In 2009 the BlackRock Group acquired Barclays Global Investors for a total sum of $13,5bn. The price was paid in part by shares ($6.9bn) and in part by cash ($6.6bn). The cash payment was paid by BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC – a US Delaware Company tax resident in the UK – but funded by the parent company by issuing $4bn loan notes to the LLC. In the years following the acquisition Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC claimed tax deductions in the UK for interest payments on the intra-group loans. The tax authorities (HMRC) denied tax deductions for the interest costs on two grounds: (1) HMRC claimed that no loans would have been made between parties acting at arm’s length, so that relief should be denied under the transfer pricing rules in Part 4 of the Taxation (International and Other Provisions) Act 2010. (2) HMRC also maintained that relief should be denied under the unallowable purpose rule in section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009, on the basis that securing a tax advantage was the only purpose of the relevant loans. An appeal was filed by the BlackRock Group with the First Tier Tribunal, which in a decision issued in November 2020 found that an independent lender acting at arm’s length would have made loans to LLC5 in the same amount and on the same terms as to interest as were actually made by LLC4 (the “Transfer Pricing Issue”). The FTT further found that the Loans had both a commercial purpose and a tax advantage purpose but that it would be just and reasonable to apportion all the debits to the commercial purpose and so they were fully deductible by LLC5 (the “Unallowable Purpose Issue”). An appeal was then filed with the Upper Tribunal by the tax authorities. According to the judgment issued in 2022, the Upper Tribunal found that the First Tier Tribunal had erred in law and therefore allowed HMRC’s appeal on both the transfer pricing issue and the unallowable purpose issue. The First Tier Tribunal’s Decision was set aside and the tax authorities amendments to LLC5’s tax returns were confirmed. An appeal was then filed by BlackRock with the Court of Appeal. Judgment The Court of Appeal found that tax deductions for the interest on the Loans were not restricted under the transfer pricing rules (cf. ground 1 above) but instead disallowed under the unallowable purpose rule in section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009 (cf. ground 2 above). Excerpt regarding application of transfer pricing rules “34. Paragraph 1.6 of both the 1995 and 2010 versions of the OECD guidelines explains that what Article 9 of the model convention seeks to do is to adjust profits by reference to “the conditions which would have obtained between independent enterprises in comparable transactions and comparable circumstances” (a comparable “uncontrolled transaction”, as opposed to the actual “controlled transaction”). The 2010 version adds that this comparability analysis is at the “heart of the application of the arm’s length principle”, while explaining at para. 1.9 that there are cases, for example involving specialised goods or services or unique intangibles, where a comparability analysis is difficult or complicated to apply. 35. In its discussion of comparability analysis, para. 1.15 of the 1995 version states: “Application of the arm’s length principle is generally based on a comparison of the conditions in a controlled transaction with the conditions in transactions between independent enterprises. In order for such comparisons to be useful, the economically relevant characteristics of the situations being compared must be sufficiently comparable. To be comparable means that none of the differences (if any) between the situations being compared could materially affect the condition being examined in the methodology (e.g. price or margin), or that reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the effect of any such differences. In determining the degree of comparability, including what adjustments are necessary to establish it, an understanding of how unrelated companies evaluate potential transactions is required. Independent enterprises, when evaluating the terms of a potential transaction, will compare the transaction to the other options realistically available to them, and they will only enter into the transaction if they see no alternative that is clearly more attractive. For example, one enterprise is unlikely to accept a price offered for its product by an independent enterprise if it knows that other potential customers are willing to pay more under similar conditions. This point is relevant to the question of comparability, since independent enterprises would generally take into account any economically relevant differences between the options realistically available to them (such as differences in the level of risk or other comparability factors discussed below) when valuing those options. Therefore, when making the comparisons entailed by application of the arm’s length principle, tax administrations should also take these differences into account when establishing whether there is comparability between the situations being compared and what adjustments may be necessary to achieve comparability.” Similar text appears at paras. 1.33 and 1.34 of the 2010 version. 36. As can be seen from this, it is essential that the “economically relevant characteristics” are “sufficiently comparable”, in the sense of any differences either not having a material effect on the relevant condition (term) of the transaction, or being capable of being adjusted for with reasonable accuracy so as to eliminate their effect. 37. Paragraph 1.17 of the 1995 version expands on the concept of differences as follows: “… In order to establish the degree of actual comparability and then to make appropriate adjustments to establish arm’s length conditions (or a range thereof), it is necessary to compare attributes of the transactions or enterprises that would affect conditions in arm’s length dealings. Attributes that may be important include the characteristics of the property or services transferred, the functions performed by the parties (taking into account assets used and risks assumed), the contractual terms, the economic circumstances of the parties, and the business strategies pursued by the parties…” Again, this is reflected in the 2010 version, at ...

