In 2019, the Danish parent company of the group, EAC Invest A/S, had been granted a ruling by the tax tribunal that, in the period 2008-2011, due to, inter alia, quite exceptional circumstances involving currency restrictions in Venezuela, the parent company should not be taxed on interest on a claim for unpaid royalties relating to trademarks covered by licensing agreements between the parent company and its then Venezuelan subsidiary, Plumrose Latinoamericana C.A. The Tax tribunal had also found that neither a payment of extraordinary dividends by the Venezuelan subsidiary to the Danish parent company in 2012 nor a restructuring of the group in 2013 could trigger a deferred taxation of royalties. The tax authorities appealed against the decisions to the High Court. Judgement of the High Court The High Court upheld the decisions of the tax tribunal with amended grounds and dismissed the claims of the tax authorities. Excerpts: Interest on unpaid royalty claim “The High Court agrees that, as a starting point, between group-related parties such as H1 and the G2 company, questions may be raised regarding the interest on a receivable arising from a failure to pay royalties, as defined in section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act. The question is whether, when calculating H1’s taxable income for the income years in question, there is a basis for fixing interest income to H1 on the unpaid royalty claim by G2, within the meaning of Paragraph 2 of the Tax Assessment Act. Such a fixing of interest must, where appropriate, be made on terms which could have been obtained if the claim had arisen between independent parties. The right to an adjustment is thus based, inter alia, on the assumptions that the failure to pay interest on the royalty claim has no commercial justification and that there is in fact a basis for comparison in the form of contractual terms between a debtor for a claim in bolivar in Venezuela and a creditor in another country independent of the debtor.” … “In the light of the very special circumstances set out above, and following an overall assessment, the Court considers that there are no grounds for finding that the failure to recover H1’s royalty claim from G2 was not commercially justified. The High Court also notes that the Ministry of Taxation has not demonstrated the existence of a genuine basis for comparison in the form of contractual terms for a claim in bolivar between a debtor in Venezuela and a creditor in a third country independent of the debtor. The High Court therefore finds that there is no basis under Section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act, cf. Section 3B(5) of the Tax Control Act, cf. Para 8 cf. Section 5(3), there is a basis for increasing G3-A/S’s income in the income years in question by a fixed rate of interest on the unpaid royalty claim with G2 company.” Dividend distribution in 2012 reclassified as royalty “…the Court of Appeal, after an overall assessment, accepts that the fact that the G2 company did not waive outstanding royalty receivables was solely a consequence of the very specific currency restrictions in Venezuela, that the payment of dividends was commercially motivated and was not due to a common interest between H1 and the G2 company, and that therefore, under Article 2(2) of the Tax Code, there is no need to pay dividends to the G2 company. 1(3), there are grounds for reclassifying the dividend distribution as a taxable deduction from the royalty claim, as independent parties could not have acted as claimed by the Tax Ministry.” Claim in respect of purchase price for shares in 2013 set-off against dividend reclassified as royalty “… For the reasons given by the Tax Court and, moreover, in the light of the very special circumstances of Venezuela set out above, the Court finds that there is no basis under section 2 of the Tax Assessment Act for reclassifying the claim of the G2 company against H2, in respect of the share purchase price for the G9 company, from a set-off against dividends due to an instalment of royalties due.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

