The German Federal Ministry of Finance issues draft law for the implementation of the EU Directive to ensure a global minimum level of taxation for multinational groups of companies and large domestic groups in the Union The aim of the draft law is to implement key elements of the international agreements on Pillar 2 of the so-called two-pillar solution. The post-taxation provisions contained therein are intended to ensure a global effective minimum taxation, to counteract harmful tax competition and aggressive tax structuring and thus to contribute to the promotion of tax justice and a level playing field. Click here for unofficial English translation ...

Unilateral APAs may present significant problems for tax administrations and taxpayers alike. From the point of view of other tax administrations, problems arise because they may disagree with the APA’s conclusions. From the point of view of the associated enterprises involved, one problem is the possible effect on the behaviour of the associated enterprises. Unlike bilateral or multilateral APAs, the use of unilateral APAs may not lead to an increased level of certainty for the taxpayer involved and a reduction in economic or juridical double taxation for the MNE group. If the taxpayer accepts an arrangement that over-allocates income to the country making the APA in order to avoid lengthy and expensive transfer pricing enquiries or excessive penalties, the administrative burden shifts from the country providing the APA to other tax jurisdictions. Taxpayers should not feel compelled to enter into APAs for these reasons ...

Bilateral and multilateral APAs substantially reduce or eliminate the possibility of juridical or economic double or non taxation since all the relevant countries participate. By contrast, unilateral APAs do not provide certainty in the reduction of double taxation because tax administrations affected by the transactions covered by the APA may consider that the methodology adopted does not give a result consistent with the arm’s length principle. In addition, bilateral and multilateral APAs can enhance the mutual agreement procedure by significantly reducing the time needed to reach an agreement since competent authorities are dealing with current data as opposed to prior year data that may be difficult and time-consuming to produce ...

The European Commission has now opened an in-depth investigation to examine whether tax rulings granted by Luxembourg to Finnish food and drink packaging company Huhtamäki may have given the company an unfair advantage over its competitors, in breach of EU State Aid rules. Margrethe Vestager, Commissioner in charge of competition policy, said: “Member States should not allow companies to set up arrangements that unduly reduce their taxable profits and give them an unfair advantage over their competitors. The Commission will carefully investigate Huhtamäki’s tax treatment in Luxembourg to assess whether it is in line with EU State aid rules.” The Commission’s formal investigation concerns three tax rulings issued by Luxembourg to the Luxembourg-based company Huhtalux S.à.r.l. in 2009, 2012 and 2013. The 2009 tax ruling was disclosed as part of the “Luxleaks” investigation led by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists in 2014. Huhtalux is part of the Huhtamäki group, which is headquartered in Finland. Huhtamäki is a company active in consumer packaging, notably in food and food service packaging in Europe, Asia and Australia. Huhtalux carries out intra-group financing activities. It receives interest-free loans from another company of the Huhtamäki group based in Ireland. These funds are then used by Huhtalux to finance other Huhtamäki group companies through interest-bearing loans. The three tax rulings issued by Luxembourg allow Huhtalux to unilaterally deductfrom its taxable base fictitious interest payments for the interest-free loans it receives. According to Luxembourg, these fictitious expenses correspond to interest payments that an independent third party in the market would have demanded for the loans that Huhtalux receives. However, Huhtalux does not pay any such interest. These deductions reduce Huhtalux’s taxable base and, as a result, the company is taxed on a substantially smaller profit. The Commission is concerned that Luxembourg has accepted a unilateral downward adjustment of Huhtalux’s taxable base that may grant the company a selective advantage. This is because it would allow the group to pay less tax than other stand-alone or group companies whose transactions are priced in accordance with market terms. If confirmed, this would amount to illegal State aid ...

On 13 November 2018, the Inclusive Framework on BEPS approved updates to the results of reviews of preferential tax regimes conducted in connection with BEPS Action 5. The data below presents the conclusions of the work on regime reviews. The results are a consolidated update of the regimes reported in Harmful Tax Practices – 2017 Progress Report on Preferential Regimes. Countries with harmfull tax practices – preferential tax regimes – are defined based on the following factors: Where no or low effective tax rates (or negotiable tax rates or bases) are imposed on income from highly mobile assets and activities Where the low tax regime is ring-fenced (separated) from the domestic economy Where there is no transparancy and no exchange of information with other jurisdictions, eg. secrecy provisions Where there is no requirement of substantial economic activities/substance The Inclusive Framework on BEPS has decided to resume the application of the substantial activities requirement for no or only nominal tax jurisdictions. Originally a criteria set out in the harmful tax framework from 1998, it had not been applied to date. However, with the elevation of the substantial activities requirements in preferential regimes, and the broad-based membership of the Inclusive Framework working together on an equal footing, it was considered the right time to ensure that equivalent substance requirements apply in no or only nominal tax jurisdictions. This global standard means that mobile business income cannot be parked in a zero tax jurisdiction without the core business functions having been undertaken by the same business entity, or in the same location. In doing so, the Inclusive Framework will ensure that substantial activities must be performed in respect of the same types of mobile business activities, regardless of whether they take place in a preferential regime or in a no or only nominal tax jurisdiction ...

