In 2009 the BlackRock Group acquired Barclays Global Investors for a total sum of $13,5bn. The price was paid in part by shares ($6.9bn) and in part by cash ($6.6bn). The cash payment was paid by BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC – a US Delaware Company tax resident in the UK – but funded by the parent company by issuing $4bn loan notes to the LLC. In the years following the acquisition Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC claimed tax deductions in the UK for interest payments on the intra-group loans. The tax authorities (HMRC) denied tax deductions for the interest costs on two grounds: (1) HMRC claimed that no loans would have been made between parties acting at arm’s length, so that relief should be denied under the transfer pricing rules in Part 4 of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010. (2) HMRC also maintained that relief should be denied under the unallowable purpose rule in section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009, on the basis that securing a tax advantage was the only purpose of the relevant loans. An appeal was filed by the BlackRock Group with the First Tier Tribunal, which in a decision issued in November 2020 found that an independent lender acting at arm’s length would have made loans to LLC5 in the same amount and on the same terms as to interest as were actually made by LLC4 (the “Transfer Pricing Issue”). The FTT further found that the Loans had both a commercial purpose and a tax advantage purpose but that it would be just and reasonable to apportion all the debits to the commercial purpose and so they were fully deductible by LLC5 (the “Unallowable Purpose Issue”). An appeal was then filed with the Upper Tribunal by the tax authorities. According to the judgment issued in 2022, the Upper Tribunal found that the First Tier Tribunal had erred in law and therefore allowed HMRC’s appeal on both the transfer pricing issue and the unallowable purpose issue. The First Tier Tribunal’s Decision was set aside and the tax authorities amendments to LLC5’s tax returns were confirmed. An appeal was then filed by BlackRock with the Court of Appeal. Judgment The Court of Appeal found that tax deductions for the interest on the Loans were not restricted under the transfer pricing rules (cf. ground 1 above) but instead disallowed under the unallowable purpose rule in section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009 (cf. ground 2 above). Excerpt regarding application of transfer pricing rules “34. Paragraph 1.6 of both the 1995 and 2010 versions of the OECD guidelines explains that what Article 9 of the model convention seeks to do is to adjust profits by reference to “the conditions which would have obtained between independent enterprises in comparable transactions and comparable circumstances” (a comparable “uncontrolled transaction”, as opposed to the actual “controlled transaction”). The 2010 version adds that this comparability analysis is at the “heart of the application of the arm’s length principle”, while explaining at para. 1.9 that there are cases, for example involving specialised goods or services or unique intangibles, where a comparability analysis is difficult or complicated to apply. 35. In its discussion of comparability analysis, para. 1.15 of the 1995 version states: “Application of the arm’s length principle is generally based on a comparison of the conditions in a controlled transaction with the conditions in transactions between independent enterprises. In order for such comparisons to be useful, the economically relevant characteristics of the situations being compared must be sufficiently comparable. To be comparable means that none of the differences (if any) between the situations being compared could materially affect the condition being examined in the methodology (e.g. price or margin), or that reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the effect of any such differences. In determining the degree of comparability, including what adjustments are necessary to establish it, an understanding of how unrelated companies evaluate potential transactions is required. Independent enterprises, when evaluating the terms of a potential transaction, will compare the transaction to the other options realistically available to them, and they will only enter into the transaction if they see no alternative that is clearly more attractive. For example, one enterprise is unlikely to accept a price offered for its product by an independent enterprise if it knows that other potential customers are willing to pay more under similar conditions. This point is relevant to the question of comparability, since independent enterprises would generally take into account any economically relevant differences between the options realistically available to them (such as differences in the level of risk or other comparability factors discussed below) when valuing those options. Therefore, when making the comparisons entailed by application of the arm’s length principle, tax administrations should also take these differences into account when establishing whether there is comparability between the situations being compared and what adjustments may be necessary to achieve comparability.” Similar text appears at paras. 1.33 and 1.34 of the 2010 version. 36. As can be seen from this, it is essential that the “economically relevant characteristics” are “sufficiently comparable”, in the sense of any differences either not having a material effect on the relevant condition (term) of the transaction, or being capable of being adjusted for with reasonable accuracy so as to eliminate their effect. 37. Paragraph 1.17 of the 1995 version expands on the concept of differences as follows: “… In order to establish the degree of actual comparability and then to make appropriate adjustments to establish arm’s length conditions (or a range thereof), it is necessary to compare attributes of the transactions or enterprises that would affect conditions in arm’s length dealings. Attributes that may be important include the characteristics of the property or services transferred, the functions performed by the parties (taking into account assets used and risks assumed), the contractual terms, the economic circumstances of the parties, and the business strategies pursued by the parties…” Again, this is reflected in the 2010 version, at ...

