Tag: Economic rationality

Poland vs “E. K.”, November 2023, Administrative Court, Case No I SA/Po 25/23

On 1 February 2010, E.K. and its subsidiary, E. S.A, concluded an agreement on the transfer of E.K.’s trade marks to E. S.A. Following the transfer (on the same day), E.K. concluded with E. S.A. an agreement to grant a licence for the use of the marks in return for payment to the licensor (E. S.A.) of a monthly remuneration. In 2011, E.K. recognised as a deductible expense the royalties paid to E. S.A. According to the tax authorities this resulted in E.K. understating its corporate income tax liability for 2011. According to the tax authorities, E. S.A. did not participate in any way in the creation of revenue, with the result that the profits generated by E.K. were ‘passed on’ in the form of royalties to a related company – E. S.A. The remuneration payable to the legal owner of the trademarks did not take into account the very limited functions performed by that entity in creating the value of the trademarks. The only function performed by E. S.A. in 2011 was to manage the legal protection of the trade marks, for which it would be entitled to a limited remuneration appropriate to its function. After receiving the resulting assessment of additional taxable income, a complaint was then filed by E.K. with the Director of the Tax Chamber which was later dismissed. An appeal was then filed by E.K. with the Administrative Court. Judgement of the Administrative Court. The Administrative Court set aside the Decision of the Tax Chamber and referred the case back to the Tax Chamber. Excerpts “… In the Court’s view, the faulty application of Article 11(1) and (4) of the u.p.d.o.p. affected the manner in which the applicant’s income was estimated and the estimation method adopted by the authorities, based on the erroneous assumption that the transaction analysed by the authorities consisted in the provision of trade mark administration services on behalf of the economic owner of those trade marks. In making that assumption, the authorities applied the net transaction margin method in order to determine the market level of the remuneration payable to the company for its trade mark administration functions. Meanwhile, the applicant provided the tax authority with the data that formed the basis for the calculation of the royalties, as well as the licence agreement. In view of the repetitive nature of such transactions on the market, the applicant used the comparable uncontrolled price method as the correct approach. The Court notes that the estimation of income by the methods indicated in Article 11(2) of the u.p.d.o.p. (comparable uncontrolled price method, reasonable margin method, selling price method) should be considered first, and only when it is not possible to apply these methods, the methods indicated in Article 11(3) of that Act (net transaction margin method, profit sharing method) will be applied. Furthermore, the applicant reasonably pointed out that in the comparability analysis the authorities should have taken into account the fact that intangible assets of significant value (trademarks) were involved in the examined transaction, being the only significant asset analysed by the parties to the examined transaction. As a result, the authorities incorrectly conducted the comparability analysis of the transaction involving the licence for the use of trademarks granted to the applicant by the limited partnership, which prejudges the validity of the allegation of a breach of Article 11(1)-(3) of the u.p.d.o.p. in conjunction with § 3, § 7, § 8, § 10 and § 11 of the MF Regulation. In the opinion of the Court, the basis for the decision in this case was not the provision of Article 11c(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. in the 2019 wording, hence the allegation of violation of this provision contained in the complaint does not merit consideration. In the opinion of the Court, the evidence gathered in the case allowed it to be resolved and, in this respect, the authorities did not fail to comply with Article 122 in conjunction with Article 187 § 1 of the Tax Ordinance. On the other hand, the allegation of a breach of Article 191 of the Tax Ordinance, consisting in the authorities’ faulty assessment of the market nature of the examined legal transactions, is justified. In the context of this allegation, however, it should be stipulated that the reclassification of a legal action by the authorities is not so much the result of a defective assessment of the evidence gathered, but results from the interpretation and manner of application of substantive law provisions adopted by the authorities (Article 11(1) and (4) of the u.p.d.o.p.). As aptly pointed out in the case law, in such a situation the state of facts was not so much established, but adopted by the tax authority. This is because the tax authority determines the factual state not on the basis of established circumstances, but reconstructs it, taking as a directional guideline the taxpayer’s intention to achieve the intended fiscal goal (unauthorised tax benefit). Thus, the state of facts adopted by the tax authorities does not so much result from the evidence gathered in the case, but from the assumption that if the taxpayer was guided only by economic and economic rationale and not by the intention to achieve an unauthorised tax benefit, it is precisely in the way the tax authority wants him to arrange his relations (judgment of the NSA of 8 May 2019, II FSK 2711/18). On the other hand, the consequence of the violation of substantive law is the legitimacy of the allegations of violation of Articles 120 and 121 § 1 of the Tax Ordinance by the authorities. On the other hand, due to the voluminous nature of the complaint, the Court referred to the allegations contained therein and their justification to the extent necessary to conduct a review of the appealed decisions (judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 26 May 2017, I FSK 1660/15). When re-examining the case, the authority will take into account the legal assessment presented above as to the interpretation and application, in the ...

