14 February 2023 the Council of the European Union published an updated list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions. The British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica, the Marshall Islands and Russia have been added to the list, which now comprises 16 jurisdictions: American Samoa Anguilla Bahamas British Virgin Islands Costa Rica Fiji Guam Marshall Islands Palau Panama Russia Samoa Trinidad and Tobago Turks and Caicos Islands US Virgin Islands Vanuatu This revised EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions includes countries that either have not engaged in a constructive dialogue with the EU on tax governance or have failed to deliver on their commitments to implement the necessary reforms. Those reforms should aim to comply with a set of objective tax good governance criteria, which include tax transparency, fair taxation and implementation of international standards designed to prevent tax base erosion and profit shifting. For the Marshall Islands, there are concerns that this jurisdiction which has a zero or only nominal rate of corporate income tax is attracting profits without real economic activity (criterion 2.2 of the EU list). In particular, the Marshall Islands were found to be lacking in the enforcement of economic substance requirements. The Marshall Islands have been listed already once, in 2018. British Virgin Islands are listed because they were found not to be sufficiently in compliance with the OECD standard on exchange of information on request (criterion 1.2). This is the first time this jurisdiction is listed. For the first time since the list was established, Costa Rica is included because it has not fulfilled its commitment to abolish or amend the harmful aspects of its foreign source income exemption regime (criterion 2.1). Russia is listed after the code of conduct group screened Russia’s new legislation adopted in 2022 against the good tax governance criteria of the code and found that Russia had not fulfilled its commitment to address the harmful aspects of a special regime for international holding companies (criterion 2.1). In addition, dialogue with Russia on matters related to taxation came to a standstill following the Russian aggression against Ukraine ...

A new huge leak of financial records revealed by ICIJ, once again shows widespread use of offshore accounts, shell companies and trusts to hide wealth and/or avoid taxes. The new leak is known as the Pandora Papers and follows other recent leaks – lux leak, panama papers, paradise papers. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists obtained 11.9 million confidential documents from 14 separate legal and financial services firms, which the group said offered “a sweeping look at an industry that helps the world’s ultrawealthy, powerful government officials and other elites conceal trillions of dollars from tax authorities, prosecutors and others.” “The key players in the system include elite institutions – multinational banks, law firms and accounting practices – headquartered in the U.S. and Europe.” The Consortium said the 2.94 terabytes of financial and legal data shows the “offshore money machine operates in every corner of the planet, including the world’s largest democracies,” and involves some of the world’s most well-known banks and legal firms. “The Pandora Papers provide more than twice as much information about the ownership of offshore companies. In all, the new leak of documents reveals the real owners of more than 29,000 offshore companies. The owners come from more than 200 countries and territories, with the largest contingents from Russia, the U.K., Argentina and China.” “Pandora Papers” leaks: Statement by Bob Hamilton, Chair of the Forum on Tax Administration and Chris Jordan, Chair of the FTA’s Joint International Task Force on Shared Intelligence and Collaboration On October 14, a statement was issued by the OECD The Forum on Tax Administration and its Joint International Task Force on Shared Intelligence and Collaboration (JITSIC) are already working collaboratively in response to the recent “Pandora Papers” leaks. This follows the model successfully adopted for the Panama and Paradise Papers leaks. 14/10/2021 – The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) has recently released information relating to its review of data leaks referred to as the Pandora Papers. As a result of the strong partnerships established through its JITSIC Network, the OECD Forum on Tax Administration (FTA) is well positioned to enable a collaborative approach to identifying and addressing aggressive tax avoidance and tax evasion involving multiple jurisdictions once the data becomes available. The FTA is dedicated to tax transparency and tax co-operation through the delivery of its collaborative work programme, and its members have access to a range of tools and platforms to help tackle offshore tax evasion and avoidance, including: The FTA’s JITSIC network, which provides an effective and well-established platform to its 42 members to cooperate directly on individual cases, as well as sharing their experience, resources and expertise. This direct and immediate collaboration proved to be very effective following the Panama and Paradise Papers leaks. JITSIC, like tax administrations more generally, operates under strict rules designed to protect the confidentiality of information and the confidence of taxpayers. As a consequence much of the work of JITSIC is not always visible to the public. The OECD standard on the exchange of information on request, which provides a powerful framework for tax administrations to receive detailed information on taxpayers’ offshore affairs from 163 jurisdictions. The OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS) under which there is automatic reporting of information between more than 100 jurisdictions on the offshore financial accounts of non-residents, to their jurisdiction of residence. Information on these financial accounts, as well as the requirements envisaged by the transparency and exchange of information on request standard, ensure greater transparency of ownership of companies, trusts, and other similar structures, the importance of which has been illustrated in the Pandora Papers. As has been the case with previous leaks, JITSIC members will continue to work together to pool resources, share information and rapidly develop a more accurate picture of potential wrong doing in order to facilitate further investigations. While the information contained in such leaks can be of value in investigations, the inclusion of information about an individual or entity in a data leak does not automatically mean that there has been non-compliance ...

