A S.A. had transferred a dividend receivable to an indirect shareholder for the purpose of acquiring other companies. The tax authorities considered the transfer to be a loan, for which A S.A should have received arm’s length interest and issued an assessment on that basis. A complaint was filed by A S.A. with the tax Court, which ruled in favour of A S.A. and dismissed the assessmemt in 2021 An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Court The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decission of the tax court and dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities. According to the Court the local transfer pricing in article 58 of the CIRC, in the wording in force at the time of the facts did not allow for a recharacterization of a transaction, only for a re-quantification. A recharacterization of the transaction would at the time of the facts only be possible under the Portuguese general anti-abuse clause, which required the tax authorities to prove that the arrangement had been put in place for securing a tax advantage. Such evidence had not been presented. Excerpt “In other words, the fact that the transfer of credits arising from ancillary benefits to non-shareholders is not common is not enough to destroy the characteristics of the ancillary obligation set out in the articles of association, which, as is well known, can be transferred – see art. Furthermore, the Tax Authority’s reasoning reveals a total disregard for the rest of the applicable legal regime, namely the restitution regime provided for in Article 213 of the CSC, which gives them the unquestionable character of quasi-equity benefits. In fact, since the admissibility of supplementary capital contributions in public limited companies has been debated for a long time, but with the majority of legal scholars being in favor of such contributions, the enshrinement in the articles of association of the figure of accessory obligations following the supplementary contributions regime appeared as a solution to the possibility of internal financing of the public limited company, (See, for example, Paulo Olavo Cunha in Direito das Sociedades Comerciais, 3rd edition, Almedina, 2007, pages 441 and 442 (in a contemporary annotation with the legal framework in force at the time). ) . Furthermore, as pointed out by the Deputy Attorney General, whose reasoning, due to its assertiveness, we do not hesitate to refer to again, “This situation is not unrelated to the fact that, in the corporate structure in question, the company “D… ” has a majority stake in the company “A…”, and there is even doctrine that defends “the possibility of transferring the credits resulting from the supplementary installments autonomously from the status of partner” – in an explicit allusion to the view taken by Rui Pinto Duarte (Author cited, “Escritos sobre Direito das Sociedades”, Coimbra Editora, 2008). In conclusion: if the Tax Administration believed that the evidence it had found, to which we have already referred, strongly indicated that the transaction in question was really about the parties providing financing to the company “D…, S.A. “, it was imperative that it had made use of the anti-abuse clause (although there are legal scholars who also include article 58 of the CIRC in the special anti-abuse rules – see Rui Duarte Morais, “Sobre a Notção de “cláusulas antiabusos”, Direito Fiscal, Estudos Jurídicos e Económicos em Homenagem ao Prof. Dr. António Sousa Franco III 2006, p.879 /894) and use the procedure laid down in Article 63 of the CPPT, as the Appellant claims. What is not legitimate, however, in these circumstances, “in view of the letter of the law and the teleology of the transfer pricing system as enshrined in the IRC Code and developed in Ministerial Order 1446-C/2001, is to use this system to carry out a sort of half-correction and, in the other half, i.e., For cases of this nature, there is a specific legal instrument in the legal system – the CGAA – specially designed and aimed at combating this type of practice (Bruno Santiago & António Queiroz Martins, “Os preços de transferência na compra e venda de participações sociais entre entidades relacionadas”, Cadernos Preços de Transferência, Almedina, 2013, Coordenação João Taborda Gama). …” Click here for English translation. Click here for other translation ...

The tax authorities issued an assessment of additional taxable income for “D. sp. z o.o.” resulting in additional corporate income tax liability for 2014 in the amount of PLN 2,494,583. The basis for the assessment was the authority’s findings that the company understated its taxable income for 2014 by a total of PLN 49,732,274.05, as a result of the inclusion of deductible expenses interest in the amount of PLN 39,244,375.62, under an intra-group share purchase loan agreements paid to W. S.a.r.l. (Luxembourg) expenses for intra-group services in the amount of USD 2,957,837 (amount of PLN 10,487,898.43) paid to W. Inc. (USA) “D. sp. z o.o.” filed a complaint with the Administrative Court (WSA) requesting annulment of the assessment. In a judgment of 15 September 2020 the Administrative Court dismissed the complaint. In the opinion of the WSA, it was legitimate to adjust the terms of the loan agreement for tax purposes in such a way as to lead to transactions that would correspond to market conditions, thus disregarding the arrangements, cf. the OECD TPG 1995 para. 1.65 and 1.66. Furthermore, according to the court the company did not present credible evidence as to the ‘shareholder’s expenses’ and the fact that significant costs were incurred for analogous services purchased from other entities indicates duplication of expenses. Consequently, it is impossible to verify whether the disputed management services were performed at all. Not satisfied with the decision “D. sp. z o.o.” filed an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The Supreme Administrative Court set aside the decision of the Administrative Court and the tax assessment and refered the case back to the tax authorities for a reexamination. According to the court, there was no legal basis in Poland in 2014 for the non-recognition or recharacterisation of controlled transactions. The Polish arm’s length principle only allowed the tax authorities to price controlled transactions. The provisions (Articles 119a § 1 and § 2 Op) allowing for the substitution of the effects of an artificial legal act, if the main or one of the main purposes of which was to achieve a tax advantage have been in force only since 15 July 2016. And the possibility provided for the tax authority to determine the taxpayer’s income or loss without taking into account the economically irrational transaction undertaken by related parties (Article 11c(4) of the CIT) came into existence even later, as of 1 January 2019. Excerpts “3.2 The tax authorities relied on section 11(1) of the Income Tax Act (as in force in 2014), under which the tax authorities could determine the taxpayer’s income and the tax due without taking into account the conditions established or imposed as a result of the relationship between the contracting entities. However, this income had to be determined by way of estimation, using the methods described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 11 of the Income Tax Act. This is because these are not provisions creating abuse of rights or anti-avoidance clauses. They only allow a different determination of transaction (transfer) prices. The notion of ‘transaction price’ was defined in Article 3(10) of the Op, which, in the wording relevant to the tax period examined in the case, stated that it is the price of the subject of a transaction concluded between related parties. Thus, the essence of the legal institution stipulated in Article 11 of the CIT is not the omission of the legal effects of legal transactions made by the taxpayer or a different legal definition of those transactions, but the determination of their economic effect expressed in the transaction price, disregarding the impact of institutional links between the counterparties (…) It is therefore a legal institution with strictly defined characteristics and can only have the effects provided for in the provisions defining it (as the law stood in 2014). Meanwhile, the application of any provisions allowing the tax authorities to interfere in the legal relations freely formed by taxpayers must be strictly limited and restricted only to the premises defined in those provisions, as they are of a far-reaching interferential nature. Any broadening interpretation of them, as a result of which legal sanction could be obtained by the interference of public administration bodies going further than the grammatical meaning of the words and phrases used in the provisions establishing such powers, is inadmissible.” “3.3 The structure of the DIAS ruling corresponds to the hypothesis of the standard of Article 11c(4) of the 2019 CIT, which was not in force in 2014. Therefore, there was no adequate legal basis for its application with respect to 2014. This legal basis was not provided by Article 11 of the Corporate Income Tax Act in force at that time. This provision regulated the issue of so-called transfer prices, i.e. transaction prices applied between entities related by capital or personality. In this provision, the legislator emphasised the principle of applying the market price (also known as the arm’s length principle), requiring that prices in transactions between related parties be determined in such a way as if the companies were functioning as independent entities, operating on market terms and carrying out comparable transactions in similar market and factual circumstances. When the transaction under review deviates from those between independent parties, in comparable circumstances, then in the event of the occurrence of also other circumstances indicated in Article 11 of the updopdop, the tax authority may require an adjustment of profit. The legislative solutions adopted in Article 11 of the CIT Act (from 1 January 2019 in Article 11a et seq. of the CIT Act) refer to the recommendations contained in the OECD Guidelines on transfer pricing for multinational enterprises and tax administrations. The Guidelines were adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 27 June 1995 and approved for publication by the OECD Council on 13 July 1995 (they have been amended several times, including in 2010 and 2017). While the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not constitute a source of law in the territory ...

