Prior to the payment of dividends by Husky Energy Inc. to its shareholders in 2003, two of its shareholders (companies resident in Barbados) transferred their shares to companies in Luxembourg under securities lending arrangements, and therefore Husky Energy Inc. only withheld dividend tax at a reduced rate of 5% under the Canada-Luxembourg Income Tax Treaty. Judgment of the Court The Court found Husky Energy liable for failing to withhold dividend tax at the non-Convention rate of 25%. As the dividends were not paid to the Barbados companies, the 15% rate under the Canada – Barbados Income Tax Convention was not available. The Canada-Luxembourg Income Tax Convention rate was also not available as the Luxembourg companies were not the beneficial owners of the dividends as they were required to pay compensation to the Barbados companies equal to the dividends received. Excerpts “Under the securities lending arrangements, companies resident in Luxembourg enjoyed nothing more than temporary custodianship of the funds received in payment of the Dividends. The compensation payments were preordained by the terms of the borrowing requests, and this preordination ensured that at all times, the Barbcos retained their rights to the full economic value of the Dividends.” “For the foregoing reasons, HWEI and LF Luxembourg were not the beneficial owners of the Dividends for the purposes of Article 10(2) because they were legally obligated from the outset of the securities lending arrangements to return the full amount of the Dividends to the Barbcos in the form of the compensation payments. This was to occur no later than approximately seven weeks after the commencement of the securities lending arrangements. Consequently, HWEI and LF Luxembourg were not entitled to the benefit of the reduced rates of Part XIII tax provided under Article 10(2) and, for the purposes of subsections 215(1) and (6), the amount of tax under Part XIII that Husky was required to withhold and remit in respect of the Dividends was 25% of the Dividends.” “The fact that the Barbcos transferred their common shares in Husky to the Luxcos under atypical securities lending arrangements really has no bearing on whether the Transactions abuse Article 10(2). The rationale of Article 10(2) is to provide relief from double taxation by allocating the right to tax dividends between Canada and Luxembourg in accordance with the theory of economic allegiance while retaining the protections against the use of conduit‐type arrangements afforded by the beneficial owner requirement and the voting power requirement. Consistent with the theory of economic allegiance described by the majority in Alta Energy, which recognizes that a recipient of passive income need not have any allegiance to the paying country, the focus of the rationale of Article 10(2) is not how the common shares of Husky came to be owned by the Luxcos, but whether the Luxcos satisfy the residence requirement, the beneficial owner requirement and the voting power requirement. Since the hypothetical being considered assumes these requirements have been satisfied, I see no basis on which to find that the securities lending arrangements abused Article 10(2). VII. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the appeal of Husky is dismissed with costs to the Respondent, and the appeals of HWLH and LFMI are allowed with costs to HWLH and LFMI and the HWLH Assessment and the LFMI Assessment are vacated. While this is an unusual result, it flows from the fact that the Minister assessed the successors of the Barbcos and did not assess the Luxcos.” Click here for translations ...

3 February 2023 the Inland Revenue of New Zealand issued an interpretation statement explaining the Commissioner’s view of the law on tax avoidance in New Zealand. It sets out the approach the Commissioner will take to the general anti-avoidance provisions in the Income Tax Act 2007 – ss BG 1 and s GA 1. Where s BG 1 applies, s GA 1 enables the Commissioner to make an adjustment to counteract a tax advantage obtained from or under a tax avoidance arrangement. The Supreme Court in Ben Nevis considered it desirable to settle the approach to the relationship between s BG 1 and the specific provisions in the rest of the Act. This approach is referred to as the Parliamentary contemplation test. The Parliamentary contemplation test was confirmed as the proper and authoritative approach to applying s BG 1 by the Supreme Court in Penny and Frucor. The statement is based on and reflects the view of the Supreme Court as set out in Ben Nevis, and applied in Penny and Frucor ...

