Maersk Oil and Gas A/S (later TotalEnergies EP Danmark A/S) continued to make operating losses, although the group’s combined oil and gas operations were highly profitable. Following an audit of Maersk Oil, the tax authorities considered that three items did not comply with the arm’s length principle. Maersk Oil incurred all the expenses for preliminary studies of where oil and gas could be found, but the results of these investigations and discoveries were handed over to the newly established subsidiaries free of charge. Licence agreements were signed with Qatar and Algeria for oil extraction. These agreements were entered into with the subsidiaries as contracting parties, but it was Maersk Oil that guaranteed that the subsidiaries could fulfil their obligations and committed to make the required technology and know-how available. Expert assistance (time writing) was provided to the subsidiaries, but these services were remunerated at cost with no profit to Maersk Oil. An assessment was issued where additional taxable income was determined on an aggregated basis as a share of profits from the activities – corresponding to a royalty of approximately 1,7 % of the turnover in the two subsidiaries. In 2018, the Tax Court upheld the decision and Maersk Oil and Gas A/S subsequently appealed to the High Court. In 2022, the High Court held that the subsidiaries in Algeria and Qatar owned the licences for oil extraction, both formally and in fact. In this regard, there was therefore no transaction. Furthermore the explorations studies in question were not completed until the 1990s and Maersk Oil and Gas A/S had not incurred any costs for the subsequent phases of the oil extraction. These studies therefore did not constitute controlled transactions. The Court therefore found no basis for an annual remuneration in the form of royalties or profit shares from the subsidiaries in Algeria and Qatar. On the other hand, the Regional Court found that Maersk Oil and Gas A/S’ so-called performance guarantees for the subsidiaries in Algeria and Qatar were controlled transactions and should therefore be priced at arm’s length. In addition, the Court found that technical and administrative assistance (so-called time writing) to the subsidiaries in Algeria and Qatar at cost was not in line with what could have been obtained if the transactions had been concluded between independent parties. These transactions should therefore also be priced at arm’s length. The High Court referred the cases back to the tax authorities for reconsideration. An appeal was then filed by the tax authorities with the Supreme Court. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court decided in favour of the tax authorities and upheld the original assessment. The court stated that the preliminary exploration phases in connection with oil exploration and performance guarantees and the related know-how had an economic value for the subsidiaries, for which an independent party would require ongoing payment in the form of profit share, royalty or the like. They therefore constituted controlled transactions. Furthermore, the court stated that Maersk Oil and Gas A/S’ delivery of timewriting at cost price was outside the scope of what could have been achieved if the agreement had been entered into at arm’s length. Finally, the transactions were considered to be so closely related that they had to be assessed and priced on an aggregated basis and Maersk Oil and Gas A/S had not provided any basis for overturning the tax authorities’ assessment. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

A Danish parent in the Maersk group’s oil and gas segment, Maersk Oil and Gas A/S (Mogas), had operating losses for FY 1986 to 2010, although the combined segment was highly profitable. The reoccurring losses was explained by the tax authorities as being a result of the group’s transfer pricing setup. “Mogas and its subsidiaries and branches are covered by the definition of persons in Article 2(1) of the Tax Act, which concerns group companies and permanent establishments abroad, it being irrelevant whether the subsidiaries and branches form part of local joint ventures. Mogas bears the costs of exploration and studies into the possibility of obtaining mining licences. The expenditure is incurred in the course of the company’s business of exploring for oil and gas deposits. The company is entitled to deduct the costs in accordance with Section 8B(2) of the Danish Income Tax Act. Mogas is responsible for negotiating licences and the terms thereof and for bearing the costs incurred in this connection. If a licence is obtained, subsequent expenditure is borne by a subsidiary or branch thereof, and this company or branch receives all revenue from extraction. Mogas shall ensure that the obligations under the licence right towards the State concerned (or a company established by the State for this purpose) and the contract with the independent joint venture participants are fulfilled by the local Mogas subsidiary or permanent establishment. Mogas has revenues from services provided to the subsidiaries, etc. These services are remunerated at cost. This business model means that Mogas will never make a profit from its operations. It must be assumed that the company would not enter into such a business model with independent parties. It should be noted that dividend income is not considered to be business income.” According to the tax authorities Mogas had provided know-how etc. to the subsidiaries in Algeria and Qatar and had also incurred expenses in years prior to the establishment of these subsidiaries. This constituted controlled transactions covered by the danish arm’s length provisions. Hence an estimated assessment was issued in which the additional income corresponded to a royalty rate of approximately 1,7 % of the turnover in the two subsidiaries. In 2018, the Tax Court upheld the decisions and Mogas subsequently appealed to the regional courts. Judgment of the Regional Court The Regional Court held that the subsidiaries in Algeria and Qatar owned the licences for oil extraction, both formally and in fact. In this regard, there was therefore no transaction. Furthermore the explorations studies in question were not completed until the 1990s and Mogas had not incurred any costs for the subsequent phases of the oil extraction. These studies therefore did not constitute controlled transactions. The Court therefore found no basis for an annual remuneration in the form of royalties or profit shares from the subsidiaries in Algeria and Qatar. On the other hand, the Regional Court found that Mogas’s so-called performance guarantees for the subsidiaries in Algeria and Qatar were controlled transactions