In 2008 and 2009 the Medtronic group acquired the entire share capital of the Israeli company, Ventor Technologies Ltd, for a sum of $325 million. Subsequent to the acquisition various inter-company agreements were entered into between Ventor Technologies Ltd and Medtronics, but no transfer of intangible assets was recognised by the Group for tax purposes. The tax authorities found that all the intangibles previously owned by Ventor had been transferred to Medtronic and issued an assessment of additional taxable profits. An appeal was filed by Medtronic Ventor Technologies Ltd. Judgement of the District Court The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Click here for English translation ...

In April 2010 Roche pharmaceutical group acquired the entire share capital of the Israeli company, Medingo Ltd, for USD 160 million. About six months after the acquisition, Medingo was entered into 3 inter-group service agreements: a R&D services agreement, pursuant to which Medingo was to provide R&D services in exchange for cost + 5%. All developments under the agreement would be owned by Roche. a services agreement according to which Medingo was to provided marketing, administration, consultation and support services in exchange for cost + 5%. a manufacturing agreement, under which Medingo was to provide manufacturing and packaging services in exchange for cost + 5. A license agreement was also entered, according to which Roche could now manufacture, use, sell, exploit, continue development and sublicense to related parties the Medingo IP in exchange for 2% of the relevant net revenues. Finally, in 2013, Medingo’s operation in Israel was terminated and its IP sold to Roche for approximately USD 45 million. The tax authorities viewed the transactions as steps in a single arrangement, which – from the outset – had the purpose of transferring all the activities of Medingo to Roche. On that basis an assessment was issued according to which the intangibles had been transferred to Roche in 2010. Based on the acquisition price for the shares, the value was determined to approximately USD 160 millions. An appeal was filed by Medingo claiming that there had been no transfer in 2010. Judgement of the District Court The court decided in favor of Medingo and set aside the 2010 tax assessment – but without passing an opinion in relation to the value of the sale of the intellectual property in 2013. Excerpts “96. The guidelines indicate that in a transaction between related parties, two different issues must be examined using the arm’s length principle: transaction characterization and transaction pricing. The characterization of the transaction must first be examined and it must be examined whether it would also have been made between unrelated parties. If the examination reveals that even unrelated parties would have entered into a transaction in the same situation, then it must be further examined whether the price paid for the assets complies with market conditions. It should be noted that in accordance with the guidelines, the characterization of the transaction should not be interfered with in violation of the agreements, except in exceptional circumstances, in which the agreements are fundamentally unfounded, or in no way allow a price to be determined according to the arm’s length principle. “Tax A tax administration should not disregard part or all of the restructuring or substitute other transactions for it unless the exceptional circumstances described in paragraph 1.142 are met”. out circumstances in which the transaction between the parties as accurately delineated can be disregarded for transfer pricing purposes. Because non-recognition can be contentious and a source of double taxation, every effort should be made to determine the actual nature of the transaction and apply arm’s length pricing to the accurately delineated transaction, and to ensure that non-recognition is not used simply because determining an arm’s length price is difficult. e same transaction can be seen between independent parties in comparable circumstances… non-recognition would not apply… the transaction as accurately delineated may be disregarded, and if appropriate, replaced by an alternative transaction, where the arrangements made in relation to the transaction, viewed in their totality, differ from those which would have been adopted by independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner in comparable circumstances, thereby preventing determination of a price that would be acceptable to both of the parties taking into account their respective perspective and the options realistically available to each of them at the time of entering into the transaction “. 97. Further to this, sections 1.146 – 1.148 of the Guideline, 2022, provide two examples of cases in which the characterization of the transaction must be ignored. The second example deals with a case closer to our case, where a one-time payment is paid for R&D services and their products provided – for 20 years. 98. After examining the characterization of the transaction in our case, I found no defect in it. This is a completely different case from those mentioned in the guidelines, and it has been proven to me that transactions with a similar characterization can be conducted and are also conducted between unrelated parties. Thus, throughout the proceedings, the appellant presented various examples of similar license agreements and R&D agreements signed between unrelated parties: In Phase A, the appellant presented various transactions for comparison (P / 2 (to which the respondent did not even refer), p. 332 of the minutes (and within the appeal Of EY Germany and of Gonen in which additional transactions were presented for comparison, including transactions of similar companies in the relevant market.” “104. I also believe that it makes sense to enter into such agreements, especially in the situation of the appellant at that time. Appellant faced considerable obstacles, and her chances of success were not guaranteed, to say the least….” “105. The inter-group agreements secured the appellant’s future in the near term, and gave her more chances to survive. As the appellant’s experts clarified, small companies find it difficult to survive alone in the medical device market (see for example Section 1 of the Michlin Opinion (hence, a licensing and commercialization agreement is common practice in the field and common with contractors with experience and resources); See also paragraph 41 regarding Broadcom).” “110. In conclusion, as long as the appellant and Roche acted in accordance with the inter-group agreements, which are acceptable in industry and in the circumstances of the case there is logic in concluding them, I did not find any invalidity in the characterization of the agreements (see paragraphs 85 and 87 in the Broadcom case).” “….As stated, I believe that even if there was an intention to transfer the activity, there was no final decision until the date of the announcement. Second, and this is the ...