Frucor Suntory (FHNZ) had deducted purported interest expenses that had arisen in the context of a tax scheme involving, among other steps, its issue of a Convertible Note to Deutsche Bank, New Zealand Branch (DBNZ), and a forward purchase of the shares DBNZ could call for under the Note by FHNZ’s Singapore based parent Danone Asia Pte Ltd (DAP). The Convertible Note had a face value of $204,421,565 and carried interest at a rate of 6.5 per cent per annum. Over its five-year life, FHNZ paid DBNZ approximately $66 million which FHNZ characterised as interest and deducted for income tax purposes. The tax authorities issued an assessment where deductions of interest expenses in the amount of $10,827,606 and $11,665,323 were disallowed in FY 2006 and 2007 under New Zealand´s general anti-avoidance rule in s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 2004. In addition, penalties of $1,786,555 and $1,924,779 for those years were imposed. The tax authorities found that, although such deductions complied with the “black letter” of the Act, $55 million of the $66 million paid was in fact a non- deductible repayment of principal. Hence only interest deduction of $11 million over the life of the Arrangement was allowed. These figures represent the deduction disallowed by the Commissioner, as compared to the deductions claimed by the taxpayer: $13,250,998 in 2006 and $13,323,806 in 2007. Based on an allegedly abusive tax position but mitigated by the taxpayer’s prior compliance history. In so doing, avoiding any exposure to shortfall penalties for the 2008 and 2009 years in the event it is unsuccessful in the present proceedings. The income years 2004 and 2005, in which interest deductions were also claimed under the relevant transaction are time barred. Which I will refer to hereafter as $204 million without derogating from the Commissioner’s argument that the precise amount of the Note is itself evidence of artifice in the transaction. As the parties did in both the evidence and the argument, I use the $55 million figure for illustrative purposes. In fact, as recorded in fn 3 above, the Commissioner is time barred from reassessing two of FHNZ’s relevant income tax returns. The issues The primary issue is whether s BG 1 of the Act applies to the Arrangement. Two further issues arise if s BG 1 is held to apply: (a) whether the Commissioner’s reconstruction of the Arrangement pursuant to s GB 1 of the Act is correct or whether it is, as FHNZ submits, “incorrect and excessive”; and (b) whether the shortfall penalties in ss 141B (unacceptable tax position) or 141D (abusive tax position) of the Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA) have application. In 2018 the High Court decided in favor of Frucor Suntory This decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal, where in 2020 a decision was issued in favor of the tax authorities. The Court of Appeal set aside the decision of the High Court in regards of the tax adjustment, but dismissed the appeal in regards of shortfall penalties. “We have already concluded that the principal driver of the funding arrangement was the availability of tax relief to Frucor in New Zealand through deductions it would claim on the coupon payments. The benefit it obtained under the arrangement was the ability to claim payments totaling $66 million as a fully deductible expense when, as a matter of commercial and economic reality, only $11 million of this sum comprised interest and the balance of $55 million represented the repayment of principal. The tax advantage gained under the arrangement was therefore not the whole of the interest deductions, only those that were effectively principal repayments. We consider the Commissioner was entitled to reconstruct by allowing the base level deductions totaling $11 million but disallowing the balance. The tax benefit Frucor obtained “from or under” the arrangement comprised the deductions claimed for interest on the balance of $149 million which, as a matter of commercial reality, represented the repayment of principal of $55 million.” This decision was then appealed to the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Frucor and ruled in favor of the tax authorities both in regards of the tax adjustment and in regards of shortfall penalties. Excerpt “[80] The picture which emerges from the planning documents which we have reviewed is clear. The whole purpose of the arrangement was to secure tax benefits in New Zealand. References to tax efficiency in those planning documents are entirely focused on the advantage to DHNZ of being able to offset repayments of principal against its revenue. The anticipated financial benefits of this are calculated solely by reference to New Zealand tax rates. The only relevance of the absence of a capital gains liability in Singapore was that this tax efficiency would not be cancelled out by capital gains on the contrived “gain” of DAP under the forward purchase agreement. [81] There were many elements of artificiality about the funding arrangement. Of these, the most significant is in relation to the note itself. [82] Orthodox convertible notes offer the investor the opportunity to receive both interest and the benefit of any increases in the value of the shares over the term of the note. For this reason, the issuer of a convertible note can expect to receive finance at a rate lower than would be the case for an orthodox loan. [83] The purpose of the convertible note issued by DHNZ was not to enable it to receive finance from an outside investor willing to lend at a lower rate because of the opportunity to take advantage of an increase in the value of the shares. The shares were to wind up with DAP which already had complete ownership of DHNZ. As well, Deutsche Bank had no interest in acquiring shares in DHNZ. Instead, it had structured a transaction that generated tax benefits for DHNZ in return for a fee. Leaving aside the purpose of obtaining tax advantages in New Zealand, the convertible note ...

