The Supreme Court in the Netherlands requested a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice to clarify its case-law on, inter alia, the freedom of establishment laid down in Article 49 TFEU, specifically whether it is compatible with that freedom for the tax authorities of a Member State to refuse to a company belonging to a cross-border group the right to deduct from its taxable profits the interest it pays on such a loan debt.  The anti-avoidance rule in question is contained in Article 10a of the Wet op de vennootschapsbelasting 1969. The rule is specifically designed to tackle tax avoidance practices related to intra-group acquisition loans. Under that legislation, the contracting of a loan debt by a taxable person with a related entity – for the purposes of acquiring or extending an interest in another entity – is, in certain circumstances, presumed to be an artificial arrangement, designed to erode the Netherlands tax base. Consequently, that person is precluded from deducting the interest on the debt from its taxable profits unless it can rebut that presumption. The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) asked the European Court of Justice to clarify its findings in its judgment in Lexel, on whether such intra-group loans may be, for that purpose, regarded as wholly artificial arrangements, even if carried out on an arm’s length basis, and the interest set at the usual market rate. “(1)      Are Articles 49 TFEU, 56 TFEU and/or 63 TFEU to be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the interest on a loan debt contracted with an entity related to the taxable person, being a debt connected with the acquisition or extension of an interest in an entity which, following that acquisition or extension, is a related entity, is not deductible when determining the profits of the taxable person because the debt concerned must be categorised as (part of) a wholly artificial arrangement, regardless of whether the debt concerned, viewed in isolation, was contracted at arm’s length? (2)      If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative, must Articles 49 TFEU, 56 TFEU and/or 63 TFEU be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the deduction of  the interest on a loan debt contracted with an entity related to the taxable person and regarded as (part of) a wholly artificial arrangement, being a debt connected with the acquisition or extension of an interest in an entity which, following that acquisition or extension, is a related entity, is disallowed in full  when determining the profits of the taxable person, even where that interest in itself does not exceed the amount that would have been agreed upon between companies which are independent of one another? (3)      For the purpose of answering Questions 1 and/or 2, does it make any difference whether the relevant acquisition or extension of the interest relates (a) to an entity that was already an entity related to the taxable person prior to that acquisition or extension, or (b) to an entity that becomes an entity related to the taxpayer only after such acquisition or extension?” Opinion of the Advocate General The Advocate General found that the Dutch anti-avoidance rule in Article 10a was both justified, appropriate and necessary – and therefore not in conflict with Article 49 of the TFEU – irrespective of the Court’s earlier judgment in the Swedish Lexel Case. Excerpts “(…) 71. In my view, the approach suggested by the intervening governments and the Commission is the correct one. Consequently, I urge the Court to revisit the approach it took in the judgment in Lexel on the matter at issue. 72. Freedom of establishment, as guaranteed by Article 49 TFEU, offers quite a wide opportunity for tax ‘optimisation’. The Court has repeatedly held that European groups of companies can legitimately use that freedom to establish subsidiaries in Member States for the purpose of benefiting from a favourable tax regime. (30) Thus, as X submits, A could legitimately choose to establish the internal bank of its group, C, in Belgium for that very purpose. Similarly, C may well grant loans to other companies of the group established in other Member States, like X in the Netherlands. Cross-border intra-group loans are not, per se, objectionable. (31) Certainly, such a loan may entail a reduction of the corporate tax base of the borrowing company in the Member State where it is established. Indeed, by deducting the interest on that loan from its taxable profits, that company reduces its tax liability with respect to that Member State. In effect, some of the profits made by the borrowing company are shifted, in the form of interest charges, from the Member State where it is established to the Member State where the lender company has its seat. However, that is something that the Member States must, in principle, accept in an integrated, single market such as the internal market of the European Union. 73. Nevertheless, the Court recognised a clear limit in that regard. It is a general legal principle that EU law, including freedom of establishment, cannot be relied on for abusive ends. The concept of ‘wholly artificial arrangements’ must be read in that light. Pursuant to the settled case-law of the Court, it is abusive for economic operators established in different Member States to carry out ‘artificial transactions devoid of economic and commercial justification’ (or, stated differently, ‘which do not reflect economic reality’), thus fulfilling the conditions to benefit from a tax advantage only formally, ‘with the essential aim of benefiting from [that] advantage’.(32) 74. Furthermore, in its judgment in X (Controlled companies established in third countries), (33) the Court has specified, with respect to the free movement of capital guaranteed by Article 63 TFEU, that ‘the artificial creation of the conditions required in order to escape taxation in a Member State improperly or enjoy a tax advantage in that Member State improperly can take several forms as regards cross-border movements of capital’. In that context, it held that the concept of ‘wholly artificial arrangement’ is capable of covering ‘any ...

