The tax authorities had notified the companies GKN Driveline Firenze s.p.a. and GKN Italia s.p.a. of four notices of assessment, relating to the tax periods from 2002 to 2005, as well as 2011. The assessments related to the signing of a leasing contract, concerning a real estate complex, between GKN Driveline Firenze s.p.a. and the company TA. p.a. and the company TAU s.r.l.. A property complex was owned by the company GKN-Birfield s.p.a. of Brunico and was leased on an ordinary lease basis by the company GKN Driveline Firenze s.p.a. Both companies belonged to a multinational group headed by the company GKN-PLC, the parent company of the finance company GKN Finance LTD and the Italian parent company GKN-Birfield s.p.a., which in turn controlled GKN Driveline Firenze s.p.a. and TAU s.r.l. GKN Driveline Firenze s.p.a. expressed interest in acquiring ownership of the real estate complex; the real estate complex, however, was first sold to TAU s. s.r.l. and, on the same date, the latter granted it to the aforesaid company by means of a transfer lease. Further negotiated agreements were also entered into within the corporate group, as the purchase of the company TAU s.r.l. was financed by the company GKN Finance LTD, at the instruction of GKN- PLC, for an amount which, added to its own capital, corresponded to the purchase price of the property complex. The choice of entering into the transferable leasing contract, instead of its immediate purchase, had led the tax authorities to suggest that this different negotiation had had, as its sole motivation, the aim of unduly obtaining the tax advantage of being able to deduct the lease payments for the nine years of the contract while, if the property complex had been purchased, the longer and more onerous deduction of the depreciation allowances would have been required. The office had therefore suggested that the transaction had been carried out with abuse of law, given that the transfer leasing contract had to be considered simulated, with fictitious interposition of TAU s.r.l. in the actual sale and purchase that took place between GKN Driveline Firenze s.p.a. and GKN Birfield s.p.a. The companies filed appeals against the aforesaid tax assessments, which, after being joined, had been accepted by the Provincial Tax Commission of Florence. The tax authorities then appealed against the Provincial Tax Commission’s ruling. The Regional Tax Commission of Tuscany upheld the appeal of the tax authorities, finding the grounds of appeal well-founded. The appeal judge pointed out that the principle of the prohibition of abuse of rights, applicable also beyond the specific hypotheses set forth in Art. 37bis, Presidential Decree no. 600/1973, presupposes the competition of three characterising elements, such as the distorted use of legal instruments, the absence of valid autonomous economic reasons and the undue tax advantage. In the case at hand, the distorted use of the negotiation acts was reflected in the fact that the leasing contract had been implemented in a parallel and coordinated manner with a plurality of functionally relevant negotiation acts in a context of group corporate connection in which each of these negotiation acts had contributed a concausal element for the purposes of obtaining the desired result. In this context, it was presumable that the company TAU s.r.l., which had been dormant for a long time and had largely insufficient capital, had been appropriately regenerated and purposely financed within the same group to an extent corresponding to the cost of the deal and that, therefore, the leasing contract had been made to allow GKN Driveline Firenze s.p.a. to obtain the resulting tax benefits. The appeal court nevertheless held that the penalties were not applicable. GKN Driveline Firenze s.p.a. and GKN Italia s.p.a. filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Regional Tax Commission and refered the case back to the Regional Tax Commission, in a different composition. Excerpts “The judgment of the judge of appeal moves promiscuously along the lines of the relative simulation of the agreements entered into within the corporate group and the abuse of rights, with overlapping of factual and legal arguments, while it is up to the judge of merit to select the evidentiary material and from it to derive, with logically and legally correct motivation, the exact qualification of the tax case. In the case in point, the trial judge reasoned in terms of abuse of rights, assuming that the leasing transaction was carried out in place of the less advantageous direct sale, in terms of depreciation charges, but, in this context, he also introduced the figure of relative simulation, which entails a different underlying assumption: that is, that the leasing transaction was not carried out, since the parties actually wanted to enter into a direct sale. Also in this case, no specification is made, at the logical argumentative level, of the assumptions on the basis of which the above-mentioned relative simulation was deemed to have to be configured. Having thus identified the legal terms of the question, the reasoning of the judgment does not fully develop any of the topics of investigation that are instead required for the purposes of ascertaining the abuse of rights, both from the point of view of the anomaly of the negotiating instruments implemented within the corporate group and of the undue tax advantage pursued, while, on the other hand, it appears to be affected by intrinsic contradiction, because it is based simultaneously on both categories, abuse of rights and relative simulation, so that it is not clear whether, in the view of the appeal court, the tax recovery is to be regarded as legitimate because the leasing transaction was aimed exclusively at the pursuit of a tax saving or because that undue tax advantage was achieved through the conclusion of a series of fictitious transactions, both in relation to the financing and to the aforementioned leasing transaction in the absence of any real transfer of immovable property. In conclusion, the sixth plea in law ...