On 30 November 2012, X sold its trademarks to subsidiary C which in turn sold the trademarks to subsidiary D. X and D then entered into a trademark license agreement according to which X would pay license fees to D. These license fees were deducted by X in its 2013 tax return. The tax authorities claimed that X had understated its taxabel income as the license fees paid by X to D for the use of trademarks were not related to obtaining or securing a source of revenue. The decision stated that in the light of the principles of logic and experience, the actions taken by the taxpayer made no sense and were not aimed at achieving the revenue in question, but instead at generating costs artificially – only for tax purposes. An appeal was filed by X. Judgement of the Administrative Court The court set aside the assessment of the tax authorities and decided in favor of X. According to the court taxpayers are not obliged to conduct their business in such a way as to pay the highest possible taxes, and gaining benefits from so-called tax optimization not prohibited by law, was allowed in 2013. The Polish anti-avoidance clause has only been in force since 15 July 2016. Furthermore, although it may have been possible to set aside legal effects of the transactions under the previous provision in Article 24b § 1 of the C.C.P., the Constitutional Tribunal in its verdict of 11 May 2004, declared this provision to be inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Excerpts “In the Court’s view, the authorities’ findings fail to comply with the provisions applied in the case, including in particular Article 15 of the CIT Act. The legal transactions described in the appealed decision indeed constitute an optimisation mechanism. However, the realised transaction scheme is not potentially devoid of economic as well as tax rationales. The actions performed were undoubtedly also undertaken in order to achieve the intended tax result, i.e. optimisation of taxation. It should be strongly emphasised that none of the actions taken were ostensible. All of the applicant’s actions were as real as possible. Noticing the obvious reality of the above transactions, the tax authorities did not even attempt to apply the institution regulated in Article 199a of the CIT Act. The omission of legal effects of the transactions performed would probably have been possible in the former legal order, under Article 24b § 1 of the C.C.P., but this provision is no longer in force. The Constitutional Tribunal in its verdict of 11 May 2004, ref. no. K 4/03 (Journal of Laws of 2004, no. 122, item 1288) declared this provision to be inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. On the other hand, the anti-avoidance clause introduced by the Act of 13 May 2016 amending the Tax Ordinance Act and certain other acts (Journal of Laws 2016, item 846) has been in force only since 15 July 2016. Pursuant to the amended Article 119a § 1 o.p. – an act performed primarily for the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit, contradictory in given circumstances to the object and purpose of the provision of the tax act, does not result in obtaining a tax benefit if the manner of action was artificial (tax avoidance). Issues related to the application of the provisions of this clause in time are regulated by Article 7 of the Amending Act, according to which the provisions of Articles 119a-119f of the Act amended in Article 1 apply to the tax advantage obtained after the date of entry into force of this Act. Thus, the anti-avoidance clause applies to tax benefits obtained after the date of entry into force of the amending law, i.e. from 15 July 2016, which, moreover, was not in dispute in the present case. Considering the above, it should be pointed out that the tax authorities in the case at hand had no authority to use such argumentation as if the anti-avoidance clause applied. In the legal state in force in 2013. (applicable in the present case) the general anti-avoidance clause was not in force. This state of affairs amounts to a prohibition on the tax authorities disregarding the tax consequences of legal transactions carried out primarily for the purpose of obtaining a tax advantage.” Click here for English translation. Click here for other translation ...

