K.P. is active in retail sale of computers, peripheral equipment and software. In December 2013 it had transfered valuable trademarks to its subsidiary and in the years following the transfer incurred costs in form of licence fees for using the trademarks. According to the tax authorities the arrangement was commercially irrationel and had therfore been recharacterised. Not satisfied with the assessment an appeal was filed. Judgement of the Provincial Administrative Court. The Court decided in favor of K.P.  According to the Court recharacterization of controlled transactions was not possible under the Polish arm’s length provisions in force until the end of 2018. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

At issue was VAT and tax deduction for costs of media and advertising space that EVEREST allegedly purchased from Koukni and Concept s.r.o. and Concept s.r.o.. A tax assessment was issued to EVEREST based on (1) failure to prove the receipt of the supply of “media and advertising space” to the declared extent and (2) denial of the claimed right to deduct VAT as the tax administrator found that EVEREST knew or should have known that it had engaged in VAT fraud by participating in those arrangements. An appeal was filed by EVEREST claiming that various legal formalities had not been observed by the tax authorities i.e. the tax administrator was not competent to issue the decision at all, the decision suffers from defects which render it manifestly internally inconsistent or legally or factually unworkable; the decision is issued on the basis of another void decision issued by the tax administrator; EVEREST was not a related party in relation to Koukni and Concept for the purpose of creating illegal tax optimisation. Decision of the Regional Court The Court decided in favor of the tax authorities and dismissed the appeal of EVEREST. Excerpts (in English) “The applicant alleges each of those grounds. However, in neither case did the Court find that her plea of nullity was well-founded.” “The case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU has repeatedly dealt with VAT fraud. It shows that a situation where a taxable person claims a deduction fraudulently (or abusively) is an exception to the principle that, if the substantive and formal conditions for entitlement to a deduction are met, the taxable person is entitled to the deduction (see, for example, Case C-371/08, CJEU v. Czech Republic [2006] ECR I-1753, paragraph 1). Judgments of the Court of Justice of 21.6.2012, Mahagében and Dávid, Joined Cases C 80/11 and C 142/11, paragraph 41, or of 28.7.2016, Giuseppe Astone, C 332/15, paragraph 50). However, the mere existence of fraudulent conduct is not sufficient to deny a deduction. The right to a deduction is not affected if one of the preceding or subsequent supplies in the chain of supplies was affected by tax fraud, unless the taxable person knew or could have known this (see, for example, judgment of the Court of Justice of 6 July 2006, Axel Kittel and Recolta, Joined Cases C 439/04 and C 440/04, paragraphs 45 and 49). It is therefore necessary to examine the existence of tax evasion and, if it is established, it must be shown that the taxable person knew or should have known of the evasion in order to be denied the right to deduct the tax.” “Also irrelevant is the applicant’s contention that it did not benefit from the disputed transactions but, on the contrary, profited from them. As the Court has already explained above, the right to deduct may be denied not only in a situation where the taxable person himself has committed the evasion, but also where the taxable person knew or ought to have known that he was engaged in a transaction which is part of a VAT evasion by acquiring goods or services and, by his participation in the chain, made such transactions possible, even though he himself did not directly benefit from them. In other words, a taxable person who knew or ought to have known that his purchase was part of a VAT fraudulent transaction must be regarded as participating in that tax fraud, irrespective of whether he benefits from the subsequent sale of goods or use of services in the context of the taxable transactions which he has carried out at the exit (see, for example, the VAT Code of Conduct, the VAT Code of Conduct and the VAT Code of Conduct, the VAT Code of Conduct and the VAT Code of Conduct, the VAT Code of Conduct and the VAT Code of Conduct). Bonik, cited above, paragraph 39; Kittel and Recolta, cited above, paragraph 56; and Mahagében and Dávid, cited above, paragraph 46). Nor can the expert opinion of Prof. Ing. Hótová, which concerned only the fictitious transactions between the applicant and Ebko. Its conclusions are therefore not transferable to the transactions now under examination. Indeed, in its reply, the applicant admitted that it partly agreed with the defendant as regards the applicability of that expert opinion in that it concerned fictitious transactions, but nevertheless stressed that it did not know and could not have known of the dishonest conduct of its business partners (see paragraph 60 above). The question of the applicant’s knowledge of its involvement in the fraud has already been dealt with in detail by the Court above.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