In 1991 and 2007, Ireland issued two tax rulings in relation to two companies of the Apple Group (Apple Sales International – ASI and Apple Operations Europe – AOE), incorporated under Irish law but not tax resident in Ireland. The rulings approved the method by which ASI and AOE proposed to determine their chargeable profits in Ireland deriving from the activity of their Irish branches. In 2016, the European Commission considered that the tax rulings, by excluding from the tax base the profits deriving from the use of intellectual property licences held by ASI and AOE, granted those companies, between 1991 and 2014, State aid that was unlawful and incompatible with the internal market and from which the Apple Group as a whole had benefitted, and ordered Ireland to recover that aid. In 2020, on the application of Ireland and ASI and AOE, the General Court of the European Union annulled the Commission’s decision, finding that the Commission had not shown that there was an advantage deriving from the adoption of the tax rulings. The Commission lodged an appeal with the Court of Justice, asking it to set aside the judgment of the General Court. Opinion of the AG In his Opinion, Advocate General Giovanni Pitruzzella proposes that the Court set aside the judgment and refer the case back to the General Court for a new decision on the merits. According to the Advocate General, the General Court committed a series of errors in law when it ruled that the Commission had not shown to the requisite legal standard that the intellectual property licences held by ASI and AOE and related profits, generated by the sales of Apple products outside the USA, had to be attributed for tax purposes to the Irish branches. The Advocate General is also of the view that the General Court failed to assess correctly the substance and consequences of certain methodological errors that, according to the Commission decision, vitiated the tax rulings. In the Advocate General’s opinion, it is therefore necessary for the General Court to carry out a new assessment ...

Since 2005, Belgium has applied a tax regime under which group companies could apply for tax exemptions on excess profits. The exemption could be obtained through a tax ruling from the Belgian tax authorities if the existence of a new situation could be demonstrated, i.e. a reorganisation leading to the relocation of the central entrepreneur to Belgium, the creation of jobs or investments. Profits were considered ‘excessive’ in the sense that they exceeded the profits that would have been made by comparable independent companies operating in similar circumstances and were exempted from corporate income tax. In 2016, the Commission found that the Belgian scheme constituted state aid that was unlawful and incompatible with the single market and ordered the recovery of the aid from 55 companies that had benefited from the practice. On 14 February 2019, the General Court annulled the Commission’s decision. It found, inter alia, that the Commission had wrongly concluded that the excess profits exemption scheme did not require further implementing measures and that the scheme therefore constituted an ‘aid scheme’ within the meaning of Regulation 2015/1589. It also rejected the Commission’s arguments concerning the existence of an alleged ‘systematic approach’ by the Belgian tax authorities. The Commission appealed to the Court of Justice and on 16 September 2002 the Court of Justice overturned the judgement of the General Court and ruled that the Commission had correctly established the existence of an unlawfull state aid scheme. Judgement of the EU General Court In this case, European Commission v Belgium, the General Court upheld the Commission’s 2016 decision, finding that the Belgian excess profits tax scheme constitutes unlawful state aid. Click here for other translations ...