The Supreme Court in the Netherlands requested a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice to clarify its case-law on, inter alia, the freedom of establishment laid down in Article 49 TFEU, specifically whether it is compatible with that freedom for the tax authorities of a Member State to refuse to a company belonging to a cross-border group the right to deduct from its taxable profits the interest it pays on such a loan debt.  The anti-avoidance rule in question is contained in Article 10a of the Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 1969. The rule is specifically designed to tackle tax avoidance practices related to intra-group acquisition loans. Under that legislation, the contracting of a loan debt by a taxable person with a related entity – for the purposes of acquiring or extending an interest in another entity – is, in certain circumstances, presumed to be an artificial arrangement, designed to erode the Netherlands tax base. Consequently, that person is precluded from deducting the interest on the debt from its taxable profits unless it can rebut that presumption. The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) asked the European Court of Justice to clarify its findings in its judgment in Lexel, on whether such intra-group loans may be, for that purpose, regarded as wholly artificial arrangements, even if carried out on an arm’s length basis, and the interest set at the usual market rate. “(1)      Are Articles 49 TFEU, 56 TFEU and/or 63 TFEU to be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the interest on a loan debt contracted with an entity related to the taxable person, being a debt connected with the acquisition or extension of an interest in an entity which, following that acquisition or extension, is a related entity, is not deductible when determining the profits of the taxable person because the debt concerned must be categorised as (part of) a wholly artificial arrangement, regardless of whether the debt concerned, viewed in isolation, was contracted at arm’s length? (2)      If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, must Articles 49 TFEU, 56 TFEU and/or 63 TFEU be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the deduction of  the interest on a loan debt contracted with an entity related to the taxable person and regarded as (part of) a wholly artificial arrangement, being a debt connected with the acquisition or extension of an interest in an entity which, following that acquisition or extension, is a related entity, is disallowed in full  when determining the profits of the taxable person, even where that interest in itself does not exceed the amount that would have been agreed upon between companies which are independent of one another? (3)      For the purpose of answering Questions 1 and/or 2, does it make any difference whether the relevant acquisition or extension of the interest relates (a) to an entity that was already an entity related to the taxable person prior to that acquisition or extension, or (b) to an entity that becomes an entity related to the taxpayer only after such acquisition or extension?” Opinion of the Advocate General The Advocate General found that the Dutch anti-avoidance rule in Article 10a was both justified, appropriate and necessary – and therefore not in conflict with Article 49 of the TFEU – irrespective of the Court’s earlier judgment in the Swedish Lexel Case. Excerpts “(…) 71. In my view, the approach suggested by the intervening governments and the Commission is the correct one. Consequently, I urge the Court to revisit the approach it took in the judgment in Lexel on the matter at issue. 72. Freedom of establishment, as guaranteed by Article 49 TFEU, offers quite a wide opportunity for tax ‘optimisation’. The Court has repeatedly held that European groups of companies can legitimately use that freedom to establish subsidiaries in Member States for the purpose of benefiting from a favourable tax regime. (30) Thus, as X submits, A could legitimately choose to establish the internal bank of its group, C, in Belgium for that very purpose. Similarly, C may well grant loans to other companies of the group established in other Member States, like X in the Netherlands. Cross-border intra-group loans are not, per se, objectionable. (31) Certainly, such a loan may entail a reduction of the corporate tax base of the borrowing company in the Member State where it is established. Indeed, by deducting the interest on that loan from its taxable profits, that company reduces its tax liability with respect to that Member State. In effect, some of the profits made by the borrowing company are shifted, in the form of interest charges, from the Member State where it is established to the Member State where the lender company has its seat. However, that is something that the Member States must, in principle, accept in an integrated, single market such as the internal market of the European Union. 73. Nevertheless, the Court recognised a clear limit in that regard. It is a general legal principle that EU law, including freedom of establishment, cannot be relied on for abusive ends. The concept of ‘wholly artificial arrangements’ must be read in that light. Pursuant to the settled case-law of the Court, it is abusive for economic operators established in different Member States to carry out ‘artificial transactions devoid of economic and commercial justification’ (or, stated differently, ‘which do not reflect economic reality’), thus fulfilling the conditions to benefit from a tax advantage only formally, ‘with the essential aim of benefiting from [that] advantage’.(32) 74. Furthermore, in its judgment in X (Controlled companies established in third countries), (33) the Court has specified, with respect to the free movement of capital guaranteed by Article 63 TFEU, that ‘the artificial creation of the conditions required in order to escape taxation in a Member State improperly or enjoy a tax advantage in that Member State improperly can take several forms as regards cross-border movements of capital’. In that context, it held that the concept of ‘wholly artificial arrangement’ is capable of covering ‘any ...

