Company S1 conducts research activities to develop intangibles that it uses to create new products that it can produce and sell. It agrees to transfer to an associated company, Company S2, unlimited rights to all future intangibles which may arise from its future work over a period of twenty years for a lump sum payment. The arrangement is commercially irrational for both parties since neither Company S1 nor Company S2 has any reliable means to determine whether the payment reflects an appropriate valuation, both because it is uncertain what range of development activities Company S1 might conduct over the period and also because valuing the potential outcomes would be entirely speculative. Under the guidance in this section, the structure of the arrangement adopted by the taxpayer, including the form of payment, should be modified for the purposes of the transfer pricing analysis. The replacement structure should be guided by the economically relevant characteristics, including the functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed, of the commercial or financial relations of the associated enterprises. Those facts would narrow the range of potential replacement structures to the structure most consistent with the facts of the case (for example, depending on those facts the arrangement could be recast as the provision of financing by Company S2, or as the provision of research services by Company S1, or, if specific intangibles can be identified, as a licence with contingent payments terms for the development of those specific intangibles, taking into account the guidance on hard-to-value intangibles as appropriate) ...

A Swiss company manufactured and distributed pharmaceutical and chemical products. The Swiss company was held by a Dutch parent that held another company in France. R&D activities were delegated by the Dutch parent to its French subsidiary and compensated with cost plus 15%. On that basis the Swiss company had to pay a royalty to its Dutch parent of 2.5% of its turnover for using the IP developed. Following an audit the Swiss tax authorities concluded that the Dutch parent did not contribute to the development of IP. In 2006 and 2007, no employees were employed, and in 2010 and 2011 there were only three employees. Hence the royalty agreement was disregarded and an assessment issued where the royalty payments were denied. Instead the R&D agreement between the Dutch parent and the French subsidiary was regarded as having been concluded between the Swiss and French companies Judgement of the Supreme Court The Court agreed with the decision of the tax authorities. The Dutch parent was a mere shell company with no substance. Hence, the royalty agreement was disregarded and replaced with the cost plus agreement with the French subsidiary. The Court found that it must have been known to the taxpayer that a company without substance could not be entitled to profits of the R&D activities. On that basis an amount equal to 75% of the evaded tax had therefore rightly been imposed as a penalty. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Company S1 conducts research activities to develop intangibles that it uses to create new products that it can produce and sell. It agrees to transfer to an associated company, Company S2, unlimited rights to all future intangibles which may arise from its future work over a period of twenty years for a lump sum payment. The arrangement is commercially irrational for both parties since neither Company S1 nor Company S2 has any reliable means to determine whether the payment reflects an appropriate valuation, both because it is uncertain what range of development activities Company S1 might conduct over the period and also because valuing the potential outcomes would be entirely speculative. Under the guidance in this section, the structure of the arrangement adopted by the taxpayer, including the form of payment, should be modified for the purposes of the transfer pricing analysis. The replacement structure should be guided by the economically relevant characteristics, including the functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed, of the commercial or financial relations of the associated enterprises. Those facts would narrow the range of potential replacement structures to the structure most consistent with the facts of the case (for example, depending on those facts the arrangement could be recast as the provision of financing by Company S2, or as the provision of research services by Company S1, or, if specific intangibles can be identified, as a licence with contingent payments terms for the development of those specific intangibles, taking into account the guidance on hard-to-value intangibles as appropriate) ...