PT Nanindah Mutiara Shipyard Ltd reported losses for FY 2013. The tax authorities issued an assessment where the income of the company was increased by a substantial amount referring to applicable transfer pricing regulations. Nanindah Mutiara Shipyard Ltd filed a complaint with the Tax Court, but the Tax Court upheld the assessment. An application for judicial review was then filed with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Nanindah Mutiara Shipyard Ltd. The Tax Court had erred in assessing facts, data, evidence and application of the law. The decision of the Tax Court was canceled and the petition for judicial review was granted. Losses reported by Nanindah Mutiara Shipyard Ltd were not due to non-arm’s length pricing, but rather exceptional circumstances that occurred at the local company in the years following 2010. Excerpts: ” … a. that the reasons for the Petitioner’s petition for judicial review in the a quo case are positive corrections to Business Circulation amounting to Rp45,920,139,538.00; which the Panel of Judges of the Tax Court maintains can be justified, because after examining and re-examining the arguments put forward in the Memorandum of Review by the Petitioner for Judicial Review in connection with the Counter Memorandum of Review, it can invalidate the facts and weaken the evidence revealed in the trial. as well as legal considerations of the Tax Court Panel of Judges, because in the a quo case in the form of substances that have been examined, decided and tried by the Tax Court Judges there are errors in assessing facts, data, evidence and application of the law as well as real mistakes in it, so that the Supreme Court of Justice canceled the a quo Tax Court decision and tried again with the legal considerations below, because in casu it is related to the evidentiary value that prioritizes the principle of material truth and based on the principle of substance over the form which has fulfilled the Ne Bis Vexari Rule principle as which has required that all administrative actions must be based on applicable laws and regulations. Whereas therefore the object of the dispute is in the form of a positive correction of Business Circulation amounting to Rp.45,920,139,538.00;which have been considered based on facts, evidence and application of the law and decided with the conclusion that the Panel of Judges maintains that there are factual errors and legal errors, so that the Supreme Court of Justice overturned the a quo decision and retrial with the consideration that due to in casu, the relationship with a special relationship, there are indications that the indicator of the current level of profit of the Appellant for the Review Applicant for the 2013 Fiscal Year which is below the normal profit range of similar companies, is not due to the existence of transfer pricing or pricing for transactions between parties that have a special relationship, but due to the impact of riots, causing extraordinary costs and companies not operating at full capacity. Thus, the Transfer Pricing Documentation of the present Appellant for the Review of the Appellant for the 2013 Fiscal Year, thus causing the loss suffered by the current Appellant of the Appeal for the Review of the 2013 Fiscal Year is the effect of extraordinary events in 2010 namely riots. at the shipyard in one of the companies belonging to the business group which is located adjacent to the shipyard of the present Appellant of the Applicant for Judicial Review. Besides that, The Panel of Supreme Court Justices is of the opinion that the decrease in income received by the Appellant now, the Petitioner for Review for the Fiscal Year after the riots, is due to the decline in new shipbuilding projects and the cancellation of orders that have caused ongoing shipbuilding projects to be neglected. decisive factors include the decline in new shipbuilding projects. Whereas on the basis of a state of chaos, it is considered as an extraordinary situation (force majeure) or a state of coercion (overmacht) which will directly result in the assessment of legal obligations on the fulfillment of tax obligations not being in the expected level of position, b. whereas therefore, the reasons for the Petitioner’s application for judicial review can be justified and sufficiently based on law because the arguments submitted are decisive opinions and therefore deserve to be granted and because there is a decision of the Tax Court which clearly contradicts the prevailing laws and regulations. applies as stipulated in Article 91 letter e of Law Number 14 of 2002 concerning the Tax Court and related laws, so that the accrued tax is recalculated into overpayment of Rp3,818,166,381.00; with the following details: …based on the above considerations, according to the Supreme Court, there are sufficient reasons to grant the petition for review;” Click here for translation ...

In response to COVID-19, some taxpayers may seek to assert force majeure in situations where it is not contained within the relevant intercompany agreement (assuming here that the law governing the contract is not a civil law jurisdiction where force majeure would automatically apply), may seek to change an existing intercompany agreement to insert a force majeure clause, or may seek to assert that a renegotiation at arm’s length would have similar economic outcomes. In these circumstances, tax administrations should carefully review such assertions in light of the accurately delineated transaction (including consideration of the conduct of the parties, both past and present) and the economically relevant circumstances of the transaction. Tax administrations should therefore review the agreements and/or the conduct of associated enterprises, in light of the guidance in section D of Chapter I of the OECD TPG, together with observations of relevant behaviour of independent parties and this guidance, in order to ascertain whether any such assertion, revision or renegotiation should be respected under the OECD TPG, and that the transfer pricing outcomes are appropriate in light of the accurate delineation of the transaction ...

