After the case was remanded by the Supreme Court in 2022, the Court of Appeal classified a Luxembourg company’s shareholder loan to “X Shareholder Loan B.V.” of €57,237,500 as an ‘imprudent loan’, with the result that the interest due on that loan was only tax deductible to a limited extent. The remaining interest was non-deductible because of fraus legis (evasion of the law). Allowing the interest due on the shareholder loan to be deductible would result in an evasion of tax, contrary to the purpose and purport of the 1969 Corporation Tax Act as a whole. The purpose and purport of this Act oppose the avoidance of the levying of corporate income tax, by bringing together, on the one hand, the profits of a company and, on the other hand, artificially created interest charges (profit drainage), in an arbitrary and continuous manner by employing – for the achievement of in itself considered business objectives – legal acts which are not necessary for the achievement of those objectives and which can only be traced back to the overriding motive of bringing about the intended tax consequence (cf. HR 16 July 2021, ECLI:NL:HR:2021:1152). Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

“X Shareholder Loan B.V.” and its subsidiaries had been set up in connection with a private equity acquisition structure. In 2011, one of “X Shareholder Loan B.V.”‘s subsidiaries bought the shares of the Dutch holding company. This purchase was partly financed by a loan X bv had obtained from its Luxembourg parent company. The Luxembourg parent company had obtained the the funds by issuing ‘preferred equity certificates’ (PECs) to its shareholders. These shareholders were sub-funds of a private equity fund, none of which held a direct or indirect interest in “X Shareholder Loan B.V.” of more than one-third. The tax authorities found, that deductibility of the interest paid by “X Shareholder Loan B.V.” to its Luxembourg parent was limited under Section 10a Vpb 1969 Act. The Court of Appeal upheld the assessment. According to the Court, whether there is an intra-group rerouting does not depend on whether the parties involved are related entities within the meaning of section 10a, i.e. whether they hold an interest of at least one-third. Instead, it should be assessed whether all the entities involved belong to the same group or concern. This does not necessarily require an interest of at least one-third. No satisfied with the decision “X Shareholder Loan B.V.” filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court declared the appeal well-founded and remanded the case to Court of Appeal for further consideration of the issues that had not addressed by the court in its previous decision. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

C is the parent company of the C-group which is involved in the construction business. C is part of a joint venture and for the expansion of these activities a framework agreement on shareholder loans was concluded. Under the agreement two shareholder loans were granted: ***loan*** II totalling 212,935,716.33 euros and ***loan*** III totalling 446,000,000 euros. At issue is whether (***loan*** II and ***loan*** III) are to be regarded as hidden equity capital or debt capital. In regards of loan II a binding ruling had previously been issued stating that the loan was hidden equity. C took the position that both loan II and loan III were to be treated for tax purposes as equity capital. Following an audit the tax authorities assessed both shareholder loans as debt capital and added interest income to the taxable income of C. In regards of the binding ruling previously issued, the authorities stated that the underlying facts had changed to such an extend that the ruling was no longer binding. The court of first instance held in favour of C, and an appeal was then filed by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Court The court upheld the decision of the court of first instance and found that the shareholder loans should be treated as hidden equity capital. Excerpts Loan II “Pursuant to § 118 (7) BAO, there is a legal claim that the assessment under tax law made in the information notice is used as a basis for the levying of the tax if the actual facts do not or only insignificantly deviate from those on which the information notice was based. It is certain that the complainant was issued a legally binding information notice in connection with the interest on the shareholder loan ***loan*** II. This information notice confirms that the loan granted has the character of hidden equity capital; an interest calculation for income tax purposes can therefore be omitted. It is also clear that the facts on which the tax office based the information notice have not changed. However, the tax authority now assumes that the factual elements on which the legal assessment of the information notice was based, and which were actually realised, were irrelevant for the assessment of the hidden equity in the present case.” Loan III “The separation principle is derived from the legal personality of a corporation, which allows for tax-effective service relationships between the shareholder and the corporation (cf. e.g. VwGH 28.04.2011, 2007/15/0031). The limit of the separation principle is the arm’s length principle (cf. Raab/Renner in Lachmayer/Strimitzer/Vock (eds.), Die Körperschaftsteuer (KStG 1988) (32nd ed. 2019) § 8 marginal no. 146). In connection with the granting of shareholder loans, conditions that are not arm’s length