According to the Canadian Budget 2023 the government will release for consultation draft legislative proposals to amend the general anti avoidance rule (GAAR) which was added to the Canadian Income Tax Act in section 245 back in 1988. If abusive tax avoidance is established, the GAAR applies to deny the tax benefit that was unfairly created. The GAAR has helped to tackle abusive tax avoidance in Canada but it requires modernizing to ensure its continued effectiveness. The following amendments to the GAAR is proposed: introducing a preamble (containing interpretive rules and statements of purpose); changing the avoidance transaction standard (from a “primary purpose” test to a “one of the main purposes” test); introducing an economic substance rule (indicators for lack in economic substance); introducing a penalty (25% of the amount of the tax benefit); and extending the reassessment period in certain circumstances (three-year extension to the normal reassessment period). The revised GAAR is expected to come into force as of 1 January 2024. See the relevant sections of the Canadian Budget 2023 below ...

Skechers US Inc. had formed a related party entity, SKII, in 1999 and transferred IP and $18 million in cash to the entity in exchange for 100 percent of the stock. Skechers then licensed the IP back from SKII and claimed a franchise tax deduction for the royalties and also deductions for management fees and interest expenses on the unpaid balance of royalty fees. The Wisconsin tax authorities held that these were sham transaction lacking business purpose and disallowed the deductions. Judgement of the Tax Appeals Commission The Tax Appeals Commission ruled in favor of the tax authorities. Excerpt “(…) The burden of proof is on Petitioner to prove that the Department’s assessment is incorrect by clear and satisfactory evidence. In this case, Petitioner must prove that it had a valid nontax business purpose for entering into the licensing transaction that generated the royalty deductions claimed on its Wisconsin tax returns and that the licensing transaction had economic substance. Both are required. Petitioner did not present persuasive evidence or testimony of either requirement being met. Therefore, the Department’s assessments are upheld. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner did not have a valid nontax business purpose for the creation of SKII. Petitioner did not have a valid nontax business purpose for entering into the licensing transactions between Skechers and SKII that generated the royalty deductions claimed on its Wisconsin tax returns. Petitioner’s licensing transactions between Skechers and SKII did not have economic substance. (…)” ...

