Ikea France (SNC MIF) had concluded a franchise agreement with Inter Ikea Systems BV (IIS BV) in the Netherlands by virtue of which it benefited, in particular, as a franchisee, from the right to operate the ‘Ikea Retail System’ (the Ikea concept), the ‘Ikea Food System’ (food sales) and the ‘Ikea Proprietary Rights’ (the Ikea trade mark) in its shops. In return, Ikea France paid Inter Ikea Systems BV a franchise fee equal to 3% of the amount of net sales made in France, which amounted to EUR 68,276,633 and EUR 72,415,329 for FY 2010 and 2011. These royalties were subject to the withholding tax provided for in the provisions of Article 182 B of the French General Tax Code, but under the terms of Article 12 of the Convention between France and the Netherlands: “1. Royalties arising in one of the States and paid to a resident of the other State shall be taxable only in that other State”, the term “royalties” meaning, according to point 2. of this Article 12, “remuneration of any kind paid for the use of, or the right to use, (…) a trade mark (…)”. As the franchise fees paid by Ikea France to Inter Ikea Systems BV were taxable in the Netherlands, Ikea France was not obligated to pay withholding taxes provided for by the provisions of Article 182 B of the General Tax Code. However, the tax authorities held that the arrangement set up by the IKEA group constituted abuse of law and furthermore that Inter Ikea Systems BV was not the actual beneficiary of the franchise fees paid by Ikea France. On that basis, an assessment for the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 was issued according to which Ikea France was to pay additional withholding taxes and late payment interest in an amount of EUR 95 mill. The court of first instance decided in favor of Ikea and the tax authorities then filed an appeal with the CAA of Versailles. Judgement of the CAA of Versailles The Court of appeal upheld the decision of the court of first instance and decided in favor of IKEA. Excerpt “It follows from the foregoing that the Minister, who does not establish that the franchise agreement concluded between SNC MIF and the company IIS BV corresponds to an artificial arrangement with the sole aim of evading the withholding tax, by seeking the benefit of the literal application of the provisions of the Franco-Dutch tax convention, is not entitled to maintain that the administration could implement the procedure for abuse of tax law provided for in Article L. 64 of the tax procedure book and subject to the withholding tax provided for in Article 182 B of the general tax code the royalties paid by SNC MIF by considering them as having directly benefited the Interogo foundation. On the inapplicability alleged by the Minister of the stipulations of Article 12 of the tax convention without any reference to an abusive arrangement: If the Minister maintains that, independently of the abuse of rights procedure, the provisions of Article 12 of the tax treaty are not applicable, it does not follow from the investigation, for the reasons set out above, that IIS BV is not the actual beneficiary of the 70% franchise fees paid by SAS MIF. It follows from all of the above that the Minister is not entitled to argue that it was wrongly that, by the contested judgment, the Versailles Administrative Court granted SAS MIF the restitution of an amount of EUR 95,912,185 corresponding to the withholding taxes payable by it, in duties, increases and late payment interest, in respect of the financial years ended in 2010 and 2011. Consequently, without there being any need to examine its subsidiary conclusions regarding increases, its request must be rejected.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The tax administration had issued an adjustment to the taxable profit of IKEA’s subsidiary in Spain considering that taxable profit in years 2007, 2008, and 2009 had not been determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle. In 2007 taxable profits had been below the interquartile range and in 2008 and 2009 taxable profits had been within the interquartile range but below the median. In all years taxable profits had been adjusted to the median in the benchmark study. Judgement of the Court In regards to the adjustment mechanism – benchmark study, interquartile range, median – the Court provide the following reasoning “However, the OECD Guidelines in point 3.60 provide that “if the relevant terms of the controlled transaction (e.g. price or margin) are within the arm’s length range, no adjustment is necessary”. Conversely, under rule 3.61, if the relevant terms of the controlled transaction “(e.g., price or margin) are outside the arm’s length range determined by the tax administration, the taxpayer should be given the opportunity to argue how the terms of the controlled transaction satisfy the arm’s length principle, and whether the result falls within the arm’s length range (i.e., that the arm’s length range is different from the arm’s length range determined by the tax administration). If the taxpayer is unable to demonstrate these facts, the tax administration must determine the point within the arm’s length range to which to adjust the condition of the controlled transaction”. And, finally, rule 3.62 provides: “In determining this point, where the range comprises highly reliable and relatively equal results, it may be argued that any one of them satisfies the arm’s length principle. Where some defects in comparability persist, as discussed in paragraph 3.57, it may be appropriate to use measures of central tendency to determine this point (e.g. median, mean or weighted mean, depending on the specific characteristics of the data) in order to minimise the risk of error caused by defects in comparability that persist but are not known or cannot be quantified”. In the Board’s view, the appellant should be upheld on this point. Indeed, as we have indicated, the Inspectorate was consistent, it gave the same treatment to the 2007 and 2008 financial years, as it understood that it should apply the median of 4.1%, in accordance with point 3.62 of the Guideline, it was appropriate to use measures of central tendency such as the median, specifically because it considered that “the study has comparability defects given that the companies included in the samples have lower sales volumes” – p. 38 of the Ruling. 