For example, assume that Company G in Jurisdiction G provides manufacturing services to Company H under a long-term manufacturing services agreement that includes a force majeure clause. The government in jurisdiction G mandates the closure of the manufacturing facility for a certain specified short-term period, which may be extended depending on the duration of the pandemic. Given the lack of clarity on the extent of the disruption, it would be important to analyse the contract to see if the disruption qualifies as a force majeure event and consider whether, at arm’s length, Company G or Company H would seek to invoke the clause. Assuming that a clause may be legally invoked under the relevant legal framework, given the long-term nature of the relationship and the short-term nature of the disruption, it may be the case that neither company would invoke the clause, even if it did qualify as a force majeure event. If the disruption was for a longer period, then the circumstances may be different, and force majeure may be more likely invoked ...

Where one party to a controlled transaction seeks to invoke force majeure, the agreement and underlying legal framework within which force majeure may be invoked should form the starting point of a transfer pricing analysis. It cannot be automatically assumed that where a relevant intercompany contract contains a force majeure clause that the COVID-19 pandemic is sufficient for a party to that contract to invoke force majeure, nor can it be automatically assumed in the absence of such a clause in the intercompany contract that a renegotiation with a potentially similar outcome at arm’s length would be inappropriate (see paragraph 59 below). Whether COVID-19 constitutes a force majeure in a particular case will depend on the plain language of the force majeure provision (and possibly also on how that provision interacts with other terms, such as certain terms of the controlled transaction itself). In addition, it will be relevant to analyse the conduct of the parties in reviewing an existing force majeure provision or in ascertaining whether or not it may be asserted in the absence of a specific term. The accurate delineation of the controlled transaction will determine whether invoking force majeure is permissible, including by reference to the conduct of the parties and not just by reference to the legal agreement. Care should be taken to assess whether the magnitude of the disruption caused by COVID-19 in the specific related party situation qualifies as a force majeure event, and to review the force majeure clause in the context of the overall relationship and contractual agreement. An analysis of the economic circumstances of the commercial arrangement is relevant to determining whether, at arm’s length, a party would decide to invoke a force majeure clause ...

Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, a party may attempt to assert that the extreme circumstances justify the non-performance of a contract and this may be achieved through invoking a force majeure clause, which defines circumstances beyond the control of parties to a transaction that can frustrate or render impossible contractual performance. For instance, force majeure events arising in the context of COVID-19 could be the prohibition of activities by a governmental body, for example through the enforced closure of production or retail facilities ...

Force majeure clauses may be invoked in order to suspend, defer, or release an enterprise from its contractual duties without liability in certain situations.33 This may result in losses for enterprises because of the loss of a customer, supplier or an ordinarily profitable contract, and could also lead to the closure of business operations and associated restructuring costs. 33 Note that these guidelines do not seek to legally define concepts such as “force majeure” or provide comment on when it may legally be invoked, but instead focus on the transfer pricing implications of the existence of the force majeure concept and its invocation. The “force majeure” concept originated in civil law systems. While the doctrine does not apply automatically in all civil law countries, certain European civil law countries at least implicitly recognise the force majeure principle in their civil codes (i.e. it may not be necessary to include it in a contract because the statutory force majeure provisions apply automatically to all contracts within those jurisdictions). In common law jurisdictions, the application of force majeure is not implied in contracts; thus, parties to the contract need to include that clause expressly, detailing the specific circumstances under which the parties can suspend or discontinue performance of its contractual obligations. In common law jurisdictions, in the absence of a “force majeure” clause in the contract, the parties may invoke certain common law doctrines to attempt to end and release the parties’ contractual obligations ...

Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has created conditions in which associated parties may consider whether they have the option to apply force majeure clauses, revoke or otherwise revise their intercompany agreements. This may impact the allocation of losses and COVID-19 specific costs between associated parties, and therefore also requires specific consideration in the current economic environment ...