The case concerned the valuation of intangible assets transferred from a Danish company to an affiliated foreign company. The Tax Tribunal basically agreed with the valuation of the expert appraisers according to the DCF model, but corrected the assumptions with regard to revenue growth in the budget period and the value of the tax advantage. Finally, the Tax Tribunal found that the value of product Y should be included in the valuation, as all rights to product Y were covered by the intra-group transfer. Excerpts “It was the judges’ view that the turnover growth for the budget period should be set in accordance with Company H’s own budgets prepared prior to the transfer. This was in accordance with TPG 2017 paragraphs 6.163 and 6.164 and SKM2020.30.LSR.” “With reference to OECD TPG section 6.178 on adjustment for tax consequences for the buyer and seller and SKM2020.30.LSR, the National Tax Tribunal ruled that the full value of the buyer’s tax asset should be added to the value of the intangible assets when valuing according to the DCF model.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

On 30 November 2012, X sold its trademarks to subsidiary C which in turn sold the trademarks to subsidiary D. X and D then entered into a trademark license agreement according to which X would pay license fees to D. These license fees were deducted by X in its 2013 tax return. The tax authorities claimed that X had understated its taxabel income as the license fees paid by X to D for the use of trademarks were not related to obtaining or securing a source of revenue. The decision stated that in the light of the principles of logic and experience, the actions taken by the taxpayer made no sense and were not aimed at achieving the revenue in question, but instead at generating costs artificially – only for tax purposes. An appeal was filed by X. Judgement of the Administrative Court The court set aside the assessment of the tax authorities and decided in favor of X. According to the court taxpayers are not obliged to conduct their business in such a way as to pay the highest possible taxes, and gaining benefits from so-called tax optimization not prohibited by law, was allowed in 2013. The Polish anti-avoidance clause has only been in force since 15 July 2016. Furthermore, although it may have been possible to set aside legal effects of the transactions under the previous provision in Article 24b § 1 of the C.C.P., the Constitutional Tribunal in its verdict of 11 May 2004, declared this provision to be inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Excerpts “In the Court’s view, the authorities’ findings fail to comply with the provisions applied in the case, including in particular Article 15 of the CIT Act. The legal transactions described in the appealed decision indeed constitute an optimisation mechanism. However, the realised transaction scheme is not potentially devoid of economic as well as tax rationales. The actions performed were undoubtedly also undertaken in order to achieve the intended tax result, i.e. optimisation of taxation. It should be strongly emphasised that none of the actions taken were ostensible. All of the applicant’s actions were as real as possible. Noticing the obvious reality of the above transactions, the tax authorities did not even attempt to apply the institution regulated in Article 199a of the CIT Act. The omission of legal effects of the transactions performed would probably have been possible in the former legal order, under Article 24b § 1 of the C.C.P., but this provision is no longer in force. The Constitutional Tribunal in its verdict of 11 May 2004, ref. no. K 4/03 (Journal of Laws of 2004, no. 122, item 1288) declared this provision to be inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. On the other hand, the anti-avoidance clause introduced by the Act of 13 May 2016 amending the Tax Ordinance Act and certain other acts (Journal of Laws 2016, item 846) has been in force only since 15 July 2016. Pursuant to the amended Article 119a § 1 o.p. – an act performed primarily for the purpose of obtaining a tax benefit, contradictory in given circumstances to the object and purpose of the provision of the tax act, does not result in obtaining a tax benefit if the manner of action was artificial (tax avoidance). Issues related to the application of the provisions of this clause in time are regulated by Article 7 of the Amending Act, according to which the provisions of Articles 119a-119f of the Act amended in Article 1 apply to the tax advantage obtained after the date of entry into force of this Act. Thus, the anti-avoidance clause applies to tax benefits obtained after the date of entry into force of the amending law, i.e. from 15 July 2016, which, moreover, was not in dispute in the present case. Considering the above, it should be pointed out that the tax authorities in the case at hand had no authority to use such argumentation as if the anti-avoidance clause applied. In the legal state in force in 2013. (applicable in the present case) the general anti-avoidance clause was not in force. This state of affairs amounts to a prohibition on the tax authorities disregarding the tax consequences of legal transactions carried out primarily for the purpose of obtaining a tax advantage.” Click here for English translation. Click here for other translation ...