If there are material differences between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions that would affect the gross profit margin, adjustments should be made to the gross profit margin earned with respect to the uncontrolled transaction according to the comparability provisions of § 1.482-1(d)(2). For this purpose, consideration of operating expenses associated with functions performed and risks assumed may be necessary, because differences in functions performed are often reflected in operating expenses. If there are differences in functions performed, however, the effect on gross profit of such differences is not necessarily equal to the differences in the amount of related operating expenses. Specific examples of the factors that may be particularly relevant to this method include – (1) Inventory levels and turnover rates, and corresponding risks, including any price protection programs offered by the manufacturer; (2) Contractual terms (e.g., scope and terms of warranties provided, sales or purchase volume, credit terms, transport terms); (3) Sales, marketing, advertising programs and services, (including promotional programs, rebates, and co-op advertising); (4) The level of the market (e.g., wholesale, retail, etc.); and (5) Foreign currency risks ...

In 2009 the BlackRock Group acquired Barclays Global Investors for a total sum of $13,5bn. The price was paid in part by shares ($6.9bn) and in part by cash ($6.6bn). The cash payment was paid by BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC – a US Delaware Company tax resident in the UK – but funded by the parent company by issuing $4bn loan notes to the LLC. In the years following the acquisition Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC claimed tax deductions in the UK for interest payments on the intra-group loans. Following an audit in the UK the tax authorities disallowed the interest deductions. The tax authorities held that the transaction would not have happened between independent parties. They also found that the loans were entered into for an unallowable tax avoidance purpose. A UK taxpayer can be denied a deduction for interest where a loan has an unallowable purpose i.e, where a tax advantage is the company’s main purpose for entering into the loan relationship (section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009). If there is such an unallowable purpose, the company may not bring into account for that period ….so much of any debit in respect of that relationship as is attributable to the unallowable purpose. An appeal was filed by the BlackRock Group. In November 2020 the First Tier Tribunal found that an independent lender acting at arm’s length would have made loans to LLC5 in the same amount and on the same terms as to interest as were actually made by LLC4 (the “Transfer Pricing Issue”). The FTT further found that the Loans had both a commercial purpose and a tax advantage purpose but that it would be just and reasonable to apportion all the debits to the commercial purpose and so they were fully deductible by LLC5 (the “Unallowable Purpose Issue”). An appeal was then filed with the Upper Tribunal by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Upper Tribunal The Upper Tribunal found that the First Tier Tribunal had erred in law and therefore allowed HMRC’s appeal on both the transfer pricing issue and the unallowable purpose issue. The First Tier Tribunal’s Decision was set aside and the tax authorities amendments to LLC5’s tax returns were confirmed. Transfer Pricing “The actual provision of the loans from LLC4 to LLC5 differed from any arm’s length provision in that the loans would not have been made as between independent enterprises. The actual provision conferred a potential advantage in relation to United Kingdom taxation. The profits and losses of LLC5, including the allowing of debits for the interest and other expenses payable on the Loans, are to be calculated for tax purposes as if the arm’s length provision had been made or imposed instead of the actual provision. In this case, no arm’s length loan for $4 billion would have been made in the form that LLC4 made to LLC5 and hence HMRC’s amendments to the relevant returns should be upheld and confirmed.” Unallowable Purpose “The FTT did not err in finding that LLC5 had both a commercial purpose and an unallowable tax advantage main purpose in entering into the Loans. However, it was wrong to decide that the just and reasonable apportionment was solely to the commercial purpose. But for the tax advantage purpose there would have been no commercial purpose to the Loans and all the relevant facts and circumstances lead inexorably to the conclusion that the loan relationship debits should be wholly attributed to the unallowable tax purpose and so disallowed.” ...