During 2012, Coronation Investment Management SA (Pty) Ltd (CIMSA) was a 90% subsidiary of Coronation Fund Managers Limited and the 100% holding company of Coronation Management Company and Coronation Asset Management (Pty) Ltd (CAM), both registered for tax in South Africa. CIMSA was also the 100% holding company of CFM (Isle of Man) Ltd, tax resident in Isle of Man. CFM (Isle of Man) Ltd, in turn, was the 100% owner of Coronation Global Fund Managers (Ireland) Limited (CGFM) and Coronation International Ltd (CIL), which were registered and tax resident in Ireland and the United Kingdom respectively. At issue was whether the net income of CGFM should be included in the taxable income of CIMSA, or whether a tax exemption in terms of s 9D of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the Act) was applicable to the income earned by CGFM. This depends on what the primary functions of CGFM in Ireland are. If the primary operations are conducted in Ireland, then the s 9D exemption applies. Of particular significance is that CGFM has adopted an outsource business model and the attendant ramifications that may have for its tax status. Aligned to this is whether the primary business of CGFM is that of investment (which is not conducted in Ireland), or that of maintaining its licence and managing its service providers (which is conducted in Ireland). The tax authorities assessed the tax liability of CIMSA for the 2012 tax year to include the entire ‘net income’ of CGFM. The tax authorities accepted that CGFM met the FBE definition, in all respects but one: economic substance. As at 2012, CGFM had offices in Dublin with a staff component of four people, consisting of a managing director, two accounting officers and a compliance officer. All the staff were resident in Ireland. It was not disputed that CGFM had conducted its business for more than a year through one or more offices in Dublin (s 9D(1)(a)(i)), or that it had ‘a fixed place of business’ in Ireland (s 9D(1)(a)(ii)) which was suitably staffed and equipped with suitable facilities (s 9D(1)(a)(ii), (iii) and (iv)). The tax authorities also accepted that the business was located in Ireland for a reason other than the postponement or reduction of South African tax (s 9D(1)(a)(iv)). However, it contended that CGFM did not meet the economic substance requirements, as ‘the primary operations’ referred to in s 9D(1)(a)(ii),(iii) and (iv) were not based in Ireland. Accordingly, the Dublin office was not suitably staffed with employees, not suitably equipped, nor did it have the suitable facilities to conduct ‘the primary operations’ of CGFM’s business. An appeal was filed and the Tax Court set aside the assessment. The court found that CGFM was a ‘foreign business establishment’ (FBE) as defined in s 9D(1) of the Act and, accordingly, qualified for a tax exemption. Hence, no amount of income from CGFM should be included in CIMSA’s income under s 9D of the Act. An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Court of Appeal. Judgement of Court The Court set aside the decision of the Tax Curt and issued a decision in favour of the tax authorities. Excerpt “[54]   The essential operations of the business must be conducted within the jurisdiction in respect of which exemption is sought. While there are undoubtedly many functions which a company may choose to legitimately outsource, it cannot outsource its primary business. To enjoy the same tax levels as its foreign rivals, thereby making it internationally competitive, the primary operations of that company must take place in the same foreign jurisdiction. [55]   On these particular facts, I conclude that the primary operations of CGFM’s business (and, therefore, the business of the controlled foreign company as defined) is that of fund management which includes investment management. These are not conducted in Ireland. Therefore, CGFM does not meet the requirements for an FBE exemption in terms of s 9D(1). As a result, the net income of CGFM is imputable to CIMSA for the 2012 tax year in terms of s 9D(2).” Click here for translation ...

The arrangement, including the contingency and the basis for payment, is consistent with the economic substance of the controlled transaction and the conduct of the controlled parties. See § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B) ...

P and S are controlled taxpayers. P licenses a proprietary process to S for S’s use in manufacturing product X. Using its sales and marketing employees, S sells product X to related and unrelated customers outside the United States. If the license between P and S has economic substance, the Commissioner ordinarily will not restructure the taxpayer’s transaction to treat P as if it had elected to exploit directly the manufacturing process. However, because P could have directly exploited the manufacturing process and manufactured product X itself, this realistic alternative may be taken into account under § 1.482-4(d) in determining the arm’s length consideration for the controlled transaction. For examples of such an analysis, see Examples 7 and 8 in paragraph (f)(2)(i)(E) of this section and the Example in § 1.482-4(d)(2) ...

Contractual terms imputed from economic substance. (i) Company X is a member of a controlled group that has been in operation in the pharmaceutical sector for many years. In years 1 through 4, Company X undertakes research and development activities. As a result of those activities, Company X developed a compound that may be more effective than existing medications in the treatment of certain conditions. (ii) Company Y is acquired in year 4 by the controlled group that includes Company X. Once Company Y is acquired, Company X makes available to Company Y a large amount of technical data concerning the new compound, which Company Y uses to register patent rights with respect to the compound in several jurisdictions, making Company Y the legal owner of such patents. Company Y then enters into licensing agreements with group members that afford Company Y 100% of the premium return attributable to use of the intangible property by its subsidiaries. (iii) In determining whether an allocation is appropriate in year 4, the Commissioner may consider the economic substance of the arrangements between Company X and Company Y, and the parties’ course of conduct throughout their relationship. Based on this analysis, the Commissioner determines that it is unlikely that an uncontrolled taxpayer operating at arm’s length would make available the results of its research and development or perform services that resulted in transfer of valuable know how to another party unless it received contemporaneous compensation or otherwise had a reasonable anticipation of receiving a future benefit from those activities. In this case, Company X’s undertaking the research and development activities and then providing technical data and know-how to Company Y in year 4 is inconsistent with the registration and subsequent exploitation of the patent by Company Y. Therefore, the Commissioner may impute one or more agreements between Company X and Company Y consistent with the economic substance of their course of conduct, which would afford Company X an appropriate portion of the premium return from the patent rights. For example, the Commissioner may impute a separate services agreement that affords Company X contingent-payment compensation for its services in year 4 for the benefit of Company Y, consisting of making available to Company Y technical data, know-how, and other fruits of research and development conducted in previous years. These services benefited Company Y by giving rise to and contributing to the value of the patent rights that were ultimately registered by Company Y. In the alternative, the Commissioner may impute a transfer of patentable intangible property rights from Company X to Company Y immediately preceding the registration of patent rights by Company Y. The taxpayer may present additional facts that could indicate which of these or other alternative agreements best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions, consistent with the parties’ course of conduct in the particular case ...