On December 5, 2017, the EU published it’s blacklist of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions (tax havens). 1. American Samoa American Samoa does not apply any automatic exchange of financial information, has not signed and ratified, including through the jurisdiction they are dependent on, the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. 2. Bahrain Bahrain does not cover all EU Member States for the purpose of automatic exchange of information, has not signed and ratified the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended, facilitates offshore structures and arrangements aimed at attracting profits without real economic substance, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. 3. Barbados Barbados has a harmful preferential tax regime and did not clearly commit to amending or abolishing it as requested by 31 December 2018. Barbados’ commitment to amend or abolish other harmful tax regimes in line with criterion 2.1 will be monitored. 4. Grenada Grenada has not signed and ratified the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended and did not clearly commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. Grenada’s commitment to comply with criteria 1.1, 2.1 and 3 will be monitored. 5. Guam Guam does not apply any automatic exchange of financial information, has not signed and ratified, including through the jurisdiction they are dependent on, the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. 6. Korea (Republic of) Korea has harmful preferential tax regimes and did not commit to amending or abolishing them by 31 December 2018. 7. Macao SAR Macao SAR has not signed and ratified, including through the jurisdiction they are dependent on, the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. Macao SAR’s commitment to comply with criteria 1.1 and 2.1 will be monitored. 8. Marshall Islands Marshall Islands facilitates offshore structures and arrangements aimed at attracting profits without real economic substance, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. Marshal Islands’ commitment to comply with criteria 1.1 and 1.2 will be monitored. 9. Mongolia Mongolia is not a member of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, has not signed and ratified the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2019. 10. Namibia Namibia is not a Member of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, has not signed and ratified the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance as amended, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2019. Furthermore, Namibia has harmful preferential tax regimes and did not commit to amending or abolishing them by 31 December 2018. 11. Palau Palau facilitates offshore structures and arrangements aimed at attracting profits without real economic substance and refused to engage in a meaningful dialogue to ascertain its compliance of with criterion 2.2. Palau’s commitment to comply with criteria 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 3 will be monitored. The following jurisdictions are committed to implement automatic exchange of information by 2018: Curaçao, Hong Kong SAR, New Caledonia, Oman, Qatar and Taiwan 12. Panama Panama has a harmful preferential tax regime and did not clearly commit to amending or abolishing it as requested by 31 December 2018. Panama’s commitment to amend or abolish other harmful tax regimes in line with criterion 2.1 will be monitored. 13. Saint Lucia Saint Lucia has harmful preferential tax regimes, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not clearly commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. 14. Samoa Samoa has harmful preferential tax regimes, does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. 15. Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago has been attributed a rating of “Non Compliant” by the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, has not signed and ratified the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters as amended, has a harmful preferential tax regime and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. Trinidad and Tobago’s commitment to comply with criteria 1.1 and 3 will be monitored. 16. Tunisia Tunisia has harmful preferential tax regimes and did not commit to amending or abolishing them by 31 December 2018. Tunisia’s commitment to comply with criterion 3 will be monitored. 17. United Arab Emirates The United Arab Emirates does not apply the BEPS minimum standards and did not commit to addressing these issues by 31 December 2018. United Arab Emirates’ commitment to comply with criteria 1.1 and 1.3 will be monitored. Fair Taxation The following jurisdictions are committed to amend or abolish the identified regimes by 2018: Andorra, Armenia, Aruba, Belize, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cook Islands, Curacao, Fiji, Hong Kong SAR, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Maldives, Mauritius, Morocco, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Seychelles, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay and Vietnam. The following jurisdictions have not explicitly reiterated the commitment taken at the FHTP to amend or abolish the identified regimes by 2018: Malaysia and Labuan Island. The following jurisdictions are committed to addressing the concerns relating to economic substance by 2018: Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Jersey and Vanuatu. Transparency The following jurisdictions are committed to implement automatic exchange of information by 2018: Curaçao, Hong Kong SAR, New Caledonia, Oman, Qatar and Taiwan. The following jurisdictions are committed to implement automatic exchange of information by 2019: Turkey. The following jurisdictions are committed to become member of the Global ...

The OECD report on harmful tax incentives provides details on reviews of 164 preferential tax regimes. Some preferential tax regimes are considered harmful – where these encourage the erosion of other jurisdictions’ tax bases. All 102 members of the BEPS Inclusive Framework have committed to ensuring that any regimes offered meet the criteria that have been agreed as part of BEPS Action 5. Crucially, this includes a requirement that taxpayers benefiting from a regime must themselves undertake the core business activity, ensuring the alignment of taxation with genuine business substance. Of the 164 regimes reviewed in the last twelve months: * 99 require action. * For 93 of these 99 regimes, the required changes have already been completed or initiated by Inclusive Framework members, * 56 regimes do not pose a BEPS risk, * 9 regimes are still under review, due to extenuating circumstances such as the impact of the recent hurricanes on certain Caribbean jurisdictions. OECD 2017-progress-report-on-preferential-regimes ...