is controlled by Company A. The determination that the party assuming a risk is not the party controlling that risk means that further consideration is required under step 5 ...

Consider for example, a manufacturer, whose functional currency is US dollars, that sells goods to an associated distributor in another country, whose functional currency is euros, and the written contract states that the distributor assumes all exchange rate risks in relation to this controlled transaction. If, however, the price for the goods is charged by the manufacturer to the distributor over an extended period of time in euros, the currency of the distributor, then aspects of the written contractual terms do not reflect the actual commercial or financial relations between the parties. The assumption of risk in the transaction should be determined by the actual conduct of the parties in the context of the contractual terms, rather than by aspects of written contractual terms which are not in practice applied. The principle can be further illustrated by Example 7 in the Annex to Chapter VI, where there is an inconsistency between the contractual assumption of risk and the conduct of the parties as evidenced by the bearing of costs relating to the downside outcome of that risk ...

In line with the discussion in relation to contractual terms (see Section D.1.1), it should be considered under step 4(i) whether the parties’ conduct conforms to the assumption of risk contained in written contracts, or whether the contractual terms have not been followed or are incomplete. Where differences exist between contractual terms related to risk and the conduct of the parties which are economically significant and would be taken into account by third parties in pricing the transaction between them, the parties’ conduct in the context of the consistent contractual terms should generally be taken as the best evidence concerning the intention of the parties in relation to the assumption of risk ...

The significance of step 4 will depend on the findings. In the circumstances of Examples 1 and above, the step may be straightforward. Where a party contractually assuming a risk applies that contractual assumption of risk in its conduct, and also both exercises control over the risk and has the financial capacity to assume the risk, then there is no further analysis required beyond step 4(i) and (ii) to determine risk assumption. Companies A and B in both examples fulfil the obligations reflected in the contracts and exercise control over the risks that they assume in the transaction, supported by financial capacity. As a result step 4(ii) is satisfied, there is no need to consider step 5, and the next step to consider is step 6 ...

Carrying out steps 1-3 involves the gathering of information relating to the assumption and management of risks in the controlled transaction. The next step is to interpret the information resulting from steps 1-3 and to determine whether the contractual assumption of risk is consistent with the conduct of the parties and the other facts of the case by analysing (i) whether the associated enterprises follow the contractual terms under the principles of Section D.1.1; and (ii) whether the party assuming risk, as analysed under (i), exercises control over the risk and has the financial capacity to assume risk ...

The Swedish Supreme Administrative Court makes it clear that OECD guidelines can be used for interpreting Swedish domestic legislation in cases where the domestic legislation is based on OECD guidance and principles. It is also concluded, that the fact that an agreement is given a certain legal term does not mean that the Court is bound by that classification. It is the substance of the agreement – based on the facts and circumstances – that matters. Click here for translation ...

There are a number of exceptions to the German interest limitation rule essentially limiting the annual interest deduction to 30% of EBITDA as shown in the accounts. One of these is the equity ratio rule exempting a subsidiary company from the interest limitation provided its equity ratio (ratio of shareholder’s equity to the balance sheet total) is no more than two percentage points lower than that of the group and no more than 10% of its net interest cost was paid to any one significant shareholder (a shareholder owning more than 25% of the share capital). A loss-making company paying slightly less than 10% of its total net interest cost to each of two significant shareholders claimed exemption from the interest limitation as its equity ratio was better than that of the group. The tax office applied the limitation as the two significant shareholders together received more than 10% of the net interest cost. The finance ministry decree on the application of the interest limitation supports this view. The Supreme Tax Court decided in favour of the taxpayer. The interest limitation is an exception to the general principle of taxing the net profit of a company and, as an exception, it must be clearly formulated. Given this demand for clarity, suggestions that applying the 10% limit to all significant shareholders collectively might better reflect the legislative intention have no relevance in the face of the clear wording of the statute – “one shareholder”. Similarly, the same wording also excludes suggestions that each significant shareholder is a related party to all others, since the wording clearly treats each shareholder separately. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Polymer S.A. had been issued an assessment of taxable income based on the arm’s length principle. In the assessment the tax authorities had based the adjustment on the guidance provided in the OECD TPG. Polymer S.A. was of the opinion that this was unconstitutional since the OECD TPG had not been implemented by law and Costa Rica was not an OECD member country. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Court dismissed the appeal of Polymer S.A. Excerpts from the Judgement “The contested Guideline does not establish or impose a single method of transfer pricing analysis, so that, in the absence of a law, the autonomy of tax law allows for the determination of the tax payable to resort to the provisions of Articles 8 and 12 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, without prejudice to the possibility that other – better – techniques may be admitted. What is important is that the contested Interpretative Guideline does not aim to eliminate multiple other scenarios arising from different forms of business organisation, but is directed at transfer pricing between related companies. Even if the legislator may adopt a certain technique or several techniques to regulate a certain behaviour of companies, or recognise legal practices to reduce taxes, it is possible to admit that if there are clashes with tax law and reality, in the absence of a law, it is ultimately up to the judge to decide on the correct application of the technical rules. Thus, in the absence of any particular legislation, this fact does not prevent the parties in conflict from presenting their arguments, producing evidence and demonstrating the need to apply other criteria that allow for the non-application of the technical rule that adopts the guideline in question, or of another possible method, a situation that evidently makes the discussion a matter of ordinary legality. For all of the above reasons, the action must be dismissed, as indeed it is. A., the contested Guideline interprets Articles 8 and 12 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, disregarding the legal forms to assess the true economic intention of the parties. It allows to assess transactions between related entities, where transfer prices exist, and to make the respective income tax adjustments. It does not aim to eliminate other multiple scenarios arising from different forms of business organisation, but rather targets transfer pricing between related companies. Moreover, our country does not need to be a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to make use of certain rules or practices that contain a high degree of consensus, under the provisions of articles 15 and 16 of the General Law of Public Administration that establish the limits to discretion, even in the absence of law. By virtue of the foregoing, and there being no reasons to justify a change of criterion, it is considered that the contested Directive does not infringe the principles of the reservation of law, regulatory power and legal certainty, and therefore the action is rejected on the merits.“ Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

In an appeal to the Supreme Court in Costa Rica, Nestlé claimed that the basis for an arm’s length adjustment was unconstitutional, since the arms length principle as described in the OECD transfer pricing guidelines had not been incorporated into the laws of Costa Rica. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Court dismissed the appeal of Nestlé. “The contested Guideline does not establish or impose a single method of transfer pricing analysis, so that, in the absence of a law, the autonomy of tax law allows for the determination of the tax payable to resort to the provisions of Articles 8 and 12 of the Code of Tax Rules and Procedures, without prejudice to the possibility of admitting “other -better- techniques”. What is important is that the contested Interpretative Guideline does not aim to eliminate other multiple scenarios arising from different forms of company organisation, but is directed at transfer pricing between related companies. Even if the legislator may adopt a certain technique or several techniques to regulate a certain behaviour of companies, or recognise legal practices to reduce taxes, it is possible to admit that if there are clashes with tax legislation and with reality, in the absence of a law, it is ultimately up to the judge to decide on the correct application of the technical rules. Thus, in the absence of any particular legislation, this fact does not prevent the parties in conflict from presenting their arguments, producing evidence and demonstrating the need to apply other criteria that allow for the non-application of the technical rule that adopts the guideline in question, or of another possible method, a situation that evidently makes the discussion a matter of ordinary legality. For all of the above reasons, the action should be dismissed, as it is in fact being dismissed.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...