“A…, Sociedade Unipessoal LDA” had taken out two intra group loans with the purpose of acquiring 70% of the shares in a holding company within the group. The tax authorities disallowed the resulting interest expenses claiming that the loan transactions lacked a business purpose. The assessment was later upheld by the tax court in decision no. 827/2019-T. An appeal was then filed by “A…, Sociedade Unipessoal LDA” with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of Supreme Administrative Court The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the tax court and the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Experts “35. In general, a transaction is considered to have economic substance when it significantly alters the taxpayer’s economic situation beyond the tax advantage it may generate. Now, the analysis of the relevant facts leads to the conclusion that neither A… nor the financial position of the Group’s creditors knew any significant economic change, nor any other economic consequence resulted or was reasonably expected to result beyond the additional increase in interest payable on intra-group loans, certainly with a view to increasing deductions and reducing the taxable profit. Even if there is a business purpose in the transaction – which is not certain in view of the permanence of the underlying economic reality – the objective of reducing the tax exposure, with the consequent reduction of the tax base, appears manifestly preponderant (principal purpose test). 36. Despite the existence of a general clause and special anti-abuse clauses, as well as specific rules on transfer pricing, earnings stripping or thin capitalization, all tax legislation must be interpreted and applied, in its systemic unity, so as to curb the erosion of the tax base and the transfer of profits. This involves a teleological interpretation that is attentive to the object, purpose and spirit of the tax rules, preventing their manifestly abusive use through sophisticated and aggressive tax planning operations. This can only be the case with rules on deductible expenses, as in the case of article 23 of the CIRC, which must be interpreted and applied in accordance with the anti-avoidance objectives that govern the entire national, European and international legal system, in order to prevent the erosion of the tax base. 37. On the other hand, where the deductibility of expenses and losses is concerned, the burden of proof lies with the taxpayer, as this is a fact constituting the claimed deduction (Art. 74, 1 of the LGT). Therefore, the accounting expenses groundedly questioned by the AT, in order to be tax deductible, would have to be objectively proven by the taxpayer who accounted for them. The excessive interest expenses are not objectively in line with the criteria of reasonableness, habituality, adequacy and economic and commercial necessity underlying the letter and spirit of Article 23(1) and (2)(c) of the CIRC, against the backdrop of business normality, economic rationality and corporate scope. We are clearly faced with a form of interest stripping, in fact one of the typical forms of profit transfer and erosion of the tax base. The excessive interest generated and paid in the framework of the financing operations analysed must be considered as “disqualified interest” (disallowed interest). 38. The setting up of credit operations within a group in order to finance an acquisition of shareholdings already belonging to the group, sometimes with interest rates higher than market values and generating chronic problems of lack of liquidity in the sphere of the taxpayer, can hardly be regarded as a business activity subject to generally acceptable standards of economic rationality, and as such worthy of consideration under tax law. The possibility of deducting the respective financial costs was or could never have been conceived and admitted by the tax legislator when it chiselled the current wording of Article 23 of the CIRC. Legal-tax concepts should always be understood by reference to the constitutionally structuring principles of the legal-tax system, to all relevant facts and circumstances in the transactions carried out and to the substantial economic effects produced by them on taxpayers, unless the law refers expressly and exclusively to legal form. In the interpretation and application of tax law the principle of the primacy of substance over form shall apply. 39. The AT is entrusted with the important public interest function of protecting the State’s tax base and preventing profit shifting. In interpreting and applying tax rules, it should seek to strike a reasonable, fair and well-founded balance between the principles of tax law and legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, on the one hand, and, on the other, the constitutional and European requirements of administrative and tax responsiveness in view of the updating and deepening of understanding and knowledge of tax problems, on a global scale, due to the latest theoretical, evaluative and principal developments which, particularly in the last decade, have been occurring in the issue of tax avoidance. 40. The facts in the case records do not allow for the demonstration of the existence of a (current or potential) economic causal connection between the assumption of the financial burdens at stake and their performance in A…’s own interest, of obtaining profit, given the respective object. Hence, the non-tax deductibility of the interest incurred in 2015 and 2016 should be considered duly grounded by the AT, as the requirements of article 23, no. 1, of the CIRC were not met, as this is the only legal basis on which the AT supports the correction resulting from the non-acceptance of the deductibility of financial costs for tax purposes, and it is only in light of this legal provision that the legality of the correction and consequent assessment in question should be assessed. A careful reading of both decisions clearly shows that the fact that different wordings of Article 23 of the CIRC were taken into consideration was not decisive for the different legal solutions reached in both decisions. In both decisions the freedom of management of the corporate bodies of the companies is accepted, and it is certain that in

“A…, Sociedade Unipessoal LDA” had taken out two intra group loans with the purpose of acquiring 70% of the shares in a holding company within the group. The tax authorities disallowed the resulting interest expenses claiming that the loan transactions lacked a business purpose. The assessment was later upheld by the tax court in decision no. 827/2019-T. An appeal was then filed by “A…, Sociedade Unipessoal LDA” with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of Supreme Administrative Court The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the tax court and the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Experts “35. In general, a transaction is considered to have economic substance when it significantly alters the taxpayer’s economic situation beyond the tax advantage it may generate. Now, the analysis of the relevant facts leads to the conclusion that neither A… nor the financial position of the Group’s creditors knew any significant economic change, nor any other economic consequence resulted or was reasonably expected to result beyond the additional increase in interest payable on intra-group loans, certainly with a view to increasing deductions and reducing the taxable profit. Even if there is a business purpose in the transaction – which is not certain in view of the permanence of the underlying economic reality – the objective of reducing the tax exposure, with the consequent reduction of the tax base, appears manifestly preponderant (principal purpose test). 36. Despite the existence of a general clause and special anti-abuse clauses, as well as specific rules on transfer pricing, earnings stripping or thin capitalization, all tax legislation must be interpreted and applied, in its systemic unity, so as to curb the erosion of the tax base and the transfer of profits. This involves a teleological interpretation that is attentive to the object, purpose and spirit of the tax rules, preventing their manifestly abusive use through sophisticated and aggressive tax planning operations. This can only be the case with rules on deductible expenses, as in the case of article 23 of the CIRC, which must be interpreted and applied in accordance with the anti-avoidance objectives that govern the entire national, European and international legal system, in order to prevent the erosion of the tax base. 37. On the other hand, where the deductibility of expenses and losses is concerned, the burden of proof lies with the taxpayer, as this is a fact constituting the claimed deduction (Art. 74, 1 of the LGT). Therefore, the accounting expenses groundedly questioned by the AT, in order to be tax deductible, would have to be objectively proven by the taxpayer who accounted for them. The excessive interest expenses are not objectively in line with the criteria of reasonableness, habituality, adequacy and economic and commercial necessity underlying the letter and spirit of Article 23(1) and (2)(c) of the CIRC, against the backdrop of business normality, economic rationality and corporate scope. We are clearly faced with a form of interest stripping, in fact one of the typical forms of profit transfer and erosion of the tax base. The excessive interest generated and paid in the framework of the financing operations analysed must be considered as “disqualified interest” (disallowed interest). 38. 38. The setting up of credit operations within a group in order to finance an acquisition of shareholdings already belonging to the group, sometimes with interest rates higher than market values and generating chronic problems of lack of liquidity in the sphere of the taxpayer, can hardly be regarded as a business activity subject to generally acceptable standards of economic rationality, and as such worthy of consideration under tax law. The possibility of deducting the respective financial costs was or could never have been conceived and admitted by the tax legislator when it chiselled the current wording of Article 23 of the CIRC. Legal-tax concepts should always be understood by reference to the constitutionally structuring principles of the legal-tax system, to all relevant facts and circumstances in the transactions carried out and to the substantial economic effects produced by them on taxpayers, unless the law refers expressly and exclusively to legal form. In the interpretation and application of tax law the principle of the primacy of substance over form shall apply. 39. The AT is entrusted with the important public interest function of protecting the State’s tax base and preventing profit shifting. In interpreting and applying tax rules, it should seek to strike a reasonable, fair and well-founded balance between the principles of tax law and legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, on the one hand, and, on the other, the constitutional and European requirements of administrative and tax responsiveness in view of the updating and deepening of understanding and knowledge of tax problems, on a global scale, due to the latest theoretical, evaluative and principal developments which, particularly in the last decade, have been occurring in the issue of tax avoidance. 40. 40. The facts in the case records do not allow for the demonstration of the existence of a (current or potential) economic causal connection between the assumption of the financial burdens at stake and their performance in A…’s own interest, of obtaining profit, given the respective object. Hence, the non-tax deductibility of the interest incurred in 2015 and 2016 should be considered duly grounded by the AT, as the requirements of article 23, no. 1, of the CIRC were not met, as this is the only legal basis on which the AT supports the correction resulting from the non-acceptance of the deductibility of financial costs for tax purposes, and it is only in light of this legal provision that the legality of the correction and consequent assessment in question should be assessed. A careful reading of both decisions clearly shows that the fact that different wordings of Article 23 of the CIRC were taken into consideration was not decisive for the different legal solutions reached in both decisions. In both decisions the freedom of management of the corporate bodies of the companies is accepted, and it is certain

Skechers US Inc. had formed a related party entity, SKII, in 1999 and transferred IP and $18 million in cash to the entity in exchange for 100 percent of the stock. Skechers then licensed the IP back from SKII and claimed a franchise tax deduction for the royalties and also deductions for management fees and interest expenses on the unpaid balance of royalty fees. The Wisconsin tax authorities held that these were sham transaction lacking business purpose and disallowed the deductions. Judgement of the Tax Appeals Commission The Tax Appeals Commission ruled in favor of the tax authorities. Excerpt “(…) The burden of proof is on Petitioner to prove that the Department’s assessment is incorrect by clear and satisfactory evidence. In this case, Petitioner must prove that it had a valid nontax business purpose for entering into the licensing transaction that generated the royalty deductions claimed on its Wisconsin tax returns and that the licensing transaction had economic substance. Both are required. Petitioner did not present persuasive evidence or testimony of either requirement being met. Therefore, the Department’s assessments are upheld. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Petitioner did not have a valid nontax business purpose for the creation of SKII. Petitioner did not have a valid nontax business purpose for entering into the licensing transactions between Skechers and SKII that generated the royalty deductions claimed on its Wisconsin tax returns. Petitioner’s licensing transactions between Skechers and SKII did not have economic substance. (…)” US vs Skechers Final DO

During 2012, Coronation Investment Management SA (Pty) Ltd (CIMSA) was a 90% subsidiary of Coronation Fund Managers Limited and the 100% holding company of Coronation Management Company and Coronation Asset Management (Pty) Ltd (CAM), both registered for tax in South Africa. CIMSA was also the 100% holding company of CFM (Isle of Man) Ltd, tax resident in Isle of Man. CFM (Isle of Man) Ltd, in turn, was the 100% owner of Coronation Global Fund Managers (Ireland) Limited (CGFM) and Coronation International Ltd (CIL), which were registered and tax resident in Ireland and the United Kingdom respectively. At issue was whether the net income of CGFM should be included in the taxable income of CIMSA, or whether a tax exemption in terms of s 9D of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the Act) was applicable to the income earned by CGFM. This depends on what the primary functions of CGFM in Ireland are. If the primary operations are conducted in Ireland, then the s 9D exemption applies. Of particular significance is that CGFM has adopted an outsource business model and the attendant ramifications that may have for its tax status. Aligned to this is whether the primary business of CGFM is that of investment (which is not conducted in Ireland), or that of maintaining its licence and managing its service providers (which is conducted in Ireland). The tax authorities assessed the tax liability of CIMSA for the 2012 tax year to include the entire ‘net income’ of CGFM. The tax authorities accepted that CGFM met the FBE definition, in all respects but one: economic substance. As at 2012, CGFM had offices in Dublin with a staff component of four people, consisting of a managing director, two accounting officers and a compliance officer. All the staff were resident in Ireland. It was not disputed that CGFM had conducted its business for more than a year through one or more offices in Dublin (s 9D(1)(a)(i)), or that it had ‘a fixed place of business’ in Ireland (s 9D(1)(a)(ii)) which was suitably staffed and equipped with suitable facilities (s 9D(1)(a)(ii), (iii) and (iv)). The tax authorities also accepted that the business was located in Ireland for a reason other than the postponement or reduction of South African tax (s 9D(1)(a)(iv)). However, it contended that CGFM did not meet the economic substance requirements, as ‘the primary operations’ referred to in s 9D(1)(a)(ii),(iii) and (iv) were not based in Ireland. Accordingly, the Dublin office was not suitably staffed with employees, not suitably equipped, nor did it have the suitable facilities to conduct ‘the primary operations’ of CGFM’s business. An appeal was filed and the Tax Court set aside the assessment. The court found that CGFM was a ‘foreign business establishment’ (FBE) as defined in s 9D(1) of the Act and, accordingly, qualified for a tax exemption. Hence, no amount of income from CGFM should be included in CIMSA’s income under s 9D of the Act. An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Court of Appeal. Judgement of Court The Court set aside the decision of the Tax Curt and issued a decision in favour of the tax authorities. Excerpt “[54]   The essential operations of the business must be conducted within the jurisdiction in respect of which exemption is sought. While there are undoubtedly many functions which a company may choose to legitimately outsource, it cannot outsource its primary business. To enjoy the same tax levels as its foreign rivals, thereby making it internationally competitive, the primary operations of that company must take place in the same foreign jurisdiction. [55]   On these particular facts, I conclude that the primary operations of CGFM’s business (and, therefore, the business of the controlled foreign company as defined) is that of fund management which includes investment management. These are not conducted in Ireland. Therefore, CGFM does not meet the requirements for an FBE exemption in terms of s 9D(1). As a result, the net income of CGFM is imputable to CIMSA for the 2012 tax year in terms of s 9D(2).” Click here for translation Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Coronation Investment Management SA (Pty) Ltd (12692021) 2023 ZASCA 10 (7 February 2023)