The case concerned interest payments of €15,636,270 on loans granted to finance the acquisition of shares in X-Group. In its corporate income tax return for FY2011, “Holding B.V.” had deducted an interest expense of €2,478,638 from its taxable profit, considering that the remaining part of its interest expenses were excluded from tax deductions under the interest limitation rule in Article 10a of the Corporate Income Tax Act. The tax authority disallowed tax deductions for the full amount refering to both local interest limitation rules and general anti-avoidance principles. It found that the main motive of the complex financial arrangement that had been set up to finance the acquisition of shares in the X-Group was to obtain tax benefits. An appeal was filed in which “Holding B.V.” now argued that the full amount of interest on the loans could be deducted from its taxable profits. It also argued that a loan fee could be deducted from its taxable profits in a lump sum. The District Court and the Court of Appeal largely ruled in favour of the tax authorities. An appeal and cross-appeal was then filed with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found the principal appeal by “Holding B.V.” well-founded and partially reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Excerpts in English “4.3.3 Article 10a(1) opening words and (c) of the Act aims to prevent the Dutch tax base from being eroded by the deduction of interest due on a debt incurred arbitrarily and without business reasons. This is the case if, within a group of affiliated entities, the method of financing a business-based transaction is prompted to such an extent by tax motives – erosion of the Dutch tax base – that it includes legal acts that are not necessary for the realisation of those business-based objectives and that would not have been carried out without those tax motives (profit drain). 4.3.4 In the genesis history of section 10a of the Act, it has been noted that the scope of this section is limited to cases of group profit drainage. Here, it must be assumed that an entity does not belong to the taxpayer’s group if that entity is not considered to be an associated entity under section 10a(4) of the Act.8 This means that Article 10a(1) chapeau and (c) of the Act lacks application in the case where, although the debt incurred by the taxpayer is related to the acquisition or expansion of an interest in an entity subsequently related to him (the taxpayer), that debt was incurred with another entity not related to him (the taxpayer). This is therefore the case even if this other entity has a direct or indirect interest in the taxpayer, or if this other entity is otherwise related to the taxpayer. This applies even if, in that case, the debt is not predominantly based on business considerations. As a rule, this situation does not fall within the scope of Section 10a(1) opening words and (c) of the Act. 4.3.5 The circumstance that, in the case referred to above in 4.3.4, Article 10a(1) opening words and (c) of the Act does not, as a rule, prevent interest from being eligible for deduction when determining profit, does not, however, mean that such deduction can then be accepted in all cases. Deduction of interest, as far as relevant here, cannot be accepted if (a) the incurring of the debt with the entity not related to the taxpayer is part of a set of legal transactions between affiliated entities, and (b) this set of legal transactions has been brought about with the decisive purpose of thwarting affiliation within the meaning of Section 10a(4) of the Act. Having regard to what has been considered above in 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 regarding the purpose of Section 10a(1) opening words and (c) of the Act, the purpose and purport of that provision would be thwarted if such a combination of legal acts could result in the deduction of that interest not being able to be refused under that provision when determining profits. 4.4 With regard to part A of plea II, the following is considered. 4.4.1 Also in view of what has been set out above in 4.3.1 to 4.3.5, the circumstances relevant in this case can be summarised as follows. (i) The loans referred to above in 2.5.3 are in connection with the acquisition of an interest in an entity that is subsequently a related entity to the interested party (the top holder). (ii) Sub-Fund I is a related entity to interested party within the meaning of section 10a(4) of the Act (see above in 2.3.1). (iii) Sub-Fund V is not such a related entity (see above in 2.3.2 and 2.3.5). (iv) All investors who participate as limited partners in LP 1 also and only participate as limited partners in LP 1A, so that sub-fund I and sub-fund V are indirectly held by the same group of investors. (v) In relation to both sub-funds I and V, the Court held – uncontested in cassation – that they are subject to corporation tax in Guernsey at a rate of nil. 4.4.2 The circumstances described above in 4.4.1 mean that the part of each of the loans granted by sub-fund V to the interested party does not, in principle, fall within the scope of section 10a(1)(c) of the Act. However, based on the same circumstances, no other inference is possible than that, if this part of each of the loans had been provided by sub-fund I and not by sub-fund V, this part would unquestionably fall within the purview of Section 10a(1)(c) of the Act, and the interested party would not have been able to successfully invoke the rebuttal mechanism of Section 10a(3)(b) of the Act in respect of the interest payable in respect of that part. 4.4.3 As reflected above in 3.2.2, the Court held that, in view of the contrived insertion of LP 1A into the structure, the overriding motive for the allocation ...