Contractual terms imputed from economic substance. (i) FP, a foreign producer of athletic gear, is the registered holder of the AA trademark in the United States and in other countries worldwide. In year 1, FP enters into a licensing agreement that affords its newly organized United States subsidiary, USSub, exclusive rights to certain manufacturing and marketing intangible property (including the AA trademark) for purposes of manufacturing and marketing athletic gear in the United States under the AA trademark. The contractual terms of this agreement obligate USSub to pay FP a royalty based on sales, and also obligate both FP and USSub to undertake without separate compensation specified types and levels of marketing activities. Unrelated foreign businesses license independent United States businesses to manufacture and market athletic gear in the United States, using trademarks owned by the unrelated foreign businesses. The contractual terms of these uncontrolled transactions require the licensees to pay royalties based on sales of the merchandise, and obligate the licensors and licensees to undertake without separate compensation specified types and levels of marketing activities. In years 1 through 6, USSub manufactures and sells athletic gear under the AA trademark in the United States. Assume that, after adjustments are made to improve the reliability of the comparison for any material differences relating to marketing activities, manufacturing or marketing intangible property, and other comparability factors, the royalties paid by independent licensees would provide the most reliable measure of the arm’s length royalty owed by USSub to FP, apart from the additional facts in paragraph (ii) of this Example 4. (ii) In years 1 through 6, USSub performs incremental marketing activities with respect to the AA trademark athletic gear, in addition to the activities required under the terms of the license agreement with FP, that are also incremental as compared to those observed in the comparables. FP does not directly or indirectly compensate USSub for performing these incremental activities during years 1 through 6. By year 7, AA trademark athletic gear generates a premium return in the United States, as compared to similar athletic gear marketed by independent licensees. In year 7, USSub and FP enter into a separate services agreement under which FP agrees to compensate USSub on a cost basis for the incremental marketing activities that USSub performed during years 1 through 6, and to compensate USSub on a cost basis for any incremental marketing activities it may perform in year 7 and subsequent years. In addition, the parties revise the license agreement executed in year 1, and increase the royalty to a level that attributes to FP substantially all the premium return from sales of the AA trademark athletic gear in the United States. (iii) In determining whether an allocation of income is appropriate in year 7, the Commissioner may consider the economic substance of the arrangements between USSub and FP and the parties’ course of conduct throughout their relationship. Based on this analysis, the Commissioner determines that it is unlikely that, ex ante, an uncontrolled taxpayer operating at arm’s length would engage in the incremental marketing activities to develop or enhance intangible property owned by another party unless it received contemporaneous compensation or otherwise had a reasonable anticipation of a future benefit. In this case, USSub’s undertaking the incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6 is a course of conduct that is inconsistent with the parties’ adoption in year 7 of contractual terms by which FP compensates USSub on a cost basis for the incremental marketing activities that it performed. Therefore, the Commissioner may impute one or more agreements between USSub and FP, consistent with the economic substance of their course of conduct, which would afford USSub an appropriate portion of the premium return from the AA trademark athletic gear. For example, the Commissioner may impute a separate services agreement that affords USSub contingent-payment compensation for the incremental activities it performed during years 1 through 6, which benefited FP by contributing to the value of the trademark owned by FP. In the alternative, the Commissioner may impute a long-term, exclusive United States license agreement that allows USSub to benefit from the incremental activities. As another alternative, the Commissioner may require FP to compensate USSub for terminating USSub’s imputed long-term United States license agreement, a license that USSub made more valuable at its own expense and risk. The taxpayer may present additional facts that could indicate which of these or other alternative agreements best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions, consistent with the parties’ course of conduct in this particular case ...

Contractual terms imputed from economic substance. (i) FP, a foreign producer of wristwatches, is the registered holder of the YY trademark in the United States and in other countries worldwide. In year 1, FP enters the United States market by selling YY wristwatches to its newly organized United States subsidiary, USSub, for distribution in the United States market. USSub pays FP a fixed price per wristwatch. USSub and FP undertake, without separate compensation, marketing activities to establish the YY trademark in the United States market. Unrelated foreign producers of trademarked wristwatches and their authorized United States distributors respectively undertake similar marketing activities in independent arrangements involving distribution of trademarked wristwatches in the United States market. In years 1 through 6, USSub markets and sells YY wristwatches in the United States. Further, in years 1 through 6, USSub undertakes incremental marketing activities in addition to the activities similar to those observed in the independent distribution transactions in the United States market. FP does not directly or indirectly compensate USSub for performing these incremental activities during years 1 through 6. Assume that, aside from these incremental activities, and after any adjustments are made to improve the reliability of the comparison, the price paid per wristwatch by the independent, authorized distributors of wristwatches would provide the most reliable measure of the arm’s length price paid per YY wristwatch by USSub. (ii) By year 7, the wristwatches with the YY trademark generate a premium return in the United States market, as compared to wristwatches marketed by the independent distributors. In year 7, substantially all the premium return from the YY trademark in the United States market is attributed to FP, for example through an increase in the price paid per watch by USSub, or by some other means. (iii) In determining whether an allocation of income is appropriate in year 7, the Commissioner may consider the economic substance of the arrangements between USSub and FP, and the parties’ course of conduct throughout their relationship. Based on this analysis, the Commissioner determines that it is unlikely that, ex ante, an uncontrolled taxpayer operating at arm’s length would engage in the incremental marketing activities to develop or enhance intangible property owned by another party unless it received contemporaneous compensation or otherwise had a reasonable anticipation of receiving a future benefit from those activities. In this case, USSub’s undertaking the incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6 is a course of conduct that is inconsistent with the parties’ attribution to FP in year 7 of substantially all the premium return from the enhanced YY trademark in the United States market. Therefore, the Commissioner may impute one or more agreements between USSub and FP, consistent with the economic substance of their course of conduct, which would afford USSub an appropriate portion of the premium return from the YY trademark wristwatches. For example, the Commissioner may impute a separate services agreement that affords USSub contingent-payment compensation for its incremental marketing activities in years 1 through 6, which benefited FP by contributing to the value of the trademark owned by FP. In the alternative, the Commissioner may impute a long-term, exclusive agreement to exploit the YY trademark in the United States that allows USSub to benefit from the incremental marketing activities it performed. As another alternative, the Commissioner may require FP to compensate USSub for terminating USSub’s imputed long-term, exclusive agreement to exploit the YY trademark in the United States, an agreement that USSub made more valuable at its own expense and risk. The taxpayer may present additional facts that could indicate which of these or other alternative agreements best reflects the economic substance of the underlying transactions, consistent with the parties’ course of conduct in the particular case ...