The issue was whether the benefits provided by the Argentina-Spain DTC were available to Empresa Distribuidora La Plata S.A., which was owned by two Spanish holding companies, Inversora AES Holding and Zargas Participaciones SL, whose shareholders were Uruguayan holding companies. The Argentine Personal Assets Tax provided that participations in Argentine companies held by non-resident aliens were generally subject to an annual tax of 0.5% or 0.25% on the net equity value of their participation. However, under the Argentina-Spain DTC, article 22.4, only the treaty state where the shareholders were located (Spain) had the right to tax the assets. On this basis, Empresa Distribuidora La Plata S.A. considered that its shares held by Spanish holding companies were not subject to the Personal Assets Tax. The tax authorities disagreed, finding that the Spanish holding companies lacked substance and that the benefits of the Argentina-Spain DTC were therefore not applicable. Judgement of the Tax Court The Tax Court ruled in favour of the tax authorities. The Court held that the treaty benefits did not apply. The Court agreed with the findings of the tax authorities that the Spanish companies had been set up for the sole purpose of benefiting from the Spain-Argentina DTC and therefore violated Argentina’s general anti-avoidance rule. Excerpt “According to the administrative proceedings, based on the background information requested from the International Taxation Directorate of the Spanish Tax Agency and other elements collected by the audit, it appears that: a) the company Inversora AES Americas Holding S.L., is made up as partners by AES Argentina Holdings S.C.A. and AES Platense Investrnents Uruguay S.C.A., both Uruguayan companies; b) the company Zargas Participaciones S.L., has as its sole partner ISKARY S.A., also a Uruguayan company. The purpose of the former is the management and administration of securities representing the equity of companies and other entities, whether or not they are resident in Spanish territory, investment in companies and other entities, whether or not they are resident in Spanish territory, and it has only three employees (one administrative and two in charge of technical areas) and has opted for the Foreign Securities Holding Entities Regime (ETVE). The second company, whose purpose is the management and administration of securities representing the equity of non-resident entities in Spanish territory, has had no employees on its payroll since its incorporation, and has also opted for the ETVE regime. Neither of the two companies is subject to taxation in their own country similar to that in the present case. According to the information provided by the Spanish Tax Agency (see fs. 34 of the Background Zargas Participaciones SL), there is no record that it has any shareholdings in the share capital of other companies. The evidence and circumstances of the case show that the Spanish companies lack genuine economic substance, with the companies AES Argentina Holdings S.C.A. and AES Platense Investments Uruguay S.C.A. (both Uruguayan) holding the shares of Inversora AES Americas Holding S.L. and the company ISKARY S.A. (also Uruguayan) holding 100% of the shares of Zargas Participaciones S.L. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the main purpose of their incorporation was to obtain the benefits granted by the Convention by foreign companies from a third country outside the scope of application of the treaty, without the plaintiff having been able to prove with the evidence produced in the proceedings that the Spanish companies carried out a genuine economic activity and that, therefore, they were not mere legal structures without economic substance (in the same sense CNCAF, Chamber I, in re “FIRST DATA CONO SUR S.R.L.” judgement of 3/12/2019). Consequently, the tax criterion should be upheld. With costs.” Click here for English Translation Click here for other translation Argentina-vs-Empresa-Distribuidora-La-Plata

In 2009 the BlackRock Group acquired Barclays Global Investors for a total sum of $13,5bn. The price was paid in part by shares ($6.9bn) and in part by cash ($6.6bn). The cash payment was paid by BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC – a US Delaware Company tax resident in the UK – but funded by the parent company by issuing $4bn loan notes to the LLC. In the years following the acquisition Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC claimed tax deductions in the UK for interest payments on the intra-group loans. Following an audit in the UK the tax authorities disallowed the interest deductions. The tax authorities held that the transaction would not have happened between independent parties. They also found that the loans were entered into for an unallowable tax avoidance purpose. A UK taxpayer can be denied a deduction for interest where a loan has an unallowable purpose i.e, where a tax advantage is the company’s main purpose for entering into the loan relationship (section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009). If there is such an unallowable purpose, the company may not bring into account for that period ….so much of any debit in respect of that relationship as is attributable to the unallowable purpose. An appeal was filed by the BlackRock Group. In November 2020 the First Tier Tribunal found that an independent lender acting at arm’s length would have made loans to LLC5 in the same amount and on the same terms as to interest as were actually made by LLC4 (the “Transfer Pricing Issue”). The FTT further found that the Loans had both a commercial purpose and a tax advantage purpose but that it would be just and reasonable to apportion all the debits to the commercial purpose and so they were fully deductible by LLC5 (the “Unallowable Purpose Issue”). An appeal was then filed with the Upper Tribunal by the tax authorities. Judgement of the Upper Tribunal The Upper Tribunal found that the First Tier Tribunal had erred in law and therefore allowed HMRC’s appeal on both the transfer pricing issue and the unallowable purpose issue. The First Tier Tribunal’s Decision was set aside and the tax authorities amendments to LLC5’s tax returns were confirmed. Transfer Pricing “The actual provision of the loans from LLC4 to LLC5 differed from any arm’s length provision in that the loans would not have been made as between independent enterprises. The actual provision conferred a potential advantage in relation to United Kingdom taxation. The profits and losses of LLC5, including the allowing of debits for the interest and other expenses payable on the Loans, are to be calculated for tax purposes as if the arm’s length provision had been made or imposed instead of the actual provision. In this case, no arm’s length loan for $4 billion would have been made in the form that LLC4 made to LLC5 and hence HMRC’s amendments to the relevant returns should be upheld and confirmed.” Unallowable Purpose “The FTT did not err in finding that LLC5 had both a commercial purpose and an unallowable tax advantage main purpose in entering into the Loans. However, it was wrong to decide that the just and reasonable apportionment was solely to the commercial purpose. But for the tax advantage purpose there would have been no commercial purpose to the Loans and all the relevant facts and circumstances lead inexorably to the conclusion that the loan relationship debits should be wholly attributed to the unallowable tax purpose and so disallowed.” HMRC_v_Blackrock_Holdco_LLC5_UT-2021-000022_-_final_decision_

The German BASF group is active in the chemical industry and has subsidiaries all over the world including Italy. In FY 2006 BASF Italia s.p.a. was served with two notices of assessment by the tax authorities. The tax assessments formulated three findings. 1. non-deductibility of the cancellation deficit – arising from the merger by incorporation of Basf Agro s.p.a. into Basf Italia s.p.a., resolved on 27 April 2004 – which the acquiring company had allocated to goodwill, the amortisation portions of which had been deducted in tenths and then, from 2005, in eighteenths. The Office had denied the deductibility on the ground that the company, in the declaration submitted electronically, had not expressly requested, as required by Article 6(4) of Legislative Decree No. 358 of 8 October 1997, the tax recognition of the greater value of goodwill recorded in the balance sheet to offset the loss from cancellation, as allowed by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the same provision. Moreover, as a subordinate ground of non-deductibility, the assessment alleged the unenforceability to the Administration of the same merger pursuant to Article 37-bis of Presidential Decree No 600 of 29 September 1973, assuming its elusive nature. 2. non-deductibility of the annulment deficit – arising from the merger by incorporation of Basf Espansi s.p.a. into Basf Italia s.p.a., resolved in 1998 – which the acquiring company had allocated partly to goodwill and partly to the revaluation of tangible fixed assets, the depreciation portions of which had been deducted annually. The Office, also in this case, had denied the deductibility due to the failure to express the relative option, pursuant to Article 6(4) of Legislative Decree No. 358 of 1997, in the company’s declaration. 3. non-deductibility of interest expenses arising from a loan obtained by the taxpayer to carry out the transactions above. The Provincial Tax Commission of Milan partially upheld BASF’s appeals against the tax assessments, upholding the latter limited to the finding referred to in the second finding, concerning the non-deductibility of the cancellation deficit arising from the merger by incorporation of Basf Espansi s.p.a.. The Lombardy CTR, accepted the first and rejected the second, therefore, in substance, fully confirming the tax assessments. BASF then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court against the judgment, relying on seven pleas. The sixth plea related to lack of reasoning in the CTR judgement in regards of non-deductibility for interest expenses arising from the intra group loan. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court found that the (first and) sixth plea was well founded and remanded the judgement to the CTR, in a different composition. Excerpts “7. The sixth plea in law criticises, pursuant to Article 360(1)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment under appeal for breach of Article 110(7) of Presidential Decree No 917 of 1986, in so far as the CTR held that the interest expense incurred by the appellant in connection with the loan obtained from another intra-group company for the purchase of the share package of Basf Agro s.p.a. was not deductible. The plea is well founded. In fact, the CTR reasoned on this point solely by stating that the deduction was ‘held to be inadmissible on the basis of the thesis underlying the contested assessment, that is, the intention to evade tax’. Such ratio decidendi is limited to the uncritical mention of the Administration’s thesis, which, however, as far as can be understood from the concise wording used by the CTR, does not relate to the financing in itself, but to the transaction, referred to in the first relief, in which it was included. A transaction whose evasive nature was not even appreciated by the CTR, the question having been absorbed by the non-deductibility, for other reasons, of the negative component arising from the merger by incorporation of Basf Agro.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Italy vs BASF SC June 2022

Keysight Technologies Malaysia Sdn Bhd (KTM) was incorporated in 1998 and active as a full-fledged manufacturer of various microwave devices and test instruments in which capacity it had also developed valuable intangibles. In 2008, KTM was converted into a contract manufacturer under an agreement with Agilent Technologies International s.a.r.l. and at the same time KLM purportedly transferred its intangibles to Agilent Technologies. KTM received an amount of RM 821 million which it reported as non-taxable gains form sale of intangibles in its tax return. Following an audit the tax authorities issued a notice of assessment for FY 2008 where the sum of RM 821 million had been considered revenue in nature and thus taxable under Section 4(f) of the ITA. This resulted in a claim of RM 311 million together with a 45% penalty. According to the tax authorities the transfer of technical knowhow was not actually a sale as KTM was still using the technical knowhow in its manufacturing activities. The proceeds were related to the conversion of KLM from a full-fledged manufacturer to a contract manufacturer, which had resulted in a reduction in taxable profits. “The gain on the transfer of technical knowhow was for the payment on the loss of income since it was related to the change of the Appellant’s function from a full-fledged manufacturer to a contract manufacturer which resulted in a reduction of profit margin of the Appellant after the change of the function.” KTM filed an appeal against the assessment in which it stated that proceeds from the sale of know-how were not revenue in nature and therefore not taxable under the ITA. KLM also appealed against the penalty imposed under Section 113(2) of the ITA. The appeal was dismissed by the Special Commissioners of Income Tax, and an appeal was then filed by KTM with the High Court. Judgement of the High Court The High Court Judge dismissed KTM’s appeal and upheld the decision of the Special Commissioners of Income Tax. According to the High Court KTM had “failed to support the claim that the gain from the transfer of technical knowhow (i.e. the marketing and manufacturing intangibles) by KTM to Agilent Technologies International totalling of RM821,615,000.00 is an outright sale.”. There were no documents showing that the IP rights had been registered in the name of Agilent Technologies International s.a.r.l. Hence the proceeds was considered revenue in nature and taxable under Section 4(f) of the Income Tax Act 1967(“ITA”). Click here for translation Malaysia vs Teysight Technologies 20-05-2022 Case No WA-144-03-2020