38 of the Resolution. Logically, the circumstances justifying the use of the median were valid for both 2007 and 2008, as the reasons were the same. However, the TEAC, starting from the fact that the Inspectorate assumes the opinion of PwC, affirms that the data obtained will never be perfectly reliable, not being congruent “that the sample is used as an analysis of comparability as well as to extract data on which the regularisation itself is based, to then be rejected for the effect that could be favourable to the interested party, such as for the application of rule 3.60 of the aforementioned Guidelines, which excludes adjustments when they are within the range”. Therefore, it annulled the Agreement on this point, as the entity was within the range, remember that the interquartile range was between 2.1% and 7.6% and in 2008 it was at 2.42%. In other words, for the TEAC it was not possible to apply the rule of art. 3.62 on which the Tax Inspectorate based itself, because in 2008, the company was within the margins required by art. 3.60, which was not the case in 2007. However, in our opinion it is clear that if the ROS is outside the limits of the inter-quantile range, the corresponding adjustment must be made, as only from 2.1 % onwards is the company within the comparable market margins. However, in order to apply the median, there must also be “comparability defects”, and if these did not exist for 2008, for the same reason they did not exist for 2007 either. It should be noted that, in response to the arguments of the Inspectorate which argued that there were defects of comparability, the TEAC states that “a difference in the volume of sales is not sufficient reason to reject the validity of the report… The fact that the entity being verified occupies a leading position within its sector due to its sales volume does not in itself cause a lack of comparability – p. 40 TEAC Resolution-. In short, it seems to us that, once it has been determined that the appellant’s ROS in the year under discussion is outside the lowest inter-quantile range – 2.1% – it is indeed appropriate to make the corresponding adjustment. However, the fact that that is the case does not, without more, allow the median to be applied in the terms provided for in Rule 3.62, since the application of that rule is not justified by the fact of being outside the range of full competence, but by the existence of ‘comparability defects’, which, according to the arguments of the TEAC itself, were not the case in 2008 and, by extension, would not be the case in relation to 2007 either. The plea is upheld, since the Board agrees, with the applicant, that the adjustment should have been made on 2.1% and not 4.1%. It is not necessary, therefore, to analyse whether the median of the interquantile range should have been used instead of the median of the sample.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

The European Commission has opened an in-depth investigation into the Netherlands’ tax treatment of Inter IKEA, one of the two groups operating the IKEA business. The Commission has concerns that two Dutch tax rulings may have allowed Inter IKEA to pay less tax and given them an unfair advantage over other companies, in breach of EU State aid rules. Commissioner Margrethe Vestager in charge of competition policy said: “All companies, big or small, multinational or not, should pay their fair share of tax. Member States cannot let selected companies pay less tax by allowing them to artificially shift their profits elsewhere. We will now carefully investigate the Netherlands’ tax treatment of Inter IKEA.” In the early 1980s, the IKEA business model changed into a franchising model. Since then, it has been the Inter IKEA group that operates the franchise business of IKEA, using the “IKEA franchise concept”. What this means more concretely is that Inter IKEA does not own the IKEA shops. All IKEA shops worldwide pay a franchise fee of 3% of their turnover to Inter IKEA Systems, a subsidiary of Inter IKEA group in the Netherlands. In return, the IKEA shops are entitled to use inter alia the IKEA trademark, and receive know-how to operate andexploit the IKEA franchise concept. Thus, Inter IKEA Systems in the Netherlands records all revenue from IKEA franchise fees worldwide collected from the IKEA shops. The Commission’s investigation concerns the tax treatment of Inter IKEA Systems in the Netherlands since 2006. Our preliminary inquiries indicate that two tax rulings, granted by the Dutch tax authorities in 2006 and 2011, have significantly reduced Inter IKEA Systems’ taxable profits in the Netherlands. The Commission has concerns that the two tax rulings may have given Inter IKEA Systems an unfair advantage compared to other companies subject to the same national taxation rules in the Netherlands. This would breach EU State aid rules. Between 2006-2011 (the 2006 tax ruling) The 2006 tax ruling endorsed a method to calculate an annual licence fee to be paid by Inter IKEA Systems in the Netherlands to another company of the Inter IKEA group called I.I. Holding, based in Luxembourg. At that time, I.I. Holding held certain intellectual property rights required for the IKEA franchise concept. These were licensed exclusively to Inter IKEA Systems. Inter IKEA