Narcea Producciones y Promociones SL managed the economic rights, representation commissions and the image and TV rights of a football player. The image and TV rights were transferred to a related party free of charge. Following an audit, the tax authorities issued an assessment where profits from the transfer had been added to the taxable income based on the arm’s length principle. Not satisfied with this decision Narcea Producciones y Promociones, S.L. filed an appeal. Judgement for the Tribunal Superior The Tribunal Superior dismissed the appeal and decided in favor of the tax authorities. Excerpts: “In accordance with Article 16.1.1º and 2º and 4.1º a) of the TRLIS, related-party transactions shall be valued at market price between independent parties in conditions of free competition and this allows the tax authorities to check this valuation and make the corresponding valuation corrections with regard to transactions subject to Corporate Income Tax, Personal Income Tax and Non-Resident Income Tax, with the limit of not determining a higher income than that effectively derived from the transaction for all the persons or entities that have carried it out and the value that is set is binding for the former in relation to the rest of the related persons or entities. In this case there has been a lower taxation than that which would have resulted from valuing the transaction at market price, considering that there was no remuneration whatsoever by the company to the member for the transfer of his image and TV rights compared to the value paid by the football club to the plaintiff company for said transfer. In relation to the valuation itself, among the means provided for this purpose by the Law, is the method of the free purchase price, article 4.1º.a) of the TRLIS, which in this case has been applied by the Inspectorate, taking as the value of the transaction the amounts received for the transfer of the image and TV rights, deducting the expenses necessary to obtain them, taking into account the percentage represented by the amounts paid by Hercules for the transfer with respect to the total income obtained by the company and the total expenses. The Inspectorate, in our opinion correctly, after analysing the peculiarities of the service provided, which takes into account the personal qualities of the partner and is the reason why the service is contracted, the assumption by the partner of the service and of the main risks and the characteristics of the market, applies the method provided for in article 16.4.1º. a) of the TRLIS, taking as market value between independent parties and in free competition the amounts received by the company that were agreed with Hercules for the transfer of the image and TV rights of the professional footballer partner, corrected with the deduction of the expenses that were necessary to obtain them, duly accredited, without the presumption of having valued the operation at market price being applicable in this case, as the requirements established in article 16. 6 of the RIS, as the company lacked the material and human resources to provide the services beyond the shareholder and did not remunerate the latter in any amount for such a transfer. This valuation method as applied by the tax authorities complies with the OECD transfer pricing guidelines of 22/0/2010, as the characteristics of the services, the functions and risks assumed by the parties, the contractual terms of the transactions and the economic circumstances of the market were taken into account. According to the appellant, the valuation method applied does not satisfy the comparability requirements of the method of Article 16(4)(a), because no basis for comparison is taken, but it is the value agreed between independent parties consisting of the amount which each year the football club was prepared to pay for the transfer of the image and TV rights of the footballer, a single person for that purpose without any comparable. Furthermore, the legal qualification made by the Inspectorate of the business carried out as a related transaction is correct as has been seen for the purposes of Article 13 of Law 58/2003 and it was not necessary to resort to the figure of the relative simulation of Article 16 of the same Law, which requires an appearance of a business other than the real one and wanted by the parties, nor the conflict in the application of the rule, whose requirements are not met given the wording of Article 15 of the same Law, which requires that the transactions are notoriously artificial or improper for the result obtained and that they do not result in relevant legal or economic effects other than the fiscal savings and the effects of the usual or proper transactions.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Since 2005, Belgium has applied a system of exemptions for the excess profit of Belgian entities which form part of multinational corporate groups. Those entities were able to obtain a tax ruling from the Belgian tax authorities, if they could demonstrate the existence of a new situation, such as a reorganisation leading to the relocation of the central entrepreneur to Belgium, the creation of jobs, or investments. In that context, profits regarded as being ‘excess’, in that they exceeded the profit that would have been made by comparable stand-alone entities operating in similar circumstances, were exempted from corporate income tax. In 2016, the Commission found that that system of excess profit exemptions constituted a State aid scheme that was unlawful and incompatible with the internal market and ordered the recovery of the aid thus granted from 55 beneficiaries, including the company Magnetrol International. Belgium and Magnetrol International brought an action before the General Court of the European Union seeking the annulment of the Commission’s decision. On 14 February 2019, the General Court annulled the Commission’s decision. It found, inter alia, that the Commission had wrongly concluded that the excess profit exemption scheme did not require further implementing measures and that that scheme therefore constituted an ‘aid scheme’ within the meaning of Regulation 2015/1589. It also rejected the Commission’s arguments relating to the existence of an alleged ‘systematic approach’ by the Belgian tax authorities. On 24 April 2019, the Commission brought an appeal before the Court of Justice. According to the Commission, the General Court made errors in the interpretation of the definition of an ‘aid scheme’. The Judgement of the European Court of Justice The Court of Justice overturned the judgement of the General Court and ruled that the Commission correctly found that there was an aid scheme. The Court therefore sets aside the judgment delivered on 14 February 2019 by the General Court and referred the case back to