and should therefore be priced at arm’s length. In addition, the Court found that technical and administrative assistance (so-called time writing) to the subsidiaries in Algeria and Qatar at cost was not in line with what could have been obtained if the transactions had been concluded between independent parties. These transactions should therefore also be priced at arm’s length. As a result, the Court referred the cases back to the tax authorities for reconsideration. Excerpts “It can be assumed that MOGAS’s profit before financial items and tax in the period 1986-2010 has essentially been negative, including in the income years in question 2006-2008, whereas MOGAS’s profit including financial items, including dividends, in the same period has been positive, and the Regional Court accepts that income from dividends cannot be regarded as business income in the sense that dividends received by MOGAS as owner do not constitute payment for transactions covered by section 2 of the Tax Act. However, the Regional Court considers that the fact that MOGAS’s profit before financial items and tax for the period 1986-2010 has been essentially negative cannot in itself justify allowing the tax authorities to make a discretionary assessment.” “As stated above, the performance guarantees provided by MOGAS and the technical and administrative assistance (timewriting) provided by MOGAS constitute controlled transactions covered by Article 2 of the Tax Code. The performance guarantees, which are provided free of charge to the benefit of the subsidiaries, are not mentioned in the transfer pricing documentation, and the Regional Court considers that this provides grounds for MOGAS’s income relating to the performance guarantees to be assessed on a discretionary basis pursuant to Section 3 B(8) of the Tax Control Act currently in force, cf. Section 5(3).” “Already because MOGAS neither participates in a joint venture nor acts as an operator in relation to oil extraction in Algeria and Qatar, the Court considers that MOGAS’ provision of technical and administrative assistance to the subsidiaries is not comparable to the stated industry practice or MOGAS’ provision of services to DUC, where MOGAS acts as an operator. Against this background, the Regional Court considers that the Ministry of Taxation has established that MOGAS’ provision of technical and administrative assistance (timewriting) to the subsidiaries at cost price is outside the scope of what could have been obtained if the agreement had been concluded between independent parties, cf. tax act Section 2 (1).” Only part of the decision have been published. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

K-GAS Corp had issued loans and performance guarantees to overseas subsidiaries but received no remuneration in return. The tax authorities issued an assessment where additional taxable income was determined by application of the arm’s length principle. An appeal was filed by K-GAS with the district court. Decision of the Court The court upheld the decision of the tax authorities and dismissed the appeal of K-GAS Corp. Excerpts related to loans “In light of the following circumstances, which can be known by the above acknowledged facts, in light of the above legal principles, it is not economically reasonable for the Plaintiff to decide not to receive interest on the self-financing portion of the case loan to the subsidiaries in question 1 until the end of the exploration phase, and there is no illegality in the method of calculating the normal price of the Defendant. … …the Plaintiff lent the money raised from the outside to the subsidiaries in the first issue, and in this type of financial transaction, it is the most reasonable and direct method to view the interest obtained by adding a certain profit to the borrowing interest corresponding to the procurement cost according to the cost plus method as the normal price (the Plaintiff also argued for the above effect on the normal price on the premise of ‘general loan and loan transactions’ (page 18 of the Complaint)). However, the Defendant not only calculated the normal price by applying the interest rate on the loan in this case, which is lower than the borrowing interest rate of the self-funding in this case, but also the price is lower than the interest rate calculated according to the Comparable Third Party Price Act when the Plaintiff lends funds for overseas resource development projects to Australian subsidiaries at the same time, so it cannot be considered that the normal price calculated by the Defendant exceeds the range of the price that is applied or is expected to be applied in ordinary transactions.” Excerpts related to performance guarantees “In light of the following circumstances, which can be seen by the above acknowledged facts, in the light of the legal principles seen in Paragraph (1) of A.A., it is not economically reasonable for the Plaintiff to not receive the performance guarantee fee from the subsidiaries, etc. of the third issue on the performance guarantee in this case, and there is no illegality in the method of calculating the normal price of the Defendant. … As seen earlier, the Plaintiff has received a performance guarantee fee when he/she guarantees the performance of the liability to pay the price under a gas sales contract of another overseas subsidiary or second-tier company. In cases of the performance guarantee in this case, it is deemed that there exists a reasonable ground not to receive the performance guarantee fee, in distinction from the above transaction, only a difference in the details of the principal obligation subject to the guarantee exists. The Plaintiff also explains that the above transaction is a payment guarantee for the business of an overseas subsidiary in the same position as an independent third-party company, so it is natural to receive a commission in return for the risks borne by the Plaintiff. There is no reason to deem otherwise in that the performance guarantee in this case is also for the business carried out by the subsidiary, etc., which is independent from the Plaintiff. The calculation of the reasonable performance guarantee fee by the Defendant for the provision of performance in this case is based on the risk approach that is the method of calculation of the performance guarantee fee that the Plaintiff has actually received from the overseas subsidiary, and as seen earlier, it is hard to deem that there is any illegality in the method of calculation of the reasonable performance guarantee fee by the Defendant, unless it is impossible to deem that the Plaintiff has no risk of performance guarantee in this case.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...