Institute of International Research España S.L. belongs to the international group Informa Group Brand, of which Informa PLC, a company listed on the London Stock Exchange, is the parent company. In 2006 it had entered into a licence agreement (“for the use of the Licensed Property, Copyright, Additional Property Derived Alwork, the Mark and Name of the Licensor for the sale of Research and Dissemination Services”) under which it paid 6.5% of its gross turnover to a related party in the Netherlands – Institute of International Research BV. Furthermore, in 2007 it also entered into a “Central Support Services Agreement” with its parent Informa PLC according to which it paid cost + 5% for centralised support services: management, finance, accounting, legal, financial, fiscal, audit, human resources, IT, insurance, consultancy and special services. Following an audit, the tax authorities issued assessments of additional income for the FY 2007 and 2008 in which deductions of the licence payments and cost of intra-group services had been disallowed. Not satisfied with the assessment, Institute of International Research España S.L. filed an appeal. Judgement of the Audiencia Nacional The Court decided in favor of Institute of International Research España S.L. and annulled the assessment issued by the tax authorities. Excerpts “The paid nature of the assignment of the use of the trademark in a case such as the one at hand is something that, in the opinion of the Chamber, does not offer special interpretative difficulties. We refer, for example, to the Resolution of the Central Economic-Administrative Court of 3 October 2013 (R.G.: 2296/2012), in which the presumption of onerousness contained in art. 12. 2 of Royal Legislative Decree 5/2004, of 5 March, approving the revised text of the Non-Resident Income Tax Law, to a case of assignment of the use of certain trademarks made in the framework of a complex services contract by a non-resident entity to an entity resident in Spain and in which the reviewing body declared that: “the importance of the trademark is such (and more so the ones we are now dealing with) that it would be difficult to understand in the opinion of the Inspectorate a purely “instrumental” transfer of use of the same and much less free of charge, as the claimant claims”. The differences found by the contested decision, between the case analysed in that decision and the case at issue here, do not affect the above statement. As the complaint states in this respect, ‘it is clear that this rejection of the entire cost of the use of the trademark and the other items included in the licence agreement is not market-based because the IIR group would simply not allow any third party to benefit from using its trademark to provide services without any consideration in return’. Finally, the fact that the appellant did not pay any amount for the assignment of the use of the trademark to the trademark proprietor until the licence agreement does not justify that it should not have paid it, referring on this point to what has just been reasoned. Nor can the signing of the licence agreement be considered sufficient proof, in the manner of the precise and direct link according to the rules of the human standard of proof of presumptions (art. 386.1 of Law 1/2000, of 7 January, on Civil Procedure), that by that circumstance alone it should be ruled out outright that the licence agreement has not brought any benefit or advantage to IIR España or improved its position and prestige with respect to the previous situation.” “It remains, finally, to examine the effective accreditation (or not) of the reality of these complementary services related to the assignment of the use of the trademark. Following the reasoning of the contested decision, in general terms, there would be four reasons why the justification of the reality of those services cannot be admitted. First, the invoices issued by IIR BV refer to the services provided by the parent company in a very generic manner, which makes it impossible to know the benefit or utility received in each case by the Spanish company. Moreover, the way in which these services are valued -simply referring to the turnover of the subsidiaries- does not take into account any rational criteria. Secondly, IIR España has not substantiated the nature of the alleged services received from its Dutch parent company and their differentiation from management support costs. Thirdly, IIR Spain had already been using the brand name ‘IIR’ since its acquisition by the group in 1987 without it being established that it paid a fee for this. Lastly, the Transfer Pricing Report does not serve as evidence of the nature of the costs and their valuation.” “In the Chamber’s view, we are faced with a question of proof. The tax authorities have not considered the reality of the complementary services to be proven (but not the transfer of the use of the trademark, as explained above) and the plaintiff considers that this evidentiary assessment is erroneous in light of the documents submitted to the proceedings. The Board’s assessment of the evidence adduced by the appellant (both in administrative proceedings and in the application) is favourable to the appellant’s arguments, i.e. that it is sufficient evidence to prove the reality of the ancillary services arising from the licence agreement.” “In the light of this documentation, we consider that the reality of the services ancillary to the assignment of the use of the trademark deriving from the licence agreement is sufficiently justified. It is true that, as the Administration basically states in its response, the intensity or completeness of the different services provided in relation to what is set out in the licence agreement can be discussed, but this debate is not exactly the same as the one we are dealing with here, which consists of deciding whether the additional services in question were actually provided or not. In the Board’s view, the documentary evidence cited above proves that they were and that the licence agreement ...