The Supreme Court in the Netherlands requested a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice to clarify its case-law on, inter alia, the freedom of establishment laid down in Article 49 TFEU, specifically whether it is compatible with that freedom for the tax authorities of a Member State to refuse to a company belonging to a cross-border group the right to deduct from its taxable profits the interest it pays on such a loan debt.  The anti-avoidance rule in question is contained in Article 10a of the Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 1969. The rule is specifically designed to tackle tax avoidance practices related to intra-group acquisition loans. Under that legislation, the contracting of a loan debt by a taxable person with a related entity – for the purposes of acquiring or extending an interest in another entity – is, in certain circumstances, presumed to be an artificial arrangement, designed to erode the Netherlands tax base. Consequently, that person is precluded from deducting the interest on the debt from its taxable profits unless it can rebut that presumption. The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) asked the European Court of Justice to clarify its findings in its judgment in Lexel, on whether such intra-group loans may be, for that purpose, regarded as wholly artificial arrangements, even if carried out on an arm’s length basis, and the interest set at the usual market rate. “(1)      Are Articles 49 TFEU, 56 TFEU and/or 63 TFEU to be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the interest on a loan debt contracted with an entity related to the taxable person, being a debt connected with the acquisition or extension of an interest in an entity which, following that acquisition or extension, is a related entity, is not deductible when determining the profits of the taxable person because the debt concerned must be categorised as (part of) a wholly artificial arrangement, regardless of whether the debt concerned, viewed in isolation, was contracted at arm’s length? (2)      If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, must Articles 49 TFEU, 56 TFEU and/or 63 TFEU be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the deduction of  the interest on a loan debt contracted with an entity related to the taxable person and regarded as (part of) a wholly artificial arrangement, being a debt connected with the acquisition or extension of an interest in an entity which, following that acquisition or extension, is a related entity, is disallowed in full  when determining the profits of the taxable person, even where that interest in itself does not exceed the amount that would have been agreed upon between companies which are independent of one another? (3)      For the purpose of answering Questions 1 and/or 2, does it make any difference whether the relevant acquisition or extension of the interest relates (a) to an entity that was already an entity related to the taxable person prior to that acquisition or extension, or (b) to an entity that becomes an entity related to the taxpayer only after such acquisition or extension?” Opinion of the Advocate General The Advocate General found that the Dutch anti-avoidance rule in Article 10a was both justified, appropriate and necessary – and therefore not in conflict with Article 49 of the TFEU – irrespective of the Court’s earlier judgment in the Swedish Lexel Case. Excerpts “(…) 71. In my view, the approach suggested by the intervening governments and the Commission is the correct one. Consequently, I urge the Court to revisit the approach it took in the judgment in Lexel on the matter at issue. 72. Freedom of establishment, as guaranteed by Article 49 TFEU, offers quite a wide opportunity for tax ‘optimisation’. The Court has repeatedly held that European groups of companies can legitimately use that freedom to establish subsidiaries in Member States for the purpose of benefiting from a favourable tax regime. (30) Thus, as X submits, A could legitimately choose to establish the internal bank of its group, C, in Belgium for that very purpose. Similarly, C may well grant loans to other companies of the group established in other Member States, like X in the Netherlands. Cross-border intra-group loans are not, per se, objectionable. (31) Certainly, such a loan may entail a reduction of the corporate tax base of the borrowing company in the Member State where it is established. Indeed, by deducting the interest on that loan from its taxable profits, that company reduces its tax liability with respect to that Member State. In effect, some of the profits made by the borrowing company are shifted, in the form of interest charges, from the Member State where it is established to the Member State where the lender company has its seat. However, that is something that the Member States must, in principle, accept in an integrated, single market such as the internal market of the European Union. 73. Nevertheless, the Court recognised a clear limit in that regard. It is a general legal principle that EU law, including freedom of establishment, cannot be relied on for abusive ends. The concept of ‘wholly artificial arrangements’ must be read in that light. Pursuant to the settled case-law of the Court, it is abusive for economic operators established in different Member States to carry out ‘artificial transactions devoid of economic and commercial justification’ (or, stated differently, ‘which do not reflect economic reality’), thus fulfilling the conditions to benefit from a tax advantage only formally, ‘with the essential aim of benefiting from [that] advantage’.(32) 74. Furthermore, in its judgment in X (Controlled companies established in third countries), (33) the Court has specified, with respect to the free movement of capital guaranteed by Article 63 TFEU, that ‘the artificial creation of the conditions required in order to escape taxation in a Member State improperly or enjoy a tax advantage in that Member State improperly can take several forms as regards cross-border movements of capital’. In that context, it held that the concept of ‘wholly artificial arrangement’ is capable of covering ‘any ...