The case concerned a complex financing structure within the General Electric Group. The taxpayer, GE Financial Investments Ltd (GEFI Ltd), a UK resident company was the limited partner in a Delaware limited partnership, of which, GE Financial Investments Inc (GEFI Inc) a Delaware corporation was the general partner. GEFI Ltd filed UK company tax returns for FY 2003-2008 in which the company claimed a foreign tax credit for US federal income tax. In total, US federal income taxes amounted to $ 303 millions and exceeded the amount of tax due in the UK. The tax authorities opened an enquiry into each of GEFI’s company tax returns for the relevant period, and subsequently issued an assessment where the claims for foreign tax credits was denied in their entirety. Judgement of the Tax Tribunal The tribunal dismissed the appeal of GEFI Ltd and ruled that the UK company did not carry on business in the US. Hence GEFI Ltd was not entitled to a foreign tax credit. Excerpt “By contrast the construction of Article 4 advanced by HMRC requires both worldwide taxation and a connection or attachment to the contracting state concerned. In my judgment, this is the correct approach as it takes into account the common feature or similarity of domicile, residence, citizenship etc, in the context of the Convention, ie that they are all criteria providing, in addition to the imposition of a worldwide liability to tax, a “connection” or “attachment” of a person to the contracting state concerned. Such an interpretation is consistent with Widrig (see paragraphs 44 – 46, above) and Vogel (see paragraph 47, above) and Crown Forest which, as Ms McCarthy submits, when properly understood in context is authority for the proposition that full or worldwide taxation is a necessary feature of the connecting criterion but is not sufficient of itself. … Although her further submission, that, other than the imposition of a worldwide liability to US tax, share stapling has no US law consequences at federal or state level (eg it does not carry with it US filing or reporting obligations or make a stapled overseas company’s constitutional documents subject to or dependent on US law), was not supported by evidence, I agree that, given the differences that do exist for tax purposes (see paragraph 29, above) the connection or attachment is between the stapled entities rather than to the country concerned. 66. Therefore, in the absence of the necessary connection or attachment by GEFI to the US, and despite Mr Baker’s persuasive submissions to the contrary, I do not consider that GEFI was a resident of the US for the purposes of Article 4 of the Convention by reason of the share staple between it and GEFI Inc. As such it is necessary to consider Issue 2, the Permanent Establishment Issue. … However, Ms McCarthy confirmed that, should I conclude that the activities of the LP are sufficient to amount to the carrying on of a business, there is no separate dispute as to whether that business is carried on in Stamford, Connecticut, or some other location. 71. As such, it is therefore necessary to consider what is in effect the only issue between the parties under issue 2(a), namely whether, as it contends, GEFI by its participation in the LP carried on a business in the US or, as HMRC argue, it did not.” … I agree with Ms McCarthy who submits that there is nothing to suggest that personnel or agents acting on behalf of the LP made or conducted continuous and regular commercial activities in the US. All that appears to have happened was that monies were directed straight to GELCO without negotiating terms or the consideration at a director level as would have been expected from a company carrying on commercial activities on sound business principles. … Therefore, notwithstanding its objects, and having regard to the degree of activity as a whole, particularly the lack of participation in the strategic direction of the LP by the directors of GEFI Inc, I have come to the conclusion that GEFI was not carrying on a business in the US through its participation in the LP. … Having concluded for the reasons above that GEFI did not carry on business in the US it is not necessary to address Issue 2(b), ie whether, if GEFI had carried out business in the US, US tax was payable under US law and if so whether the UK is required under Article 24(4)(a) to give relief against this US tax. … Therefore, for the reasons above the appeal is dismissed.” UKFTT 210 (TC) TC08160″] ...