“GAAR S.A” is a holding company with a share capital of EUR 55,000.00. In 2010, “GAAR S.A” was in a situation of excess equity capital resulting from an accumulation of reserves (EUR 402,539.16 of legal reserves and EUR 16,527,875.72 of other reserves). The Board of Directors, made up of three shareholders – B………… (holder of 21,420 shares, corresponding to 42.84% of the share capital), C………… (holder of a further 21,420 shares, corresponding to 42.84% of the share capital) and D………… (holder of 7. 160 shares, corresponding to the remaining 14.32% of the share capital) – decided to “release this excess of capital” and, following this resolution, the shareholders decided: i) on 22.02.2010 to redeem 30,000 shares, with a share capital reduction, at a price of EUR 500.00 each, with a subsequent share capital increase of EUR 33. 000.00, by means of incorporation of legal reserves, and the share capital of the appellant will be made up of 20,000 shares at the nominal value of €2.75 each; and ii) on 07.05.2010, to cancel 10,000 shares, with a capital reduction, at the price of €1. 000.00 each, with a subsequent share capital increase of 27,500.00 Euros, by means of incorporation of legal reserves, and the share capital of the appellant is now composed of 10,000 shares at a nominal value of 5.50 Euros each (items E and F of the facts). As a result of this arrangements, payments were made to the shareholders in 2010, 2011 and 2012, with only the payment made on 4 September 2012 being under consideration here. On that date, cheques were issued for the following amounts: B………… – €214,200.00; C………… – €214,200.00; and D………… – €71,600.00. Payments which, according to “GAAR S.A”, since they constitute exempt capital gains, were not subject to taxation, that is, no deduction at source was made. Following an inspection the tax authorities decided, to disregard the arrangement, claiming that it had been “set up” by the respective shareholders with the aim of obtaining a tax advantage (whilst completely ignoring the economic substance of the arrangement). In short, the tax authorities considered that the transactions were carried out in order to allow “GAAR S.A” to distribute dividends under the “guise” of share redemption, thus avoiding the tax to which they would be subject. An appeal filed by “GAAR S.A.” with the Administrative Court was dismissed. An appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal and found that “GAAR S.A.” was liable for the payment of the tax which was not withheld at source and which should have been, we also consider that there is no error in the judgment under appeal in concluding that “at least in terms of negligence, it seems to us that the award of compensatory interest is, in cases such as the present, the natural consequence of the verification of the abuse, especially given the environmental and intellectual elements, demonstrating that there was a deliberate intention to avoid the due withholding tax” According to the court the tax authorities does not have to prove an “abusive” intention of the taxpayer. The tax authorities is not required to prove that the taxpayer opted for the construction leading to the tax saving in order to intentionally avoid the solution which would be subject to taxation. It is sufficient for the tax authorities to prove that the operation carried out does not have a rational business purpose and that, for this reason, its intentionality is exhausted in the tax saving to which it leads. Having provided this proof, the requirements of article 38(2) of the LGT should be considered to have been met. When the application of the GAAR results in the disregard of a construction and its replacement by an operation whose legal regulation would impose the practice of a definitive withholding tax act, it is the person who comes to be qualified as the substitute (in the light of the application of the GAAR) who is primarily liable for this tax obligation whenever the advantage that the third party obtains results from an operation carried out by him and it is possible to conclude, that he was the beneficiary of the operation. It is also possible to conclude, under the procedure set out in Article 63 of the CPPT, that the third party had a legal obligation to be aware of the alternative legal transaction that comes to be qualified as legally owed as a result of the disregard of the transaction carried out. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The Italian Tax Authorities held that the withholding tax exemption under the European Interest and Royalty Directive did not apply to interest paid by Stiga s.p.a. to it’s parent company in Luxembourg. The interest was paid on a loan established in connection with a merger leverage buy out transaction. According to the Tax Authorities the parent company in Luxembourg was a mere conduit and could not be considered as the beneficial owner of the Italian income since the interest payments was passed on to another group entity. The Court rejected the arguments of the Italian Tax Authorities and recognized the parent company in Luxembourg as the beneficial owner of the interest income. In the decision, reference was made to the Danish Beneficial Owner Cases from the EU Court of Justice to clarify the conditions for application of the withholding tax exemption under the EU Interest and Royalty Directive and for determination of beneficial owner status. The Court also found that no tax abuse could be assessed. In this regard the court pointet out that the parent company in Luxembourg performed financial and treasury functions for other group entities and made independent decisions related to these activities. Click here for Translation ...

In 2013, L SARL requested in writing an “advance tax agreement” regarding the tax treatment of Mandatory Redeemable Preference Shares (MRPS) which generated a preferred dividend for its sole shareholder. L SARL wanted confirmation that the MRPS would be characterised as debt and that payments under the MRPS would therefore be tax deductible. The tax administration issued an advance tax agreement confirming that the content of the request complied with the tax laws and administrative practices in force. However, despite the agreement the tax authorities challenged the 2013 tax return and demanded proof that the return on the MRPS complied with the arm’s length principle. L SARL found that such proof was not necessary since the MRPS’ tax treatment had already been agreed by the tax administration agreement. The tax administration disagreed and issued an assessment. The case was brought before the Administrative Tribunal. The Administrative Tribunal held that an advance tax agreement is binding upon the tax administration where the following conditions are met: the taxpayer’s question must be in writing; the taxpayer’s request must be sufficiently clear and complete to allow the LTA to adequately analyse the taxpayer’s situation; the tax administration’s answer must come from a duly authorised tax official, or an official who the taxpayer could legitimately expect to be duly authorised; the tax administration must have had the intention of being bound by the information given to the taxpayer; and the tax administration’s answer must have had decisive influence on the taxpayer. These conditions were met and the Tribunal concluded that the tax administration was bound to the advance tax agreement. The Tribunal added that in the presence of an advance tax agreement, the tax authority cannot characterise the same structure and operations as an abuse of law, since the reality and legality of the taxpayer’s actions has already been acknowledged. Click here for other translation ...

