The facts are the same as Example 5, except that sufficient data is not available to determine whether any of the uncontrolled distributors provide warranties or to determine the payment terms of the contracts. Because differences in these contractual terms could materially affect price or profits, the inability to determine whether these differences exist between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions diminishes the reliability of the results of the uncontrolled comparables. However, the reliability of the results may be enhanced by the application of a statistical method when establishing an arm’s length range pursuant to § 1.482-1(e)(2)(iii)(B) ...

Aggregation of interrelated manufacturing, marketing, and services activities. S1 is the exclusive Country Z distributor of computers manufactured by P. S2 provides marketing services in connection with sales of P computers in Country Z and in this regard uses significant marketing intangibles provided by P. S3 administers the warranty program with respect to P computers in Country Z, including maintenance and repair services. In evaluating whether the transfer prices paid by S1 to P, the fees paid by S2 to P for the use of P marketing intangibles, and the service fees earned by S2 and S3 are arm’s length amounts, it would be appropriate to perform an aggregate analysis that considers the combined effects of these interrelated transactions if they are most reliably analyzed on an aggregated basis ...

Assume that a warranty is offered with respect to all products so that the downstream price is uniform. Distributor C performs the warranty function but is, in fact, compensated by the supplier through a lower price. Distributor D does not perform the warranty function which is performed by the supplier (products are sent back to the factory). However, Distributor D’s supplier charges D a higher price than is charged to Distributor C. If Distributor C accounts for the cost of performing the warranty function as a cost of goods sold, then the adjustment in the gross profit margins for the differences is automatic. However, if the warranty expenses are accounted for as operating expenses, there is a distortion in the margins which must be corrected. The reasoning in this case would be that, if D performed the warranty itself, its supplier would reduce the transfer price, and therefore, D’s gross profit margin would be greater ...

Assume that there are two distributors selling the same product in the same market under the same brand name. Distributor A offers a warranty; Distributor B offers none. Distributor A is not including the warranty as part of a pricing strategy and so sells its product at a higher price resulting in a higher gross profit margin (if the costs of servicing the warranty are not taken into account) than that of Distributor B, which sells at a lower price. The two margins are not comparable until a reasonably accurate adjustment is made to account for that difference ...