speaks in favour of hidden equity (cf. e.g. Ressler/Stürzlinger in Lang/Rust/Schuch/Staringer (eds.) KStG2 (2016) § 8 marginal no. 47). Conditions that are not customary for third parties speak against the existence of a genuine or serious shareholder loan (cf. e.g. VwGH 14.12.2000, 95/15/0127; 26.07.2006, 2004/14/0151). In the opinion of the authority concerned, only the lack of interest speaks in favour of the shareholder loan not being customary for third parties. A single indication was not sufficient to reclassify a shareholder loan as hidden equity. On the other hand, the subjective intention to repay the loan was to be regarded as the basis for the assumption that the loan was in fact debt and not equity. The fact that subjectively there was already an intention to repay at the time the shareholder loan was granted is not questioned in principle by the complainant, who himself points out in justification of the chosen model that a greater flexibility for a possible later repayment should be ensured. In addition, the chosen construction can also be explained on the basis of the company law legislation of ***Land***, according to which a repayment of equity capital is only possible in the context of a capital reduction or in the event of liquidation (cf. the legal opinion submitted on 22 February 2022). For the Federal Supreme Finance Court it is clear that the shareholder loan ***loan*** III was not granted at arm’s length (see in detail the explanations and assessment of the circumstantial evidence as part of the evaluation of the evidence). Thus, in the opinion of the Federal Fiscal Court, there is no shareholder loan to be recognised for tax purposes, but hidden equity. Since no interest is to be paid on equity capital (for tax purposes), the appeal is to be upheld on this point and the interest payment made by the authorities is to be reversed.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A German corporation,”G Corp” held interests in domestic and foreign companies in the year in dispute (2005). G Corp granted loans to various subordinate companies – resident in France and the USA. These loans were mainly at fixed interest rates; instead of a fixed interest rate, an annual participation of 12.5% in the balance sheet profit of the subordinate company, limited to a maximum amount of 25% of the loan volume, was agreed as consideration for one loan. No collateral was provided. In the year in dispute, G Corp wrote off these loans against taxable profits. G Corp also transferred assets at book value to a Maltese subsidiary company, of which it was the sole shareholder, and contributed the shares in this company, pursuant to section 23(4) of the Reorganisation Tax Act applicable in the year in dispute, also at book value, to another Malta-based company in the context of a capital increase against the granting of company rights. Finally, in the year in dispute, G Corp and its controlled companies earned interest income from loan claims against various foreign subordinated companies totalling … €. The tax authorities issued an assessment where the taxable income related to a partial value write-downs on unsecured loan receivables issued within the group and a book value transfer of assets to foreign subsidiaries had been adjusted. In 2017 the regional tax court issued its decision concluding that the adjustment was not possible under the relevant German arm’s length provision. This decision was then appealed to the Federal tax court by both parties. Judgment of the Court (Bundesfinanzhof) The Federal tax court found the appeal well-founded and referred the case back to the regional fiscal court. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Lender GmbH acquired all shares in T GmbH from T in 2012 (year in dispute) for a purchase price of … €. To finance the purchase price of the shares, Lender GmbH took out a loan from its sole shareholder, D GmbH, a loan in the amount of … €, which bore interest at 8% p.a. (shareholder loan). The interest was not to be paid on an ongoing basis, but only on expiry of the loan agreement on 31.12.2021. No collateral was agreed. D GmbH, for its part, borrowed funds in the same amount and under identical terms and conditions from its shareholders, among others from its Dutch shareholder N U.A. In addition Lender GmbH received a bank loan in the amount of … €, which had an average interest rate of 4.78% p.a. and was fully secured. Finally Lender GmbH also received a vendor loan from the vendor T in the amount of … €, which bore an interest of 10 % p.a. and was not secured. The shareholder loan was subordinated to all other liabilities. The tax office issued a tax assessment in 2016 with regard to interest payments on the shareholder loan. According to the tax authorities an interest rate of of 5 % would have been agreed between independent parties. The difference up to the actual interest rate of 8% was therefore considered a hidden profit distribution(vGA) and added to the income of Lender GmbH. A complaint filed by Lender GmbH against the tax assessment was unsuccessful (Cologne Fiscal Court, Judgment of 29.06.2017 – 10 K 771/16.) The appeal before the Bundesfinanzhof was directed against this judgment. Lender GmbH claims that there has been an infringement of substantive law and requests that the contested judgment be set aside and that the the 2012 corporate income tax assessment be annulled. The tax authorities requests that the appeal be rejected. Judgment of the Court (Bundesfinanzhof) When determining the arm’s length loan interest rate for an unsecured shareholder loan, the statutory subordination of shareholder loans (section 39(1)(5) InsO) does not preclude a risk premium when determining the interest rate to compensate for the lack of loan collateralisation. It is contrary to general principles of practice if the court assumes without factual findings that a third party would agree on the same interest rate for a subordinated and unsecured loan as for a secured and senior loan. The judgment of the Cologne Fiscal Court of 29 June 2017 – 10 K 771/16 is set aside and the case is referred back to the Cologne Fiscal Court for a different hearing and decision. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A taxpayer with a 98% shareholding in a joint stock company, CH AG, based in Switzerland had provided EUR 30 million as an interest-free shareholder loan to the company. There was no written agreement. CH AG used this capital to provide loans to two affiliated companies in Austria and Germany, each with an interest rate of 2%. The tax authorities added a 2% interest to the the shareholder loans – based on the interest on the loans passed on by CH AG to its affiliated companies. EXCURSION: In the present case, the argumentation of the taxpayer or the tax representative against interest on the loan was also interesting: In the complaint – with reference to the so-called “relatives’ case law” – it was stated that due to a lack of sufficiently clear agreements, lack of collateral, etc., not at all a “loan” in the tax sense is to be assumed, but that the financing in question is rather a question of equity-replacing grants ( hidden deposits ) and therefore no interest rate is justified. In the preliminary appeal decision, the tax authorities replied that the nature of the loan could very well be derived from various documents and information (probate proceedings and accounting treatment at CH AG). OneIn addition, reclassification of the loans in question as hidden contributions or hidden share capital is only permissible under “ special circumstances ”, with reference to the relevant case law. In the opinion of the tax authorities, this question did not arise in the present case because CH AG did not have any financial difficulties at the time the funds were injected and had sufficient equity capital. Judgement of the Court The court found that the shareholder loan was not covered by the scope of the Austrian arm’s length provision which requires the existence of a domestic company or a domestic permanent establishment and is therefore only relevant when determining business income. If no interest has actually accrued, no fictitious interest can be subject to taxation for such an interest-free shareholder loan. The question of whether the amounts given were actually loans or (hidden) equity was left undecided by the court. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

“SH Loan Ltd” had provided a loan to its shareholder/manager and claimed that it did not expect any profit (interest) from this transaction, since it was not a bank. The tax authorities issued an assessment where additional interest income was added to the income of the company due to a loan granted to its sole shareholder. The additional interest income for the company was determined based on the relevant interest rates from the Bank of Greece’s Financial Situation Statistics. SH Loan Ltd filed an appeal. Judgement of the Court The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the tax authorities. “Because Mr. , is a person related to the applicant, in accordance with the provisions of Article 2(g) of Law No. 4172/2013, since he is a shareholder (100%), legal representative and member of the Board of Directors. (Chairman and Managing Director), and the granting of the loans in question to the related person was made on economic terms different from those that would apply between unrelated persons, whereas if the loan had been granted to an unrelated person, it would have earned interest income, as calculated in detail on pages 38 to 50 of the relevant audit report, in the total amount of € 22,372.58 for the three years under audit, in accordance with the provisions of Article 50 of Law No. 4172/2013. Because, contrary to the applicant’s claims, in order to find the interest rates, the audit did not act arbitrarily, but referred to the Bank of Greece’s Statistical Bulletins of Economic Trends, issues 160 (January – February 2015), 166 (January – February 2016) and 172 (January – February 2017). Since the findings of the audit, as recorded in the audit report of 13/12/2018 by the auditor of the C.E.M.E.P. on which the contested acts are based, are considered to be valid, acceptable and fully reasoned, the Head of the above audit centre was right to issue the contested acts and the present appeal must be dismissed.