“GAAR S.A” is a holding company with a share capital of EUR 55,000.00. In 2010, “GAAR S.A” was in a situation of excess equity capital resulting from an accumulation of reserves (EUR 402,539.16 of legal reserves and EUR 16,527,875.72 of other reserves). The Board of Directors, made up of three shareholders – B………… (holder of 21,420 shares, corresponding to 42.84% of the share capital), C………… (holder of a further 21,420 shares, corresponding to 42.84% of the share capital) and D………… (holder of 7. 160 shares, corresponding to the remaining 14.32% of the share capital) – decided to “release this excess of capital” and, following this resolution, the shareholders decided: i) on 22.02.2010 to redeem 30,000 shares, with a share capital reduction, at a price of EUR 500.00 each, with a subsequent share capital increase of EUR 33. 000.00, by means of incorporation of legal reserves, and the share capital of the appellant will be made up of 20,000 shares at the nominal value of €2.75 each; and ii) on 07.05.2010, to cancel 10,000 shares, with a capital reduction, at the price of €1. 000.00 each, with a subsequent share capital increase of 27,500.00 Euros, by means of incorporation of legal reserves, and the share capital of the appellant is now composed of 10,000 shares at a nominal value of 5.50 Euros each (items E and F of the facts). As a result of this arrangements, payments were made to the shareholders in 2010, 2011 and 2012, with only the payment made on 4 September 2012 being under consideration here. On that date, cheques were issued for the following amounts: B………… – €214,200.00; C………… – €214,200.00; and D………… – €71,600.00. Payments which, according to “GAAR S.A”, since they constitute exempt capital gains, were not subject to taxation, that is, no deduction at source was made. Following an inspection the tax authorities decided, to disregard the arrangement, claiming that it had been “set up” by the respective shareholders with the aim of obtaining a tax advantage (whilst completely ignoring the economic substance of the arrangement). In short, the tax authorities considered that the transactions were carried out in order to allow “GAAR S.A” to distribute dividends under the “guise” of share redemption, thus avoiding the tax to which they would be subject. An appeal filed by “GAAR S.A.” with the Administrative Court was dismissed. An appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal and found that “GAAR S.A.” was liable for the payment of the tax which was not withheld at source and which should have been, we also consider that there is no error in the judgment under appeal in concluding that “at least in terms of negligence, it seems to us that the award of compensatory interest is, in cases such as the present, the natural consequence of the verification of the abuse, especially given the environmental and intellectual elements, demonstrating that there was a deliberate intention to avoid the due withholding tax” According to the court the tax authorities does not have to prove an “abusive” intention of the taxpayer. The tax authorities is not required to prove that the taxpayer opted for the construction leading to the tax saving in order to intentionally avoid the solution which would be subject to taxation. It is sufficient for the tax authorities to prove that the operation carried out does not have a rational business purpose and that, for this reason, its intentionality is exhausted in the tax saving to which it leads. Having provided this proof, the requirements of article 38(2) of the LGT should be considered to have been met. When the application of the GAAR results in the disregard of a construction and its replacement by an operation whose legal regulation would impose the practice of a definitive withholding tax act, it is the person who comes to be qualified as the substitute (in the light of the application of the GAAR) who is primarily liable for this tax obligation whenever the advantage that the third party obtains results from an operation carried out by him and it is possible to conclude, that he was the beneficiary of the operation. It is also possible to conclude, under the procedure set out in Article 63 of the CPPT, that the third party had a legal obligation to be aware of the alternative legal transaction that comes to be qualified as legally owed as a result of the disregard of the transaction carried out. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