The Hungarian tax office had carried out an an audit of “Seeds Kft” – a group company engaged in the trade in cereals and oilseeds – in relation to accounting for commodity futures. In the assessment decision, the tax office emphasized that the economic substance of the given transaction and the purpose to be achieved by the transaction are relevant. Clearing transactions are not settled by the delivery of the underlying commodities of the transaction and the payment of the forward price, but by financial settlement of the difference between the market price of the commodity and the forward price. With regard to the transfer pricing documentation, the tax office agreed with the pricing method chosen by Seeds Kft but found the application thereof arbitrary and therefore not resulting in establishment of a market price. The Court of First Instance found the tax office’s claim to be partly well-founded and ordered the tax authorities to reopen the proceedings. On the issue of the legal nature of the options, the court noted that, according to the expert opinion obtained in the litigation, Seeds Kft had correctly applied passive accruals and had correctly booked the transactions as clearing transactions. With regard to the transfer pricing documentation, it was noted that neither the resale price method applied by the Seeds Kft nor that of the tax office was correct. Following requests for review by both the tax office and Seeds Kft, the Court of Appeal partially set aside the judgment of the Court of First Instance and ordered the Court of First Instance to reopen the proceedings and to give a new decision. With regard to futures contracts, it was emphasized that the Court of First Instance did not rule on the issue of whether the transactions were clearing or delivery. It is not excluded that the examination of the facts necessary for deciding a particular point of law may require particular expertise, but the legal nature of the transactions cannot be inferred from the findings of experts. The valuation of legal transactions, based on accounting standards and actual implementation, is a legal issue which the expert may decide on the applicability of accruals as a professional issue. In regards to the legal nature of the contracts the Court stated that the first step was to determine whether they were correctly classified by the authority as delivery transactions and not clearing transactions. Click here for translation ...

The Administrative Court re-characterised a profit-participating loan into equity for tax purposes. The court provided the following reasoning: “Compared with the criteria specified above for a requalification as a disguised contribution of capital, it should firstly be noted that the sums made available to the two subsidiaries were allocated to investments in properties intended in principle to represent investments in the medium or long term as assets of the invested assets and in the absence of a clause providing for a repayment plan or a fixed maturity, the sums were intended to remain at the disposal of the subsidiaries for a period otherwise limited. In addition, this availability of funds did not give rise to any fixed consideration from the two subsidiaries, but only to a share of the appellant in the capital gains generated by hotel disposals, this interest amounting to three quarters of the capital gains obtained by the affiliates.” “...the sums made available to the two subsidiaries by the appellant were not, as a financing from a lender seeking to recover the capital lent, but as a risk-oriented investment. on the value gains of the hotels financed through the two loans, so that these sums are to be assimilated to cash contributions to the subsidiaries and that the normal way of making these sums available would have been the capital increase. Since there is no other particular economic interest justifying the replacement of capital contributions by loans arising from the elements in question or not put forward by one of the parties, it must be concluded that the essential tax interest consisted in the deduction of ” participating interests ” by the subsidiaries in the Dominican Republic as expenses in relation to the taxable gains from affiliates.” “The evidence presented to the Court thus allows the conclusion that the appellant’s claims under the two loan agreements in question are subordinate. In any case, whether the loan is subordinated or not is only one of several factors to be taken into account in the context of the overall analysis if it corresponds to the normal route of financing dictated by serious economic or legal considerations, analysis that the court should have made instead of focusing on the only question of whether or not subordinated loans are cause.” “…it must be concluded that, in view of the conditions to which they were granted, the loans at issue in fact amount to disguised capital injections in addition to the shareholdings…thus qualify as participating in the share capital of these companies within the meaning of § 60 BewG.” Click here for translation ...

In the transfer pricing case of C J Wildbird Foods Limited the issue was whether a related party loan should be treated as such for tax purposes. There was a loan agreement between the parties and the agreement specified that there was an obligation to repay the loan and interest. However, no interest had actually been paid and a tax deduction had also been claimed by the tax payer on the basis that the debt was unlikely to be repaid. The tax authorities argued that the loan did not have the characteristics of a loan. The borrower was loss making  and did not have the financial capacity to pay any interest. The tribunal found that there was a legal obligation to repay the loan and interest. Whether the loan or interest was actually repaid was irrelevant. “The modern business world has many famous examples of companies, especially in the technology sector, with no cash and no immediate prospect of generating a profit which go on to be very successful. Clearly the appellant considers BFL potentially to be such a company and is therefore prepared to subsidise its running costs by way of loan for the time being in the hope of obtaining repayment of some or all of its loans in due course, possibly with a gain on its share investment as well. As to the “hallmarks” that Mr Baird asks me to consider, there is no requirement that for a loan relationship to exist, interest must be charged; were it otherwise, many perfectly normal intra-group loans would fall foul of that requirement (and in any event, the loans in this case include a contractual obligation to pay interest, albeit an obligation that has not yet been enforced). Nor is there any requirement that, for a loan relationship to exist, the lender must have any degree of certainty that the debt will be repaid normal commercial loans are inherently hedged about with uncertainty about whether repayment will be made and save in degree, the present situation is no different. Lack of a fixed repayment date for a loan is perfectly commonplace. Here, the money has been advanced by the appellant on terms that it is all to be repaid. The fact that such repayment has not been made and HMRC may have formed the opinion that these payments will never be repaid is beside the point. The loans have been advanced as a matter of arm’s length negotiation between the two parties, there is an obligation to repay (as recognized by both companies in their respective audited accounts and  confirmed in evidence), and the fact that the appellant may well not recover some or all of its money is neither here nor there. It has made a commercial judgment that it is in its best interests to continue to support BFL by continuing loans, and the fact that HMRC may disagree with that judgment is irrelevant to the underlying nature of the transaction. Ultimately it may turn out that the appellant’s business judgment was overly optimistic, but that is of no relevance. It follows that I find the transactions in question to amount to loan relationships…“ Hence, the tribunal found in favor of the taxpayer ...