K. S.A. had made an in-kind contribution to a subsidiary (a partnership) in the form of previously created or acquired and depreciated trademark protection rights for individual beer brands. The partnership in return granted K. S.A. a licence to use these trademarks (K. S.A. was the only user of the trademarks). The partnership made depreciations on these intangible assets, which – due to the lack of legal personality of the partnership – were recognised as tax deductible costs directly by K. S.A. According to the tax authorities the role of the partnership was limited to the administration of trademark rights, it was not capable of exercising any rights and obligations arising from the licence agreements. Therefore the prerequisites listed in Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. were met, allowing K. S.A.’s income to be determined without regard to the conditions arising from those agreements. The assessment issued by the tax authorities was later set aside by the Provincial Administrative Court. An appeal and cross appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decisions of the Provincial Administrative Court and dismissed both appeals as neither of them had justified grounds. The Provincial Administrative Court had correctly deduced that Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. authorises only adjustment of the amount of licence fees, but not the nature of the controlled transactions by recognising that instead of a licence agreement for the use of the rights to trademarks, an agreement was concluded for the provision of services for the administration of these trademarks. Excerpts “The tax authorities, in finding that the applicant had not in fact made an in-kind contribution of trademark rights to the limited partnership, but had merely entrusted that partnership with the duty to administer the marks, referred to Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. (as expressed in the 2011 consolidated text. ), by virtue of which the tax authorities could determine the taxpayer’s income and the tax due without taking into account the conditions established or imposed as a result of the links between the contracting entities, with the income to be determined by way of an estimate, using the methods described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 11 u.p.d.o.p. However, these are not provisions creating abuse of rights or anti-avoidance clauses, as they only allow for a different determination of transaction (transfer) prices. The notion of ‘transaction price’ is legally defined in Article 3(10) of the I.P.C., which, in the wording relevant to the tax period examined in the case, stipulated that it is the price of the subject of a transaction concluded between related parties. Thus, the essence of the legal institution regulated in Article 11 of the u.p.d.o.p. is not the omission of the legal effects of legal transactions performed by the taxpayer or a different legal definition of those transactions, but the determination of their economic effect expressed in the transaction price, with the omission of the impact of institutional links between counterparties”  “For the same reasons, the parallel plea alleging infringement of Articles 191, 120 and 121(1) of the P.C.P. by annulling the tax authority’s legal rulings on the grounds of a breach of the aforementioned rules of evidence in conjunction with Articles 11(1) and 11(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. and holding that the tax authority did not correct the amount of royalties and the marketability of the transaction, but reclassified the legal relationship on the basis of which the entity incurred the expenditure, is also inappropriate. In fact, the assessment of the Provincial Administrative Court that such a construction of the tax authority’s decision corresponds to the hypothesis of the 2019 standard of Article 11c(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. is correct, but there was no adequate legal basis for applying it to 2012/2013 and based on Article 11(1) and (4) of the u.p.d.o.p. in its then wording. Failure to take into account a transaction undertaken by related parties deemed economically irrational by the tax authority violated, in these circumstances, the provisions constituting the cassation grounds of the plea, as the Provincial Administrative Court reasonably found.” “Contrary to the assumption highlighted in the grounds of the applicant’s cassation appeal, in the individual interpretations issued at its request, the applicant did not obtain confirmation of the legality of the entire optimisation construction, but only of the individual legal and factual actions constituting this construction, presented in isolation from the entire – at that time – planned future event. Such a fragmentation of the description of the future event does not comply with the obligation under Article 14b § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure to provide an exhaustive account of the actual state of affairs or future event, and therefore – as a consequence – the applicant cannot rely on the legal protection provided under Article 14k § 1 or Article 14m § 1, § 2 (1) and § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