A new huge leak of financial records revealed by ICIJ, once again shows widespread use of offshore accounts, shell companies and trusts to hide wealth and/or avoid taxes. The new leak is known as the Pandora Papers and follows other recent leaks – lux leak, panama papers, paradise papers. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists obtained 11.9 million confidential documents from 14 separate legal and financial services firms, which the group said offered “a sweeping look at an industry that helps the world’s ultrawealthy, powerful government officials and other elites conceal trillions of dollars from tax authorities, prosecutors and others.” “The key players in the system include elite institutions – multinational banks, law firms and accounting practices – headquartered in the U.S. and Europe.” The Consortium said the 2.94 terabytes of financial and legal data shows the “offshore money machine operates in every corner of the planet, including the world’s largest democracies,” and involves some of the world’s most well-known banks and legal firms. “The Pandora Papers provide more than twice as much information about the ownership of offshore companies. In all, the new leak of documents reveals the real owners of more than 29,000 offshore companies. The owners come from more than 200 countries and territories, with the largest contingents from Russia, the U.K., Argentina and China.” ...

Redington India Limited (RIL) established a wholly-owned subsidiary Redington Gulf (RG) in the Jebel Ali Free Zone of the UAE in 2004. The subsidiary was responsible for the Redington group’s business in the Middle East and Africa. Four years later in July 2008, RIL set up a wholly-owned subsidiary company in Mauritius, RM. In turn, this company set up its wholly-owned subsidiary in the Cayman Islands (RC) – a step-down subsidiary of RIL. On 13 November 2008, RIL transferred its entire shareholding in RG to RC without consideration, and within a week after the transfer, a 27% shareholding in RC was sold by RG to a private equity fund Investcorp, headquartered in Cayman Islands for a price of Rs.325.78 Crores. RIL claimed that the transfer of its shares in RG to RC was a gift and therefore, exempt from capital gains taxation in India. It was also claimed that transfer pricing provisions were not applicable as income was exempt from tax. The Indian tax authorities disagreed and found that the transfer of shares was a taxable transaction, as the three defining requirements of a gift were not met – that the transfer should be (i) voluntary, (ii) without consideration and that (iii) the property so transferred should be accepted by the donee. The tax authorities also relied on the documents for the transfer of shares, the CFO statement, and the law dealing with the transfer of property. The arm’s length price was determined by the tax authorities using the comparable uncontrolled price method – referring to the pricing of the shares transferred to Investcorp. In the tax assessment, the authorities had also denied deductions for trademark fees paid by RIL to a Singapore subsidiary for the use of the “Redington” name. The tax authorities had also imputed a fee for RIL providing guarantees in favour of its subsidiaries. RIL disagreed with the assessment and brought the case before the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) who ruled in favour of the tax authorities. The case was then brought before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) who ruled in favour of RIL. ITAT’s ruling was then brought before the High Court by the tax authorities. The decision of the High Court The High Court ruled that transfer of shares in RG by RIL to its step-down subsidiary (RC) as part of corporate restructuring could not be qualified as a gift. Extraneous considerations had compelled RIL to make the transfer of shares, thereby rendering the transfer involuntary. The entire transaction was structured to accommodate a third party-investor, who had put certain conditions even prior to effecting the transfer. According to the court, the transfer of shares was a circular transaction put in place to avoid payment of taxes. “Thus, if the chain of events is considered, it is evidently clear that the incorporation of the company in Mauritius and Cayman Islands just before the transfer of shares is undoubtedly a means to avoid taxation in India and the said two companies have been used as conduits to avoid income tax” observed the Court. The High Court also disallowed deductions for trademark fees paid by RIL to a Singapore subsidiary. The court stated it was illogical for a subsidiary company to claim Trademark fee from its parent company (RIL), especially when there was no documentation to show that the subsidiary was the owner of the trademark. It was also noted that RIL had been using the trademark in question since 1993 – long before the subsidiary in Singapore was established in 2005. Regarding the guarantees, the Court concluded these were financial services provided by RIL to it’s subsidiaries for which a remuneration (fee/commission) was required ...