ALTA Energy, a resident of Luxembourg, claimed an exemption from Canadian income tax under Article 13(5) of the Canada-Luxembourg Income Tax Treaty in respect of a large capital gain arising from the sale of shares of ALTA Canada, its wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary. At that time, Alta Canada carried on an unconventional shale oil business in the Duvernay shale oil formation situated in Northern Alberta. Alta Canada was granted the right to explore, drill and extract hydrocarbons from an area of the Duvernay formation designated under licenses granted by the government of Alberta. The Canadian tax authorities denied that the exemption applied and assessed ALTA Energy accordingly. Article 13(5) of the Canada-Luxembourg Tax Treaty is a distributive rule of last application. It applies only in the case where the capital gain is not otherwise taxable under paragraphs (1) to (4) of Article 13 of the Treaty. Article 13(4) is relevant to the outcome of this appeal. Under that provision, Canada has preserved its right to tax capital gains arising from the disposition of shares where the shares derive their value principally from immovable property situated in Canada. However, the application of Article 13(4) is subject to an important exception. Property that would otherwise qualify as Immovable Property is deemed not to be such property in the circumstances where the business of the corporation is carried on in the property (the “Excluded Property” exception). The tax authorities argued that the Shares derived their value principally from Alta Canada’s Working Interest in the Duvernay Formation. The authorities also argued that the capital gain it realized would be taxable under Article 13(4) unless the Court agreed with ALTA’s submission that its full Working Interest is Excluded Property. ALTA Energy appealed the position of the tax authorities and argued the contrary view. According to ALTA, substantially all of ALTA Canada’s Working Interest remained Immovable Property because ALTA Canada drilled in and extracted hydrocarbons from only a small area of the Duvernay Formation that it controlled. In 2018 the Federal Court of Appeal decided in favour of ALTA Energie and the matter was referred back for reconsideration and reassessment. This decision was then appealed by the tax authorities before the Supreme Court The Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities but with dissenting judges. Excerpts: [185] Nevertheless, we agree with Alta Luxembourg that treaty shopping is not inherently abusive. There is nothing necessarily improper about minimizing tax liability by selecting a beneficial tax regime in making an investment in a foreign jurisdiction (Crown Forest, at para. 49). Certain jurisdictions may provide tax incentives to attract businesses and investment; as such, taxpayers are entitled to avail themselves of such benefits to minimize tax. Thus, merely selecting a treaty to minimize tax, on its own, is not abusive. In fact, it may be consonant with one of the main purposes of tax treaties: encouraging trade and investment. [186] However, where taxing rights in a tax treaty are allocated on the basis of economic allegiance and conduit entities claim tax benefits despite the absence of any genuine economic connection with the state of residence, treaty shopping is, in our view, abusive. As Professors N. Bammens and L. De Broe explain, the use of “conduit companies” is disconnected from the objectives of bilateral tax treaties: . . . tax treaties are concluded for reasons of an economic nature: the contracting states want to stimulate reciprocal commercial relations by preventing double taxation. The use of conduit companies and treaty shopping structures has very little to do with this economic objective. Treaty shopping thus upsets the balance and reciprocity of the tax treaty: in order to preserve a tax treaty’s inherent reciprocity, its benefits must not be extended to persons not entitled to them. [Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.] (“Treaty Shopping and Avoidance of Abuse”, in Lang et al., Tax Treaties, 51, at p. 52; see also Li and Avella, at s. 2.1.1.3.) [187] In such cases, as here, the avoidance transaction would be contrary to the objectives of bilateral tax treaties and frustrate the object, spirit or purpose of the specific provisions related to the allocation of taxing rights. Preventing such abuse is the purpose of the GAAR: “. . . most double tax treaties do not contain specific limitations on the ability of third-country residents to treaty shop [and instead] rely on the concept of beneficial ownership or on domestic anti-abuse legislation to safeguard against hollow conduits” (Krishna (2009), at p. 540). Similarly, C. A. Brown and J. Bogle are of the view that the GAAR is “[t]he primary tool to fight treaty shopping in Canada currently” (“Treaty Shopping and the New Multilateral Tax Agreement — Is it Business as Usual in Canada?” (2020), 43 Dal. L.J. 1, at p. 4). [188] In conclusion, not all types of treaty shopping lead to abuse of a tax treaty. Only when an avoidance transaction frustrates the rationale of the relevant treaty provision will treaty shopping be abusive and the tax benefit denied. For instance, where contracting parties allocate taxing rights to the state of residence on the basis of economic allegiance, as in this case, treaty shopping will be abusive if the resident of a third-party state uses a conduit company to claim treaty benefits conferred by provisions requiring a genuine economic connection with the residence state. Therein lies the undermining of these provisions’ rationale clothed in a formalistic adherence to their text. Ignoring this is to render the GAAR empty of meaningful effect. Click here for other translation ...