“Lux Credit B.V.” took out various credit facilities from related parties [company name 2] s.a.r.l. and [company name 3] s.a.r.l. – both resident in Luxembourg. These were financings whereby “Lux Credit facility B.V.” could draw funds (facilities) up to a pre-agreed maximum amount. In doing so, “Lux Credit B.V.” owed both interest and “commitment fees”. The commitment fees were calculated on the maximum amount of the facility. Interest and commitment fees were owed. The interest payable to [company name 2] and [company name 3], respectively, was calculated by deducting the commitment fees from the interest payable on the amount withdrawn, with interest payable on the amount withdrawn, the commitment fees owed after the due date and the interest owed after the due date. In its returns for the current financial years, “Lux Credit B.V.” charged both interest and commitment fees against taxable profit. Following an audit, an assessment of additional taxable income was issued for the financial years 2012/2013 – 2016/2017. According to the tax authorities, the financial arrangement was not at arm’s length. The interest rate and commitment fees were adjusted and part of the loans were classified as equity. A complaint was filed by “Lux Credit B.V.” Judgement of the District Court The Court found mainly in favour of Credit Facility B.V.. It upheld most of the adjustments relating to commitment fees, but overturned the adjustment to the interest rate. According to the Court, Lux Credit B.V. was entitled to an interest deduction for the years under review, calculated at the contractually agreed interest rate on the amounts actually borrowed. Excerpts “51. With regard to the transfer pricing documentation, the court considers the following. Although the documentation referred to in Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Vpb Act was not available at the time the defendant requested it, the claimant has remedied this defect by again preparing records to substantiate the conditions surrounding the facilities. In the court’s opinion, the defendant did not make it plausible with what it argued that the claimant’s administration contains such defects and shortcomings that it cannot serve as a basis for the profit calculation that must lead to the conclusion that the claimant did not file the required return.10 The court also took into account that the parliamentary history of Section 8b of the 1969 Vpb Act noted that the documentation requirement of Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Vpb Act relates to the availability of information necessary to assess whether the prices and conditions(transfer prices) used in affiliated relationships qualify as arm’s length. 11 In the court’s opinion, the defendant has not argued sufficiently to conclude that the transfer-pricing data further collected, prepared and documented by the claimant and the documents that were present at [company name 2] and [company name 3] on the determination of the credit ratings are so deficient that the claimant has not complied with the obligations of Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Income Tax Act. The fact that source documents for the period, in which the transactions were entered into, have not been preserved and the defendant has comments on the data used by the claimant and disagrees with the outcomes of the claimant, do not alter this.” “56. In the court’s view, the defendant was right to make the adjustments in respect of commitment fees on facilities 1 and 3 for the years under review. The defendant was also correct in imposing the 2014/2015, 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 assessments to correct the commitment fees on Facility 7bn. In assessing whether the defendant was justified in making those corrections, the court relied on what [company name 1] and [company name 2] and [company name 3] agreed on civilly. The agreements between [company name 1] and [company name 2] and [company name 3] explicitly distinguish between interest due and commitment fees due. The court therefore rejects the plaintiff’s position that it must be assessed whether the total of the commitment fee and interest costs remained within the margins of Section 8b of the 1969 Vpb Act, and the commitment fee and interest costs should be considered together as an “all-in rate”. That the terms of Facilities 1, 3 and 7bn show similarities with Payment in Kind loans, as claimed by the claimant, does not make it necessary in this case to deviate from what the parties agreed under civil law. Indeed, the defendant has argued, with reasons, that stipulating headroom for the purpose of funding interest that may be credited, if the same facts and circumstances are present, is not usual in the market but it is usual in the market that over interest to be credited, a charge arises only at the time of the maturity of the interest. It is not usual that a charge – in this case in the form of commitment fees – is already due before the due date. This involves a double burden, as interest is also charged on the commitment fee. On the other hand, the plaintiff has not made it plausible that independent third-party parties were willing to agree such terms in similar circumstances, nor has it made its economic reality plausible. The court also took into account that the claimant did not make any calculations, prior to setting the maximum amount and commitment fees. 57. In the court’s view, the defendant was right to make the adjustments in respect of the commitment fees and interest payable thereon in respect of Facility 5. The defendant has made it plausible that such an agreement between independent third parties will not be concluded. The defendant was right to point out the following aspects:” “In the court’s opinion, with what the defendant has put forward and also in view of what the claimant has put forward in response, the defendant has failed to make it plausible that the interest rates agreed by [company name 1] , [company name 2] and [company name 3] regarding facilities 1, 3 and 7bn are not in line with what would have been agreed by independent parties in the ...