In 2009-2011 Fortis Petroleum Norway AS (FPN) bought seismic data related to oil exploration in the North Sea from a related party, Petroleum GeoServices AS (PGS), for NKR 95.000.000. FBN paid the amount by way of a convertible intra-group loan from PGS in the same amount. FPN also purchased administrative services from another related party, Consema, and later paid a substantial termination fee when the service contract was terminated. The acquisition costs, interest on the loan, costs for services and termination fees had all been deducted in the taxable income of the company for the years in question. Central to this case is the exploration refund scheme on the Norwegian shelf. This essentially means that exploration companies can demand cash payment of the tax value of exploration costs, cf. the Petroleum Tax Act § 3 letter c) fifth paragraph. If the taxpayer does not have income to cover an exploration cost, the company receives payment / refund of the tax value from the state. On 21 November 2018, the Petroleum Tax Office issued two decisions against FPN. One decision (the “Seismic decision”) which applied to the income years 2010 to 2011, where FPN was denied a deduction for the purchase of seismic services from PGS and interest on the associated seller credit, as well as ordinary and increased additional tax (hereinafter the «seismic decision»), and another decision (the “Consema decision”) which applied to the income years 2011 and 2012 where, FPN’s claim for deduction for the purchase of administrative services from Consema for the income years 2011 and 2012 was reduced at its discretion, and where FPN was also denied a deduction for the costs of the services and a deduction for termination fees. Finally in regards of the “Seismic decision” an increased additional tax of a total of 60 per cent, was added to the additional taxation on the basis of the incorrectly deducted seismic purchases as FPN had provided incorrect and incomplete information to the Oil Tax Office. In the “Seismic decision” the tax office argued that FPN used a exploration reimbursement scheme to run a “tax carousel” In the “Consema decision” the tax office found that the price paid for the intra-group services and the termination fee had not been determined at arm’s length. An appeal was filed by Fortis Petroleum Norway AS with the district court where, in December 2020, the case was decided in favour of the tax authorities. An appeal was then filed with the Court of Appel Judgement of the Court of Appeal The court upheld the decisions of the district court and decided in favour of the tax authorities. The Court concluded that the condition for deduction in the Tax Act § 6-1 on incurred costs on the part of Fortis Petroleum Norway AS was not met, and that there was a basis for imposing ordinary and increased additional tax. The Court of Appeal further found that the administrative services and the termination fee were controlled transactions and had not been priced at arm’s length. Excerpts – Regarding the acquisition of seismic exploration Based on the case’s extensive evidence, and especially the contemporary evidence, the Court of Appeal has found that there was a common subjective understanding between FPN and PGS, both at the planning stage, during the conclusion of the agreement, in carrying out the seismic purchases and in the subsequent process. should take place by conversion to a subscription price that was not market-based. Consequently, seismic would not be settled with real values. This was made possible through the common interest of the parties. The parties also never significantly distanced themselves from this agreement. The Court of Appeal has heard testimonies from the management of PGS and FPN, but can not see that these entail any other view on the question of what was agreed. The loan was never repaid, and in the end it was converted to the pre-agreed exchange rate of NOK 167. In the Court of Appeal’s view, there is no other rational explanation for this course than that it was carefully adapted to the financing through 78 per cent of the exploration refund. The share value at the time of conversion was down to zero. The Court of Appeal agrees with the state that all conversion prices between 167 and 0 kroner would have given a share price that reflected the value in FPN better and which consequently had given PGS a better settlement. On this basis, the Court of Appeal believes that the conversion rate did not cover the 22 percent, and that there was a common perception that this was in line with the purpose of the establishment of FPN, namely not to pay “a penny” of fresh capital. The Court of Appeal has also emphasized that the same thing that happened in 2009 was repeated in 2010 and 2011. For 2009, the Oil Tax Office came to the conclusion that it was a pro forma event and a shift in financial risk. In 2010 and 2011, the same actors used the same structure and procedure to finance all costs from the state. It is thus the Court of Appeal’s view that there was a common understanding between the parties to the agreement that the real relationship within was different from that which was signaled to the tax authorities regarding sacrifice and which provided the basis for the deduction. Furthermore, in the Court of Appeal’s view, the loan transactions were not fiscally neutral. The seismic purchases constituted the only source of liquidity and were covered in their entirety by the state. In light of ESA’s decision from 2018 as an element of interpretation, such a loss of fiscal neutrality would indicate that when the company has thus not borne any risk itself, sacrifice has not taken place either. Even if the debt had been real, assuming a sale without a common interest of the parties, in the Court of Appeal’s view in a tax context it could not be decisive, as long as 22

Ikea France (SNC MIF) had concluded a franchise agreement with Inter Ikea Systems BV (IIS BV) in the Netherlands by virtue of which it benefited, in particular, as a franchisee, from the right to operate the ‘Ikea Retail System’ (the Ikea concept), the ‘Ikea Food System’ (food sales) and the ‘Ikea Proprietary Rights’ (the Ikea trade mark) in its shops. In return, Ikea France paid Inter Ikea Systems BV a franchise fee equal to 3% of the amount of net sales made in France, which amounted to EUR 68,276,633 and EUR 72,415,329 for FY 2010 and 2011. These royalties were subject to the withholding tax provided for in the provisions of Article 182 B of the French General Tax Code, but under the terms of Article 12 of the Convention between France and the Netherlands: “1. Royalties arising in one of the States and paid to a resident of the other State shall be taxable only in that other State”, the term “royalties” meaning, according to point 2. of this Article 12, “remuneration of any kind paid for the use of, or the right to use, (…) a trade mark (…)”. As the franchise fees paid by Ikea France to Inter Ikea Systems BV were taxable in the Netherlands, Ikea France was not obligated to pay withholding taxes provided for by the provisions of Article 182 B of the General Tax Code. However, the tax authorities held that the arrangement set up by the IKEA group constituted abuse of law and furthermore that Inter Ikea Systems BV was not the actual beneficiary of the franchise fees paid by Ikea France. On that basis, an assessment for the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 was issued according to which Ikea France was to pay additional withholding taxes and late payment interest in an amount of EUR 95 mill. The court of first instance decided in favor of Ikea and the tax authorities then filed an appeal with the CAA of Versailles. Judgement of the CAA of Versailles The Court of appeal upheld the decision of the court of first instance and decided in favor of IKEA. Excerpt “It follows from the foregoing that the Minister, who does not establish that the franchise agreement concluded between SNC MIF and the company IIS BV corresponds to an artificial arrangement with the sole aim of evading the withholding tax, by seeking the benefit of the literal application of the provisions of the Franco-Dutch tax convention, is not entitled to maintain that the administration could implement the procedure for abuse of tax law provided for in Article L. 64 of the tax procedure book and subject to the withholding tax provided for in Article 182 B of the general tax code the royalties paid by SNC MIF by considering them as having directly benefited the Interogo foundation. On the inapplicability alleged by the Minister of the stipulations of Article 12 of the tax convention without any reference to an abusive arrangement: If the Minister maintains that, independently of the abuse of rights procedure, the provisions of Article 12 of the tax treaty are not applicable, it does not follow from the investigation, for the reasons set out above, that IIS BV is not the actual beneficiary of the 70% franchise fees paid by SAS MIF. It follows from all of the above that the Minister is not entitled to argue that it was wrongly that, by the contested judgment, the Versailles Administrative Court granted SAS MIF the restitution of an amount of EUR 95,912,185 corresponding to the withholding taxes payable by it, in duties, increases and late payment interest, in respect of the financial years ended in 2010 and 2011. Consequently, without there being any need to examine its subsidiary conclusions regarding increases, its request must be rejected.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation France vs Ikea, CAA de VERSAILLES, 1ère chambre, 08_02_2022, 19VE03571

A restructuring that followed the acquisition of Timberland by VF Enterprises in 2011 resulted in an intra-group transfer of ownership to valuable intangibles to a Swiss corporation, TBL Investment Holdings. The IRS was of the opinion that gains from the transfer was taxable. Judgement of the US Tax Court The tax court upheld the assessment of the tax authorities. Excerpt: “we have concluded that petitioner’s constructive distribution to VF Enterprises of the TBL GmbH stock that petitioner constructively received in exchange for its intangible property was a “disposition” within the meaning of section 367(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II). We also conclude, for the reasons explained in this part IV, that no provision of the regulations allows petitioner to avoid the recognition of gain under that statutory provision.” “Because we do not “agree[] to reduce the adjustment to income for the trademarks based on a 20-year useful life limitation, pursuant to Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.367(d)-1T,” we determine, in accordance with the parties’ stipulation, that “[p]etitioner’s increase in income for the transfer of the trademarks is $1,274,100,000.” Adding that figure to the agreed value of the foreign workforce and customer relationships that petitioner transferred to TBL GmbH and reducing the sum by the agreed trademark basis, we conclude that petitioner’s income for the taxable year in issue should be increased by $1,452,561,000 ($1,274,100,000 +$23,400,000 + $174,400,000 − $19,339,000), as determined in the notice of deficiency. Because petitioner did not assign error to the other two adjustments reflected in the notice of deficiency, it follows that respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we will grant respondent’s motion for summary judgment and deny petitioner’s corresponding motion.” Click here for translation US vs TBL Licensing LLC Jan 2022 US tax court

BenQ Italy SRL is part of a multinational group headed by the Taiwanese company BenQ Corporation that sells and markets technology products, consumer electronics, computing and communications devices. BenQ Italy’s immediate parent company was a Dutch company, BenQ Europe PV. Following an audit the tax authorities issued a notice of assessment for FY 2003 in which the taxpayer was accused of having procured goods from companies operating in countries with privileged taxation through the fictitious interposition of a Dutch company (BenQ Europe BV), the parent company of the taxpayer, whose intervention in the distribution chain was deemed uneconomic. On the basis of these assumptions, the tax authorities found that the recharge of costs made by the interposed company, were non-deductible. The tax authorities also considered that, through the interposition of BenQ BV, the prices charged by the taxpayer were aimed at transferring most of the taxable income to the manufacturing companies of the BenQ Group located in countries with privileged taxation. Thirdly, the costs recharged by the Dutch company to the taxpayer for the insurance of the solvency risk of its customers was denied. Not agreeing with the assessment BenQ Italy filed a complaint which was rejected first by the provincial court and later by the regional court. The regional court held – in relation to purchases from non-EU countries – that there were no economic reasons for the interposition of the parent company in relation to such purchases. Secondly, the court found that the taxpayer did not allocate the income earned in Italy according to the market values of the goods purchased from the group’s distribution chain, which resulted from the variability of the unit prices and the application by the seller under Dutch law of negative mark-up prices, constituting circumstantial evidence of the transfer of the economic advantage to group companies located in other countries. Finally, it held that the insurance costs were not inherent. BenQ then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court based on ten grounds. In the forth ground of appeal BenQ Italy alleged that the judgment under appeal held that the rules on transfer prices had been infringed. BenQ Italy argues that the burden of proof is on the tax authorities, in order to overcome the documentary (and negotiated) element of the purchase price agreed between the seller and the other companies in the group, to provide evidence that such price constitutes a breach of the arm’s length principle. BenQ also points out that none of the methods advocated on the basis of the OECD Guidelines and the Circular of the tax authorities No 32/9/2267 of 1980 has been applied in the present case, with a consequent breach of the rules governing placement of the burden of proof. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court granted the appeal on the fourth ground. The judgment of the regional court was therefore set aside and referred back to the regional court for reconsideration. Excerpts “5 – The fourth ground is well-founded. 5.1 – The judgment appealed against found, on the basis of the contested notice, that “the interposition of the parent company appears to be for the purpose of circumventing the tax rules – which is not economically justifiable – and consequently the mark-up applied to the aforementioned imports loses the requirement of inherence in that it is not necessary or causally/mente connected with the income-producing activity under Article 11O(7) of the TUIR”. While drawing inspiration from the recovery of the non-deductibility of the cost of recharge (based on the different and distorted assumption of the uneconomic nature of the interposition of the company under Dutch law), the CTR hypothesizes the existence of an element of alleged tax avoidance and evaluates in this sense the “inconsistent and unexplained marked variability of the prices charged by the parent company, as well as [. …] the application of the alleged negative margins’, in order to derive the ‘presumption’ that the BenQ Group ‘did not allocate the income earned in Italy according to market values […] but concentrated it in the producers’ countries of residence’. Therefore, despite the fact that the Office did not adopt any method of calculating normal value (by comparing, for example, the prices charged by the taxpayer with the other non-resident companies in the group with respect to transactions concluded by and with independent parties), the CTR found that the normal value pursuant to art. 110, seventh paragraph, TUIR, the excessive variability of unit prices and the application of negative mark-ups by the parent company, as a “symptom of pathological conduct”, inducing evidence of the “transfer of the actual economic advantage to companies with lower production costs”. 5.2 – The CTR arrives, therefore – after deducting the negative mark-up percentage of a 5% flat-rate margin – to consider the burden of proof met by the Office regarding the assessment of a normal value of the prices charged (generically indicated as “both in purchase and sale”), as an exception to the contractual prices charged by the taxpayer, in terms of the indicated provisions of the TUIR (art. 76, paragraphs 2 and 5 of the TUIR, corresponding to Article 110, paragraphs 2 and 7 of the TUIR pro tempore and Article 9 of the TUIR) without having made any reference to the methodologies which, according to the OECD Guidelines, allow the comparison of the margin of the resident intra-group company with that which would be achieved by the same in case of transactions with independent companies (such as, for example, the resale price method and the cost-plus method). 5.3 – It should be noted that this Court has long pointed out that the rule of assessment of the normality of the transaction price, as well as the relative burden of proof, are the responsibility of the Office (Court of Cassation, Section V, 2 March 2020, No. 5645), without the taxpayer’s avoidance purpose being relevant, since the tax authorities do not have to prove the assumption of higher domestic taxation compared to cross-border taxation. What the tax