12 March 2019 the EU Council added ten jurisdictions to the list of Non-Cooperative Tax Jurisdictions – Tax Havens. Non-Cooperative Tax Jurisdictions are those that refused to engage with the EU or to address tax good governance shortcomings. As of March 2019 the EU list of Non-Cooperative Tax Jurisdictions includes 15 countries: American Samoa Barbados Guam Samoa Trinidad and Tobago US Virgin Islands Aruba Belize Bermuda Dominica Fiji Marshall Islands Oman United Arab Emirates Vanuatu ...

On December 5, 2017, the EU published it’s blacklist of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions (tax havens). 1. American Samoa American Samoa does not apply any automatic exchange of financial information, has not signed and ratified, including through the jurisdiction they are dependent on, the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. 2. Bahrain Bahrain does not cover all EU Member States for the purpose of automatic exchange of information, has not signed and ratified the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended, facilitates offshore structures and arrangements aimed at attracting profits without real economic substance, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. 3. Barbados Barbados has a harmful preferential tax regime and did not clearly commit to amending or abolishing it as requested by 31 December 2018. Barbados’ commitment to amend or abolish other harmful tax regimes in line with criterion 2.1 will be monitored. 4. Grenada Grenada has not signed and ratified the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended and did not clearly commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. Grenada’s commitment to comply with criteria 1.1, 2.1 and 3 will be monitored. 5. Guam Guam does not apply any automatic exchange of financial information, has not signed and ratified, including through the jurisdiction they are dependent on, the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. 6. Korea (Republic of) Korea has harmful preferential tax regimes and did not commit to amending or abolishing them by 31 December 2018. 7. Macao SAR Macao SAR has not signed and ratified, including through the jurisdiction they are dependent on, the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. Macao SAR’s commitment to comply with criteria 1.1 and 2.1 will be monitored. 8. Marshall Islands Marshall Islands facilitates offshore structures and arrangements aimed at attracting profits without real economic substance, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. Marshal Islands’ commitment to comply with criteria 1.1 and 1.2 will be monitored. 9. Mongolia Mongolia is not a member of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, has not signed and ratified the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2019. 10. Namibia Namibia is not a Member of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, has not signed and ratified the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2019. Furthermore, Namibia has harmful preferential tax regimes and did not commit to amending or abolishing them by 31 December 2018. 11. Palau Palau facilitates offshore structures and arrangements aimed at attracting profits without real economic substance and refused to engage in a meaningful dialogue to ascertain its compliance of with criterion 2.2. Palau’s commitment to comply with criteria 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 3 will be monitored. The following jurisdictions are committed to implement automatic exchange of information by 2018: Curaçao, Hong Kong SAR, New Caledonia, Oman, Qatar and Taiwan 12. Panama Panama has a harmful preferential tax regime and did not clearly commit to amending or abolishing it as requested by 31 December 2018. Panama’s commitment to amend or abolish other harmful tax regimes in line with criterion 2.1 will be monitored. 13. Saint Lucia Saint Lucia has harmful preferential tax regimes, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not clearly commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. 14. Samoa Samoa has harmful preferential tax regimes, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. 15. Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago has been attributed a rating of “Non Compliant” by the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, has not signed and ratified the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters as amended, has a harmful preferential tax regime and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. Trinidad and Tobago’s commitment to comply with criteria 1.1 and 3 will be monitored. 