The question at issue was whether a Crop tax adviser had acted in accordance with the requirements of a reasonably competent and reasonably acting adviser when advising on the so-called royalty routing and its implementation. Judgement of the Court of Appeal “Crop is liable for the damages arising from the shortcoming. For the assessment of that damage, the case must be referred to the Statement of Damages, as the District Court has already decided. To answer the question of whether the likelihood of damage resulting from the shortcomings is plausible, a comparison must be made between the current situation and the situation in which business rates would have been applied. For the hypothetical situation, the rates to be recommended by the expert should be used. For the current situation, the Tax Authorities have agreed to adjusted pricing. The question whether and to what extent [the respondents] et al. can be blamed for insufficiently limiting their loss in the negotiations with the tax authority, as argued by Crop, should be adjudicated in the proceedings for the determination of damages, because it has not been made plausible beforehand that Crop’s obligation to pay compensation should lapse in full because this is required by the requirements of fairness under the given circumstances” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation ...

Cameco, together with its subsidiaries, is a large uranium producer and supplier of the services that convert one form of uranium into another form. Cameco had uranium mines in Saskatchewan and uranium refining and processing (conversion) facilities in Ontario. Cameco also had subsidiaries in the United States that owned uranium mines in the United States. The Canadian Revenue Agency found that transactions between Cameco Corp and the Swiss subsidiary constituted a sham arrangement resulting in improper profit shifting. Hence, a tax assessment was issued for FY 2003, 2005, and 2006. Cameco disagreed with the Agency and brought the case to the Canadian Tax Court. In 2018 the Tax Court ruled in favor of Cameco and dismissed the assessment. This decision was appealed by the tax authorities to the Federal Court of Appeal. The Federal Court of Appeal in 2020 dismissed the appeal and also ruled in favor of Cameco A application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal was then brought to the Canadian Supreme Court by the tax authorities. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court ...

AgraCity Canada had entered into a Services Agreement with a group company, NewAgco Barbados, in connection with the sale by NewAgco Barbados directly to Canadian farmer-users of a glyphosate-based herbicide (“ClearOut”) a generic version of Bayer-Monsanto’s RoundUp. In reassessing the taxable income of AgraCity for 2007 and 2008 the Canada Revenue Agency relied upon the transfer pricing rules in paragraphs 247(2)(a) and (c) of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”) and re-allocated an amount equal to all of NewAgco Barbados’ profits from these sales activities to the income of AgraCity. According to the Canadian Revenue Agency the value created by the parties to the transactions did not align with what was credited to AgraCity and NewAgco Barbados. Hence, 100% of the net sales profits realized from the ClearOut sales by NewAgco Barbados to FNA members – according to the Revenue Agency – should have been AgraCity’s and none of those profits would have been NewAgco’s had they been dealing at arm’s length. “arm’s length commercial parties would never agree to let NewAgco Barbados have any of the profits if it served no function in the transactions given that it had no assets, employees, resources, or other role or value to contribute to the profit making enterprise or to bring thereto.” The Tax Court found that the purchase, sale, and related transactions with NewAgco Barbados were not a sham, nor was any individual transaction in the series of transactions beginning with the incorporation of NewAgco Barbados for the ClearOut sales activity a sham. The transactions that occurred and were documented were the transactions the parties intended, agreed to, and that the parties reported to others including the Canadian Revenue Agency. Any shortcomings in any paperwork was not intended to deceive the CRA or anyone else ...

Cameco, together with its subsidiaries, is a large uranium producer and supplier of the services that convert one form of uranium into another form. Cameco had uranium mines in Saskatchewan and uranium refining and processing (conversion) facilities in Ontario. Cameco also had subsidiaries in the United States that owned uranium mines in the United States. In 1993, the United States and Russian governments executed an agreement that provided the means by which Russia could sell uranium formerly used in its nuclear arsenal. The net result of this agreement was that a certain quantity of uranium would be offered for sale in the market. Cameco initially attempted to secure this source of uranium on its own but later took the lead in negotiating an agreement for the purchase of this uranium by a consortium of companies. When the final agreement was signed in 1999, Cameco designated its Luxembourg subsidiary, Cameco Europe