The US tax authorities had increased Whirlpool US’s taxable because income allocated to Whirlpool Luxembourg for selling appliances was considered taxable foreign base company sales income FBCSI/CFC income to the parent company in the U.S. under “the manufacturing branch rule” under US tax code Section 951(a). The income from sales of appliances had been allocated to Whirlpool Luxembourg  through a manufacturing and distribution arrangement under which it was the nominal manufacturer of household appliances made in Mexico, that were then sold to Whirlpool US and to Whirlpool Mexico. According to the arrangement the income allocated to Luxembourg was not taxable in Mexico nor in Luxembourg. Whirlpool challenged IRS’s assessment and brought the case to the US Tax Court. In May 2020 the Tax Court ruled in favor of the IRS. “If Whirlpool Luxembourg had conducted its manufacturing operations in Mexico through a separate entity, its sales income would plainly have been FCBSI [foreign base company sales income] under section 954(d)(1),”. The income should therefore be treated as FBCSI under the tax code, writing that “Section 954(d)(2) prevents petitioners from avoiding this result by arranging to conduct those operations through a branch.” Whirlpool brought this decision to US court of appeal. Judgement of the Court of Appeal The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the tax court and found that under the text of the statute alone, the sales income was FBCSI that must be included in the taxpayer’s subpart F income. Excerpt: “The question presented is whether Lux’s income from its sales of appliances to Whirlpool-US and Whirlpool-Mexico in 2009 is FBCSI under §954(d)(2). That provision provides in full: Certain branch income. For purposes of determining foreign base company sales income in situations in which the carrying on of activities by a controlled foreign corporation through a branch or similar establishment outside the country of incorporation of the controlled foreign corporation has substantially the same effect as if such branch or similar establishment were a wholly owned subsidiary corporation deriving such income, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary the income attributable to the carrying on of such branch or similar establishment shall be treated as income derived by a wholly owned subsidiary of the controlled foreign corporation and shall constitute foreign base company sales income of the controlled foreign corporation. As the Tax Court aptly observed, § 954(d)(2) consists of a single (nearly interminable) sentence that specifies two conditions and then two consequences that follow if those conditions are met. The first condition is that the CFC was “carrying on” activities “through a branch or similar establishment” outside its country of incorporation. The second condition is that the branch arrangement had “substantially the same effect as if such branch were a wholly owned subsidiary corporation [of the CFC] deriving such income[.]” If those conditions are met, then two consequences follow as to “the income attributable to” the branch’s activities: first, that income “shall be treated as income derived by a wholly owned subsidiary of the controlled foreign corporation”; and second, the income attributable to the branch’s activities “shall constitute foreign base company sales income of the controlled foreign corporation.” 26 U.S.C. § 954(d)(2).” … “From these premises, § 954(d)(2) expressly prescribes the consequences that follow: first, that the sales income “attributable to” the “carrying on” of activities through Lux’s Mexican branch “shall be treated as income derived by a wholly owned subsidiary” of Lux; and second, that the income attributable to the branch’s activities “shall constitute foreign base company sales income of” Lux. That second consequence directly answers the question presented in this appeal. We acknowledge that § 954(d)(2) states that, if the provision’s two conditions are met, then “under regulations prescribed by the Secretary” the provision’s two consequences “shall” follow. And Whirlpool makes various arguments as to those regulations, seeking a result different from the one mandated by the statute itself. But the agency’s regulations can only implement the statute’s commands, not vary from them. (The Tax Court read the “under regulations” text the same way. See Op. at 38 (“The Secretary was authorized to issue regulations implementing these results.”)). And the relevant command here—that Lux’s sales income “shall constitute foreign base company sales income of” Lux—could hardly be clearer.” Click here for translation 21a0280p-06

In 2003 Molinos Argentina had incorporated Molinos Chile under the modality of an “investment platform company” regulated by Article 41 D of the Chilean Income Tax Law. Molinos Argentina owned 99.99% of the shares issued by Molinos Chile, and had integrated the share capital of the latter through the transfer of the majority shareholdings of three Uruguayan companies and one Peruvian company. Molinos Argentina declared the dividends originating from the shares of the three Uruguayan companies and the Peruvian company controlled by Molinos Chile as non-taxable income by application of article 11 of the DTA between Argentina and Chile. On that factual basis, the tax authorities applied the principle of economic reality established in article 2 of Law 11.683 (t.o. 1998 and its amendments) and considered that Molinos Argentina had abused the DTA by using the Chilean holding company as a “conduit company” to divert the collection of dividends from the shares of the Uruguayan and Peruvian companies to Chilean jurisdiction, in order to avoid paying income tax in Argentina and similar income tax in Chile at the same time. The non-taxation in Argentina was due to the application of article 11 in the DTA which established that dividends were only taxed by the country in which the company distributing them was domiciled (in the case of Chile, because Molinos Chile was domiciled in Chile) and the non-taxation in Chile was verified – in turn – because the dividends originated in the Uruguayan and Peruvian companies did not pay income tax in that country because they were profits from investment platform companies which “will not be considered domiciled in Chile, so they will be taxed in the country only for Chilean source income”. The tax authorities considered that the incorporation of the holding company in Chile by Molinos Argentina was not justified from the point of view of the corporate structure, since it had no real economic link with the Uruguayan and Peruvian companies and lacked economic substance or business purpose, since the dividends distributed by those companies did not remain in Molinos Chile but was used as an intermediary to remit those profits almost immediately to Molinos Argentina. It was constituted with the sole purpose of eliminating the taxation and to conduct the income obtained in states that are not party to the DTA -Uruguay and Peru- through the State with which the double taxation treaty has been concluded and using the benefits offered by the latter. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court’s ruled in favor of the tax authorities. Molinos’s conduct was not protected by the rules of the DTA. International standards must be interpreted in accordance with the principle of good faith. The conclusions reached by the National Tax Court and the National Chamber of Appeals in Federal Administrative Litigation was not seen as unreasonable or devoid of Foundation according to the doctrine of arbitrariness. Click here for English Translation Argentina FALLO CAF 001351_2014_CS001

While living in France, Israel Daniel Amram (IDA) devised an idea for the development of a unique and efficient computerized interface that would link insurance companies and physicians and facilitate financial accounting between medical service providers and patients. IDA registered the trademark “SEPHIRA” and formed a company in France under the name SAS SEPHIRA . IDA then moved to Israel and formed Sephira & Offek Ltd. Going forward the company in Israel would provid R&D services to SAS SEPHIRA in France. All of the taxable profits in Israel was labled as “R&D income” which is taxed at a lower rate in Israel. Later IDA’s rights in the trademark was sold to Sephira & Offek Ltd in return for €8.4m. Due to IDA’s status as a “new Immigrant” in Israel profits from the sale was tax exempt. Following the acquisition of the trademark, Sephira & Offek Ltd licensed the trademark to SAS SEPHIRA in return for royalty payments. In the books of Sephira & Offek Ltd, the trademark was labeled as “goodwill” and amortized. Following an audit the tax authorities determined that the sale of the trademark was an artificial transaction. Furthermore, they found that part of the profit labeled by Sephira & Offek Ltd as R&D income (subject to a lower taxation in Israel) should instead be labeled as ordinary income. On that basis an assessment was issued. Sephira & Offek Ltd and IDA disapproved of the assessment and took the case to Court. Judgement of the Court The court ruled in favor of the tax authorities. The trademark  transaction was artificial, as commercial reasons for the transaction (other than tax optimization) had been provided. The whole arrangement was considered non-legitimate tax planning. The court also agreed that part of the income classified by the company as R&D income (subject to reduced taxes) should instead be taxed as ordinary income. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation Israel vs Sephira & Offek Ltd_2995-03-17

The case concerned a complex financing structure within the General Electric Group. The taxpayer, GE Financial Investments Ltd (GEFI Ltd), a UK resident company was the limited partner in a Delaware limited partnership, of which, GE Financial Investments Inc (GEFI Inc) a Delaware corporation was the general partner. GEFI Ltd filed UK company tax returns for FY 2003-2008 in which the company claimed a foreign tax credit for US federal income tax. In total, US federal income taxes amounted to $ 303 millions and exceeded the amount of tax due in the UK. The tax authorities opened an enquiry into each of GEFI’s company tax returns for the relevant period, and subsequently issued an assessment where the claims for foreign tax credits was denied in their entirety. Judgement of the Tax Tribunal The tribunal dismissed the appeal of GEFI Ltd and ruled that the UK company did not carry on business in the US. Hence GEFI Ltd was not entitled to a foreign tax credit. Excerpt “By contrast the construction of Article 4 advanced by HMRC requires both worldwide taxation and a connection or attachment to the contracting state concerned. In my judgment, this is the correct approach as it takes into account the common feature or similarity of domicile, residence, citizenship etc, in the context of the Convention, ie that they are all criteria providing, in addition to the imposition of a worldwide liability to tax, a “connection” or “attachment” of a person to the contracting state concerned. Such an interpretation is consistent with Widrig (see paragraphs 44 – 46, above) and Vogel (see paragraph 47, above) and Crown Forest which, as Ms McCarthy submits, when properly understood in context is authority for the proposition that full or worldwide taxation is a necessary feature of the connecting criterion but is not sufficient of itself. … Although her further submission, that, other than the imposition of a worldwide liability to US tax, share stapling has no US law consequences at federal or state level (eg it does not carry with it US filing or reporting obligations or make a stapled overseas company’s constitutional documents subject to or dependent on US law), was not supported by evidence, I agree that, given the differences that do exist for tax purposes (see paragraph 29, above) the connection or attachment is between the stapled entities rather than to the country concerned. 66. Therefore, in the absence of the necessary connection or attachment by GEFI to the US, and despite Mr Baker’s persuasive submissions to the contrary, I do not consider that GEFI was a resident of the US for the purposes of Article 4 of the Convention by reason of the share staple between it and GEFI Inc. As such it is necessary to consider Issue 2, the Permanent Establishment Issue. … However, Ms McCarthy confirmed that, should I conclude that the activities of the LP are sufficient to amount to the carrying on of a business, there is no separate dispute as to whether that business is carried on in Stamford, Connecticut, or some other location. 71. As such, it is therefore necessary to consider what is in effect the only issue between the parties under issue 2(a), namely whether, as it contends, GEFI by its participation in the LP carried on a business in the US or, as HMRC argue, it did not.” … I agree with Ms McCarthy who submits that there is nothing to suggest that personnel or agents acting on behalf of the LP made or conducted continuous and regular commercial activities in the US. All that appears to have happened was that monies were directed straight to GELCO without negotiating terms or the consideration at a director level as would have been expected from a company carrying on commercial activities on sound business principles. … Therefore, notwithstanding its objects, and having regard to the degree of activity as a whole, particularly the lack of participation in the strategic direction of the LP by the directors of GEFI Inc, I have come to the conclusion that GEFI was not carrying on a business in the US through its participation in the LP. … Having concluded for the reasons above that GEFI did not carry on business in the US it is not necessary to address Issue 2(b), ie whether, if GEFI had carried out business in the US, US tax was payable under US law and if so whether the UK is required under Article 24(4)(a) to give relief against this US tax. … Therefore, for the reasons above the appeal is dismissed.” ”G UKFTT 210 (TC) TC08160″]

