The facts underlying the notice of assessment are undisputed: a) Casa di Cura Santa Rita s.p.a. grants a free loan to Spazio Immobiliare 2000 s.r.l.; b) the latter company, substantially lacking its own means and wholly controlled by the former, uses the parent company’s loan in full to purchase certain assets; c) said assets are rented to the parent company against payment of a consideration, partly due also for the year 2004; d) payment of the consideration for the years of rental is deferred until 31/12/2005.
In view of these facts, the tax authorities makes the following contentions: (a) the parent company did not directly purchase the goods and services from the subsidiary because it would not have been able to deduct the VAT due to the fact that it carried out almost all exempt transactions; (b) the subsidiary benefited from a VAT credit for the year 2004 (arising from the purchase of the goods then leased) which was then included in the group VAT settlement, but which it should have offset against the VAT paid by the parent company on the rentals c) the payment of the hire was contractually delayed between the parties in such a way as not to permit the aforesaid set-off; d) in this context, in which the payment of the hire was contractually delayed, the free loan granted by the parent company was the true consideration for the hire transaction, with the subsidiary’s obligation to pay the VAT relating to the transactions already in 2004.
Judgment of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court upheld the decision in regards of the assessment but remanded the the question of penalties to the court of first instance.
Excerpts
“17.4. The reconstruction of the case by the CTR is immune from the criticisms addressed to it both in terms of infringement of the law (fifth ground of appeal) and in terms of contradictory reasoning (ninth ground of appeal); with the result that the aforesaid grounds must be rejected (if not declared inadmissible).
17.4.1. The reasoning of the CTR is in no way contradictory, in that: (a) it classifies the financing as consideration for the hire contract; (b) it holds that that consideration, if paid on time, would have given rise to a VAT liability of SI 2000 (c) maintains that the rental agreement between the parent company and the subsidiary provided for the deferment of payment of the consideration solely for the purposes of evasion (surreptitious deferment of the time of taxation under Article 6 of Presidential Decree No 633 of 1972); (d) asserts the existence of VAT evasion by the subsidiary.
17.4.2. This is an entirely straightforward factual finding, legitimately made on the basis of the allegations of the parties and not affected by SI 2000’s objections. Nor can the appellant, in the context of legitimacy, substitute its own different reconstruction of the facts for that made by the CTR, free from the contested logical defects.
17.4.3. In view of the CTR’s legitimate findings of fact, there is not even a violation of the law complained of, a violation that would only arise from the different classification of the parent company’s disbursements as gratuitous loans and the legitimacy of the deferment of the rental fee, as claimed by the appellant.
17.4.4. In other words, the alleged breach of law follows from the different reconstruction of the case made by SI 2000, so that the fifth plea is inadmissible rather than unfounded.
17.5. The assessment made by the Regional Tax Commission leads to the conclusion that we are not dealing with a case of avoidance or abuse of law, but only with an evasion of tax, resulting from the qualification of the inter partes transaction made by the Regional Tax Commission, a qualification that is not called into question by the appellant’s complaints.
17.6 The issue has already been addressed by the S.C. in a recent judgment (Cass. no. 27550 of 30/10/2018), for which “the non-payment of taxes in relation to a transaction qualified in a legally correct manner by the financial administration integrates a hypothesis of tax evasion and not of tax avoidance, which occurs when a negotiating instrument is used for the purpose of obtaining a tax advantage through a distorted use of tax legislation, so that the provisions of law and the principles developed by the case law, both domestic and EU, on the subject of abuse of law cannot be applied”.
17.6.1. It is worth retracing the reasoning of the aforementioned judgment.
17.6.2. ‘It is well known that “in tax matters, according to the Community and national case law, an abusive practice is an economic transaction which, through the “improper” and “distorted” use of the negotiating instrument, has as its predominant and absorbing (though not exclusive) purpose the avoidance of the tax rule, while the mere abstract configurability of a tax advantage is not sufficient to integrate the abusive case, since the concomitant condition of the non-existence of economic reasons other than the mere saving of tax and the ascertainment of the effective will of the contracting parties to obtain an undue tax advantage is required” (so Cass. No. 25758 of 05/12/2014; see, also, Cass. No. 19234 of 7 November 2012; Cass. No. 21782 of 20/10/2011; Cass. S.U. No. 30055 of 23 December 2008).
17.6.3. With specific reference to direct taxes, then, the prohibition of abuse of rights translates into a general anti-avoidance principle that is grounded, first of all, in the same constitutional principles that inform the Italian tax system (Cass. no. 3938 of 19/02/2014; Cass. no. 4604 of 26/02/2014) and, above all, in Art. 37 bis of Presidential Decree No. 600 of 29 September 1973 (Cass. No. 405 of 14/01/2015; Cass. No. 4561 of 06/03/2015), which allows the tax authorities to disallow and declare non-enforceable transactions and acts, in themselves devoid of valid economic reasons and directed to the sole purpose of obtaining tax benefits that are otherwise not due.”
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