Poland vs “K.P.”, October 2023, Provincial Administrative Court, Case No I SA/Po 475/23

K.P. is active in retail sale of computers, peripheral equipment and software. In December 2013 it had transfered valuable trademarks to its subsidiary and in the years following the transfer incurred costs in form of licence fees for using the trademarks. According to the tax authorities the arrangement was commercially irrationel and had therfore been recharacterised. Not satisfied with the assessment an appeal was filed. Judgement of the Provincial Administrative Court. The Court decided in favor of K.P.  According to the Court recharacterization of controlled transactions was not possible under the Polish arm’s length provisions in force until the end of 2018. Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Poland vs “K. S.A.”, July 2023, Supreme Administrative Court, Case No II FSK 1352/22 – Wyrok

K. S.A. had made an in-kind contribution to a subsidiary (a partnership) in the form of previously created or acquired and depreciated trademark protection rights for individual beer brands. The partnership in return granted K. S.A. a licence to use these trademarks (K. S.A. was the only user of the trademarks). The partnership made depreciations on these intangible assets, which – due to the lack of legal personality of the partnership – were recognised as tax deductible costs directly by K. S.A. According to the tax authorities the role of the partnership was limited to the administration of trademark rights, it was not capable of exercising any rights and obligations arising from the licence agreements. Therefore the prerequisites listed in Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. were met, allowing K. S.A.’s income to be determined without regard to the conditions arising from those agreements. The assessment issued by the tax authorities was later set aside by the Provincial Administrative Court. An appeal and cross appeal was then filed with the Supreme Administrative Court. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decisions of the Provincial Administrative Court and dismissed both appeals as neither of them had justified grounds. The Provincial Administrative Court had correctly deduced that Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. authorises only adjustment of the amount of licence fees, but not the nature of the controlled transactions by recognising that instead of a licence agreement for the use of the rights to trademarks, an agreement was concluded for the provision of services for the administration of these trademarks. Excerpts “The tax authorities, in finding that the applicant had not in fact made an in-kind contribution of trademark rights to the limited partnership, but had merely entrusted that partnership with the duty to administer the marks, referred to Article 11(1) of the u.p.d.o.p. (as expressed in the 2011 consolidated text. ), by virtue of which the tax authorities could determine the taxpayer’s income and the tax due without taking into account the conditions established or imposed as a result of the links between the contracting entities, with the income to be determined by way of an estimate, using the methods described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 11 u.p.d.o.p. However, these are not provisions creating abuse of rights or anti-avoidance clauses, as they only allow for a different determination of transaction (transfer) prices. The notion of ‘transaction price’ is legally defined in Article 3(10) of the I.P.C., which, in the wording relevant to the tax period examined in the case, stipulated that it is the price of the subject of a transaction concluded between related parties. Thus, the essence of the legal institution regulated in Article 11 of the u.p.d.o.p. is not the omission of the legal effects of legal transactions performed by the taxpayer or a different legal definition of those transactions, but the determination of their economic effect expressed in the transaction price, with the omission of the impact of institutional links between counterparties”  “For the same reasons, the parallel plea alleging infringement of Articles 191, 120 and 121(1) of the P.C.P. by annulling the tax authority’s legal rulings on the grounds of a breach of the aforementioned rules of evidence in conjunction with Articles 11(1) and 11(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. and holding that the tax authority did not correct the amount of royalties and the marketability of the transaction, but reclassified the legal relationship on the basis of which the entity incurred the expenditure, is also inappropriate. In fact, the assessment of the Provincial Administrative Court that such a construction of the tax authority’s decision corresponds to the hypothesis of the 2019 standard of Article 11c(4) of the u.p.d.o.p. is correct, but there was no adequate legal basis for applying it to 2012/2013 and based on Article 11(1) and (4) of the u.p.d.o.p. in its then wording. Failure to take into account a transaction undertaken by related parties deemed economically irrational by the tax authority violated, in these circumstances, the provisions constituting the cassation grounds of the plea, as the Provincial Administrative Court reasonably found.” “Contrary to the assumption highlighted in the grounds of the applicant’s cassation appeal, in the individual interpretations issued at its request, the applicant did not obtain confirmation of the legality of the entire optimisation construction, but only of the individual legal and factual actions constituting this construction, presented in isolation from the entire – at that time – planned future event. Such a fragmentation of the description of the future event does not comply with the obligation under Article 14b § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure to provide an exhaustive account of the actual state of affairs or future event, and therefore – as a consequence – the applicant cannot rely on the legal protection provided under Article 14k § 1 or Article 14m § 1, § 2 (1) and § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” Click here for English translation Click here for other translation ...