Samsung Electronics Baltic Ltd, is a subsidiary of Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd, which was established at the end of 2007. On 1 January 2008, Samsung Electronics Baltic and Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd entered into Distribution Agreement, under which Samsung Electronics Baltic was appointed as the distributor in the Baltic States of the products manufactured by Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd and its subsidiaries (‘the Distribution Agreement’). In 2008 and 2009, Samsung Electronics Baltic carried out business activities in the territory of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia distributing the goods received from Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd under the Distribution Agreement. Samsung Electronics Baltic also provided warranty services for the goods sold by engaging service providers for that purpose, namely merchants who carried out repairs of the goods (‘Repair Services’). On 2 January 2008, Samsung Electronics Baltic concluded a Warranty Assumption Agreement (‘the Warranty Assumption Agreement’) with its sister company, Samsung Electronics Overseas B.V. (‘Dutch Samsung’), which was the distributor of Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd’s products in the Baltic States before the Applicant. Under the agreement, Samsung Electronics Baltic undertook to provide product warranty services for products sold by Dutch Samsung in the Baltic markets in 2005, 2006 and 2007, and Dutch Samsung undertook to pay Samsung Electronics Baltic a lump sum of USD 4 369 550 to fulfil the assumed warranty obligations. In order to fulfil its obligations under this contract, Samsung Electronics Baltic engaged the services of Repair Service Providers. Pursuant to the Distribution Agreement and the Marketing Fund Agreement (‘the Marketing Fund Agreement’) concluded on 1 January 2008 between Samsung Electronics Baltic and Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd, Samsung Electronics Baltic also performed marketing functions for the Samsung Group in 2008. In particular, Samsung Electronics Baltic engaged marketing agencies as marketing service providers in accordance with the marketing strategy set out by Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. Samsung Electronics Baltic paid the service fees indicated in the invoices issued by these agencies and subsequently invoiced Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd (or other related companies) for the same amount. The State Revenue Service (hereinafter – the Service) audited Samsung Electronics Baltic for value added tax for the period from January 2008 to October 2009 and for corporate income tax for 2008. The administrative procedure before the authority was concluded by the decision of the Revenue Service of 15 February 2011 (hereinafter – the appealed decision), by which the value added tax, the related penalty and late payment fines were calculated for additional payment to the budget, the value added tax to be refunded from the budget and the related penalty were reduced, and the corporate income tax and the related late payment fines and penalties were calculated for additional payment to the budget by the applicant. As regards value added tax, the contested decision states that in 2008 and 2009 Samsung Electronics Baltic deducted as input tax in its value added tax returns the amounts of tax indicated in the invoices issued to Samsung Electronics Baltic by the Repair Service. According to the Authority, Samsung Electronics Baltic was not entitled to do so, since the transactions in question were not aimed at the pursuit of Samsung Electronics Baltic’s economic activity (transactions subject to value added tax). The Revenue Service considers that Samsung Electronics Baltic used the transactions in question to secure its warranty service obligations towards Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd and Samsung Netherlands, whereas, in the Revenue Service’s view, these relationships are not to be regarded as transactions subject to value added tax but as cost compensation transactions which are not subject to value added tax. As regards corporation tax, the contested decision states that Samsung Electronics Baltic, in performing the group’s marketing functions, has acted as an intermediary which undertakes to provide the related companies with the services of subcontractors (marketing agencies). The Authority found that since Samsung Electronics Baltic passed on the services received from the unrelated parties – the marketing agencies – to Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd and other related undertakings without a mark-up, it follows that Samsung Electronics Baltic provided services to the related undertakings below the market price, since an unrelated undertaking would have added a mark-up to such intermediation services in order to make a profit. Consequently, there are grounds for adjusting Samsung Electronics Baltic’s corporation taxable income by the difference between the value of the services reported by Samsung Electronics Baltic and the market value of the services as calculated by the Revenue Service. The method of adding up costs should be used to determine the market value of the services provided. Taking into account the information available in the Amadeus database, it is estimated that the operating cost or profit margin for unrelated undertakings ranges between 1,7 % and 4,05 %. Consequently, the market value of the services provided by Samsung Electronics Baltic to its affiliates was determined by applying the profit margin of 1,7 % to the sum of the value of the services received from the marketing agencies and Samsung Electronics Baltic’s agency costs as determined in the audit. In follows from the judgement that – If the arm’s length price is not applied and the goods or services are sold at a price below the arm’s length price, the taxable income for corporation tax purposes must be revised upwards by that part of the difference. The legislator has accepted that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, which summarise the best practices in transfer pricing of OECD Member States, complement the explanation of the market price methods in the legislation and provide guidance to help calculate the market price as accurately as possible. Consequently, the application of market price methodologies should take into account and use, to the extent possible, the guidance provided in those guidelines. Determining the nature of the service provided is a prerequisite for application of the cost markup method. The essence of the cost markup method is the application of a mark-up to the costs incurred by the service provider in providing the service which is ...

Assume that a warranty is offered with respect to all products so that the downstream price is uniform. Distributor C performs the warranty function but is, in fact, compensated by the supplier through a lower price. Distributor D does not perform the warranty function which is performed by the supplier (products are sent back to the factory). However, Distributor D’s supplier charges D a higher price than is charged to Distributor C. If Distributor C accounts for the cost of performing the warranty function as a cost of goods sold, then the adjustment in the gross profit margins for the differences is automatic. However, if the warranty expenses are accounted for as operating expenses, there is a distortion in the margins which must be corrected. The reasoning in this case would be that, if D performed the warranty itself, its supplier would reduce the transfer price, and therefore, D’s gross profit margin would be greater ...

Assume that there are two distributors selling the same product in the same market under the same brand name. Distributor A offers a warranty; Distributor B offers none. Distributor A is not including the warranty as part of a pricing strategy and so sells its product at a higher price resulting in a higher gross profit margin (if the costs of servicing the warranty are not taken into account) than that of Distributor B, which sells at a lower price. The two margins are not comparable until a reasonably accurate adjustment is made to account for that difference ...