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Determination of the criterion “decisive influence” or controlling interest. There is no basis for a general conclusion that, where two persons have the same ability to influence decision-making, they both exercise joint control. Otherwise, Section 12(2) of the Corporation Tax Act should apply to any case where two or more persons exercise equal control over the management of a company, even if the only way in which decisions could ever be taken in the company is if they are taken in concert. It is not excluded that two persons have established a mechanism for exercising influence on an equal footing precisely in order to ensure that neither has a decisive influence. In order to apply Section 12(2) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax in accordance with its meaning, i.e. to identify cases where the decisive influence of a person has been the basis for entering into transactions which are not in line with market prices, it should be possible to identify a set of circumstances in circumstances of equal influence which makes it possible to consider that two or more persons are acting jointly. Such circumstances may be apparent, inter alia, from the activities of the undertaking over an extended period of time, from the location of the disputed transactions in the context of the other business activities, from the links between the persons concerned, in particular in the long term. Excerpt from the Judgement of the Supreme Court “[16] As can be seen, the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned case did not find any difference in principle between the direct or indirect interpretation of decisive influence contained in the Law on Concerns and other laws. There would be no reason to find such a difference in the present case, since, in view of the general meaning of the concept of decisive influence, it must be established that one person can take decisions (control) in relation to the company and, in the absence of specific agreements on other arrangements, such a situation must be established in the first place by a participation, from which, in ordinary cases, further derive the corresponding voting rights and the possibility to appoint and dismiss the management body. The Regional Court, too, in interpreting Article 1(12) of the Credit Institutions Law and concluding that decisive influence means the ability to control the decisions of the governing body of the company with regard to the conclusion of economic transactions and their value, has not in fact changed this general understanding, i.e. it has emphasised the ability to control decision-making. Moreover, any interpretation of the concept of ‘decisive influence’ cannot contradict its immediate general meaning, namely that the person concerned has the power to make a difference in the decision-making, in the determination of issues. In accordance with the general principles of commercial companies, this will normally be secured by an appropriate share in the share capital. At the same time, it should be noted that the Regional Court has used the concept (control) explained in Article 1(12) of the Credit Institutions Law to explain the concept of “decisive influence”, which is used in the provision as a means of clarification, but insofar as it does not detract from the meaning – the characteristic of being able to decisively influence decisions – the interpretation is not incorrect. One can agree with the representative of the State Revenue Service at the hearing that it is important to apply the concept of ‘decisive influence’ contained in Section 1(5) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax in its own right in accordance with its meaning. [17] The judgment of the District Court, after a legal analysis, further assesses the circumstances of the case. The Court finds that the status of the members of the applicant’s board of directors in the applicant, as well as their participation in the capital of the applicant’s parent company (50 per cent each) and their status as members of the parent company’s board of directors, created a set of circumstances which ensured decisive influence over the applicant and the ability to exercise (joint) control over the applicant. It follows from the above that the Regional Court, although it had previously examined the question of the elements of decisive influence of a single person, reached its conclusion by finding that two persons exercised control jointly. The assessment is thus based on an aspect which goes beyond the concept of decisive influence as contained in the Law on Concerns and the Law on Credit Institutions. The question of joint control requires consideration of whether decisive influence can be said to exist even if each person individually does not formally possess it under either definition and whether it is possible to consider the possibility of control by those persons together. The conclusion that, where two persons have the same ability to influence decision-making, they both exercise joint control is not self-evident. Otherwise, Section 12(2) of the Corporation Tax Act should apply to any case where two or more persons exercise equal control over the management of a company, even if the only way in which decisions could ever be taken in the company is by a decision agreed between them. It is not excluded that two persons have established a mechanism for exercising influence on an equal footing precisely in order to ensure that neither has a decisive influence. [18] At the same time, it cannot be excluded that, in a situation of equal influence, more than one person knowingly implements a common economic plan with a common objective, and it is precisely this conscious cooperation which makes it safe to assume that one person can count on the other in decision-making. That is to say, a plan or objective and the cooperation within it make it possible to regard them as a single entity. [19] In order to apply Section 12(2) of the Law on Corporation Tax in accordance with its meaning, namely to identify cases where the decisive influence of a person has been the ...