Italy vs BenQ Italy SRL, March 2021, Corte di Cassazione, Sez. 5 Num. 1374 Anno 2022

BenQ Italy SRL is part of a multinational group headed by the Taiwanese company BenQ Corporation that sells and markets technology products, consumer electronics, computing and communications devices. BenQ Italy’s immediate parent company was a Dutch company, BenQ Europe PV. Following an audit the tax authorities issued a notice of assessment for FY 2003 in which the taxpayer was accused of having procured goods from companies operating in countries with privileged taxation through the fictitious interposition of a Dutch company (BenQ Europe BV), the parent company of the taxpayer, whose intervention in the distribution chain was deemed uneconomic. On the basis of these assumptions, the tax authorities found that the recharge of costs made by the interposed company, were non-deductible. The tax authorities also considered that, through the interposition of BenQ BV, the prices charged by the taxpayer were aimed at transferring most of the taxable income to the manufacturing companies of the BenQ Group located in countries with privileged taxation. Thirdly, the costs recharged by the Dutch company to the taxpayer for the insurance of the solvency risk of its customers was denied. Not agreeing with the assessment BenQ Italy filed a complaint which was rejected first by the provincial court and later by the regional court. The regional court held – in relation to purchases from non-EU countries – that there were no economic reasons for the interposition of the parent company in relation to such purchases. Secondly, the court found that the taxpayer did not allocate the income earned in Italy according to the market values of the goods purchased from the group’s distribution chain, which resulted from the variability of the unit prices and the application by the seller under Dutch law of negative mark-up prices, constituting circumstantial evidence of the transfer of the economic advantage to group companies located in other countries. Finally, it held that the insurance costs were not inherent. BenQ then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court based on ten grounds. In the forth ground of appeal BenQ Italy alleged that the judgment under appeal held that the rules on transfer prices had been infringed. BenQ Italy argues that the burden of proof is on the tax authorities, in order to overcome the documentary (and negotiated) element of the purchase price agreed between the seller and the other companies in the group, to provide evidence that such price constitutes a breach of the arm’s length principle. BenQ also points out that none of the methods advocated on the basis of the OECD Guidelines and the Circular of the tax authorities No 32/9/2267 of 1980 has been applied in the present case, with a consequent breach of the rules governing placement of the burden of proof. Judgement of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court granted the appeal on the fourth ground. The judgment of the regional court was therefore set aside and referred back to the regional court for reconsideration. Excerpts “5 – The fourth ground is well-founded. 5.1 – The judgment appealed against found, on the basis of the contested notice, that “the interposition of the parent company appears to be for the purpose of circumventing the tax rules – which is not economically justifiable – and consequently the mark-up applied to the aforementioned imports loses the requirement of inherence in that it is not necessary or causally/mente connected with the income-producing activity under Article 11O(7) of the TUIR”. While drawing inspiration from the recovery of the non-deductibility of the cost of recharge (based on the different and distorted assumption of the uneconomic nature of the interposition of the company under Dutch law), the CTR hypothesizes the existence of an element of alleged tax avoidance and evaluates in this sense the “inconsistent and unexplained marked variability of the prices charged by the parent company, as