In 2009 the BlackRock Group acquired Barclays Global Investors for a total sum of $13,5bn . The price was paid in part by shares ($6.9bn) and in part by cash ($6.6bn). The cash payment was paid by BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC – a US Delaware Company tax resident in the UK – but funded by the parent company by issuing $4bn loan notes to the LLC. In the years following the acquisition Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC claimed tax deductions in the UK for interest payments on the intra-group loans. Following an audit in the UK the tax authorities disallowed the interest deductions. The tax authorities held that the transaction would not have happened between independent parties. They also found that the loans were entered into for an unallowable tax avoidance purpose. A UK taxpayer can be denied a deduction for interest where a loan has an unallowable purpose i.e, where a tax advantage is the company’s main purpose for entering into the loan relationship (section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009). If there is such an unallowable purpose, the company may not bring into account for that period ….so much of any debit in respect of that relationship as is attributable to the unallowable purpose. The Court ruled in favor of BlackRock and allowed tax deduction for the full interest payments. According to the Court it was clear that the transaction would not have taken place in an arm’s length transaction between independent parties. However there was evidence to establish that there could have been a similar transaction in which an independent lender. Hence, the court concluded that BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC could have borrowed $4bn from an independent lender at similar terms and conditions. In regards to the issue of “unallowable purposes” the court found that securing a tax advantage was a consequence of the loan. However,  Blackrock LLC 5 also entered into the transactions with the commercial purpose of acquiring Barclays Global Investors. The Court considered that both reasons were “main purposes” and apportioned all of the debits (interest payments) to the commercial purpose ...

X S.à.r.l./B.V. filed corporate income tax returns for the year 2012 as a foreign taxpayer, declaring a taxable profit and a taxable amount of nil. No dividend distribution had been declared for income tax purposes Following an audit, the tax authorities included the dividend distribution in the taxable income and tax was levied on the dividend distribution at a rate of 2.5 per cent. In dispute before the Supreme Court was whether the dividend distribution was taxable to the X S.à.r.l./B.V. under Section 17(3) opening words and (b) of the Act. The dispute centred on the questions (i) whether X S.à.r.l./B.V. held the substantial interest in Holding with the main purpose or as one of the main purposes to avoid the levying of income tax or dividend tax on the DGA, and (ii) whether this substantial interest was not part of the business assets of X S.à.r.l./B.V.. Depending on the answers to those questions, the dispute was whether levying corporate income tax on the dividend distribution (a) was prevented by the operation of Directive 2011/96/EU (hereinafter: the Parent-Subsidiary Directive), or (b) was contrary to the freedom of establishment provided for in Article 49 TFEU. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Excerpt “When examining whether an arrangement is abusive, it is not sufficient to apply predetermined general criteria. In each specific case, the arrangement in question must be examined as a whole. Automatic application of an anti-abuse measure of general scope without the inspector being required to produce even the slightest evidence or indications of abuse goes beyond what is necessary to prevent abuse (see Eqiom and Enka, paragraph 32). If it is sufficient for the inspector to produce such initial evidence or indications, the taxpayer must be given the opportunity to produce evidence showing the existence of economic reasons for the arrangement (cf. ECJ 20 December 2017, Deister Holding AG and Juhler Holding A/S, joined cases C 504/16 and C 613/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1009, para 70). 2.6.6. In applying the scheme, the starting point for the allocation of the burden of proof is that the inspector states the facts and circumstances from which it follows that the subjective condition has been fulfilled, and, in the event of reasoned challenge, makes them plausible (cf. Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 33 003, no. 10, p. 94). This principle is in line with Union law (cf. T Danmark judgment, paragraph 117). 2.6.7. When applying Union law, the fulfilment of the subjective condition merely provides a presumption of proof that abuse has occurred. This is confirmed by the T Danmark judgment, paragraph 101. If such a presumption of abuse exists, the taxpayer must be given the opportunity to rebut that presumption. The taxpayer may overcome this presumption by establishing, and if necessary demonstrating, facts indicating that the holding of the substantial interest does not constitute a wholly artificial arrangement unrelated to economic reality. A group of companies may be regarded as a wholly artificial arrangement if, in a group structure involving (a) non-EU resident, underlying shareholder(s) and a company resident in the Netherlands, a body resident within the Union has been interposed in order to avoid the levying of Dutch income or dividend tax, without this EU body or the body’s establishment in the EU Member State having any real significance (cf. Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 33 003, no. 3, pp. 105 and 106, and T Danmark judgment, paragraph 100). 