16. Tunisia Tunisia has harmful preferential tax regimes and did not commit to amending or abolishing them by 31 December 2018. Tunisia’s commitment to comply with criterion 3 will be monitored. 17. United Arab Emirates The United Arab Emirates does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. United Arab Emirates’ commitment to comply with criteria 1.1 and 1.3 will be monitored. Fair Taxation The following jurisdictions are committed to amend or abolish the identified regimes by 2018: Andorra, Armenia, Aruba, Belize, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cook Islands, Curacao, Fiji, Hong Kong SAR, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Mauritius, Morocco, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay and Vietnam. The following jurisdictions have not explicitly reiterated the commitment taken at the FHTP to amend or abolish the identified regimes by 2018: Malaysia and Labuan Island. The following jurisdictions are committed to addressing the concerns relating to economic substance by 2018: Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey and Vanuatu. Transparency The following jurisdictions are committed to implement automatic exchange of information by 2018: Curaçao, Hong Kong SAR, New Caledonia, Oman, Qatar and Taiwan. The following jurisdictions are committed to implement automatic exchange of information by 2019: Turkey. The following jurisdictions are committed to become member of the Global ...

A tax assessment based on Japanese CFC rules (anti-tax haven rules) had been applied to a Japanese Group’s (Denso), subsidiary in Singapore. According to Japanese CFC rules, income arising from a foreign subsidiary located in a state or territory with significantly lower tax rates is deemed to arise as the income of the parent company when the principal business of the subsidiary is holding shares or IP rights. However, the CFC rules do not apply when the subsidiary has substance and it makes economic sense to conduct business in the subsidiary in the low tax jurisdiction. According to the Supreme Court, total revenue, number of employees, and fixed facilities are relevant in this determination. The Singapore subsidiary managed it’s own subsidiaries or affiliates in other territories, and while the income from services to logistics in those territories represented 85% of its revenue, between 80% and 90% of it’s income came from dividends from its subsidiaries and affiliates. The Supreme Court held that the Singapore subsidiary had conducted a broad range of businesses – including finance and logistics – with the economically rational purpose of streamlining its ASEAN operations, and thus set aside the CFC taxation. Click here for English translation ...

By Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Jan Fichtner, Frank W. Takes, & Eelke M. Heemskerk Multinational corporations use highly complex structures of parents and subsidiaries to organize their operations and ownership. Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs) facilitate these structures through low taxation and lenient regulation, but are increasingly under scrutiny, for instance for enabling tax avoidance. Therefore, the identifcation of OFC jurisdictions has become a politicized and contested issue. We introduce a novel data-driven approach for identifying OFCs based on the global corporate ownership network, in which over 98 million firms (nodes) are connected through 71 million ownership relations. This granular firm-level network data uniquely allows identifying both sink-OFCs and conduit-OFCs. Sink-OFCs attract and retain foreign capital while conduit-OFCs are attractive intermediate destinations in the routing of international investments and enable the transfer of capital without taxation. We identify 24 sink-OFCs. In addition, a small set of countries – the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Singapore and Switzerland – canalize the majority of corporate offshore investment as conduit-OFCs. Each conduit jurisdiction is specialized in a geographical area and there is signifcant specialization based on industrial sectors. Against the idea of OFCs as exotic small islands that cannot be regulated, we show that many sink and conduit-OFCs are highly developed countries. Conduits-and-Sinks-in-the-Global-Corporate-Ownership-Network.pdf ...

