Tag: Freedom of establishment
Netherlands, March 2024, European Court of Justice – AG Opinion, Case No C‑585/22
The Supreme Court in the Netherlands requested a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice to clarify its case-law on, inter alia, the freedom of establishment laid down in Article 49 TFEU, specifically whether it is compatible with that freedom for the tax authorities of a Member State to refuse to a company belonging to a cross-border group the right to deduct from its taxable profits the interest it pays on such a loan debt. The anti-avoidance rule in question is contained in Article 10a of the Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 1969. The rule is specifically designed to tackle tax avoidance practices related to intra-group acquisition loans. Under that legislation, the contracting of a loan debt by a taxable person with a related entity – for the purposes of acquiring or extending an interest in another entity – is, in certain circumstances, presumed to be an artificial arrangement, designed to erode the Netherlands tax base. Consequently, that person is precluded from deducting the interest on the debt from its taxable profits unless it can rebut that presumption. The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) asked the European Court of Justice to clarify its findings in its judgment in Lexel, on whether such intra-group loans may be, for that purpose, regarded as wholly artificial arrangements, even if carried out on an arm’s length basis, and the interest set at the usual market rate. “(1)      Are Articles 49 TFEU, 56 TFEU and/or 63 TFEU to be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the interest on a loan debt contracted with an entity related to the taxable person, being a debt connected with the acquisition or extension of an interest in an entity which, following that acquisition or extension, is a related entity, is not deductible when determining the profits of the taxable person because the debt concerned must be categorised as (part of) a wholly artificial arrangement, regardless of whether the debt concerned, viewed in isolation, was contracted at arm’s length? (2)      If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, must Articles 49 TFEU, 56 TFEU and/or 63 TFEU be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the deduction of  the interest on a loan debt contracted with an entity related to the taxable person and regarded as (part of) a wholly artificial arrangement, being a debt connected with the acquisition or extension of an interest in an entity which, following that acquisition or extension, is a related entity, is disallowed in full  when determining the profits of the taxable person, even where that interest in itself does not exceed the amount that would have been agreed upon between companies which are independent of one another? (3)      For the purpose of answering Questions 1 and/or 2, does it make any difference whether the relevant acquisition or extension of the interest relates (a) to an entity that was already an entity related to the taxable person prior to that acquisition or extension, or (b) to an entity that becomes an entity related to the taxpayer only after such acquisition or extension?” Opinion of the Advocate General The Advocate General found that the Dutch anti-avoidance rule in Article 10a was both justified, appropriate and necessary – and therefore not in conflict with Article 49 of the TFEU – irrespective of the Court’s earlier judgment in the Swedish Lexel Case. Excerpts “(…) 71. In my view, the approach suggested by the intervening governments and the Commission is the correct one. Consequently, I urge the Court to revisit the approach it took in the judgment in Lexel on the matter at issue. 72. Freedom of establishment, as guaranteed by Article 49 TFEU, offers quite a wide opportunity for tax ‘optimisation’. The Court has repeatedly held that European groups of companies can legitimately use that freedom to establish subsidiaries in Member States for the purpose of benefiting from a favourable tax regime. (30) Thus, as X submits, A could legitimately choose to establish the internal bank of its group, C, in Belgium for that very purpose. Similarly, C may well grant loans to other companies of the group established in other Member States, like X in the Netherlands. Cross-border intra-group loans are not, per se, objectionable. (31) Certainly, such a loan may entail a reduction of the corporate tax base of the borrowing company in the Member State where it is established. Indeed, by deducting the interest on that loan from its taxable profits, that company reduces its tax liability with respect to that Member State. In effect, some of the profits made by the borrowing company are shifted, in the form of interest charges, from the Member State where it is established to the Member State where the lender company has its seat. However, that is something that the Member States must, in principle, accept in an integrated, single market such as the internal market of the European Union. 73. Nevertheless, the Court recognised a clear limit in that regard. It is a general legal principle that EU law, including freedom of establishment, cannot be relied on for abusive ends. The concept of ‘wholly artificial arrangements’ must be read in that light. Pursuant to the settled case-law of the Court, it is abusive for economic operators established in different Member States to carry out ‘artificial transactions devoid of economic and commercial justification’ (or, stated differently, ‘which do not reflect economic reality’), thus fulfilling the conditions to benefit from a tax advantage only formally, ‘with the essential aim of benefiting from [that] advantage’.(32) 74. Furthermore, in its judgment in X (Controlled companies established in third countries), (33) the Court has specified, with respect to the free movement of capital guaranteed by Article 63 TFEU, that ‘the artificial creation of the conditions required in order to escape taxation in a Member State improperly or enjoy a tax advantage in that Member State improperly can take several forms as regards cross-border movements of capital’. In that context, it held that the concept of ‘wholly artificial arrangement’ is capable of covering ‘any ...