Determination of the criterion “decisive influence” or controlling interest. There is no basis for a general conclusion that, where two persons have the same ability to influence decision-making, they both exercise joint control. Otherwise, Section 12(2) of the Corporation Tax Act should apply to any case where two or more persons exercise equal control over the management of a company, even if the only way in which decisions could ever be taken in the company is if they are taken in concert. It is not excluded that two persons have established a mechanism for exercising influence on an equal footing precisely in order to ensure that neither has a decisive influence. In order to apply Section 12(2) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax in accordance with its meaning, i.e. to identify cases where the decisive influence of a person has been the basis for entering into transactions which are not in line with market prices, it should be possible to identify a set of circumstances in circumstances of equal influence which makes it possible to consider that two or more persons are acting jointly. Such circumstances may be apparent, inter alia, from the activities of the undertaking over an extended period of time, from the location of the disputed transactions in the context of the other business activities, from the links between the persons concerned, in particular in the long term. Excerpt from the Judgement of the Supreme Court “[16] As can be seen, the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned case did not find any difference in principle between the direct or indirect interpretation of decisive influence contained in the Law on Concerns and other laws. There would be no reason to find such a difference in the present case, since, in view of the general meaning of the concept of decisive influence, it must be established that one person can take decisions (control) in relation to the company and, in the absence of specific agreements on other arrangements, such a situation must be established in the first place by a participation, from which, in ordinary cases, further derive the corresponding voting rights and the possibility to appoint and dismiss the management body. The Regional Court, too, in interpreting Article 1(12) of the Credit Institutions Law and concluding that decisive influence means the ability to control the decisions of the governing body of the company with regard to the conclusion of economic transactions and their value, has not in fact changed this general understanding, i.e. it has emphasised the ability to control decision-making. Moreover, any interpretation of the concept of ‘decisive influence’ cannot contradict its immediate general meaning, namely that the person concerned has the power to make a difference in the decision-making, in the determination of issues. In accordance with the general principles of commercial companies, this will normally be secured by an appropriate share in the share capital. At the same time, it should be noted that the Regional Court has used the concept (control) explained in Article 1(12) of the Credit Institutions Law to explain the concept of “decisive influence”, which is used in the provision as a means of clarification, but insofar as it does not detract from the meaning – the characteristic of being able to decisively influence decisions – the interpretation is not incorrect. One can agree with the representative of the State Revenue Service at the hearing that it is important to apply the concept of ‘decisive influence’ contained in Section 1(5) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax in its own right in accordance with its meaning. [17] The judgment of the District Court, after a legal analysis, further assesses the circumstances of the case. The Court finds that the status of the members of the applicant’s board of directors in the applicant, as well as their participation in the capital of the applicant’s parent company (50 per cent each) and their status as members of the parent company’s board of directors, created a set of circumstances which ensured decisive influence over the applicant and the ability to exercise (joint) control over the applicant. It follows from the above that the Regional Court, although it had previously examined the question of the elements of decisive influence of a single person, reached its conclusion by finding that two persons exercised control jointly. The assessment is thus based on an aspect which goes beyond the concept of decisive influence as contained in the Law on Concerns and the Law on Credit Institutions. The question of joint control requires consideration of whether decisive influence can be said to exist even if each person individually does not formally possess it under either definition and whether it is possible to consider the possibility of control by those persons together. The conclusion that, where two persons have the same ability to influence decision-making, they both exercise joint control is not self-evident. Otherwise, Section 12(2) of the Corporation Tax Act should apply to any case where two or more persons exercise equal control over the management of a company, even if the only way in which decisions could ever be taken in the company is by a decision agreed between them. It is not excluded that two persons have established a mechanism for exercising influence on an equal footing precisely in order to ensure that neither has a decisive influence. [18] At the same time, it cannot be excluded that, in a situation of equal influence, more than one person knowingly implements a common economic plan with a common objective, and it is precisely this conscious cooperation which makes it safe to assume that one person can count on the other in decision-making. That is to say, a plan or objective and the cooperation within it make it possible to regard them as a single entity. [19] In order to apply Section 12(2) of the Law on Corporation Tax in accordance with its meaning, namely to identify cases where the decisive influence of a person has been the ...

Wells Fargo, an American multinational financial services company, had claimed foreign tax credits in the amount of $350 based on a “Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged Securities” (STARS) scheme. The STARS foreign tax credit scheme has two components — a trust structure which produces the foreign tax credits and a loan structure which generates interest deductions. Wells Fargo was of the opinion that the STARS arrangement was a single, integrated transaction that resulted in low-cost funding. In 2016, a jury found that the trust and loan structure were two independent transactions and that the trust transaction failed both the objective and subjective test of the “economic substance” analysis. With respect to the loan transaction the jury found that the transaction passed the objective test by providing a reasonable possibility of a pre-tax profit, but failed the subjective test as the transaction had been entered into “solely for tax-related reasons.” The federal court ruled that Wells Fargo had not been entitled to foreign tax credits. The transaction lacked both economic substance and a non-tax business purpose. (The economic substance doctrine in the US had an objective and a subjective prong . The objective prong of the analysis considered whether a transaction had a real potential to produce an economic profit after consideration of transaction costs and without consideration of potential tax benefits. The subjective prong of the analysis considered whether the taxpayer had a non-tax business purpose for the transaction. The relationship between the two prongs had long been debated.  Some argued for application of the prongs disjunctively and others argued for application of the prongs conjunctively. When the US Congress codified the economic substance doctrine in 2010, it adopted a conjunctive formulation—denying tax benefits to a transaction if it failed to satisfy either prong.) ...

Ensco Gerudi provided offshore drilling services to the petroleum industry in Malaysia. The company did not own any drilling rigs, but entered into leasing agreements with a rig owner within the Ensco Group. One of the rig owners in the group incorporated a Labuan company to facilitate easier business dealings for the taxpayer. Ensco Gerudi entered into a leasing agreement with the Labuan company for the rigs. Unlike previous transactions, the leasing payments made to the Labuan company did not attract withholding tax. The tax authorities found the Labuan company had no economic or commercial substance and that the purpose of the transaction had only been to benefit from the tax reduction. The High Court decided in favour of the taxpayer. The Court held that there was nothing artificial about the payments and that the transactions were within the meaning and scope of the arrangements contemplated by the government in openly offering incentives. The High Court ruled that taxpayers have the freedom to structure transactions to their best tax advantage in so far as the arrangement viewed in a commercially and economically realistic way makes use of the specific provision in a manner that was consistent with Parliament’s intention ...