the latter for it to rule on other aspects of the case. In its decision the Court of Justice notes that, for a state measure to be classified as an aid scheme, three cumulative conditions must be satisfied. First, aid may be granted individually to undertakings on the basis of an act. Secondly, no further implementing measure is required for that aid to be granted. Thirdly, undertakings to which individual aid may be granted must be defined ‘in a general and abstract manner’. As regards, first of all, the first condition, the Court clarifies the concept of an ‘act’. It confirms that the term may also refer to a consistent administrative practice by the authorities of a Member State where that practice reveals a ‘systematic approach’. Although the General Court found that the legal basis of the scheme at issue resulted not only from a provision of the Code des impôts sur les revenus 1992 (Income Tax Code 1992; ‘CIR 92’), 3 but also from the application of that provision by the Belgian tax authorities, it did not, however, draw all the appropriate conclusions from that finding. In particular, it did not take account of the fact that the Commission inferred the application of that provision not only from certain acts, 4 but also from a systematic approach on the part of those authorities. The General Court did, however, rely on the incorrect premise that the fact that certain key facts of the scheme at issue were not apparent from those acts, but from the rulings themselves, meant that those acts necessarily had to be the subject of further implementing measures. Consequently, by limiting its analysis to only the abovementioned normative acts, the General Court misapplied the term ‘act’. Next, as regards the second condition for defining an ‘aid scheme’, namely that no ‘further implementing measures’ are required, the Court of Justice notes that that issue is intrinsically linked to the determination of the ‘act’ on which that scheme is based. In the context of that examination, the General Court failed to take account of the fact that one of the essential characteristics of the scheme at issue lay in the fact that the Belgian tax authorities had systematically granted the excess profit exemption when the conditions were satisfied. Contrary to what the General Court held, the identification of such a systematic practice was capable of constituting a relevant factor in order to establish, where applicable, that the tax authorities did not in fact have any discretion. As regards the third condition defining an ‘aid scheme’, namely that the beneficiaries of the excess profit exemption are defined ‘in a general and abstract manner’, the Court of Justice notes that that issue is also intrinsically linked to the first two conditions, relating to the existence of an ‘act’ and the absence of ‘further implementing measures’. Accordingly, the errors of law made by the General Court concerning the first two conditions vitiated its assessment of the definition of the beneficiaries of the excess profit exemption. The Court of Justice therefore concludes that the General Court made several errors of law. Furthermore, as regards proof of the existence of a ‘systematic approach’, the Court of Justice finds that the sample of rulings examined by the Commission (22 selected in a weighted manner from a total of 66) is, by its nature, capable of representing a ‘systematic approach’ taken by the Belgian tax authorities. The Court of Justice therefore sets aside the judgment of the General Court. However, it finds that the state of the proceedings does not permit final judgment to be given as regards the pleas alleging, in essence, the incorrect classification of the excess profit exemption as State aid, in view of, inter alia, the absence of any advantage or selectivity, and as regards the pleas in law alleging, inter alia, infringement of the principles of legality and protection of legitimate expectations, in so far as the recovery of the alleged aid was incorrectly ordered, including from the groups to which the beneficiaries of that aid belong. The Court of Justice ...

In a decision of 30 August 2016 the European Commission concluded that Ireland’s tax benefits to Apple were illegal under EU State aid rules, because it allowed Apple to pay substantially less tax than other businesses. The decision of the Commission concerned two tax rulings issued by Ireland to Apple, which determined the taxable profit of two Irish Apple subsidiaries, Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe, between 1991 and 2015. As a result of the rulings, in 2011, for example, Apple’s Irish subsidiary recorded European profits of US$ 22 billion (c.a. €16 billion) but under the terms of the tax ruling only around €50 million were considered taxable in Ireland. Ireland appealed the Commission’s decision to the European Court of Justice. The Judgement of the European Court of Justice The General Court annuls the Commission’s decision that Ireland granted illegal State aid to Apple through selective tax breaks because the Commission did not succeed in showing to the requisite legal standard that there was an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. According to the Court, the Commission was wrong to declare that Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe had been granted a selective economic advantage and, by extension, State aid. The Court considers that the Commission incorrectly concluded, in its primary line of reasoning, that the Irish tax authorities had granted Apple’s Irish subsidiaries an advantage as a result of not having allocated the Apple Group intellectual property licences to their Irish branches. According to the Court, the Commission should have shown that that income represented the value of the activities actually carried out by the Irish branches themselves, in view of the activities and functions actually performed by the Irish branches of the two Irish subsidiaries, on the one hand, and the strategic decisions taken and implemented outside of those branches, on the other. In addition, the Court considers that the Commission did not succeed in demonstrating, in its subsidiary line of reasoning, methodological errors in the contested tax rulings which would have led to a reduction in chargeable profits in Ireland. The defects identified by the Commission in relation to the two tax rulings are not, in themselves, sufficient to prove the existence of an advantage for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU. Furthermore, the Court considers that the Commission did not prove, in its alternative line of reasoning, that the contested tax rulings were the result of discretion exercised by the Irish tax authorities and that, accordingly, Apple Sales International and Apple Operations Europe had been granted a selective advantage ...