S.A. (CESA), to be the signatory to this agreement. The agreement related to the purchase of the Russian uranium was executed in 1999 among CESA, Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires (COGEMA) (a French state-owned uranium producer), Nukem, Inc. (a privately owned United States trader in uranium), Nukem Nuklear GMBH and AO “Techsnabexport” (Tenex) (a Russian state-owned company). This agreement, which is also referred to as the HEU Feed Agreement, initially provided for the granting of options to purchase the uranium that Tenex would make available for sale. In the years following 1999, there were a number of amendments to this agreement. In particular, the fourth amendment in 2001, in part, obligated the western consortium (CESA, COGEMA and Nukem) to purchase a certain amount of uranium (paragraph 82 of the reasons). On September 9, 1999, CESA entered into an agreement with Urenco Limited (Urenco) (a uranium enricher) and three of its subsidiaries to purchase uranium that Urenco would be receiving from Tenex. Also in 1999, Cameco formed a subsidiary in Switzerland. This company, in 2001, changed its name to Cameco Europe AG (SA, Ltd) (CEL). In 2002, CESA transferred its business (which was described in the transfer agreement as “trading with raw materials, particularly uranium in various forms”) to CEL under the Asset Purchase and Transfer of Liabilities Agreement dated as of October 1, 2002, but executed on October 30, 2002. Therefore, CESA transferred to CEL the rights that CESA had to purchase uranium from Tenex and Urenco. CEL also purchased Cameco’s expected uranium production and its uranium inventory. It would appear that this arrangement did not include any uranium that was sold by Cameco to any customers in Canada (paragraph 40 of the Crown’s memorandum). At certain times, Cameco also purchased uranium from CEL. The profits in issue in this appeal arose as a result of the sale of uranium by CEL that it purchased from three different sources: Tenex, Urenco, and Cameco. When the arrangements with Tenex and Urenco were put in place in 1999, the price of uranium was low. In subsequent years, the price of uranium increased substantially. As a result, the profits realized by CEL from buying and selling uranium were substantial. The Canadian Revenue Agency found that the transactions between Cameco Corp and the Swiss subsidiary constituted a sham arrangement resulting in improper profit shifting.  According to the Canadian Revenue Agency, Cameco would not have entered into any of the transactions that it did with CESA and CEL with any arm’s length person, cf. paragraph 247(2) of the Act. All of the profit earned by CEL should therefore be reallocated to Cameco Corp. Hence, a tax assessment was issued for FY 2003, 2005, and 2006 where $43,468,281, $196,887,068, and $243,075,364 was added to the taxable income of Cameco Canada. Cameco disagreed with the Agency and brought the case to the Canadian Tax Court. In 2018 the Tax Court ruled in favor of Cameco and dismissed the assessment. This decision was then appealed by the tax authorities to the Federal Court of Appeal. The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and also ruled in favor of Cameco. “In this appeal, the Crown does not challenge any of the factual findings made by the Tax Court Judge. Rather, the Crown adopts a broader view of paragraphs 247(2)(b) and (d) of the Act and submits that Cameco would not have entered into any of the transactions that it did with CESA and CEL with any arm’s length person. As a result, according to the Crown, all of the profit earned by CEL should be reallocated to Cameco. The Crown, in its memorandum, also indicated that it was raising an alternative argument related to the interpretation of paragraph 247(2)(a) of the Act. … However, subparagraph 247(2)(b)(i) of the Act does not refer to whether the particular taxpayer would not have entered into the particular transaction with the non-resident if that taxpayer had been dealing with the non-resident at arm’s length or what other options may have been available to that particular taxpayer. Rather, this subparagraph raises the issue of whether the transaction or series of transactions would have been entered into between persons dealing with each other at arm’s length (an objective test based on hypothetical persons) — not whether the particular taxpayer would have entered into the transaction or series of transactions in issue with an arm’s length party (a subjective test). A test based on what a hypothetical person (or persons) would have done is not foreign to the law as the standard of care in a negligence case is a “hypothetical ‘reasonable person’” (Queen v. Cognos Inc., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87, at page 121, 1993 CanLII 146). … The Crown’s position with respect to this hypothetical transaction is also contradicted by its position in this case. Essentially, in this case, Cameco became aware of an opportunity to purchase Russian sourced uranium from Tenex and Urenco and chose to complete those arrangements through a foreign subsidiary rather than purchasing this uranium itself and selling it to third-party customers in other countries. This was a foreign-based business opportunity to ...