During the taxable year, the owner (lessee) or the user was regularly engaged in the trade or business of renting property of the same general type as the property in question to unrelated persons ...

The taxpayer establishes a more appropriate rental charge under the general rule set forth in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section; or ...

The provisions of paragraph (c)(2)(iii)(A) of this section shall not apply if either – ...

Except as provided in paragraph (c)(2)(iii)(B) of this section, where possession, use, or occupancy of tangible property, which is leased by the owner (lessee) from an unrelated party is transferred by sublease or other arrangement to the user, an arm’s length rental charge shall be considered to be equal to all the deductions claimed by the owner (lessee) which are attributable to the property for the period such property is used by the user. Where only a portion of such property was transferred, any allocations shall be made with reference to the portion transferred. The deductions to be considered include the rent paid or accrued by the owner (lessee) during the period of use and all other deductions directly and indirectly connected with the property paid or accrued by the owner (lessee) during such period. Such deductions include deductions for maintenance and repair, utilities, management and other similar deductions ...

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See § 1.482-2(c)(2)(ii) (26 CFR Part 1 revised as of April 1, 1985), for the determination of safe haven rental charges in the case of certain leases entered into before May 9, 1986, and for leases entered into before August 7, 1986, pursuant to a binding written contract entered into before May 9, 1986 ...

For purposes of paragraph (c) of this section, an arm’s length rental charge shall be the amount of rent which was charged, or would have been charged for the use of the same or similar property, during the time it was in use, in independent transactions with or between unrelated parties under similar circumstances considering the period and location of the use, the owner’s investment in the property or rent paid for the property, expenses of maintaining the property, the type of property involved, its condition, and all other relevant facts ...

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Where possession, use, or occupancy of tangible property owned or leased by one member of a group of controlled entities (referred to in this paragraph as the owner) is transferred by lease or other arrangement to another member of such group (referred to in this paragraph as the user) without charge or at a charge which is not equal to an arm’s length rental charge (as defined in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section) the district director may make appropriate allocations to properly reflect such arm’s length charge. Where possession, use, or occupancy of only a portion of such property is transferred, the determination of the arm’s length charge and the allocation shall be made with reference to the portion transferred ...

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Ensco Gerudi provided offshore drilling services to the petroleum industry in Malaysia, including leasing drilling rigs, to oil and gas operators in Malaysia. In order to provide these services, the Ensco entered into a Master Charter Agreement dated 21.9.2006 (amended on 17.8.2011) (“Master Charter Agreement”) with Ensco Labuan Limited (“ELL”), a third-party contractor, to lease drilling rigs from ELL. Ensco then rents out the drilling rigs to its own customers. As part of the Master Charter Agreement, Ensco agreed to pay ELL a percentage of the applicable day rate that Ensco earns from its drilling contracts with its customers for the drilling rigs. By way of a letter dated 12.10.2018, the tax authorities initiated its audit for FY 2015 to 2017. The tax authorities issued its first audit findings letter on 23.10.2019 where it took the position that the pricing of the leasing transactions between the Applicant and ELL are not at arm’s length pursuant to s 140A of the Income Tax Act 1967 (“ITA”). The tax authorities proposed that the profit earned by ELL should remain with the Ensco by reducing the cost of the leasing asset by 20% or equivalent to the margin obtained by ELL. Ensco disputed the tax assessment and brought the case to court for an appeals review. Decision of the High Court The High Court granted orders in terms of Ensco’s application allowing an appeal. Excerpts “It has been said that additional assessment is rooted in fairness and that there is a duty on the part of the Respondent [tax authorities] being an important public authority to give its reasons more so, when the issues pertaining to transfer pricing are complex matters and can never be straightforward. As the Applicant [Ensco] has submitted and this Court agrees, that at the very least, the most basic Transfer Pricing Report by the Respondent will be able to shed some light on the Applicant on this issue because without some basis, how would the Applicant be able to adequately defend itself before the Special Commissioners of Income Tax. The Applicant’s [Ensco] basis and justifications for the pricing of the leasing transactions is definitely in stark contrast to the Respondent’s failure to provide its own Transfer Pricing Report to the Applicant. In the present matter, exceptional circumstances of the case have been established at the leave stage which is a starting point in judicial review cases. Illegality, unlawful treatment, error of law and failure to adhere to legal principles established by the Courts tantamount to an excess of jurisdiction and all of which this Court finds have been demonstrated by the Applicant ...