On 3 September 2012, the Luxembourg tax authorities issued a tax ruling in favour of Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe (‘FFT’), an undertaking in the Fiat group that provided treasury and financing services to the group companies established in Europe. The tax ruling at issue endorsed a method for determining FFT’s remuneration for these services, which enabled FFT to determine its taxable profit on a yearly basis for corporate income tax in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. In 2015, the Commission concluded that the tax ruling constituted State aid under Article 107 TFEU and that it was operating aid that was incompatible with the internal market. It also noted that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg had not notified it of the proposed tax ruling and had not complied with the standstill obligation. The Commission found that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg was required to recover the unlawful and incompatible aid from FFT. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and FFT each brought an action before the General Court for annulment of the Commission’s decision. They criticise the Commission in particular for: (1) having adopted an analysis leading to tax harmonisation in disguise; (2) having found that the tax ruling at issue conferred an advantage, notably on the ground that it did not comply with the arm’s length principle, contrary to Article 107 TFEU and to the obligation to state reasons and in breach of the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations; (3) having found that that advantage was selective, contrary to Article 107 TFEU; (4) having found that the measure at issued restricted competition and distorted trade between Member States, contrary to Article 107 TFEU and to the obligation to state reasons; and (5) having breached the principle of legal certainty and infringed the rights of the defence, by ordering that the aid at issue be recovered. In it’s judgment, the General Court dismisses the actions and confirms the validity of the Commission’s decision. In the first place, with regard to the plea relating to tax harmonisation in disguise, the Court notes that, when considering whether the tax ruling at issue complied with the rules on State aid, the commission did not engage in any ‘tax harmonisation’ but exercised the power conferred on it by EU law by verifying whether that tax ruling conferred on its beneficiary an advantage as compared to ‘normal’ taxation, as defined by national tax law. In the second place, as regards the pleas relating to the absence of an advantage, the Court first considered whether, for a finding of an advantage, the Commission was entitled to analyse the tax ruling at issue in the light of the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision. In that regard, the Court notes in particular that, in the case of tax measures, the very existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation and that, in order to determine whether there is a tax advantage, the position of the recipient as a result of the application of the measure at issue must be compared with his position in the absence of the measure at issue and under the normal rules of taxation. The Court goes on to note that the pricing of intra-group transactions is not determined under market conditions. It states that, where national tax law does not make a distinction between integrated undertakings and stand-alone undertakings for the purposes of their liability to corporate income tax, that law is intended to tax the profit arising from the economic activity of such an integrated undertaking as though it had arisen from transactions carried out at market prices. The Court holds that, in those circumstances, when examining, pursuant to the power conferred on it by Article 107(1) TFEU, a fiscal measure granted to such an integrated undertaking, the Commission may compare the fiscal burden of such an integrated undertaking resulting from the application of that fiscal measure with the fiscal burden resulting from the application of the normal rules of taxation under the national law of an undertaking placed in a comparable factual situation, carrying on its activities under market conditions. The Court makes clear that the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision is a tool that allows the Commission to check that intra-group transactions are remunerated as if they had been negotiated between independent companies. Thus, in the light of Luxembourg tax law, that tool falls within the exercise of the Commission’s powers under Article 107 TFEU. The Commission was therefore, in the present case, in a position to verify whether the pricing for intra-group transactions endorsed by the tax ruling at issue corresponds to prices that would have been negotiated under market conditions. The Court further notes that it does not follow from the contested decision that the Commission found that every tax ruling necessarily constitutes State aid. Second, with regard to demonstrating the actual existence of an advantage, the Court examined whether the Commission was right to find that the methodology for calculating FFT’s remuneration, as endorsed by the tax ruling at issue, did not enable an arm’s length remuneration to be obtained and whether this resulted in a reduction of FFT’s taxable profit. In that regard, the Court concludes that the Commission correctly found that the arrangements for the application of the transactional net margin method (TNMM) endorsed by the tax ruling at issue were incorrect and, specifically, that the whole of FFT’s capital should have been taken into account and a single rate should have been applied. In any event, the Commission also correctly considered that the method consisting, on the one hand, in using FFT’s hypothetical regulatory capital and, on the other, in excluding FFT’s shareholdings in Fiat Finance North America (FFNA) and Fiat Finance Canada (FFC) from the amount of the capital to be remunerated could not result in an arm’s length outcome. Consequently, the Court finds that the methodology approved by the tax ruling ...