A tax assessment based on Japanese CFC rules (anti-tax haven rules) had been applied to a “TH Corp”‘s, subsidiary in Singapore. According to Japanese CFC rules, income arising from a foreign subsidiary located in a state or territory with significantly lower tax rates is deemed to arise as the income of the parent company when the principal business of the subsidiary is holding shares or IP rights. However, the CFC rules do not apply when the subsidiary has substance and it makes economic sense to conduct business in the subsidiary in the low tax jurisdiction. Judgement of the court. According to the court, total revenue, number of employees, and fixed facilities are relevant in this determination. The Court held that the Singapore subsidiary had conducted a broad range of businesses – including finance and logistics – with the economically rational purpose of streamlining its ASEAN operations, and thus set aside the CFC taxation. Excerpt “Satisfaction of the substance and control criteria (a) According to the above-mentioned findings, A1 rents an office in Singapore and uses it for the regional control business. Therefore, it can be said that A1 has fixed facilities in Singapore, the country where its head office is located, which are deemed to be necessary for the conduct of its main business, the regional control business. Therefore, it satisfies the substantive criteria (Article 6-6(4) and (3) of the Act). (b) According to the facts certified above, A1 holds general meetings of shareholders and meetings of the board of directors, executes the duties of officers, and prepares and keeps accounting books in Singapore. Therefore, it can be said that A1 manages, controls and operates its own business in the country where its head office is located, and therefore, the management control standard (Article 66-6 Article 66-6, paragraphs 4 and 3). Conclusion According to the above, A1 satisfies all of the requirements for exemption from application, namely, the business criterion, the country of domicile criterion, the substance criterion and the control criterion. Therefore, the plaintiff is exempted from the application of Article 66-6(1) of the Measures Act in each of the fiscal years in question.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Oxfam’s list of Tax Havens, in order of significance are: (1) Bermuda (2) the Cayman Islands (3) the Netherlands (4) Switzerland (5) Singapore (6) Ireland (7) Luxembourg (8) Curaçao (9) Hong Kong (10) Cyprus (11) Bahamas (12) Jersey (13) Barbados, (14) Mauritius and (15) the British Virgin Islands. Most notably is The Netherlands placement as no. 3 on the list. Oxfam researchers compiled the list by assessing the extent to which countries employ the most damaging tax policies, such as zero corporate tax rates, the provision of unfair and unproductive tax incentives, and a lack of cooperation with international processes against tax avoidance (including measures to increase financial transparency). Many of the countries on the list have been implicated in tax scandals. For example Ireland hit the headlines over a tax deal with Apple that enabled the global tech giant to pay a 0.005 percent corporate tax rate in the country. And the British Virgin Islands is home to more than half of the 200,000 offshore companies set up by Mossack Fonseca – the law firm at the heart of the Panama Papers scandal. The United Kingdom does not feature on the list, but four territories that the United Kingdom is ultimately responsible for do appear: the Cayman Islands, Jersey, Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands ...

According to a royal decrete dividends received deduction is not available in Belgium where the recieving company is resident in a country defined to be a “tax haven” A tax haven is defined as a country where: (1) the nominal rate of the corporate income tax is less than 15%; or (2) the effective corporate tax burden is less than 15%. The Belgien list of “tax haven” jurisdictions for 2016 contains the following countries: Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dubai, Gibraltar, Guernsey, Jersey, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait, Kosovo, Liechtenstein, Macao, Macedonia, Maldives, Isle of Man, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Oman, Uzbekistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Ras al Khaimah, Serbia, Sharjah, East Timor, Turkmenistan, and Umm al Quaiwain ...