Sweden vs “A Loan AB”, January 2024, Supreme Administrative Court, Case No 4068-23
A AB is part of an international group. The group was planning a reorganisation involving a number of intra-group transactions. As part of this reorganisation, A AB would acquire all the shares in B from the group company C. The acquisition would mainly be financed by A AB taking a loan from group company D, which is domiciled in another EU country. The terms of the loan, including the interest rate, would be at market terms. A AB requested an advance ruling to know whether the deduction of the interest expenses on the debt to D could be denied on the grounds that the debt relationship had been incurred exclusively or almost exclusively for the purpose of obtaining a significant tax advantage or because the acquisition of B was not essentially commercially motivated. If the interest was subject to non-deductibility, A AB wanted to know whether this would constitute an unauthorised restriction of the freedom of establishment under the EC Treaty. The Board of Advance Tax Rulings concluded that deductions for interest expenses could not be denied. Not agreeing with this ruling the tax authority filed an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgment of the Court The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the Board of Advance Tax Rulings. Although the interest expenses were covered by the Acquisition Rule, it would be in breach of Article 49 TFEU (freedom of establishment) to deny the interest deductions. Excerpt “16. In the case HFD 2021 ref. 68, the Supreme Administrative Court found, with reference to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Lexel (C-484/19, EU:C:2021:34), that the provision in Chapter 24, Section 18, second paragraph, of the Tax Code constitutes a restriction of the freedom of establishment which cannot be justified if it is applied to interest payments to companies in other Member States in situations where the companies involved would have been subject to the provisions on group contributions if both companies had been Swedish (paragraph 37). 17. According to the second paragraph of Section 18, interest expenses may not be deducted if the debt relationship has arisen exclusively or almost exclusively in order to obtain a significant tax advantage for the community of interest. According to its wording, the provision makes no distinction between interest paid to Swedish and foreign recipients. The reason why the provision is nevertheless considered to constitute a restriction on the freedom of establishment is that, as stated in the preparatory works, it is not intended to cover interest payments between companies covered by the provisions on group contributions. Such an interest payment is not considered to give rise to any tax advantage since the same result can be achieved with group contributions (Proposition 2012/13:1, pp. 254 and 334, and HFD 2021 ref. 68, paragraph 29, with reference to Lexel, paragraphs 35-44). 18. The question is whether there is reason to assess the provision in Chapter 24, section 19, first paragraph, of the Tax Code differently. According to that provision, interest expenses relating to an intra-group loan to finance an intra-group acquisition of participatory rights are not deductible if the acquisition is not essentially motivated by commercial considerations. Nor does that provision, according to its wording, make any distinction between interest paid to Swedish and foreign recipients. 19. In the first paragraph of Section 19, the prohibition of deduction has not, as in the second paragraph of Section 18, been made dependent on the existence of a possible tax advantage, but on what the borrowed capital has been used for, namely an intra-group acquisition of shareholding rights which is not essentially commercially motivated. Although the provision does not expressly state anything about tax benefits, in the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court, it cannot be ignored that it is part of a system of rules whose overall purpose is to counteract tax planning with interest deductions. It is clear from the travaux préparatoires that the provision in Section 19, first paragraph also has this purpose (Government Bill 2017/18:245, pp. 193 and 366 et seq.). 20. It can thus be concluded from the travaux préparatoires that the provision in Section 19, first paragraph, is not intended to cover interest payments that do not entail any tax benefit, which is the case when the companies involved are covered by the provisions on group contributions. The refusal of a deduction for interest paid to companies in other Member States on the basis of the first paragraph of Section 19 may therefore, in the same way as when a deduction is refused on the basis of the second paragraph of Section 18, be regarded as entailing a difference in the treatment of domestic and cross-border situations which is, in principle, impermissible. 21. In HFD 2021 ref. 68, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the difference in treatment resulting from the provision in Chapter 24, Section 18, second paragraph, of the Income Tax Code cannot be justified by overriding reasons of public interest (paragraphs 30-36). As has been shown, the provisions in Section 18, second paragraph, and Section 19, first paragraph, have the same purpose, namely to counteract tax planning with interest deductions. Furthermore, both provisions cover transactions carried out under market conditions and are not limited to purely fictitious or artificial arrangements. The reasoning of the Court in the case is therefore equally relevant to the provision in Section 19(1). Thus, the difference in treatment resulting from that provision cannot be justified either. 22. It follows from the above that the provision in Chapter 24, Section 19, first paragraph, of the Tax Code also constitutes an unauthorised restriction of the freedom of establishment if it is applied to interest payments to companies in other Member States and the companies involved would have been subject to the provisions on group contributions if they had been Swedish. 23. It follows from the conditions submitted that A and D would have been subject to the provisions on group contributions if both companies had been Swedish. The ...
Sweden vs “A Share Loan AB”, December 2022, Supreme Administrative Court, Case No 3660-22
As a general rule interest expenses are deductible for the purposes of income taxation of a business activity. However, for companies in a group, e.g. companies in the same group, certain restrictions on the deductibility of interest can apply. In Sweden one of these limitations is that if the debt relates to the acquisition of a participation right from another enterprise in the partnership, the deduction can only be made if the acquisition is substantially justified by business considerations, cf. Chapter 24, Sections 16-20 of the Swedish Income Tax Act. A AB is part of the international X group, which is active in the manufacturing industry. A restructuring is planned within the group which will result in A becoming the group’s Swedish parent company. As part of the restructuring, A will acquire all the shares in B AB, which is currently the parent company of the Swedish part of the group, from group company C, which is resident in another EU country. Payment for the shares will be made partly by a contribution in kind equivalent to at least 75 % of the purchase price and partly by A issuing an interest-bearing promissory note on the remaining amount. A AB requested a preliminary ruling from the Tax Board on whether the rules limiting the right to deduct interest would result in interest expenses incurred as a result of the intra-group acquisition of the shares in B AB not being deductible. The Board found that the restructuring is justified for organisational reasons and that it follows from the preparatory works and previous practice that the acquisition is therefore not commercially justified within the meaning of the legislation in question. According to the Board, the application of Swedish domestic law therefore means that no deduction should be allowed. However, the Board found that it would be contrary to the freedom of establishment under the TFEU to deny A AB deduction for the interest expenses. An appeal was filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Administrative Court in which they requested that the preliminary ruling from the tax board be amended and answer the question by denying A AB a deduction for interest expenses. Judgement of the Court The Court upheld the decision of the Tax Board and allowed deductions for the interest expenses in question. Not for the Swedish rules being contrary to the freedom of establishment under the TFEU but by reason of the interest expenses being justified by business considerations. Excerpts â€15. The interest relates to a debt owed to C which is situated in another EU country. It is clear from the conditions provided that it is only C who is actually entitled to the interest income. Furthermore, the description of the circumstances of, and reasons for, the planned restructuring provided in the application do not constitute grounds for considering that the debt relationship must be created exclusively or almost exclusively in order for the community of interest to obtain a significant tax benefit. Deduction of the interest expenditure should therefore not be refused on the basis of Chapter 24, Section 18. 16. The question is then whether the deduction should be refused on the basis of Chapter 24, Section 19.†… â€26. In this case, a relatively long period of time has elapsed between the external acquisitions of the shares in Y Group’s Parent B – which were completed in 2015 – and the intragroup acquisition of the shares in that company that is now under consideration. However, the acquisition of B has been part of a larger process that has also involved the incorporation of Z Group and eventually W Group into X Group. As this is a process which is typically extensive and complex and which has resulted in the merger of several large manufacturing groups into one, the time lag should not lead to the conclusion that the intra-group acquisition is not substantially justified from a commercial point of view. Furthermore, it appears that the acquisition of the shares in B under consideration would not have taken place if the external acquisitions had not taken place. 27. Since the external acquisitions were made for commercial reasons and the acquisition under consideration in the context of the present restructuring is prompted by the external acquisitions, the acquisition can be considered to be substantially justified on commercial grounds. Accordingly, the deduction of interest expenses should not be denied under Chapter 24, Section 19. 28. The preliminary assessment is therefore confirmed.†Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...
