The Bundesfinanzhof confirmed prior case law according to which the provisions on hidden deposits and hidden profit distributions must be observed in the context of the additional taxation. On the question of economic activity of the controlled foreign company, the Bundesfinanzhof refers to the ruling of the European Court of Justice concerning Cadbury-Schweppes from 2006. According to paragraphs §§ 7 to 14 in the Außensteuergesetz (AStG) profits from controlled foreign companies without business activity can be taxed in Germany. In the case at hand the subsidiary was located in a rented office in Cyprus and employed a resident managing director. Her job was to handle correspondence with clients, to carry out and supervise payment transactions, manage business records and keep records. She was also entrusted with obtaining book licenses to order these sub-licenses for the benefit of three of Russia’s and Ukraine’s affiliates, which distributed the books in the Russian-speaking market. The license income earned by subsidiary was taxed at 10 percent in Cyprus. The Income was considered ‘passive’ as the subsidiary lacked the necessary ‘actual economic activity’. On that basis the Bundesfinanzhof rejected the appeal of the taxpayer. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Li & Fung (Trading) Ltd., Hong Kong, entered into contracts with its global third party customers for provision of sourcing services with respect to products to be sourced by such global customers directly from third party vendors in India. For the sourcing services, the Hong Kong company received a 5% commission of the FOB value of goods sourced. The company in India was providing sourcing support services to the Hong Kong group company, and remunerated at cost plus 5 percent mark-up for provision of these services. The tax administration found that the the company in India should get the 5% commission on the free on board (FOB) value of the goods sourced from India as the Hong Kong company contributed no value. The Tribunal held that the compensation received by the company in Hong Kong – 5% of the FOB value – should be distributed between the company in India and the company in Hong Kong in the ratio of 80:20 based on there functional profiles. • The company in India had actually performed all critical functions, assumed significant risks and had also developed unique intangibles over the years. • The company in Hong Kong did not have either any technical expertise or manpower to carry out the sourcing activities. Se also India vs Li & Fung 2013 and India vs Li & Fung 2011 ...

A company of a Swiss based group maintained a permanent establishment in the Cayman Islands for financing the domestic group companies. Whereas the group companies were able to deduct the interest payments from the taxable profit to their full extent, the interest income, for Swiss tax purposes, was allocated to the permanent establishment in the Cayman Islands, and therefore led to non-taxation of this interest income. By interpreting the legal term “foreign permanent establishment” the Federal Supreme Court concluded that the finance company in the Cayman Islands had only four employees and that such a lean structures was in contrast to the figures in the annual accounts. Therefore, it denied the allocation of interest income to the Cayman Islands for Swiss tax purposes. Click here for English translation ...

The tax scheme in the Ben Nevis-case involved land owned by the subsidiary of a charitable foundation being licensed to a group of single purpose investor loss attributing qualifying companies (LAQC’s). The licensees were responsible for planting, maintaining and harvesting the forest through a forestry management company. The investors paid $1,350 per hectare for the establishment of the forest and $1,946 for an option to buy the land in 50 years for half its then market value. There were also other payments, including a $50 annual license fee. The land had been bought for around $580 per hectare. This meant that the the investors, if it wished to acquire the land after harvesting the forest, had to pay half its then value, even though they had already paid over three times the value at the inception of the scheme. In addition to the above payments, the investors agreed to pay a license premium of some $2 million per hectare, payable in 50 years time, by which time the trees would be harvested and sold. The investors purported to discharge its liability for the license premium immediately by the issuing of a promissory note redeemable in 50 years time. The premium had been calculated on the basis of the after tax amount that the mature forest was expected to yield. Finally the investors had agreed to pay an insurance premium of $1,307 per hectare and a further premium of $32,000 per hectare payable in 50 years time. The “insurance company” was a shell company established in a low tax jurisdiction by one of the promoters of the scheme. The insurance company did not in reality carry any risk due to arrangements with the land-owning subsidiary and the promissory notes from the group of investors. There was also a “letter of comfort” from the charitable foundation that it would make up any shortfall the insurance company was obliged to pay out. 90 per cent of the initial premiums received by the insurance company were paid to a company under the control of one of the promoters as commission and introduction fees tunneled back as loans to the promoters’ family trusts. Secure loans over the assets and undertakings secured the money payable under the promissory notes for the license premium and the insurance premium. The investors claimed an immediate tax deduction for the insurance premium and depreciated the deduction for the license premium over the 50 years of the license. The Inland Revenue disallowed these deductions by reference to the generel anti avoidance provision in New Zealand. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and ruled in favor of the Inland revenue. The majority of the SC judges rejected the notion that the potential conflict between the general anti-avoidance rule and specific tax provisions requires identifying which of the provisions, in any situation, is overriding. Rather, the majority viewed the specific provisions and the general anti-avoidance provision as working “in tandem”. Each provides a context that assists in determining the meaning and, in particular, the scope of the other. The focus of each is different. The purpose of the general anti-avoidance provision is to address tax avoidance. Tax avoidance may be found in individual steps or in a combination of steps. The purpose of the specific provisions is more targeted and their meaning should be determined primarily by their ordinary meaning, as established through their text in the light of their specific purpose. The function of the anti-avoidance provision is “to prevent uses of the specific provisions which fall outside their intended scope in the overall scheme of the Act.” The process of statutory construction should focus objectively on the features of the arrangements involved “without being distracted by intuitive subjective impressions of the morality of what taxation advisers have set up.” A three-stage test for assessing whether an arrangement is tax avoidance was applied by the Court. The first step in any case is for the taxpayer to satisfy the court that the use made of any specific provision comes within the scope of that provision. In this test it is the true legal character of the transaction rather than its label which will determine the tax treatment. Courts must construe the relevant documents as if they were resolving a dispute between the parties as to the meaning and effect of contractual arrangements. They must also respect the fact that frequently in commerce there are different means of producing the same economic outcome which have different taxation effects. The second stage of the test requires the court to look at the use of the specific provisions in light of arrangement as a whole. If a taxpayer has used specific provisions “and thereby altered the incidence of income tax, in a way which cannot have been within the contemplation and purpose of Parliament when it enacted the provision, the arrangement will be a tax avoidance arrangement.” The economic and commercial effect of documents and transactions may be significant, as well as the duration of the arrangement and the nature and extent of the financial consequences that it will have for the taxpayer. A combination of those factors may be important. If the specific provisions of the Act are used in any artificial or contrived way that will be significant, as it cannot be “within Parliament’s purpose for specific provisions to be used in that manner.” The courts are not limited to purely legal considerations at this second stage of the analysis. They must consider the use of the specific provisions in light of commercial reality and the economic effect of that use. The “ultimate question is whether the impugned arrangement, viewed in a commercially and economically realistic way, makes use of the specific provisions in a manner that is consistent with Parliament’s purpose.” If the arrangement does make use of the specific provisions in a manner consistent with Parliament’s purpose, it will not be tax avoidance. The third stage is to consider whether tax avoidance ...