A SGPS S.A. is the parent company of Group A. In 2016, a subsidiary, B S.A., took a loan in a bank, amounting to 1,950,000.00 Euros, and incurred interest costs and Stamp Tax. However, the majority of the loan, an amount of €1,716,256.60, was transferred as an interest free loan to A SGPS S.A. The tax authorities issued an assessment related to costs incurred on the loan and deducted by B S.A. The tax authorities disallowed B S.A.’s deduction of the costs as they were not intended to protect or obtain income, and therefore did not meet the requirements for deductibility under the general provisions of the Tax Code; A complaint was filed by A SGPS S.A. with the Administrative Tribunal. According to A SGPS SA the tax authorities did not justify why it considered that the expenses incurred by B S.A. to an independent bank for a loan that was passed on to the parent company were not deductible. According to A SGPS SA, this was not an issue of requirements for deductibility , but rather a question of transfer pricing. Hence, the correct framework for an adjustment would be that of article 63 regarding pricing of controlled transactions and not the general provisions in Article 23 of the Tax Code. Therefore the tax authorities had erred in law. Judgement of the CAAD In regards of B S.A.s deductions of loan expenses, the complaint of A SGPS S.A was dismissed and the assessment upheld. According to the tribunal, expenses held by a subsidiary to grant a loan to a parent company could not be said to “protect or obtain income” of the subsidiary since it did not own the parent company. “…the basic rule of deductibility of expenses is stated in article 23, no. 1 of the IRC Code, which, in its normative hypothesis, contains the respective constitutive assumptions, of a substantive nature, requiring a connection between the expenses and the activity generating income subject to IRC. Note that this is not a requirement of a direct causal relation between expenses and income (see Judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court of 24 September 2014, Case No. 0779/12; of 15 November 2017, Case No. 372/16; and of 28 June 2017, Case No. 0627/16, of 28 June 2017 ). The latter judgement considers “definitively ruled out a finalistic view of indispensability (as a requirement for costs to be accepted as tax costs), according to which a cause-effect relation, of the type conditio sine qua non, between costs and income would be required, so that only costs for which it is possible to establish an objective connection with the income may be considered deductible”. The causal connection should be made between the expenses and the activity globally considered (going beyond the strict expense-income nexus), and the Administration cannot assess the correctness, convenience or opportunity of the business and management decisions of the corporate entities. As highlighted by the Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 21 September 2016, Case No. 0571/13 “[t]he concept of indispensability of costs, to which article 23 of the CIRC refers, refers to the costs incurred in the interest of the company or supported within the scope of the activities arising from its corporate scope”. On the other hand, this construction requires a link of subjective imputation that is implicit in the relationship required between the expense and the activity. This link must be made with the specific activity of the taxpayer and not with any other activity, namely that of its partners or third parties. It is in this framework that the corrections under analysis are based and not on the transfer pricing regime (see article 63 of the IRC Code), or on the “anti-abuse” regime, for which reason the assessment of the latter does not belong here. The Court is limited to the knowledge of the reasons expressed in the contemporaneous grounds of the tax act and if a correction has several valid grounds, only those that have been invoked as grounds for the contested act may be assessed. In this case, the only basis of the addition to the taxable amount of the deducted financial costs respects to the non-compliance of the assumptions of article 23, no. 1 of the Corporate Income Tax Code. As the conditions that integrate the normative hypothesis are not met, one cannot but validly conclude, together with the Defendant, that the deduction is not admissible. This, without prejudice to the fact that the factual situation may possibly be subject to a concurrent framework in other rules, which, as said, it is not for us to assess if they are not part of the foundations of the tax acts. The point is that the legal-tax regime effectively applied is based on correct legal and factual assumptions. … Taking into account the criterion described, the granting of free loans by B…, S.A. to the parent company [the Claimant] does not appear susceptible of being regarded as an activity of management of a financial asset by the former, since it is not the latter that holds shares in the parent company, but the opposite. In effect, there is no asset of which B…, S.A. is the holder that underlies this financing operation to the parent company. Nor can the argument regarding the exercise of significant influence over management, usually measured (in relation to subsidiary companies) by a percentage holding of at least 20%, be invoked in these circumstances to judge that the interest in the investment has been verified. Here, the significant influence is exercised in the opposite direction, since the parent company holds 92% of the capital of the Claimant. Therefore, it is concluded that the non-interest bearing financing granted by B…, S.A. to the Claimant are not carried out within the scope of the activity of the former and in its economic interest, so, in agreement with the Defendant, the financial costs incurred do not pass the test of the necessary causal relation between the expenses incurred and the activity of ...