Germany vs X GmbH & Co. KG, October 2022, European Court of Justice, Case No C-431/21
A Regional Tax Court in Germany had requested a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice on two questions related to German transfer pricing documentation requirements. whether the freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU) or the freedom to provide services (Article 56 TFEU) is to be interpreted in such a way that it precludes the obligation to provide transfer pricing documentation for transactions with a foreign related parties (Section 90 (3) AO) and whether the sanctions regulated in section 162(4) AO could be contrary to EU law The Regional Tax Court considered that these provisions establish special documentation requirements for taxpayers with transactions with foreign related parties. In the event of non-compliance with these documentation requirements, section 162(4) AO leads to a sanction in the form of a fine/surcharge. Neither was provided for taxpayers with transactions with domestic related parties. However, such discrimination can be justified by compelling reasons in the public interest. In this context, the Regional Tax Court considered the legitimate objective of preventing tax avoidance and the preservation of the balanced distribution of taxation powers between the Member States as possible grounds for justification. However, the Tax Court was not confident in regards to the level of sanctions – i.e. whether the fine/surcharges went beyond what was necessary to achieve the intended purpose. Judgement of the European Court of Justice The Court ruled that German transfer pricing documentation requirement and related sanctions was not in conflict with EU law. “Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude national legislation under which, in the first place, the taxpayer is subject to an obligation to provide documentation on the nature and content of, as well as on the economic and legal bases for, prices and other terms and conditions of his, her or its cross-border business transactions, with parties with which he, she or it has a relationship of interdependence, in capital or other aspects, enabling that taxpayer or those parties to exercise a definite influence over the other, and which provides, in the second place, in the event of infringement of that obligation, not only that his, her or its taxable income in the Member State concerned is rebuttably presumed to be higher than that which has been declared, and the tax authorities may carry out an estimate to the detriment of the taxpayer, but also that a surcharge of an amount equivalent to at least 5% and at most 10% of the excess income determined is imposed, with a minimum amount of EUR 5 000, unless non-compliance with that obligation is excusable or if the fault involved is minor.” ...
Belgium, December 2021, Constitutional Court, Case No 184/2021
By a notice of December 2020, the Court of Appeal of Brussels referred the following question for a preliminary ruling by the Constitutional Court : “ Does article 207, second paragraph, ITC (1992), as it applies, read together with article 79 ITC (1992), in the interpretation that it also applies to abnormal or gratuitous advantages obtained by a Belgian company from a foreign company, violate articles 10, 11 and 172 of the Constitution? “. The Belgian company “D.W.B.”, of which Y.S. and R.W. were the managers, was set up on 4 October 2006 by the Dutch company “W.”. On 25 October 2006, the latter also set up the Dutch company “D.W.” On 9 November 2006, bv “W.” sold its shareholdings in a number of subsidiaries of the D.W. group to its subsidiary nv ” D.W. “. It was agreed that 20 % of the selling price would be contributed by e.g. “W.” to the capital of the latter and that 80 % would be converted into a five-year interest-bearing loan between e.g. “W.” and “D.W.”. On 16 March 2007 the capital of “D.W.B.” was increased. This increase in capital was achieved by a contribution in kind by “W.”. of its claim against nv “D.W.” by virtue of the aforementioned loan. The contribution of the claim was partly booked in the account “Kapital” and partly on the account “Issuance premiums”, which were not available. On 17 March 2007, “W.” sold all its shares in ” D.W.B. ” to the “D.W.” On 31 August 2009, “D.W.B.” was put into liquidation and the liquidation was completed. Y.S. and R.W. were the liquidators. Pursuant to the loan agreement, the interest from “D.W.” to “D.W.B.” was not to be paid until 8 November 2011. In accordance with the accounting principle of accrual, according to which costs and revenues must be allocated to the period to which they relate, “D.W.B.” added the annual interest, due by the ” D.W. ” on 31 December 2007, 31 December 2008 and 31 August 2009, to its profit and loss account and to its amounts receivable after more than one year in its accounts on 31 December 2007, 31 December 2008 and 31 August 2009. It declared the amounts of interest in its returns for the assessment years 2008, 2009 and 2009 special, in which it then applied the deduction for risk capital (code 103). The tax administration rejected the aforementioned deductions for risk capital with application of Article 207(2) of the Income Tax Code 1992 (hereinafter: CIR 1992), as applicable for the assessment years 2008 and 2009. According to the administration, the capital on which “D.W.B.” wanted to make the deduction for risk capital comes from a transaction obtained under abnormal circumstances and which is not justified by economic objectives, but only by tax objectives. A tax increase of 10 pct. was applied. Y.S. and R.W. lodged an administrative appeal against that decision, but it was rejected by the regional director. Thereupon, Y.S. and R.W. filed a claim with the Dutch-speaking Court of First Instance in Brussels. By judgment of 18 November 2014, the Court dismissed the claim as unfounded. Y.S. and R.W. subsequently lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal of Brussels. The court ruled that the interest on the intra-group loan was at arm’s length and that the contribution in kind to “D.W.B.” constituted a transaction with an actual quid pro quo, but that it was acquired in the context of transactions which cannot be explained by reference to economic objectives, but only by reference to the fiscal purpose of the deduction for risk capital. However, Y.S. and R.W. argue that the application of Article 207(2) (now Article 207(7)) of the CIR 1992 to the benefits obtained from a foreign company is contrary to the constitutional principle of equality. The Court of Appeal of Brussels therefore decided to raise of its own motion the above question. Judgement of the Constitutional Court The Constitutionals Court’s answer to the question is that “Article 207 of the Income Tax Code 1992, read in conjunction with Article 79 of that Code, as applicable for the assessment years 2008 and 2009, does not violate Articles 10, 11 and 172 of the Constitution.” Click Here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...