Broadcom Semiconductors Ltd is an Israeli company established in 2001 under the name Dune Semiconductors Ltd. The Company is engaged in development, production, and sale of components to routers, switches etc. The shares in Dune Semiconductors were acquired by the Broadcom Corporation (a US group) in 2009 and following the acquisition intellectual property was transferred to the new Parent for a sum of USD 17 million. The company also entered into tree agreements to provide marketing and support services to a related Broadcom affiliate under a cost+10%, to provide development services to a related Broadcom affiliate for cost+8%, and a license agreement to use Broadcom Israel’s intellectual property for royalties of approximately 14% of the affiliate’s turnover. The tax authorities argued that functions, assets, and risks had been transferred leaving only an empty shell in Israel and a tax assessment was issued based on the purchase price for the shares resulting in additional taxes of USD 29 millions. According to the company such a transfer of functions, assets, and risks would only be applicable if Broadcom Israel had been emptied of its activities which  was not the case. Following the restructuring Broadcom Israel continued as a licensor and as a service provider. The financial situation of the company also improved. The position of the company was further supported by the fact that several years following the restructuring, Broadcom Israel sold its intellectual property and was taxed for the capital gain. The District Court held in favor of the company. A business restructuring from a fully fledged principal  to a service provider on a cost-plus basis does not necessarily result in a transfer of value. Judgement of the Court In the judgement the court argues that this case is different from the prior Gteko-case where the Israeli company became an empty shell and financial results were dramatically reduced following the acquisition and restructuring of the company. Unlike the Gteko-case, Broadcom had increased its activities in Israel following the acquisition. The court also emphasized that the tax authorities did not take into consideration options realistically available to the company at the time of the restructuring. For a business restructuring to constitute a sale of functions, assets, and risks property for tax purposes, it must be demonstrated not only that the change occurred, but also that the change did not meet the arm’s length principle. The court confirmed that the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines are applicable as a reference for tax purposes in Israel. Click here for an English translation ...