A S.A. had transferred a dividend receivable to an indirect shareholder for the purpose of acquiring other companies. The tax authorities considered the transfer to be a loan, for which A S.A should have received arm’s length interest and issued an assessment on that basis. A complaint was filed by A S.A. with the tax Court, which ruled in favour of A S.A. and dismissed the assessmemt in 2021 An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Court The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decission of the tax court and dismissed the appeal of the tax authorities. According to the Court the local transfer pricing in article 58 of the CIRC, in the wording in force at the time of the facts did not allow for a recharacterization of a transaction, only for a re-quantification. A recharacterization of the transaction would at the time of the facts only be possible under the Portuguese general anti-abuse clause, which required the tax authorities to prove that the arrangement had been put in place for securing a tax advantage. Such evidence had not been presented. Excerpt “In other words, the fact that the transfer of credits arising from ancillary benefits to non-shareholders is not common is not enough to destroy the characteristics of the ancillary obligation set out in the articles of association, which, as is well known, can be transferred – see art. Furthermore, the Tax Authority’s reasoning reveals a total disregard for the rest of the applicable legal regime, namely the restitution regime provided for in Article 213 of the CSC, which gives them the unquestionable character of quasi-equity benefits. In fact, since the admissibility of supplementary capital contributions in public limited companies has been debated for a long time, but with the majority of legal scholars being in favor of such contributions, the enshrinement in the articles of association of the figure of accessory obligations following the supplementary contributions regime appeared as a solution to the possibility of internal financing of the public limited company, (See, for example, Paulo Olavo Cunha in Direito das Sociedades Comerciais, 3rd edition, Almedina, 2007, pages 441 and 442 (in a contemporary annotation with the legal framework in force at the time). ) . Furthermore, as pointed out by the Deputy Attorney General, whose reasoning, due to its assertiveness, we do not hesitate to refer to again, “This situation is not unrelated to the fact that, in the corporate structure in question, the company “D… ” has a majority stake in the company “A…”, and there is even doctrine that defends “the possibility of transferring the credits resulting from the supplementary installments autonomously from the status of partner” – in an explicit allusion to the view taken by Rui Pinto Duarte (Author cited, “Escritos sobre Direito das Sociedades”, Coimbra Editora, 2008). In conclusion: if the Tax Administration believed that the evidence it had found, to which we have already referred, strongly indicated that the transaction in question was really about the parties providing financing to the company “D…, S.A. “, it was imperative that it had made use of the anti-abuse clause (although there are legal scholars who also include article 58 of the CIRC in the special anti-abuse rules – see Rui Duarte Morais, “Sobre a Notção de “cláusulas antiabusos”, Direito Fiscal, Estudos Jurídicos e Económicos em Homenagem ao Prof. Dr. António Sousa Franco III 2006, p.879 /894) and use the procedure laid down in Article 63 of the CPPT, as the Appellant claims. What is not legitimate, however, in these circumstances, “in view of the letter of the law and the teleology of the transfer pricing system as enshrined in the IRC Code and developed in Ministerial Order 1446-C/2001, is to use this system to carry out a sort of half-correction and, in the other half, i.e., For cases of this nature, there is a specific legal instrument in the legal system – the CGAA – specially designed and aimed at combating this type of practice (Bruno Santiago & António Queiroz Martins, “Os preços de transferência na compra e venda de participações sociais entre entidades relacionadas”, Cadernos Preços de Transferência, Almedina, 2013, Coordenação João Taborda Gama). …” Click here for English translation. Click here for other translation ...