In 2014, the tax authorities issued the Italien Bank a notice of assessment with which it reclaimed for taxation IRAP for 2009 part of the interest expense paid by the bank to a company incorporated under Irish law, belonging to the same group which, according to the tax authorities, it also controlled. In particular, the tax authorities noted that the spread on the bond was two points higher than the normal market spread. The Bank appealed the assessment, arguing that there was no subjective requirement, because at the time of the issue of the debenture loan it had not yet become part of the group of which the company that had subscribed to the loan belonged. It also pleaded that the assessment was unlawful because it applied a provision, Article 11(7) TUIR, provided for IRES purposes, the extension of which to IRAP purposes was provided for by Article 1(281) of Law 147/13, a provision, however, of an innovative nature, the retroactivity of which was considered to be in conflict with the Community principles of legitimate expectations and with Articles 23, 41, 42 and 53 of the Italian Constitution. Decision of the Court The Court dismissed the appeal and decided in favor of the tax authorities. Click her for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The Italien company had qualified a funding arrangement in an amount of Lira 500 billion classified by the parties as a non-interest-bearing contribution reserved for a future capital increase. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Italian Supreme Court found that intra-group financing agreements are subject to transfer pricing legislation and that non-interest-bearing financing is generally not consistent with the arm’s-length principle. The court remanded the case to the lower court for further consideration. “”In conclusion, with regard to appeal r.g. no. 12882/2008, the first plea should be upheld, the second absorbed, and the third and fourth declared inadmissible; the judgment under appeal should be set aside in relation to the upheld plea and the case referred to another section of the Regional Tax Commission of Lombardy, which will comply with the principle of law set out in paragraph 3.5…” In regards to the non-interest-bearing financing the Court states in paragraph 3.5: “35… It follows that the valuation “at arm’s length” is irrespective of the original ability of the transaction to generate income and, therefore, of any negotiated obligation of the parties relating to the payment of the consideration (see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, paragraph 1.2). In fact, it is a matter of examining the economic substance of the transaction that has taken place and comparing it with similar transactions carried out, in comparable circumstances, in free market conditions between independent parties and assessing its conformity with these (cf, on the criteria for determining normal value, Court of Cassation no. 9709 of 2015): therefore, the qualification of the non-interest-bearing financing, possibly made by the parties (on whom the relevant burden of proof is incumbent, given the normally onerous nature of the loan agreement, pursuant to article 1815 of the Italian Civil Code), proves to be irrelevant, as it is in itself incapable of excluding the application of the criterion of valuation based on normal value. It should be added that it would be clearly unreasonable, and a source of conduct easily aimed at evading the legislation in question, to consider that the administration can exercise this power of adjustment in the case of transactions with a consideration lower than the normal value and even derisory, while it is precluded from doing so in the case of no consideration.” Click her for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A Turkish company located in a tax free zone had obtained interest income based on the interest rate applied to foreign currency loans, although the company had lent money to its partner in Turkish Lira. Normally interest income is considered taxable, but within the tax free zone, income from listed activities is exempt. Click here for translation ...