The dispute in this case was transactions involving distressed asset/debt transaction. The tax authorities found the DAD transactions of russian receivables under a “DBO distressed debt structure scheme” lacked economic substance, and denied the taxpayers involved tax decuctions of USD 4.5 and 12.2 million. A report provided on behalf of the government analyzed whether a rational investor would have entered into the transaction were it not for the claimed tax benefits. The Courts opinion: “there was no realistic possibility for the transactions at issue to break even absent any tax benefits.” Hence the transactions were not recognized. US Tax Court, Case No. 11051-10, 6853-12 ...

Cadence is a US group active in the business of electronic design automation. Cadence Taiwan provided R&D services to Cadence US. In 2003, based on a transfer pricing study, Cadence US concluded that the service fees that it had paid to Cadence Taiwan in 2002 were too high and therefore instructed Cadence Taiwan to book a significant sales allowance amount in it’s 2003 and 2004 accounts. A debit note was send to Cadence Taiwan and a tax deduction was claimed. Cadence brought the case to court The Supreme Administrative court rejected Cadence’s appeal. The service agreement between Cadence US and Cadence Taiwan did not contain any provision for a retroactive adjustment of the service fees. The debit notes from Cadence US were not signed off by Cadence Taiwan to acknowledge its agreement to the adjustments. Therefore, the subsequent sales allowances booked by Cadence Taiwan were purely for the purpose of allocating profits without any economic substance, and thus could not be allowed. Click here for English Translation ...

The Brazilian group Marcopolo assembles bus bodies in Brazil for export. It used two related offshore companies, Marcopolo International Corporation, domiciled in the British Virgin Islands, and Ilmot International Corporation, domiciled in Uruguay, in a re-invoicing arrangement whereby the product was shipped from Marcopolo to the final customers but the final invoice to the customers was issued by the offshore companies. The tax authorities found that the arrangement lacked business purpose and economic substance and, on this basis, disregarded the transactions. Decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal The Court ruled in favour of Marcopolo. According to the Court, the transactions with the offshore companies had a business purpose and were therefore legitimate tax planning. Excerpts “6. The absence of an operational structure of the companies controlled by the Appellant, capable of supporting the transactions performed, even if, in isolation, it could be admitted within the scope of a “rational organization of the economic activity”, in the case at hand, gains greater significance because a) it constituted only one of the elements within a broad set of evidence presented by the tax authority; b) considering the size of the business undertaken (voluminous export), such absence cannot be such that one can even speculate on the very factual existence of such companies; and c) there is no effective evidence in the case records of the performance of the transactions of purchase and resale of products by such companies; 7. even if it can be admitted that the results earned abroad by the companies MIC and ILMOT were, by equity equivalence, reflected in its accounting, the Appellant does not prove having paid Income Tax and Social Contribution on Net Profits on those same results, thus not contradicting the arguments presented by the tax authority authorizing such conclusion; 8. There is no dispute in this case that a Brazilian transnational company cannot see, in addition to tax benefits, other reasons for conducting its operations through offshore financial centres. What is actually at issue is that, when asked to prove (with proper and suitable documentation) that its controlled companies effectively acquired and resold its products, the Appellant does not submit even a single document capable of effectively revealing a commercial relation between its controlled companies and the end recipients of said products; 9. it is also not disputed that the Brazilian economic environment, especially in the year submitted to the tax audit, is likely to lead to higher costs for national companies operating abroad, both in relation to competitors from developed countries, and in relation to competitors from other emerging countries. What is being questioned is that, specifically in the situation being examined herein, at no time did the Appellant at all materialize such costs, demonstrating on documents, by way of example, that in a given export transaction, if the transaction were effected directly, the cost would be X, the profit would be Y, and the tax paid would be Z, whereas, due to the form adopted, the cost would be X – n, the profit would be Y + m, and the tax paid represented Z + p. No, what the Appellant sought to demonstrate is that, considering a historical series of its exports, there was a significant increase in its revenues and, consequently, in the taxes paid. As already stated, if a significant capitalization of funds through evasive methods is admitted, no other result could be expected. (…) Thus, considering everything in the case records, I cast my vote in the sense of: a) dismissing the ex-officio appeal; b) partially granting the voluntary appeal in order to fully exempt the tax credit related to the withholding income tax, fully upholding the other assessments.” “I verify that, when doing business with companies or individuals located in Countries with Favorable Tax Treatment, the legislation adopted minimum parameters of values to be considered in exports; and maximum parameters in values to be considered in payments made abroad, under the same criteria adopted for transfer pricing. Here, it is important to highlight that the legislation did not equalize the concepts of business carried out with people located in Countries with Favorable Tax Regime and transfer pricing. What the law did was to equalize the criteria to control both, but for conceptually distinct operations. Thus, based on the assumption that Brazilian law specifically deals in its legislation, by means of a specific anti-avoidance rule, with transactions carried out with companies in countries with a favored tax regime, I cannot see how one can intend to disregard the transactions carried out by a Brazilian company with its foreign subsidiaries, since these are deemed to be offshore companies in the respective countries where they are incorporated. In fact, every country with a Favorable Tax Regime has, as a presupposition, the existence of offshore companies, in which the activities are limited to foreign business. In the case at hand, there are two wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Appellant, namely, MIC – Marcopolo International Corporation, located in the British Virgin Islands, and ILMOT International Corporation S.A., incorporated as an investment finance corporation – SAFI, in Uruguay. From what can be extracted from the case records, the deals carried out by the Appellant with the final purchasers of the products were intermediated by both companies, and the tax assessment charged, as income of the Appellant, the final values of the deals carried out by those intermediary companies with the purchasers abroad. However, this was not the legal treatment given by Brazilian law to business deals made with offshore companies established in Countries with a Favorable Tax Regime. Law 9430/96 is limited to checking whether the price charged is supported by the criteria set out in articles 18 to 22 thereof; once such minimum parameters are met, the business plan made by the taxpayer must be respected. Therefore, in this case, I believe that the Tax Authorities could not disregard the business carried out by the Appellant with its wholly-owned subsidiaries beyond what Law 9430/96 provides for the hypothesis of companies located in Countries ...