In 2008, the Netherlands tax authorities concluded an advance pricing arrangement (APA) with Starbucks Manufacturing EMEA BV (Starbucks BV), part of the Starbucks group, which, inter alia, roasts coffees. The objective of that arrangement was to determine Starbucks BV’s remuneration for its production and distribution activities within the group. Thereafter, Starbucks BV’s remuneration served to determine annually its taxable profit on the basis of Netherlands corporate income tax. In addition, the APA endorsed the amount of the royalty paid by Starbucks BV to Alki, another entity of the same group, for the use of Starbucks’ roasting IP. More specifically, the APA provided that the amount of the royalty to be paid to Alki corresponded to Starbucks BV’s residual profit. The amount was determined by deducting Starbucks BV’s remuneration, calculated in accordance with the APA, from Starbucks BV’s operating profit. In 2015, the Commission found that the APA constituted aid incompatible with the internal market and ordered the recovery of that aid. The Netherlands and Starbucks brought an action before the General Court for annulment of the Commission’s decision. They principally dispute the finding that the APA conferred a selective advantage on Starbucks BV. More specifically, they criticise the Commission for (1) having used an erroneous reference system for the examination of the selectivity of the APA; (2) having erroneously examined whether there was an advantage in relation to an arm’s length principle particular to EU law and thereby violated the Member States’ fiscal autonomy; (3) having erroneously considered the choice of the transactional net margin method (TNMM) for determining Starbucks BV’s remuneration to constitute an advantage; and (4) having erroneously considered the detailed rules for the application of that method as validated in the APA to confer an advantage on Starbucks BV. In it’s judgment, the General Court annuls the Commission’s decision. First, the Court examined whether, for a finding of an advantage, the Commission was entitled to analyse the tax ruling at issue in the light of the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision. In that regard, the Court notes in particular that, in the case of tax measures, the very existence of an advantage may be established only when compared with ‘normal’ taxation and that, in order to determine whether there is a tax advantage, the position of the recipient as a result of the application of the measure at issue must be compared with his position in the absence of the measure at issue and under the normal rules of taxation. The Court goes on to note that the pricing of intra-group transactions is not determined under market conditions. It states that where national tax law does not make a distinction between integrated undertakings and stand-alone undertakings for the purposes of their liability to corporate income tax, that law is intended to tax the profit arising from the economic activity of such an integrated undertaking as though it had arisen from transactions carried out at market prices. The Court holds that, in those circumstances, when examining, pursuant to the power conferred on it by Article 107(1) TFEU, a fiscal measure granted to such an integrated company, the Commission may compare the fiscal burden of such an integrated undertaking resulting from the application of that fiscal measure with the fiscal burden resulting from the application of the normal rules of taxation under the national law of an undertaking placed in a comparable factual situation, carrying on its activities under market conditions. The Court makes clear that the arm’s length principle as described by the Commission in the contested decision is a tool that allows it to check that intra-group transactions are remunerated as if they had been negotiated between independent companies. Thus, in the light of Netherlands tax law, that tool falls within the exercise of the Commission’s powers under Article 107 TFEU. The Commission was therefore, in the present case, in a position to verify whether the pricing for intragroup transactions accepted by the APA corresponds to prices that would have been negotiated under market conditions. The Court therefore rejects the claim that the Commission erred in identifying an arm’s length principle as a criterion for assessing the existence of State aid. Second, the Court reviewed the merits of the various lines of reasoning set out in the contested decision to demonstrate that, by endorsing a method for determining transfer pricing that did not result in an arm’s length outcome, the APA conferred an advantage on Starbucks BV. The Court began by examining the dispute as to the Commission’s principal reasoning. It notes that, in the context of its principal reasoning, the Commission found that the APA had erroneously endorsed the use of the TNMM. The Commission first stated that the transfer pricing report on the basis of which the APA had been concluded did not contain an analysis of the royalty which Starbucks BV paid to Alki or of the price of coffee beans purchased by Starbucks BV from SCTC, another entity of the group. Next, in examining the arm’s length nature of the royalty, the Commission applied the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP method). As a result of that analysis, the Commission considered that the amount of the royalty should have been zero. Last, the Commission considered, on the basis of SCTC’s financial data, that Starbucks BV had overpaid for the coffee beans in the period between 2011 and 2014. The Court holds that mere non-compliance with methodological requirements does not necessarily lead to a reduction of the tax burden and that the Commission would have had to demonstrate that the methodological errors identified in the APA did not allow a reliable approximation of an arm’s length outcome to be reached and that they led to a reduction of the tax burden. As regards the error identified by the Commission in respect of the choice of the TNMM and not of the CUP method, the Court finds that the Commission did not invoke any element to support as such ...