Romania vs Impresa Pizzarotti & C SPA Italia, October 2020, ECJ Case C-558/19
A Regional Court of Romania requested a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice in the Case of Impresa Pizzarotti. Impresa Pizzarotti is the Romanian branch of SC Impresa Pizzarotti & C SPA Italia (‘Pizzarotti Italia’), established in Italy. In 2017, the Romanian tax authorities conducted an audit of an branch of Impresa Pizzarotti. The audit revealed that the branch had concluded, as lender, two loan agreements with its parent company, Pizzarotti Italia: one dated 6 February 2012 for EUR 11 400 000 and another dated 9 March 2012 for EUR 2 300 000. Those sums had been borrowed for an initial period of one year, which could be extended by way of addendum, that the loan agreements did not contain any clause concerning the charging of interest by Impresa Pizzarotti, and that although the outstanding amount as of 1 January 2013 was EUR 11 250 000, both loans had been repaid in full by 9 April 2014. Transactions between Romanian persons and non-resident related persons are subject to the rules on transfer pricing. The concept of ‘Romanian persons’ covers a branch which is the permanent establishment of a non-resident person The tax authorities held that the local branch of Impresa Pizzarotti, was to be treated as a person related to Pizzarotti Italia and that the interest rate on those loans should have been set at market price, in accordance with the rules on transfer pricing. Consequently, a tax assessment was issued based on the tax audit report of the same date imposing on Impresa Pizzarotti a tax increase of 297 141.92 Romanian lei (RON) (approximately EUR 72 400) and an additional taxable amount of RON 1 857 137 (approximately EUR 452 595). Impresa Pizzarotti subsequently brought the case before the Romanian national court, the Tribunalul Cluj (Regional Court, Cluj, Romania), seeking annulment of the tax assessment. Impresa Pizzarotti held that the national provisions relied on by the tax office infringe Articles 49 and 63 TFEU, in so far as they provide that transfers of money between a branch established in one Member State and its parent company established in another Member State constitute transactions which may be subject to the rules on transfer pricing, whereas those rules do not apply where the branch and its parent company are established in the territory of the same Member State. The Romanian Court decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: “>‘Do Articles 49 and 63 [TFEU] preclude national legislation such as [Articles 11(2) and 29(3) of the Tax Code], which provides that a transfer of money from a company branch resident in one Member State to the parent company resident in another Member State may be reclassified as a revenue-generating transaction, with the consequent obligation to apply the rules on transfer pricing, whereas, if the same transaction had been effected between a company branch and a parent company, both of which were resident in the same Member State, that transaction could not have been reclassified in the same way and the rules on transfer pricing would not have been applied?’ Judgement of the Court The Court concluded that Romanian transfer pricing regulations were not in breach with the EU Fredoms of Establishment, cf. Article 49 TFEU. “By taxing the permanent establishment on the basis of the presumed amount of the remuneration for the advantage granted gratuitously to the parent company, in order to take account of the amount which that permanent establishment would have had to declare in respect of its profits if the transaction had been concluded in accordance with market conditions, the legislation at issue in the main proceedings thus allows Romania to exercise its power to tax in relation to activities carried out in its territory.” “…national legislation…, which seeks to prevent profits generated in the Member State concerned from being transferred outside the tax jurisdiction of that Member State via transactions that are not in accordance with market conditions, without being taxed, is appropriate for ensuring the preservation of the allocation of the power to tax between Member States.” “…national legislation which provides for a consideration of objective and verifiable elements in order to determine whether a transaction represents an artificial arrangement, entered into for tax reasons, is to be regarded as not going beyond what is necessary to attain the objectives relating to the need to maintain the balanced allocation of the power to tax between Member States and to prevent tax avoidance where, first, on each occasion on which there is a suspicion that a transaction goes beyond what the companies concerned would have agreed under fully competitive conditions, the taxpayer is given an opportunity, without being subject to undue administrative constraints, to provide evidence of any commercial justification that there may have been for that transaction…” “…, it appears that the Romanian legislation at issue in the main proceedings does not go beyond what is necessary to attain the legitimate objective underlying that legislation.” “…, the answer to the question referred is that Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding, in principle, legislation of a Member State under which a transfer of money from a resident branch to its parent company established in another Member State may be reclassified as a ‘revenue-generating transaction’, with the consequent obligation to apply the rules on transfer pricing, whereas, if the same transaction had been effected between a company branch and a parent company, both of which were established in the same Member State, that transaction would not have been classified in the same way and the rules on transfer pricing would not have been applied.” Article 49 TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding, in principle, legislation of a Member State under which a transfer of money from a resident branch to its parent company established in another Member State may be reclassified as a ‘revenue-generating transaction’, with the consequent obligation to apply the rules on transfer pricing, whereas, if the same transaction had been effected between a company branch and a parent company, both of which were established ...
Netherlands vs Hunkemöller B.V., January 2020, AG opinion – before the Supreme Court, Case No ECLI:NL:PHR:2020:102
To acquire companies and resell them with capital gains a French Investment Fund distributed the capital of its investors (€ 5.4 billion in equity) between a French Fund Commun de Placement à Risques (FCPRs) and British Ltds managed by the French Investment Fund. For the purpose of acquiring the [X] group (the target), the French Investment Fund set up three legal entities in the Netherlands, [Y] UA, [B] BV, and [C] BV (the acquisition holding company). These three joint taxed entities are shown as Fiscal unit [A] below. The capital to be used for the acquisition of [X] group was divided into four FCPRs that held 30%, 30%, 30% and 10% in [Y] respectively. To get the full amount needed for the acquisition, [Y] members provided from their equity to [Y]: (i) member capital (€ 74.69 million by the FCPRs, € 1.96 million by the Fund Management, € 1.38 million by [D]) and (ii) investment in convertible instruments (hybrid loan at 13% per annum that is not paid, but added interest-bearing: € 60.4 million from the FCPRs and € 1.1 million from [D]). Within Fiscal unit [A], all amounts were paid in [B], which provided the acquisition holding company [C] with € 72.64 million as capital and € 62.36 million as loan. [C] also took out loans from third parties: (i) a senior facility of € 113.75 million from a bank syndicate and (ii) a mezzanine facility of € 35 million in total from [D] and [E]. On November 22, 2010, the French [F] Sà rl controlled by the French Investment Fund agreed on the acquisition with the owners of the target. “Before closing”, [F] transferred its rights and obligations under this agreement to [C], which purchased the target shares on January 21, 2011 for € 265 million, which were delivered and paid on January 31, 2011. As a result, the target was removed from the fiscal unit of the sellers [G] as of 31 January 2011 and was immediately included in the fiscal unit [A]. [C] on that day granted a loan of € 25 million at 9% to its German subsidiary [I] GmbH. Prior to the transaction the sellers and the target company had agreed that upon sale certain employees of the target would receive a bonus. The dispute is (i) whether the convertibles are a sham loan; (ii) if not, whether they actually function as equity under art. 10 (1) (d) Wet Vpb; (iii) if not, whether their interest charges are partly or fully deductible business expenses; (iv) if not, or art. 10a Wet Vpb stands in the way of deduction, and (v) if not, whether fraus legis stands in the way of interest deduction. Also in dispute is (vi) whether tax on the interest received on the loan to [I] GmbH violates EU freedom of establishment and (viii) whether the bonuses are deducted from the interested party or from [G]. Amsterdam Court of Appeal: The Court ruled that (i) it is a civil law loan that (ii) is not a participant loan and (iii) is not inconsistent or carries an arm’s length interest and that (iv) art. 10a Wet Vpb does not prevent interest deduction because the commitment requirement of paragraph 4 is not met, but (v) that the financing structure is set up in fraud legislation, which prevents interest deduction. The Court derived the motive from the artificiality and commercial futility of the financing scheme and the struggle with the aim and intent of the law from the (i) the norm of art. 10a Corporate Income Tax Act by avoiding its criteria artificially and (ii) the norm that an (interest) charge must have a non-fiscal cause in order to be recognized as a business expense for tax purposes. Re (vi), the Court holds that the difference in treatment between interest on a loan to a joined tax domestic subsidiary and interest on a loan to an non-joined tax German subsidiary is part of fiscal consolidation and therefore does not infringe the freedom of establishment. Contrary to the Rechtbank, the Court ruled ad (viii) that on the basis of the total profit concept, at least the realization principle, the bonuses are not borne by the interested party but by the sellers. Excerpts regarding the arm’s length principle “In principle, the assessment of transfer prices as agreed upon between affiliated parties will be based on the allocation of functions and risks as chosen by the parties. Any price adjustment by the Tax and Customs Administration will therefore be based on this allocation of functions and risks. In this respect it is not important whether comparable contracts would have been agreed between independent parties. For example, if a group decides to transfer the intangible assets to one group entity, it will not be objected that such a transaction would never have been agreed between independent third parties. However, it may happen that the contractual terms do not reflect economic reality. If this is the case, the economic reality will be taken into account, not the contractual stipulation. In addition, some risks cannot be separated from certain functions. After all, in independent relationships, a party will only be willing to take on a certain risk if it can manage and bear that risk.” “The arm’s-length principle implies that the conditions applicable to transactions between related parties are compared with the conditions agreed upon in similar situations between independent third parties. In very rare cases, similar situations between independent parties will result in a specific price. In the majority of cases, however, similar situations between independent third parties may result in a price within certain ranges. The final price agreed will depend on the circumstances, such as the bargaining power of each of the parties involved. It follows from the application of the arm’s-length principle that any price within those ranges will be considered an acceptable transfer price. Only if the price moves outside these margins, is there no longer talk of an arm’s-length price since a third party acting in ...