The facts underlying the notice of assessment are undisputed: a) Casa di Cura Santa Rita s.p.a. grants a free loan to Spazio Immobiliare 2000 s.r.l.; b) the latter company, substantially lacking its own means and wholly controlled by the former, uses the parent company’s loan in full to purchase certain assets; c) said assets are rented to the parent company against payment of a consideration, partly due also for the year 2004; d) payment of the consideration for the years of rental is deferred until 31/12/2005. In view of these facts, the tax authorities makes the following contentions: (a) the parent company did not directly purchase the goods and services from the subsidiary because it would not have been able to deduct the VAT due to the fact that it carried out almost all exempt transactions; (b) the subsidiary benefited from a VAT credit for the year 2004 (arising from the purchase of the goods then leased) which was then included in the group VAT settlement, but which it should have offset against the VAT paid by the parent company on the rentals c) the payment of the hire was contractually delayed between the parties in such a way as not to permit the aforesaid set-off; d) in this context, in which the payment of the hire was contractually delayed, the free loan granted by the parent company was the true consideration for the hire transaction, with the subsidiary’s obligation to pay the VAT relating to the transactions already in 2004. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the decision in regards of the assessment but remanded the the question of penalties to the court of first instance. Excerpts “17.4. The reconstruction of the case by the CTR is immune from the criticisms addressed to it both in terms of infringement of the law (fifth ground of appeal) and in terms of contradictory reasoning (ninth ground of appeal); with the result that the aforesaid grounds must be rejected (if not declared inadmissible). 17.4.1. The reasoning of the CTR is in no way contradictory, in that: (a) it classifies the financing as consideration for the hire contract; (b) it holds that that consideration, if paid on time, would have given rise to a VAT liability of SI 2000 (c) maintains that the rental agreement between the parent company and the subsidiary provided for the deferment of payment of the consideration solely for the purposes of evasion (surreptitious deferment of the time of taxation under Article 6 of Presidential Decree No 633 of 1972); (d) asserts the existence of VAT evasion by the subsidiary. 17.4.2. This is an entirely straightforward factual finding, legitimately made on the basis of the allegations of the parties and not affected by SI 2000’s objections. Nor can the appellant, in the context of legitimacy, substitute its own different reconstruction of the facts for that made by the CTR, free from the contested logical defects. 17.4.3. In view of the CTR’s legitimate findings of fact, there is not even a violation of the law complained of, a violation that would only arise from the different classification of the parent company’s disbursements as gratuitous loans and the legitimacy of the deferment of the rental fee, as claimed by the appellant. 17.4.4. In other words, the alleged breach of law follows from the different reconstruction of the case made by SI 2000, so that the fifth plea is inadmissible rather than unfounded. 17.5. The assessment made by the Regional Tax Commission leads to the conclusion that we are not dealing with a case of avoidance or abuse of law, but only with an evasion of tax, resulting from the qualification of the inter partes transaction made by the Regional Tax Commission, a qualification that is not called into question by the appellant’s complaints. 17.6 The issue has already been addressed by the S.C. in a recent judgment (Cass. no. 27550 of 30/10/2018), for which “the non-payment of taxes in relation to a transaction qualified in a legally correct manner by the financial administration integrates a hypothesis of tax evasion and not of tax avoidance, which occurs when a negotiating instrument is used for the purpose of obtaining a tax advantage through a distorted use of tax legislation, so that the provisions of law and the principles developed by the case law, both domestic and EU, on the subject of abuse of law cannot be applied”. 17.6.1. It is worth retracing the reasoning of the aforementioned judgment. 