Unicomer (St. Vincent) Ltd. is engaged in the business of selling household furniture and appliances. In FY 2013 and 2014 Unicomer entered into an “insurance arrangement” involving an unrelated party, United insurance, and a related party, Canterbury. According to the tax authorities United Insurance had been used as an intermediate/conduit to funnel money from the Unicomer to Canterbury, thereby avoiding taxes in St. Vincent. In 2017 the Inland Revenue Department issued an assessments of additional tax in the sum of $12,666,798.23 inclusive of interest and penalties. The basis of the assessment centered on Unicomer’s treatment of (1) credit protection premiums (hereinafter referred to as “CPI”) under the insurance arrangement, (2) tax deferral of hire-purchase profits and (3) deductions for royalty payments. Unicomer appealed the assessment to the Appeal Commission where a decision was rendered in 2018. The Appeal Commission held that the CPI payments were rightfully disallowed by the tax authorities and that withholding tax was chargeable on these payments; the deferral of hire purchase profits was also disallowed; but royalty expenses were allowed. This decision was appealed by Unicomer to the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court predominantly ruled in favor of the tax authorities. The court upheld the decision of the Appeal Commission to disallow deductions for CPI’s and confirmed that withholding tax on these payments was chargeable. The deferral of taxation of hire-purchase profits was also disallowed by the court. However, although the additional taxes should of course be collected by the tax authorities, the procedure that had been followed after receiving the decision of the Appeal Commission – contacting the bank of Unicomer and having them pay the additional taxes owed by the company – was considered wholly unacceptable and amounted to an abuse of the power. The taxes owed should be collected following correct procedures. Click here for translation Unicomer (St. Vincent) Ltd v Appeal Commissioners

“A…, Sociedade Unipessoal LDA” had taken out two intra group loans with the purpose of acquiring 70% of the shares in a holding company within the group. The tax authorities disallowed the resulting interest expenses claiming that the loan transactions lacked a business purpose. A complaint was filed with the Tax Court (CAAD). Decision of the Court The Court decided in favour of the tax authorities and upheld the assessment. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation P827_2019-T - 2021-01-25 - JURISPRUDENCIA

Azot is a producer of mineral fertilizers and one of the largest industrial groups in Ukraine. Following an audit the tax authorities concluded that Azot’s export of mineral fertilizers to a related party in Switzerland, NF Trading AG, had been priced significantly below the arm’s length price, and moreover that Azot’s import of natural gas from Russia via a related party in Cyprus, Ostchem Holding Limited, had been priced significantly above the arm’s length price. On that basis, an assessment of additional corporate income tax in the amount of 43 million UAH and a decrease in the negative value by 195 million UAH was issued. In a decision from 2019 the Administrative Court ruled in favor of the tax authorities. This decision was then appealed by Azot to the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal and decided in favor of the tax authorities. Click here for translation Єдиний державний реєстр судових рішень

Redington India Limited (RIL) established a wholly-owned subsidiary Redington Gulf (RG) in the Jebel Ali Free Zone of the UAE in 2004. The subsidiary was responsible for the Redington group’s business in the Middle East and Africa. Four years later in July 2008, RIL set up a wholly-owned subsidiary company in Mauritius, RM. In turn, this company set up its wholly-owned subsidiary in the Cayman Islands (RC) – a step-down subsidiary of RIL. On 13 November 2008, RIL transferred its entire shareholding in RG to RC without consideration, and within a week after the transfer, a 27% shareholding in RC was sold by RG to a private equity fund Investcorp, headquartered in Cayman Islands for a price of Rs.325.78 Crores. RIL claimed that the transfer of its shares in RG to RC was a gift and therefore, exempt from capital gains taxation in India. It was also claimed that transfer pricing provisions were not applicable as income was exempt from tax. The Indian tax authorities disagreed and found that the transfer of shares was a taxable transaction, as the three defining requirements of a gift were not met – that the transfer should be (i) voluntary, (ii) without consideration and that (iii) the property so transferred should be accepted by the donee. The tax authorities also relied on the documents for the transfer of shares, the CFO statement, and the law dealing with the transfer of property. The arm’s length price was determined by the tax authorities using the comparable uncontrolled price method – referring to the pricing of the shares transferred to Investcorp. In the tax assessment, the authorities had also denied deductions for trademark fees paid by RIL to a Singapore subsidiary for the use of the “Redington” name. The tax authorities had also imputed a fee for RIL providing guarantees in favour of its subsidiaries. RIL disagreed with the assessment and brought the case before the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP) who ruled in favour of the tax authorities. The case was then brought before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) who ruled in favour of RIL. ITAT’s ruling was then brought before the High Court by the tax authorities. The decision of the High Court The High Court ruled that transfer of shares in RG by RIL to its step-down subsidiary (RC) as part of corporate restructuring could not be qualified as a gift. Extraneous considerations had compelled RIL to make the transfer of shares, thereby rendering the transfer involuntary. The entire transaction was structured to accommodate a third party-investor, who had put certain conditions even prior to effecting the transfer. According to the court, the transfer of shares was a circular transaction put in place to avoid payment of taxes. “Thus, if the chain of events is considered, it is evidently clear that the incorporation of the company in Mauritius and Cayman Islands just before the transfer of shares is undoubtedly a means to avoid taxation in India and the said two companies have been used as conduits to avoid income tax” observed the Court. The High Court also disallowed deductions for trademark fees paid by RIL to a Singapore subsidiary. The court stated it was illogical for a subsidiary company to claim Trademark fee from its parent company (RIL), especially when there was no documentation to show that the subsidiary was the owner of the trademark. It was also noted that RIL had been using the trademark in question since 1993 – long before the subsidiary in Singapore was established in 2005. Regarding the guarantees, the Court concluded these were financial services provided by RIL to it’s subsidiaries for which a remuneration (fee/commission) was required. India vs Ms Redington (India) Limited 10 Dec 2020 Madras High Court FY 09 10

In 2009 the BlackRock Group acquired Barclays Global Investors for a total sum of $13,5bn . The price was paid in part by shares ($6.9bn) and in part by cash ($6.6bn). The cash payment was paid by BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC – a US Delaware Company tax resident in the UK – but funded by the parent company by issuing $4bn loan notes to the LLC. In the years following the acquisition Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC claimed tax deductions in the UK for interest payments on the intra-group loans. Following an audit in the UK the tax authorities disallowed the interest deductions. The tax authorities held that the transaction would not have happened between independent parties. They also found that the loans were entered into for an unallowable tax avoidance purpose. A UK taxpayer can be denied a deduction for interest where a loan has an unallowable purpose i.e, where a tax advantage is the company’s main purpose for entering into the loan relationship (section 441 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009). If there is such an unallowable purpose, the company may not bring into account for that period ….so much of any debit in respect of that relationship as is attributable to the unallowable purpose. The Court ruled in favor of BlackRock and allowed tax deduction for the full interest payments. According to the Court it was clear that the transaction would not have taken place in an arm’s length transaction between independent parties. However there was evidence to establish that there could have been a similar transaction in which an independent lender. Hence, the court concluded that BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC could have borrowed $4bn from an independent lender at similar terms and conditions. In regards to the issue of “unallowable purposes” the court found that securing a tax advantage was a consequence of the loan. However,  Blackrock LLC 5 also entered into the transactions with the commercial purpose of acquiring Barclays Global Investors. The Court considered that both reasons were “main purposes” and apportioned all of the debits (interest payments) to the commercial purpose. UK vs Blackrock November 2020 TC07920

Companies carrying on “oil-related activities” are subject to both corporation tax and a “supplementary charge”. “Oil-related activities” are treated as a separate trade and the income from them represents “ring fence profits” on which corporation tax is charged. The “supplementary charge” is levied on “adjusted” ring fence profits, in calculating which financing costs are left out of account. Between 2006 and 2011, the supplementary charge amounted to 20% of adjusted ring fence profits. On 23 March 2011, however, it was announced that the supplementary charge would be increased to 32% from midnight. The change in rate was subsequently carried into effect by section 7 of the Finance Act 2011, which received the royal assent on 19 July 2011. Total E&P, previously Maersk Oil North Sea UK Limited and Maersk Oil UK Limited, carried on “oil-related activities” and so were subject to the supplementary charge. The question raised by the appeal is how much of each company’s adjusted ring fence profits for 2011 are liable to the charge at 20% and how much at 32%. The accounting period which ran from 1 January to 31 December 2011 and so straddled the point at which the supplementary charge was raised. The approach elected by Maersk Oil North Sea UK Limited and Maersk Oil UK Limited – an “actual” basis in place of the time apportionment basis – resulted in all the adjusted ring fence profits for the 2011 accounting period being allocated to the period before 24 March (“the Earlier Period”) rather than that from 24 March (“the Later Period”) and so in escaping the “new” 32% rate of supplementary charge. HMRC did not consider the basis on which Maersk Oil North Sea UK Limited and Maersk Oil UK Limited had approached apportionment of their adjusted ring fence profits to be “just and reasonable”. The Court of Appeal concluded that treating each time period as if they were two separate accounting periods, and allocating income, expenditure and allowances to the periods accordingly was just and reasonable. Capital allowances could be treated similarly for notionally separate periods. UK vs TOTAL E&P 2020

General Electric (GE) have been routing financial transactions (AUS $ 5 billion) related to GE companies in Australia via the UK in order to gain a tax advantage – by “triple dipping” in regards to interest deductions, thus saving billions of dollars in tax in Australia, the UK and the US. Before entering into these transactions, GE obtained clearance from HMRC that UK tax rules were met, in particular new “Anti-Arbitrage Rules” introduced in the UK in 2005, specifically designed to prevent tax avoidance through the exploitation of the tax treatment of ‘hybrid’ entities in different jurisdictions. The clearance was granted by the tax authorities in 2005 based on the understanding that the funds would be used to invest in businesses operating in Australia. In total, GE’s clearance application concerned 107 cross-border loans amounting to debt financing of approximately £21.2 billion. The Australian Transaction was one part of the application. After digging into the financing structure and receiving documents from the Australian authorities, HMRC now claims that GE fraudulently obtained a tax advantage in the UK worth US$1 billion by failing to disclose information and documents relating to the group’s financing arrangements. According to the HMRC, GE provided UK tax officers with a doctored board minute, and misleading and incomplete documents. The documents from Australia shows that the transactions were not related to investments in Australian businesses, but part of a complex and contrived tax avoidance scheme that would circulate money between the US, Luxembourg, the UK and Australia before being sent back to the US just days later. These transactions had no commercial purpose other than to create a “triple dip” tax advantage in the UK, the US and Australia. HMRC are now seeking to annul the 2005 clearance agreement and then issue a claim for back taxes in the amount of $ 1 billion before interest and penalties. From GE’s 10 K filing “As previously disclosed, the United Kingdom tax authorities disallowed interest deductions claimed by GE Capital for the years 2007-2015 that could result in a potential impact of approximately $1 billion, which includes a possible assessment of tax and reduction of deferred tax assets, not including interest and penalties. We are contesting the disallowance. We comply with all applicable tax laws and judicial doctrines of the United Kingdom and believe that the entire benefit is more likely than not to be sustained on its technical merits. We believe that there are no other jurisdictions in which the outcome of unresolved issues or claims is likely to be material to our results of operations, financial position or cash flows. We further believe that we have made adequate provision for all income tax uncertainties.” The English High Court decision on whether the case has sufficient merit to proceed to trial: “150. For the above reasons, I refuse the application to amend in respect of paragraphs 38(b) and 38(e) of APOC and I will strike out the existing pleading in paragraph 38(e) of APOC. I will otherwise permit the amendments sought by HMRC insofar as they are not already agreed between the parties. Specifically, the permitted amendments include those in which HMRC seeks to introduce allegations of deliberate non-disclosure, fraud in respect of the Full Disclosure Representation, a claim that the Settlement Agreement is a contract of utmost good faith (paragraphs 49B and 53(ca) of APOC) and the claim for breach of an implied term (paragraphs 48 and 49 of APOC). 151. As to paragraph 68(b) of the Reply, I refuse the application to strike it out. To a large extent this follows from my conclusion in relation to the amendments to the APOC to add allegations of deliberate failure to disclose material information. In GE’s skeleton argument, a separate point is taken that paragraph 68(b) of the Reply is a free-standing plea that is lacking in sufficient particulars. I do not accept this: there can be no real doubt as to which parts of the APOC are being referred to by the cross-reference made in paragraph 68(b)(ii). 152. The overall result is that, while I have rejected the attempts to infer many years after the event that specific positive representations could be implied from limited references in the contemporaneous documents, the essential allegation which lay at the heart of Mr Jones QC’s submissions – that GE failed to disclose the complete picture, and that it did so deliberately – will be permitted to go to trial on the various alternative legal bases asserted by HMRC. I stress that, beyond the conclusion that there is a sufficient pleading for this purpose, and that the prospects of success cannot be shown to be fanciful on an interlocutory application such as this, I say nothing about the merits of the claims of deliberate non-disclosure or fraud.” UK-vs-GE-2020