“Lux Credit B.V.” took out various credit facilities from related parties [company name 2] s.a.r.l. and [company name 3] s.a.r.l. – both resident in Luxembourg. These were financings whereby “Lux Credit facility B.V.” could draw funds (facilities) up to a pre-agreed maximum amount. In doing so, “Lux Credit B.V.” owed both interest and “commitment fees”. The commitment fees were calculated on the maximum amount of the facility. Interest and commitment fees were owed. The interest payable to [company name 2] and [company name 3], respectively, was calculated by deducting the commitment fees from the interest payable on the amount withdrawn, with interest payable on the amount withdrawn, the commitment fees owed after the due date and the interest owed after the due date. In its returns for the current financial years, “Lux Credit B.V.” charged both interest and commitment fees against taxable profit. Following an audit, an assessment of additional taxable income was issued for the financial years 2012/2013 – 2016/2017. According to the tax authorities, the financial arrangement was not at arm’s length. The interest rate and commitment fees were adjusted and part of the loans were classified as equity. A complaint was filed by “Lux Credit B.V.” Judgement of the District Court The Court found mainly in favour of Credit Facility B.V.. It upheld most of the adjustments relating to commitment fees, but overturned the adjustment to the interest rate. According to the Court, Lux Credit B.V. was entitled to an interest deduction for the years under review, calculated at the contractually agreed interest rate on the amounts actually borrowed. Excerpts “51. With regard to the transfer pricing documentation, the court considers the following. Although the documentation referred to in Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Vpb Act was not available at the time the defendant requested it, the claimant has remedied this defect by again preparing records to substantiate the conditions surrounding the facilities. In the court’s opinion, the defendant did not make it plausible with what it argued that the claimant’s administration contains such defects and shortcomings that it cannot serve as a basis for the profit calculation that must lead to the conclusion that the claimant did not file the required return.10 The court also took into account that the parliamentary history of Section 8b of the 1969 Vpb Act noted that the documentation requirement of Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Vpb Act relates to the availability of information necessary to assess whether the prices and conditions(transfer prices) used in affiliated relationships qualify as arm’s length. 11 In the court’s opinion, the defendant has not argued sufficiently to conclude that the transfer-pricing data further collected, prepared and documented by the claimant and the documents that were present at [company name 2] and [company name 3] on the determination of the credit ratings are so deficient that the claimant has not complied with the obligations of Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Income Tax Act. The fact that source documents for the period, in which the transactions were entered into, have not been preserved and the defendant has comments on the data used by the claimant and disagrees with the outcomes of the claimant, do not alter this.” “56. In the court’s view, the defendant was right to make the adjustments in respect of commitment fees on facilities 1 and 3 for the years under review. The defendant was also correct in imposing the 2014/2015, 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 assessments to correct the commitment fees on Facility 7bn. In assessing whether the defendant was justified in making those corrections, the court relied on what [company name 1] and [company name 2] and [company name 3] agreed on civilly. The agreements between [company name 1] and [company name 2] and [company name 3] explicitly distinguish between interest due and commitment fees due. The court therefore rejects the plaintiff’s position that it must be assessed whether the total of the commitment fee and interest costs remained within the margins of Section 8b of the 1969 Vpb Act, and the commitment fee and interest costs should be considered together as an “all-in rate”. That the terms of Facilities 1, 3 and 7bn show similarities with Payment in Kind loans, as claimed by the claimant, does not make it necessary in this case to deviate from what the parties agreed under civil law. Indeed, the defendant has argued, with reasons, that stipulating headroom for the purpose of funding interest that may be credited, if the same facts and circumstances are present, is not usual in the market but it is usual in the market that over interest to be credited, a charge arises only at the time of the maturity of the interest. It is not usual that a charge – in this case in the form of commitment fees – is already due before the due date. This involves a double burden, as interest is also charged on the commitment fee. On the other hand, the plaintiff has not made it plausible that independent third-party parties were willing to agree such terms in similar circumstances, nor has it made its economic reality plausible. The court also took into account that the claimant did not make any calculations, prior to setting the maximum amount and commitment fees. 57. In the court’s view, the defendant was right to make the adjustments in respect of the commitment fees and interest payable thereon in respect of Facility 5. The defendant has made it plausible that such an agreement between independent third parties will not be concluded. The defendant was right to point out the following aspects:” “In the court’s opinion, with what the defendant has put forward and also in view of what the claimant has put forward in response, the defendant has failed to make it plausible that the interest rates agreed by [company name 1] , [company name 2] and [company name 3] regarding facilities 1, 3 and 7bn are not in line with what would have been agreed by independent parties in the ...