2.6.8. The Court did not disregard the foregoing in 2.6.2 to 2.6.7 above. The judgments challenged by ground I do not show an error of law and, as interwoven with valuations of a factual nature, cannot otherwise be examined for correctness by the Supreme Court in the cassation proceedings. Nor are those judgments incomprehensible. For this reason plea I also fails.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The Bundesfinanzhof confirmed prior case law according to which the provisions on hidden deposits and hidden profit distributions must be observed in the context of the additional taxation. On the question of economic activity of the controlled foreign company, the Bundesfinanzhof refers to the ruling of the European Court of Justice concerning Cadbury-Schweppes from 2006. According to paragraphs §§ 7 to 14 in the Außensteuergesetz (AStG) profits from controlled foreign companies without business activity can be taxed in Germany. In the case at hand the subsidiary was located in a rented office in Cyprus and employed a resident managing director. Her job was to handle correspondence with clients, to carry out and supervise payment transactions, manage business records and keep records. She was also entrusted with obtaining book licenses to order these sub-licenses for the benefit of three of Russia’s and Ukraine’s affiliates, which distributed the books in the Russian-speaking market. The license income earned by subsidiary was taxed at 10 percent in Cyprus. The Income was considered ‘passive’ as the subsidiary lacked the necessary ‘actual economic activity’. On that basis the Bundesfinanzhof rejected the appeal of the taxpayer. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The legislation on ‘controlled foreign companies’ in force in the United Kingdom provided for the inclusion, under certain conditions, of the profits of subsidiaries established outside the United Kingdom in which a resident company has a controlling holding. The UK tax authorities thus claimed from the parent company of the Cadbury Schweppes group, established in the United Kingdom, tax on the profits made by one of the subsidiaries of the group established in Ireland, where the tax rate was lower. The Court was asked to consider whether this legislation was compatible with the provisions of the Treaty on freedom of establishment (Articles 43 and 48 EC). The Court recalled that companies or persons could not improperly or fraudulently take advantage of provisions of Community law. However, the fact that a company has been established in a Member State for the purpose of benefiting from more favourable tax legislation does not in itself suffice to constitute abuse of the freedom of establishment and does not deprive Cadbury Schweppes of the right to rely on Community law. The Court then analysed the legislation in terms of freedom of establishment. According to settled case-law, although direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States, they must none the less exercise that competence consistently with Community law. The Court noticed the difference in the treatment of resident companies depending on whether the CFC legislation was or was not applicable: in the first instance the company is taxed on the profits of another legal person, whereas this is not the case in the latter instance (that is, when a resident company has a subsidiary taxed in the United Kingdom or a subsidiary established in another Member State where the tax rate is higher than in the United Kingdom). The Court noted that the separate tax treatment is such as to hinder the exercise of freedom of establishment, dissuading a resident company from establishing, acquiring or maintaining a subsidiary in a Member State with a lower tax rate. The Court pointed out that a national measure restricting freedom of establishment may be justified only where it specifically relates to wholly artificial arrangements aimed at circumventing the application of the legislation of the Member State concerned and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that purpose. In order to find that there is such an arrangement there must be, in addition to a subjective element, objective and ascertainable evidence – with regard, in particular, to the extent to which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment – that the incorporation of this subsidiary does not reflect economic reality, that is to say it is not an actual establishment intended to carry on genuine economic activities in the host Member State. The tests conducted under the national legislation must incorporate these factors if they are to be compatible with Community law. The Substance Test 67 As suggested by the United Kingdom Government and the Commission at  the hearing, that finding must be based on objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties with regard, in particular, to the extent to which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment. 68 If checking those factors leads to the finding that the CFC is a fictitious establishment not carrying out any genuine economic activity in the territory of the host Member State, the creation of that CFC must be regarded as having the characteristics of a wholly artificial arrangement. That could be so in particular in the case of a ‘letterbox’ or ‘front’ subsidiary (see Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC [2006] £CR 1-3813, paragraphs 34 and 35). 69 On the other hand, as pointed out by the Advocate General in point 103 of his Opinion, the fact that the activities which correspond to the profits of the CFC could just as well have been carried out by a company established in the territory of the Member State in which the resident company is established does not warrant the conclusion that there is a wholly artificial arrangement ...