“Lux Credit B.V.” took out various credit facilities from related parties [company name 2] s.a.r.l. and [company name 3] s.a.r.l. – both resident in Luxembourg. These were financings whereby “Lux Credit facility B.V.” could draw funds (facilities) up to a pre-agreed maximum amount. In doing so, “Lux Credit B.V.” owed both interest and “commitment fees”. The commitment fees were calculated on the maximum amount of the facility. Interest and commitment fees were owed. The interest payable to [company name 2] and [company name 3], respectively, was calculated by deducting the commitment fees from the interest payable on the amount withdrawn, with interest payable on the amount withdrawn, the commitment fees owed after the due date and the interest owed after the due date. In its returns for the current financial years, “Lux Credit B.V.” charged both interest and commitment fees against taxable profit. Following an audit, an assessment of additional taxable income was issued for the financial years 2012/2013 – 2016/2017. According to the tax authorities, the financial arrangement was not at arm’s length. The interest rate and commitment fees were adjusted and part of the loans were classified as equity. A complaint was filed by “Lux Credit B.V.” Judgement of the District Court The Court found mainly in favour of Credit Facility B.V.. It upheld most of the adjustments relating to commitment fees, but overturned the adjustment to the interest rate. According to the Court, Lux Credit B.V. was entitled to an interest deduction for the years under review, calculated at the contractually agreed interest rate on the amounts actually borrowed. Excerpts “51. With regard to the transfer pricing documentation, the court considers the following. Although the documentation referred to in Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Vpb Act was not available at the time the defendant requested it, the claimant has remedied this defect by again preparing records to substantiate the conditions surrounding the facilities. In the court’s opinion, the defendant did not make it plausible with what it argued that the claimant’s administration contains such defects and shortcomings that it cannot serve as a basis for the profit calculation that must lead to the conclusion that the claimant did not file the required return.10 The court also took into account that the parliamentary history of Section 8b of the 1969 Vpb Act noted that the documentation requirement of Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Vpb Act relates to the availability of information necessary to assess whether the prices and conditions(transfer prices) used in affiliated relationships qualify as arm’s length. 11 In the court’s opinion, the defendant has not argued sufficiently to conclude that the transfer-pricing data further collected, prepared and documented by the claimant and the documents that were present at [company name 2] and [company name 3] on the determination of the credit ratings are so deficient that the claimant has not complied with the obligations of Section 8b(3) of the 1969 Income Tax Act. The fact that source documents for the period, in which the transactions were entered into, have not been preserved and the defendant has comments on the data used by the claimant and disagrees with the outcomes of the claimant, do not alter this.” “56. In the court’s view, the defendant was right to make the adjustments in respect of commitment fees on facilities 1 and 3 for the years under review. The defendant was also correct in imposing the 2014/2015, 2015/2016 and 2016/2017 assessments to correct the commitment fees on Facility 7bn. In assessing whether the defendant was justified in making those corrections, the court relied on what [company name 1] and [company name 2] and [company name 3] agreed on civilly. The agreements between [company name 1] and [company name 2] and [company name 3] explicitly distinguish between interest due and commitment fees due. The court therefore rejects the plaintiff’s position that it must be assessed whether the total of the commitment fee and interest costs remained within the margins of Section 8b of the 1969 Vpb Act, and the commitment fee and interest costs should be considered together as an “all-in rate”. That the terms of Facilities 1, 3 and 7bn show similarities with Payment in Kind loans, as claimed by the claimant, does not make it necessary in this case to deviate from what the parties agreed under civil law. Indeed, the defendant has argued, with reasons, that stipulating headroom for the purpose of funding interest that may be credited, if the same facts and circumstances are present, is not usual in the market but it is usual in the market that over interest to be credited, a charge arises only at the time of the maturity of the interest. It is not usual that a charge – in this case in the form of commitment fees – is already due before the due date. This involves a double burden, as interest is also charged on the commitment fee. On the other hand, the plaintiff has not made it plausible that independent third-party parties were willing to agree such terms in similar circumstances, nor has it made its economic reality plausible. The court also took into account that the claimant did not make any calculations, prior to setting the maximum amount and commitment fees. 57. In the court’s view, the defendant was right to make the adjustments in respect of the commitment fees and interest payable thereon in respect of Facility 5. The defendant has made it plausible that such an agreement between independent third parties will not be concluded. The defendant was right to point out the following aspects:” “In the court’s opinion, with what the defendant has put forward and also in view of what the claimant has put forward in response, the defendant has failed to make it plausible that the interest rates agreed by [company name 1] , [company name 2] and [company name 3] regarding facilities 1, 3 and 7bn are not in line with what would have been agreed by independent parties in the ...