East African Breweries International Ltd (applicant) is a wholly owned subsidiary of East African Breweries Limited, and is incorporated in Kenya. East African Breweries International Ltd was involved in developing the markets of the companies in countries that did not have manufacturing operations. The company did not carry out marketing services in Uganda but was marketing Ugandan products outside Uganda. After sourcing customers, they pay to the applicant. A portion is remitted to Uganda Breweries Limited and East African Breweries International Ltd then adds a markup on the products obtained from Uganda Breweries Limited sold to customers in other countries. East African Breweries International Ltd would pay a markup of 7.5 % to Uganda Breweries and then sell the items at a markup of 70 to 90%. In July 2015 the tax authorities (respondent) audited Uganda Breweries Limited, also a subsidiary of East African Breweries Limited, and found information relating to transactions with the East African Breweries International Ltd for the period May 2008 to June 2015. The tax authorities issued an assessment of income tax of Shs. 9,780,243,983 for the period June 2009 to June 2015 on the ground that East African Breweries International Ltd was resident in Uganda for tax purposes. An appeal was filed by East African Breweries International Ltd where the agreed issues were: 1. Whether the applicant is a taxable person in Uganda under the Income Tax Act? 2. Whether the applicant obtained income from Uganda for the period in issue? 3. What remedies are available to the parties? Judgement of the Tax Appeals Tribunal The tribunal dismissed the appeal of East African Breweries International Ltd and upheld the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Excerpt “From the invoices and dispatch notes tendered in as exhibits, it was not clear who the exporter of the goods was. There was no explanation why the names of the parties were crossed out and replaced with others in some of the invoices and dispatch notes. While the applicant did not have an office or presence in Uganda it was exporting goods. In the absence of satisfactory explanations, the Tribunal would not fault the Commissioner’s powers to re-characterize transactions where there is a tax avoidance scheme. The arrangement may not only be a tax avoidance scheme but also one where the form does not reflect the substance. The markup the applicant was paying Uganda Breweries was extraordinarily low compared to what the applicant was obtaining from its sale to third partied. Once again in the absence of good reasons, the form does not reflect the substance. If the Commissioner re-characterized such transactions, the Tribunal will not fault him or her. The Commissioner cannot be said to have acted grossly irrationally for the Tribunal to set aside the decision. The Tribunal notes that the activities of the group companies were overlapping. It is not clear whether they were actually sharing TIN, premises and staff. The witness who came to testify on behalf of the applicant was from East African Breweries Limited. Despite the applicant selling goods to many countries it does not have an employee or officer to testify on its behalf. The markup of the sale of the goods by Uganda Breweries Limited to the applicant was far lower than that between the applicant and the final consumers in Sudan, Congo and Rwanda. While Uganda Breweries Limited was charging the applicant a markup of 7.5% the applicant was charging its customers 70 to 90%. This is part of a transfer pricing arrangement where the companies are dealing with each other not at arm’s length. The arm’s length principle requires inter-company transactions to conform to a level that would have applied had the transactions taking place between unrelated parties, all other factors remaining the same. Under. S. 90 of the Income Tax Act, in any transaction between associates, the commissioner may distribute, apportion or allocate income, deductions between the associates as is necessary to reflect the income realized by the taxpayer in an arm’s length transaction. An associate is defined in S. 3 of the Income Tax Act. In making any adjustments the commissioner may determine the source of income and the nature of any payment or loss. The transfer pricing arrangement originated in Uganda. The Commissioner apportion taxes according to the income received by the applicant. In Unilever Kenya Limited v CIT Income Tax Appeal No. 753/2003 (High Court of Kenya) Unilever Kenya Limited (UKL) and Unilever Uganda Limited (UUL) were both subsidiaries of Unilever PLC, a UK multinational group. Pursuant to a contract, UKL manufactured goods on behalf of and supplied them to UUL, at a price lower than UKL charged to unrelated parties in its domestic and export sales for identical goods. The Commissioner raised an assessment against UKL in respect of sales made by UKL to UUL on the basis that UKL’s sale to UUL were not at arm’s length prices. In that matter it was held that in the absence of guidelines under Kenya law, the taxpayer was entitled to apply OECD transfer pricing guidelines. In this application, the issue is not about which rules to apply. What the Tribunal can note is that the Commissioner has powers to apportion income on an intergroup company and issue an assessment. In this case the Commissioner chose the applicant over Uganda Breweries Limited. The Tribunal feels that the Commissioner was acting within his discretion and was justified to do so. Taking all the above into consideration, the Tribunal finds that the applicant did not discharge the burden placed on it to prove the respondent ought to have made the decision differently. Click here for other translation 10178_EABLi_Vs_URA (1)

C. SA provides “services, in particular in the areas of communication, management, accounting, management and budget control, sales development monitoring and employee training for the group to which it belongs, active in particular in the field of “F”. C. SA is part of an international group of companies, G. group, whose ultimate owner is A. The G group includes H. Ltd, based in the British Virgin Islands, I. Ltd, based in Guernsey and J. Ltd, also based in Guernsey. In 2005, K. was a director of C. SA. On December 21 and December 31, 2004, an exclusive agreement for distribution of “F” was entered into between L. Ltd, on the one hand, and C. SA , H. Ltd and J. Ltd, on the other hand. Under the terms of this distribution agreement, L. Ltd. undertook to supply “F” to the three companies as of January 1, 2005 and for a period of at least ten years, in return for payment. Under a supply agreement C. SA agreed to sell clearly defined quantities of “F” to M for the period from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2014. In the course of 2005, 56 invoices relating to sales transactions of “F” to M. were drawn up and sent to the latter, on the letterhead of C. SA. According to these documents, M. had to pay the sale price directly into two accounts – one held by H. Ltd and the other by J. Ltd. Part of this money was then reallocated to the supply of “F”, while the balance was transferred to an account in Guernsey held by J. Ltd. The result was, that income from C. SA’s sale of “F” to M was not recognized in C. SA but instead in the two off-shore companies H. Ltd and J. Ltd. Following an audit, the Swiss tax authorities issued an assessment where C. SA and A were held liable for withholding taxes on a hidden distribution of profits. A and C. SA brought this assessment to Court. Decision of the Court The Court decided in favor of the tax authorities. “The above elements relied on by the appellants in no way provide proof that the appellant carried out the said transactions on behalf of the other companies in the [G]B group. Moreover, they do not in themselves allow the conclusion that the appellant acted through the other companies in its group, as the appellants maintain. Insofar as, as has been seen (see recital 5.1 above), the contract for the sale of *** was concluded and the relevant invoices issued in the name of the appellant, which is moreover designated as the seller in the sales contract (see heading and point 9. 2(a) of that contract), and that the other companies in the group are never mentioned in the context of the transactions at issue, it is much more appropriate to hold that they were carried out, admittedly for the benefit of the appellant, but through the appellant acting in its name and on its behalf. Therefore, by renouncing the resulting proceeds to the appellant, the appellant did indeed make concealed distributions of profits, i.e. appreciable cash benefits subject to withholding tax” “In these circumstances and insofar as the proceeds from the sale of *** were paid directly by [C. SA.] O. to the companies [H Ltd and J Ltd.] Y. and X.     – which must undoubtedly be regarded as persons closely related to the appellant within the meaning of the case-law (cf. recital 3.2.1 above) -, without any equivalent consideration in favour of the appellant, and that part of those proceeds was reallocated to the supply of *** (cf. d above), the lower authority was right to find that there was a taxable supply of money (see recitals 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 above) and to calculate this on the basis of an estimate of the profit resulting from the purchase and resale of *** (see decision under point 4.3, pp. 10 et seq.)” “In the absence of any document attesting to an assignment to the appellant of the claims arising from the purchase contract with [L] M. and the supply agreements of November 2004 with [M] O.     In addition, there is no reason to consider that the allocation of the profit resulting from the purchase and resale of *** to the companies of the group based abroad constitutes the remuneration granted to the latter for the takeover of the two contracts (purchase and sale), nor is there any justification for deducting the value of those contracts from the amount retained by the lower authority. The appellant’s submissions to this effect (see the memorandum of 12 May 2015, pp. 22 et seq. [under para. 6]) must therefore be rejected. Accordingly, the court of appeal refrains from carrying out the expert assessment requested by the appellant in order to estimate that value (see the memorandum of 12 May 2015, p. 25 [under section V]; see also section 2.2.1 above).” “… it should be noted that, in view of the foregoing and the size of the amounts waived by the appellant, the taxable cash benefit was easily recognisable as such by all the participants. Consequently, and insofar as the appellant did not declare or pay the relevant withholding tax spontaneously, the probable existence of tax evasion must be accepted, without it being necessary to determine whether or not it was committed intentionally (see recitals 4.1 and 4.2 above). Accordingly, there can be no criticism of the lower authority’s application of the provisions of the DPA and, since a contribution was wrongly not collected, of Article 12 paras. 1 and 2 of that Act in particular.” “The contested decision must therefore also be confirmed in this respect. Finally, as the case file is complete, the facts sufficiently established and the court is convinced, the court may also dispense with further investigative measures (see section 2.2.1 above). It is therefore also appropriate to reject the appellant’s subsidiary claim that he should be required, by all legal means, to provide

The US tax authorities had increased Whirlpool US’s taxable because income allocated to Whirlpool Luxembourg for selling appliances was considered taxable foreign base company sales income/CFC income to the parent company in the U.S. under “the manufacturing branch rule” under US tax code Section 951(a). The income from sales of appliances had been allocated to Whirlpool Luxembourg  through a manufacturing and distribution arrangement under which it was the nominal manufacturer of household appliances made in Mexico, that were then sold to Whirlpool US and to Whirlpool Mexico. According to the arrangement the income allocated to Luxembourg was not taxable in Mexico nor in Luxembourg. Whirlpool challenged IRS’s assessment and brought the case to the US Tax Court. The tax court ruled in favor of the IRS. “If Whirlpool Luxembourg had conducted its manufacturing operations in Mexico through a separate entity, its sales income would plainly have been FCBSI [foreign base company sales income] under section 954(d)(1),”. The income should therefore be treated as FBCSI under the tax code, writing that “Section 954(d)(2) prevents petitioners from avoiding this result by arranging to conduct those operations through a branch.” Whirlpool-050520-TC-Opinion

In 2008, the A Group had reorganized its internal financing function so that the Group’s parent company, A Oyj, had established A Finance NV in Belgium. Thereafter, A Oyj had transferred to intra-group long-term loan receivables of approximately EUR 223,500,000 to A Finance NV. In return, A Oyj had received shares in A Finance NV. The intra-group loan receivables transferred in kind had been unsecured and the interest income on the loan receivables had been transferred to A Finance NV on the same day. A Finance NV had entered the receivables in its balance sheet as assets. In addition, A Oyj and A Finance NV had agreed that target limits would be set for the return on investment achieved by A Finance NV through its operations. A Finance NV has reimbursed A Oyj for income that has exceeded the target limit or, alternatively, invoiced A Oyj for income that falls below the target limit. Based on the functional analysis prepared in the tax audit submitted to A Oyj, the Group Tax Center had considered that A Oyj had in fact performed all significant functions related to intra-group financing, assumed significant risks and used significant funds and that A Finance NV had not actually acted as a group finance company. The Group Tax Center had also considered that A Finance NV had received market-based compensation based on operating costs. In the tax adjustments for the tax years 2011 and 2012 submitted by the Group Tax Center to the detriment of the taxpayer, A Oyj had added as a transfer pricing adjustment: n the difference between the income deemed to be taxable and the income declared by the company and, in addition, imposed tax increases on the company. In the explanatory memorandum to its transfer pricing adjustment decisions, the Group Tax Center had stated that the transactions had not been re-characterized because the characterization or structuring of the transaction or arrangement between the parties had not been adjusted but taxed on the basis of actual transactions between the parties. The Supreme Administrative Court found that the Group Tax Center had ignored the legal actions taken by A Oyj and A Finance NV and in particular the fact that A Finance NV had become a creditor of the Group companies. It had identified the post-investment transactions between A Oyj and A Finance NV and considered that A Oyj had in fact performed all significant intra-group financing activities and that A Finance NV had not in fact acted as a group finance company. Thus, when submitting the tax adjustments to the detriment of the taxpayer, the Group Tax Center had re-characterized the legal transactions between A Oyj and A Finance NV on the basis of section 31 of the Act on Tax Procedure. As the said provision did not entitle the Group Tax Center to re-characterize the legal transactions made by the taxpayer and since it had not been alleged that A Oyj and A Finance NV had reorganized the Group’s financial activities for tax avoidance purposes, the Group Tax Center could not correct A Oyj taxes to the detriment of the taxpayer and does not impose tax increases on the company. Tax years 2011 and 2012. that A Oyj and A Finance NV had undertaken to reorganize the Group’s financial operations for the purpose of tax avoidance, the Group Tax Center could not, on the grounds presented, correct A Oyj’s taxation in 2011 and 2012 to the detriment of the taxpayer or impose tax increases on the company. Tax years 2011 and 2012. that A Oyj and A Finance NV had undertaken to reorganize the Group’s financial operations for the purpose of tax avoidance, the Group Tax Center could not, on the grounds presented, correct A Oyj’s taxation in 2011 and 2012 to the detriment of the taxpayer or impose tax increases on the company. Tax years 2011 and 2012. Click here for translation KHO-2020-35