17.6.2. ‘It is well known that “in tax matters, according to the Community and national case law, an abusive practice is an economic transaction which, through the “improper” and “distorted” use of the negotiating instrument, has as its predominant and absorbing (though not exclusive) purpose the avoidance of the tax rule, while the mere abstract configurability of a tax advantage is not sufficient to integrate the abusive case, since the concomitant condition of the non-existence of economic reasons other than the mere saving of tax and the ascertainment of the effective will of the contracting parties to obtain an undue tax advantage is required” (so Cass. No. 25758 of 05/12/2014; see, also, Cass. No. 19234 of 7 November 2012; Cass. No. 21782 of 20/10/2011; Cass. S.U. No. 30055 of 23 December 2008). 17.6.3. With specific reference to direct taxes, then, the prohibition of abuse of rights translates into a general anti-avoidance principle that is grounded, first of all, in the same constitutional principles that inform the Italian tax system (Cass. no. 3938 of 19/02/2014; Cass. no. 4604 of 26/02/2014) and, above all, in Art. 37 bis of Presidential Decree No. 600 of 29 September 1973 (Cass. No. 405 of 14/01/2015; Cass. No. 4561 of 06/03/2015), which allows the tax authorities to disallow and declare non-enforceable transactions and acts, in themselves devoid of valid economic reasons and directed to the sole purpose of obtaining tax benefits that are otherwise not due.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The issue is whether MIL (INVESTMENTS) S.A. was exempt from Canadian income tax in respect of the capital gain of $425,853,942 arising in FY 1997 on the sale of shares of Diamond Field Resources Inc. by virtue of the Canadian Income Tax Act and the Convention Between Canada and The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (“Treaty”). The Canadian Tax Authorities found that MIL was not exempt under local anti avoidance provisions and issued an assessment where the capital gain had been added to the taxable income. Disagreeing with the assessment, MIL (INVESTMENTS) S.A. filed an appeal with the Tax Court. The tax court allowed the appeal of MIL (INVESTMENTS) S.A. and set aside the assessment issued by the tax authorities. An appeal was then filed with the Federal Court by the tax authorities. Judgement of Federal Court The Federal Court dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities and ruled in favor of MIL (INVESTMENTS) S.A. Excerpts “In order to succeed in this appeal, the appellant Her Majesty the Queen must persuade us that one transaction in the series of transactions in issue is an avoidance transaction, and that the tax benefit achieved by the respondent MIL (Investments) S.A. is an abuse or misuse of the object and purpose of article 13(4) of the Convention between Canada and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (the Tax Treaty). … “It is clear that the Act intends to exempt non-residents from taxation on the gains from the disposition of treat exempt property. It is also clear that under the terms of the Tax Treaty, the respondent’s stake in DFR was treaty exempt property. The appellant urged us to look behind this textual compliance with the relevant provisions to find an object or purpose whose abuse would justify our departure from the plain words of the disposition. We are unable to find such an object or purpose. If the object of the exempting provision was to be limited to portfolio investments, or to non-controlling interests in immoveable property (as defined in the Tax Treaty), as the appellant argues, it would have been easy enough to say so. Beyond that, and more importantly, the appellant was unable to explain how the fact that the respondent or Mr. Boulle had or retained influence of control over DFR, if indeed they did, was in itself a reason to subject the gain from the sale of the shares to Canadian taxation rather than taxation in Luxembourg. To the extent that the appellant argues that the Tax Treaty should not be interpreted so as to permit double non-taxation, the issue raised by GAAR is the incidence of Canadian taxation, not the foregoing of revenues by the Luxembourg fiscal authorities. As a result, the appeal will be dismissed with costs.” An interesting article on the case has been published in 2008 by the University of Toronto, Faculty of Law. Click here for other translation ...