“X Beverages S.A.” had entered into an agreement with the ABCDE Group for the use of concentrate and trademarks for the production and sale of beverages in Spain, but according to the agreement, “X Beverages S.A.” only paid for the concentrate. Following an audit for the financial years 2005-2007, the tax authorities issued an assessment which considered part of the payment to be royalties on which withholding tax should have been paid. Court’s Judgement The Court agreed that part of the payment could be qualified as royalties, but the assessment made by the tax authorities had been based on secret comparables – leaving the taxpayer defenceless – and on this basis the Court annulled the assessment. Excerpts “The taxpayer itself seems to recognize that the so-called “Contract of …” contains both a distribution contract and a trademark assignment contract when it says on page 127 of its statement of allegations “Indeed, this authorization of use is necessary to be able to carry out the activity of packaging and distribution that is the object of the contract, and it would not be possible for X to carry out its obligations under the contract if it did not have this authorization to use the trademark. If X did not have the right to use the trademark, it would not be able to package and label the product as required by its principal (Z), nor would it be able to distribute it under said trademark, in accordance with the terms of the contract.” And although the “authorization of use” of the trademark recognized by the taxpayer is qualified by the latter as an obligation and not as a right of the same, seeming to want to reach the conclusion that only if it were a right it would generate a royalty, in the opinion of this Court both aspects (obligation and right) are not mutually exclusive but complementary: X acquires the right to use the trademark and the obligation to use the same with respect to the products (the beverages) made by it with the “concentrates” acquired from the ABCD Group. And without the existence of limits and/or conditions. Limits and/or conditions which, on the other hand, are inherent to any assignment of rights contract, which is never absolute. In the present case, such limits would be that X may not use the trademark to identify other products not made with the “concentrates” purchased from the ABCD Group and that it may not identify the products made with such “concentrates” under another trademark. Both things are logical since the trademark owner remains the owner of the trademark (he only assigns its use in a certain temporal and territorial scope) and must protect its prestige by means of the indicated precautions (previously called limits and/or conditions). Por otro lado, y en contra de lo alegado (pág. 129 of the pleadings), the right to use the trademark is not something merely “instrumental” but something “substantial” to the contracts entered into between the parties in the sense that it is in the interest of the supplier to sell its concentrates and of X to market the products it manufactures with such concentrates under certain trademarks (ABCD or M8), of special diffusion and prestige in the market and whose use implies a volume of sales notably higher than that which it would obtain if it marketed the products under X ‘s own denomination without such diffusion and prestige in the market. The importance of the trademark is such (and more so the ones we are now dealing with) that it would be difficult to understand in the opinion of the Inspectorate a purely “instrumental” transfer of use of the same, and much less free of charge, as the claimant defends. This circumstance is supported by the Inspection in the Valuation Report, which grants to the assignment of the trademark, as an example, percentages of 61.17% of the price of the concentrate in the case of ABCD-1 and 46.18% in the case of ABCD-2.” “Thus, it is clear that the promotion of the ABCD trademark in Spain (not of the products themselves, which is what is made with the “concentrates” acquired by X) generates expenses for the holder of the trademark[2] ( ABCD Group and, specifically,ABCD C…), the inspection revealed that “it does not seem reasonable to think that the ABCD trademarks in Spain only generate expenses and no income” (….) “From a strictly economic perspective, the actions of the ABCD group, assuming such an amount of expenses to make the brand known to the consumer without this action generating any income for the brand in Spain, lacks all rationality”. This is an additional fact taken into account by the Inspectorate for the purpose of confirming the rationality of the fact that the assignment of use of the trademark is not free of charge but that the ABCD Group obtains income from it.” “In the case at hand, we cannot properly speak of “lack of evidence” but more properly of “lack of externalized evidence” since, even if such evidence exists (which this Court, in principle, has no doubt about), it cannot be incorporated into the file that is made available to the interested party, Therefore, the latter is defenseless when it comes to being able to oppose the suitability of the comparables used, so that, as stated in the previously transcribed SAN, we are faced with an “inadequate assessment method” in terms of generating defenselessness in the taxpayer. This Central Court has recently pronounced in the same sense as above in its RG of 05-09-2013 (RG 3780/11). Having said the above with respect to the “subjective motivation”, it should be noted that the objections raised by the taxpayer with respect to the “technical motivation” refer basically to the fact that the data used by the Inspection to assess are not in any case comparable with those of ABCD because ABCD is unique and neither by its product characteristics, nor by the characteristics of the product …. . In ...