An assessment had been issued where the pricing of intra group rental expenses for machinery had been set aside by the tax authorities for FY 2010-2013. By an application filed with the Court of Appeal S.C. A. S.R.L. requested the Court for annulment of the assessment issued by the tax authorities. The Court of Appeal by judgment no. 164 of 31 October 2017, partially partially annulled the assessment. Unsatisfied with this decision, both parties filed an appeal to the High Court. S.C. A. S.R.L. considers that the first court misapplied the substantive rules of law applicable to the case with regard to the additional determination of a corporation tax in the amount of RON 56,715 for 2010, with reference to the interpretation of the OECD Guidelines. “Although the expert appointed by the court of first instance correctly established the adjusted margins of trade mark-up for each of the years 2010 to 2013 and the adjusted margins of operating profit for the same period, he erred in finding that, for the purposes of the final calculation, an analysis of the year-by-year comparability of the profitability indicators obtained in the period 2010 to 2013 is required. The approach is wrong because paragraphs 3.76 and 3.79 of the OECD Guidelines require the elimination of any market influences or gaps that may have an impact on the company, the only correct method being to use multi-year financial data. The use of this method is intended to minimise the impact of individual factors on comparable entities and the economic environment, as well as temporary economic factors such as the economic crisis.” Judgement of Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the court of first instance. Excerpts “As regards the method chosen, although the appellant criticises the ‘year-on-year’ comparability method, it does not specifically point out what its shortcomings are, but only why it is necessary to use the method of multi-year or agreed financial data. The ‘year-on-year’ comparability method was used because it was observed that the adjusted net trading profit margins and adjusted operating profit margins for 2012 were lower than the lower quartile limit, so it was correctly required to adjust the company’s 2012 revenue to bring the profitability indicators to the median of the market range obtained for independent comparable companies. Paragraph 3.76 of the OECD Guidelines was correctly interpreted by the court of first instance as meaning that the provision primarily considers the analysis of the data for the year under assessment and, in the alternative, the data for previous years, so that the use of the aggregate comparison method is not required. Furthermore, paragraph 3.79 of the OECD Guidelines states that the use of multi-yearly data may only be used to improve the accuracy of the range of comparison, but in the present case the appellant has not shown in concrete terms the consequences of using that method.” “With regard to the estimation of transfer prices and the increase of the tax base by the amount of RON 3 815 806, the appellant-respondent submits that the difference in income between the expert’s report and the tax inspection report is due solely to the fact that the expert used the indicators from 7 companies and the tax authority used the indicators from 3 companies out of the 11 chosen. The criticism is unfounded because the expert and, by implication, the court of first instance, demonstrated that there were 4 other companies which were comparable in terms of the activity carried out and for which the tax inspection authorities considered that there was no information, but it was demonstrated by the evidence in the file that they should be included in the comparability sample.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