To acquire companies and resell them with capital gains a French Investment Fund distributed the capital of its investors (€ 5.4 billion in equity) between a French Fund Commun de Placement à Risques (FCPRs) and British Ltds managed by the French Investment Fund. For the purpose of acquiring the [X] group (the target), the French Investment Fund set up three legal entities in the Netherlands, [Y] UA, [B] BV, and [C] BV (the acquisition holding company). These three joint taxed entities are shown as Fiscal unit [A] below. The capital to be used for the acquisition of [X] group was divided into four FCPRs that held 30%, 30%, 30% and 10% in [Y] respectively. To get the full amount needed for the acquisition, [Y] members provided from their equity to [Y]: (i) member capital (€ 74.69 million by the FCPRs, € 1.96 million by the Fund Management, € 1.38 million by [D]) and (ii) investment in convertible instruments (hybrid loan at 13% per annum that is not paid, but added interest-bearing: € 60.4 million from the FCPRs and € 1.1 million from [D]). Within Fiscal unit [A], all amounts were paid in [B], which provided the acquisition holding company [C] with € 72.64 million as capital and € 62.36 million as loan. [C] also took out loans from third parties: (i) a senior facility of € 113.75 million from a bank syndicate and (ii) a mezzanine facility of € 35 million in total from [D] and [E]. On November 22, 2010, the French [F] Sàrl controlled by the French Investment Fund agreed on the acquisition with the owners of the target. “Before closing”, [F] transferred its rights and obligations under this agreement to [C], which purchased the target shares on January 21, 2011 for € 265 million, which were delivered and paid on January 31, 2011. As a result, the target was removed from the fiscal unit of the sellers [G] as of 31 January 2011 and was immediately included in the fiscal unit [A]. [C] on that day granted a loan of € 25 million at 9% to its German subsidiary [I] GmbH. Prior to the transaction the sellers and the target company had agreed that upon sale certain employees of the target would receive a bonus. The dispute is (i) whether the convertibles are a sham loan; (ii) if not, whether they actually function as equity under art. 10 (1) (d) Wet Vpb; (iii) if not, whether their interest charges are partly or fully deductible business expenses; (iv) if not, or art. 10a Wet Vpb stands in the way of deduction, and (v) if not, whether fraus legis stands in the way of interest deduction. Also in dispute is (vi) whether tax on the interest received on the loan to [I] GmbH violates EU freedom of establishment and (viii) whether the bonuses are deducted from the interested party or from [G]. Amsterdam Court of Appeal: The Court ruled that (i) it is a civil law loan that (ii) is not a participant loan and (iii) is not inconsistent or carries an arm’s length interest and that (iv) art. 10a Wet Vpb does not prevent interest deduction because the commitment requirement of paragraph 4 is not met, but (v) that the financing structure is set up in fraud legislation, which prevents interest deduction. The Court derived the motive from the artificiality and commercial futility of the financing scheme and the struggle with the aim and intent of the law from the (i) the norm of art. 10a Corporate Income Tax Act by avoiding its criteria artificially and (ii) the norm that an (interest) charge must have a non-fiscal cause in order to be recognized as a business expense for tax purposes. Re (vi), the Court holds that the difference in treatment between interest on a loan to a joined tax domestic subsidiary and interest on a loan to an non-joined tax German subsidiary is part of fiscal consolidation and therefore does not infringe the freedom of establishment. Contrary to the Rechtbank, the Court ruled ad (viii) that on the basis of the total profit concept, at least the realization principle, the bonuses are not borne by the interested party but by the sellers. Excerpts regarding the arm’s length principle “In principle, the assessment of transfer prices as agreed upon between affiliated parties will be based on the allocation of functions and risks as chosen by the parties. Any price adjustment by the Tax and Customs Administration will therefore be based on this allocation of functions and risks. In this respect it is not important whether comparable contracts would have been agreed between independent parties. For example, if a group decides to transfer the intangible assets to one group entity, it will not be objected that such a transaction would never have been agreed between independent third parties. However, it may happen that the contractual terms do not reflect economic reality. If this is the case, the economic reality will be taken into account, not the contractual stipulation. In addition, some risks cannot be separated from certain functions. After all, in independent relationships, a party will only be willing to take on a certain risk if it can manage and bear that risk.” “The arm’s-length principle implies that the conditions applicable to transactions between related parties are compared with the conditions agreed upon in similar situations between independent third parties. In very rare cases, similar situations between independent parties will result in a specific price. In the majority of cases, however, similar situations between independent third parties may result in a price within certain ranges. The final price agreed will depend on the circumstances, such as the bargaining power of each of the parties involved. It follows from the application of the arm’s-length principle that any price within those ranges will be considered an acceptable transfer price. Only if the price moves outside these margins, is there no longer talk of an arm’s-length price since a third party acting in ...