The European Commission has opened an in-depth investigation into the Netherlands’ tax treatment of Inter IKEA, one of the two groups operating the IKEA business. The Commission has concerns that two Dutch tax rulings may have allowed Inter IKEA to pay less tax and given them an unfair advantage over other companies, in breach of EU State aid rules. Commissioner Margrethe Vestager in charge of competition policy said: “All companies, big or small, multinational or not, should pay their fair share of tax. Member States cannot let selected companies pay less tax by allowing them to artificially shift their profits elsewhere. We will now carefully investigate the Netherlands’ tax treatment of Inter IKEA.” In the early 1980s, the IKEA business model changed into a franchising model. Since then, it has been the Inter IKEA group that operates the franchise business of IKEA, using the “IKEA franchise concept”. What this means more concretely is that Inter IKEA does not own the IKEA shops. All IKEA shops worldwide pay a franchise fee of 3% of their turnover to Inter IKEA Systems, a subsidiary of Inter IKEA group in the Netherlands. In return, the IKEA shops are entitled to use inter alia the IKEA trademark, and receive know-how to operate andexploit the IKEA franchise concept. Thus, Inter IKEA Systems in the Netherlands records all revenue from IKEA franchise fees worldwide collected from the IKEA shops. The Commission’s investigation concerns the tax treatment of Inter IKEA Systems in the Netherlands since 2006. Our preliminary inquiries indicate that two tax rulings, granted by the Dutch tax authorities in 2006 and 2011, have significantly reduced Inter IKEA Systems’ taxable profits in the Netherlands. The Commission has concerns that the two tax rulings may have given Inter IKEA Systems an unfair advantage compared to other companies subject to the same national taxation rules in the Netherlands. This would breach EU State aid rules. Between 2006-2011 (the 2006 tax ruling) The 2006 tax ruling endorsed a method to calculate an annual licence fee to be paid by Inter IKEA Systems in the Netherlands to another company of the Inter IKEA group called I.I. Holding, based in Luxembourg. At that time, I.I. Holding held certain intellectual property rights required for the IKEA franchise concept. These were licensed exclusively to Inter IKEA Systems. Inter IKEA Systems used these intellectual property rights to create and develop the IKEA franchise concept. In other words, it developed, enhanced and maintained the intellectual property rights. Inter IKEA Systems also managed the franchise contracts and collected the franchise fees from IKEA shops worldwide. The annual licence fee paid by Inter IKEA Systems to I.I. Holding, as endorsed by the 2006 tax ruling, made up a significant part of Inter IKEA Systems’ revenue. As a result, a significant part of Inter IKEA Systems’ franchise profits were shifted from Inter IKEA Systems to I.I. Holding in Luxembourg, where they remained untaxed. This is because I.I. Holding was part of a special tax scheme, as a result of which it was exempt from corporate taxation in Luxembourg. After 2011 (the 2011 tax ruling) In July 2006, the Commission concluded that the Luxembourg special tax scheme was illegal under EU State aid rules, and required the scheme to be fully repealed by 31 December 2010. No illegal aid needed to be recovered from I.I. Holding because the scheme was granted under a Luxembourg law from 1929, predating the EC Treaty. This is a historical element of the case and not part of the investigation opened today. However, as a result of the Commission decision I.I. Holding would have had to start paying corporate taxes in Luxembourg from 2011. In 2011, Inter IKEA changed the way it was structured. As a result, the 2006 tax ruling was no longer applicable: Inter IKEA Systems bought the intellectual property rights formerly held by I.I. Holding. To finance this acquisition, Inter IKEA Systems received an intercompany loan from its parent company in Liechtenstein. The Dutch authorities then issued a second tax ruling in 2011, which endorsed the price paid by Inter IKEA Systems for the acquisition of the intellectual property. It also endorsed the interest to be paid under the intercompany loan to the parent company in Liechtenstein, and the deduction of these interest payments from Inter IKEA Systems’ taxable profits in the Netherlands. As a result of the interest payments, a significant part of Inter IKEA Systems’ franchise profits after 2011 was shifted to its parent in Liechtenstein. The Commission’s investigation The Commission considers at this stage that the treatment endorsed in the two tax rulings may have resulted in tax benefits in favour of Inter IKEA Systems, which are not available to other companies subject to the same national taxation rules in the Netherlands. The role of EU State aid control is to ensure that Member States do not give selected companies a better tax treatment than others, via tax rulings or otherwise. More specifically, transactions between companies in a corporate group must be priced in a way that reflects economic reality. This means that the payments between two companies in the same group should be in line with arrangements that take place under comparable conditions between independent companies (so-called “arm’s length principle”). The Commission will now investigate Inter IKEA Systems’ tax treatment under both tax rulings: The Commission will assess whether the annual licence fee paid by Inter IKEA Systems to I.I. Holding, endorsed in the 2006 tax ruling, reflects economic reality. In particular, it will assess if the level of the annual licence fee reflects Inter IKEA Systems’ contribution to the franchise business; The Commission will also assess whether the price Inter IKEA Systems agreed for the acquisition of the intellectual property rights and consequently the interest paid for the intercompany loan, endorsed in the 2011 tax ruling, reflect economic reality. In particular, the Commission will assess if the acquisition price adequately reflects the contribution made by Inter IKEA Systems to the value of the franchise business, and the ...