Goodland Taiwan had sold 7 machines to a local buyer via a related party in Hongkong thus avoiding taxes on sales profits. The transaction had been audited by the Taiwanese tax administration and an assessment issued. Goodland brought the case to court. The Supreme Administrative court dismissed the appeal and upheld the assessment. “The appeal alleges that the original judgment failed to conduct an investigation, but does not specify what the original judgment found to be wrong or what specific legal norm was violated. In fact, Article 2 of the Regulations Governing the Recognition of Income from Controlled Foreign Enterprises by Profit-making Enterprises, as cited in the appeal, states that Article 3 and Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Regulations Governing the Recognition of Income from Controlled Foreign Enterprises and the Unusual Transfer Pricing Check for Business Enterprises, as cited in the appeal, are all specific to the income tax law and may not be consistent with the judgment of related parties under the business tax law. In addition, in this case, the U.S. and local companies are at least covered by the fact that the income tax of the business is not in compliance with the requirements of Article 3 and Article 4(2) of the regular transfer pricing audit. The method of recognizing the income of a controlled foreign enterprise is based on the premise that there is a difference between domestic and foreign income tax liabilities, and is not related to the determination of related parties under business tax law. It is difficult to argue that the original decision did not apply these provisions and that the application of the law was incorrect or that the reasons for the decision were inadequate.As to the statement in the appeal that “the factual findings of the original judgment are contrary to the law of civil contracts”, the reasoning of the appeal is that “the original judgment is contrary to the law of civil contracts”.It is not clear what the specific breach of the law is, as the argument is brief and vague and lacks a complete legal reasoning.3. In conclusion, the original decision is clear and detailed and there is nothing that can be said to be unlawful. The grounds of appeal, as set forth in the original judgment, are only general allegations of the application of the law, but not specific allegations of “inapplicability of the law”, “improper application of the law”, or “the circumstances listed in Article 243, Paragraph 2 of the Administrative Procedure Law”. In accordance with the preceding provisions and explanations, the appeal should be considered unlawful.” Click here for English Translation 最高行政法院109年裁字第147號裁定

At issue was the transfer of taxable assets from a shareholder to a 100% owned company, “VSR Inc”. This transfer of resulted in an understatement of profits in a controlled sale of vehicle scrapping rights. Following an audit, the tax authority concluded that the rights had been acquired in the previous quarter from the one transferred and that a sale value below cost could not be justified. According to the tax authorities the arrangement lacked economic or commercial substance. The sole purpose had been to lower the overall taxation. An revised tax assessment – and a substantial fine – was issued by the tax authorities. VSR filed an appeal. Judgement of the Court The court dismissed the appeal and decided in favor of the tax authorities. “Since it is apparent from the above that the above transactions were intended to transfer taxable material from the applicant’s sole proprietorship to the associated company under the name of ” “, TIN and to tax them at a lower average tax rate, all the above transactions are therefore artificial arrangements which are not consistent with normal business behaviour and lead to a significant tax advantage without any assumption of business risk on the part of ” “, TIN Because, for each of the 2005 withdrawal rights, which is identical to a vehicle registration number, the tax authority identified the corresponding purchase document and determined the total acquisition value of these rights at the amount of six hundred and six thousand one hundred and sixty euros (€ 606,160.00), i.e. an average acquisition price per withdrawal right of € 302.32. Consequently, the taxable amount transferred, in the form of an artificial arrangement, from the applicant’s sole proprietorship to the associated company with the name ” “, VAT number , amounts to € 405,580.00 (€ 606,160.00 – € 200,580.00). In the light of the foregoing, the applicant’s claims concerning the tax authority’s unsubstantiated assessment of the existence of artificial arrangements and the absence of the element of intention are rejected as unfounded. Since the public administration is bound by the principle of legality, as laid down in Article 26(1)(b) of the Staff Regulations, the Commission is bound by the principle of proportionality. 2, 43, 50, 50, 82, 83 and 95 & 1 of the Constitution (Council of State 8721/1992, Council of State 2987/1994), which implies that the administration must or may take only those actions provided for and imposed or permitted by the rules laid down by the Constitution, legislative acts, administrative regulatory acts adopted on the basis of legislative authorisation, as well as by any rule of higher or equivalent formal force to them. Since the review of constitutionality is a matter for the courts and does not fall within the competence of the administrative bodies, which are required to apply the existing legislative framework, it is inadmissible and is not being examined in the context of the present action. Consequently, the applicant’s allegation of a breach of the principle of economic freedom in Article 5 of the Constitution, the principle of proportionality in Article 25 para. 1 of the Constitution and the requirements of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is rejected as being unfounded. Because the applicant’s claim that the excess amount already paid by ” “, TIN, as income tax (EUR 118 073,21) should be deducted from the income tax assessed on the applicant’s sole proprietorship, TIN, is rejected as unfounded in substance and in law, since there is no relevant provision in the tax legislation providing for such a deduction. With regard to the individual claim that the amount of the income difference found by the audit for his sole proprietorship of € 405,580.00 should be added to the expenses of the I.C.E., this is a matter that should be raised and dealt with by the I.C.E., which is a separate tax entity, and not by the applicant as a natural person, and is therefore irrelevant. “ Click here for English translation Click here for other translation 2631-2019

Azot is a producer of mineral fertilizers and one of the largest industrial groups in Ukraine. Following an audit the tax authorities concluded that Azot’s export of mineral fertilizers to a related party in Switzerland, NF Trading AG, had been priced significantly below the arm’s length price, and moreover that Azot’s import of natural gas from Russia via a related party in Cyprus, Ostchem Holding Limited, had been priced significantly above the arm’s length price. On that basis, an assessment of additional corporate income tax in the amount of 43 million UAH and a decrease in the negative value by 195 million UAH was issued. The Court ruled in favor of the tax authorities. Click here for translation UK v Az 2019

A Swiss company manufactured and distributed pharmaceutical and chemical products. The Swiss company was held by a Dutch parent that held another company in France. R&D activities were delegated by the Dutch parent to its French subsidiary and compensated with cost plus 15%. On that basis the Swiss company had to pay a royalty to its Dutch parent of 2.5% of its turnover for using the IP developed. Following an audit the Swiss tax authorities concluded that the Dutch parent did not contribute to the development of IP. In 2006 and 2007, no employees were employed, and in 2010 and 2011 there were only three employees. Hence the royalty agreement was disregarded and an assessment issued where the royalty payments were denied. Instead the R&D agreement between the Dutch parent and the French subsidiary was regarded as having been concluded between the Swiss and French companies Judgement of the Supreme Court The Court agreed with the decision of the tax authorities. The Dutch parent was a mere shell company with no substance. Hence, the royalty agreement was disregarded and replaced with the cost plus agreement with the French subsidiary. The Court found that it must have been known to the taxpayer that a company without substance could not be entitled to profits of the R&D activities. On that basis an amount equal to 75% of the evaded tax had therefore rightly been imposed as a penalty. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation 2C_11-2018

Following an audit of “Cyprus Corp” for FY 2011, the tax authorities found that the intra-group purchases worth 6.363.281,83 € for mechanical and medical equipment from a group company in Cyprus, were overpriced by 3.833.503,78 €. Corporate taxation i Cyprus is significantly lower than in Greece. Hence, the overpricing resulted in the Cyprus Corp having technically increased its (high) tax depreciation in Greece and (low) tax profits in Cyprus, which in combination resulted in a lower overall tax payment of the group. An revised tax assessment – and a substantial fine – was issued by the tax authorities. Cypres Corp filed an appeal. Judgement of the Court The court predominantly decided in favor of the tax authorities. “Because, during the financial period 1/1-31/12/2011, Mr K. is a shareholder in the applicant company with a 22.81% share, chairman and managing director until 23/08/2011 and from 30/06/2010 to 01/11/2012 the sole shareholder of the Cypriot company ” “, with the result that the transacting companies in the present case are linked by a direct relationship of direct material management, financial dependence and control. Because, the amount of 135.471,48 € declared as accounting difference with the amended Income Tax Return for the financial period 01/01/2011 – 31/12/2011 with the number and date of filing 29/05/17 in application of the provisions of Law 4446 /2016, relates to part of the total amount of depreciation of EUR 194,077.55, which the applicant carried out on the fixed assets purchased from the Cypriot company ” “, as stated in the relevant partial income tax audit report of D. O.Y.A. PATRON and is apparent from the documents No 5 and 7 lodged with the appeal, namely (over-invoicing/ value of purchases from the Cypriot company x total depreciation: € 3 833 503,78/ € 6 363 281,83 = 60,24 % X € 322 174,55 = € 194 077,95). Since the purchases of the applicant company from the Cypriot company ” “, relate to fixed capital goods on which depreciation is carried out and were not deducted as expenditure from the gross income for the financial year 2011, the profit within the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 39 of Law No 2238/1994 is made through the depreciation carried out each year on fixed assets worth € 6,363,281.83. The fifth (fifth) plea of the applicant company is therefore accepted, all the others being rejected.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation 1109-2018

CF (Pvt) Ltd’s main business was import, distribution and marketing of motor vehicles and spare parts of a specified brand. Following an audit CF had been issued a tax assessment related to the transfer pricing and VAT – import prices, management fees, audit costs etc. Judgement of the High Court The High Court issued a decision predominantly in favor of the tax authorities. In its judgement, the court stated that either the general deduction provision under section 15 (2) or section 24 or section 98 of the Income Tax Act could be employed to deal with transfer pricing matters. Excerpts: “It seems to me that the unsupported persistent assertions maintained by the appellant even after the concession of 14 November 2014 were indicative of both corporate moral dishonesty and a lack of good faith. I therefore find that the appellant through the mind of its management evinced the intention to evade the payment of the correct amount of tax as contemplated by s 46 (6) of the Income Tax Act by claiming the deduction of management fees paid to the intermediary, who was not entitled to such fees. The Court or the Commissioner have no option but to impose a 100% penalty. The penalty imposed by the Commissioner is accordingly confirmed.” “It seems to me that the Commissioner may very well have been justified in invoking the provisions of s 24 of the Income Tax Act by the acts of commission and omission of the appellant in respect of both management fees and goods in transit at the time he did. However, in accordance with the provisions of s 65 (12) of the Income Tax Act I did not find the claim of the Commissioner unreasonable even in respect of the interest issue that the Commissioner conceded at the eleventh hour or the grounds of appeal frivolous. I will therefore make no order of costs against either party other than that each party is to bear its own costs. Disposal Accordingly, it is ordered that: 1. The amended assessments number 20211442 for the year ending 31 December 2009, 20211443 for the year ending 31 December 2010, 202211446 for the year ending 31 December 2011 and 20211448 for the year ending 31 December 2012 that were issued against the appellant by the respondent on 27 June 2014 are hereby set aside. 2. The Commissioner is directed to issue further amended assessments against the appellant in respect of each year of assessment in compliance with this judgment and in doing so shall: a. Add back to income 7% interest on the cost of services rendered by the appellant for the consignment stock in transit to Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania in the sum of US$2 240 for 2009, US$ 2 505.87 for 2010, US$ 2 198.13 for 2011 and US$3 273.20 for 2012 tax years, respectively. b. Add back to income management fees that were deducted by the appellant in each year in the sum of US$130 000 for 2009, US$140 000 for 2010, US$ 256 629 for 2011 and US$ 140 000 for 2012 tax year, respectively. c. Bring to income the provisions for leave pay in the sum of US$10 000 for 2009, US$ 9 960 for 2010, US$2 049 for 2011 and US$ 491 for 2012 tax year. d. Bring to income provisions for audit fees in the sum of US$ 10 199.17 for 2009, US$12 372 for 2010, US$10 575 for 2011 and US$ 1 260 for the 2012 tax year, respectively. e. Discharge the notional interest he sought to impose on loans and advances made to ADI and GS, respectively. 3. The appellant is to pay 100% additional tax on management fees, 4. The appellant shall pay additional penalties of 10% in respect of leave pay and audit fee provisions. 5. The tax amnesty application is dismissed. 6. Each party shall bear its own costs.” Click here for other translation 2018-zwhhc-99