This case concerns the sale of extended warranties to third-party customers of Dixons, a large retail chain in the UK selling white goods and home electrical products. The DSG group captive (re)insurer in the Isle of Man (DISL) insured these extended warranties for DSG’s UK customers. Until 1997 this was structured via a third-party insurer (Cornhill) that reinsured 95% on to DISL. From 1997 onwards the warranties were offered as service contracts that were 100% insured by DISL. The dispute concerned the level of sales commissions and profit commissions received by DSG. The Tax Tribunal rejected the taxpayer’s contentions that the transfer pricing legislation did not apply to the particular series of transactions (under ICTA 88 Section 770 and Schedule 28AA) – essentially the phrases ‘facility’ (Section 770) and ‘provision’ (Schedule 28AA) were interpreted broadly so that there was something to price between DSG and DISL, despite the insertion of a third party and the absence of a recognised transaction between DSG and the other parties involved. The Tax Tribunal also rejected potentially comparable contracts that the taxpayer had used to benchmark sales commissions on similar contracts on the basis that the commission rate depended on profitability, which itself depended on the different level of loss ratios expected in relation to the products covered. A much more robust looking comparable provider of extended warranty cover offered as a benchmark for the market return on capital of DISL was also rejected owing to its differing relative bargaining power compared to DISL. This third-party re-insurer was considered to be a powerful brand providing extended ‘off-the-shelf’ warranty cover through disparate distributors – the tribunal noted that DSG had a strong brand, powerful point of sales advantage through access to customers in their shops and could easily have sourced the basic insurance provided by DISL elsewhere. The overall finding of the Tax Tribunal was that, to the extent that ‘super profits’ were available, these should be distributed between the parties according to the ability of each party to protect itself from normal competitive forces and each party’s bargaining power. The Tax Tribunal noted in this context that DISL was entirely reliant on DSG for its business. According to the facts of this case, the super profits were deemed to arise because of DSG’s point-of-sale advantage as the largest retailer of domestic electrical goods in the UK and also DSG’s past claims data. DISL was considered to possess only routine actuarial know-how and adequate capital, both of which DSG could find for itself. As a result, the tribunal thought that a profit-split approach was the most appropriate, whereby DISL was entitled to a market return on capital, with residual profit over and above this amount being returned to DSG via a profit commission. This decision offers valuable insights into consideration of the level of comparability demanded to support the use of comparable uncontrolled prices; Selection of the appropriate ‘tested party’ in seeking to benchmark a transaction; The importance of bargaining power; Approval of profit split as the most appropriate methodology; That a captive insurer that is underwriting ‘simple’ risks, particularly where the loss ratios are relatively stable and predictable, and that does not possess significant intangibles or other negotiating power, should not expect to earn more than a market return to its economic capital ...

In the Seagate Tech case the US Tax Court was asked to decide on several distinct transfer pricing issues arising out of a transfer pricing adjustments issued by the IRS. Whether respondent’s reallocations of gross income under section 482 for the years in issue are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; whether respondent should bear the burden of proof for any of the issues involved in the instant case; whether petitioner Seagate Technology, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Seagate Scotts Valley), paid Seagate Technology Singapore, Pte. Ltd. (Seagate Singapore), a wholly owned subsidiary of Seagate Scotts Valley, arm’s-length prices for component parts; whether Seagate Scotts Valley paid Seagate Singapore arm’s-length prices for completed disk drives; whether Seagate Singapore paid Seagate Scotts Valley arm’s-length royalties for the use of certain intangibles; whether the royalty fee Seagate Singapore paid Seagate Scotts Valley for disk drives covered under a section 367 private letter ruling applies to all such disk drives shipped to the United States, regardless of where title passed; whether the procurement services fees Seagate Singapore paid Seagate Scotts Valley were arm’s length; whether the consideration Seagate Singapore paid Seagate Scotts Valley pursuant to a cost-sharing agreement was arm’s length; and whether Seagate Scotts Valley is entitled to offsets for warranty payments Seagate Singapore paid to Seagate Scotts Valley ...