In January 2016 the European Commission concluded that Belgium’s excess profits tax exemption scheme was incompatible with the internal market and unlawful and ordering recovery of the aid granted . Belgium’s excess profits tax exemption In the first step, the arm’s length prices charged in transactions between the Belgian entity of a group and the companies with which it is associated were fixed based on a transfer pricing report provided by the taxpayer. Those transfer prices were determined by applying the transactional net margin method (TNMM). A residual or arm’s length profit was thus established, which corresponded to the profit actually recorded by the Belgian entity. In the second step the Belgian entity’s adjusted arm’s length profit was established by determining the profit that a comparable standalone company would have made in comparable circumstances. The difference between the profit arrived at following the first and second steps (namely the residual profit minus the adjusted arm’s length profit) constituted the amount of excess profit which the Belgian tax authorities regarded as being the result of synergies or economies of scale arising from membership of a corporate group and which, accordingly, could not be attributed to the Belgian entity. Under the scheme at issue, that excess profit was not taxed. According to the Commission, that non-taxation granted the beneficiaries of the scheme a selective advantage, particularly since the methodology for determining the excess profit departed from a methodology that leads to a reliable approximation of a market-based outcome and thus from the arm’s length principle. The Commission considered that the measure in question constituted an aid scheme, based on Article 185(2)(b) of the CIR 92, as applied by the Belgian tax administration. According to the Commission, those acts constitute the basis on which the exemptions in question were granted. In addition, the Commission considered that those exemptions were granted without further implementing measures being required, since the advance rulings were merely technical applications of the scheme at issue. Furthermore, the Commission stated that the beneficiaries of the exemptions were defined in a general and abstract manner by the acts on which the scheme was based. Those acts referred to entities that form part of a multinational group of companies. Belgium appealed the decision to the European General Court. The Judgement of the General Court The General Court annulled the Commission’s decision. “Conclusion on the classification of the measures in question as an aid scheme 135   It follows from the foregoing considerations that the Commission erroneously considered that the Belgian excess profit system at issue, as presented in the contested decision, constituted an aid scheme. 136    Accordingly, it is necessary to uphold the pleas raised by the Kingdom of Belgium and Magnetrol International, alleging the infringement of Article 1(d) of Regulation 2015/1589, as regards the conclusion set out in the contested decision regarding the existence of an aid scheme. Consequently, without it being necessary to examine the other pleas raised against the contested decision, that decision must be annulled in its entirety, inasmuch as it is based on the erroneous conclusion concerning the existence of such a scheme.” ...

The European Commission’s investigation on granting of selective tax advantages to Starbucks BV, cf. EU state aid rules ...

Ensco Gerudi provided offshore drilling services to the petroleum industry in Malaysia. The company did not own any drilling rigs, but entered into leasing agreements with a rig owner within the Ensco Group. One of the rig owners in the group incorporated a Labuan company to facilitate easier business dealings for the taxpayer. Ensco Gerudi entered into a leasing agreement with the Labuan company for the rigs. Unlike previous transactions, the leasing payments made to the Labuan company did not attract withholding tax. The tax authorities found the Labuan company had no economic or commercial substance and that the purpose of the transaction had only been to benefit from the tax reduction. The High Court decided in favour of the taxpayer. The Court held that there was nothing artificial about the payments and that the transactions were within the meaning and scope of the arrangements contemplated by the government in openly offering incentives. The High Court ruled that taxpayers have the freedom to structure transactions to their best tax advantage in so far as the arrangement viewed in a commercially and economically realistic way makes use of the specific provision in a manner that was consistent with Parliament’s intention ...