Netherlands vs “X S.Ã .r.l./B.V. “, January 2020, Supreme Court, Case No 18/00219 (ECLI:NL:HR:2020:21)
X S.Ã .r.l./B.V. filed corporate income tax returns for the year 2012 as a foreign taxpayer, declaring a taxable profit and a taxable amount of nil. No dividend distribution had been declared for income tax purposes Following an audit, the tax authorities included the dividend distribution in the taxable income and tax was levied on the dividend distribution at a rate of 2.5 per cent. In dispute before the Supreme Court was whether the dividend distribution was taxable to the X S.Ã .r.l./B.V. under Section 17(3) opening words and (b) of the Act. The dispute centred on the questions (i) whether X S.Ã .r.l./B.V. held the substantial interest in Holding with the main purpose or as one of the main purposes to avoid the levying of income tax or dividend tax on the DGA, and (ii) whether this substantial interest was not part of the business assets of X S.Ã .r.l./B.V.. Depending on the answers to those questions, the dispute was whether levying corporate income tax on the dividend distribution (a) was prevented by the operation of Directive 2011/96/EU (hereinafter: the Parent-Subsidiary Directive), or (b) was contrary to the freedom of establishment provided for in Article 49 TFEU. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Excerpt “When examining whether an arrangement is abusive, it is not sufficient to apply predetermined general criteria. In each specific case, the arrangement in question must be examined as a whole. Automatic application of an anti-abuse measure of general scope without the inspector being required to produce even the slightest evidence or indications of abuse goes beyond what is necessary to prevent abuse (see Eqiom and Enka, paragraph 32). If it is sufficient for the inspector to produce such initial evidence or indications, the taxpayer must be given the opportunity to produce evidence showing the existence of economic reasons for the arrangement (cf. ECJ 20 December 2017, Deister Holding AG and Juhler Holding A/S, joined cases C 504/16 and C 613/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:1009, para 70). 2.6.6. In applying the scheme, the starting point for the allocation of the burden of proof is that the inspector states the facts and circumstances from which it follows that the subjective condition has been fulfilled, and, in the event of reasoned challenge, makes them plausible (cf. Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 33 003, no. 10, p. 94). This principle is in line with Union law (cf. T Danmark judgment, paragraph 117). 2.6.7. When applying Union law, the fulfilment of the subjective condition merely provides a presumption of proof that abuse has occurred. This is confirmed by the T Danmark judgment, paragraph 101. If such a presumption of abuse exists, the taxpayer must be given the opportunity to rebut that presumption. The taxpayer may overcome this presumption by establishing, and if necessary demonstrating, facts indicating that the holding of the substantial interest does not constitute a wholly artificial arrangement unrelated to economic reality. A group of companies may be regarded as a wholly artificial arrangement if, in a group structure involving (a) non-EU resident, underlying shareholder(s) and a company resident in the Netherlands, a body resident within the Union has been interposed in order to avoid the levying of Dutch income or dividend tax, without this EU body or the body’s establishment in the EU Member State having any real significance (cf. Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 33 003, no. 3, pp. 105 and 106, and T Danmark judgment, paragraph 100). 2.6.8. The Court did not disregard the foregoing in 2.6.2 to 2.6.7 above. The judgments challenged by ground I do not show an error of law and, as interwoven with valuations of a factual nature, cannot otherwise be examined for correctness by the Supreme Court in the cassation proceedings. Nor are those judgments incomprehensible. For this reason plea I also fails.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...
Denmark vs Bevola, June 2018, European Court of Justice, Case No C-650/16
The Danish company Bevola had a PE in Finland. The PE incurred a loss when it was closed in 2009 that could not be utilized in Finland. Instead, Bevola claimed a tax deduction in its Danish tax return for 2009 for the loss suffered in Finland. A deduction of the loss was disallowed by the tax authorities because section 8(2) of the Danish Corporate Tax Act stipulates that the taxable income does not include profits and losses of foreign PEs (territoriality principle). Bevola would only be entitled to claim a tax deduction for the Finnish loss in the Danish tax return by making an election of international joint taxation under section 31 A. However, such an election means that all foreign entities must be included in the Danish tax return and the election is binding for a period of 10 years. The decision of the tax authorities was confirmed by the National Tax Tribunal on 20 January 2014. The taxpayer filed an appeal with the Eastern High Court claiming that section 8(2) was incompatible with the EU principle of freedom of establishment, because Bevola would have been entitled to claim a tax deduction if the loss had been suffered by a domestic Danish PE. A reference was made to the ECJ decision in case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer. The High Court asked the European Court of Justice if Article 49 TFEU preclude a national taxation scheme such as that at issue in the main proceedings under which it is possible to make deductions for losses in domestic branches, while it is not possible to make deductions for losses in branches situated in other Member States, including in circumstances corresponding to those in the Court’s judgment [of 13 December 2005] in Marks & Spencer, C 446/03, EU:C:2005:763, paragraphs 55 and 56, unless the group has opted for international joint taxation on the terms as set out in the main proceedings? The Court held that section 8(2) causes losses of foreign PEs to be treated less favorable compared to losses of domestic PEs. The fact that a taxpayer could opt for international joint taxation did not make a difference because this scheme was subject to two strict conditions. Comparability of the situations should be evaluated based on the purpose of the relevant legislation. The purpose of the Danish law was to prevent double taxation of profits and double deduction of losses. With regard to losses suffered by a PE in another Member State which has ceased activity and whose losses cannot be deducted in that Member State, the situation of a company having such a PE was held not to be different from that of a company with a domestic PE, from the point of view of the objective of preventing the double deduction of losses. The Court added that the aim of section 8(2) more generally is to ensure that the taxation of a company with such a PE is in line with its ability to pay tax. Yet the ability to pay tax of a company with a foreign PE which has definitively incurred losses is affected in the same way as that of a company whose domestic PE has incurred losses. On this basis, the Court concluded that the difference in treatment concerned situations that were objectively comparable. According to the Court, section 8(2) could be justified by overriding reasons in the public interest relating to the balanced allocation of powers of taxation between Member States, the coherence of the Danish tax system, and the need to prevent the risk of double deduction of losses ...