“H-trademark S.A.” applied for a ruling on the tax rules governing a business restructuring where trademarks were transferred to another group company and licensed back – whether Polish arm’s length provisions would apply to the transaction. The company was of the opinion that Polish arm’s length provision (article 11) would not apply, since the arrangement was covered by special Polish provisions related to financial leasing (article 17b-g). Judgement of the Court The Court found that the Polish arm’s length provisions applied to the transaction. Excerpts “In the present case, the legal problem boils down to the correct identification of the nature of the norms arising from Article 11 of the A.p.d.o.p. and its relationship with the provisions on leasing raised by the applicant (Articles 17b – 17g of the A.p.d.o.p.). Indeed, the applicant takes the view that the leasing provisions themselves introduce derogations from market conditions and that, consequently, it is not possible to examine certain activities governed by the leasing provisions on the basis of the criteria provided for in Article 11 of the A.p.d.o.p.” “Therefore, it should be stated that the norm of Article 11 of the A.l.t.d.o.p. constitutes lex specialis in relation to the norms concerning taxation of leasing agreements (Article 17a et seq. of the A.l.d.o.p.). It may therefore also be applied in the case concerning taxation of such agreements. Thus, the Court does not share the view of the Appellant Company that it is the provisions concerning the leasing agreement that constitute lex specialis in relation to Article 11 of the discussed Act. It is also of no significance for the position of the Court that the agreement presented in the description of the future event is not a commonly occurring agreement, and therefore, as the appellant claims, it will not be possible to make determinations on the basis of Article 11 of the A.l.t.d.o.p. This is because the very demonstration that the price would have been different if certain connections on the basis of the aforementioned provision had not occurred is already an element of establishing the facts and conducting tax proceedings in a specific case. Meanwhile, the subject of the present proceedings, was the answer to the question whether the aforementioned provision is excluded in the case of taxation of leasing agreements. In addition, it should be noted that, contrary to the assertions in the application, it was not in the description of the future event, but in the position presented by the party that it stated that: “(…) the initial value of the rights to be used will be determined on the basis of a valuation prepared by an independent entity and will therefore correspond to their market value”.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The subject-matter of the dispute was the exclusion of the rent for lease of machinery and equipment. It referred to the lease and sublease agreements for non-residential premises, machinery and equipment with the companies B.p., s.r.o. and M.-T., s.r.o., by which the parties agreed that the objects of the lease agreements would be used free of charge for a certain period of time – during the trial period. Bp s.r.o. disputed the use of transfer prices in accordance with the arm’s length principle and the question of the tenant’s payment behaviour. It argued economic aspects – the possibility of making a real profit over a longer period of time. According to the taxpayer the tax authority should have examined the possibility of obtaining a total profit for the taxpayer over a five-year period and not simply applied ‘the most ideal course of market economics (i.e. the business partners are always solvent and the market situation is optimal)’. It also supplemented the application with a profit forecast, from which it concluded that ‘from a long-term profitability point of view, it was therefore worthwhile to support the related parties during the transitional period’. According to the tax authorities, although the procedures and methods set out in the OECD Directive are not directly enshrined in domestic tax law (nor is there a direct reference to the OECD Directive), the binding nature of the OECD Directive in the interpretation of arm’s length under double taxation treaties derives from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31 of which contains rules of interpretation. In this respect, the OECD Directive is an interpretative document on double taxation treaties. Judgement of the Court The Court dismissed the appeal and decided in favour of the tax authorities. Excerpt “In addition to the above, the Supreme Administrative Court notes that the above-mentioned guidelines (Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations) are part of the OECD Declaration of 21 June 1976 on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (available, for example, at www.oecd.org) , which is only a recommendation by governments to multinational companies; it is therefore not a legal regulation (soft law). With regard to the objection to the application of section 23(7) of the Income Tax Act, it should be noted that the complainant does not dispute that the rent is subject to that tax in accordance with sections 18(1) and 22(1)(e) and (g)(5) of the Income Tax Act, nor does it dispute the court’s conclusion that the parties were personally and economically linked, nor the notion of consideration in rental and sublease agreements. In other words, the complainant does not refute the legal conclusions of the court and the tax authorities, which formed the basis for the application of Article 23(7) of the Tax Code. of the Act. The conceptual features of the contracts concluded by the complainant are precisely the aforementioned consideration. Therefore, the dispute as to whether a ‘foreign’ entity would have been willing to conclude a contract on the same terms, including the argumentation of economic aspects, is inappropriate. Hypothetical circumstances (relating, moreover, to third parties), which have no direct connection with the grounds on which the Regional Court based its decision, cannot lead to the conclusion that the appeal is well-founded. The objection concerning the need to take account of the applicant’s costs of further renting of premises, machinery and equipment is not admissible under Article 104(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, since the applicant did not raise it in the proceedings before the Regional Court whose decision is under review, nor does it claim that it could not have done so. Therefore, the Court could not deal with that objection. For the reasons set out above, the Supreme Administrative Court concludes that the complainant’s cassation complaint is unfounded and therefore dismisses it…” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...