Canadian mining company, Cameco Corp., sells uranium to a wholly owned trading hub, Cameco Europe Ltd., registred in low tax jurisdiction, Switzerland, which then re-sells the uranium to independent buyers. The parties had entered into a series of controlled transactions related to this activity and as a result the Swiss trading hub, Cameco Europe Ltd., was highly profitable. Following an audit, the Canadian tax authorities issued a transfer pricing tax assessment covering years 2003, 2005, 2006, and later tax assessments for subsequent tax years, adding up to a total of approximately US 1.5 bn in taxes, interest and penalties. The tax authorities first position was that the controlled purchase and sale agreements should be disregarded as a sham as all important functions and decisions were in fact made by Cameco Corp. in Canada. As a second and third position the tax authorities held that the Canadian transfer pricing rules applied to either recharacterise or reprice the transactions. The Tax Court concluded that the transactions were not a sham and had been priced in accordance with the arm’s length principle. The tax authorities have now decided to appeal the decision with the Federal Court of Appeal. See also Canada vs Cameco Corp, Aug 2017, Federal Court, Case No T-856-15 and Cameco’s settelment with the IRS ...

Santander Holding USA is a financial-services company that used a tax strategy called Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged Securities (STARS) to generate more than $400 million in foreign tax credits. The scheme was developed and promoted to several U.S. banks by Barclays Bank PLC, a U.K. financial-services company, and the accounting firm KPMG, LLC. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ultimately concluded that the STARS transaction was a sham, and that the economic-substance doctrine therefore prohibited petitioner from claiming the foreign tax credits. The STARS-scheme was designed to transform the foreign tax credit into economic profit, at the expense of the U.S. Treasury. STARS involved an arrangement whereby the U.S. taxpayer paid tax to the United Kingdom, claimed a foreign tax credit for that U.K. tax, and simultaneously recouped a substantial portion of its U.K. tax. Instead of the typical one-to-one correlation of credits claimed to taxes paid, the taxpayer thus received one dollar in U.S. tax credits for substantially less than one dollar in foreign taxes paid. The STARS shelter was complex, but in  general terms worked as follows: The U.S. taxpayer diverted income from U.S. assets (such as loans to U.S. borrowers) into and out of a wholly owned Delaware trust that had a nominal U.K. trustee. Circulation of the income through the trust was purely a paper transaction, and no income was put at risk or deployed in any productive activities. Because the trustee was a U.K. resident, however, circulation of the income through the trust caused the income to become subject to U.K. tax, even though the assets and income never left the United States or the U.S. taxpayer’s control. The taxpayer would pay the trust’s U.K. tax and claim corresponding foreign tax credits on its U.S. return. STARS, however, incorporated a mechanism that allowed the taxpayer to recoup a substantial portion of the U.K. tax, while retaining the full amount of the U.S. foreign tax credits. Barclays, the entity that marketed STARS, acquired at the outset a formal interest in the Delaware trust. Under U.K. law, that formal interest allowed Barclays to claim certain U.K. tax benefits, ultimately permitting Barclays to recover almost the full amount (in this case, 85%) of the taxes that the taxpayer had paid. As part of the STARS strategy, Barclays agreed to return a significant percentage of that amount to the U.S. taxpayer, while keeping the rest as its fee. As a result, the U.S. taxpayer would receive an effective refund (through Barclays) of approximately 50% of its U.K. taxes, while claiming a foreign tax credit on its U.S. tax return as if it had paid 100% of those taxes. That benefit was achieved without putting any money at economic risk and without engaging in any productive business activities. The STARS strategy had an unlimited capacity to generate additional foreign tax credits, bounded only by the amount of income that a taxpayer could cycle through the trust petitioner employed the transaction to generate more than $400 million in foreign tax credits during the 2003-2007 tax years. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the economic substance of a transaction for which a taxpayer claims foreign tax credits on its federal tax return depends in part on whether the transaction was profitable after all foreign taxes were paid. Like other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, foreign tax credits are subject to the “economic substance” doctrine under that longstanding common-law principle, which was codified by Congress in 2010. According to the doctrine a transaction are not allowable if the transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business purpose. The doctrine reflects the principle that Congress does not intend for sham transactions to produce tax benefits, even if the transactions would otherwise trigger tax benefits under the pertinent statutory and regulatory provisions. The Court denies the petition for a writ of certiorari ...

In this case the Court held that while a “colourable device” could result in the transaction being considered a sham, that did not mean that tax planning within the law will not be permitted ...