Germany vs Hornbach-Baumarkt, May 2018, European Court of Justice, C-382/16
In the Hornbach-Baumarkt case, a German parent company guaranteed loans of two related companies for no remuneration. The German tax authorities made an assessment of the amount of income allocated to the parent company as a result of the guarantee, based on the fact that unrelated third parties, under the same or similar circumstances, would have agreed on a remuneration for the guarantees. Hornbach-Baumarkt argued that German legislation was in conflict with the EU freedom of establishment and lead to an unequal treatment of domestic and foreign transactions since, in a case involving german domestic transactions, no corrections to the income would have been made for guarantees granted to subsidiaries. The company further argued that the legislation is disproportionate to achieving the objectives as it provides no opportunity for the company to present commercial justification for the non-arm’s-length transaction. The German Court requested a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice on these arguments. In May 2018 The European Court of Justice concluded that German transfer pricing legislation is consistent with EU freedom of establishment. Moreover, the Court ruled, that a parent company’s position as a shareholder of a non-resident company may be taken into account in determining whether there is sufficient commercial justification for a non-arm’s length related-party transaction. The Court further stated that transfer pricing legislation inherently constitutes a restriction to the freedom of establishment. However, this restriction can be justified by the need to preserve a balanced allocation of taxing rights between the Member States. The goal of the transfer pricing legislation is to prevent profit shifting via transactions that are not in accordance with market conditions. German legislation does not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objectives relating to the need to maintain the balanced allocation of the power to tax between the Member States and to prevent tax avoidance, without being subject to undue administrative constraints, to provide evidence of any commercial justification that there may have been for that transaction. The Court concluded that the income adjustment made by the German tax authorities was limited to the portion of the income which exceeded what would have been agreed between unrelated companies. The concept of Commercial justification may include economic reasons resulting from the very existence of a relationship of interdependence between the parent company resident in the Member State concerned and its subsidiaries which are resident in another Member State. A parent company has sufficient commercial reason to provide capital on non-arm’s-length terms to a subsidiary when a subsidiary lacks sufficient equity capital to expand. Therefore, the Court stated that comfort letters containing a guarantee free of any remuneration might be commercially justified because the parent company is a shareholder of the foreign group companies, which would justify the transaction at issue under non-arm’s-length terms. The opinion of the Advocate General was issued December 2017. European Court of Justice Judgment in Hornbach-Baumarkt case, Case No C-382/16 ...
Spain vs. Schwepps (Citresa), February 2017, Spanish Supreme Court, case nr. 293/2017
The Spanish Tax administration made an income adjustment of Citresa (a Spanish subsidiary of the Schweeps Group) Corporate Income Tax for FY 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, resulting in a tax liability of €38.6 millon. Citresa entered into a franchise agreement and a contract manufacturing agreement with Schweppes International Limited (a related party resident in the Netherlands). The transactions between the related parties were not found to be in accordance with the arm’s length principle. In the parent company, CITRESA, the taxable income declared for the years 2003 to 2005 was increased as a result of an adjustment of market prices relating to the supply of certain fruit and other components by Citresa to Schweppes International Limited. In the subsidiary, SCHWEPPES, S.A. (SSA), the taxable income declared for the years 2003 to 2006 was increased as a result of adjustment of market prices relating to the supply of concentrates and extracts by the entity Schweppes International Limited, resident in Holland, to SSA. The taxpayer had used the CUP method to verify the arm’s length nature of the transaction while the Spanish Tax administration – due to lack of comparable transactions – found it more appropriate to use the transactional net margin method (TNMM). Prior to 1 December 2006, the Spanish Corporate Income Tax Act (CIT) established three methods of pricing related transactions (the “Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method”, the “Cost Plus Method” and the “Resale Price Method”) and if none were applicable it established the application of the “Transactional Profit Split Method”. Thus, the “Transactional Net Margin Method” was not included at the time the market value of related transactions was established. However, as the Tax Treaty between Spain and the Netherlands was applicable, the Spanish Tax Authorities considered that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines could be directly applicable. Consequently, as the “Transactional Net Margin Method” was envisaged in the above-mentioned Guidelines, the Spanish Tax Authorities understood that this method could be used as a valid pricing method. The case ended up in Court where Citresa argued that the assessment was in breach of EU rules on freedom of establishment and that the TNM method had been applied by the authorities without any legal basis in Spain for the years in question. Judgement of the Court In regards to the claimed violation of the principle of freedom of establishment cf. TFEU article 49, the Court stated: “….the mere purposes of argument, that there can be no doubt as to the conformity with European Union Law of the regime of related-party transactions in Spain, in the terms in which this infringement is proposed to us, which is what is strictly speaking being postulated in cassation for the first time, it being sufficient to support this assertion to record some elementary considerations, such as that the censure is projected indiscriminately on the whole of the law (that is to say, on the legal regime of related-party transactions), which is to say, on the legal regime of related-party transactions, on the legal regime of related-party transactions regulated by Article 16 of Law 43/1995, of 27 December 1995, on Corporate Income Tax, and then Article 16 of Royal Legislative Decree 4/2004, of 5 March 2004, which approves the revised text of the Law on Corporate Income Tax – TRLIS), while, at the same time and in open contradiction, it advocates the application of the precept to resolve the case, thus starting from its compliance with European Union Law.” In regards to application of the transactional net margin method, the Court stated: “…tax years cover the period from January 2003 to February 2006. Article 16.3 of Law 43/1995, in the wording applicable to the case, and the same provision of the TRLIS, in its original version, established the following: “In order to determine the normal market value, the tax authorities shall apply the following methods: Market price of the good or service in question or of others of similar characteristics, making, in this case, the necessary corrections to obtain equivalence, as well as to consider the particularities of the transaction. The following shall be applicable on a supplementary basis: The sale price of goods and services calculated by increasing the acquisition value or production cost of the goods and services by the margin normally obtained by the taxable person in comparable transactions entered into with independent persons or entities or by the margin normally obtained by companies operating in the same sector in comparable transactions entered into with independent persons or entities. Resale price of goods and services established by the purchaser, reduced by the margin normally obtained by the aforementioned purchaser in comparable transactions arranged with independent persons or entities or by the margin normally obtained by companies operating in the same sector in comparable transactions arranged with independent persons or entities, considering, where applicable, the costs incurred by the aforementioned purchaser in order to transform the aforementioned goods and services. Where none of the above methods are applicable, the price derived from the distribution of the joint result of the transaction in question shall be applied, taking into account the risks assumed, the assets involved and the functions performed by the related parties”. This hierarchical list exhausts the possible methods available to the administration for establishing the market value of the transactions to which it has been applied. It consists of four methods: one of them, which we can call direct or primary, that of the market price of the good or service in question (art. 16.3.a) LIS); two others that the law itself declares to be supplementary, that of the increase in acquisition value and that of the resale price (art. 16.3.b) of the legal text itself); and finally, as a residual or supplementary second degree method, that of the distribution of the joint result of the operation in question (art. 16.3.c) LIS). These obviously do not include the valuation method used by the tax inspectorate in this case, that of the net margin of all transactions, introduced ex novo by Law 36/2006, of 29 November, on measures for the ...