On 17 February 2003, the President of the Polish Supreme Administrative Court and the Ombudsman requested the Constitutional Court to declare that Article 24b par. 1 of the Tax Ordinance of 29 August 1997 – by giving the tax authorities and fiscal control bodies, while resolving a tax case, the right to disregard the effects of legal transactions which may give the taxpayer an advantage in the form of reduction of tax liability, increase of overpayment or refund of tax – violates the principle of citizens’ trust in the state and the created law resulting from Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and violates the principle of freedom of economic activity expressed in the freedom to arrange one’s civil law relations, i.e. Article 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Article 24b of the Tax Ordinance had the following wording: “Art. 24b par. 1. Tax authorities and tax inspection bodies, when settling tax cases, shall disregard the tax consequences of legal actions, if they prove that from the performance of these actions one could not expect any significant benefits other than those arising from a reduction in the amount of tax liability, increase in loss, increase in overpayment or refund of tax. Par. 2. If the parties, by performing a legal transaction referred to in par. 1, have achieved an intended economic result for which another legal transaction or transactions is appropriate, the tax consequences are derived from that other legal transaction or transactions”. Judgement of the Constitutional Court In a split decision, the Court declared the provision in Article 24b § 1 of the Tax Ordinance inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Excerpts “The infringement of the Constitution consists in enacting unclear and ambiguous provisions, which do not allow a citizen to foresee the legal consequences of his actions” /Judgement of 22 May 2002, K 6/02 – OTK ZU 2002 nr 3/A poz. 33 p. 448/. It follows from the principle of determinacy that “every legal regulation should be constructed correctly from the linguistic and logical point of view – it is only when this basic condition is met that it can be assessed in terms of the remaining criteria”.” “Phrases such as: “could not have been expected”, “other significant benefits”, “benefits resulting from the reduction of the amount of the liability” definitely do not allow to assume that “their jurisprudential interpretation will indeed be uniform and strict” and that “from their wording it will not be possible to derive a law-making power of the applying bodies”. It is worth noting here, that the aforementioned reservation, that a provision using indefinite phrases should not become the object of law-making activity of organs applying the law, has been formulated by the Constitutional Tribunal first and foremost in relation to the normative provisions applied by the courts” “In the opinion of the Constitutional Tribunal, such a statutory solution does not withstand criticism in the light of art. 93 clause 2 of the Constitution. On the one hand, it leads to a dangerous and undesirable blurring of the distinction between lawmaking and its interpretation, which results from giving the value of extended validity to the official interpretation, which is supposed to perform exclusively the function of subjectively limited ordering and unification of the jurisprudential activity. On the other hand, it makes acts addressed formally only to the internal structure of the state apparatus a means of influencing the sphere of taxpayers’ rights and freedoms, i.e. the sphere which may be regulated only by acts included in the closed category of sources of universally binding law. This kind of impact is not permissible either through sources of law of an internal character, or even less so through acts, which only seemingly have the value of purely interpretative actions, but in practice assume features similar to those displayed by normative acts. Therefore, apart from the inconsistency with art. 93 sec. 2 sentence 2 of the Constitution, the solution adopted in art. 14 par. 2 of the Tax ordinance may lead to “disruption” of the whole concept of the system of sources of law adopted by the legislator.” NB. A new Polish anti-avoidance clause was introduced by the Act of 13 May 2016 amending the Tax Ordinance and has been in force since 15 July 2016. Pursuant to the amended anti-avoidance provision in Article 119a § 1 o.p. – an act performed primarily for the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit, contradictory in given circumstances to the object and purpose of the provision of the tax act, does not result in obtaining a tax benefit if the manner of action was artificial (tax avoidance). Click here for English translation. Click here for other translation ...