Systems used these intellectual property rights to create and develop the IKEA franchise concept. In other words, it developed, enhanced and maintained the intellectual property rights. Inter IKEA Systems also managed the franchise contracts and collected the franchise fees from IKEA shops worldwide. The annual licence fee paid by Inter IKEA Systems to I.I. Holding, as endorsed by the 2006 tax ruling, made up a significant part of Inter IKEA Systems’ revenue. As a result, a significant part of Inter IKEA Systems’ franchise profits were shifted from Inter IKEA Systems to I.I. Holding in Luxembourg, where they remained untaxed. This is because I.I. Holding was part of a special tax scheme, as a result of which it was exempt from corporate taxation in Luxembourg. After 2011 (the 2011 tax ruling) In July 2006, the Commission concluded that the Luxembourg special tax scheme was illegal under EU State aid rules, and required the scheme to be fully repealed by 31 December 2010. No illegal aid needed to be recovered from I.I. Holding because the scheme was granted under a Luxembourg law from 1929, predating the EC Treaty. This is a historical element of the case and not part of the investigation opened today. However, as a result of the Commission decision I.I. Holding would have had to start paying corporate taxes in Luxembourg from 2011. In 2011, Inter IKEA changed the way it was structured. As a result, the 2006 tax ruling was no longer applicable: Inter IKEA Systems bought the intellectual property rights formerly held by I.I. Holding. To finance this acquisition, Inter IKEA Systems received an intercompany loan from its parent company in Liechtenstein. The Dutch authorities then issued a second tax ruling in 2011, which endorsed the price paid by Inter IKEA Systems for the acquisition of the intellectual property. It also endorsed the interest to be paid under the intercompany loan to the parent company in Liechtenstein, and the deduction of these interest payments from Inter IKEA Systems’ taxable profits in the Netherlands. As a result of the interest payments, a significant part of Inter IKEA Systems’ franchise profits after 2011 was shifted to its parent in Liechtenstein. The Commission’s investigation The Commission considers at this stage that the treatment endorsed in the two tax rulings may have resulted in tax benefits in favour of Inter IKEA Systems, which are not available to other companies subject to the same national taxation rules in the Netherlands. The role of EU State aid control is to ensure that Member States do not give selected companies a better tax treatment than others, via tax rulings or otherwise. More specifically, transactions between companies in a corporate group must be priced in a way that reflects economic reality. This means that the payments between two companies in the same group should be in line with arrangements that take place under comparable conditions between independent companies (so-called “arm’s length principle”). The Commission will now investigate Inter IKEA Systems’ tax treatment under both tax rulings: The Commission will assess whether the annual licence fee paid by Inter IKEA Systems to I.I. Holding, endorsed in the 2006 tax ruling, reflects economic reality. In particular, it will assess if the level of the annual licence fee reflects Inter IKEA Systems’ contribution to the franchise business; The Commission will also assess whether the price Inter IKEA Systems agreed for the acquisition of the intellectual property rights and consequently the interest paid for the intercompany loan, endorsed in the 2011 tax ruling, reflect economic reality. In particular, the Commission will assess if the acquisition price adequately reflects the contribution made by Inter IKEA Systems to the value of the franchise business, and the ...

The French tax authorities had issued an assessment for the fiscal years 2002, 2003 and 2004 related to royalty fees paid by IKEA France to foreign group companies. It was claimed that the royalty fees paid were excessive. The Court reject the position of the authorities. It had not been proven that the fees paid by IKEA France to foreign IKEA companies were excessive based on the arm’s length principle and on Article 57 of the CGI. The Court stresses the irrelevance of the comparables presented by the administration: “Considering that the nine trademarks used as comparables by the administration relate to the French market, the furniture sector and distribution methods similar to that of Ikea; that, however, as the company Ikea Holding France argues, the Minister does not give any precise indication on the content of the services rendered to the franchisees of these trademarks in return for their royalty; these trademarks are notoriously inferior to Ikea’s and they are not comparable in terms of concept, business strategy and range of products; that, furthermore, it is not disputed that the profitability of the DSIF and MIF companies is much higher than that of their competitors and that of the trademarks used as comparables by the administration; Lastly, the documents produced by Ikea Holding France show that, in the few cases where Ikea stores are not managed by Ikea group companies but by third-party franchisees, they pay the 3% franchise fee and get their supplies from wholesalers of the Ikea group; that, when purchasing directly from Ikea suppliers without going through a wholesaler of the group, they pay the 2% commission for the development and design of Ikea products and the commission of 5.5% for supplier management; that if it is not established that, in this case, they also pay the 1% commission for the coordination of supplies, this commission remunerates a service which benefits in the first place wholesalers, and not distributors;” Click here for translation ...