Following an audit of “Cyprus Corp” for FY 2011, the tax authorities found that intra-group purchases worth 5.947.034,44 € for mechanical and medical equipment from a related company in Cyprus, were overpriced by 3.693.150,15 €. Corporate taxation i Cyprus is significantly lower than in Greece. Hence, the overpricing resulted in the Cyprus Corp having technically increased its (high) tax depreciation in Greece and (low) tax profits in Cyprus, which in combination resulted in a lower overall tax payment of the group. An revised tax assessment – and a substantial fine – was issued by the tax authorities. Cypres Corp filed an appeal. Judgement of the Court The court predominantly decided in favor of the tax authorities. “Because, in the financial period 1/1-31/12/2011 Mr. is a shareholder in the applicant company with a 28.18% share, and from 30/06/2010 to 01/11/2012 the sole shareholder of the Cypriot company ‘……. “, with the result that the transacting undertakings in the present case are linked by a relationship of direct and substantial management, economic dependence and control. Because, the amount of 156.920,37 € declared as accounting difference with the amended Income Tax Return for the financial period 01/01/2011-31/12/2011 with the number of the first day and date of filing 29/05/17 in application of the provisions of Law No. 4446/2016, relates to part of the total amount of depreciation of 176.684,43, which the applicant carried out on the fixed assets purchased from the Cypriot company ‘………. “, as stated in the relevant partial income tax audit report of the D.O.Y.A. PATRON and as shown in the documents No 5 and 7 filed with the appeal, namely (Over-invoicing/value of purchases from the Cypriot company x total depreciation: € 3,693,150.15/ € 5,947,034.44 = 62.1 % X € 284,515.99 = € 176,684.43). Since the applicant company’s purchases from the Cypriot company ‘………. “, relate to fixed capital goods on which depreciation is carried out, and were not deducted as expenditure from the gross income for the financial year 2011, the profit within the meaning of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 39 of Law No 2238/1994 is made through the depreciation carried out each year on fixed assets worth € 5,947,034.44. The fifth (5th) plea of the applicant company is therefore accepted, all the others being rejected. Since, as regards the fine under Article 39(7) of Law No. 2238/1994, the Act imposing the fine No. /2017 was correctly imposed and is confirmed.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation 417-2018 ORG

“Paper Trading B.V.” was active in the business of buying and selling paper. The paper was purchased (mostly) in Finland, and sold in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Germany. The purchasing and selling activities were carried out by the director of Paper Trading B.V. “Mr. O” who was also the owner of all shares in the company. In 1994, Mr. O set up a company in Switzerland “Paper Trader A.G”. The appointed director of “Paper Trader A.G” was a certified tax advisor, accountant, and trustee, who also acted as director of various other companies registered at the same address. The Swiss director took care of administration, correspondence, invoicing and corporate tax compliance. A couple of years later, part of the purchasing and selling of the paper was now carried out through “Paper Trader A.G”. However, Mr. O proved to be highly involved in activities on behalf of “Paper Trader A.G”, and the purchase and sale of its paper. Mr. O was not employed by “Paper Trader A.G”, nor did he receive any instructions from the company. From witness statements quoted by the Court in the context of a criminal investigation, it followed that Mr. O de facto ran “Paper Trader A.G” like Paper Trading B.V. Mr. O decided on a case-by-case basis whether a specific transaction was carried out by either one of the companies. Moreover, both companies had the same suppliers of paper, paper products, logistics providers and buyers. The only difference was the method of invoicing and payment. The tax authorities issued additional corporate income tax assessments for fiscal years 1996, 1997 and 1998. For fiscal year 1999, the tax authorities issued a corporate income tax assessment that deviated from the corporate income tax return filed by Paper Trading B.V. These decisions were appealed at the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam (the Court). Ruling The Court considered it plausible that the attribution of profit was not based on commercial consideration, but motivated by the interest of the Mr O. The aim was to siphon a (large) part of the revenue achieved from trading activities from the tax base in the Netherlands. The Court of Appeal ruled that the income generated by Paper Trader A.G had to be accounted for at the level of the Paper Trading B.V. For administrative services, Paper Trader A.G was entitled to a cost plus remuneration of 15%. Certain expenses could not be included in the cost basis, such as factoring and insurance fees. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court confirmed the ruling. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ECLI_NL_PHR_2011_BT8777

This case is about extensive tax evasion set up by the tax manager of the Asian Agri Group. According to the tax authorities income from export sales had been manipulated. Products were sent directly to the end buyer, whereas the invoices recorded that the products were first sold to companies in Hong Kong and then sold to a company in Macau or the British Virgin Islands before they were finally sold to the end buyer. The intermediary companies were proven to have been used only for the purpose of lowering the taxable income by under-invoicing the sales prices compared to the sales price to the end buyer. Various fees had also been deducted from the companies income to further lower the tax payment. These included a “Jakarta fee”, a Hedging fee and a Management fee. Judgement of the Supreme Court The court ruled that the tax manager was guilty of submitting an incorrect or incomplete tax return. On that basis the tax manager was sentenced to a probationary imprisonment for two years on condition that, within one year, Asian Agri Group’s 14 affiliated companies paid a fine of twice the underpaid tax amount – 2 x Rp. 1.259.977.695.652,- = Rp. 2.519.955.391.304,-. Click here for translation (Hundreds of pages from the judgement containing lists of thousands of invoices and payments have been omitted in the translated version) putusan_2239_k_pid.sus_2012_20220425

The Brazilian group Marcopolo assembles bus bodies in Brazil for export. It used two related offshore companies, Marcopolo International Corporation, domiciled in the British Virgin Islands, and Ilmot International Corporation, domiciled in Uruguay, in a re-invoicing arrangement whereby the product was shipped from Marcopolo to the final customers but the final invoice to the customers was issued by the offshore companies. The tax authorities found that the arrangement lacked business purpose and economic substance and, on this basis, disregarded the transactions. Decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal The Court ruled in favour of Marcopolo. According to the Court, the transactions with the offshore companies had a business purpose and were therefore legitimate tax planning. Excerpts “6. The absence of an operational structure of the companies controlled by the Appellant, capable of supporting the transactions performed, even if, in isolation, it could be admitted within the scope of a “rational organization of the economic activity”, in the case at hand, gains greater significance because a) it constituted only one of the elements within a broad set of evidence presented by the tax authority; b) considering the size of the business undertaken (voluminous export), such absence cannot be such that one can even speculate on the very factual existence of such companies; and c) there is no effective evidence in the case records of the performance of the transactions of purchase and resale of products by such companies; 7. even if it can be admitted that the results earned abroad by the companies MIC and ILMOT were, by equity equivalence, reflected in its accounting, the Appellant does not prove having paid Income Tax and Social Contribution on Net Profits on those same results, thus not contradicting the arguments presented by the tax authority authorizing such conclusion; 8. There is no dispute in this case that a Brazilian transnational company cannot see, in addition to tax benefits, other reasons for conducting its operations through offshore financial centres. What is actually at issue is that, when asked to prove (with proper and suitable documentation) that its controlled companies effectively acquired and resold its products, the Appellant does not submit even a single document capable of effectively revealing a commercial relation between its controlled companies and the end recipients of said products; 9. it is also not disputed that the Brazilian economic environment, especially in the year submitted to the tax audit, is likely to lead to higher costs for national companies operating abroad, both in relation to competitors from developed countries, and in relation to competitors from other emerging countries. What is being questioned is that, specifically in the situation being examined herein, at no time did the Appellant at all materialize such costs, demonstrating on documents, by way of example, that in a given export transaction, if the transaction were effected directly, the cost would be X, the profit would be Y, and the tax paid would be Z, whereas, due to the form adopted, the cost would be X – n, the profit would be Y + m, and the tax paid represented Z + p. No, what the Appellant sought to demonstrate is that, considering a historical series of its exports, there was a significant increase in its revenues and, consequently, in the taxes paid. As already stated, if a significant capitalization of funds through evasive methods is admitted, no other result could be expected. (…) Thus, considering everything in the case records, I cast my vote in the sense of: a) dismissing the ex-officio appeal; b) partially granting the voluntary appeal in order to fully exempt the tax credit related to the withholding income tax, fully upholding the other assessments.” “I verify that, when doing business with companies or individuals located in Countries with Favorable Tax Treatment, the legislation adopted minimum parameters of values to be considered in exports; and maximum parameters in values to be considered in payments made abroad, under the same criteria adopted for transfer pricing. Here, it is important to highlight that the legislation did not equalize the concepts of business carried out with people located in Countries with Favorable Tax Regime and transfer pricing. What the law did was to equalize the criteria to control both, but for conceptually distinct operations. Thus, based on the assumption that Brazilian law specifically deals in its legislation, by means of a specific anti-avoidance rule, with transactions carried out with companies in countries with a favored tax regime, I cannot see how one can intend to disregard the transactions carried out by a Brazilian company with its foreign subsidiaries, since these are deemed to be offshore companies in the respective countries where they are incorporated. In fact, every country with a Favorable Tax Regime has, as a presupposition, the existence of offshore companies, in which the activities are limited to foreign business. In the case at hand, there are two wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Appellant, namely, MIC – Marcopolo International Corporation, located in the British Virgin Islands, and ILMOT International Corporation S.A., incorporated as an investment finance corporation – SAFI, in Uruguay. From what can be extracted from the case records, the deals carried out by the Appellant with the final purchasers of the products were intermediated by both companies, and the tax assessment charged, as income of the Appellant, the final values of the deals carried out by those intermediary companies with the purchasers abroad. However, this was not the legal treatment given by Brazilian law to business deals made with offshore companies established in Countries with a Favorable Tax Regime. Law 9430/96 is limited to checking whether the price charged is supported by the criteria set out in articles 18 to 22 thereof; once such minimum parameters are met, the business plan made by the taxpayer must be respected. Therefore, in this case, I believe that the Tax Authorities could not disregard the business carried out by the Appellant with its wholly-owned subsidiaries beyond what Law 9430/96 provides for the hypothesis of companies located in Countries

At issue in this case was whether Belgian arm’s length provision in article 344 infringed Article 170 of the Belgian constitution, according to which a tax in favor of the State may only be introduced by law. “Does Article 344(1) of the Income Tax Code 1992, in the version applicable to the assessment years 1996, 1997 and 1998, infringe Article 170 of the Constitution, in particular Article 1 of that article, which provides that a tax for the benefit of the State may be introduced only by a law, in that Article 344(1) gives the executive authority the task of determining the taxable circumstances or at least makes it possible to determine taxable circumstances either by means of a standard to be laid down by the State itself or by means of a blank form to be filled in?» The Decision of the CourtIn accordance with the principle of legality in tax matters, as set out in Article 170(1) of the Constitution, a person may be subject to a tax only if it has been decided by a democratically elected consultative assembly which alone has the power to introduce that tax. The legislature itself has laid down the strict conditions, set out in B.3.2 to B.3.5, under which the measure referred to in Article 344(1) of the 1992 Income Tax Code may be applied in order to achieve a legitimate objective, namely to combat tax avoidance, without however affecting the principle that the least taxed option may be chosen (B.3.1). The measure cannot be regarded as a general enabling provision which would allow the administration to determine the taxable object itself by means of a general measure, but as a means of evidence to assess specific situations individually in specific cases, if necessary, under the control of the judge. In this case, the constitutional principle of legality in tax matters does not require the legislature to specify in greater detail the substantive conditions for the application of the measure, since this is impossible by the very nature of the phenomenon it is intended to combat. For these reasons the court finds that article 344(1) of the Income Tax Code 1992 does not infringe Article 170 § Section 1 of the Constitution. Click here for translation Belgium Brepols 241104 nr. 188-2004 2004-188d

The first rulings where the IRS proposed recharacterizing transactions that could be considered abusive through use of transfer pricing provisions. Judgement of the Supreme Court The court instead applied the general anti-abuse doctrine. “It is earnestly contended on behalf of the taxpayer that, since every element required by the foregoing subdivision (B) is to be found in what was done, a statutory reorganization was effected, and that the motive of the taxpayer thereby to escape payment of a tax will not alter the result or make unlawful what the statute allows. It is quite true that, if a reorganization in reality was effected within the meaning of subdivision (B), the ulterior purpose mentioned will be disregarded. The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted. United States v. Isham, 17 Wall. 496, 84 U. S. 506; Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390, 280 U. S. 395-396; Jones v. Helvering, 63 App.D.C. 204, 71 F.2d 214, 217. But the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended. The reasoning of the court below in justification of a negative answer leaves little to be said. When subdivision (B) speaks of a transfer of assets by one corporation to another, it means a transfer made “in pursuance of a plan of reorganization” [§ 112(g)] of corporate business, and not a transfer of assets by one corporation to another in pursuance of a plan having no relation to the business of either, as plainly is the case here. Putting aside, then, the question of motive in respect of taxation altogether, and fixing the character of the proceeding by what actually occurred, what do we find? Simply an operation having no business or corporate purpose — a mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the petitioner. No doubt, a new and valid corporation was created. But that corporation was nothing more than a contrivance to the end last described. It was brought into existence for no other purpose; it performed, as it was intended from the beginning it should perform, no other function. When that limited function had been exercised, it immediately was put to death. In these circumstances, the facts speak for themselves, and are susceptible of but one interpretation. The whole undertaking, though conducted according to the terms of subdivision (B), was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else. The rule which excludes from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, because the transaction, upon its face, lies outside the plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.” Click here for translation US Supreme Court Gregory v Helvering 293 U.S. 465 (1935)