UK vs Cadbury- Schweppes, September 2006, European Court of Justice, Case C-196/04
The legislation on ‘controlled foreign companies’ in force in the United Kingdom provided for the inclusion, under certain conditions, of the profits of subsidiaries established outside the United Kingdom in which a resident company has a controlling holding. The UK tax authorities thus claimed from the parent company of the Cadbury Schweppes group, established in the United Kingdom, tax on the profits made by one of the subsidiaries of the group established in Ireland, where the tax rate was lower. The Court was asked to consider whether this legislation was compatible with the provisions of the Treaty on freedom of establishment (Articles 43 and 48 EC). The Court recalled that companies or persons could not improperly or fraudulently take advantage of provisions of Community law. However, the fact that a company has been established in a Member State for the purpose of benefiting from more favourable tax legislation does not in itself suffice to constitute abuse of the freedom of establishment and does not deprive Cadbury Schweppes of the right to rely on Community law. The Court then analysed the legislation in terms of freedom of establishment. According to settled case-law, although direct taxation falls within the competence of the Member States, they must none the less exercise that competence consistently with Community law. The Court noticed the difference in the treatment of resident companies depending on whether the CFC legislation was or was not applicable: in the first instance the company is taxed on the profits of another legal person, whereas this is not the case in the latter instance (that is, when a resident company has a subsidiary taxed in the United Kingdom or a subsidiary established in another Member State where the tax rate is higher than in the United Kingdom). The Court noted that the separate tax treatment is such as to hinder the exercise of freedom of establishment, dissuading a resident company from establishing, acquiring or maintaining a subsidiary in a Member State with a lower tax rate. The Court pointed out that a national measure restricting freedom of establishment may be justified only where it specifically relates to wholly artificial arrangements aimed at circumventing the application of the legislation of the Member State concerned and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that purpose. In order to find that there is such an arrangement there must be, in addition to a subjective element, objective and ascertainable evidence – with regard, in particular, to the extent to which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment – that the incorporation of this subsidiary does not reflect economic reality, that is to say it is not an actual establishment intended to carry on genuine economic activities in the host Member State. The tests conducted under the national legislation must incorporate these factors if they are to be compatible with Community law. The Substance Test 67 As suggested by the United Kingdom Government and the Commission at the hearing, that finding must be based on objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties with regard, in particular, to the extent to which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment. 68 If checking those factors leads to the finding that the CFC is a fictitious establishment not carrying out any genuine economic activity in the territory of the host Member State, the creation of that CFC must be regarded as having the characteristics of a wholly artificial arrangement. That could be so in particular in the case of a ‘letterbox’ or ‘front’ subsidiary (see Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC [2006] £CR 1-3813, paragraphs 34 and 35). 69 On the other hand, as pointed out by the Advocate General in point 103 of his Opinion, the fact that the activities which correspond to the profits of the CFC could just as well have been carried out by a company established in the territory of the Member State in which the resident company is established does not warrant the conclusion that there is a wholly artificial arrangement ...