well as [. …] the application of the alleged negative margins’, in order to derive the ‘presumption’ that the BenQ Group ‘did not allocate the income earned in Italy according to market values […] but concentrated it in the producers’ countries of residence’. Therefore, despite the fact that the Office did not adopt any method of calculating normal value (by comparing, for example, the prices charged by the taxpayer with the other non-resident companies in the group with respect to transactions concluded by and with independent parties), the CTR found that the normal value pursuant to art. 110, seventh paragraph, TUIR, the excessive variability of unit prices and the application of negative mark-ups by the parent company, as a “symptom of pathological conduct”, inducing evidence of the “transfer of the actual economic advantage to companies with lower production costs”. 5.2 – The CTR arrives, therefore – after deducting the negative mark-up percentage of a 5% flat-rate margin – to consider the burden of proof met by the Office regarding the assessment of a normal value of the prices charged (generically indicated as “both in purchase and sale”), as an exception to the contractual prices charged by the taxpayer, in terms of the indicated provisions of the TUIR (art. 76, paragraphs 2 and 5 of the TUIR, corresponding to Article 110, paragraphs 2 and 7 of the TUIR pro tempore and Article 9 of the TUIR) without having made any reference to the methodologies which, according to the OECD Guidelines, allow the comparison of the margin of the resident intra-group company with that which would be achieved by the same in case of transactions with independent companies (such as, for example, the resale price method and the cost-plus method). 5.3 – It should be noted that this Court has long pointed out that the rule of assessment of the normality of the transaction price, as well as the relative burden of proof, are the responsibility of the Office (Court of Cassation, Section V, 2 March 2020, No. 5645), without the taxpayer’s avoidance purpose being relevant, since the tax authorities do not have to prove the assumption of higher domestic taxation compared to cross-border taxation. What the tax ...

Japan vs. IBM, March 2015, Tokyo High Court, Case no 第265å·ï¼ï¼•6(順å·ï¼‘2639)

An intermediate Japanese holding company in the IBM group acquired from its US parent all of the shares of a Japanese operating company. The Japanese holdings company then sold a portions of shares in the operating company back to the issuing company for the purpose of repatriation of earned profits. These sales resulted in losses in an amount of JPY 400 billion which for tax purposes were offset against the operating company’s taxable income in FY 2002 – 2005. The Japanese tax authorities did not allow deduction of the losses resulted from the sales referring to article 132 of the Corporation Tax Act of Japan (general anti avoidance regulation). The tax authorities found that the reduction of corporation tax due to the tax losses should be disregarded because there were no legitimate reason or business purpose for the transactions. According to the authorities the transactions would not have taken place between independent parties and the primary purpose of the transactions had been tax avoidance. Decision of the Tokyo High Court The Court decided in favour of IBM and annulled the tax assessment. The Court held that the establishment of the intermediate holding company and the following share transfers should not be viewed as one integrated transaction but rather as separate transactions, and that each of these transactions could not be considered lacking economic reality. In 2016 the Supreme Court rejected the tax authorities’ petition for a final appeal. (The Corporation Tax Act of Japan was amended in 2010 and similar tax losses resulting from share repurchases between a Japanese parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary can no longer be claimed.) Click here for English Translation of the Tokyo High Court decision ...