France vs Sodirep Textiles SA-NV , November 2015, Conseil d’État, Case No 370974 (ECLI:FR:CESSR:2015:370974.20151109)
In this decision, the Conseil d’État confirms that Article 57 of the General Tax Code is applicable to any company taxable in France, including a French branch of a foreign company. Under Article 57, where the tax authorities establish the existence of a relationship of dependence and a practice falling within its scope, the presumption of an indirect transfer of profits can only be effectively rebutted by the company liable to tax in France if it proves that the advantages granted by it were justified by the receipt of a benefit. Excerpts “….4. Considering, firstly, that if the applicant company mentions supplier debts of its branch towards the head office, such debts, in normal relations between independent companies, do not generate interest, so that this circumstance has no bearing on the absence of interest stipulations on the advances granted to the head office; 5. Considering, secondly, that under the first paragraph of Article 57 of the General Tax Code, applicable to corporation tax by virtue of Article 209 of the same code: “For the purposes of determining the income tax due by companies which are dependent on or which have control over companies located outside France, the profits indirectly transferred to the latter, either by way of an increase or decrease in purchase or sale prices, or by any other means, are incorporated into the results shown in the accounts (…)”; that these provisions institute the principle of the taxable income of companies located outside France. )”; that these provisions establish, as soon as the administration establishes the existence of a link of dependence and a practice falling within their provisions, a presumption of indirect transfer of profits which can only be usefully combated by the company liable to tax in France if it provides proof that the advantages it has granted were justified by the obtaining of compensation; that, on the one hand, these provisions are applicable to any company taxable in France, including a French branch of a company whose registered office is abroad, without the circumstance that the branch does not have legal personality being an obstacle to this; that, on the other hand, the advantages granted by a company taxable in France to a company located outside France in the form of interest-free loans constitute one of the means of indirect transfer of profits abroad; The tax authorities may therefore reinstate in the results of a permanent establishment, taxable in France, the interest which was not invoiced because of the recording of advances granted to the head office located outside France, provided that these advances do not correspond to after-tax profits and that the company does not establish the existence of counterparts for the development of the activity of the French branch; 6. Considering that, in its accounting records drawn up for the purposes of its taxation in France, the permanent establishment of Sodirep Textiles SA-NV recorded advances of funds granted to the Belgian headquarters of this company; that it follows from the above that, in the circumstances of the case, the administration is justified in reintegrating, in the taxable results in France of this permanent establishment, the interest which should have remunerated the advances of funds thus granted, insofar as the absence of invoicing of this interest constitutes an indirect transfer of profits within the meaning of Article 57 of the general tax code, in the absence of proof provided by the applicant company that the advantages in question had at least equivalent counterparts for its branch; 7. Considering, thirdly, that Article 5(4) of the Franco-Belgian Tax Convention of 10 March 1964 stipulates, in the version applicable to the facts of the case: “Where an enterprise carried on by a resident of one of the two Contracting States is dependent on or has control over an enterprise carried on by a resident of the other Contracting State, (…) and where one of these enterprises is dependent on or has control over the other enterprise, (…) and where the other enterprise is dependent on or has control over the other enterprise, (…) and where the other enterprise is dependent on or has control over the other enterprise, (…) ) and one of those enterprises grants or imposes conditions to the other enterprise which differ from those which would normally be accorded to effectively independent enterprises, any profits which would normally have accrued to one of those enterprises but which have thereby been transferred, directly or indirectly, to the other enterprise may be included in the taxable profits of the first enterprise. In that event, double taxation of the profits so transferred shall be avoided in accordance with the spirit of the Convention and the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall agree, if necessary, on the amount of the profits transferred. ” ; 8. Considering that the permanent establishment operated in France by the company Sodirep Textiles SA-NV is, as has been said, a branch without legal personality under the control of this Belgian company; that in the light of the above-mentioned provisions, the profits transferred by the branch to the Belgian company may be taxed in France if the branch has granted the head office interest-free cash advances under conditions different from those which would normally be made to genuinely independent enterprises; that there is no need, in order to interpret these provisions, to refer to the comments formulated by the Tax Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on Article 7 of the model convention drawn up by this organisation, since these comments were made after the adoption of the provisions in question;…” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...
Belgium vs Lammers & Van Cleeff, January 2008, European Court of Justice, Case No. C-105/07
The question in this case, was whether EU community law precluded Belgien statutory rules under which interest payments were reclassified as dividends, and thus taxable, if made to a foreign shareholder company. A Belgian subsidiary was established and the two shareholders of the Belgian subsidiary and the parent company, established in the Netherlands, were appointed as directors. The subsidiary paid interest to the parent which was considered by the Belgian tax authorities in part to be dividends and was assessed as such. The European Court of Justice was asked to rule on the compatibility of these Belgien statutory rules with EU Community law The Court ruled that art. 43 and 48 EC precluded national legislation under which interest payments made by a company resident in a member state to a director which was a company established in another member state were reclassified as taxable dividends, where, at the beginning of the taxable period, the total of the interest-bearing loans was higher than the paid-up capital plus taxed reserves, whereas, in the same circumstances, interest payments made to a director which was a company established in the same member state were not reclassified and so were not taxable. National legislation introduced, as regards the taxation of interest paid by a resident company in respect of a claim to a director which was a company, a difference in treatment according to whether or not the latter company had its seat in Belgium. Companies managed by a director which was a non resident company were subject to tax treatment which was less advantageous than that accorded to companies managed by a director which was a resident company. Similarly, in relation to groups of companies within which a parent company took on management tasks in one of its subsidiaries, such legislation introduced a difference in treatment between resident subsidiaries according to whether or not their parent company had its seat in Belgium, thereby making subsidiaries of a non resident parent company subject to treatment which was less favourable than that accorded to the subsidiaries of a resident parent company. A difference in treatment between resident companies according to the place of establishment of the company which, as director, had granted them a loan constituted an obstacle to the freedom of establishment if it made it less attractive for companies established in other member states to exercise that freedom and they might, in consequence, refrain from managing a company in the member state which enacted that measure, or even refrain from acquiring, creating or maintaining a subsidiary in that member state. The difference in treatment amounted to a restriction on freedom of establishment which was prohibited, in principle, by art. 43 and 48 EC. Such a restriction was permissible only if it pursued a legitimate objective which was compatible with the Treaty and was justified by overriding reasons of public interest. It was further necessary, in such a case, that its application was appropriate to ensuring the attainment of the objective thus pursued and did not go beyond what was necessary to attain it. “In order for a restriction on the freedom of establishment to be justified on the ground of prevention of abusive practices, the specific objective of such a restriction must be to prevent conduct involving the creation of wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national territory (Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation, paragraph 74 and the case‑law cited” Even if the Belgian application of such a statutory limit sought to combat abusive practices, it went beyond what was necessary to attain that objective ...
Netherlands vs Bosal Holding BV, September 2003, European Court, Case no C-168/01
Bosal is a company which carries on holding, financing and licensing/royalty related activities and which, as a taxpayer, is subject to corporation tax in the Netherlands. For the 1993 financial year, it declared costs amounting to NLG 3 969 339 in relation to the financing of its holdings in companies established in nine other Member States. In an annex to its declaration concerning that financial year, Bosal claimed that those costs should be deducted from its own profits. The inspector refused to allow the deduction sought, and the Gerechtshof te Arnhem (Netherlands), before which Bosal brought an action against the dismissal of its claim, confirmed the inspector’s position. It is in those circumstances that Bosal appealed on a point of law to the referring court. Taking the view that an interpretation of Community law was necessary in order to resolve the dispute before it, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: 1. Does Article 52 of the EC Treaty, read in conjunction with Article 58 thereof …, or any other rule of EC law, preclude a Member State from granting a parent company subject to tax in that Member State a deduction on costs relating to a holding owned by it only if the relevant subsidiary makes profits which are subject to tax in the Member State in which the parent company is established? 2. Does it make any difference to the answer to Question 1 whether, where the subsidiary is subject to tax based on its profits in the Member State concerned but the parent company is not, the relevant Member State takes account of the abovementioned costs in levying tax on the subsidiary? Judgement of the Court The court ruled in favor of Bosal. Not allowing deductions of costs related to participations in foreign subsidiaries is contrary to EC law. “Council Directive 90-435-EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, interpreted in the light of Article 52 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 43 EC) precludes a national provision which, when determining the tax on the profits of a parent company established in one Member State, makes the deductibility of costs in connection with that company’s holding in the capital of a subsidiary established in another Member State subject to the condition that such costs be indirectly instrumental in making profits which are taxable in the Member State where the parent company is established.” Click here for text version ...